Lords Sitting of 11 March 1881

SOUTH AFRICA—THE TRANSVAAL—THE ARMISTICE—REPORT OF INTERCEPTION OF SUPPLIES.

  QUESTION. OBSERVATIONS.
  LORD ELLENBOROUGHasked the Under Secretary of State for War, Whe-

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  ther the Government had received any confirmation of the report that the supplies for the beleaguered garrisons in the Transvaal had been intercepted by the Boers?
  THE EARL OF MORLEY: No, my Lords, we have no information whatever on the subject.
  EARL CADOGAN: My Lords, the news received this morning from South Africa, and the statement made last night by the Prime Minister in the other House of Parliament, are of so important a nature that I felt it would be my imperative duty to give Notice to my noble Friend the Secretary of State fur the Colonies of further Questions with reference to these matters. My Lords, the information which has been vouchsafed to both Houses of Parliament ever since the commencement of these negotiations has been of so unsatisfactory and meagre a character that we are not in a position to understand clearly what has taken place; but I think I may very shortly state what we do understand to have been the course of these negotiations. We were informed that, previous to the disaster which took place at Majuba Hill, a communication had been made to the leaders of the Boers, to which the leaders of the Boers gave no reply. The late Sir George Colley appears, while waiting for that reply, to have commenced his attack upon Majuba Hill. Certainly that course would seem to be one that required seine explanation. Whether it was authorized by Her Majesty's Government or not we have not been told. What we have been told is that, after the lamented death of that General, Her Majesty's Government, feeling a desire to understand how far the negotiations had proceeded, instructed Sir Evelyn Wood to go to the front—not, as I understand, to repair the disaster to our arms, or to vindicate the authority of Her Majesty in Natal, but to ascertain what was the position of the negotiations with a view to an armistice or to peace. Sir Evelyn Wood appears to have negotiated and signed an armistice; and, if we can believe the accounts which we have received, he did so, not under any fresh authority from Her Majesty's Government, but in pursuance of instructions which had previously been sent to Sir George Colley, and which Sir Evelyn Wood seems to have inherited. My Lords, I think it has considerable signi-
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  ficance, because it appears to show the instructions which were given to Sir George Colley when he was entrenched in his camp, when re-inforcements were expected to reach him from day to day, and when we might have hoped for a successful termination to the military proceedings—that these instructions were considered to apply equally to a state of things which existed after the disaster at Majuba Hill. However that may be, an armistice was signed, and we have heard nothing further from the Government on the subject until last night, when the Prime Minister was asked a Question in the other House; and in the course of his reply he made use of the following words:—
  "At the time when Her Majesty was advised to sanction the delivery of that Speech (the Queen's Speech) we were under the impression, winch I think was correct, that our first duty, on the occurrence of the rising in the Transvaal, was to place the local authority of the Queen and the military acting under Her Majesty in South Africa in a condition to deal with the emergency. We were at that time actively engaged in that duty; and until it had been fulfilled we did not consider the opportunity had arisen for our endeavouring to bring about a settlement of affairs in the Transvaal. We do consider that in existing circumstances such an opportunity has arisen, so far, at least, as to make it our duty and worth our while to have the circumstances carefully tested, with a view to ascertain what may be the result."
  My Lords, I do not clearly understand the latter part of the sentence; I do not know how you are to test what may be the result of those circumstances; but the earlier part of the sentence is clear enough. It amounts to this—that Her Majesty's Government do now consider that existing circumstances have made a change in the position of affairs. I may be permitted to quote the words which Her Majesty was advised to use in Her Gracious Speech from the Throne—
  "A rising in the Transvaal has recently imposed upon me the duty of taking military measures with a view to the prompt vindication of my authority; and has of necessity set aside for the time any plan for securing to the European settlers that full control over their own local affairs, without prejudice to the interests of the natives, which I had been desirous to confer."
  Therefore, at the time of the meeting of Parliament, Her Majesty felt it her duty to take military measures with a view to the prompt vindication of her authority. We are now told that circum-

