HL Deb 15 February 1881 vol 258 cc856-65
THE EARL OF LYTTON

My Lords, before your Lordships proceed to the business of the day, I would wish, with the permission of your Lordships and of the noble Duke (the Duke of Argyll), to whom I have given private Notice of it, to make a very short personal statement with reference to some observations addressed to your Lordships by the noble Duke last week with regard to alleged preparations made by the Government of India in 1876, those being a great military expedition, involving the construction of a bridge of boats across the Indus, and the concentration of a large army on the Afghan Frontier for the purpose—at any rate, for the apparent purpose—of invading or menacing Afghanistan, or the Russian possessions in Central Asia, or both. In addressing to the noble Earl the present Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs the Question to which my remarks were strictly confined, I did not expect that I should myself be questioned on other matters by the noble Duke; because, to tell the truth, I was not aware that it would be regular for the noble Duke, any more than for myself, to address to your Lordships a somewhat elaborate, and, as it seems to me, a not very relevant series of remarks upon the answer so courteously given to the Question by the noble Earl. But, my Lords, I cannot but think that it would be exceedingly inconvenient to this House—and I confess it would be encumbering and embarrassing to myself—-if, in moving the Resolution of which I have given Notice in reference to Candahar, I were to enter in detail upon matters wholly unconnected with that question; because I must freely confess that I am quite unable to see how the expediency of retaining or abandoning Candahar can possibly be affected by the question whether, five years ago, I wished to build a bridge of boats across the Indus; and, therefore, I wish to take this opportunity of answering at once the question asked by the noble Duke on the subject. The noble Duke last week told your Lordships a very interesting and impressive story about the construction of this bridge of boats, and the collection of a large army for which this bridge of boats was to be employed; and, having completed his narrative, he called upon me to state to your Lordships whether the whole story as told to you was a myth. As told to you by the noble Duke, that story, undoubtedly, is a myth, and I think I shall be able to satisfy your Lordships that it is a very imaginative myth; but, like all other myths, it has a very minute substratum of fact, and the substratum of fact is this. Your Lordships are, no doubt, well aware that there is a small tongue of independent and barbarous territory which juts into the old unscientific Frontier on the North-West of India directly between the important fortresses of Peshawur'and Kohat; and so long as the Government of India had been at peace with the turbulent tribes which populate it, all our communications between Peshawur and Kohat had been carried on straight across this tongue; but when I arrived in India, in 1876, disputes had arisen between the Frontier Tribes and the Punjaub Government, which, I need hardly remind your Lordships, has always been, and is, the local guardian of our interests, and this pass had been closed by the hostile tribes, and the Punjab Government was blockading those tribes who had closed the road. But, unfortunately, the blockade was so ineffectual that when I visited Peshawur in the winter of 1876 there had been no fewer than eight very serious outrages perpetrated on our own territory by the Frontier Tribes and other tribes who were supposed to be acting with them. In these circumstances, the Punjaub Government represented to me the expediency of showing those tribes that our means of communication with Kohat could be made practically independent of their permission or protection. With this object Sir Robert H. Davies, who was then Lieutenant Governor of the Punjaub, recommended three measures. He recommended, in the first place, the immediate improvement of the old road between Kohat and Delhi, which had been formerly used for our communications between the two fortresses, but which had not been used while we had the other road communication. He recommended, in the second place, the establishment of a mail-cart service from Kohat, via Kushalghar, to Rawul Pindi. In the third place, he recommended in connection with this mail-cart service the substitution of a boat-bridge over the Indus for the then existing ferry, which had been found very uncertain, and which was insufficient for the passage of the mail-cart. Well, all those measures were, I believe, simply a revision to the means of communication which had formerly existed with Kohat before the opening of the road across the tongue of territory which was closed by the hostility of the Durani Tribes. In addition to those measures, the principal military and political authorities at Peshawur had urged upon mo the expediency of a military expedition to Thull for the purpose of active operations against the recalcitrant tribes. That was the situation I had then to deal with, and, in doing so, it appeared to me that all three measures which I have mentioned—that is to say, the improvement of the road from Kohat to Delhi, the re-establishment of the mail-cart service, and the re-construction of the bridge of boats—might be sanctioned or carried out, in compliance with the suggestion of the Punjaub Government; but with regard to the proposed military expedition, I am of opinion that it was not expedient at that time to sanction it, and I will tell your Lordships why. It appeared to me that at the time there was a very unfortunate, but a very marked, predisposition on the part of certain influential parties and persons in England to attribute, upon any conceivable pretext, to the Government of India certain very bellicose propensities which we were certainly very far from entertaining towards neighbours very much more important than those Frontier Tribes. Therefore, though, in ordinai'y circumstances, I should have regarded this