Lords Sitting of 30 June 1881

MINUTES.
PUBLIC BILLS—First Reading—Petroleum (Hawking) * (139).
Second Reading—Coroners (Ireland) * (134).
Committee—Gas Provisional Orders* (97).
Third Reading—Charitable Trusts (120), and passed.

IRELAND—THE UNITED STATES—SECRET MISSION TO IRELAND.

  QUESTION.
  LORD EMLYasked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Whether there was any truth in the intelligence contained in a telegram which had been published in some of the newspapers, and which stated that the President of the United States had despatched a Secret Mission from America to this country, with instructions to draw up a Report on the condition of Ireland?
  EARL GRANVILLE: My Lords, Her Majesty's Government have received no official information of the alleged event to which the telegram refers. The Mission which it speaks of is described as secret, and therefore the Government would not be bound to know of it. I have, however, a very good reason for saying that there is no foundation for the rumour to which the telegram gives publicity.

TURKEY AND GREECE—THE BOUNDARY QUESTION.

  QUESTION.
  THE EARL OF ROSEBERYasked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Whether he would have any objection to place within the precincts of the House a map showing the boundaries proposed to be assigned to Greece under the arrangements made at Constantinople, and also the boundaries of that country, as fixed at the Conference of Berlin?
  EARL GRANVILLEsaid, he would do so.

CHARITABLE TRUSTS BILL.—(No. 120.)
(The Lord Chancellor.)
THIRD READING.
Order of the Day for the Third Reading read.
Moved, "That the Bill be now read 3a"—(The Lord Chancellor.)
LORD DENMANsaid, that when the Bill had been appointed for the third reading for a previous day, he had been presumptuous enough—as he had announced to the noble Marquess (the Marquess of Salisbury) on account of a new Amendment—to intend to move its rejection. He had thus proposed, because he recollected a Bill on the subject of Affirmations instead of Oaths being rejected—although it had passed the House of Commons, and been brought forward by his lamented Relative—without any previous Notice—even Lord Brougham speaking and voting against his paralytic Friend; but he had given Notice, after the delay, and he called to their Lordships' remembrance the Life Peerage Bill, 1869, which, as at first framed, would have allowed 23 Life Peers, at one time, to sit in their Lordships' House This, in Committee, had been reduced to two; but the present Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, having accused their Lordships of tinkering the Bill, it was thrown out. The other Bill was the London Bridge Approaches Bill; and by the exertions of a noble Earl, late Secretary of State for the Colonies, that Bill had failed to obtain a third reading. He (Lord Denman), failing to obtain a Teller, the Bill was, as stated, passed.
Amendment moved, to leave out ("now") and add at the end of the motion ("this day three months.")—(The Lord Denman.)
On question, that ("now") stand part of the Motion, resolved in the affirmative; Bill read 3a accordingly; amendments made; Bill passed, and sent to the Commons.

MAINTENANCE OF ROADS IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES.—QUESTION.
VISCOUNT SIDMOUTHasked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Whether he will object to instruct the Secretaries of Legation to supply information respecting the systems upon which public roads are constructed and maintained in the different European States to which they are accredited; also, where-ever such information may be procurable to supply statistics showing the costs of maintaining the roads in repair?
EARL GRANVILLEsaid, he had no objection to accede to the request of the noble Viscount.

GREEK FRONTIER.

  ADDRESS FOR A PAPER.
  LORD STRATHEDEN AND CAMPBELL, in rising to call attention to the further Correspondence on the Greek Frontier; and to move for any Protocol or Treaty which forms the basis of the European concert alluded to in several despatches, said: My Lords, although this Notice has been frequently postponed, at the desire or suggestion of the Government, in order that the latest Correspondence might appear, we only just possess it, and I will not pretend that I am thoroughly acquainted with it. I am induced to bring the subject forward by the circumstance of having slightly entered into it in August last, when nearly everyone else had disappeared, and since been led into pursuing it. Had I been certain that discussion would arise from any other quarter I should have been much inclined to avoid it. Whatever bears upon the East provokes comparatively little interest at present, although there are not wanting dangers to remind us that our lamp upon that subject ought to be perpetually burning. At least, with regard to the Greek Frontier, the time is come for looking back on what has happened. A lucid version has appeared in the French Circular, to which I will endeavour to conform myself. My Lords, it would be an error to suppose that the Russian march towards Constantinople, involving many consequences as it did, involved among them a necessity of changing the Greek Frontier. The Treaty of San Stefano, which embodied the ideas and will of Russia, had no allusion to the subject. It would also be an error to suppose that our Plenipotentiaries at the Congress of Berlin led the way in raising such a question. They took measures to uphold the interest of the Hellenic race wherever it existed against the new demands of the Slavonic race; but they desired to reduce as far as possible all territorial accessions. A territorial accession in the interest of Greece was first proposed by M. Waddington, who represented France during the Congress. It is quite true that the Greek Frontier, as established in 1830, has been objected to by some remarkable

  1607
  authorities. Prince Leopold, when he was asked to take the Sovereignty of Greece, desired to enlarge it. Mr. Finlay, the historian, proposed that something should be added to Greece, and, at the same time, that something should be added to the Ottoman Empire. The late Lord Strangford, in a conversation recorded by Mr. Nassau Senior, in his well-known travels, spoke ambiguously, however, of letting Greece obtain more than the line of 1830 had conceded. But these authorities have now been more than counterbalanced by the voice of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe given in a recent volume for which we are indebted to the Dean of Westminster. In a Memorandum only drawn up last year—it is page 60—Lord Stratford de Redcliffe encounters the whole case advanced for the enlargement of the Hellenic Kingdom. The House may recollect that Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, as a diplomatist, was profoundly mixed up with the creation of that Kingdom. He was amongst its earliest advisers. He was thoroughly conversant with its geographical relations. He had watched its history from the outset with advantages which no one else could rival. If I were not anxious to detain the House as little as is possible I should read through the grave and parting admonition he bequeathed to us. These are the main lessons. He contends that the Christian Powers would be perfectly unjustified in forcing a demand upon the Sultan; that the Greeks have no claim whatever on the Ottoman Empire; that the existing Frontier recommended by three Plenipotentiaries and accepted by the London Conference in 1829–30 is essentially a good one; that a large and serious concession would encourage the Greeks in their desire for another, and could not possibly be lasting. His view is summed up in an emphatic phrase of this kind—that the Turks having given no cause of offence to the Greeks, for the interests of Europe required to be strengthened by measures of relief, rather than weakened by further acts of spoliation. So much for Lord Stratford de Redcliffe. The Congress of Berlin may defend itself, however, on the ground that his opinion pronounced in 1880 was unknown to them in 1878. They framed their celebrated Article and Protocol. The two Powers concerned were recommended to negotiate. But as Greece made
  1608
  no offer of indemnity negotiation of the kind was demonstrably fruitless. It was idle to ask the Porte without return to sacrifice a portion of its territory, considering the state of its finances before the war and after. It was like asking a racing man who had lately become insolvent which of his horses he would be disposed to give away, not to satisfy a creditor, but aggrandize a rival. No good was done at Prevesa or Constantinople. The case for mediation had arisen which the Congress had anticipated. Mediation, according to public law, is the effort of a neutral Power, or several together, to induce two conflicting States to adopt a settlement which is proposed to them. There is not any title to compulsion in the process. The States at variance retain their freedom to accept or to reject. A Conference was summoned at Berlin with the avowed design of promoting mediation. If the expedient really aimed at mediation, it was ill-chosen and unfortunate. If it aimed at something else, it was no less clearly disingenuous. The assembled Powers became committed to a Frontier which the Porte was certain to reject, but which its authors could not easily abandon. Had they confined themselves to mediation, another Frontier, or a second or a third, might have been substituted. But they assumed the function of dictators, and would not swerve from a precipitate conclusion. A Naval Demonstration was repeatedly alluded to, and seemed to be impending to enforce it. My Lords, when the mediators threw off their disguise, and openly admitted that they were rather wolves than sheep; that they were rather gendarmes than pacificators; that they did not aim at a reciprocal consent, but a one-sided spoliation, the Sublime Porte resisted, baffled, and defeated them. The Navy was dispersed, the Conference renounced, and arbitration offered. On this stage we ought to dwell a moment. When arbitration was propounded, the recent attitude and language of the Conference was thoroughly condemned by those who had resorted to it. What is arbitration? Here also public law replies for us. It is a process founded on the resolution of two States to accept the arbitrating body as an infallible tribunal, and to abide by its decision. But this is the exact authority the Conference had aimed at. The mediators

