HL Deb 21 June 1881 vol 262 cc962-79
EARL DE LA WARR

, in asking what were the present diplomatic relations, between this country and the Regency of Tunis, and in moving an Address for Copy of M. Roustan's Circular promulgating a decree of His Highness the Bey of Tunis constituting him, as French Minister resident, the sole official intermediary between all foreign representatives and the Government of Tunis; also for copy of the instructions issued to the British Political Agent at Tunis on the subject, and for other papers and correspondence relative to the treaty recently concluded between France and Tunis; said, he wished to address their Lordships on a subject which he believed the noble Earl opposite the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs thought ought to be allowed to sink into oblivion sub silentio—"unwept." He would not say "unhonoured and unsung," for he gathered from what had fallen from his noble Friend at different times that transactions which had recently taken place, to which he was about to allude, were in his view honourable, and that it was a matter of rejoicing that a nation which made civilization its watchword had discharged what had been described as a "sacred duty" in taking an uncivilized country, as it was said, under its protection and nurturing care. He was sorry to say that he entirely differed from his noble Friend. He deeply lamented what had occurred. He saw in the steps taken by France with regard to Tunis much to deplore. He could not see that the course which had been adopted was an honourable one, neither Could he see any cause for rejoicing that the so-called greater civilization of France was to be introduced into the Regency of Tunis. Viewing it apart from British interests, he conceived that Tunis was regarded as an uncivilized country, and that it needed the genial influence of a great Western Power to soften its manners and reform its abuses. He was inclined to take a somewhat different view. He doubted the existence of much sympathy between Western and Eastern civilization, and the good resulting from the contact of one with the other, and he thought he discerned in the Treaty of 1875 between this country and Tunis traces of civilization as great as in Treaties between what were generally regarded as the most civilized countries of Europe. Events had passed in rapid succession. It was but a few months ago that he himself saw the Regency of Tunis a prosperous and a contented country, under the mild sway of its own Ruler, where natives and foreigners traded together in friendly intercourse, with agriculture and commerce flourishing. But a change had passed over it. A foreigner now ruled; the Sovereign was all but a prisoner; his officers had been dismissed; and the Political Agents of Foreign Powers accredited to him could no longer approach him, save only through the Minister of the Power which had laid violent hands upon his country. He desired to abstain from the use of any expressions which might be construed in an offensive manner; but he did think that the time was come when secrecy and dark and ambiguous forms of speech should cease to be used, and that the truth of all that had taken place should no longer be concealed. The subject was not a new one. As long ago as July, 1878, the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Bourke) was asked in the other House of Parliament— To explain whether there are any grounds for the rumours about changes in the Mahommedan territories of Tunis and Tripoli as respects their transfer to Italy and France?"—[3 Hansard,, ccxli. 1580.] No information was, however, given. But it would be noticed that the question of Tripoli as well as Tunis was at that time also supposed to be agitated; and if any of their Lordships should be disposed to regard what had happened at Tunis as a solitary instance of aggressive action, he would ask whether it was likely to continue to be so? There was another country not very different in geographical position, and not very different in its political status, which might be found before long to be inconveniently close to Tunis, as Tunis was to Algeria. He alluded to Tripoli; and beyond Tripoli there was a country with which the interests of England were closely allied. He meant Egypt; and if at the present time not even a protest was made against the aggressive action of France, we might be involved not long hence in graver and more serious complications. He could assure their Lordships that he was not speaking without some knowledge of what had passed and of what was now going on. If he asked for information from the noble Earl opposite, possibly he might be told either that there was none, or that it would be given at a future day, or that it was inconvenient that any should be given at all, or that he was in possession of all that the noble Earl knew, as it came from an undoubted source—and so it did, and he did not hesitate to say that he relied upon it more than upon what had been given from other sources; and therefore it was that he felt he might ask their Lordships' serious attention to the present position in which this country was placed with regard to its political and commercial relations with Tunis. Now, in the year 1875, a Convention was concluded between England and Tunis, by which this country was treated as "the most favoured nation," and great advantages were given, both politically and commercially. By this Treaty Her Majesty's Political Agent and Consul General was accredited to the Bey with "every privilege and immunity which is paid or allowed to the representative of any other nation whatsoever," and also the most favourable terms were made with reference to the import of British goods and manufactures. An ad valorem duty of 8 per cent was fixed as the maximum, or a specific duty equivalent thereto. But what was the present state of affairs? They were informed that Her