Lords Sitting of 15 August 1881

MINUTES.
Sat First in Parliament—The Earl of Harrington, after the death of his father.
PUBLIC BILLS—First Reading—National Debt* (213).
Third Reading—Erne Lough and River* (206), and passed.

DRAINAGE (IRELAND) PROVISIONAL ORDER BILL.—RESOLUTION.
LORD THURLOWmoved—
"That the Order of the 1st day of April last, which limits the time for the Second Reading of any Bill brought from the House of Commons confirming any Provisional Order he dispensed with respect to the said Bill."
The noble Lord explained that the Bill was one of considerable interest and importance to a large number of persons in Ireland. The measure had reference to a district in the county of Cork. It was of a very useful character, and he hoped it would not be prevented from becoming law by reason of a technicality in the Forms of the House.
THE EARL OF REDESDALE (CHAIRMAN of COMMITTEES)said, he did not think he ever rose to do a more painful or unpleasant duty than the present. He had been for a great many years Chairman of the Committees of that House, and it was his duty in that Office to see that the Orders of the House with regard to private legislation were observed. He had never yet found any want of confidence in the decisions he had come to, and this was the first time in which, having expressed a decided opinion against a proceeding of this kind, that opinion had been overruled. One of the Standing Orders of the House was that no Bill confirming a Provisional Order should be read a second time if brought from the other House after the 16th of June; but this Bill was not read a first time in the House of Commons till the 21st of July, and if their Lordships allowed such an infraction of their Orders, those Orders were worth nothing at all, for nobody could rely on them. He had never shown any unwillingness to suspend the Orders when good reason had been shown; but here there was a deliberate insult to the House of Lords.

1879
Everything was ready in the Office in Ireland by the 22nd of January, and the delay was simply owing to the negligence of the promoters to push it forward in due time.
EARL GRANVILLEentirely agreed with the observation of the noble Earl that the Orders of the House should be maintained; but could not accept the view that any insult to the noble Earl would be involved in a Resolution of their Lordships to suspend the Order for the public convenience. He was not acquainted with the details of the matter, and could not say why the Bill was not proceeded with at an earlier date. He could not help thinking that the observations of the noble Earl would expedite parties who were concerned in Private Bills. There was really no objection to this Bill. The object of it was good, and it was desirable that it should be passed this Session. He thought they might suspend the Order in this exceptional case. To do so would cast no reflection on the Office of the noble Earl.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURYsaid, he felt that the noble Earl had done his duty by calling attention to this matter. Unless the Order was maintained, there was very little chance of it meeting with any respect hereafter. These Orders were often a security against private rights being invaded by the action of Provisional Orders, and if the noble Earl went to a division he should support him. But, while saying that, he admitted that there was in this case some ground why they should take an indulgent view; and, as there was no opposition to the Bill, he would advise the noble Earl not to press his objection.
THE EARL OF REDESDALE (CHAIRMAN of COMMITTEES)said, he could not accept the advice which had been given him, because if he did it would go forth that their Orders were of no use. If this were a small case he would not press his objection. This Bill was ready on the 22nd of January; but the promoters had thought proper not to push the Bill forward. If the Motion were agreed to there would be an end of their Standing Orders.
LORD THURLOWdesired to assure their Lordships that nothing had been done which was prejudicial to the dignity or the Office of the noble Chairman of Committees. There had been an unfor-
1880
tunate delay; but he might observe that two Bills analogous to the present were brought in last year in the month of August, and were passed into law.
THE EARL OF REDESDALE (CHAIRMAN of COMMITTEES)said, that the fact just mentioned showed that he was not unwilling in proper cases to have the Standing Orders suspended. The circumstances of last Session were very exceptional indeed. Everything was very late. As he believed it to be necessary that the Standing Orders should be obeyed, he should divide against the Motion.
On question? Their Lordships divided:—Contents 29; Not-Contents 31: Majority 2.

CONTENTS.

Selborne, L. (L. Chancellor.)

Breadalbane, L. (E. Breadalbane.)

De Mauley, L.

Ailesbury, M.

Denman, L.

Fingall, L. (E. Fingall.)

Kenmare, L. (E. Kenmare.)

Camperdown, E.

Granville, E.

Kenry, L. (E. Dunraven and Mount-Earl.)

Kimberley, E.

Minto, E.

Monson, L. [Teller.]

Morley, E.

Ramsay, L. (E. Dalhousie.)

Northbrook, E.

Spencer, E.

Rosebery, L. (E. Rosebery.

Sydney, E.

Sandhurst, L.

Exeter, L. Bp.

Stanley of Alderley, L.

Strafford, L. (V. Enfield.

Ampthill, L.

Boyle, L. (E. Cork and Orrery.) [Teller.]

Talbot de Malahide, L.

Thurlow, L.

Braye, L.

Wrottesley, L.

NOT-CONTENTS.

Somerset, D.

Borthwick, L.

Colchester, L.

Salisbury, M.

Ellenborough, L.

Winchester, M.

Elphinstone, L.

Foxford, L. (E. Limerick.)

Cairns, E.

Devon, E.

Harlech, L.

Fortescue, E.

Lamington, L.

Harrington, E.

Oranmore and Browne, L.

Ilchester, E.

Lathom, E.

Rowton, L.

Redesdale, E. [Teller.]

Silchester, L. (E. Longford.)

Hawarden, V.

Stratheden and Campbell, L.

Melville, V.

Sidmouth, V.

Strathspey, L. (E. Sea field.) [Teller.]

St. Albans, L. Bp.

Ventry, L.

Waveney, L.

Alington, L.

Wynford, L.

Bateman, L.

Resolved, in the negative.

PATRIOTIC FUND BILL.
Commons Amendments considered (according to Order), and agreed to.
In reply to Viscount SIDMOUTH,
THE EARL OF NORTHBROOKsaid, there was a sufficient fund at the disposal of the Commissioners, supplemented as it would be from other funds that were available, to render it unnecessary that an appeal should be made to the public for subscriptions for the widows and orphans of the sufferers by the loss of the Doterel, and he hoped that other similar cases would also be met in the same manner in future.

CEYLON—ECCLESIASTICAL SUBSIDIES.