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  stances have occurred which appear to have changed the opinion of Her Majesty's Government on that point. My Lords, we shall all be anxious to receive from the noble Earl any information which he is willing to give as to what those circumstances are. So far as we know, they consist in a series of unfortunate defeats, culminating in the disaster at Majuba Hill, since which time an armistice has been signed—we are not told at whose instigation, and we have no further information on the point; but, no doubt, the noble Earl will elucidate it. The second point on which I should be glad to have some information is with reference to a telegram published in The Times of this morning, which states—
  "That the Home Government proposed to follow up the armistice by appointing Sir Hercules Robinson, Sir John de Villiers, and Sir Evelyn Wood as British Commissioners, to meet a similar commission of the Boers, thus conceding to the latter sovereign rights."
  My Lords, this also is a statement of very great importance; but I am bound to admit that, coming as it does from the correspondent of a newspaper, it does not bear the same authority, and may not perhaps be regarded by your Lordships with the same anxiety, as any utterance of the Prime Minister's. But I may point out that the gentlemen who are stated to be members of this Commission include the High Commissioner in South Africa and the Commander of the Forces. Therefore, I imagine we shall hot overrate the importance of that intelligence if we believe they are not appointed solely with the view to the prolongation of the armistice, but that they have instructions with reference to the conclusion of terms of peace; and, more than that, that they are empowered by Her Majesty's Government to treat with the leaders of the Boers. The leaders of the Boers in this movement are in the position not only of rebels against Her Majesty's authority, but they are invaders. They are at this moment encamped on the soil of our territory—of our undisputed territory. Under these circumstances, that a Commission should be appointed consisting of such men as those mentioned is a statement which we have a right to expect some explanation of from Her Majesty's Government. Those are the two points on which I think I
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  have a right to ask for some definite information. I hope the noble Earl will acquit me of any desire to——
  THE EARL OF KIMBERLEY: What are the two points?
  EARL CADOGAN: Whether he will kindly explain the meaning of the Prime Minister when he stated that circumstances which existed at the time when Her Majesty delivered Her Gracious Speech no longer exist, or have been modified; and, secondly, whether the Commission mentioned in The Times has been appointed; and, if so, with what objects?, I should add, my Lords, that I will give no opinion myself upon questions of policy. I am not even pressing Her Majesty's Government to say anything as to their views or intentions as to the future. I ask a Question upon plain matters of fact which have occurred during the last ten days, and of which we have received intelligence only to-day. I do not believe that it will be of any real advantage to the Government that any further reticence should be used. On the contrary, I believe it would be advantageous to the Government that these matters should be fully understood. There is undoubtedly at this moment a strong feeling of anxiety in the public mind with regard to the course of events in South Africa. I trust, therefore, that I shall be forgiven for having directed your Lordships' attention to the points on which I have touched.
  THE EARL OF KIMBERLEY: My Lords, I hope the Government will not be accused of undue reticence if we are not able to state facts which have not yet occurred, because with the anxiety which my noble Friend shows almost from hour to hour I am not able to keep pace.
  EARL CADOGAN: I beg to state that it is several days since I put a Question to the noble Earl.
  THE EARL OF KIMBERLEY: What I mean to say is that it is utterly impossible to conduct the affairs of Government at all if, before a decision is taken upon particular points, and if because there is a rumour in the newspapers the Government is expected, not only to give full information as to what has taken place, but to state their intentions as to what is about to take place.
  EARL CADOGAN: I am very sorry to interrupt the noble Earl; but I must

