§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURYMy Lords, I rise to ask the noble Earl opposite, Whether he has any information to give with respect to the intention and policy of Her Majesty's Government in Egypt? I do not rise with any sanguine anticipation that I shall get a satisfactory answer, because of the language which has already been used by the Head of the Government "elsewhere." But I feel bound, at all events, to justify myself for putting the Question by calling your attention to the peculiar position in which Parliament stands with respect to the decision of the Government on this momentous question. When first these troubles began in the summer, almost simultaneously it was announced that a Conference was going to be held; and while a Conference is being held it is not considered seemly or consistent with the interest of the Public Service that any discussion should take place about the matters which are submitted to the Conference. For that reason the matter was not the subject of great discussion. I do not know that the Conference achieved very much; but I think its principal achievement was to silence the British Parliament. Before the Conference came to a close—if, indeed, it has come to a close—a war arose—I beg pardon, I should say the suppression of a military rebellion took place—which did not in any way belong to the proceedings of that Conference, or issue out of them; but which was, in fact, rather contrary, in the view of many Members of the Conference, to the spirit in which that Conference was assembled. But the military operations in which Her Majesty's Government have been engaged, effected, with regard to Parliament, precisely the same result which had been effected by the peaceful discussions in which they had been engaged before, and it was still impossible for Parliament to discuss the matter. Now the war is closed, and no sooner is it closed than Her Majesty's Government has commenced negotiations; and now, on the strength of those negotiations, they will tell us that it is impossible to make any statement to Parliament. It is possible this process may go further. A fresh war may come out of 156 the negotiations, and then it will be impossible for Her Majesty's Government to make any statement whatever as to the political measures which Her Majesty's Government desire to adopt, and then there may be another Conference, and so on. We have had no statement whatever upon authority with respect to the main end to which Her Majesty's Government are tending. Now, I say, if total ignorance is hard to bear, it is not, perhaps, quite so hard as ignorance relieved by the occasional fitful gleam of incorrect information. Though Her Majesty's Government have not spoken, we have received information which I cannot but believe is incorrect—no doubt unintentionally so—from a distinguished statesman who stands on the threshold of the Cabinet, who represents the important Department of the Colonial Office.
§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURYThen I am afraid he is more interested still. His statement is that Egypt is to be left to "stew in her own juice." That dark saying has given me much perplexity to solve, and it is because of the impossibility of attaching any satisfactory meaning to those proverbial and mysterious words that I have come as a suppliant to the noble Earl for some information. The difficulty of leaving Egypt to stew in her own juice is, in the first place, to understand precisely what the process was to which this distinguished statesman referred. I cannot believe that Her Majesty's Government have for one moment desired to leave Egypt to absolute anarchy. To do so would be utterly to condemn the whole of the policy of the war. It would be to say that all this valuable blood has been spilt, that these terrible risks have been run, that this mighty force has been dispersed, and that heavy burdens have been east upon the English taxpayer, in vain. I cannot believe that Her Majesty's Government would deliberately leave the whole of Egypt to anarchy. Then it is said, stewing in her own juice means that Egypt is to be left to flourish in an orderly, and contented, and progressive condition, without any aid or support from any external source. I think that those, whoever they may be, who look with much hopefulness upon this process 157 forget the enormous change which has taken place in the position of the Khedive in consequence of the events of this year. I do not say it for the purpose of expressing blame. I merely desire to record it as an historical fact that Her Majesty's Government preferred to postpone the period of their intervention till the Khedive was absolutely overthrown by his rebellious soldiers; that they deliberately preferred to do that rather than interfere at a time when his soldiery were submissive and his authority intact. The result of this fact is that the position of the Khedive when he comes back is as far removed as possible from his position when he went away. He comes back on foreign bayonets. I think, in one of the noble Earl's speeches, he said it was our duty to uphold the Khedive, and I have no doubt that was the intention; but it is not what has been done. The noble Earl has not held up the Khedive; he has picked up the Khedive. Nothing could be more widely opposed than these two processes in their results. What is the Khedive to depend upon if he is to have no external assistance? Do not let it be supposed that I am speaking with any want of sympathy for him, or any want of admiration for his character. I highly honour the steadfast good faith he has shown to the English Government—that manliness and regard for his pledged word which we do not always meet with in Asiatics