AFFAIRS OF TUNIS. (Hansard, 27 May 1881)

§ EARL DE LA WARR ,
in rising to call attention to the state of affairs in the Regency of Tunis; and to ask, what steps Her Majesty's Government propose to take in reference to the French invasion of that country, the breach of International law, and the treaty or convention which the Bey by military force has been compelled to sign; also to move for Papers, said, he did not think their Lordships would dissent from at least one remark which he was about to make—that the time was come when the country ought to know what was to be the future policy of Her Majesty's Government with regard to the affairs of Tunis. Events had marched rapidly onwards, and what was lately foreseen in the future had now become history of the past. But, under the garb of diplomatic secrecy, information had been 1441 withheld, save what had been given by the public Press, till it was announced that one of the fairest and most fertile countries of Northern Africa was virtually placed under a French Protectorate. It was but a few weeks ago that rumours reached the country that French troops were being massed on the Frontier of Algeria and Tunis; and it was soon afterwards stated, on the authority of M. St. Hilaire, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, that the sole object of the movement was to punish and repress some lawless mountainous tribes who had been committing ravages on the Algerine Frontier, and that there was no idea on the part of France of conquest or annexation. But it soon became apparent that these tribes could nowhere be found. The troops then occupied the most important military positions in the country, with the view of encircling, as alleged, the supposed enemy. But, failing in this, after throwing some hundred shells into a fort which was afterwards discovered to be almost unarmed, the troops advanced to within a few miles of the City of Tunis. Ships of war, in the meantime, were engaged in operations on the coast; the French General, with an armed escort of 100 men or more, and with a large force encamped within two miles of the residence of the Bey, went to the palace and demanded an audience of the Sovereign. Guns were also placed in position commanding the palace. He was now stating what had been told him personally by an eye-witness, who was in the palace at the time. A Treaty was produced, of the contents of which their Lordships were now aware, which was at length signed by the Bey, under the pressure of military force. Thus ended the military drama. They now came to the diplomatic part, and here let him say it was far from his wish in any way to represent what was not strictly correct in what had taken place. He knew that excited feelings might sometimes lead to statements which might afterwards be viewed with regret. But, calmly speaking, and looking at the events which had taken place, he would ask the Government what value they placed on the assurances that had been given them by the French Government. Was it possible that this was not a premeditated plan of operation? Would an army of 20,000 men, and he believed he was 1442 understating the number, have been sent to stop the incursions of a few almost unarmed mountain tribes? And, if it was not premeditated, what change of circumstances caused the change of operations? Scarcely any hostile tribes appeared, save some harmless Bedouins or other Natives here and there tending their flocks and herds, whose tents, as alleged, were burnt and themselves sometimes shot. The Bey offered no hostility, but only protested, carefully avoiding all collision with the French troops, and treated them in a friendly manner up to the time when his independence was wrested from him. And that was done acting upon the assurance which had been repeatedly given that the operations of the French troops would be strictly confined to the punishment of the Kroumirs. But how was it that Her Majesty's Government were left uninformed of that? How was it that they assured their Lordships and the country that this expedition meant nothing beyond repressing some hostile tribes, while the French General must have had his orders to force submission upon the Bey, and carried with him the Treaty which was to be extorted from him? That was a matter upon which their Lordships ought to be informed. Did Her Majesty's Government believe that the avowed object of this expedition was the real one? He would for a moment refer to the Papers which had been laid before the House, in order to show that there was information in the hands of the Government which had not been communicated to their Lordships. It was impossible not to see that this question of French influence in Tunis was one of long standing, and that it had not its beginning in the recent outbreak of Frontier Tribes. As far back as the year 1878 M. Waddington, the then French Minister for Foreign Affairs, related a conversation which took place between himself and the noble Marquess below him (the Marquess of Salisbury), which it was impossible to read without seeing that it had been long a question of taking the first opportunity of spreading French influence. He found that the noble Marquess did not admit the construction put upon his words as given in the despatch of M. Waddington; and the improbability of the use of such words was much confirmed, if confirmation were needed, by what had been 1443 stated by the noble Earl opposite (Earl Granville) in his despatch dated June 17, 1880, in which he said— In the view of Her Majesty's Government, Tunis was a portion of the Ottoman Empire, to dispose of which Great Britain had no moral or International right. He would now return to that part of the subject more immediately before the House—the recent action of Her