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  remind him that my Question had reference to a statement made by the Prime Minister last night.
  THE EARL OF KIMBERLEY: The noble Earl refers to Commissioners who certainly were not mentioned by Mr. Gladstone last night. The fact of the matter is that the appointment of Commissioners, as Mr. Gladstone stated, is under the consideration of the Government. I am perfectly ready to admit that the Government have the intention to appoint a Commission; but they have not yet decided upon the names of the Commissioners, much less upon their instructions. Therefore, I cannot give my noble Friend the information upon that point which he desires. With regard to the other matter to which my noble Friend referred, he seemed to think that there is some mystery in this matter of the armistice. As far as I know, the circumstances are these. The first point to which I need refer is that a communication was received from Mr. Kruger on behalf of the Boers. It was addressed in the form of a letter to Sir George Colley, who telegraphed the purport of it to us. We desired him to send an answer to Mr. Kruger, and to fix a reasonable time within which that answer could be received. There has been some obscurity as to the exact proceedings of Sir George Colley, and we have not been able to clear it up in consequence of his death. There has been extreme difficulty in getting at the precise facts; but I believe they are as follow:—Sir George Colley fixed 48 hours, but did not receive an answer within that time. He, therefore, I conclude, considered himself free from any obligation to wait longer, and so made the attack upon Majuba Hill. After that attack, a letter was received from Mr. Bok, who acts as Secretary to the Boer leaders, addressed to Sir George Colley, which was opened by Sir Evelyn Wood. That letter, as I understand, informed Sir Evelyn Wood that an answer to the communication sent to Mr. Kruger could not be despatched for a certain time, owing to Mr. Kruger being at some distance. Therefore, as far as I can gather—for I cannot absolutely vouch for the accuracy of the facts—Sir George Colley did not take any offensive steps until after the expiration of the period which he had fixed. I believe, in point of fact, that
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  a considerably longer period than 48 hours elapsed. I believe that Sir George Colley acted with perfect straightforwardness in the matter. Mr. Bok, therefore, had told Sir George Colley—which information reached Sir Evelyn Wood, Sir George Colley being dead—that there would be an answer from Mr. Kruger to the communication which had been sent to him. No, I must correct myself. As far as I know, Mr. Bok did not explicitly state whether an answer was coming or not from Mr. Kruger; but, in order that there should be no misunderstanding, I desired Sir Evelyn Wood to inquire whether an answer was coming, and he accordingly made that inquiry. Now, with regard to the armistice, Sir George Colley's instructions were that if he received a favourable answer to the communication sent to Mr. Kruger, he might agree to a suspension of hostilities. That was the instruction given to Sir George Colley. No instructions on this point were ever given to Sir Evelyn Wood, who sent us a telegram saying he had concluded an armistice, and telling us what the terms of that armistice were. I think I read to the House the exact terms the other day, and I suppose I read the passage in which he says that in order to give Mr. Kruger time to reply he had concluded the armistice. That, I believe, is the entire history of the matter. I am not able to say whether Sir Evelyn Wood said to the Boers, Will you agree to an armistice?" or whether the Boers said to him, "Will you agree to an armistice?" But there is a telegram which mentions that Mr. Kruger had asked whether Sir Evelyn Wood would be opposed to a proposal of that kind, which seems to indicate that the suggestion must have come from Mr. Joubert, in order to give time for the expected answer to be sent by Mr. Kruger. Therefore, it appears that the object of Sir Evelyn Wood in concluding the armistice was to give time for receiving that answer. We approved of Sir Evelyn Wood having concluded the armistice. In whatever mode this proposal originated, it is quite clear that when Sir Evelyn Wood made this armistice he acted upon his own judgment, which told him it would be a wise proceeding. Now, I think I have answered my noble Friend as explicitly as I can. I will refer again to the point as to the Commissioners, in order that there may

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  be no misunderstanding. Mr. Gladstone said that the appointment of a Commission was under consideration. The appointment of Commissioners was suggested by the Boers on their own motion. Those Commissioners have not been named, nor have their instructions been decided upon.
  THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: It cannot be wondered at that, considering the anxiety of the country generally and that which we feel ourselves, we should give expression to our feelings with respect to the proceedings of the Government. If any justification for the question of my noble Friend was required it would be afforded by the fact that we have obtained from the noble Earl a considerable amount of very important information which we never had before. I think, however, on reflection, that the noble Earl will see, when he considers it, that he has not really answered the points to which my noble Friend directed his attention. According to the tenour of events which come to our ears, and according to the answer attributed to Mr. Gladstone last night, there seems to have been a sharp turn in the policy of the Government. If that turn has taken place in consequence of certain circumstances which have occurred, we are anxious to know what those circumstances are. In Her Majesty's Gracious Speech from the Throne we heard that the authority of the Crown was first to be vindicated, and when the first duty of vindicating that authority was discharged the question of creating a system of local self-government would be considered. But now we hear that communications are being made to the Boers to ascertain what their terms are. After a certain delay was granted within which an answer was to be returned, and that delay was exceeded, the Government are so anxious for peace that they have applied for, and obtained, an armistice, and now have actually resolved to name Commissioners, on the suggestion of the Boers, to meet other Commissioners, named by the Boers, to consider those very matters which, according to the Queen's Speech, were not to be considered until the supremacy of Her Majesty was established. I do not, at this time, wish to discuss the general policy of the Government. I think it would be premature to do so; but I hold that it is calculated to create grave anxiety in the
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  public mind if it appears that they had no defined and consistent course of policy, and that a sharp turn of their policy takes place directly after our arms have suffered a damaging and conspicuous defeat. My Lords, the policy of the Peace Society is one which I do not approve. I know that a great deal may be said for it—a great deal may be said for all doctrines which are held by any considerable body of men. There is a great deal to be said for the opposite policy, and there is a great deal also to be said for the policy which Her Majesty's Government first resolved on to vindicate the authority of the Crown before entering into any discussion of the terms to be granted to those in arms; but the policy for which nothing can be said is the policy of maintaining a martial and bellicose tone until you have suffered a very dangerous and damaging defeat, and then to ask for an armistice, and propose a Commission to discuss the terms of peace. After the defeat has not been wiped out, to propose that Commissioners should meet to discuss terms of peace with those who are rebels to the Queen, who are at this moment invaders of the territory of the Queen, to do that, and to do it after a defeat, is what a nation might do at its last gasp. It is what might have been done after the surrender of York Town; but it is not a course of proceeding which we can look on our Government doing without great anxiety and fear of a considerable loss of reputation among other nations. I wish the Government, after having given this appearance of pursuing a policy which is discreditable to us, would abandon the reticence which they have hitherto observed, and give us ground for believing that they are still resolved to maintain the policy which they announced in the Speech from the Throne; that they are still resolved to vindicate the authority of the Crown before entering on plans for self-government; and that the circumstances which, apparently, in Mr. Gladstone's view, had altered in that respect, were alluded to by the right hon. Gentleman under a mistake.
  EARL GRANVILLE: I feel much tempted to point out that the course which would have been in accordance with the Rules of this House is not exactly the course which has been adopted by the noble Earl (Earl Ca-

