Lords Sitting of 10 May 1881

MINUTES.
PUBLIC BILLS—Second Reading—Inland Revenue Buildings* (73).
Committee—Municipal Franchise (Scotland)* (55).

SOUTH AFRICA—THE ANNEXATION OF THE TRANSVAAL—MR. GLAD- STONE'S LETTER TO MR. TOMKIN SON.—OBSERVATIONS.
THE EARL OF CARNARVONrose to call attention to a letter in The Times of 15th April, purporting to be written by the Right Honourable W. E. Gladstone to Mr. Tomkinson on the Transvaal War. He said: I believe that since Parliament sat this subject has been under discussion on several occasions in this House, and I wish to take the earliest opportunity of making my acknowledgements to my noble Friend opposite (the Earl of Kimberley) for the fair and considerate way in which whenever my name has been mentioned as one of those concerned in the annexation he has been good enough to deal with it. That makes me all the more sorry that I have to criticize the letter referred to in the Notice I have given. Ordinarily, I should not be prepared to take notice of a letter on a public subject; but this letter is of a somewhat different character from others. It is written by the Prime Minister, and it contains charges of such a very grave and dark character that it is hardly possible for me to avoid taking some notice of it. I think, therefore, the earliest notice which it is in my power to take is the best. The letter purports to be a letter from the Prime Minister to Mr. Tomkinson, who, I understand, was a Liberal candidate for West Cheshire. The earlier part of the letter I need not trouble your Lordships with; but I must read the concluding sentences. They are—
"I am glad that in your address in relation to the Transvaal you take the bull by the horns, and avow your approval outright. I can assure you that when we come to the discussion in the House of Commons I shall adopt no apologetic tone. It was a question of saving the country from sheer blood-guiltiness. I chiefly regret the discussion, because it will oblige us to go back and censure anew what it would have been more agreeable to spare."
There are three different points in these paragraphs. As regards the singular illustration of taking the bull by the horns, I was prepared for something very startling by the vehement metaphor with which it was ushered in; and I was, therefore, surprised when I found that all Mr. Tomkinson did say was that he strongly approved of the moral courage of the Government in their

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policy in the Transvaal. It is rather a moderate expression to evoke so strong a simile. The points which are of consequence are in the sentences. which follow. When Mr. Gladstons says he regrets the discussion "because it will oblige us to go back and censure anew what it would have been more agreeable to spare," that sentence, as far as I can read it, can point only to one of two persons—either to Sir Theophilus Shepstone, who practically carried the annexation into effect, or to myself. Sir Theophilus Shepstone is a man whose name, until within the last few years, was not known in this country. He was one of those public servants of which this country has so many and feels so proud, whose whole lives are spent in the conscientious and faithful discharge of their duty abroad. His has been a very long and unblemished career; but I shall not attempt to defend him until I know more distinctly what are the charges made against him. It is only fair that the accusations against such a man should be formulated. Whenever any charge is directly made against him I am perfectly prepared to take my full share of responsibility in the matter; and I feel confident that I can put his conduct in a light which will satisfy your Lordships and the country. As regards myself and Mr. Gladstone's wish to spare censure, I have no desire to be spared in the matter at all. I ask for no forbearance, and I am prepared to face any charge that may be made against me in this matter. I would, however, venture to offer to the right hon. Gentleman a caution, and it is that when he makes these charges he should beware lest in his haste he involves some of his Colleagues in the common accusation. I cannot help thinking that my noble Friend opposite, the Colonial Secretary, expressed a very honourable and fair approval of the measure at the time. In the other House, the Chief Secretary for Ireland (Mr. W. E. Forster) never hesitated to declare his concurrence in the measure; and I believe that no fewer than four Members of the present Government voted in favour of the first Transvaal grant, while there were others who by their silence assented to it. I am not now going into any defence of the original annexation of the Transvaal; but when I hear the grounds on which it is attacked, I shall be perfectly pre-