  1609
  claimed the deference which only arbitrators can pretend to. But they exposed themselves the moment they declared that mediation and arbitration are distinct from one another. If they are the same, why was arbitration subsequently aimed at? If they are distinct, why for a long time were they confounded? It must have been from either ignorance or violence. The effect, however, was deplorable. Greece was inflamed into what appeared to her legitimate rapacity to be upheld by nearly ruinous expenditure. Her Press, her Sovereign, her leading men abounded in the fiery demand for territory Europe—as they were taught to fancy—had assigned to them. The moment arbitration was projected their title vanished altogether. It was not a matter of surprise that arbitration was repelled by the Sublime Porte after the illegal mode in which the Conference had acted. It had inspired deep distrust in both the possible belligerents. An appeal to Germany was made by our Foreign Office. It is found in the first despatch of the new volume. Negotiations at Constantinople proceeded under German influence, and ended in the Convention now before us. As the French Circular interprets it, Epirus is retained by the Sublime Porte, while Thessaly is alienated from it. Such is the outline of the different stages which occurred in the transaction, and there is only one I should desire for a moment to recur to. The House will see that the Conference, so far from gaining the result it aimed at, was a mischievous obstruction to it. The negotiations, which terminated in a settlement—be it good or bad—were forced to overlook it. They would have taken place with 10 times more facility had no such Conference existed. The line projected by the Conference was always coming back to harass the negotiators at Constantinople by its spectre. It was a rock gratuitously flung into a channel of diplomacy, and it required on the part of those who flung it in the greatest art and judgment to elude it. It was a lion set upon the path by those who afterwards contended with it. Their only triumph is to have gradually surmounted the obstruction they had recklessly created. If they put out a fire, it was the fire they had kindled. The negotiators at Constantinople, under the influence of Germany, inasmuch, as they
  1610
  averted war, deserve the praise of energy and judgment. But it is the energy and judgment which struggles from a quagmire fancifully entered, unless indeed some latent power required the plunge, and barely sanctioned the escape from it. It may seem, however, to your Lordships that it is more important to glance at the results of the transaction which survive it, than to dwell on any of the blots which marked it in it progress. The most palpable result is the diminution of the Ottoman Empire. Its loss is estimated at £1,000,000 sterling of revenue. It is a blow to all the Powers which have to guard Constantinople by its agency. It is a direct impediment to the various reforms they have demanded and to which expenditure was necessary. It is a new misfortune to the creditors of Turkey. But it may be thought, at least, that the Hellenic Party, whom I do not undervalue, ought to be congratulated. Even this is doubtful. If I can venture to interpret them, the Hellenic Party, ever since the time of Lord Byron, their heroic founder, have always looked to a resuscitated Athens. Since the beginning of the struggle with the Porte they have aspired to make Athens the intellectual, political, artistic centre which it used to be. But territorial extension of the kind which has occurred—as Lord Stratford de Redcliffe indeed has pointed out—must foster the well-known desire of the Greeks to move towards Constantinople. Were that object ever compassed, so far from shining as a mistress in the East, Athens must again become subordinate, forgotten and provincial, as she was throughout the night of servitude and dust, from which, half a century ago, her nationality and monuments awakened. It is true, indeed, that beyond the range of the Hellenic Party we encounter a highly vague, but rather prevalent impression that by extending Greece something is accomplished for the solution of the Eastern Question, should adverse fate supplant the Ottoman dominion on the Bosphorus. As soon as it is recollected that the population of the whole Greek race within the Kingdom, within the Islands, and European Turkey, is only rated at 5,000,000, even by Hellenic advocates such as Mr. Lewis Sergeant—whose work appeared a year ago—the fallacy of such a calculation is apparent. Even if Greece assimilated every conflict-

  1611
  ing race between the Danube and the Sea of Marmora for such an aim, her force would be inadequate. It would not be difficult to show that as regards the safety of Constantinople—against Russia—the aggrandizement of Greece is not only useless, but injurious. But I cannot dwell at length on any one of the results to be considered. The next, and last, is most important. The Convention between Greece and the Sublime Porte now before us has no guarantee to uphold the latter against perpetual demands for the unhappy Frontier which the Conference has stereotyped. Greece merely acquiesces in the large amount of territory ceded to her. The gift is so arranged as to achieve the work of a privation. The object which put the Congress of Berlin in movement on the subject is quite as distant as it used to be. It was to bring Greece and the Sublime Porte into a more friendly and less precarious relation. Greece now aspires to the Frontier which the Conference had traced more eagerly than she aspired before to undefined and general encroachment. She is more restless from the ill-conceived arrangements which had no pretext but their tendency to soothe her. The Porte, although reduced, continues to be menaced. At least, the Frontier traced at Berlin may be constantly invoked as that which Europe sanctions, so long as the name of Europe is appropriated by the concert which adopted it. Your Lordships may thus see in what manner the two subjects of my Notice are inseparably linked together. If the concert is still recognized, its Frontier is still the goal and the horizon to be aimed at. In that case, there is perpetual disquietude for Greece, perpetual hazard for the Ottoman Empire. If the concert disappears before the touch of reason or of policy, its Frontier may be set aside, and thus the new arrangement will be comparatively lasting. In the interest of that arrangement—although on other grounds as well—the concert merits strict examination from your Lordships. To save time, I pass over the despatches in which its authority is blazoned; but I have brought down here to-night a series to refer to if desirable. With regard, therefore, to the concert so much vaunted, there is one thing to be remarked upon the surface, even by those who do not care to go too deeply
  1612
  into it. They cannot but remark its inability and nullity. As regards the Greek Frontier it had no effect but that of exciting animosity between two Powers, since the arrangement was brought about by the controlling influence of Berlin. Beyond France there is but one opinion as to what has lately taken place in Tunis, although there may be different judgments as to how the Government have acted. We have observed in Tunis assurances unexecuted, war undeclared, a considerable blow inflicted on the Ottoman Empire by one of the Allies in the Crimea. If an European Concert has no vigour to retard or to discountenance or place in its true light a consummation of this kind, it may be fairly asked for what is it available? Is it for promoting Ottoman improvement, which, indeed, it ostentatiously demanded? It has not established one by its remonstrances. The solution is not a remote one. No concert in which Russia largely figures can exercise an influence over the Sultan. Persuasive faculty must always be denied to it. It was long ago explained by so great a master of international affairs as M. Gentz that the Sublime Porte may listen to the powers which uphold, but not when they are mingled and confounded with the power which habitually assails it. My Lords, when the sterility and weakness of the so-termed concert has been noted, we are naturally led on to ask how much of Europe has been incorporated in it. We are thus led to ascertain that even nominally it consists only of six Powers, from which Spain and Sweden, as well as others less important, are excluded. Of course, those countries cannot be unconscious of the humiliation they submit to. Sweden has an Army of above 100,000 Regulars, and 100 vessels in its Navy. But that is not the limit of her virtual capacity. We must reflect on Sweden, not only as she has been, not only as she is, but as a steady and enlightened policy would make her. Whenever great political capacity arises there, Sweden will attract towards herself the minor States to which she has a geographical proximity. Embracing Denmark only in her system, her force would not be inconsiderable. Can it be said that Sweden was never found in other European combinations? She entered into that of 1815 against Napoleon I., as the recent life of Mr.