proposed expedition as a very natural, a very proper, and a very efficacious measure, still, having regard to what I considered the relations of the whole situation I was dealing with, it appeared to mo that it was not expedient for the Government of India at that time to sanction any military movement not absolutely indispensable which might possibly have the effect of giving even the faintest pretext for those most deplorable and mischievous impressions with regard to our policy. We were most anxious to avoid giving even the shadow of any sort of provocation to the ill-will of the Ameer of Cabul, who had long previously assumed an attitude towards the Government of India which was very ambiguous, very sinister, and, short of actual hostilities, very hostile, and at a time when the whole Eastern Question was under the consideration of a European Congress at Constantinople, with results which, of course, we could not foresee or fore-reckon. Well, that was my view of the measure on which I had to give my decision. But, before finally acting on that view of it, at least in reference to the proposed expedition to Thull, I thought it advisable to refer my view to my Military Colleague, Sir Henry Norman, whom I had left as President of the Council during my absence, and who had, during that time, reached Calcutta with his other Colleagues in Council. These are the terms in which Sir Henry Norman replied to me from Calcutta on the 3rd of December, 1876— The opening of the mail-cart again from Kohat to Rawul Pindi, improvement of the road, and construction of the bridge of boats over the Indus on that route will he beneficial. Your Lordship's resolution not to send a detachment to Thull in the face of the advice to do so from influential quarters was, if I may venture to say so, admirable. What was actually ordered is desirable, and can have no bad effect. Perhaps I may be allowed to mention, further, that, so far from collecting a large army, or any army at all, on our Afghan Frontier, either at that time or any subsequent time until we were in open hostilities—forced upon us by the conduct of the Ameer—I, in the year referred to by the noble Duke, rescinded the order issued by the Punjaub Government for the employment of troops for the enforcement of its blockade against these tribes. I gave my sanction to the augmentation—it was not a largo augmentation—of the ordinary police force upon that Frontier. I also sanctioned the issue of smooth-bore arms and ammunition to one or two villages of our own on that Frontier, which were specially exposed to raids and depredations by those hostile tribes, and which, in the opinion of the local authorities, it was extremely desirable to furnish with means of defending themselves against any hostile attack, because I need hardly remind your Lordships that that part of the Frontier is very wide, and the defensive force employed upon it is comparatively small. All those measures were carried out on the express and repeated recommendations of the Punjaub Government, and they were by that Government reported most fully in detail, and officially, to Her Majesty's Government in a despatch from the Governor of India dated March 9, 1877. I do not know whether that despatch has ever been pub- lished, as it dealt with purely local circumstances. It is not a secret or confidential despatch, so far as I know; and I have no doubt that the noble Duke will find it in the archives of the India Office. I trust I have said enough to satisfy the noble Duke that in the ardour of his search for evidence of design in phenomena which are really of the commonest and most ordinary character, his acute and powerful intellect—and it is an acute and powerful intellect in the treatment of any subject to which it is addressed, but I wish it was not so frequently addressed to the denunciation of crimes which I have not committed— I trust I have satisfied him, and that he himself will see it, that for once he has been misled, as many other acute and powerful intellects have been misled, by the fatal influence of a preconceived theory. But in answering the question of the noble Duke—and it is one which I am most anxious to answer fairly and completely—perhaps it is only fair that I should not altogether leave out of mention another fact, totally disconnected with the circumstances to which he has referred; but which, for all I know to the contrary, in a time which was literally teeming with misrepresentations, alarming rumours, and I might even say personal calumnies, may probably have given rise to gossiping surmises and conjectures; and if those surmises and conjectures did reach the noble Duke at that time, I do not suppose he was in a position to verify them, and they may have tended to confirm those impressions which have excited his long-continued anxiety. It is undoubtedly true that at that time—and I must ask your Lordships to remember what were the circumstances of that time, how uncertain they were, how critical they were, and how anxious they were—I did deem it my duty, as the Viceroy of India, to endeavour to render myself personally cognizant in some detail of the actual condition and efficiency of our Indian Army; and with that view I addressed, most confidentially, to my chief military advisers, certain questions, to be dealt with only on paper, in reference to the commissariat, transport, and other branches of our military organization, which I feared might possibly be found to be defective should they hereafter be called upon for active service. I need hardly toll your Lordships that these were simply the ordinary inquiries which every vigilant Government is bound from time to time to institute amongst those departments; and that they did not involve any public action, any movement, any concentration of troops, or anything which by any possibility could be construed as a menace or demonstration against any foreign Power. I shall only add that I conceived then, and I conceive still, that in making those inquiries I was simply performing one of the plainest and most imperative duties incumbent on me as Governor General of India.

