HL Deb 25 June 1880 vol 253 cc810-32

Order of the Day for the Second Reading, read.

LORD HOUGHTON,

in moving that the Bill be now read the second time, said, that as the subject had been so frequently discussed on former occasions it would not be necessary for him to deliver a long speech. In the various discussions which had taken place on the question with which the Bill dealt, matters of antiquarian, historical, and ecclesiastical interest had been thoroughly considered; and he should not, therefore, again travel over the ground which they covered, nor need he refer to the legal difficulties which had arisen from the differences between the law in this country and the law in those of our Colonies, where marriages of this description were legal. But he proposed to say a few words upon the ecclesiastical and upon the social aspects of the question. He gave the first rank to the ecclesiastical question, because it constituted the real difficulty which had to be encountered in dealing with the subject. While no one would more regret than he the absence of the right rev. Bench from the deliberations of that House, there could be no doubt that the measure would almost instantaneously become law but for the resistance of the right rev. Prelates. It should, however, be remembered that if the right rev. Prelates prevented the measure passing, with them also lay the responsibility. Already the people of England were beginning to understand that it was the Church of England, as represented in their Lordships' House, which came between them and what many of them thought a portion of their public rights, and thus interfered, so far as this question was concerned, with their domestic happiness. He had never disputed, either in their Lordships' presence or in the Lower House, that there was a general consensus in the Christian Church from very early times in regard to the prohibition of marriages of this kind. There was no doubt that the Christian Church soon began to bring within its domain the law of marriage, and several new provisions on the subject were added at an early period to the Canon Law. Among those provisions were some which dealt with marriage in certain degrees of kindred and affinity. What was the animus of the Christian Church in this matter was not easy to decide. It might be that it felt itself bound in some degree to go upon the lines of the Levitical Law. It might be that in those rude ages it was thought that every possible restraint should be placed upon the indulgence of the sexual passion. It might have been also that the Church was anxious to extend its own powers by imposing restrictions in regard to marriage. The Church might also desire to increase the sanctity attaching to marriage by every means in its power, although it always preached the superior piety of the celibate state. Whatever the motive, these rights of restriction asserted at a very early period by the Church were confirmed by the State. But with the right of restriction there was always associated the right of dispensation. But with the changes of time the right was asserted, but the practice of dispensation had disappeared. When, in the order of events, the question of marriage fell out of the hands of the Church and came into the sphere of the State, there came with it the necessity of a change in the law; and the consequence of the development of these views was that they had adopted civil marriage as the absolute law of the country. No religious ceremony was required—no connection with the Church of England or any other religious body. What was the consequence? Could the right rev. Bench any longer assert their authority over the question? An enormous body of their Nonconformist fellow-countrymen asserted that there was no religion in the question at all, and that the Bishops of the Church had no right to enforce their opinions upon others by allying their opinions with their office. Had the right rev. Prelates any right to impose their views upon that important section of the community? He remembered being struck many years ago by the remarks made to him by a distinguished Prelate, Bishop Phillpotts of Exeter. That eminent man said to him that he was only concerned in the question so far as it concerned the Church of England; if the House of Lords gave the right to contract such marriages to the Dissenters, he had not a word to say against it; there was no reason, he said, why he or his Episcopal Brethren should dictate to other communions than their own. What Bishop Phillpotts had expressed his concurrence in was all that he asked from the Episcopal Bench. Let the Bishops continue their ecclesiastical legislation as they chose; but they ought not to attempt to impose it upon the enormous body of Nonconformists; and he called upon them to show by what right they could interfere with what many thought to be their social and religious liberties. So much for the ecclesiastical aspect. He would next call attention to the social view of the question. This was not a matter which affected only one single class of the community; and he believed that its social aspect affected their Lordships more than the former. If the question concerned only the class of society in which their Lordships lived they would have a full right to follow their inclinations in the matter; but they were a Representative Assembly, and as such they must legislate not for a section alone, but for the community generally. His first inclination to take an interest in the question originated in what he had seen in his own neighbourhood in the North of England. There, in the great towns, he found those marriages were most frequent, and were made utterly regardless of the law. These marriages had been contracted in enormous numbers— and not only in the large towns, but in the rural districts— and would continue to be formed, because the grounds on which the interposition was based were purely ecclesiastical. What right had a certain number of people to oppose themselves to the comfort and honour of thousands? There was little knowledge of human nature in those who thought that the system of family relationship would be damaged by such a measure as this. The responsibility of marriage was the one thing which cheeked the appetites of men. But looking still deeper into human nature, it would be seen that the real danger lay in our best feelings— feelings of devoted attachment, of sisterly love ripened into affection, and which now came on without check or warning, which the proposed change in the law would suggest and interpose. He believed their Lordships would not be justified by refusing this Bill to oppose the desire of a large portion of the British people.

Moved," That the Bill be now read 2a"—(The Lord Houghton.)