Majesty's Political Agent and Consul General accredited to the Bey had been removed from the position which he occupied so far as that he could now no longer communicate with the Bey or his Government except through the medium of the French Mi- nister. This was the first result of the Treaty which had been forced upon the Bey. The consequences of this were manifest. All transactions, political or commercial, between this country and Tunis must be carried on through the Minister of a Foreign Power, who might or might not be friendly to us. If Treaties were to be made or revised—and the Treaty of 1875 might be subject to revision in 1882—all must pass through this channel, and England, which had been treated "as the most favoured nation," and had Treaties of great commercial value with Tunis, might be obliged to make very different terms when commercial questions were brought under French supervision. Now, in the despatch of the noble Earl opposite, dated May 20, 1881, great stress was laid upon the assurance given by the French Government "that all existing connections between Tunis and Foreign Powers will be maintained and respected;" but he would really ask his noble Friend whether it was possible, even with the greatest diplomatic ingenuity, to say that the Treaty was maintained and respected when the Agent and Consul General of Her Majesty was excluded from access to the Bey or his Government, except through the medium of the French Minister? This was a question of grave importance, and one which excited considerable interest throughout the country, especially considering how important it was to us to maintain our prestige and supremacy in the Mediterranean. He would, therefore, put it deliberately and seriously to Her Majesty's Government whether these things were to be passed over in silence, as though they were matters of no concern to the country, as if outside their Lordships' House no notice was taken of them? He could not for a moment suppose that the manufacturing and commercial interest of this country would rest satisfied with this transfer of English influence to France. He believed if this Treaty were acknowledged and no protest were made against it, that perplexing and complicated questions would arise and the political and commercial position of this country would be seriously affected by it. But, apart from this, which was, it appeared to him, a most important aspect of it, he would ask was it consistent with the honour and dignity of this country that Her Majesty's Political Agent and Consul General accredited to the Bey should no longer be able to approach him, and that he should be informed by a Circular from the Minister of a Foreign Power that he could only do so through him? Such, as it seemed, was the present position of diplomatic relations between this country and Tunis; and it must not be forgotten that there were not less than 10,000 British subjects in the Regency of Tunis, who, if this Treaty, which had been forced from the Bey, were acknowledged by Her Majesty's Government, would be handed over to a Foreign Power and their interests placed under its protection. These were some of the reasons why he wished to ask the noble Earl opposite what were the present diplomatic relations between this country and Tunis, in what position Her Majesty's Political Agent was placed, and how he was to discharge the duties with which he had been intrusted, if all communications between the Sovereign to whom he was accredited and the Government of this country were to pass through the hands of the Minister of a Foreign Power? He would further observe that by the Convention of 1875 the rights of British subjects were secured, Consular Courts were established for the adjudication of all cases between British subjects, so also were their rights secured in cases where British and Tunisian or foreign interests were concerned. He might refer to the Enfida case still pending, of which they had heard so much. But how would it now be? All would be subjected to the authority and will of a Foreign Power over which we had no control. He could hardly conceive a position more humiliating or more injurious to British interests. And now he must refer for one moment to the recent protest of the Porte, which appeared in The Times of the 16th of June, of which he concluded the noble Earl opposite had received an official copy. It would seem that already French interference had reached Tripoli. We were informed that the French Consul addressed a letter to the Governor General of Tripoli stating that, in pursuance of the recent Treaty between France and Tunis— He begged to submit to him a list of Tunisians resident in Tripoli and requested that those persons be henceforth considered as French protected subjects. No wonder some alarm was felt in various quarters as to what might be the next step, what further violations of International Law might take place, or what further aggressions might be made. Their Lordships well knew that England was not the only country watching passing events on the Northern shores of Africa. Italy was not a silent spectator, for Italy was deeply interested in them. He firmly believed that if the voice of England had earlier been raised—and he trusted that it was not yet too late—this unhappy complication, so damaging to English interests and dangerous to the peace of Europe, would not have occurred. Moved, "That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty for copy of M. Roustan's Circular promulgating a decree of His Highness the Bey of Tunis constituting him, as French Minister resident, the sole official intermediary between all foreign representatives and the Government of Tunis; also copy of the instructions issued to the British Political Agent at Tunis on the subject, and for other papers and correspondence relative to the treaty recently concluded between France and Tunis."—(The Earl De La Warr.)