THE DUKE OF ARGYLL

My Lords, the noble Earl has taken, I think, a somewhat unusual course. I received from him the day before yesterday a communication saying that he would make a personal statement to the House on the subject of the military bridge of boats over the Indus, but without giving any date or any indication as to when he would make that personal statement. I concluded without doubt that it would be in the course of the observations which he would address to your Lordships when moving the Resolution on the question of Candahar, which he is to submit to the House on the 24th of this month. Under that impression, I returned an immediate reply, thanking the noble Earl for his courtesy, and I immediately set myself to collect and tabulate such evidence as might be relevant with regard to the statement which I had made—or rather, I ought to say, with regard to the statement which was implied in the Question I attempted to answer. These inquiries have only proceeded one day. I only got the Notice of the noble Earl the day before yesterday, and I have employed the intermediate time in making inquiries as to the circumstances connected with the bridge of boats in question. My Lords, so far as I have yet gone they are entirely confirmatory of the impression at which I had originally arrived; and I have heard with unfeigned astonishment the statement just made by the noble Earl. I can only say that I think the noble Earl has forgotten certain things which passed at that time. In these circumstances, I think it will be more respectful to the noble Earl and more respectful to your Lordships' House that I should take into careful consideration the statement which he has made to- night, and that I should on a future occasion and on special notice state to the noble Earl and explain to the House the grounds on which I venture to think the noble Earl has not given a complete explanation of all the circumstances connected with that celebrated transaction. On this occasion I will only say this— that the noble Earl has made a mistake in dates in referring to what he calls the preconceived opinions and the anxiety of the country, and fastening upon him imputations, or ascribing to him motives, which were far from his mind. The noble Earl appears to have forgot that all these operations of his and threatening of Shere Ali were words and deeds that were conducted for many months— I think for 18 months or two years, certainly for more than a year—before a single question was asked in this House, or reference made as to embarrassing the Government or implying any accusation against the noble Earl. The operations upon the Indus, the violent threats issued by the noble Earl against Shere Ali, took place between May and October, 1876, and I put my Question to the noble Marquess (the Marquess of Salisbury) not in 1876, but in July, 1877. The noble Earl and his Government, and the Government of that time, had absolutely free course in all their operations connected with Afghanistan. Nobody interfered with them either in this or in the other House; and it was not until the country and Parliament began to awake to the serious consequences likely to ensue that I ventured to put the Question. The noble Earl is, therefore, completely mistaken in supposing that I had any preconceived opinion. I had no preconceived opinion; and when I come to make my counter-statement, I hope I shall be able to make good to the House and to the noble Earl sufficient grounds for the suspicion I then entertained, that the operations on the Indus were part of the foreign policy of the Government in regard to our North-Western Frontier.

THE EARL OF BEACONSEIELD

My Lords, I do not object to the course proposed to be taken by the noble Duke; but I think it would have been just, if not generous, had the noble Duke acknowledged the completeness with which my noble Friend treated the subject introduced into your discussion last week by the noble Duke himself, and not in a manner usual in debate in this House. I must recall your Lordships' attention to the fact that the noble Duke has made no answer whatever to the statement of my noble Friend. The noble Duke has told us that he will make a statement afterwards; and he is so confident of the result of his researches, which have not yet been made, that he has already arrived at a conclusion. I confess I do not predict from that statement the candour for which I would willingly give him credit. I am afraid he does approach this subject with a degree of prejudice and passion which I am sorry that one so distinguished and capable should extend to a matter of Imperial interest. With regard to the step taken by my noble Friend in vindicating himself from the charge made against him by the noble Duke, I think it a step discreet and wise, and which was adopted in duo deference to the convenience of your Lordships. Because I think, if we are to have a debate on the real question of the policy or impolicy of retaining Candahar, we should approach that subject with great difficulty, and arrive at a conclusion little satisfactory to your Lordships and the country, if it were to be mixed up with the vindication of the Government of my noble Friend, which must cover a period of nearly five years. I repeat, then, that, in my opinion, it was discreet of my noble Friend that he should disencumber himself of these episodes, which it would have been most inconvenient for your Lordships to have attended to, and that he has relieved us from considerations which would have inconveniently interposed and interfered with that judgment which I hope the House will exercise in arriving at a conclusion on the question of the detention of Candahar.

EARL GRANVILLE

The noble Earl who has just spoken has approached this subject with a warmth which I do not think it calls for. I am not going to continue this discussion, which is of a somewhat irregular character. My recollection is to this effect. A few days ago the noble Earl (the Earl of Lytton) asked mo a Question about certain Papers —whether, on behalf of Her Majesty's Government, I was prepared to present them or not. He made rather a long preface to that Question, and, in answer to his observations, my noble Friend behind me (the Date of Argyll) put two questions of a rather pointed character. The noble Earl gave no answer to these questions at the time, which was within his discretion. Nor did the noble Earl do so next day; but he gave an indefinite notice individually to my noble Friend behind me that he intended at some time or other to make a personal explanation. I do not know whether it is the intention of the noble Earl to make another personal explanation about the other question that my noble Friend put to him—namely, what was the authority on which he stated that Russia was ready to join this country in the destruction of Afghanistan; but if he does, it would be very much to the convenience of the House if he would give a general Notice of his intention, so that we should know on what day we should come to listen to, or take part in, the discussion. I quite agree with the noble Duke that he should not at once deal with the question, but should take time to consider the information which is in his collection, before attempting any complete answer to the noble Earl (the Earl of Lytton); and I entirely concur with the noble Earl (the Earl of Beaconsfield) that in considering the main question, as to whether we shall retain Candahar or abandon it, the less personal recrimination we have introduced the better, and that the merits of the question should alone be considered.