EARL BEAUCHAMP,

in moving an Amendment that the Bill be read a second time that day three months, said, their Lordships were fully aware of the very active canvass which had been made on behalf of the Bill, and to the powerful influences which had been brought to bear in its favour. He trusted, however, that their Lordships would not be deterred from applying their minds carefully to the examination of a proposal which mainly affected that family life which was the foundation of society and the source of all their purest joys. The Bill he must, in the first place, point out contained that very retrospective clause to which so much objection was taken last year; and, considering the promises repeatedly made by the noble Baron (Lord Houghton), that if the Bill was re-introduced it should deal only with the future and not with the past, he failed to understand why that pledge, given only last year, was not redeemed, and why in the Bill on their Lordships' Table it was provided that all marriages whatever which had been contracted within those prohibited degrees in this Kingdom or without should be valid. Some of their Lordships might think that, even if it were right to permit such marriages in future, there were good reasons why that legislation which was to apply to the future ought not to apply to the past. Those who had deliberately and with their eyes open entered into marriages which the law forbade had no just claim to the indulgence now demanded for them. The only reason he had heard from the noble Baron was that these marriages were contracted in enormous numbers. He begged leave to doubt the accuracy of that statement; but, at the same time, it was a fact that inducements had been held out for many years, and representations had been un-blushingly made, that although those marriages were invalid if contracted in England they would be valid if contracted abroad. No one pitied more than he did persons who had been misled by those who ought to have known better into entering into those unions. But, even assuming that they had been contracted, as alleged, in enormous numbers, that was no reason whatever for refraining from considering the circumstances in which they had been contracted. If their Lordships were to be told that infractions of the law were to be reasons for changing the law, he asked, where was that principle to stop? Were they prepared to abolish contracts because one of the parties declined to fulfil the conditions into which they had entered? Would they abolish the law against bigamy because some men and women were not faithful to their marriage vows? Or would they repeal the law of larceny because there was an increase of juvenile crimes? He protested against that doctrine as being subversive of all legislation and morality. Whatever might have been the case previous to the year 1835—whatever obscurities or difficulties might have existed as to the enforcement of what had been the law for 1,200 years, and, indeed, since Christianity was part of the law of the land— since 1835 the path had been plain and the road clear, and there could be no doubt that those marriages in the cognizance of every Court of Law were null and void. They were always null and void before; but a defect in procedure prevented the enforcement of the law in the temporal Courts. Their Lordships were asked to pass that Bill because it had been repeatedly brought up to them from the Lower House. Now, to urge that the measure had constantly received the support of the House of Commons was grossly to misrepresent the real facts of the case. The measure had been before Parliament since 1841, and there had been eight or nine Parliaments since then, and, speaking broadly, the measure had been before every one of those Parliaments. In the Parliament elected in 1841 the House of Commons refused to allow the Bill to be introduced at all. In the Parliament elected in 1847 the Bill was twice read a second time. In the Parliament of 1852 it was once read a second time and once rejected on the second reading. In the Parliament of 1857 the Bill was twice read a second time; in that of 1859 the House of Commons twice rejected it; in that of 1866 they rejected it once; in that of 1868 the second reading was four times carried; and in that elected in 1874 the second reading was negatived. This showed that in the majority of Parliaments the House of Commons refused to accept the Bill, and in the Parliament most favourable to the Bill, that of 1868, the majority in favour diminished from 100 to 35. So far as any argument could be drawn from the House of Commons its votes were conclusive against the Bill. Certainly, the noble Baron ought to be convinced by these statistics that the Bill had not been hitherto defeated by the action of the Episcopal Bench; and even when the Bill was last before their Lordships' House, the second reading was rejected by a majority of lay Peers. He thought the reference to the Episcopal Bench was an invidious one, and devoid of the basis of fact. But he did not know any question for which the presence of Bishops in that House was more appropriate than one such as this affecting the in- terests of morality and religion. The majority of the House of Commons had rejected the Bill; and, therefore, he hoped their Lordships would not listen to misrepresentations which were industriously circulated. The law of England, as it was in this matter, had stood for 1,200 years. It was clearly defined by the Westminster Confession of Faith. The principle there laid down was that a man might not marry of his wife's kin one nearer than he might of his own. This was the principle on which the law rested, and if that principle were once encroached upon he could not tell how they were to escape from further encroachments. The whole of the English family-life rested on the clear lines of this marriage law, and once they departed from those lines they could not possibly stop. It was said there was no country in Europe where these marriages were not allowed, and they were told to take the case of Germany; but their Lordships had not been told that wherever these marriages were allowed, marriages between uncles and nieces were permitted. Among the Royal Houses of Germany arrangements of this description were frequent from political purposes; and there was one ease in which a ruling Prince had married two of his own nieces in succession who were sisters. The noble Baron told them to look at America. He should decline to go to America. He did not prefer the social and domestic life of America to that of England. He might point to the peculiar arrangements that prevailed in certain classes in the United States, and would refer their Lordships to the enormous number of divorces as a proof of how slender was the family tie in that country. In whose interest was this change in the law proposed? It could not benefit the children, for in thousands of families the children received the greatest possible benefit from the tender teaching of the mother's sister. But if this Bill became law, the aunt could not give the same attention to her sister's children which she now gave, and desolation and dismay would be brought into hundreds and thousands of homes. Jealousy would take the place of love, and suspicion would be found where now there was confidence. They would not increase the confidence of the children in the aunt by making her a stepmother. It would not benefit the widower, who now was able to seek consolation with his wife's relatives, but who, were this Bill to become law, would be deprived of their society for himself and his children. Who, then, would benefit by this Bill? The rich and powerful? No one ventured to say so, and therefore he would pass over that part of the question with this remark— that the money lavished in promoting this Bill could not have come from the very poor. Would this alteration of the law satisfy those who were moving in the matter? He deplored the well-known fact that among the lower classes so many men and women should be living together without being bound by the marriage tie; but that was no proof that this was owing to the restrictions imposed by the law upon marriages of the description now in question. He had been supplied with some statistics referring to a certain parish, by which it appeared that out of a total of nearly 30 cases there were three cases of union with a deceased wife's sister, and two cases of union with a wife's sister while the wife was still living; but there were seven cases of men living with their own daughters, ten cases of men living with their own sisters, and six cases of men living with their own nieces. Therefore he said that if they were to deal with the case of the poor, this measure really brought them no relief whatever; but it did unsettle the foundation of our marriage law. The noble Baron had alluded to the Roman law in respect to marriage in terms of depreciation. But he would read to their Lordships a passage from the history of Mr. Gibbon, which would show in what light the Romans regarded this subject. He says— The freedom of love and marriage was restrained among the Romans by natural and civil impediments. An instinct almost innate and universal appears to prohibit the incestuous commerce of parents and children in the infinite series of ascending and descending generations. Concerning the oblique and collateral branches, nature is indifferent, reason mute, and custom various and arbitrary. In Egypt the marriage of brothers and sisters was admitted without scruple or exception; a Spartan might espouse the daughter of his father, an Athenian that of his mother; and the nuptials of an uncle with his niece were applauded at Athens as a happy union of the dearest relations. The profane law-givers of Rome were never tempted by interest or superstition to multiply the forbidden degrees; but they inflexibly condemned the marriage of sisters and brothers, hesitated whether first cousins should be touched by the same interdict, and revered the parental character of aunts and uncles, and treated affinity … as a just imitation of the ties of blood. On one occasion, when this Bill was under consideration in the House of Commons, Lord Russell said that if they made this change in the law they could not stop there—that this change would be, in his opinion, utterly imperfect unless they made it applicable to both sexes and to all degrees of relationship. Those who sought to defend this Bill by resorting to the Scriptural argument would find themselves standing on very slippery ground. He implored the House not to pass the Bill, because it would destroy the happiness of English homes and the trust and purity of English family life, while it would introduce confusion into our law.