  1613
  Herries has informed us—Mr. Herries who at that time was the distributor of subsidies to Europe. In that union even Switzerland appeared. But to proceed to Spain so wantonly disparaged, neither in military nor in naval force is she inferior to Sweden. A volume would not hold the recollections we efface when we declare that Spain is not a member ofthe European system. We must forget the great anxiety her Meet, during the last century, from time to time, occasioned to this country. We must forget the labours of the Duke of Wellington in the Peninsula. We must forget even the mode in which the recent war between France and Germany originated. Our own engagements are, perhaps, the clearest proof that Spain ought not to be entirely disregarded as having passed into an obsolete existence. We are bound to defend Portugal by guarantees so numerous that when Mr. Canning wished to send them to Lord Liverpool—the statement is his own—he could not find in his Department a red box large enough to hold them. But Spain is the only Power by which Portugal, in some contingencies, might be endangered. According to the doctrine of the Government that Europe is complete without a Spanish Representative, Great Britain is prepared, at any moment, to support her old Ally against nonentity and vacancy. It is only from a shadow of the past that Portugal is guarded. If, indeed, the Government have formed a resolution not to defend Portugal, whatever happens, it may be subtle and long-sighted to prepare the world for their inaction, by assuming, even now, that Spain has passed beyond the limits of reality. However, there is still a weighty ground on which it might appear to them that Spain ought not to be dishonoured for equivocal or inconsiderable objects. It is that by retaining Gibraltar we cannot but preserve a certain sensibility on her part. The sensibility may rise to discontent, when it is wantonly inflamed, when it is superfluously trifled with. But, my Lords, the principle on which the concert is established is even more adapted to call in question its validity than the startling voids and perilous deficiencies by which it lays the ground for war, by which it fosters enterprize, imposes self-assertion, and scatters animosity around it. It is a concert to uphold, to second,
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  to co-operate with that Power which is usually regarded as aggressive and is often found to be so. That I may not appear to go beyond the rules of international amenity, let me remark that to describe one Power as aggressive is by no means so injurious as to ignore, to question, or connive at the existence of another. An aggressive Power must have considerable qualities and great resources to impel it. Now, our foreign policy—in spite of variations and vicissitudes—has so far been uniform in tenour that it has nearly always tried to form a balance to the aggressive States—wherever they might be—by which the rest of Europe was awakened into vigilance. The opposite idea might have, indeed, a sort of vindication. To seek an intimate relation with the aggressive Power of the day, in the hope of guiding, moderating, and correcting it, may be an amiable design, and, if history was blotted out, might be a rational experiment. But it has only led, when fairly tried, to conflict and embarrassment. It was attempted, in reference to France, by Charles II. and James II. A century of war with that Power was insufficient to atone for it. It was attempted, far less decidedly, of course, by the late Earl of Aberdeen in reference to Russia. The tombs of the Crimea, to which our attention was called the other day, have been its gloomy refutation. The true objection to this mode of acting may be easily presented. It cannot win the friendship of the aggressive Power, and restrain its movement simultaneously. It does uphold its spirit and facilitate its enter-prizes. It unavoidably insures the hatred and contempt of all the States which feel themselves deserted. If, therefore, heroism, duty, and consistency are finally renounced as unconvincing in their claims and doubtful in their basis; if the defence of Europe is chimerical; if great examples ought to be forgotten and great traditions set aside in an age which is thought to lean towards material delight or sceptical activity; if it is better to be guided by the head of Machiavelli than by the ardour of Lord Chatham; even then reflecting prudence will not sanction the new principle on which the concert has been founded. But, my Lords, the doctrine it maintains should be regarded as the true criterion by which, the virtue of the concert may

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  be measured. After the Conference at Berlin, it was gravely and repeatedly laid down that the Sublime Porte was bound without a fragment of indemnity to sacrifice as much as they demanded of its territory to the award, as they were pleased to term it, of the Powers who usurped the name of Europe at that moment. It was entirely forgotten that according to public law a Sovereign is not at liberty to alienate his territory unless the nation has consented. The whole subject of alienation is discussed in Vattel, Book I., Chapter 1, and Section 265, which noble Lords may readily examine. At first sight, the doctrine of the concert is astounding. If a Sovereign is ordered to give up cities, as the Sultan was required to abandon Mezzovo, Larissa, and Janina, he may be ordered to renounce his capital with similar authority. United Europe—with some omitted Powers—may claim a distant jurisdiction. China and Japan may find their distribution altered by its fiat. It might be necessary for Brazil to enlarge a South American Republic. Let us suppose, however, that the doctrine has a limitation, and is asserted only for the benefit of States which insurrection has created, as against the States from which they have detached themselves. Even in that case, it might bear hardly on Great Britain. United Europe may resolve that a large part of Canada is necessary to a young and mighty federation stifling and panting between the Gulf of Mexico and the St. Lawrence. However, the doctrine may be limited to one quarter of the globe, as well as to a single form of national encroachment. Even then, Spain—regarded by the concert as so vanishing a Power—might be instructed to make more room in the Iberian Peninsula for Portugal, which is so great in Africa, and has' been so successful in America. But there is a better illustration in the case of Holland and Belgium. Belgium sprung from civil war with Holland as Greece emerged from civil war with Sultan Mahmoud. Belgium is so far from being sufficient in resources that it was thought desirable to neutralize her; a process which is not free from inconveniences. Luxemburg is a remote dependency of Holland, on the South-Eastern Frontier of Belgium. In language, taste, and nationality, it is identified with Belgium. But, more than that,
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  you cannot urge that its possession is indispensable to Holland. Not many years ago, the King of Holland was inclined to dispose of it. United Europe, with the greatest plausibility—if they may order anything—might order him to part with it gratuitously. An European object—the security of Belgium—would be advanced by the concession. No European object would have been forwarded by the concession so dictatorially urged upon the Sultan. Will the united Powers reply that they are crusaders in their essence; that they are only leagued against Mahometan dominion; that nothing else can tempt their zeal; that nothing else can shelter their rapacity? But still they ask the Sultan to be guided by their counsels. But still they claim the part of his advisers and his patrons. My Lords, this flagrant inconsistency, if it escapes the ridicule, may yet demand the hesitation of the world before it acquiesces in a concert of which—to sum up the charges I have brought against it—the nullity is only equalled by the arrogance, of which the basis is as weak as the pretension is intolerable. It might further be contended that a series of results would be desirable for Europe to which the so-called concert is a barrier. But I am more inclined to strict reserve upon that subject. There is another topic not so easily passed over. In spite of these remarks against a system to which the Government are leaning, I absolve the noble Earl the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of all responsibility. He may differ in opinion. He may assure the House that he is not to be regarded as the Earl of Dudley controlled in the affairs of his Office by the Duke of Wellington. He may insist that his relation to the Prime Minister is more like that of Lord Bolingbroke to the Earl of Oxford. He may accuse himself, he cannot force another person to accuse him. The origin of so untenable a concert is sufficiently explained without imputing any grave degree of error upon his part. It is found in the peculiar circumstances in which a surreptitious Government presented itself. It is needless, and perhaps imprudent, to dilate on the course of the actual First Lord of the Treasury during the five years which preceded his return to power. It may safely be remarked, however, that love of one Em-