  QUESTION. OBSERVATIONS.
  LORD STANLEY OF ALDERLEY LORD STANLEY OF ALDERLEY, in rising to call the attention of the House to the correspondence relative to ecclesiastical subsidies in Ceylon; and to ask the Secretary of State for the Colonies for explanations of his despatches of 19th November 1880, and 14th June, said, he desired to call their Lordships' attention to the Correspondence recently laid before Parliament on the ecclesiastical subsidies in Ceylon. This Correspondence referred to two subjects which were distinct—namely, the maintenance of the Bishop of Colombo and his clergy, and the maintenance of the Reformed Church at Wolfendahl. With regard to the Bishop, he should say nothing of the intrinsic merits of the Bishop of Colombo, because it would weaken the line of argument he was going to take, because he had better leave that to other noble Lords and to the right rev. Bench, and because he was bound to believe that the only grounds of action of the Secretary of State for the Colonies were those stated in paragraph No. 2 of his despatch of November 19 of last year—namely, the small number of persons supposed to be benefited out of the general taxation of Ceylon. For the Secretary of State this was, therefore, a question of population, and if the population of Ceylon were limited to the 250,000 Christians, of whom 190,000 were Roman Catholics, the inequality which had moved the Secretary of State would be great; but as there were 2,150,000 non-Christian inhabitants of the Island, other considerations must be taken into account.
  1882
  According to the figures adopted by the Secretary of State's despatch, there were some 470,000 Hindoos in Ceylon. He proposed to eliminate these altogether from the discussion, because most of these were poor Coolies employed on the coffee plantations, and were, for the most part, only temporary sojourners in Ceylon, and were not affected by taxation. Those who belonged to the few Hindoo temples in Ceylon might be classed with the Buddhists. Now, the 1,500,000 Buddhists and the 180,000 Mussulmans of Ceylon would be equally dismayed and alarmed for the property held by themselves as religious communities when they found the Government disendowing its own religion; and there were indications in this Correspondence that the temple lands of the Buddhists were threatened with attack and spoliation, or with new taxation, which would have the same effect. As to the Mussulmans, it was to them but a very slight grievance, if it were a grievance at all, that some portion of the public money derived from general taxation should go to the maintenance of a representative of the religion of the State; but it would be a great grievance to them to be subjected to a State and a Government without any religion, such as the English Government would appear to be if the policy of these despatches were carried out. He could not conceive any greater humiliation for the Mussulmans than to be under a Government which had discarded religion and its ministers, and which hung out the colours of infidelity, or, as it was now called, agnosticism. In the meantime, this grievance was as nothing compared to that from which the Mussulmans of Ceylon were actually suffering. Though they were from 170,000 to 180,000 in number, and were the most intelligent, active, and wealthy of the Native communities, they still had no representative in the Legislative Council. He hoped that the regard for equality of the noble Earl would induce him to remedy this before long. So far he had spoken on general principles; but to come to particulars, the Mussulmans in Ceylon often spoke to him of the Bishop of Colombo, but they never said anything against him or his office; and, though this subject had probably been discussed in the local newspapers, it had not been alluded to in the letters

  1883
  he had received from that Island. He might say much the same as to the Buddhists; although it appeared to be inconsistent with their tenets, yet they were much attached to public worship, and would think ill of a Government which discouraged it. The most ancient mosque in Ceylon was originally built on temple land, which was leased by the Buddhist priests to the Mussulmans; and when they found that the building erected by them was dedicated to public worship the Buddhist priests refused to take the money reserved as rent for the land. The Governor of Ceylon, Sir James Longden, wrote to the Secretary of State to the effect that the ecclesiastical subsidies might be withdrawn in Ceylon because the circumstances were different from those in Trinidad, where he had opposed such a measure. He thought that the difference was, however, all against the policy of the noble Earl, for in Trinidad less scandal would be caused than in Ceylon, where the exemplary demeanour and learning of the Buddhist priests made it the more essential that a State professing to be Christian should not desert the Held. If the Government persisted in the course laid down in these despatches, it would be more easy to believe that it was indifferent and hostile to religion than to believe the excuses on account of economy or of equality put forward in this Correspondence. He trusted that the noble Earl would reconsider his decision, even though he should reduce the stipend of the Bishop and reduce the number of the clergy who were now supported by the Government of Ceylon, and that he would not sever the connection between Church and State, and throw to the Bishop a freedom which he did not require, or, as the noble Earl's despatch worded it, "relieve him from all State interference." At the same time, in order to satisfy those feelings which were raised by consideration of the statistics of the population, some assistance might well be granted to the Portuguese, who, in general, were not as wealthy as the other classes of the Christians. It appeared from the Correspondence that the Dutch Reformed Church willingly joined the Church of England, and rallied to that Church in 1796, and had shown no signs of wishing to separate from it. As for the unofficial Members of the Legislative Council who had
  1884
  raised this question, and who, in a heathen and idolatrous country, had called upon the Government to withdraw its countenance and support from the established ministers of religion, the more fitting attitude for the Government towards them would be that which was adopted by His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople some 200 years ago, who, when the Quaker persisted in keeping on his hat before him, said the Turks were right, and that the man must be mad. The Government of Ceylon might get over the difficulty caused by the steps taken and related in this Correspondence by making grants of some of the land still at the disposal of the Government to the different Churches. The case of the Church of Wolfendahl, belonging to the Reformed Dutch Church of Colombo, stood upon a different ground. The decision of the Secretary of State, in his despatch of June 14, was open to all the objections which might be made to his decision against the Bishop of Colombo; but, besides that, it was a distinct violation of the engagements of the British Government at the time of the capitulation of the Dutch in 1796. It appeared to be only a quibble to endeavour to evade that engagement by saying that the Dutch clergy voluntarily left Ceylon in 1806. The Dutch settlers did not leave, and were now there, and were known as Burghers. They required and had a claim to the stipends stipulated for their clergy in 1796, and it made no difference to them whether the original clergy left voluntarily or had all died of an epidemic. Least of any could our Government afford to disregard and break its Treaty engagements; and, even if the Secretary of State attached any value to this quibble of the Law Officers, the matter in dispute was too trifling to make it advisable to risk the opposite view which was taken by the Dutch Burghers. This was not the only Colony in which Treaty obligations had been set aside and disregarded and hostile comment provoked on the part of the former countrymen of the Colonists whose rights had been set aside.
  THE ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURYsaid, it was important that they should know whether the disendowment referred to by the noble Lord had been effected, and, if it had not, whether there was time for consideration. It