THE EARL OF DUNRAVEN

said, he thought their Lordships were indebted to the noble Earl for having brought this question forward, as the matter involved was one of very great importance in many of its aspects, and one, morever, concerning which their Lordships' House and the country had a right to ask for information at the hands of Her Majesty's Government which would have a tendency to smooth out the tangled skein of difficulty in which this country was placed, not only in reference to the Bey of Tunis, but to the Ottoman Porte and to France. The French began by saying that their only object in landing a force on Tunisian territory was to punish some unruly Kroumirs, and to see that French interests were better attended. The result, however, was that they had actually annexed the country. He did not wish to impute any bad faith on the part of France, knowing how difficult it was at the commencement to estimate how far matters would go; but he thought they had grounds sufficient to justify them in asking the Government to give them some information as to what it was thought affairs would lead to, and how far English interests were likely to be involved. He could not but think that the Treaty which had been signed between the Bey of Tunis and the French Government had altered the relations of Her Majesty's Government to that of Tunis, in that, as was well known, it abrogated the right which the British Consul or Political Agent in Tunis had always hitherto enjoyed of free access to the person of the Bey in cases where the interests of British subjects were affected. This right had been taken away by a Treaty which the Bey said he was compelled by force to sign. On this point he would venture to quote the opinion of Wheaton, who, in his work on International Law, wrote as follows:— The usage of all times, and especially the more recent times, authorizes public Ministers of every class to confer on all suitable occasions with the Sovereigns at whose Courts they are accredited on the political relations between the two States. In a subsequent portion of his work Wheaton used these words— Consuls and other commercial agents not being accredited to the Sovereign or Minister of Foreign Affairs are not in general considered as public Ministers, but the Consuls maintained by the Christian Powers of Europe and America near the Barbary States are accredited and treated as public Ministers. He had not the slightest doubt that their Representative in Tunis enjoyed the privilege of access to the person of the Bey, and that such privilege had been taken away from him by the French Political Resident after signing the Treaty of the 12th of May, which Treaty their Lordships were aware the Bey signed under protest, stating that he was compelled to sign by force. It had been stated that their Treaties were to be maintained; but it was impossible that they could be maintained, seeing that they must, of necessity, be broken in the most important part he had mentioned—that their Minister should have access to the Bey, and be able to appeal directly to him in cases affecting the interests of British subjects. As far as the actual position of affairs in Tunis was concerned, it seemed to him to resemble, for all practical purposes, an annexation by France, though it was described as being simply a temporary occupation. How far their duty, as one of the Signatories of the Treaty of Paris, was affected by the present situation in Tunis he hoped they should hear from the noble Earl the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. The question affected them in three ways. In the first place, it affected their duty as a Signatory of these Treaties; secondly, as to how far the state of things in Tunis might affect their commercial and Imperial interests; and, also, they had to look at it to consider the manner in which the state of things existing in Tunis had been brought about, and whether it had been conducted with proper deference to the honour and dignity of this country. Tunis, at all events, had always been considered as forming a part of the Ottoman Empire by this country, and, he believed, was so considered by France up to 1824; it was so recognized by Russia, seeing she withdrew her Representative upon the war with Turkey; and it was so recognized by Germany. It was stated in the most straightforward and clear language the other day by the noble Earl the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that England still looked upon Tunis as forming part of the Ottoman Empire, and that he did not feel it right to interfere in the disposition of that country. Well, he (the Earl of Dunraven) would like to know whether they intended not only to interfere with the partition of the Ottoman Empire, but whether they, as Signatories of the Treaties of Paris and Berlin, were bound to interfere, if the integrity of the Ottoman Empire and the rights of the Sultan were interfered with? That was a question which it would be interesting to their Lordships to have an answer to, if Her Majesty's Government could give one. Even if the occupation of Tunis was not an infringement of the rights of the Sultan, or an invasion of his Empire, there could be no question of one thing—that France had taken over the management of the foreign affairs; in other words, France adopted the position of a Suzerain over Tunis. In the discussion on the Transvaal some time ago, the noble Earl the Secretary of State for the Colonies (the Earl of Kimberley) stated that England's having control over the Transvaal Boers made her, in fact, a Suzerain, and that suzerainty exactly described the position of England in having control over the foreign affairs of the Transvaal Boers; and the noble Earl went on to state that their having control over 40,000 people without any access to the sea was a matter of very considerable importance. If it was, how much more important must be their relations with 2,000,000 of people, forming a portion of the Great Ottoman Empire, having a sea-board of 500 miles on the Mediterranean, and commanding a great portion of that sea? It seemed to him that whether the Dominions of the Sultan were infringed upon or not, France, in Tunis, had taken upon herself the suzerainty