Majesty's Government. It was upon the 5th of April last that the French Government announced their intention of taking steps to subdue the lawless Frontier Tribes, that only being the avowed object. But almost immediately after that, on the 9th of April, Lord Lyons informed the noble Earl opposite that M. St. Hilaire's language implied that the expedition was undertaken solely with a view to chastise the lawless tribes, and that it was not intended that it should enter further into Tunisian territory than might be necessary for that purpose. The noble Lord further said— It may be that the present intentions of the French Government do not go much beyond this. I am not, however, blind to the probability that they may be led on much further, and even M. St. Hilaire hinted that the opportunity might he taken to bring the Bey of Tunis to his senses with regard to other matters affecting French interests. Lord Lyons made use of other words indicating anxiety as to the possible consequences. This very important despatch of Lord Lyons was received at the very beginning of the expedition, and a further despatch, dated April 12, was in the same tone of apprehension, and quoted the words of M. Jules Ferry in the French Chambers, who "spoke of the entrance of French troops on Tunisian territory as a matter of course." To the same effect were the despatches of Mr. Reade, Her Majesty's Consul at Tunis. He wished to recall the attention of the noble Earl opposite to these despatches of Lord Lyons and Mr. Reade, as he could not understand how it was that the House had been informed on several occasions that the French Government had no idea of annexation or conquest, but that their operations would be confined to the punishment of the Frontier Tribes. On the 6th of May the noble Earl stated in the House— It does not appear unreasonable that the French should resent outrages within the Algerian frontier, and should take measures to 1444 prevent the recurrence of such outrages. The French Government have constantly given us assurances that they have no intention to annex territory, and yesterday they formally and distinctly authorized Lord Lyons to assure Her Majesty's Government that there was no idea of conquest or annexation with regard to Tunis." [3 Hansard, cclx. 1927.] Now, at the very time that the noble Earl addressed these words to the House, he was in possession of the information that the French troops had occupied the fort of Bizerta and other military positions, and were advancing in the direction of the City of Tunis. At the same time, in a despatch to Lord Lyons, dated the 7th of May, the noble Earl said— They (Her Majesty's Government) cannot, however, conceal from themselves that proceedings of a military nature such have been instituted by the French—the occupation of Bizerta and the destruction of the fort of Tabarca—seem to be directed to some object beyond the mere chastisement of disorderly Arab tribes on the frontier, nor can they affect to misunderstand the intimations which have been given to your Excellency by M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire that, although the French Government did not seek to establish a protectorate, the new Treaty which would be imposed upon the Bey would be in the nature of one. He could not reconcile those facts and statements with the words of the noble Earl on the 6th of May, that "the French Government had shown no intention of annexation." He came next to the point of Treaties and International rights. Her Majesty's Government had recently stated that Tunis was an integral portion of the Ottoman Empire, and in that view it naturally followed that no Treaty could be valid without the consent of the Sultan. He need hardly remind the House that the strongest proofs could be adduced in support of that. Among them was the fact that the Beys of Tunis had always received investiture from the Sultan, and that troops in lieu of tribute were furnished in time of war, and there were other stipulations of a similar kind. It was known that the French now refused, for manifest reasons, to acknowledge the suzerainty of the Sultan; but it would be easy to show that France in Treaties dating back to 1604 and onward to 1824 acknowledged it, and so recently as 1863, on the occasion of the Tunisian Loan contracted at Paris, M. Drouyn de Lhuys, Minister for Foreign Affairs, suggested the authorization of the Sublime Porte 1445 to legalize the transaction. But, however that might be, the noble Earl opposite could not regard the Treaty which had just been signed as a legal document, if Tunis was a part of the Ottoman Empire. By the Treaty of Paris in 1856, by the Treaty of London in 1871, and by the recent Treaty of Berlin, the integrity of the Ottoman Empire was guaranteed. He could not leave this part of the subject without alluding to what must be regarded as a great violation of International rights. The territory of a neighbouring and friendly Sovereign was invaded against repeated protests, without any declaration of war, military positions were taken up in various parts of the country, his flag was hauled down from a Tunisian fort and the French flag hoisted, troops advanced to the walls of the city, the general with an armed escort entered the palace, and, under military compulsion, a Treaty was signed. Whether Tunis owed allegiance to the Sultan or whether the Bey was independent, there had surely been a great violation of International rights. And now he came to this—In what way did it affect this country? It was impossible to look at the geographical position of Tunis without seeing that it was a matter of great importance. It could not for a moment be supposed that this country could regard with indifference a territory like Tunis falling