  1885
  could hardly be considered as actually done; because, so far as he knew, there was a Legislative Body in Ceylon, and the only record they had of the opinion of that body was to the effect that it ought not to be done. The Secretary of State, in his despatches, seemed to contemplate that the thing would be done. He presumed it would be done by votes, in obedience to orders from head-quarters. The objections raised to the proposal were, first, that it was a violation of Treaty obligations; and, secondly, that it was inexpedient in itself. As to its being in violation of Treaty obligations, that, at all events, was a very important matter, and it had, probably, been considered by the Law Officers of the Crown. There was a Proclamation following the Treaty, which, to uninstructed persons, seemed to be an acknowledgment of the obligation of maintaining the Christian religion on the part of the Government which succeeded the occupation of the Dutch. At the time of the cession of Ceylon by the Dutch there were two great religions in the Island—one the original Buddhist religion, professed by the great majority of the inhabitants, the other the Christian religion, professed by a large body. At that time the Government issued a Proclamation, stating that both those religions should retain the rights ceded to them by the Dutch Government. But it was said that instead of one body of Christians in the Island there were now several; and, no doubt, there was a temptation to apply to Ceylon the principles which had been applied in other places where there were different Christian denominations. But when they considered the Papers they would find that not even all the congregations of the Church of England were subsidized. Some successors of the old Dutch congregations continued to receive those stipends, and they were under the Bishop of Ceylon, although they were, by descent, the representatives of the old Dutch Presbyterian congregations. Many of their ministers were actually persons whose ancestors were of those Dutch Christians, or belonged to the Native Churches which grew up under Dutch protection. Now, the question was raised—Why give the subsidy to the Church of England and not to the other bodies? It was a sufficient answer to
  1886
  this to say there was a large heathen population, consisting also of various bodies. The most important was the Buddhist, which received this subsidy; but there were other heathen denominations existing throughout the country who received no subsidy. To those who said that the Bhuddist body should be disendowed as well as the Christians the answer was plain—if you promised a sum of money to one person it was no reason he should not get it because other persons to whom you made no such promise got none. The noble Lord said that the Buddhists were not endowed; but they were secured by the Government one-third of the landed property of the whole country. Not only so; but in the cultivation of this land they were secured from taxes which fell on all the other inhabitants of the Island. That, of course, increased the incidence of taxation on the other inhabitants; and, therefore, the Buddhists were practically endowed with a large sum of money. If they endeavoured to disendow the Buddhist body they would lose possession of the Island, because one-third of the land was in their possession, and they constituted an overwhelming majority of the population. Consequently, it would be dangerous to tamper with the rights secured to them by Treaty. Now, he was surprised that some of those who were so eager against endowments of all kinds should be discontented with endowing their Christian brethren in Ceylon, while they were bound to maintain so very large an endowment of a heathen religion. The case of Jamaica was not analogous to the present, because in Jamaica no heathen religion received large amounts of public money. It would, besides, be highly undesirable to show in Ceylon our readiness to shake off all recognition of the Christian religion on the part of the State, especially as the Proclamation at the cession of the Island made such loud declarations that the Christian religion, which the Dutch had left in a nourishing condition, was to be maintained by the Government that succeeded them. The course pursued in a good many instances by the Colonial Office lately, of disestablishing and disendowing Churches, was one which, to say the least, required to be taken with caution. It was now proposed to sweep away the corporation sole created by

  1887
  Letters Patent in the Bishopric of Colombo. This experiment ought, in his judgment, to be made with great caution. It was in the power of the Crown to create corporations; but it was not quite clear that the Crown could by its own act supersede them. The gravest complications as to property had been introduced in various Colonies by the off-hand way in which the Colonial Office had dealt with these matters. A serious law-suit had recently arisen with reference to property at Grahamstown, in the Cape Colony; and a very important question would have to be decided before long by the Privy Council as to whether the corporation of the Bishopric of Grahamstown was still in existence, although the Crown had, for the time, failed to appoint anyone to occupy the corporation. The result at present was complete confusion as to all property connected with this matter. So in Ceylon the same difficulties might arise which had occurred in other Colonies, where the seeds of many law-suits had been sown by the way in which this matter had been dealt with. Therefore, although he did not expect the noble Earl to alter his views on the subject, he hoped he would not fail to give full consideration to the difficulties that might arise from the course he was about to adopt.
  THE EARL OF KIMBERLEYsaid, he was not prepared to admit, in the slightest degree, that the action of the Colonial Office, either in that or the other matters referred to, had been either rash or hasty. The decision affecting the Cape Bishopric to which the most rev. Prelate referred took place many years ago, before he was in the Office which he now had the honour to hold; and the effect of it, as far as he remembered, was that the Letters Patent could not be legally maintained. He could not admit the truth of the allegation that the action of the Colonial Office had sown the seeds of many legal disputes in regard to ecclesiastical matters in the Colonies. The Colonial Office had, in all these instances, advised that a statute should be passed in each Colony to enable the disendowed Churches to transact their work and to hold property. He agreed, indeed, with the most rev. Prelate that it would be a great hardship and a scandal to the Church if measures were not taken to enable the
  1888
  Church to administer its affairs in a satisfactory manner. With regard to the particular question now before the House, he must point out that the most rev. Prelate had spoken of the Buddhist endowment as if it were the same thing as the endowment which was about to be done away with. The Buddhists in Ceylon had possessed, from very ancient times, large tracts of land, which were known as temple lands, while the very small endowment which was now given to the Anglican and the Presbyterian Churches came directly out of the taxation of the Island, and was paid by the Government. With regard to any lands which the Church possessed, it was distinctly provided in a despatch, which he wrote on the subject, that there was to be no interference.
  THE ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURYinquired whether such lands were free from taxation?
  THE EARL OF KIMBERLEYsaid, he did not know; but he did not think that because they were bound by Treaty to respect the privileges of the Buddhists, therefore they were bound, for all time, to extend the same privileges to other religions. This was a question, not of Christianity, but of a variety of Christian denominations. There were in Ceylon large numbers of Buddhists, Mahomedans, and Hindoos, a considerable number of Roman Catholics, and a handful of Anglicans and Presbyterians. They endowed this handful of Anglicans and Presbyterians; but they totally disregarded the claims of the Roman Catholics, Mahomedans, and Hindoos. Such an injustice could not possibly be defended. When he held Office before this question came up for consideration, and some persons at that time desired that a change should be made; but nothing was done, because it did not appear that there was any feeling in Ceylon in favour of the change. Since then, however, a strong feeling had been expressed by a considerable number of persons in Ceylon that these endowments should be put an end to. Therefore, he thought, the time had come when the change might be made, not rashly, but after the consideration of many years. There were nearly 250,000 Christians in Ceylon. Of these, 190,000 were Roman Catholics, and 45,000 belonged to unassisted Protestant denominations, leaving only