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  dogan). At half-past 3 o'clock he sent a Notice to my noble Friend of a private character, and conveyed in very indefinite language. A quarter of an hour before the House met my noble Friend received more definite Notice of what the Question was going to be. Then my noble Friend makes a statement of some length, in which he says that he will not enter into questions of a political character but simply ask a Question, and then he enters into a statement of facts, and thus takes a course which, I must say, is very likely to cause a debate. I am quite certain that nobody who has just heard the noble Marquess will think that he can boast of great reticence in the expression of an opinion on the policy of the Government. He has just now made two statements which are not in accordance with the facts of the case. Then, having followed that course, he proceeds to a denunciation of the policy of the Government. I am not going, on an irregular occasion like this, into a discussion of the question of policy; but I will just say that the noble Marquess has been misinformed on two important points. One of his statements is that we went to the Boers to ask them for their terms, and the other is that we changed our policy after the disaster which we all deplore. It is not the case. We had overtures made to us by the Boers, and we sent them the answer before we knew, or could have known, of the disaster which had taken place.

ARMY REGULATIONS.

  QUESTION. OBSERVATIONS.
  VISCOUNT HARDINGEasked the Under Secretary of State for War, Whether it is intended, under the proposed regulations for increasing the number of field officers in each regiment of the Line, that such regulations should have a retrospective effect with regard to those officers who have been compulsory retired under the existing system; and to what extent? The Secretary of State for War had announced his intention of altering the battalion organization of the Army. The present establishment of a double battalion was 2 lieutenant-colonels, 4 majors, 20 captains, and 34 subalterns. The proposed establishment was 4 lieutenant-colonels, 8 majors, 12 captains, and 30 subalterns.
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  He did not wish to open up the question of battalion organization; but would only remark that Lord Airey's Committee, the Adjutant General, and Sir Garnet Wolseley, had all expressed themselves in favour of the existing organization; whilst Sir Lintorn Simmons and others advocated a change to the 4-company organization. No doubt, one of the advantages of the Secretary of State's plan was that it would check compulsory retirements—a system which drove out of the Army officers in the very prime of life. But such questions as battalion organization should be settled on the advice of the most competent military authorities, and not according to considerations of pay and promotion. No doubt in the end it might work well, as of 1,000 officers 516 instead of 216 would attain the rank of major. But for the present, as two captains would have to be absorbed in every regiment, the promotion of the subalterns would come to a dead-lock. As these captains, if 40 years of age, were in three years to be brought back to their regiments, voluntary retirement could not be relied upon, and the openings in the Staff would be few and far between. He wished to know whether any calculation had been made as to whether the flow of promotion would be the same as Lord Cardwell had undertaken it should be after the abolition of purchase?
  THE EARL OF MORLEY, in reply, said, that the noble Viscount complained that the inducements now offered to officers were not sufficient to induce them to retire voluntarily. Under the purchase system the inducements were that an officer could receive back again the money paid for his commission. At the present time he paid nothing; but after 12 years' service he could, if he chose to go, receive £1,200; after 15 years' service, £1,600; and after 18 years' service, £2,000. He thought these inducements quite as great as those which existed under the purchase system in the rank of captain or lieutenant. According to the statement of the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War in "another place," 581 out of 1,000 officers would be retired before they could reach the rank of major. This calculation was based on the slowest rate of promotion, the death rate only being taken into consideration. He saw no reason why voluntary