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pared to defend it. At the time no voice was raised against it. Two years subsequently, in this House, when the question was mooted, I stated the facts, and there was not a shadow of opposition. It is not too much to ask now, if it is to be condemned on new grounds, that those new grounds should be distinctly and formally stated. When they are so stated I shall be perfectly prepared to defend the course I took, and to vindicate the course of the Government of which I was a Member. I pass on now to another point in one sentence of the letter, in which the right hon. Gentleman leaves the region of vague charges and comes to the more substantial ground, direct propositions. The right hon. Gentleman says, "It was a question of saving the country from sheer blood-guiltiness." I can truly say that when I read those words I was lost in astonishment as to what their meaning was. They are hard words. What does blood-guiltiness mean? Blood-guiltiness is a term you apply to murderers and other criminals of the highest degree of depravity. If the words had fallen from the lips of some irresponsible speaker perorating on the subject, I should not have troubled your Lordships or myself about them. But this is a very different case; these are the words of the Prime Minister; and they are not words spoken in the heat of debate; they are words coolly and deliberately set down in writing, and used as a manifesto at an Election, which was declared far and wide to be a test Election of public feeling. If there were blood-guiltiness at the time of adopting the policy, there must have been blood - guiltiness in continuing it; there must have been blood-guiltiness in fighting the battles of Majuba, Ingogo, and Laing's Nek, and, above all, in proclaiming in the Queen's Speech on the 6th of January that measures would be taken to vindicate the authority of the Crown. If this policy was right, it was right at every step; if it was wrong, it was wrong at every step. But it really seems to have been reserved to the Government to make this notable discovery after we had sustained three severe and heavy defeats; after one massacre which the late Parliamentary Papers show to have been treacherous and cold-blooded; and after a capitulation obtained by fraudulent means, promised to be cancelled,

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but which, as I understand, has never been so cancelled. And it is after this succession of events, that for the first time this discovery is made. I should be the last person to accuse anyone of blood-guiltiness; and it is my practice to use hard words; but I must, in all coolness and deliberation, say, if there be real responsibility for this measure—I do not say conscious responsibility, but a real responsibility for the unhappy events which have taken place—that responsibility is to be found in the actions and words of the right hon. Gentleman himself, coupled with such acts as the appointment of Mr. Courtney to an Office in the Government. Nothing can be more certain than this—that the unfortunate speeches which he made in his Mid Lothian canvass contributed to produce these unhappy events. [Laugher.] My noble Friend seems to doubt it. [Earl GRANVILLE: Very much.] My noble Friend may doubt; but if there be one thing more certain than another it is that the words used then were taken up and carried from month to mouth, and have exercised a most sinister influence on the Boers of the Transvaal. Can it be wondered that it was believed the annexation would be reversed when they had the assurance of the right hon. Gentleman? Can it be wondered at that when that annexation was not cancelled their disappointment broke out into insurrection? The very leaders with whom you are in negotiation had appealed to the right hon. Gentleman's speeches, and in a remarkable Petition, signed by Dutch people in Holland, which, no doubt, your Lordships have read, the same confident language was held. When the reports of the right hon. Gentleman's speeches reached the Transvaal, they were printed and circulated with every kind of exaggeration and approval, and it was said that the Transvaal would be restored. But there came a telegram from this country that the annexation must be maintained. Upon which, the Boers said—"Then there is nothing for us but to saddle our horses and get out our arms." I do not here want to say anything of the terms on which this peace has been made. My noble and learned Friend (Earl Cairns), some few weeks ago, went at length into the subject. The Commission is at present sitting, and it may be wiser for the present to
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leave that part of the question alone. But I must venture on this occasion to express my very strong protest against the time and manner in which it has been made. I should have thought the reversal of the annexation under any circumstances most impolitic; but it might at least have been done without the discredit which now attaches to it. First, you might have abandoned it when you came into Office. Secondly, when the scheme of Confederation broke down you had a fresh point of departure. And there was another opportunity—you might have marched your army to Pretoria, and, probably, without shedding one drop of blood, laid down the terms on which you were propared to grant peace. But you waited for three defeats, and an unfortunate capitulation, and then gave up everything the Boers had been demanding—terms which every officer and soldier and man of honour in the country know to be terms of humiliation and disgrace. Allow me, my Lords, to add one warning. The position of my noble Friend opposite is one of danger at the present moment. First, because he does not know