in that country which they had hitherto allowed to exist in the Ottoman Porte. As to the effect on their power he did not wish to say much. With respect to their immediate interests, England had a considerable amount of trade with Tunis, and through Tunis with the interior of Africa, as to which trade very favourable arrangements had been entered into with Tunis. In these days, when already certain ports were closed against them, they ought to be thankful for small mercies. Their goods were only charged 8 per cent ad valorem duty and they had had considerable trade. But if the entry into the interior was blocked to them through Tunis, there would remain only Morocco; and if Morocco were blocked to them, the interior of Africa would be entirely closed to their trade. That was a matter which was rather serious, because they must not forget that their only trade was with savages aud semi-savages, and their Colonies and Dependencies. If they were shut out of Tunis they could not deal with the semi-savages of the interior. Then, again, the whole of their Indian, Australian, New Zealand, and China trade passed through the Malta Channel, and he need not point out the change that would arise if that channel were at all threatened. That, indeed, was the most important part of the export trade of this country, and anything which could, in the slightest degree, endanger that trade was a subject which deserved the most serious consideration by Her Majesty's Government. Malta was supplied with meat and grain from Tunis, and a great deal of the coasting trade was carried on by Maltese vessels. The effect, therefore, upon the British Empire of the overthrow of the balance of power in the Mediterranean which would be caused by the preponderance of one Power on the littoral of the Mediterranean could scarcely be overrated, as it might render necessary the consideration on the part of this country of how the balance of power in that sea could be re-adjusted. But the question as to their trade was that which was of more immediate importance, because, as he had said, the greater bulk of their export trade must pass through the Malta Channel, and that trade could be very much threatened and placed in a difficult and precarious position by any Power having control of or the capability of endangering the safety of that channel. But what he thought was more of present moment than anything else, was the most extraordinary manner in which recent affairs had been conducted in Tunis. The danger to England of French preponderance in the Mediterranean was one which could not now be considered very pressing. France was, and had for a long time been, a good friend and Ally of this country; and, that being so, he confessed he was more than astonished at the extraordinary way in which she had acted in Tunis as regarded this country. Their Lordships were aware that an English vessel had been stopped on the high seas and searched by a French vessel, and that another English vessel had been taken into port and searched. That was an action of which, as far as he knew, between two friendly Powers they had no other instance. At all events, it was a most extraordinary circumstance, even for a belligerent, and one very hard to find a parallel for. The French Government stated very properly that the commanders of their vessels had exceeded their orders; and, certainly, they had exceeded them in a most extraordinary manner. However, this matter had been apologized for, and nothing more was to be said about it; but he should have thought the French officials would afterwards have been more careful not to offend the dignity of this country, or hurt the feelings of Englishmen again. He saw, however, in the papers that Englishmen had been recently more or less grievously insulted in Tunis. One of Her Majesty's Consuls was accused of intriguing against France, another was accused of murder, and a third of selling powder to the Arabs, and so forth; and, as far as he knew, no explanation or apology had been offered in respect of these matters. But the most remarkable matter of all was the extraordinary attitude which our Political Agent had been forced to assume, and the novel manner in which the intelligence had been communicated to him and to the other Foreign Representatives resident in Tunis. This country had had Treaties with Tunis for 200 or 300 years, under which the privilege of a direct appeal was allowed to our Political Agent in respect of the lives and properties of the 9,000 or 10,000 British subjects resident in Tunis. What had recently occurred, however, placed the Sovereign of this country in a very novel position. Having concluded a Treaty giving the privilege to our Political Agent to which he had referred, that privilege had been set aside and the Treaty altered, not by the Bey, or by the Sultan, but by the Representative of another foreign country. That was a novel position, he ventured to say, for a Representative of England to find himself placed in. He thought the situation of British subjects, who found themselves in Tunis, was also a novel and peculiar one. Instead of being entitled to appeal through our Political Agent directly to the Bey to demand justice, a British subject in Tunis would now be forced to sue for justice to the Representative of a Foreign Power. That was a state of things which he could only describe as being insupportable; and he trusted they would have some information from Her Majesty's Government which would explain these matters, and would tend to allay the uneasiness which must be felt, not only by that House and in Parliament, but throughout the country. These matters did not improve by keeping. Such a state of things was a novel sensation for the people of this country, and the sooner such uneasiness in their minds was removed the better it would be. He trusted Her Majesty's Government would find it convenient to give information on these subjects. He should be the last to ask Her Majesty's Government for information; but these matters were of a serious and pressing nature, and if Her Majesty's Government could give them information that would set their minds at rest, he thought it would be to the interest of Parliament and the country.