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  pire and hatred of another may kindle eloquence but cannot organize a policy. A concert, in which Russia was really the preponderating force, inevitably sprung from the arrangement, which is still as unexplained and mysterious as when it burst upon our wonder. Such a concert could not be averted by any Secretary of State, however indefatigable. There is only one objection against which I should desire to guard the Motion I submit, and then I may release the House with many thanks for its indulgence. It may be thought that the variety of arguments by which I have opposed the concert now before us ought to suggest a Resolution more explicit to discountenance it. It often occurred to me, and were I immediately connected with a Parliamentary majority I should have probably attempted it. But such a Resolution would have been too hazardous unless secure of being adopted. Beyond that it may not be possible for any Resolution in either House to shake or influence the concert at this moment. It may, no doubt, be put an end to if Russia, intent on other cares, no longer feels inclined to uphold it. The voice of Germany at any moment may dissolve it. It does not seem that Austria is much disposed to recognize its cogency. But long reflection has convinced me that its proper grave will only be discovered in the Ministerial cessation of its author, who does not sit among your Lordships. On that account, Motions with regard to it are less important than they might be otherwise. It is useful—if I am not deceived—to ascertain, as this Notice will, how far the concert stands upon a Treaty as the concert of the Three Powers was formed on one after the events of 1815. But no one ought, on that account, to overlook the certainty that a more stringent agency is requisite to bring back the Continental world either to salutary aims or to legitimate alliances. The noble Lord concluded by moving the Resolution of which he had given Notice.
  Moved, That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty for any protocol or treaty which forms the basis of the European concert alluded to in several despatches.—(The Lord Stratheden and Campbell.)
  EARL GRANVILLE: My Lords, the noble Lord has given reasons why he should not make a Motion which he has
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  not made because he believes this one is sure to be adopted by your Lordships. I doubt that for reasons I shall give. The noble Lord has moved for any Treaty or Protocol which forms the basis of the European Concert alluded to in several despatches. That concert is based, as far as regards that which is commonly called the Eastern Question, on tradition, on the Treaty of Vienna, on the Treaty of Paris of 1856, on that of London of 1871, and on that of Berlin of 1880, and, finally, on the acceptance by all the Powers of the Circular of May 4, which was issued by Her Majesty's Government soon after our taking Office. All these documents have been already presented to Parliament, and it therefore appears somewhat difficult to accede to the Motion of the noble Lord. I have followed the speech of the noble Lord with very great attention; but I am not quite sure that I have been able to master the drift of it. What is the bearing of it? The noble Lord seems to be more Turk than the Turk himself. He objects to an arrangement to which the Turks have agreed, and which I believe they are determined very loyally to carry out. He objects also to the concert of Europe at the very moment when that concerted action has settled two questions of no inconsiderable difficulty. And while he appears to object to the apparent want of harmony in the European Concert, he suggests, in order to make it work more easily, greatly to increase the number of the Powers who have formed that concert. I think it would be better, if, instead of trying to follow very literally what the noble Lord has said, I give to your Lordships a very short statement of what has passed with regard to the Greek Frontier Question. The noble Lord dwelt at considerable length on the merits and demerits of the present Frontier. Notwithstanding his opinion, and notwithstanding the opinions of Lord Stratford De Redcliffe, I believe that Frontier is one that cannot be defended. It is not, however, necessary to trouble your Lordships with the history of the settlement of that Frontier after the War of Independence in 1832. Great objections were raised at the time to that Frontier by the Greeks, by the most sagacious candidate for their Throne, and by eminent statesmen in this country. Those objections have

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  not been disproved by subsequent experience. The existing Frontier has not been successful either as regards Turkey or Greece. It has been a settlement singularly favourable to brigandage on both sides, and a fruitful cause of quarrels verging upon war between the two countries. It was in September, 1876, when Servia and Montenegro declared war against Turkey, that the Greek Government called upon Her Majesty's late Government for some promise that the question of the Greek Provinces should be dealt with at the negotiations which seemed likely to take place at Constantinople; and again at the end of the year a similar request was made when the Conference took place. The answers from the noble Earl (the Earl of Derby) as Secretary of State, and of the noble Marquess (the Marquess of Salisbury), Plenipotentiary at Constantinople, were of a courteous, but negative character. In 1877 Russia declared war against Turkey. The Greeks renewed their application to the British Government. Assurances were given that, when the time came, Her Majesty's Government would do their best to secure reforms for the Greek Provinces. But, in the meanwhile, prudence was recommended in the interest of the Greek population. When in July the Russians had passed the Balkans, fresh movements began on the part of the Greeks on the Turkish Frontier; the Turks complained and threatened; and Her Majesty's Government exercised pressure upon the Greek Government to prevent their involving their country in a ruinous war. The Greeks agreed to do nothing at that moment; but when Plevna surrendered on the 10th of December, 1877, there was a fresh movement. The Russians and the Turks, however, agreed to the basis of a peace. The Turkish Fleet made a threatening movement. The French as well as the British Government gave advice, the results of which were the withdrawal of the Turkish Fleet to Volo, and of the Greek Forces within their Frontier, and, after some further negotiations, the withdrawal of the volunteer bands. In March, before the meeting of the Congress, the noble Earl (the Earl of Derby) told the Greeks that they were fairly entitled to be represented at it. In April, the noble Marquess (the Marquess of Salisbury) held the same language. He inquired
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  from the Turks, without success, whether they were prepared to agree to a Frontier line (about equivalent to the Frontier of the present Convention, although giving a little more of Epirua and a little less of Thessaly); and when the Congress met in June, the noble Marquess proposed and carried, with a modification, the admission of a Greek Representative. It was at this time that the French Plenipotentiary took a leading part in the discussion with regard to Greece. M. Waddington, in common with the Plenipotentiary of Italy, submitted the following proposal:—
  "The Congress invites the Sublime Porte to arrange with Greece for a rectification of frontiers in Thessaly and Eprius, and is of opinion that this rectification might follow the valley of the Salamyrias (the ancient Peneus), on the side of the Ægean Sea, and that of the Kalamas, on the side of the Lonian Sea. The Congress declared its confidence that the interested parties would succeed in coming to an agreement. At the same time, it declared, in order to facilitate the success of the negotiations, that the Powers were prepared to offer their direct mediation to the two parties."
  The Protocol which recorded this proposal thus laid down a line very similar to that originally recommended by the noble Marquess, only it extended it considerably by naming the valleys instead of the rivers to indicate the Frontiers. This Protocol was practically embodied in the Treaty of July, in Article 24. A long correspondence followed, during which M. Waddington proposed immediate mediation, to which Her Majesty's Government objected as being premature; but at last, in December, 1878, the Turkish Government assented to a meeting of Turkish and Greek Commissioners at Prevesa. They met five times, but without any result. M. Waddington then proposed a Conference at Constantinople, which was objected to by the noble Marquess. But Turkish and Greek Commissioners met at Constantinople without coming to any better agreement. Almost M. Waddington's last act before resigning the Foreign Office was to propose a modified Frontier, leaving Janina to the Turks and giving Metzovo to the Greeks. To this the noble Marquess (the Marquess of Salisbury) objected, recommending the question to be settled by a local inquiry, and proposed that an International Commission should meet on the spot. After some objections on the part of the French