  1889
  15,000 Anglicans and Presbyterians, who received a State contribution of £10,000 a-year. If the endowment of the latter was continued, could it possibly be maintained that the Roman Catholics ought to receive nothing? If there were Treaty obligations requiring them to keep up this endowment, he should have considered that they were absolutely bound either to continue it or to give a sum of money by way of compensation. But he thought the most rev. Prelate could not have referred to the actual words of the Treaty, which said—
  "The clergy shall continue in their functions and receive the same pay and emoluments as they have from the Dutch."
  The only question which could arise was whether the present Dutch Church in Ceylon was entitled under the Treaty to continue to receive some stipend? As there might be a legal doubt on this point, he referred it to the Law Officers, who gave it as their distinct opinion that the Treaty did not apply, for shortly after its conclusion the whole of the Dutch clergy left, and the payment made to them came to an end, and the present payment could not be held to be made under the Treaty. The Bishop of Colombo had urged upon him the necessity of giving sufficient time to the Church in Ceylon to make arrangements, and a period of five years had accordingly been granted for the purpose. He might observe that the Bishop said he was not prepared to advance on behalf of the Church of England in Ceylon, as a whole, any claim for a continuance of the State assistance, and he added—
  "I am not aware that as a Church we have any right to it, nor am I sure that its permanent continuance would be to our ultimate advantage."
  This was not merely a question of the disendowment of a Church. It was a question of justice to the various inhabitants of the Island. To give a concurrent endowment to all these religious communions would be out of the question for various reasons, and, amongst others, that it would impose a burden on the revenues of the Colony which they could not bear. The strongest possible case had been made out for putting an end to this small endowment, which was not at all necessary for the maintenance of the Church in
  1890
  Ceylon; and he could not hold out any hope that the policy on which Her Majesty's Government had determined in respect to this matter would be departed from.
  THE EARL OF CARNARVONdesired to know whether all the details of the proposed arrangement had been settled, or whether there was still room to modify them? He trusted care would be taken to prevent legal complications in. regard to Church property if disestablishment took place. He also trusted that his noble Friend would make the transition as gradual and as easy as possible.

TUNIS.—RESOLUTION.
THE EARL OF DUNRAVEN, in rising to call attention to the present state of affairs in Tunis; and to move—
"That, in the opinion of this House, any interference with the integrity of the Ottoman Empire in North Africa is likely to prove dangerous to the peace of Europe,"
said, that on the last occasion this subject was before the House the noble Earl the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs remarked that, in view of the complicated state of things then existing, it would be the duty of the Government to take the best advice they could get and to give a full and frank explanation to Parliament. Since then Papers had been presented relating to both Tunis and Tripoli, and, judging from the public Press, matters had become somewhat less complicated than they were; but the information contained in the Papers was somewhat meagre, and matters were still so far complicated that he thought that the full explanation which the noble Earl suggested would be welcomed by the House and the country. The first thing that would strike anyone on reading the Papers would probably be that there was no mention made of the Enfida case. It was not necessary for him to go into the details of this dispute. The facts were that a French Company negotiated with Khereddin Pasha for the purchase of a large estate in land. As there existed in Tunis, as in other Mahomedan countries, a right of pre-emption on the part of neighbouring proprietors in the case of a sale of landed property, the precaution was taken of leaving a strip all round the Enfida estate in the hands of Khereddin

1891
Pasha, so as to exclude the possibility of the right of pre-emption being exercised. But, as it turned out, this precaution was unavailing, as a Mr. Levy possessed some portions of property in the centre of the Enfida estate. He was consequently able to exercise his right of pre-emption, and did so. It was suggested that the matter should be referred to arbitration; but Her Majesty's Government very properly decided that it ought to be settled in the Local Courts, and, in order that the Courts should exercise unbiased judgment, two British ships of war were sent to Tunis. Mr. Levy brought his claim forward in the Hanefi Court, the Court to which such matters were always referred, and an order was given putting Mr. Levy in possession. Afterwards, at the instance of the French Minister Resident, the case was taken out of the jurisdiction of the Hanefi Court, and referred to the Maliki Court, which did not take cognizance of cases of that kind. He had seen it stated that this Court had decided against Mr. Levy. How far that was true or not he did not know. He had seen it also stated that the British Consular Judge had been ordered back to Tunis to report as to whether our Treaty rights were interfered with by the transference of Mr. Levy's claim from the Hanefi to the Maliki Court. Whether, theoretically, our Treaty rights were broken was a matter which he could not judge; but he should imagine that there could be no doubt that, practically speaking, they had been broken. If the matter had been left to the free and unbiased action of the Bey's Court there could be no question that Mr. Levy would be put in possession of the estate; but if, owing to the preponderating influence of some other Power, the case was taken out of the proper Court and referred to another tribunal and decided against Mr. Levy, there could surely be no doubt that an infringement of our Treaty rights had taken place. Another important omission was that instructions from the Government to our Consul General at Tunis were not, he imagined, given in full. Mr. Reade had instructions to accept the new order of things in so far as it did not violate our Treaty rights. The noble Earl the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs was very properly most particular that our Treaty rights should not be infringed, and
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France, very properly, undertook to say that they should not be infringed; but, as a matter of fact, it appeared to him impossible that they could be maintained in the spirit. One of the principal stipulations in our Treaties was that the Representative of Great Britain should be treated with the same honours in every way as were accorded to the Representative of any other nation; but as very special honours and privileges were accorded to the Representative of France, there could be no question that at that time our Treaties were broken. The noble Earl pointed out the difficulties arising from the double functions exercised by the French Minister Resident at Tunis, and France had so far recognized these difficulties that she had appointed a subordinate of M. Roustan's to the post of Consul. But the difficulty was not really solved by this. Another point of importance was the right of access which our Representative had to the Bey, and the right of British subjects to have matters in dispute decided by the Consul in concurrence with the Bey or his delegate. The delegate must, of course, mean a Tunisian delegate; and if the Bey's delegate was the Representative of another Power, the spirit of the Treaty was broken in that case. The Papers presented contained the statement made through the Havas Agency to the effect that there was nothing in the French Treaty to preclude the Representatives of Foreign Powers from claiming audience of the Bey whenever he thought right to accord it. That might be very true; but the Treaty contained a provision giving us a right of access to the Bey. It might be said that we could not have compelled the Bey at any time to have accorded an audience to our Representative; but, in the event of his not doing so, we should have had our remedy in remonstrances with the Bey. It was useless to suppose that we had that remedy now, seeing it was absurd to suppose that the Bey was any longer a free agent in the matter. The general tenour and object of our Treaties was that British subjects should enjoy equal privileges in the way of acquiring lands, investing money, and carrying on all the affairs of life with the subjects of any other Power; and it was obvious that if any other Power obtained a preponderating influence over the Bey and over the Local Courts, the