with whom we have to deal. But there is no doubt that the ordinary sources of strength which supports an Oriental Sovereign will be found wanting to him. An Oriental Sovereign may rest on the unbroken tradition and the power of his family coming down from some anterior date. When the Khedive left Cairo he had the traditions of Mehemet Ali's great performances and the unbroken power of his House since that time. These traditions are shattered now, and can give him no possible support. Up to that time he was, at least, supposed to rest on the adhesion and affection of his Mahometan subjects; but we know in this case, so far as it has acted at all, Mahometan feeling has been adverse to him, and that what has been done has been done avowedly in the teeth of the Caliph of Islam. Oriental Potentates often rest, as Mehemet Ali himself did, on the affection and adhesion of the 158 Army; but that Army has become mutinous, has been dispersed, and the Khedive can no longer rest upon it. There are none of the ordinary elements of Mahometan society on which we can safely base the restoration of the Khedive's power. I do not say that they may not grow up; I do not say that after a sufficient lapse of time, if his Government is strong, and firm, and equitable, he may not acquire sources of power and support which are independent of any foreign aid; but one effect of our having allowed him to be overthrown, instead of keeping him upright while he yet stood, is this—that there is no power and no force on which he can rely in Mahometan society; and unless we are prepared to do the business over again, and to leave Egypt to an anarchy which is inconsistent with all our professions, and fatal to our interests, he must be sustained by that which is the only thing upright in that land—namely, the power of Great Britain. I am aware there are many ways in which that power can be applied. I do not now inquire into what way it can be most profitably applied; but whatever that way may be, it will be inconsistent with the cynical recommendation that Egypt should be allowed to stew in her own juice. It is not so much in the hope of receiving a satisfactory answer, as with the belief that the noble Earl will find himself able to give some information to many people in this country who are anxious on this question, that I ask him to tell us that British power will continue to uphold the Khedive, even though he may prefer to defer to a future period information as to the precise means by which that power will be applied. At all events, if he gives me no answer, at least I can say this—that though Her Majesty's Government have a strict Constitutional right to refuse information while negotiations are going on, yet by the peculiar sequence of events during the present year they have severely strained that right; and they must not be surprised, if they continue to maintain reserve on this point, that the greatest anxiety will be felt, because men must know that it is to the power of England that Egypt will ultimately look, and they will feel a deep solicitude lest by any imprudent pledges now, or, still more, any imprudent concessions, the power of England to perform that 159 duty in the future may be compromised.
§ EARL GRANVILLEMy Lords, I must say I was considerably alarmed at the prospect of having to answer the Question of which the noble Marquess gave Notice, and I am relieved to find that it appears even to him that I could not be expected at present to give an answer that would be perfectly satisfactory. At the same time, I could not but be struck by the genial and light-hearted manner in which he has approached this important subject. His references to Mr. Courtney remind me of the fact that Mr. Canning was once with difficulty restrained from leaving the House of Commons and coming into the House of Lords in order to answer one of the speeches of Earl Grey. I do not know whether Mr. Courtney will leave the House of Commons, or that Mr. Gladstone will recommend him for a Peerage, in order that he may come here to answer the speech that has been made to-night; but, failing some such arrangement, I am afraid I cannot undertake to answer for him. I cannot answer, in the first place, why Mr. Courtney should not be allowed to follow the example of the noble Lord the late Governor General of India with regard to the quotation about one stewing in his own juice. Next, I cannot answer for the particular line of policy he has described. Indeed, I have a good precedent for not doing so; for while the Secretary to the Treasury is a man of singular ability and knowledge, I feel about him very much as Lord Beacons-field felt about Lord Sandon, referring to one of whose speeches the late Earl said that when the Head of a Department who was not in the Cabinet addressed his constituents no official authority ought to be attached to any statement he might make on a matter that was still before the Cabinet; and, if I am not greatly mistaken—and I read the report of the speech of Mr. Courtney—he most distinctly stated that in what he said he spoke only for himself. As to the points touched upon by the noble Marquess, for reasons which will be perfectly obvious to him and to your Lordships, it would be entirely out of keeping with a sense of deep responsibility, which has been increased by the glorious successes of the men whom you have thanked to-day, if I were now to 160 give a crude and premature description of the steps which we are about to take. I am relieved, however, of the necessity of doing so; and I am able to answer the only Question which the noble Marquess has really put by saying that it certainly is the intention of Her Majesty's Government to maintain the Khedive as the Head of the State in Egypt.