  1621
  Government this was agreed to. But this idea was not carried out on account of the delay in getting any answer from the Turkish Government. This was the state of things with which we had to deal when Mr. Gladstone had formed his Administration. With regard to the Treaty of Berlin, which we did our best to carry out, we found that certain important conditions had been fulfilled affecting Austria and Russia, but that besides the question of Armenia and the administration of financial reforms in European Turkey there were two Frontier questions, one that of Montenegro and the other that of Greece, which had not been resolved, both of much difficulty, both involving some sacrifice on the part of Turkey, and each the possible cause of complications which might extend much further. I need only deal with the Greek Frontier Question this evening. Her Majesty's Government on the 4th of May proposed to the Powers to call upon Turkey to reply at once to the proposal of the noble Marquess (the Marquess of Salisbury), which had been presented to the Porte by all the Powers. But the French Government urged that this would not be sufficient. They proposed that there should he a meeting of the Commissioners at once outside of Turkey. We proposed that an option should be given to Turkey, which, however, was objected to by France; and finally our suggestion that, instead of the meeting of Commissioners outside Turkey, the Ambassadors at Berlin should discuss the question, was agreed to, and an intimation to that effect was conveyed to the Porte. The French Government, in the meanwhile, proposed to us a line which would have brought the Frontier beyond Mount Olympus. This appeared to us to go beyond the Protocol. Sir Lintorn Simmons went on a confidential visit to Paris to confer with M. de Freycinet, who consented to modify his views. We informed Lord Odo Russell that we desired to adhere generally to the geographical indications given in the 13th Protocol of the Congress of Berlin. We did not wish to annex to Greece any members of an unwilling Mussulman population, while we desired to give relief to the Greek-speaking inhabitants so far as they were collected in a sufficiently defined district. The French Representative made at the Conference the proposal which was
  1622
  afterwards adopted. He was supported by Italy and by Lord Odo Russell. The Russian Ambassador proposed an extension of territory in favour of Greece, but subsequently agreed to the French proposal, as did also the German and Austrian Representatives. It has been said that the Austrian Government reluctantly consented to the line of the Conference. But Sir Henry Elliot reported a conversation with the Austrian Foreign Minister, in which the latter expressed a fear that Count Szechenyi had not sufficiently shown their satisfaction with it. The Frontier lines proposed by Turkey and Greece, respectively, were rejected by all the Plenipotentiaries. The Turkish Government protested against this Berlin Award, which, however, had been unanimously described by the Powers as in conformity with the spirit and terms of the Treaty and 13th Protocol of Berlin. The Turkish protest had no effect. Her Majesty's Government urged strongly upon the Turks their acceptance of the settlement. M. de Freycinet said that it was out of the question to re-open negotiations, and that the decisions of Berlin were irrevocable. Germany, Austria, Russia, and Italy all held that it must be maintained, and the Turks were so informed. If this attitude on the part of the Powers had been continued, I may be wrong, but I have no doubt myself that the question would have been settled according to the decisions of the Congress and of the Conference of Berlin. I believe, as I had occasion to state at a subsequent period to the Greek Government, that it is impossible for a country of no preponderating strength to resist the will of Europe when firmly and unanimously expressed on a matter affecting the question of maintaining peace. But it cannot be denied that a change occurred in the circumstances of the case. Germany and Austria had always declared that they would not exercise force. The French Government, who had taken the leading part at the Congress and Conference of Berlin, who had urged both upon the noble Marquess (the Marquess of Salisbury) and upon ourselves greater activity, who had only consented to a Naval Demonstration about the Montenegrin Frontier, on the condition that the same measure should be applied for the settlement of the Greek Frontier Ques-

  1623
  tion, who had held encouraging language to Greece, and had, as the Greeks alleged, promised the loan of officers and of arms to her, became aware how strongly opposed the feeling of the French nation was to any energetic action on behalf of Greece. I make no I complaint of this change, which took place first under M. de Freycinet, and still more markedly under M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire. It would have been difficult for them to act in opposition to what was evidently and incontestably the general feeling in France. National feelings of the same sort very strongly influenced the Austrian Government, which, with Germany, had always declared that they were not themselves disposed to use force in the matter; and it must be also admitted that the Albanian difficulty proved to be stronger than it had appeared either at the Congress or at the Conference of Berlin. In these circumstances Her Majesty's Government had to consider carefully what their duty was towards Europe and towards Greece. We had all along most scrupulously avoided, as the Greek Prime Minister has since acknowledged, promising any support to Greece further than what was implied by our joint action with all the other Powers at Berlin. On the other hand, we firmly adhered to our resolution not to abandon the Conference line until we saw some satisfactory substitute, and we declined to exercise pressure upon Greece unless we could assure her of compensation for her self-control. As to the concert of Europe in this matter, we never despaired of its maintenance, and the result has proved us to be right. After many communications the French Government decided to take further action in the matter; they proposed arbitration. We stated that we were not sanguine as to the result on account of the dispositions of both Turkey and Greece; but we gave our willing co-operation to the attempt, as did all the other Powers. It failed from the unwillingness of either of the two parties to agree to defer unconditionally to the award of an arbitration. We then proposed to Germany to take a more active part than she had hitherto done. We were encouraged by the other Powers to do so, and, at the same time, assured that there was little chance of our obtaining success; but we persevered. Prince Bismarck has always
  1624
  minimized the interest which Germany takes in the Eastern Question; but it was always obvious that a great military Empire in the centre of Europe could not really be indifferent to it. This was shown by the preponderating part which Prince Bismarck took at the Congress of Berlin. It has been shown by the important help that he has since given to the settlement of the question. At first he answered our approaches with great caution; but, after some further communications, Mr. Goschen was instructed to stop at Berlin on his way to Constantinople. He then succeeded in coming to a perfect understanding with the Chancellor as to the course to be pursued; and although this programme was, owing to circumstances, somewhat departed from, the result has been a satisfactory arrangement of this most difficult and dangerous question. A Convention was signed between the Powers and Turkey, with an Annexe relating to the evacuation, and a general Protocol of the proceedings. A similar Convention will be signed by Turkey and Greece, and both countries are already engaged in preparations for carrying it out. These documents describe the new Frontier line; they provide, as I proposed in a despatch of June last year, for religious liberty and the enjoyment of rights of property by Mussulmans. They provide for a Delimitation Commission, composed of Delegates of the Powers, of Turkey, and Greece, and for the nomination of Military Delegates as a Commission to act as the intermediaries for the evacuation by the Ottoman authorities and the taking over by the Hellenic authorities of the ceded territories. The evacuation is to take place by portions, and is to be accomplished in five months. We have now no reason to doubt that both countries are working honestly to carry out the arrangement. I cannot pretend that we have obtained for Greece all we should have desired to do; but they have little to complain of in a result which is much due to their own energy, spirit, and, at the same time, self-control, while I hope we have much contributed to it by our persevering support, aided by the co-operation of Europe. We always abstained, as the Greek Prime Minister has himself acknowledged, from giving Greece the slightest encouragement to expect any support from us further than that im-