1893
whole spirit of the Treaty was, practically speaking, broken. Our Commercial Treaties also must not be lost sight of. Our Commercial Treaties with Tunis were very favourable to us. They would be open to revision next year; and although it was stipulated that they could not be altered without the consent of both parties, it was probable that, in view of the commercial relations between France and England, there might be more difficulty in renewing them on equally favourable terms to us, under present circumstances, than if we had to deal with the Bey uninfluenced by France. The real difficulty was that there was no real authority in Tunis. The Sultan claimed supreme authority; but his claims had been disallowed. The authority of the Bey had been, practically, superseded, and yet in theory it remained unchanged. The foreign affairs of the country were, to all intents and purposes, in the hands of the French Minister Resident, who thereby became the Suzerain of Tunis. And yet he was not the Foreign Minister of the Bey, for the Tunisian Minister of Foreign Affairs retained his position, but was subject to the control of the French Minister Resident. It was difficult to see what was the position of British subjects in reference to Tunisian subjects in Tunis, or Egypt, or Malta, or in this country. Would disputes in which Tunisians were implicated be decided by the French Ambassador or Consul General or by the Consul General and Ambassador of Turkey; and would a British subject, having a dispute with a Tunisian subject—say in Egypt—be dealt with by the British Consul and the Courts of the Viceroy, or by the British and French Consular Courts? A kind of government within a government, where nobody appeared to be responsible, existed in Tunis, which might lead to endless difficulties. For instance, to whom were British subjects to apply for redress who had lost property during the bombardment of Sfax? Was application to be made to the Bey, who was supposed to be responsible for the government, but was certainly not responsible for the bombardment; or to France, who was responsible for the bombardment, and who was not supposed to be responsible for the government of Tunis? If a country was conquered, and the conqueror accepted the Treaty
1894
obligations of the conquered, the other parties to those Treaties had no cause to complain. They could hold the new Government responsible for the observance of their Treaties. But if one nation exercised complete control over the affairs of another nation, but without definitely taking and exercising the functions of a Government, it was difficult to see how other people could guard their interests. To whom were they to appeal? Who was responsible? The one nation was not responsible for the government of the country theoretically, neither was the other responsible practically, seeing that it had ceased to retain real freedom of action. Our Treaties were designed for the protection of British subjects at a Court irresponsible and independent as far as European influence was concerned. Tunis could not any longer be looked upon in that light; and though the letter of our Treaties might remain intact, it would be strange if the spirit of them was not broken. A state of things existed which might lead to difficulties at any time; and, as anything that could imperil in the slightest degree the friendship existing between this country and France would be greatly to be deplored, the present state of affairs was most unsatisfactory, and it would be a relief to know that there was a probability of this anomalous condition of affairs being brought to a close. So much for the manner in which our Treaty rights were jeopardized. He did not intend to dilate upon the possible dangers to our trade. He called the attention of the House on a former occasion to the magnitude of our Indian and Colonial trade that passed through the Malta Channel; and it could not be denied that our feeling as regarded the security of that trade must be modified if an important naval position commanding the Malta Channel passed out of the hands of one of the Barbary States into those of a great Naval Power. We had great interests involved in that part of the globe, as had also other nations, Spain and Italy especially, and anything imperilling the interests of those countries could not but be dangerous to the good feeling existing among nations. The greatest danger, however, appeared to arise from the effect upon the feelings and sentiments of Turkey which might be produced by the annexation or occupation of any portion of her dominions-

1895
in Africa. Turkey was very hardly dealt with. Her territories were constantly circumscribed and guaranteed, and then circumscribed and guaranteed again. But if every guarantee was speedily followed by some fresh infringement of her territory, it was not likely that Turkey would have much confidence in guarantees. He presumed that some continuity existed in Treaties, and that the Treaty of Berlin ratified the Treaty of Paris, and that again ratified former Treaties affecting Turkey. He did not think that Tunis was mentioned in the Treaty of London of 1841; but it happened that it was particularly mentioned during the Conference at Vienna which preceded the Treaty of Paris of 1856. It was probable that Tunis was especially before the eyes of Europe at that moment as having contributed a contingent of 25,000 men to the forces of the Sultan engaged in the Crimean War. Russia was, very naturally, somewhat reluctant to give a specific detailed guarantee as regarded all portions of the Ottoman Empire, though willing to give a general guarantee; and Prince Gortchakoff stated as one of his reasons that, if any detailed guarantee were given, such a thing as an invasion of Tunis would have to be considered a casus belli. Trance, however, saw no difficulty in giving detailed guarantees; and M. Drouyn de Lhuys stated that he would willingly give, not only a general guarantee, but a detailed guarantee, and added that he saw no difficulty in extending it to the Regency of Tunis. According to the 13th Protocol of the Conference of Vienna there could be little doubt that the Regency of Tunis was considered to be included within the general guarantee given by the Great Powers to Turkey by the Treaty of 1856, and we could not be surprised if Turkey considered that an infringement of her Treaty rights had taken place. Turkey, as was usual, had been put in an impossible position. She was told that if hostilities broke out among the Arab tribes on the Frontier of Tripoli, she would be held responsible if she could not put them down: and she was told also that if she sent troops to Tripoli, and hostilities broke out among the Arabs, she would be responsible for having fomented them. If she did not send troops and difficulties arose, she would be told, as was told to the Bey of Tunis, that she was unable to
1896
control the Arabs. Any interference with the Sultan's dominions in that quarter of the globe was greatly to be deplored, as being likely to upset the balance of power in the Mediterranean, and to unsettle that settlement of the Eastern Question which Her Majesty's Government had laboured so hard and so successfully, in some respects, to bring about. Turkey gave way to the wishes of the European Concert and allowed a settlement to be made. But if the settlement so arrived at in deference to the wishes of the concert was to be followed immediately by some fresh interference, we could not expect Turkey to look upon the concert as anything but a somewhat one-sided affair. If the concert of the Powers were only possible when there was a question of dividing some portion of the Ottoman Empire, and if it resolved itself into its primitive elements the moment there was a question of preserving what was left of the Ottoman Empire, the Sultan was not likely to look with great respect upon the European Concert and the concert failed in its objects. How could we, or any other of the European Powers, expect Turkey to fulfil her obligations, financial or otherwise, if we did not fulfil our obligations to her? How could we press upon her to undertake reforms and carry out the promises which she made, if we on our part did not carry out the promises which we made to her? It was not unreasonable to look with some degree of anxiety upon what might result from the French occupation of Tunis. A fire was burning in the midst of most inflammable materials, and all those who had property in the neighbourhood naturally felt anxious. There were two ways in which a fire could be treated. It could either be dealt with at the commencement, or it could be confined within limits. The first policy, if practicable, was the best. There could be no objection, on the part of this or any other country, to France taking the necessary measures for the protection of her Algerian Dominions; but it was possible that if the grave consequences which might ensue from the occupation of Tunis had been pointed out to her, she would have been able to do all that was necessary without going so far as she had. It would be a most lamentable thing if anything occurred to endanger the friendship existing between England