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  retirement should not be as frequent under the present as under the purchase system, with this exception—that the prospects of an officer might in certain respects be better now than then; and it is obvious that the number of officers who would be compulsorily retired must be diminished by those who retired voluntarily. During the past seven years they had been passing through a transition state, and it was difficult to place figures before the House of a trustworthy character. The effect of the changes proposed by the War Secretary would be so far retrospective that any non-purchase captain who has been, or may be, retired compulsorily before the 1st of July would be allowed, subject to the approval of the Commander-in-Chief, to join the list of unattached majors on half-pay. The officers placed on that list would have the chance, though not the assurance, of employment, either regimental or on the Staff, but not necessarily in the regiment they had left. This privilege would not belong to officers who had sold their commissions, or who had commuted their pensions. Under the new rules promotion among subalterns would be somewhat retarded; but they would ultimately have a better chance of continued career to the highest rank in the Army. He had that day laid on the Table of the House a Memorandum, showing the effect of all the changes which they proposed to make with regard to this and other questions connected with Army Organization.

AFGHANISTAN—CANDAHAR

  MOTION FOR A RETURN.
  LORD STRATHNAIRNrose to call the attention of the House (1.) To the following extract from the enclosure to be found on page 20 of the Blue Book [C.-27761 Afghanistan (1881), No. 1:—
  "Monday, 15 March. In the afternoon the General received the principal Mullas and Kowanins of the city and surrounding villages in Durbar. They were twenty-nine in number, and had come in consequence of Sir Donald Stewart's late letter to the Sirdar, to inform him that they had all taken an oath on the Koran to the effect that they would at once deliver up to justice any individual whom they might hear of that was an ill-wisher to the British Government, and intending to do mischief to the troops here in garrison."
  After the General had heard their statement, he informed them that
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  "There was no chance of Kandahar again falling under the authority of a supreme ruler in Kabul. Kandahar would for the future stand by itself, and the moment the Sirdar should inform Sir Donald Stewart that he considered his power sufficiently consolidated to take charge of the city the General would be quite prepared to make it over to him;"
  and (2.) To an extract of a Memorandum by Sir John Lawrence, dated Calcutta, 25th November 1868; and also to move for a Return of the number of men invalided from the effects of the Peshawar fever and cholera in the Peshawar Valley from 1862 to 1878. He begged with great deference to submit—first, strategical and political proofs that England's and India's most important interests and rights as well as those of our national good faith required the military occupation of Candahar. Secondly, the military occupation of Candahar maintained and secured the great political advantages obtained by the successful campaigns of 1879–80–81. Before going further, it would be apposite to state to their Lordships that he was instructed, when commanding in India, by the Supreme Government, to submit a Report to them of the best means of defending the Peshawar Valley and the Trans-Indus Frontier against an attack from the Khyber and North West Passes; and Sir Neville Chamberlain, in order to assist him in doing so, was requested to accompany him along the Frontier to give him the valuable information he possessed on the subject. He would fail in his duty to their Lordships and the country were he to withhold the information thus obtained respecting a State interest on which, he believed, depended our rights and interests in India, Central Asia, and the Eastern Question. It was also apposite to that subject to say that Party tactics and false delicacy had made that as well as the Eastern a vexed question, by keeping out of sight Russia, whom the records of history and of every Foreign Office in the civilized world proved to have been the principal actor for nearly two centuries in the great drama, the scene which began at first in a little port, Archangel, but now extended from the Mediterranean to the China Sea. In mentioning Russia in that short address, he only did so under the influence of that truth without which no difference, national or private, could be satisfactorily settled. No one more than he