  1625
  plied by our joint action with the Powers in conference at Berlin; but, on the other hand, we refused to depart from the award of the Conference until we saw some satisfactory substitute placed in its stead, and we also refused to exercise any real pressure until we were able to promise Greece some real compensation for the sacrifice she was called upon to make. Greece has obtained, by the present arrangement, without having recourse to the ultima ratio of war, an addition of more or less 5,000 square miles, being about two-thirds of the Berlin Award, an addition of about 50 per cent to their present territory, an addition greater in extent than that obtained by Germany at the end of the Franco-German War, Provinces of great fertility, with, for the most part, an excellent military Frontier. She has regained very nearly the limits of ancient Greece. This last consideration, I cannot help thinking, ought to be a stimulus to a spirited, energetic, and intellectual race. They cannot appeal to history to show that with such limits a country cannot become famous. Possible complications among the Powers have been averted, great and obvious difficulties for Turkey and Greece have been removed. We have every reason to hope that the relations of the two countries may be for the future on a much more satisfactory footing. I cannot sit down without taking credit for one act of Her Majesty's Government, I mean the retention of Mr. Goschen as special Ambassador at Constantinople during the last year. It required considerable pressure to induce him to accept an appointment in a line to which he had not been accustomed. He undertook it at some self-sacrifice, which, however, must be fully compensated by his conviction that he has greatly contributed by his ability, sagacity, industry, and firmness to the accomplishment of a task which we were told was impossible, which we thought difficult, but which we are justified in saying has been brought to a successful end.
  LORD HOUGHTONsaid, he wished to express his satisfaction at the general result that had been arrived at with regard to the Greek Frontier. The noble Earl who had just spoken had given the House a succinct, a clear, and an interesting account of the steps by which that result had been reached. The
  1626
  noble Earl, however, had not fully explained how it was that the Berlin Conference had promised to give so large an accession of Frontier to Greece without having previously obtained, he did not say an express declaration of consent, but some assurance from Turkey that would have afforded a reasonable hope that the Porte would yield upon the point. Nothing could have been more easy than for the Great Powers, acting in combination, to have forced Turkey to have conceded the point; and if the Porte had declined to give such an assurance, Constantinople itself might have been occupied, inasmuch as Turkey was absolutely helpless in the matter. As it was, the hopes of the Greeks had been excited by the assurances of the Powers; but when the time came for Greece to assert her claim to an extended Frontier, the Powers told her that they could give her nothing but moral support. He entirely agreed with the noble Earl, however, that the arrangement that had now been come to was a satisfactory one, even to Greece herself, because it would not have conduced to her future prosperity to have acquired dominion over a large Mussulman population. He should have been glad, however, if his noble Friend had been able to give the House a more definite explanation with regard to the Albanian difficulty. The true policy of the Turkish Empire was to concentrate itself within the territories occupied by its loyal subjects. Although he acknowledged the excellence of the diplomatic influence which had brought about the result described by the noble Earl, he was afraid that the Eastern Question still remained as difficult and as dangerous as ever.
  THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, it is not necessary that I should trouble the House with many observations, inasmuch as I agree almost entirely with those which have fallen from the noble Lord who has just sat down. With the result which has been arrived at in reference to the Greek Frontier I have no reason to be dissatisfied. Nevertheless, if it were worth while for anyone to undertake to criticize the action of Her Majesty's Government in connection with that matter, I think that that action is open to criticism, in respect of the circuitous route by which the result has been reached. If I were disposed

  1627
  to bring any charge against the Government in reference to this question, it would be based on the haste with which, immediately after their accession to Office, they determined on offering so large a Frontier to Greece, without having previously ascertained whether it was probable that such an offer would be acceptable to Turkey. The proposal made at the Berlin Congress was not made with the consent of Turkey, and in that respect I think that the action of the Congress was of doubtful expediency. We did not think it wise to separate ourselves from our Allies. Lord Beaconsfield gave his assent to the particular Frontier suggested; but he did it in very guarded terms, because, not having the advantage of knowing the manner in which Turkey was disposed to receive the proposal, and, still more, not having the great benefit of the criticism which the local knowledge of the Turkish Plenipotentiaries would have enabled them to offer, there was a danger that the particular Frontier suggested by M. Waddington could not, in practice, be carried into effect. We, therefore, while accepting the general principle of a modification of Frontier, and joining in the expression of our willingness to offer our good offices to procure an agreement between the two Powers, felt that it was wise to accept that particular Frontier in very guarded terms. Scarcely had the Congress separated when the difficulty connected with the carrying out of that portion of the Berlin arrangement which, however vague, generally indicated a large portion of the Province of Epirus, was very strikingly illustrated. From the moment of the murder of Mehemet Ali it became clear that the Albanian difficulty was a real one, and that so long as the Albanian difficulty was in the way the obstacles to an arrangement being effected between Turkey and Greece would be of the most serious kind. The difficulty arose, not merely from the character of the Albanian nationality, from its habitude for war and the resolution it had displayed at all periods of its history, but also from the known influence which, through religious and other feelings, it had on the minds of the authorities at Constantinople. Therefore, both when M. Waddington first pressed that Janina should be included in the cession, and afterwards when he proposed that Janina should be excluded, but
  1628
  that Metzovo should be included, I felt that such proposals contained in them a danger to the peace of Europe, and that France was pursuing an injudicious course in pressing for the inclusion of any considerable portion of Epirus in the proposed cession to Greece. There was already before the Powers—I am not sure whether the Government have any record of it or not—a proposal by the Italian Consul which was very much in effect the result at which the Powers have now arrived; and it was felt by us at the time that there was great wisdom in the escape from the difficulty of the case which he suggested, because the proposal was based on this—that whereas Epirus was inhabited by a Mahomedan population attached to the Turkish connection, and averse to union with Greece, Thessaly was principally inhabited by a Greek population, who desired nothing more than to escape from Turkey and become united with Greece. Knowing the circumspection of the noble Earl opposite, I think that if he had allowed a little time to elapse until his Agents in foreign parts could inform him of the state of feeling and the circumstances of that country, he would not have committed himself to the very extravagant line of Frontier which was suggested by the Conference of Berlin. And although I do not say that any very great evil has ultimately resulted from the somewhat undignified position in which the Powers of Europe placed themselves, still I think it is a misfortune that Europe should have declared a thing to be irrevocable which was ultimately revoked, and that Europe should have strongly insisted on its will in a matter on which that will was eventually disregarded. The friction, too, arising from exciting such hopes on the one side and such great apprehensions on the other was calculated to add considerably to our unpopularity with the Sultan and his Government to which those proceedings led. It also tended to detract materially from the gratitude of the Greek population for the result which has been arrived at. Therefore, it is rather on account of the incidental and collateral consequences of the negotiations, and their effect on our position and influence at Athens and at Constantinople, than on account of their bearing on the ultimate territorial result, that I deplore the haste with which the pro-