1897
and France; and he did not suppose that France would wish to do anything that could weaken that friendship; but the danger was that in embarking on a certain course she might find it very difficult to check herself. He must confess that French statesmen appeared to have but vague apprehension of the danger to which the state of things in Africa exposed them and others. The noble Earl the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs pointed out the difficulties that might arise on account of the pretensions of French Consuls in Tripoli and Egypt to exercise protection over Tunisian subjects. M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire merely promised to examine into the question and to make a communication about it. Whether that communication had been received he did not know; but anyone would have supposed that such a simple matter required very little examination, and needed only a distinct disavowal. M. St. Hilaire had spoken very plainly concerning Tripoli. He stated to Lord Lyons that the French Government had no intention whatever either of invading it or of attempting to establish any exclusive or predominant influence in it. But it must be remembered that he and other French statesmen had been equally distinct and clear in disavowing any intention of annexation or of an occupation of Tunis other than one of "an essentially provisional character," and in stating that the only object of French interference was the guarding of her Algerian Frontier, and protecting her interests in Algeria. But as yet we saw no sign of the provisional nature of the occupation. On the contrary, France appeared to be consolidating her occupation, and was even appointing Governors over various portions of the country. He did not suppose that France had any designs towards Tripoli; but the danger was that in occupying the position she now held she might find herself irresistibly dragged into a still more complicated position. The noble Earl the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs also spoke very distinctly as regarded Tripoli; but he was equally clear as regarded Tunis. In fact, it was difficult to understand what difference this country could recognize between the two Provinces. The noble Earl stated that Tripoli formed an integral portion of the Ottoman Empire, and that Her Majesty's Government
1898
looked upon Tunis as forming part of the Ottoman Empire. The only difference that he could see was that the Governor of Tunis was called a "Bey," and the Governor of Tripoli was called a "Dey." He was tempted to remark that—
"Tis strange there should such difference be,
'Twixt letter B and letter D."
But it seemed that in the difference between the letters "B" and "D" there was some inscrutable reason which caused Her Majesty's Government and the other Powers to look upon Tripoli in a different light to that in which they viewed Tunis. It would be very interesting to know what was the opinion of the other Great Powers on this point, particularly on account of what the noble Earl the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said on a former occasion in that House. He then stated that, although we held that Tunis formed part of the Ottoman Empire, and although Austria and Germany held the same view, he had reason to know that they would not have assisted us in carrying our views into effect. It was important, therefore, to know what Austria and Germany, for instance, thought about Tripoli, because if our carrying out our obligations and views depended upon the assistance we received from other Powers, it was obvious that the assurances of the noble Earl concerning Tripoli were not of great value unless read alongside of the opinions of the other Powers on the subject. For the reasons he had given, it appeared to him that there was scarcely any portion of the world where more sensitive interests of many nations were at stake than in those portions of the Ottoman Empire which bordered on the Mediterranean. There was no spot on the globe where a small spark was more likely to bring forth a serious conflagration. Under those circumstances, it was not unnatural that we should feel somewhat uneasy that Parliament should separate without the full explanation that was promised by the noble Earl.
Moved to resolve,
"That, in the opinion of this House, any interference with the integrity of the Ottoman Empire in North Africa is likely to prove dangerous to the peace of Europe."—(The Earl of Dunraven.)
LORD LAMINGTONsaid, that, with all deference to the noble Earl who had

1899
just sat down, he thought that the subject of Tunis and the position of the Ottoman Empire in respect of it had been brought recently much too frequently before their Lordships. He confessed that having read the recent despatches laid upon the Table he did not think that France had any design whatever to interfere with the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and that the assurances given to them by eminent French statesmen ought to satisfy them on that subject. For his part, he had gathered the opinion he had expressed from the despatches before their Lordships and from the speeches delivered by M. St. Hilaire, M. Gambetta, and other distinguished French statesmen. They ought to take the assurances of Foreign Powers as they were given, until by some overt act they had reason to believe that they had said what they did not mean.
EARL GRANVILLE: I desire to say a few words to your Lordships in respect of the speech of my noble Friend behind me; and, in the first place, I have to express my regret that entirely owing, not to my fault, but to circumstances with which your Lordships are acquainted, my noble Friend was obliged on several occasions to postpone his Motion. I have listened very attentively to what my noble Friend has said. Some of us, my Lords, in this House and out of it, are sometimes not able to express our ideas very clearly; but I know no one who is able to express his views with more clearness than is my noble Friend. The only thing which I failed to catch was the drift—the practical result which he desired by his speech to obtain. Certainly the noble Earl does not wish to censure Her Majesty's Government, towards whom he seemed to entertain a friendly feeling throughout the speech. He made but one complaint, to which I will allude immediately. He put the question whether the Government can assure the House that a state of things which he described as anomalous would soon be brought to an end. I hardly know what that question means. Does it mean that he expects the French Government to give up the Treaty with the Bey and withdraw from their position, which undoubtedly is one that enables them to exercise great influence in Tunis? That is a question that he can hardly expect a reply to. The noble
1900
Earl complains that the Correspondence does not give sufficient details of the Enfida case, in which he takes great interest. The fact is, the Papers give all the information we have to give. The noble Earl had been informed that it was decided to refer the case to arbitration, and that two vessels of war were sent to watch that arbitration; but that is an entire misapprehension. At the beginning, when we were hardly informed of the circumstances of the case, and when it appeared that the French were going to increase their Naval Force, we thought that, unintentionally, such an increase might produce an unfair pressure upon that particular case, and we thought it our duty, also, to send a man-of-war also to be present, and which left at the time the increase to the French Force was taken away. In a case of this sort we thought it our duty to take legal advice as to every piece of information; we consulted the highest legal authority, who has taken great interest in the matter; and the fact is that up to this moment we have been positively advised that we had no ground of interference as a Government in this matter. I do not say that circumstances might not arise which might make it our duty to interfere; but up to this time, as we have been advised, we have not been in a position to interfere at all. The noble Earl alluded to a fact that shows the anxiety of the French Government to meet our wishes. The position of M. Roustan as Consul created a considerable technical difficulty with regard to the equality of our Consul; the French Government promised to pay attention to our representation; and the result is that they have appointed another gentleman as Consul at Tunis. Whether the fact is one of great importance or not, it is one that shows the sort of feeling in which the two countries ought to act together in this matter. The noble Earl speaks of difficulties which may arise in the present state of things. I cannot deny that such difficulties may arise; but up to this moment they have not arisen. As to the question whether our Treaty rights have been broken in any way, I have already stated, in answer to the noble Earl, that we have no Treaty rights as regards access to the Bey, and I adhere to that statement. We have no Treaty rights; but we have had the practice