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  admired the patriotic and devoted feeling which the Russian people displayed in the years 1855–7 in the defence of their country; and no one could have seen without admiration the discipline and steadfast courage of the Russian Army in re-constructing their shattered works at Sebastopol under fire. But he did not sympathize with their Eastern diplomacy. He returned from that digression to the advantages gained in the late campaign in Afghanistan. They were, first, the disappearance of the danger which had always threatened the North-West Frontier of India, and, therefore, India herself. He had so fully explained that danger on former occasions to their Lordships that it would be waste of time now to enlarge upon it. He would briefly observe that the danger was the union of Sunni Mussulmans and fanatical Afghanistan, the most powerful military State—including Persia and Central Asia—from the east of the Caspian to the China Sea, with the Sunni Mussulman and warlike tribes of the Suleiman ranges, whose difficult and almost inaccessible country was a formidable strategical bulwark for Afghanistan against India, defensive and offensive, and dominating our Trans-Indus Border. Those tribes were so hostile that the Government of India were compelled to keep on a war footing a corps of Jezailchees (Militia) called the Punjaub Frontier Force, garrisoning a line of forts along the whole Frontier to protect the Trans-Indus and Punjaub from their devastations. The danger of that union was exemplified in 1857, when Dost Mahomed, under fanatical influences, was on the point of unfurling the green flag and summoning the Mussulman Border Tribes—numbering some 150,000 men—to march with his army on Delhi to rescue Islam, besieged and endangered there. It was only on the evening before Dost Mahomed marched that his son, Azim Khan, a friend of the English alliance, dissuaded him from his purpose. The belief was universal that if he had fallen like an avalanche on Delhi with the Border Tribes, numbering some 150,000 fighting men, it would have caused a rising of the Hindoo and Mussulman populations; and England must have retreated, at least for a time, on the sea, India being for a while at least lost. If such was the danger of the combination of Af-
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  ghanistan with the Mussulman Tribes of the North-West, how much greater would not have been the crisis if Russia had sided in 1857 with Afghanistan as she did in 1878. But the danger of a combined attack on India by Russia with Afghan troops and the tribes vanished when the Afghan Army was routed. Shere Ali eloped with the Treasury, and Herat returned to its independence, while Candahar was occupied by British troops. Afghanistan, dismembered, lapsed into insignificance. Here he must do an act of justice to Her Majesty's late Government. Profiting by their knowledge of Russian policy in 1838 as regards Central Asia, and the evidence of the sacrifices which that Power had made in persuading the young Shah of Persia, in disregard of so many promises, to besiege Herat and to detach the then Ameer of Afghanistan secretly from his alliance with us, which was the cause of war between India and Afghanistan, and followed by the terrible English disasters in the Khyber Pass and the capture of Cabul—with all that before their eyes, he said that the Government of India could not have done otherwise than act on that warning of which the Russian Mission in 1878 was an unmistakable reminder. It was impossible to imagine that anybody with the slightest instincts of statesmanship or respect for facts could, after such warnings, wish to restore Afghanistan to its former united position. A glance at Lord, then Sir John, Lawrence's able Memorandum of the 25th of November, 1868, would convince that person of its impossibility. He now came to the second advantage gained by England. Shere Ali's defection had upset the balance of power guaranteed by England and Russia, who, according to Count Nesselrode, were the guardians of the destinies of Asia; but the occupation of Candahar restored that equipoise, and who would not prefer Candahar, a strong military and strategical position, and acknowledged as such by Napoleon and Russia, to the utter unreliability of an alliance with Afghanistan, of whose utter unreliability Lord Napier and Sir John Lawrence had in their able and unanswerable Minutes given such convincing proofs? But if Candahar were evacuated, how was the balance of power in Asia to be maintained? Nothing was made more clear by the Russian and Afghan