with whom he is negotiating. Who are the negotiators? They are men—I wish to measure, my words—whose hands are scarcely clean, I will not say from blood, but from complicity in blood foully shed. They are men who have scattered far and wide the grossest, most scandalous, and false accusations against English officers. They are men who have declared from first to last that they would take nothing short of independence from the Zambesi River to Simon's Bay; and, worst of all, men who have no real authority over their followers. They are powerless to execute that which they pledged themselves to carry out. Look at the evidence we have of the state of things to which this unhappy policy is bringing us. Compare the condition of the Transvaal now with what it was four years ago. It was then overrun with Native Tribes. It was bankrupt. There was only 12 s. 6d. in the Exchequer. The Boers were trembling for their lives. We stepped in and saved them. Their cattle were preserved; their lives were saved; and the anarchy which existed gradually disappeared. Prosperity so far revived that the finance of the Province is not only in a state of equilibrium, but there is

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a large surplus. But, now, things have reached such a state that society has been resolved back to its original elements. There is no law which the magistrates can enforce. Property is disappearing throughout the country. Here and there a store may be open; but banks and shops are closing. Loyalists are outraged, pillaged, obliged to flee the country. The Natives threaten to rise against the Boers. And what of the Boer leaders? They are powerless. It requires very little foresight, indeed, to prophesy what must happen under these circumstances. Hardly anyone who knows anything about the state of things can doubt that as soon as your troops are withdrawn—perhaps sooner—you will have a fresh rising. The same state of anarchy will result in the same dangers and the same horrible outrages. But it may be said we shall gain the Dutch. While I was in Office nothing was nearer my heart, as far as Colonial policy was concerned, than to win the Dutch back to loyalty and affection; and I venture to say, without egotism, that, circumstances favouring me, I did more in that direction than any other Minister ever had done. I had then just as great a difficulty to solve with the Orange Free State as Her Majesty's Government have now. But I solved it, President Brand was satisfied; and if you now enjoy his loyal co-operation and help it is to that settlement with me that you owe it. I should be the last man to quarrel with conciliation; but this is not the way to win the Dutch. And there is something above the mere conciliation of any section of the community. Something is due to those Natives to whom you have pledged the good faith, honour, and protection of the Crown. Something is due to those loyalists who stood by us, shoulder to shoulder, in the Zulu War, and to whom we have made promises ever since we have been in possession of the Transvaal. Something is due to the English residents there, who have accepted the assurances of two successive Governments, three successive Secretaries of State, and two Governors, and on the faith of those assurances built houses and bought farms, and invested their capital in the country. Something is due also to the English Colonists of South Africa. And by all of these this action is condemned in language far
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stronger than any I have used, and will be condemned wherever the English name is known or the English tongue spoken. This is not the way in which the English Empire was won; nor is this the way in which it will be maintained. I wish I could think that by this unhappy measure you will secure the object you have in view. But, my Lords, there is no peace in this settlement. It is a house built upon the sand, and very soon to be swept away by the rising flood. You will find that this settlement will lead not only to the strife of races, but to further troubles and even bloodshed. But all this is now in a certain sense a thing past and irremediable. But one thing remains—and, as to this, with no Party feeling, I entreat Her Majesty's Government to be firm in their dealings with the Boers. They have, wisely or unwisely, committed themselves to certain terms. Those terms are laid down in certain telegrams, and in the Instructions to the Commission just issued. I do entreat Her Majesty's Government, having laid down those terms, to adhere to them. There is a feeling abroad that all concessions will be in vain, and that anything may be wrung and extorted out of the Government provided it is only pursued with sufficient pertinacity. I can conceive no- thing so dangerous; nothing, to put it on the lowest ground, so expensive. When credit is lost, even the National Exchequer itself suffers. Dangerous it certainly is; because if once the impression gets rooted abroad that you can be driven from pillar to post, and that any concession may be wrung out of you by pertinacity and force of arms, then before long you will have to fight not only in the Transvaal and South Africa, but in India—anywhere and everywhere—for Empire and for very existence.