1901
of access to the Bey, and I am not aware that it has been diminished by what has occurred. I added, what is obvious, that the importance of access to the Bey is probably much diminished by the present state of things. As regards Treaty stipulations on this point, they do not exist; as regards practice, we are not in the least prohibited from the access to the Bey we have previously enjoyed. The noble Earl could see no difference between the position of Tunis and that of Tripoli; but there are great differences. In one the authority of the Sultan is purely of a nominal character; in the other there has been active interference in many ways. Indeed, in Tunis the French and the Italians deny the suzerainty of the Porte; but as to Tripoli, all the Powers are united in admitting that it is a portion of the Ottoman Empire. I am sure, from what he said, that the noble Earl approves our policy. We have adopted the Treaty of Berlin; we have endeavoured, and we shall endeavour, to remove any difficulty in the way of fulfilling the conditions of that Treaty. We believe that if all the conditions of the Treaty of Berlin are carried out there is no reason whatever why the Sultan should not maintain his authority in Turkey, and we desire that he should do so. As to Tripoli, all we have done, and it was clearly our duty, is this—in the most friendly, and, I flatter myself, the most courteous manner, we gave our opinion with absolute frankness to France, and France has returned assurances of a most definite character. The noble Earl has intimated that there may be some doubt about those assurances; but I cannot think it is desirable that in this House we should question the perfectly definite and clear assurances given by the Governments of great and friendly Powers. For one, I certainly wish to rely on those assurances. I quite admit that in international affairs those who are charged with the conduct of the foreign relations of a country must not take everything for granted, but must keep their eyes open, and must be prepared, when occasion arises, to act in the manner required by the interests of their country. With regard to our position, I really do not think I have any information to give with regard either to Tunis or Tripoli beyond what is to be found in the Papers
1902
presented to this House, and I must return my thanks to the noble Lord opposite (Lord Lamington) for having spoken of them as so very satisfactory.
LORD STRATHEDEN AND CAMPBELL: My Lords, at this time of the Session and this hour of the evening it is not easy to command the favour of the House on a great subject. If I desired to express at all completely the ideas which have occurred to me during the course of the transaction, or during the long interval in which the Notice was delayed, I ought to look to other channels for producing them. But as I fully share the view of my noble Friend who brought the Motion forward, as the two speeches we have heard have both of them been adverse to it, and as I am led to think he counts on my support, I feel bound, however brief and hurried it may be, if possible, to give it. The noble Lord who followed him indulged in some extraordinary criticism. He complained that the subject was too frequently adverted to. Since the end of June it has never been adverted to at all, although its phases have been multiplying. Before that time, all the Notices on Tunis came from his side of the House. The question has never until to-day been introduced upon these Benches. What is more material, the House has never until to-day had any opportunity to pronounce a judgment on the character of the transaction. The noble Lord has laid down as a maxim that the assurances of foreign Governments should be accepted as substantial. It may be satisfactory that such a maxim should proceed from any quarter to which foreign policy has been a theme of meditation or discussion. But the noble Lord does not go so far as to contend that assurances may be relied on when they are shown to be illusory. Can he maintain that the assurances of the French Government have been performed? The whole series of events involves a constant violation of them. I listened with much attention to the speech of the noble Earl the Secretary of State, but could not ascertain from it a single ground on which the present Motion is objected to. It is not a Motion to reflect on the proceedings of the Government, which I may, therefore, now pass over. It is a Motion to affirm that interference with Ottoman domi-

1903
nion in North Africa tends to endanger the peace of Europe. In that sense alone would I discuss it.
There is one part of the subject which tends, perhaps, more rapidly than any other to the conclusion my noble Friend has recommended to us. The Trench Government maintain—to justify their violence—that Tunis is not incorporated in the Ottoman Empire. In that manner they admit that if Tunis is incorporated in the Ottoman Empire they have been led into considerable errors. But, according to the Foreign Office, and the noble Earl presiding in it, there is no doubt at all upon the subject. The French Government is thus condemned and reprimanded by the British Government in spite of all its friendly language and ingenious connivance. But the British Government is condemned by itself, since, if Tunis is a portion of the Ottoman Empire, Great Britain was bound either to insure its safety or to protest against its violation. The position of the British Government is, therefore, fatally untenable. They shelter the accused, while they reject the plea on which alone he can defend himself. The French Government can only vindicate itself by a successful reference to history and to Treaties. But no such reference suffices. The connection of Tunis and the Ottoman Empire has had so many illustrations that it is really difficult to choose out of the number which to bring before your Lordships. My noble Friend has mentioned one I never heard before, and which appears to me conclusive—namely, that, in a Conference which happened at Vienna, before the negotiations and the Treaties of 1856, France acknowledged, in a formal way, the dependency of Tunis on the Sultan. It is worth while to add a circumstance which shows that during the whole Crimean War she systematically recognized it. During the Crimean War Tunis was contributing a military force to the united Armies which upheld the Ottoman Empire against Russia. She was either a fifth Ally, in the same rank with the Sublime Porte, with France, Great Britain, and Sardinia, or else a Vassal of the former. She was not a fifth Ally of the co-operating Powers, or history would have mentioned it. She therefore acted—and France considered her to action the obligation of
1904
a Vassal sending a contingent to the Suzerain. Where is the reply? But did Tunis, after the Crimean War, become divested of the status which then undoubtedly belonged to her? So late as 1863, M. Drouyn de Lhuys, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, when it was attempted to negotiate a Tunisian loan at Paris, pointed out that the authority of the Sultan ought to be invoked to give it the validity it wanted. Since 1863 has Tunis ceased to be dependent? To support the argument is useless; but M. Rousseau, the French Consul, and author of the Annales Tunisiennes, would give voluminous materials for doing so. When the French and British Governments have both been led into a position they are not able to defend their influence is lowered; and when their influence is lowered the peace of Europe is less secure than otherwise it would be.
My Lords, the Motion gains new support by remarking what might have been done, and what has been omitted, as to Italy. It is allowed that the Italian Government were anxious, and in some degree impatient, to combine with us in such precautionary measures as might have guarded Tunis against the fate which has befallen it. Italy, since 1870, when her unity became complete, has been a great, a splendid, and an unappropriated element to tempt the labour of diplomacy. She has resided in the air without a bias or direction, except so far as Germany in some degree controlled her. At length, the opportunity to draw her strongly to the objects of Great Britain, which are not alien to her own, was forced upon the Government. It was abandoned for no purpose. To defend the latter phrase it is essential for a moment to advert to a prevailing fallacy, which is not less unfounded than prevailing, and which, indeed, appears to underlie the whole course the Government have followed as to Tunis. There is a general assumption that France is an Ally to be on that account conciliated or condoned in any deviation she adopts, until it reaches great or insupportable extremity. No doubt, in disposition and in feeling, since the War of 1870 the relations of France and Great Britain have maintained—down to the present year—their former cordiality. But alliance, in the sense of common action, perished with the Empire. It perished as the flag