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  Correspondence than that Shere Ali, who was more the victim of his fears than of his bad intentions, was induced by Russia to abandon his engagement with the British Government, and that the excuse of Russia—that she did so because she thought war was imminent with England—was only another of many proofs of the value which Russia had always placed upon substituting Russian for British influence in Afghanistan. He would now consider the third advantage gained in the late campaigns, which was the protection of another and greater balance of power, of which Constantinople was the pivot—with the Dardanelles and the Mediterranean to the West and the Bosphorus and the Black Sea to the East—from a diversion against England in India in resisting a move of Russia against Constantinople. Here was another strategical and political advantage to England gained by the fall of Shore Ali and his Kingdom; and nothing would so much prevent the realization of such a diversion in Afghanistan as the presence of an English force at Candahar, which gave us action on the Herat and Merv line if driven to war, a direction in which Russia was advancing with rapid strides by the construction of a Central Asian railway from Fort Michael towards Merv. The fourth and last advantage was the great political and strategical exchange of a dangerously unhealthy military station and outwork of our North-Western Frontier at Peshawur for a healthy and very strategical outpost at Candahar. Candahar was as healthy as the Valley of Peshawur was the reverse, with its dangerous fevers and constant ravages of cholera, which not only rendered regiments unfit for duty, but would cause their prostration if they took the field, although the force in the Peshawur Valley was supposed to be always ready for service, as it was frequently called upon to assist the Frontier Force in resisting the invasions of the tribes. Besides, Peshawur was a cramped and bad strategical position, dominated by mountains to the front and on both flanks, which masked the movements of an enemy, and enabled them to make feints and unexpected attacks in other quarters. Candahar was a fortress constructed on obsolete principles; but there was a very strong position on a commanding height on the
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  River Arghandab, about a mile distant, which, if fortified and supported by detached redoubts on low hills round it, would, in the opinion of competent judges, become nearly impregnable. The position of Candahar was in itself very strategical—a cheval across the Afghan high road from Herat to Cabul, and having action on both. Besides, it was a fresh base of operations on the dangerous obstacles on the other sides of the Suleiman ranges, and placed them and their warlike and lawless inhabitants in the position of being between two fires. He hoped Her Majesty's Government would regard as binding the promise which was given that Candahar should never come under the authority of a supreme Ruler in Cabul. The best authority he ever had for the sanctity of engagements was the late Duke of Wellington, who said there was no interest like the interest of keeping your word.
  Moved for—
  "A Return of the number of men invalided from the effects of the Peshawur fever and cholera in the Peshawur Valley from 1862 to 1878."—(The Lord Strathnairn.)
  VISCOUNT ENFIELDthought their Lordships would agree with him in thinking it was a pity that the noble and gallant Lord, whose distinguished services entitled him to be heard on questions of this kind, had not delivered his speech a week ago, when it would have been listened to with the greatest attention and interest by a larger House than was now present. He hoped the noble and gallant Lord would not think him wanting in respect, which he most unfeignedly felt for him both in his private and public capacity, if he did not follow him throughout the speech with which he had prefaced his Motion. The noble and gallant Lord seemed rather to complain that the promise which was made by Sir Donald Stewart on behalf of Her Majesty's Government as to Candahar not coming under the authority of a supreme Ruler in Cabul was not kept; but he (Viscount Enfield) thought that upon a fair consideration of the facts of the case, the noble and gallant Lord would be of opinion, and he hoped their Lordships would agree, that no promise had been violated as far as Her Majesty's Government were concerned. He should be the last person

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  to say that any promise made by an English Minister or General should not be observed; but it would be a dangerous doctrine to lay down that statements made by a General Officer, not fully conversant, perhaps, with all the political difficulties of the situation, should be binding upon all future Administrations. The promise made by Sir Donald Stewart had been faithfully kept. If the noble and gallant Lord had read the concluding words of the despatch, it would have been seen that before the Government redeemed their promise the people of Candahar must keep theirs. At the end of the despatch it was stated that the General, after the Durbar, dismissed the assembly, and told them that the policy inaugurated by him would certainly be continued as long as the people remained loyal to the Sirdars and the Government. Accordingly, the British Government had kept its promise at Cabul and other parts of the country; but what did the people of Candahar do? In the first place, as they knew, there had been a revolt; and, in the second place, after the Maiwand disaster, those very persons who had taken the oath of allegiance to the British Government behaved so badly that the General commanding had to turn them out of the city. This question had been ably and exhaustively dealt with in the debate of last week, and he did not feel justified in trespassing on their Lordships' time in going over the same ground. With regard to the retention of Candahar, Her Majesty's Government thought that, on this question, the military opinions were divided, the financial difficulties considerable, and the commercial advantages very doubtful, as was also the political morality, if he might say so without incurring the censure of the noble Marquess opposite (the Marquess of Salisbury). Under these circumstances, Her Majesty's Government did not think it right or expedient to retain Candahar; but they were making such arrangements as to leave Candahar and the district under competent government. As to the Return moved for, its preparation by the Indian Government would entail much time and considerable expense; and, therefore, he hoped the noble and gallant Lord would not press for it.
  LORD WAVENEYthought attention should be called to the subject of the
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  abandonment of Candahar at every step and every stage. Heedless of Russia, China, or any other Power, they should remain at Candahar, put down their foot, and state their determination to retain it, and not depart from the policy of Clive, Cornwallis, and Wellesley. The policy of making other people do our work in Afghanistan was a mistake, as was also that of making that country a buttress between ourselves and. Russia in Asia.
  Motion (by leave of the House) withdrawn.