LORD LAMINGTON

said, that he concurred in the opinions expressed by the noble Earl who had introduced the subject. He could not but think, however, that at the outset the noble Earl the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had treated the action taken by the French Government in a proper spirit. The explanation given in the earlier stages of this matter to the effect that the French Government had informed Lord Lyons that there was no intention of annexation was satisfactory enough; but the subsequent conduct of France through its Agents had been far from satisfactory. The question now stood in a very different position to what it formerly did. There were most important interests on the part of this country to be conserved, compared with which the question of annexation dwindled into insignificance. The result of the unhappy policy of the French Government was seen in the recent events which had happened at Marseilles. He must express his approval of the course taken by the noble Earl the Secretary for Foreign Affairs. He trusted, however, that the Government would display firmness as well as prudence in their future policy on the subject, and that they would be able to place on the Table Papers which would be of a satisfactory character.

LORD STANLEY OF ALDERLEY

said, that the attitude now taken by Her Majesty's Government was inconsistent, since the country had been told that British interests and Treaty rights should be maintained, and it had also been, told that the British Political Agent must go to M. Roustan on behalf of British subjects; yet it was but a few years ago that Her Majesty's Government had waged war against China for the sake of obtaining access to the Emperor for Her Majesty's Representative. It was much less necessary to obtain access to the Emperor, instead of to the Chinese Ministers, than it was to get access to the Bey himself, instead of to the representative of interests which were frequently opposed to those of British subjects. Another point was that it was often stated that the hands of Her Majesty's Government were tied by what had been unadvisedly said by a Member of a former Government; but that must be left out of account, since the affair had taken a new departure from the declarations made by M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Paris, and it was no offence to France to hold the French Government to those declarations.

THE EARL OF CAMPERDOWN

said, that it was quite clear, whether the word "annexation" was used or not, that France was now in possession of Tunis. It was equally clear that the Bey was in subjection to a Power with which a few months ago he was on equal terms. It was not, however, equally clear what had been done by England from the first. They had all read with very great interest the letters which detailed the conversations which had been alluded to elsewhere by the noble Marquess opposite; but what he should like to know was what was the position which England took up from the first with regard to this question at the time of those conversations? Everything that England had done since that time had been explained to Parliament. But the information on the attitude of England in the first instance was still very insufficient, and it would be a great advantage if some further information were given on that point.