THE EARL OF KIMBERLEY: My Lords, the noble Earl has stated that the house we are laboriously endeavouring to build is crumbling away. I will remind my noble Friend that the house which he built has crumbled away, and it is because it has crumbled away entirely that we find ourselves involved in; the difficulties we are now discussing. I have always admitted that my noble; Friend was actuated by motives of the most honourable kind in what he attempted to do, and that he believed the policy he was pursuing would conduce

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to our interest in that part of the world. But when my noble Friend says that entirely approved his policy, he is overstating the case. I have already explained in the House what I did say; but as my noble Friend has referred to the subject, I may be again allowed to state it. What I did say was that if my noble Friend was correctly informed that the Boers were disposed to acquiesce, the annexation of the Transvaal would be a boon to the Empire. But everything depended on their acquiescence. I entirely depended on the information possessed by the Government. I always thought it a disadvantage that there should be an absence of union among the States in South Africa, and I rejoiced that there should be an opportunity if based upon good reasons for uniting a large portion of South Africa to the Crown. But the result has shown that my noble Friend committed a most serious error of judgment. I can scarcely conceive a policy which has more completely and totally failed than the policy he pursued. I freely admit that we owe him a debt of gratitude for settling the difficulty with regard to the Diamond Fields and Griqualand West; but I am profoundly convinced that the whole of his policy in South Africa with that exception was the most complete and lamentable failure that could be. My noble Friend endeavoured to initiate a very wise policy if it could be effected—a policy of Confederation. I told him at the time that I thought his action on the question premature, and that he employed a very unwise agent in Mr. Froude. Anybody who has followed the course of Mr. Froude in South Africa must be convinced that if anyone could have wrecked a policy, Mr. Froude would have done so. Another mistake was the annexation of the Transvaal. When my noble Friend announced that he had committed himself to the Confederation policy, I thought it advisable that every effort should be made for its succes. But my point is this—that in that policy, and also in the annexation of the Transvaal, he committed an error of judgment by forcing on a policy for which the country was not ripe. The policy was based on sand. With regard to the annexation of the Transvaal, I should have thought my noble Friend would require no proof that his policy has failed. What proof can be stronger
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than that three years after the annexation its reversal was pursued by a great portion of the Dutch population with as much energy and determination as in any insurrection I ever heard of? But then for this my noble Friend has an explanation of his own. He says the failure is owing to the speeches of Mr. Gladstone and the appointment of Mr. Courtney as Under Secretary at the Home Office. The latter it is impossible to connect with the question, for Mr. Courtney was not appointed Under Secretary until after the insurrection broke out. Well, Mr. Gladstone did undoubtedly make speeches on the question, and condemned the policy pursued. But anyone who has read the Blue Book on the subject and other publications must know that there was a continuous protest on the part of the Transvaal, showing itself in deputations to this country and in remonstrances addressed to Sir Michael Hicks-Beach; and there is no reason to date the disaffection of the Boers from the time Mr. Gladstone made the speeches referred to. I am perfectly free to admit, if we are to be blamed, that we did not foresee that those discontents would culminate in a serious outbreak against the Government. If I am to be blamed, it is for that. But those who will take the trouble to read the despatches I received will find that there was a most remarkable and continuous expression of opinion on the part of those best qualified to judge, from their position in the country, that the state of things was gradually growing better. It was said, I think, in some despatches that time and patience alone were required to bring about a happy result. There was a very interesting and important despatch from Sir Garnet Wolseley, dated in 1879, as to which he drew my attention to the fact that it had been omitted in the Papers laid before Parliament, and I complied with his request to produce it. In that despatch there was a strong expression of opinion that the Boers had a rooted dislike to English rule, and it has been argued that we ought to have inferred from that that Sir Garnet Wolseley's opinion was that there was danger in our position in the Transvaal. But there were later despatches from Sir Garnet Wolseley which by no means bore out his former opinion. I will refer to one of those despatches, the one dated April 10, 1880; which I take in

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preference to the others, because it was written either just before or just after I came into Office. In it Sir Garnet Wolseley says—
"Reports from all quarters of the Transvaal sustain the opinion that the people, being thoroughly weary of the uncertainty and the troubles attendant upon opposition to the Government, and seeing no hope of any successful issue from the dangerous measures in which they have been induced to place confidence, have determined to renounce all further disturbing action, and to return to the peaceful cares of their rural life, which was already beginning to suffer from the continuance of political irritation."