ARMY RE-ORGANIZATION—BATTALIONS ABROAD.

  ADDRESS FOR RETURNS.
  VISCOUNT BURYrose to ask the Under Secretary of State for War, What will be the number of battalions abroad beyond the normal number contemplated by the localization scheme when the intended re-inforcement of six regiments has been despatched to South Africa; and to move—
  "That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty for Return (similar to No. 70 of 1879) of all non-commissioned officers and privates of each battalion under orders for or sent to South Africa since the 1st of January of the present year, as they embarked, showing ages, length of service, and number who have not completed their drill and musketry instruction; also similar Returns of all drafts to complete other battalions than those sent from home stations; also number drawn to complete for service for other than their own brigades in tabular form similar to that of the above-named Return."
  It was essential that this information should be laid before the House to enable their Lordships to consider Mr. Childers' proposal to modify Lord Cardwell's scheme, which was drawn up without regard to our small wars, of which there had been no fewer than 35 during the last 40 years. At the General Election, complaint was made of the reticence of the late Government, and it had been promised that when the present Government came into Office we were to live in the light of publicity. He trusted, therefore, that Her Majesty's Government would not refuse to give any information on this subject which would not be of service to the enemy.
  Moved that an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty for Return (similar to No. 70 of

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  1879) of all non-commissioned officers and privates of each battalion under orders for or sent to South Africa since the 1st of January of the present year, as they embarked, showing ages, length of service, and number who have not completed their drill and musketry instruction; also similar Return of all drafts to complete other battalions than those sent from home stations; also number drawn to complete for service from other than their own brigades, in tabular form similar to that of the above-named Return.—(The Viscount Bury.)
  THE EARL OF MORLEYassured their Lordships that there was every desire on the part of the Government to give the fullest possible information as regarded the new re-organization scheme and the general state of the Army at present. But when he said that, he should also express a hope that the noble Lord would not press for the Returns, which it would be contrary to public policy to produce, in face of the war in which we were now engaged. The Boers had all the details of our movements from day to day sent to them, and he could not see how the information which the Returns would supply could be kept from them. In saying this he must also be allowed to remark that it was not without surprise that he heard the noble Lord, who had held an important and responsible position in a former Government, put such a Question. He could not understand why the Government, in satisfying the perhaps laudable curiosity of the noble Lord, should also gratify the less innocent curiosity of the Boer leaders, who would, without doubt, like to have information as to the strength and equipment of the forces sent out to South Africa. He was anxious, however, to give broadly some information which would be satisfactory to their Lordships. The number of battalions abroad beyond the normal number contemplated by the localization scheme when the intended re-inforcement of six regiments had been despatched to South Africa was fixed at 10, and since the 1st of January an order had been issued that no soldiers should be allowed to embark who had not been two years in the Army. All regiments and drafts sent abroad had been drawn either from the linked battalions, the depôts, or volunteers; and of these, except in a few cases, no soldier had been allowed to pass who had not completed two years' musketry instruction. With regard to Viscount Cardwell's scheme, it was too much forgotten sometimes that that
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  scheme had been subjected to a very considerable strain within the last few years, and that it had, to a considerable extent, borne the strain without any addition to the establishment. Having given this explanation, he could only repeat that in the view of Her Majesty's Government it would not be consistent with the public interest to enter into further detail, or to grant the Returns for which the noble Viscount asked.
  VISCOUNT CRANBROOKwould advise his noble Friend not to persist in his Motion for the Returns, inasmuch as he had been told that to grant them would be contrary to public policy, although the figures for which his noble Friend asked were practically to be found in Blue Books which had been already laid before Parliament, and arguments deduced from them might fairly be used in any future discussion.
  After a few remarks from the Earl of NORTHBROOK in defence of Viscount Cardwell's scheme,
  VISCOUNT BURYsaid, of course, he would not press the Motion for the Returns after what had been said.
  Motion (by leave of the House) withdrawn.
  House adjourned at Seven o'clock, to Monday next, Eleven o'clock.