  1629
  posals made at the Conference of Berlin were adopted. Congratulations were expressed at the time on the great rapidity with which that decision was reached. I confess I think it affords rather an illustration of the truth of the proverb—" The more haste the less speed." Although I do not contest that the results at last attained have been in the main satisfactory; and although I am far from denying that these consequences are very largely due to the ability and the judgment which Mr. Goschen displayed in the duties which he undertook—and I believe that men of all Parties will join in congratulating him on the result of his labours—I cannot agree with the noble Earl when he cites all this history as a signal and satisfactory proof of the value and efficiency of his favourite idea of the European Concert. I think that the concert of Europe has been proved to be an admirable instrument as long as words and negotiations are concerned, but that it has absolutely broken down whenever it came to deeds. When diplomatic pressure was to be put upon the Turkish Government to induce it to adopt that line of Frontier, the European Concert was very fairly maintained—at least, to all external appearance. But when it became necessary to resort to more stringent measures, the European Concert gave way, because, as the noble Earl said, all the Powers were not equally sincere in their desire that the results of the Conference should be carried out. But that is the difficulty which the European Concert always has to meet. If the Powers were all equally sincere, it would, undoubtedly, be an instrument of unsurpassed vigour and efficiency. But its very nature, involving, as it does, the consent of so many Powers differently situate as to their interests and as to the Constitutional authority by which they are guided, makes it always a matter of the extremest difficulty to bring them to join in any practical action; and, consequently, for ordinary purposes of European government, it is a resource on which it would be unwise to rely. The noble Earl cites these transactions as grounds for believing in the authority of the European Concert. For my part, I confess that, if I correctly followed his remarks, I think they are rather grounds for believing in the authority
  1630
  of Prince Bismarck; and if the noble Earl asks me to believe in that means of settling European difficulties, I am disposed to agree with him, and I hope that Prince Bismarck's authority will al-ways be applied in an equally satisfactory manner. I cannot pass from this subject without expressing the hearty congratulations—which, I am sure, will be concurred in by all Parties among us—to the Greek nation on their improved prospects, and the career which seems to be opened out to them. The noble Earl spoke, I think, with great wisdom when he pointed out that it is now impossible for anybody to say that full play to Greek energy and enterprize has not been afforded by the territory which has been assigned to them by Europe. The friends and the enemies of Greece alike must feel that if in future Greece does not answer the anticipations which so many in Europe have enthusiastically formed about her, it will be only on herself and on her own population that the responsibility must fall. I earnestly hope that any evil forebodings in that respect will not be justified by the event, and that the Greeks may show a splendid contrast to the Turkish administration which they replace. But whether Greece be successful or not, I still would urge on this House and on Her Majesty's Government not to place on it too confident or too exclusive a reliance as a means of resisting that onward march of Slavonic encroachment which so many nations in Europe have reason to apprehend. I fear that the day when small nations, however excellent their spirit, however free their institutions, can oppose an effective barrier to the encroachments of great military Powers has passed or is rapidly passing away. The whole course of modern history, if we look back to it, shows you a process of consolidation incessantly going on—small nations constantly disappearing, and large nations growing more and more powerful and menacing. And every assistance which the advance of science gives to the concentration of vast armies gathered from a widely extended population on a single spot adds to the difficulties with which small nations have to contend in maintaining their place against the greater Empires. If it were possible to hope that any such thing as a federation of the hetero-

  1631
  geneous nations which make up the Balkan Peninsula could ever be formed, perhaps on such a defence some expectations might be based. But I do not think that anybody can believe that so unlikely an amalgamation can take place. And in the absence of it you must not trust—however much you may admire the qualities which distinguish the Greek race—you must not trust to small nations of that kind effecting the objects which even a nation like Turkey, with all its military power, is unable to secure. It is for you to maintain an unceasing vigilance for English interests which English power is alone able to sustain.
  THE EARL OF ROSEBERYsaid, the noble Lord (Lord Houghton) complained that the Government had not consulted the Turks before they made any proposition on the Greek Frontier in the Berlin Conference. The noble Lord and the noble Marquess (the Marquess of Salisbury) professed to be extremely surprised at the course of proceedings; but he would have thought that the noble Marquess, who knew more of Turkish feeling than any person in that House, would have been the last person to express that surprise. Suppose the course had been taken that was suggested, and that the Government had waited to consult the Turks as to whether they wished or did not wish the surrender of these Provinces to Greece, what would have been the result? It was shown in every page of the Blue Books that the Turks, who had not lost their cunning, would have been able to prevent the solution of this problem. The noble Marquess had also said something as to the haste or rashness of the Government, on entering Office, proposing the cession of territory to Greece. He did not know as to the cession; but he believed they did lay before the Porte a proposal for a Conference to settle this matter. The Conference met, and the noble Marquess complained that the Government went behind to carry out the decisions of the Congress; and said that the policy pursued by Her Majesty's Government, if not discreditable, at least ended in a fiasco, because it caused the decision of the European Concert to be disregarded. But look at the alternative which the noble Marquess suggested—namely, that Her Majesty's Government should proceed with the Conference, that the Powers should meet, and then, after
  1632
  arriving at a solemn decision, retrace the decisions at which it had just arrived. It did appear to him that if there was one way of bringing the European Concert into contempt, it was the way suggested.
  THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: I never proposed that the Government should depart from the European Concert; but I said it would be wiser, before settling at the Conference the proposal which was made by myself and France, that the Government should obtain a greater knowledge of the feelings of the Turkish Government and population, with respect to whom that proposal was made.
  THE EARL OF ROSEBERYsaid, the feelings of the Turkish Government were very well known; but he was sorry he had mistaken the meaning of the noble Marquess, because he understood him to have imputed rashness to the Government. The European Concert had been a good deal flouted that night, and the noble Lord who had introduced the subject said the smaller Powers of Europe were not admitted. They could only congratulate themselves on the proceedings of the European Concert. No one believed that Turkey would have given up an acre or a rood of ground if it had not been for the European Concert; and how could the Montenegrin question have been settled if not for the European Concert? When it was remembered that the European Concert had resulted in the settlement of the Dulcigno and Greek difficulties, it seemed to him strange that they should hear the same complaint proceeding from the same quarter. He had read the Blue Book submitted to their Lordships, and he must congratulate the Government on its contents. It was not merely that they had extremely interesting despatches from Mr. Goschen, which breathed throughout common sense and determination, and which showed that had it not been for the policy of determination pursued by the Government, together with the European Concert, this concession would not have been fulfilled. The Government, no doubt, would have been glad if the decision of the Berlin Conference could have been adhered to; but the Committee over which he presided—the Greek Committee—without acknowledging that the largest possible accession of