Therefore, it is clear that Sir Garnet Wolseley, although he pointed out the rooted dislike entertained by the Boers for the English, was of opinion that there was no serious danger. And more than this, it was with his concurrence that the late Government reduced the garrison in the Transvaal to only three regiments. I have said that this accusation is the most difficult for me to meet; but I ask the House to consider the state of things that my noble Friend has described. Notwithstanding that you have improved the revenue and the administration of the Transvaal, and in spite of all the advantages which your rule may have brought into the country, so violent is the feeling of the population in favour of independence that they are determined to rise and cast away all those advantages, and at the expense of a severe contest, in order, if possible, to emanicipate themselves from your rule. The fact is, that our rule failed in one essential condition—namely, in lacking the consent of the population. Everything turns on that. If the Transvaal had been a conquered country, or if the annexation had been effected on grounds other than the willing acquiescence of the people, then the policy that we have pursued might have been questioned; but if you have taken possession of a country on the express grounds that the White population are willing to accept your rule, and if you find them violently hostile to you after an experience of three years, the only question that you have to consider is how you may most satisfactorily divest yourself of your acquisition. There can be no doubt that the grounds on which my noble Friend opposite annexed the Transvaal have proved to be entirely false. Having dealt with that portion of our policy
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which has been so readily challenged, I come to the question underlying the phrase "blood-guiltiness." My noble Friend seems to think it a most astonishing expression, and one that requires explanation; but, as it appears to me, the statement made in the letter of my right hon. Friend is little more than a truism. What he said may be said, with certain limitations, of every war that ever was begun. If you go on with a war and unnecessarily prolong it, you are undoubtedly shedding blood guiltily. But I suppose my noble Friend's interpretation of the matter is that if there was blood-guiltiness in going on with the war at the moment when we stopped it, there was also blood-guiltiness in ever beginning it. Now, as a matter of fact, we did not begin it, but were ourselves attacked. We found an insurrection in the country, and all our garrisons were beleaguered; there was the affair of Bruncker's Spruit, and we had nothing to do but to collect our forces and vindicate the Queen's authority. Then, having collected our forces, it is suggested that we were bound to prosecute the war to the bitter end. But are we to be placed in this dilemma—to be bound either to submit to the insurgents and to grant all their demands, or, if we do not give them all they ask, to go on fighting till they are entirely subdued? That is a dilemma into which no Government ought to be forced. The real question was—was it, at the time when we made peace, in the interests of the country that we should do so? The question of blood-guiltiness is one of conscience, though the noble Marquess opposite may deny that conscience enters into such questions as this. It seems to be assumed throughout that if wo had taken no steps to collect our forces, and had made no effort to resist the insurgents, we might still have made the same terms with them. But that is not at all the case. Anyone who reads the despatches will find that the demand was made that we should withdraw our garrisons; but we did nothing of the kind. And more than that, in the present state of things, the present question is this—Is peace finally concluded now? Not at all. What we concluded was an agreement preliminary to peace. And does it not make a considerable difference when you have to

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carry into effect certain terms whether you have a force at your back or not? Does my noble Friend suppose that, if we had taken no steps to vindicate the Queen's authority, we should now be in a position to make peace? Certainly not. It is a settlement which may be carried through; but it is one of very great difficulty. I concur with my noble Friend opposite that some firmness may be requisite; but I deny that it is the same thing now to negotiate as to have submitted to the insurgents at the first outbreak without making any movement; at all to show that we were in a position to uphold our authority in South Africa. My noble Friend spoke of his desire to conciliate the Dutch. I do not think that we should be actuated simply by a desire to conciliate the Dutch, but by a desire for the good and prosperity of South Africa generally; and if a war of this kind be allowed to degenerate into a war of races, a state of things will be brought about which will make it almost impossible to maintain the Queen's authority in that country. When my noble Friend speaks of the possibility of maintaining the Queen's authority in the Transvaal, I reply that it was possible till we had the insurrection; but after it we were placed in this position—we could have maintained it permanently only by conquering the Transvaal Boers, and then we must have maintained a large force to keep them in subjugation. But would the country have borne the expense of such a force, and would it have been possible to avoid difficulties of the most serious kind with the Dutch population elsewhere? I think not; and, therefore, I regard the course that has been taken as just, and right, and sound, and conducive to the permanent interests of South Africa. As regards the present position of affairs, I am far from saying that I am without hope of a satisfactory settlement; but I am aware of the difficulties and dangers of the whole question, and will not speak in a too sanguine tone. But I am certain that the policy initiated by my noble Friend opposite could not have been maintained. Whether ours will be permanently successful, I cannot say; but our motives are as good as his, and I hope the chances of success are greater for our policy than for that which he pursued.