EARL GRANVILLE

My Lords, I have no doubt that my first few sentences will be satisfactory to your Lordships, whatever may be the case with the others. I have very great pleasure in agreeing to the Motion of the noble Earl opposite, and, in point of fact, had he not made the Motion, it was the intention of Her Majesty's Government to have presented the Papers for which he has asked. I have no doubt that they will give the best explanation of the question as to the relations between this country and the Regency of Tunis. Having said this, I do not quarrel in the slightest degree with the noble Earl, either for his tone or for what he has said. He has been perfectly consistent throughout. He has been perfectly consistent in utterly condemning Her Majesty's Government for not having opposed—I do not know to what extent he would have carried the opposition—that great increase of political supremacy which there is no doubt France has now established in Tunis- I twitted him the other day for standing alone in this opinion in this House. I can no longer use that taunt, because he has now been more or less supported by individual Members of this House. What I wish to point out is this—that until I hear a contrary opinion more generally expressed, I am of opinion that the great majority of this House do not think that we were wrong in the course we have taken, and that they really agree with what the noble Marquess opposite stated, who thought that under all the circumstances of the case we had taken the right course. But, be this as it may, that course has been taken, and concurrently we have received the strictest engagements, and recorded them as such, from the French Government, that our Treaty rights, as far as commerce and as far as British subjects are concerned, will not be invaded. It appears to me absolutely unavoidable that in a novel and unusual state of things incidents should have arisen which will require careful examination from Her Majesty's Government. They will take the best advice they can about these points, and they must certainly not refrain from having, not only very friendly, but very frank explanations from the French Government upon these points. On the other hand, I cannot conceive, not having opposed the substantial point—namely, the political supremacy—that there is any advantage in getting up petty squabbles and petty cases of irritation with the French nation, except where our Treaty engagements are in any way endangered. My noble Friend (the Earl of Dunraven) has made a long speech, and has gone over a great many topics. He stated that he did not wish to embarrass the Government, and I completely give him credit for that assertion. The fact is, a speech of that sort does not embarrass the Government; but I am not sure that it was a very useful speech to make, scraping together everything he could gather, both from official Papers and newspapers, calculated to create an irritated feeling in this country against that great country with which, whatever may have happened lately, it is our own interest and wish to remain on the most friendly terms. The noble Earl began about the integrity of the Ottoman Empire and the Treaty of 1856. We have always held that Tunis was part of the Ottoman Empire; but that opinion has not been universal. The French Government have consistently denied it since the taking of Algiers; and the Italians, 10 year's ago, utterly denied that Tunis was in the Ottoman Empire. I believe that Germany and Austria theoretically consider it is; but we have reason to know that they would not have given us the slightest encouragement if we had come forward to support that political doctrine. This is a great subject for declamation; but for practical statesmanship it does not very much affect the question. I think the noble Lord took rather an unworthy course in bringing forward that incident of the searching of the two vessels. It was contrary to law, and the French had no right to do so. But what happened? The commanding officer immediately gave all the redress in his power, and assured our naval officer that the thing was absolutely contrary to the instructions he had given. The captain of the vessel was severely reprimanded, and both himself and the vessel were sent away from the station. Really, to bring these questions forward in order to embitter this sort of discussion was not, I think, quite worthy of the great ability of my noble Friend. He asked another question. He spoke very strongly on the right of access to the Bey. I believe we have no right by Treaty to get access to the Bey, and I am not aware that any right of access that exists is taken away. In any case, I feel that in present circumstances the right of access to the Bey is not one of paramount political importance. These are points to which Her Majesty's Government are paying great attention. Several of these questions have arisen; they will arise, and it is our duty to examine them most carefully and bring them before the attention of the French Government. But I do say that, having conceded the great point of the political influence now exercised by France in Tunis, it would be quite unbecoming in us to raise any unnecessary questions merely to embitter feelings between the two countries.

THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY

My Lords, my noble Friend on previous occasions brought this matter, as he was fully entitled to do, under the attention of the House, intending to deal mainly with the question of the acquisition of great political influence by France in Tunis. Upon that point I was not able entirely to agree with him. My opinions are well known to the House, because they are the opinions of the late Government, and they appear in despatches which are now on the Table of the House. They are opinions which have been fully stated, and I think I have nothing to add to them. In fact, as far as I am aware, no other communications proceeded from this Government to that of France upon the sub- ject; and from those despatches your Lordships will have gathered that we held the view that the political influence of France in Tunis was not a matter of which this country had reason to be jealous—that we had no objection to its extension, and, as a matter of fact, we were willing to have given to the phrase a very liberal interpretation. I expressed my opinion, however, on that occasion, that France had gone a little further—or some considerable distance further—than the liberal interpretation of the phrase "extension of political influence "would permit; but, nevertheless, Her Majesty's Government had thought fit to acquiesce in the conduct that France pursued on that occasion. I saw nothing in the interests which this country has in Tunis, or interests which it possesses generally, which should make it wise in us to compromise our relations with an old and trusted Ally; and, therefore, I was not prepared, as the noble Earl has reminded the House to-night, to challenge the conduct of Her Majesty's Government. In fact, I am quite prepared to go with the noble Lord who spoke behind me, and who has left the House (Lord Lamington), and say that the despatches of the noble Earl opposite appear to be worthy of approval as far as that point has reached. But I confess I agree—though I feel it is a subject upon which one must speak with much reserve and care—with the noble Peers who think that the matter has now entered upon a some what new phase, and that the considerations which guided us before do not wholly continue to apply. I am not alluding in this respect to the matter of Tripoli, to which my noble Friend referred. The case of Tripoli and Tunis are entirely different. As to Tunis, we have held that it was a part of the Ottoman Empire; but for a long time France never agreed to that contention. But there is no doubt whatever that Tripoli belongs to the Ottoman Empire, and is, practically, governed by the Ottoman Power; and, therefore, no interference, no dealings with the rights of territory of Tripoli, could take place except by way of negotiations with the Porte, and subject to the sanction of the Porte. And I imagine that the Signatories of the Treaties of Berlin and Paris would hold themselves bound to observe such a condition. I do not think that the question of Tripoli is one which is within the range of practical politics at present; but it is, in this respect, that the question of Tunis has assumed a new shape—that, whereas before, we were only dealing with the relations between Tunis and France, we are now dealing, to some considerable extent, with the relations between England and English subjects and the Government of Tunis. That is a matter which is, undoubtedly, very different in its nature, and may become a matter of very considerable importance. I do not, however, go so far as to say that it has become a matter of considerable importance now. On that point I would rather wait for information; but I confess I cannot help expressing my concurrence with the noble Earl who spoke on the Back Benches that the proceedings of France in this matter are not wholly intelligible. I should have thought, in the peculiar circumstances of the case, it would have been the object of the French Government to adopt a conciliatory attitude to other nations having relations with the Tunisian Government. I confess neither the news received this morning, nor the action of the French Government, or rather the Circular of M. Roustan, makes me absolutely confident that that could have been the intention of the French Government—at least, that it could have been the intention of the subordinates of the French Government. I cannot refrain from saying that there has been on the part of these subordinates an unnecessary disregard of the feelings and interests of other Powers. In saying so, I am not speaking principally of Great Britain. The noble Earl opposite has, no doubt, the best guidance as to the attitude taken up by M. Roustan, and whether there has been any infraction of International Law. I suppose no one can take exception as a matter of international right to the appointment of M. Roustan as Foreign Secretary by the Bey. I imagine it would be quite competent for Her Majesty, as a matter of International Law, to appoint M. Challemel-Lacour her Foreign Secretary if she pleased; but when we come to the statement that the access to the Bey of Tunis is barred by the recent Circular of M. Roustan, I think a grave matter for reflection arises, and I shall look with some curiosity to see in what manner Her Majesty's Government will treat that claim. I earnestly hope, and I am inclined to believe, that it will be found that claim, precisely as stated, has not really been made, and that the undoubted right, not by Treaty, but by the Comity of Nations, every Power possesses of sending an Ambassador if it chooses to the Ruler of another nation has not been in any way interfered with. If it is the case, of course it explains the language held by the noble Earl, and the attitude which he is inclined to take up in respect to this question. The matter is, undoubtedly, one of considerable difficulty. There are many considerations arising bearing upon it not touching merely English interests and politics. In this matter I feel it is our wisest plan, so long as we have no grounds that could drive us to abandon such a position, to leave these transactions and the responsibility to Her Majesty's Government, reserving to ourselves in the ultimate issue the right to express the opinions which we may entertain. But there is some danger that if we discuss the question too early, or at too great length, we may raise questions which would rouse feelings between the two countries, and also might tend to envenom the feelings which have arisen between France and one of her Neighbours. On these grounds—although the noble Earl is well aware that, if it was a question of maintaining the rights of Englishmen, he could command the support, not only of his own Friends, but of Englishmen of all Parties whatever—on all these grounds, I think we should be adopting the wisest course if we did not pursue this debate at any very great length.

EARL DE LA WARR

asked, whether, there being no access to the Bey, there was an access to the Government of Tunis?

EARL GRANVILLE

said, that the noble Marquess had explained very clearly how the matter stood, and he himself had stated that they had no Treaty right of personal access to the Bey; but that what had been the usual course would not be interfered with.

EARL DE LA WARR

asked, whether our Diplomatic Agent had personal access to the Government of Tunis?

EARL GRANVILLE

said, if the noble Earl would explain what he meant by the Government, he would answer him.

Motion agreed to.

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