into the hands of a great Power commanding, as it might do, the channel to the East along which the greater portion of the traffic of this country passed. There was a narrow channel of not more than 80 miles between the Italian and Tunisian shores. At no great distance from Tunis lay the harbour of Bizerta, with sufficient water—from five to seven fathoms—to float the largest iron-clad in any Navy with sufficient space, being about eight miles in length and in width about five miles, to manœuvre a fleet, and which, at a comparatively small outlay at the entrance, might be made one of the finest harbours in the Mediterranean. In case of war, how greatly would be increased the difficulty of our communications with the East, how greatly would it add to the difficulty of maintaining our position in the Mediterranean if a large French Fleet were at Bizerta, within 200 miles of Malta. There was another point of which he must briefly remind their Lord- 1446 ships, and it was one of some importance. Malta was mainly dependent upon Tunis for provisions, both meat and corn. In the event of war, if Tunis were in the possession of France, it would be difficult to know whence these supplies could be procured. And he could net omit to mention that the future commercial interests of this country might be greatly imperilled if the Regency of Tunis were under a French Protectorate. At present, Commercial Treaties with Tunis were favourable. If France was for the future to have the control of Treaties such as that of 1875, which expired in 1882, very different conditions might be imposed which might seriously affect the exports of our manufactures. He did not believe that this country would regard with jealousy any just and fair development of French interests in the Mediterranean; but the annexation of territory, or the establishing a Protectorate over a country without the consent of other Powers who had great interests at stake, could not do otherwise than lead to an estrangement which might be productive of grave and serious consequences. He must say, in conclusion, that in the Papers and Correspondence now before their Lordships, he could see no distinct intimation as to what would be the future policy of Her Majesty's Government. He trusted it would no longer be withheld, and he sincerely hoped it would be based upon the upholding of Treaties and the respecting of International rights—that unjust aggressions would not be tolerated, and that the honour and good faith of this country would be maintained.

§ LORD STANLEY OF ALDERLEY
said, that perhaps the less was said in Parliament about the recent proceedings in Tunis the more chance there would be of the French adhering to the professions of their Government and of their desisting from extreme exactions. It was the less necessary to speak of the disregard of the Law of Nations, since within the last few days a pamphlet had appeared, written by a Frenchman, appealing to Frenchmen to do right, and laying the blame on those who had tempted France to do wrong. He trusted that the noble Earl the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs would not look upon the Treaty recently published as in any way obligatory or final.

§ EARL GRANVILLE
My Lords, your Lordships do not seem generally inclined to join in this discussion, which has been raised by the noble Earl opposite (Earl De La Warr) on a very important subject, in which, as we all know, he takes a very great interest. Many years ago, I asked a very experienced Foreign Secretary whether he did not feel it a difficulty in his position that it frequently happened that he could not state publicly the best reasons for things that he did or things that he did not do. His answer was, that that was a very great difficulty; but that there was compensation in the greatly superior knowledge which he had to the opposition which attacked him. But I am bound to say, with regard to the noble Earl opposite, that no one can accuse him of a want of information on this subject. I believe the noble Earl will not contradict me when I state that I believe he has been in almost daily correspondence with a gentleman of great energy, great ability, and high character, the counsel of Mr. Levy in the Enfida case, and who, I am informed, is in correspondence with three of the London papers, writes the Reuter telegrams, and is more or less ably represented in both Houses of Parliament. The noble Earl has also had the advantage of all the official documents which have passed between us and France on the subject of Tunis—documents which, as far as I am aware, notwithstanding the doubt which he has thrown upon them, entirely carry out all that at different times, and generally in answer to himself, I have stated to your Lordships. If there were any feeling shown on either side of the House to raise an important discussion on this question, and, still more, if there were any intention of bringing an attack or moving a Vote of Censure on Her Majesty's Government for what they have done, I should be only too happy to enter into the fullest discussion of this matter. But I must say that I very much agree with my noble Friend who has just sat down (Lord Stanley of Alderley), and I doubt exceedingly whether any great public object would be attained by Her Majesty's Government entering into weekly or bi-weekly driblets of discussion with one particular Peer on a matter of great importance involving questions of very great delicacy between 1448 two great and friendly Governments. Therefore, until I see a greater indication of the wish of the House generally to have a really important discussion on this subject I am sure the noble Earl will not think it a want of respect to him individually if I do not go fully into the case.