The DUKE of ARGYLL: No Member of the House need be surprised that my
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noble Friend opposite should have taken a very early opportunity of saying something in vindication of the policy that he pursued in the Transvaal, and of repudiating the charges which have been leveled against him and against the Government with which he was connected. I confess, however, that, in my opinion, my noble Friend has not taken a very convenient course in raising this great question on a letter written by the Prime Minister in respect to certain electioneering proceedings in England. Having been myself procul negotiis for some weeks, I have not yet seen the letter; but when my noble Friend read it, I was glad to find that the words, though sharp and severe, fairly represented the grounds on which the present Government have acted. I was prevented from taking part in the debate raised some weeks ago by the noble and learned Earl opposite (Earl Cairns), and I shall not endeavour to answer the elaborate speech he made on that occasion. I am going to take a very simple course. There are some advantages in being out of Office, for one can speak the arguments that are in his own mind and need not be afraid of committing others with regard to any of the arguments so used. I wish to explain briefly to my noble Friend the course of argument which I pursued in my own mind when I assented to the course the Government took on this most difficult and delicate question. In the first place, let me say that during the conduct of the Opposition in the winter before last I never took any part in blaming the late Government for their transactions in the Transvaal. I believed that their policy was dictated by a sincere desire to promote the good of South Africa; and, what is more, I believed that the action of my noble Friend was taken upon such evidence as was procurable by him, that the annexation of the Transvaal was really either desired, or at least acquiesced in, by the great majority of the population. I will venture to say that there is no public man in this country, belonging to any Party, be it Whig, Radical, or Conservative, who would have cared to annex the Transvaal if he had believed that it was against the assent of the population. Such assent as was given at the time by my noble Friend who is now Secretary of State for the Colonies, was, as I very

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well recollect, for I sat next to him on the occasion, qualified by the supposition and assumption that the evidence and reports of our officers in South Africa were true, and that the great majority of the population were in favour of the annexation. I believe that the late Government took part in that transaction under the belief that that evidence was sound, and I think that their action was perfectly justified. Therefore, I never uttered one word blaming the foreign policy of the late Government in regard to the transactions in South Africa. I, therefore, come to the discussion of this question with a mind not only entirely unprepossessed against the late Government, but rather prepossessed in favour of the policy they took. A great deal has been said of the fact that when the present Government became responsible for the Speech from the Throne, a paragraph was inserted declaring our determination to re-assert the authority of the Crown in South Africa. Well, up to a period later than that, I myself saw no adequate ground for doubting the conclusion that the majority of the Transvaal Boers were in favour of our annexation. It was the universal report of all our officers that the malcontents were a small though active minority, that things would soon settle down, and that the annexation was popular in the country. My belief in these statements was not shaken until shortly before the action at Laing's Nek. Reports came to the Government before that date showing that the Boers, to the number of 4,000 men at least, had been congregated in various parts of the Transvaal for the purpose of asserting their independence. I believe that the whole fighting force of the Transvaal Boers could not be more than 8,000 men at the very outside; and when you have the fact that upwards of 4,000 men had congregated in arms to resist the authority of the Queen in that country, it became perfectly evident that our officers who sent the reports had been deceived, and that the idea of the general acquiescence in our dominion was wholly a mistake. It was under these circumstances, and before the action at Laing's Nek, that indirect negotiations, or—if that word should be considered too formal, and perhaps it is so—indirect communications were entered into
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with a view to peace. The question then arose, were those negotiations or communications with the view to peace to be stopped on account of the defeat at Laing's Nek? That was the question which came before Her Majesty's Government. I do not deny that there were great difficulties in this question. I know that the feeling of military men was universally, and I believe it is now almost universally, in favour of retrieving that defeat before the negotiations were completed. I do not put aside the opinion of soldiers. It ought always to be deeply respected. The honour of the Army is not to be lightly treated, and the sentiment of the Army ought to be respected; but, on the other hand, the opinion of soldiers—the feeling and sentiments of soldiers on such occasions—is not always a safe guide in political affairs. I confess that the evidence of fact in regard to the non-assent of the Boer population affected my own conscience deeply. I felt it might be said that we had taken the country of these people, as it were, by stealth. I could not for a moment feel that allegiance in the true sense of the word—that duty which men owe to the Government under which they have been born and bred—was owing to us by the Boer population. Therefore, I felt it was more than probable that there was a great majority of that population who might honestly say—"England has taken our country from us under a mistake; but she obstinately shuts her eyes to the evidence we have produced, and the deputations we have sent, and she will own to no wrong although she is committing a great wrong." Under these circumstances, I think it was not the duty of England to stop the negotiations for peace in consequence of the check at Laing's Nek. There were two other actions which followed that engagement; and let us look at the circumstances in which they took place. I believe Sir George Colley was a most gallant man and a most able and accomplished officer; but I have heard no soldier speak on this subject who did not admit that he handled his forces with great rashness on those two occasions. He exposed small bodies of men unsupported in situations where they could not be supported to overwhelming forces of the enemy armed in a manner that our men were not skilled to meet. In such circumstances, these