  1633
  territory to Greece had been obtained, saw that it was a fear for the consequences to the peace of Europe that led to that decision not being carried out. He did not believe, however, that any Member of that Committee, or that any subject of the King of the Hellenes, could read those Blue Books, and not acknowledge that the utmost possible concession of territory had been obtained from Turkey by the exertions of Her Majesty's Government. He did not know that any course of action could have obtained a better result for Greece, because it was all very well for those who belonged to what the noble Lord called the Hellenic Party to refer as to what were the limits of their wishes and aspirations; but it was the duty of the Government to look first to the great interest of the Empire—especially in this question. What was their interest in this question? Surely it was the European Concert, which had been so much decried that night. There was one Power who thought moral compulsion should be applied to the Porte. Well, moral compulsion applied to the Porte usually produced immoral results—that was to say, no result at all. He tendered his congratulations to the noble Earl (Earl Granville), not merely for having given an adequate concession of territory to Greece, and not merely for having preserved the peace of Europe, but also for having kept together a most splendid yet efficient instrument—the European Concert.
  THE EARL OF KIMBERLEYsaid, he thought it singular that the noble Marquess, who complained that the Government had not first ascertained the views of the Powers and nationalities concerned, had himself afforded an instance of the success that might have been arrived at in that way when he acted in accordance with his own principles in 1878. Singularly enough the noble Marquess then suggested as extensive a line as was afterwards proposed at the Berlin Conference; but what became of that proposal? The noble Marquess practically got no answer on it from the Porte. That was what always happened in negotiations with the Porte. The initiatory proceedings in this matter were of more importance than any subsequent transaction could be; and by the original proceeding at the Berlin Congress Greece was led to expect that
  1634
  she might have a large extension of territory. The noble Marquess has accused the present Government of having acted with haste. The noble Marquess, however, after setting his hand and seal to that which was the commencement of the whole affair, left this question for two years without any progress being made; and it seemed to him (the Earl of Kimberley) that it was then a matter that required some haste, because if haste had not been shown in resuming it there might have been war in the East. The Government, in proposing that the matter should be resumed, were simply acting in accordance with the 24th Article of the Treaty of Berlin. The noble Marquess could not refrain from making his usual protest against the European Concert. The noble Marquess appeared to have a singular idea of diplomacy. For his own part, he had always regarded diplomacy as a contrivance for avoiding the application of force; but the noble Marquess seemed to think that diplomacy was useless without a resort to force. It was not often that the great European Powers could be induced to unite in order to employ force. If they indeed united with that object they would be all-powerful, and there would be no more wars. The real use of the European Concert was to bring diplomatic pressure to bear, and, in the present case, that pressure had been brought to bear most satisfactorily. He was not sanguine enough to hope that the European Concert could operate universally to solve all international difficulties; but, nevertheless, if its efforts were successful in a few cases only, they would be highly beneficial to Europe; whereas if questions were left to the action of only one or two of the Powers, he should despair of preserving the peace of Europe.
  LORD STRATHEDEN AND CAMPBELL, in reply, said: My Lords, I shall only detain the House by one or two remarks the noble Earl the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has rendered necessary. Although absolving him from blame, I was not aware, as he supposes, that I had lavished eulogy upon him. But now, at least, he has well merited the praise of courage in venturing to set up his own authority against that of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe on such a point as the Greek Frontier. He has also won a title to the character of pru-

  1635
  dence in not attempting to-night to uphold the European Concert against the various reproaches it elicits. The noble Earl professes inability to understand the drift of all my former observations. It may be resumed in a minute. I indicated that the Conference at Berlin was a flagrant and unpardonable error, which nearly led to war between Greece and the Sublime Porte; that the Greek Frontier was arranged at last, as it might have been at first, by German influence at Constantinople; that unless the so-called European Concert is dispelled the arrangement cannot be a lasting one; that it ought to be abandoned upon every ground which just ideas of foreign policy suggest to us. It now appears to be devoid of any special Treaty to consolidate it; so that, although the Motion is withdrawn on that account, it will not have been useless. Some noble Lords have been betrayed to-night into a rather intricate discussion on the merit or the inconvenience of the concerts organized in Europe. Let me suggest to them a practical criterion when any system of the kind is offered to their notice. Let them inquire and ascertain whether the concert is designed to check aggressive power, or, on the contrary, to aid it.
  Motion (by leave of the House) withdrawn.

ARMY—DESERTIONS.

  OBSERVATIONS.
  LORD STRATHNAIRNsaid, he rose to call attention to the statement made by the Under Secretary of State for War on the 20th of June, that desertions had fallen to 2,000 a-year under the short-service system, whilst a War Office Return laid before the House on the 19th of February 1880, gives the following result:—In 1874 there were 5,572 desertions, in 1875 there were 4,382, in 1876 there were 4,878, in 1877 there were 5,058, and in 1878 there were 5,406. These figures showed an annual average of 5,059 desertions, or more than 300 per cent than had been stated by the noble Earl.
  THE EARL OF MORLEYsaid, he thought he might save the noble and gallant Lord trouble by at once stating that what he had said on the occasion referred to, as the noble and gallant Lord had, unintentionally, no doubt,
  1636
  completely misrepresented him. The words he used were—
  "In five years of long service, from 1866 to 1870, inclusive, deducting those who rejoined, the desertions averaged 2,158, and in an equal period of short service they averaged 2,460, being a yearly increase of 302."
  LORD STRATHNAIRNsaid, that direct desertions from regiments had been always considered a very serious crime and dangerous, and an indication of bad discipline and feeling, want of esprit de corps when it became extensive. But it was not astonishing, for all officers of regimental experience, not the experience of officers who had served on the Staff only, and authors of one-sided articles in periodicals, but the officers who had studied and knew the feelings of their men, their weak points, and their good points, had all along predicted that short service—that was, general service, which changed the soldiers continually from regiment to regiment, which offered no military future, but only 6d. a day for six years, with no prospect but a very uncertain civil employment, and then left them on the pavé with nothing at all—could engender nothing but distaste for the Service. All the commandants of depôts that he had seen concurred in saying, speaking from their own experience and that of their recruiting staff, that the Service and recruiting had no worse enemies than the short service and Reserve discharged soldiers, and used language respecting both which would not bear repetition. But while these authorities gave these opinions as to short-service soldiers, they held very different opinions of the old pensioners, who, they said, were the best recruiting sergeants, because they advised the adventurous spirits of their districts and villages who they knew would make the best soldiers to enlist and serve the Queen faithfully in all those varied climes and countries where the English soldiers' lot led them, to obey their officers, and do their duty to their Queen and country, and before the enemy at any sacrifice; and then, if spared from death by climate or war, to return to their homes to independence from the workhouse given them by a generous country and grateful Sovereign. The second class of desertions was that from one regiment to another, and to many other regiments. But the worst remained to be told, and that was the

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  most dangerous—fraudulent enlistment. Statisticians said it applied to no less than one-third of the Army. He referred to recruits who were that they were of the proper recruiting age when they were under that age. What chance had our youthful Army enlisting at 18 years of age, and then deluged up to one-third of their strength by perjured boys from 18 to 15, whose strength, when heavily loaded, was certain to collapse in marches and operations of war, and with it their moral powers and their courage? They had reinforced the Army by a Reserve which was not to fight except in wars with a foreign Power or in distant India. In either of these cases civil employment, the means of the existence of this Reserve, disappeared, and with it the Reserve. They had given the officers of the Army an education half military, half civil, and the half civil tainted by the competitive study of immoral and debasing literature—an education which he had repeatedly told their Lordships no honest Englishman would give his children.
  THE EARL OF MORLEYsaid, it was unnecessary to answer the speech of the noble and gallant Lord, inasmuch as it was based upon an unintentional misinterpretation of a speech which he made in their Lordships' House a few days ago. The point in which the noble and gallant Lord had misunderstood him in speaking of desertions was in reference to the men who, having deserted, had rejoined the Service in other branches. He had not used the words "to other branches," which would obviously be inapplicable. What he said was that in five years preceding the short service, deducting those men who rejoined the Army, the average annual number of desertions was 2,158, and since the period of the short service 2,460, making an increase of 302. These figures were absolutely correct. It was, if he might say so, absurd to talk of waste in the Army without taking into account the total number of deserters who rejoined.

  PETROLEUM (HAWKING) BILL [H.L.]
  A Bill to regulate the hawking of Petroleum and other substances of a like nature—Was presented by The Earl of DALHOUSIE; read 1a. (No. 139.)
  House adjourned at Eight o'clock, till To-morrow, a quarter before Five o'clock.