§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY
The noble Earl who introduced this subject (Earl De La Warr) stated his case with great moderation, and evidently spoke under a sense of responsibility in touching upon this question. But although I quite understand the point of view from which he approaches the subject, and that much is to be said in favour of some of the considerations advanced by him, I am compelled to express an opinion strictly in harmony with that of the noble Earl who has just sat down (Earl Granville)—namely, that no great public benefit will be derived from expanding or continuing this discussion. Any person taking part in this discussion must feel that he is speaking under the weight of great responsibility, because all that is said here is addressed not only to your Lordships and to the English public, but to others, and it is a matter of notoriety that this is a question upon which the French Government and the French people feel very strongly. I do not think that my noble Friend behind me gave quite sufficient weight to the grounds which undoubtedly exist, and which have existed for some time, for causing the French Government to look upon Tunis with great interest and to desire to extend their influence in that country. It is not merely that it is a neighbouring country, but it is a neighbouring country inhabited by tribes of a very warlike and fanatical character, who are of the same race and of the same religion as those who are the subjects of the French Government in the neighbouring Colony of Algiers. I think that no one impartially considering such a state of things will wonder at or blame the French Government for desiring that their influence should be extended and strengthened in Tunis. Supposing an analogous case to arise in reference to one of our own Colonies, and that a race of men of a warlike and fanatical tendency of the same religion and race as those of our own subjects lived outside of 1449 our Frontier, we should be very jealous of any other influence beside our own being acquired over that population. The French Government, however, have gone a good deal further than insuring or extending their influence in Tunis; but, and especially after what has fallen from the noble Earl opposite (Earl Granville), I am not here to express any opinion upon what they have done. It is always a very doubtful point whether, in a case which does not invite the action of this country to take any more decided steps, remonstrance is in itself a prudent proceeding; and in this case I doubt whether there is any ground in the interest of this country alone for even any intervention or remonstrant action; but whether there is ground for any such action or not, we do not yet know precisely what the proceedings or the intentions of Her Majesty's Government on this subject have been and are. They have not up to this time remonstrated in any formal manner against the action of the French Government. It is, however, perfectly in their discretion to do so. The French Government have undoubtedly taken steps which it is open to us to regard—if we think fit to do so on grounds of policy or of antecedent history—as trenching upon the comity of one friendly nation towards another. But Her Majesty's Government have not thought fit to do so, and I am bound to say that I for one shall not, as far as my knowledge at present goes, challenge that decision. I shall not prolong this discussion. I believe that the French Government and the French nation are actuated by a very friendly sentiment towards this country, and I believe that that friendly connection between us is of the highest importance to this country and to the interest of the world. As far as Tunis is concerned, I see no interest which this country possesses which would justify or should induce us to strain or to place any undue weight upon the friendly relations that exist between the two countries. I do not deny that the French Treaty with the Bey, to which both the noble Lords have alluded, is one which Her Majesty's Government will find it necessary to bear in mind, and which will increase their vigilance for British interests in certain quarters. As far as Tunis is concerned, however, I do not hold that 1450 we have any interest there that should cause us to be disturbed or disquieted by what has passed. If it were possible to suppose that the action which the French Government have taken had any further or more distant object, I do not at all forget that there are in other parts of the Mediterranean British interests of the very gravest character, and any Government who thinks that those interests are in any way compromised by the action of the French Government would be justified in taking up an attitude of great vigilance. But the French Government have given the noble Earl opposite assurances which have been laid upon the Table of the House, and which the noble Earl has very wisely treated as amounting to International engagements. Those assurances, which we have no ground for believing to be other than sincere—and, indeed, it would be unseemly for us to doubt their sincerity—we are justified in accepting as being sufficient to remove any disquieting impressions; and, therefore, no case has arisen to make it incumbent on any independent Member of your Lordships' House to call attention to the subject.