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military defeats were not to be weighed in the scale for a moment with the great political question before us. Our troops were beaten under circumstances in which they really had no opportunity of displaying their military valour. They were shot down at great distances by deer-stalkers rather than by soldiers. The question for consideration was, whether it was worth while to get a military triumph over the Boers and to stop all negotiations for peace? In dealing with this question we had to consider the nature of the forces by which our troops were defeated. The Boers are not an army; they have no regiments, and no artillery. They are simply armed farmers who are accustomed to deer-stalking, and who are fighting for the independence of their country. Now, I ask any soldier in this House whether a great military triumph could be obtained by conquering such men? None whatever. Who can doubt that the British Army which soon afterwards assembled, consisting of upwards of 10,000 men, had the perfect power of conquering the Boers? The Boer force could hold a mountainous position like Laing's Nek with great success; but on a plain they would not be able to stand for a moment against the British Army. In my opinion it was no question of military glory, it was a question of policy. Was it wise to stop our negotiations for peace for the sake of defeating farmers who had succeeded, under accidental circumstances, and by great rashness on the part of our commanders, in gaining a victory over us? That was the position of the Government, and I maintain that the Government came to the right decision, that the negotiations ought not to be stopped on that account. I entirely agree with the opinion expressed by my noble Friend (the Earl of Kimberley) that the question was entirely political and not military. In the event of our overcoming the Dutch population of the Transvaal, would that have tended to the restoration of permanent peace in South Africa? Looking to the undoubted sympathy of the Dutch population in the Cape Colony with the Transvaal Boers, there was a serious danger of involving that country in a war of races; the most calamitous of all things in any country, and a result which any Government is bound in duty to avoid, if possible. These were the main arguments which induced me, for
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one, to agree with the course which the Government have taken; and although, undoubtedly, it is a course which, owing to the previous policy of the Government and the mistakes they had been led into, was full of difficulty and danger, was, I have not the slightest doubt, the right policy to pursue. I entirely agree with my noble Friend opposite in trusting that the Government will now, in the conduct of the negotiations, be firm with the Boers, and give them clearly to understand that the authority of the Crown is to be maintained in South Africa in the fullest sense of the word suzerainty, and that we shall not allow any portion of that country to lapse into anarchy. There was one argument used by my noble Friend, the relations of the British Government to the Native population, which I cannot help saying has been greatly overstated. My noble Friend opposite says that in South Africa we have always made a point of reserving our relations with the Native States. What is the meaning of that? Look at what is going on at the present moment. The Cape Colony has been waging war against the Basutos contrary to the advice of the British Government. My noble Friend remonstrated, and his Representative in the other House made some observations which gave great offence in the Cape Colony. The conduct of the Sprigg Ministry towards the Basutos was pursued entirely independent of the advice of the British Government; and it is rather absurd to say that we are more responsible for our relations with the Natives in the Transvaal, which we have held only two years, than we are in the Cape Colony, which we have possessed for many years.
LORD BRABOURNEfelt strongly that the policy pursued by Her Majesty's Government in South Africa would tend to produce the most disastrous results. It was said by the supporters of the Government that the Transvaal ought not to have been annexed except with the consent of a majority of the inhabitants. That, he was sure, was a doctrine which no one would dispute. Those who urged it forgot apparently that possibly enough the annexation of the Transvaal was desired by a majority of the inhabitants at the time it was effected, as being their only hope of safety, and that they changed their views only after the English Govern-