1905
descended from the Tuilleries at half-past 3 o'clock on the memorable 4th of September—an incident which cannot be forgotten by those who happened to observe it. From that time France has had but two pre-occupations—externally, at least—first, to withstand calamities which multiplied around her, then to recover the position she held in Europe before the war with Germany affected it. She has not been able or disposed to share the line, and to pursue the objects of Great Britain as she used to do. She has not been able or disposed to venture upon any course by which Russia would be alienated. So deeply was the situation felt in 1871, that at the Black Sea Conference of London, under the auspices of the noble Earl the Secretary of State, it was not thought worth while to wait for her Ambassador before commencing the proceedings. However, that is but an isolated proof which leads to others more convincing. When the Eastern Question re-appeared in 1874, over a series of transactions in which her aid would have been precious and her countenance important—the alliance of the three Emperors; the Herzegovinian, Servian, and Bulgarian rebellions; the war which they produced, the negotiations which preceded it—the voice of France, which so powerfully operated in 1853, was altogether wanting. Even at the Congress of Berlin—except as regards Greece—you cannot urge that France had any telling weight in the direction it adopted. The French alliance, therefore, we had lost by no fault on either side, but by events which violently drew one Power into a different set of calculations and of thoughts from that which used to bind the two to one another. Until the reclamation of Alsace and Lorraine has been achieved, or else until it is despaired of, the greatest minds and soundest combinations will not restore a French alliance which is more than negative and formal. Since France is unattainable, whatever language she may hold, whatever Rulers may direct her, you have to look to other Western Powers as a substitute. The affair of Tunis, although sinister in itself, presented such a chance of gaining Italy as had never before occurred, and is not likely to come back again. But we have failed to grasp what might have been a substance in order to retain
1906
—at no little cost of dignity—what must, until another epoch has been opened, continue to be nothing but a shadow. Italy is not only unattached and undecided in her policy, but embittered against France and discontented with Great Britain. The peace of Europe becomes endangered by her attitude.
If we examine the question still more closely, it seems to me that such interference with the Ottoman Empire in North Africa tends to European war under two categories. It tends, in the first instance, to re-establish an antagonism between France and Great Britain, which we had hoped that many centuries of strife had finished and exhausted. The division is produced when Tunis is encroached upon; becomes more grave when Tripoli is compromised; should Egypt be involved, is certain to be more thoroughly accentuated. In Egypt elements of variance between France and Great Britain are abundant; if only because one Power designed the Canal the other has the greater interest in using and preserving it. Whatever nourishes a French ascendancy in Egypt must embitter the relations of the countries. The comparative tranquillity of France has been purchased by struggles and by sacrifices which elude the grasp of the historian—of which no picture can be adequate. It cannot be denied that Her Majesty's Government have helped her to resume the demon of aggression and rapacity against which William III. first led us to protest, and which the Duke of Wellington was thought at last to have exorcised. But it is not only by reviving discord between the leading Western Powers that the risk of European war has been promoted. We ought to bear in mind the consequences of that discord. As soon as it is felt, an irresistible temptation to revive the troubles of the Eastern Question is administered. Greece observes the moment for' reclaiming the Frontier which a recent Conference imprudently propounded. Russia is invited to cross the Pruth again, if only to adjust the difficulties of Bulgaria. Germany and Austria can hardly look on such a movement with indifference. But, disregarding these contingencies, it cannot be assumed that the Ottoman Empire will always be disposed to leave invasion un-resisted. The experience of 1877 forbids such an assumption.

1907
But it is not enough to show that any Motion is correct, unless it is seen, at the same time, that it would be productive of advantage to adopt it. In France there is a considerable party opposed to the aggression upon Tunis, which has found organs in the Due de Broglie and M. Clemenceau—great names abroad, of which the first, at least, is known in this country. They seem to represent extremes of opposite opinion, although concurring on this subject. The debate in the Chamber of Deputies on the 23rd of May, the debate in the Senate on the 25th of July, reveal the current of opinion which the voice of this House would tend to dignify and strengthen. Another result to which the Motion, if adopted, may contribute is that of warning the French Government itself that lawless and insulting policy directed to encroach upon the Ottoman Empire, and not directed to replace it, has found a just interpretation, and may provoke a serious discouragement. They may be led to see that such a policy will make the recovery of Alsace and Lorraine more difficult than otherwise it would be; that Allies will not be found to put an end to losses and to remedy disasters which, instead of being a school of moderation and forbearance, have excited a contempt for right and hunger for disturbance. If, therefore, my noble Friend thinks proper to divide the House, I shall give an unhesitating vote in favour of his Motion.
Motion (by leave of the House) withdrawn.
House adjourned at 25 minutes to 8 P.M. during pleasure.
House resumed at 25 minutes to 3 A.M.
The Earl of CORK—Chosen Speaker in the absence of The LORD CHANCELLOR and The LORD COMMISSIONER.

LAND LAW (IRELAND) BILL,
Returned from the Commons with an amendment made by the Lords to which the Commons had disagreed and on which the Lords have insisted, agreed to; and with several of the further amendments made by the Lords, agreed to; several agreed to, with amendments, and with consequential amendments to the Bill; and several disagreed to, with reasons for such disagreement: The said amendments and reasons to be printed, and to be considered To-morrow. (No. 214.)
House adjourned at a quarter before Three o'clock A.M., till a quarter before Five o'clock.