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ment had warded off the danger which threatened them. In any case the fact remained that a serious blow had been struck at our prestige in South Africa. He would be told, perhaps, that prestige was not a thing which a nation wanted, and he knew it was a word objected to by some of Her Majesty's Government. But what was prestige? In its conventional sense it was the reputation which a country possessed in the eyes of others. It was very much the same to a great country as credit was to a commercial house, and could equally little be dispensed with. It would be unbecoming of him to criticize the language of the Prime Minister's letter; but he would observe that it was a mistake to treat the literary productions of the right hon. Gentleman as those of an ordinary individual. It was well known that the speeches of the Mid Lothian campaign condemning annexation were quoted by the Boer leaders in justification of their rebellion against British authority, and his noble Friend the Secretary of State for the Colonies would find these statements in his own Blue Book, which he could hardly have read if he denied that the Prime Minister's speeches had anything to do with the rising. Reference had been made to the massacre at Brunker's Spruit. That was one of the most disgraceful events he had ever heard of. He had carefully searched the Blue Books and had not found a single word from his noble Friend the Secretary of State for the Colonies expressing his sorrow and indignation at what had occurred. What, in fact, did occur? A detachment of some 250 British soldiers, marching in long convoy and with no knowledge of any state of war, with women, children, and baggage, were stopped by the Boers and suddenly summoned to surrender. That war had not then been declared was proved by the very letter delivered to Colonel Anstruther by the Boers, in which they said—"We do not know whether we are in a state or war or not;" but that if he advanced, "we know what we will have to do in self-defence." Self-defence! when even while Colonel Anstruther was reading the letter, under cover of the flag of truce, the Boers were quietly advancing to positions they had before planned, the distances having been marked by them and a regular ambush laid. The Colonel sent a message back, asking for an answer, but
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immediately the Boers opened fire, without giving him any reply or any intimation that he was in the presence of a superior force. What would Lord Palmerston have done in such circumstances? He would have demanded explanations from the Boers; and if it had been found—as he believed it would have been found—that the act was beyond the usages of civilized warfare, atonement would have been exacted from the Boers, and the massacred troops would have been avenged. Nothing of the kind was done by his noble Friend. No more official notice was taken of the massacre of our soldiers than would have been taken of the killing of so many dogs. He had inquired of his noble Friend, more than once, whether the perpetrators of this outrage would be brought to justice, and the reply he had received was that the Commission would have power to deal with the matter, but that the amnesty would probably cover that act of the rebel Boers. Well, in the Instructions given to the Commission, there was not one word to call their attention to the occurrence, and it appeared as if the Boer version of the affair were to be calmly accepted, and the testimony of our own soldiers cast aside as worthless. The British soldier was not highly paid—his was not a lucrative service—but he did care for the honour of his flag, and up to the present time he had always known that he could rely upon the support and sympathy of his fellow-countrymen at home whilst fighting in distant lands. As far as the Government was concerned this support and sympathy had failed him now, and the Secretary of State for the Colonies seemed to consider the slaughter of British soldiers a matter of no moment. From what he heard he did not believe that the Boers were at all inclined to submit to the authority of the British Crown. His noble Friend could hardly expect it. Why, those men asserted that they were fighting for their independence and for the land of their fathers—a great portion of which, by-the-bye, had been pilched from the Natives within the last 20 years. But in his "Instructions" to the Commission his noble Friend proposed to cut off more than one-third of this land, either to be given to Native Tribes or kept under British authority. Did anyone in his senses suppose the Boers—exulting and victorious

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—were going to submit to this? Why, in the last Blue Book was printed their notice to a Native Chief not to assist "our enemies the English Government which we have already overthrown." And again they say—"We alone are able to work out the English." If we had defeated them, there might have been some show of generosity in our proceedings towards them; but as matters were the Boers, who, no doubt, considered themselves a match for us, would not tamely submit to our terms. There was no hope of tranquillity in South Africa until there was a law-abiding population, under a Government which would assert and enforce equal laws for all; and there was no Government which could and would do that save the British Government. It was well known that the Transvaal rebellion took its rise in the refusal of certain persons to pay taxes to the English, as they had previously refused to pay them to the Boer Government. He wished, too, to know what was to be done for the loyal inhabitants of the Transvaal, who had lost their all because they trusted England? There were good words concerning them, no doubt, in the Instructions; but what power would the Commissioners have to enforce their decisions. or to procure any redress for those men? Judging from appearances, he very much feared that we were only at the beginning of our troubles in South Africa, and he should be only too glad if the result should show that he had been mistaken in his prognostications.
LORD STANLEY OF ALDERLEY: The only sense that can be attributed to the words of Mr. Gladstone's letter are that he considers himself not responsible because no Boers were killed at Laing's Nek or Majuba Hill, and only our own soldiers were sacrificed in vain; but any theologian will tell him that whoever wages an unjust war is responsible for those that fall on both sides. And Mr. Gladstone is responsible for the war. as he did not enter into any communications with the Boers after denouncing the annexation in his Mid Lothian speeches. As to the other matters referred to, I entirely concur with the speech of the noble Duke (the Duke of Argyll).
House adjourned at a quarter before Seven o'clock, to Thursday next, half past Ten o'clock.