Amendment moved, to leave out ("now") and add at the end of the Motion ("this day three months.")—(The Earl Beauchamp.)

VISCOUNT LIFFORD

said, that while he could not agree with the arguments of the noble Earl who had just sat down (Earl Beauchamp), neither could he altogether join in the conclusions of the noble Baron (Lord Houghton) who moved the second reading. Our marriage law, no doubt, was founded upon the Levitical law; but there was nothing in Holy Scriptures which in any way tended to forbid such marriages as those with a deceased wife's sister, and it was not until that most iniquitous Pope, Alexander VI., sanctioned the restriction in the Canon Law that such a restriction became a law of the Church. He would here take the liberty of reminding the right rev. Bench that the Canon Law prohibited the marriage of priests. He thought he need hardly ask whether the right rev. Prelates acknowledged such marriages to be null and void? His own opinion was that these marriages, not being forbidden by the law of God, it became very much a matter of taste and inclination, and there was no reason why we should not revert to the old Levitical law. He believed that these marriages were much more numerous than was imagined, and the reason was that the people who contracted them considered that they were doing nothing contrary to Scriptural law. On the whole, he had come to the conclusion to support the Bill.

LORD COLERIDGE

I should like to say in a few sentences why I am still unable to vote for the second reading, or adopt the principle, of this Bill. It is not a question to be looked at from a Party point of view, nor is one's judgment upon it to be affected by Party considerations. Why supporting it should be supposed to be a portion of the Liberal creed I have never been able to make out; why Liberals more than Tories should desire this particular marriage, or care less than Tories for the comfort and delight which unmarriageable sisters-in-law can give, I confess passes my comprehension. It is possible that the grounds on which this measure is opposed do not approve themselves to the majority of Liberals; but dissent from some of the reasons of opposition is quite consistent with a strong dislike for other reasons to the thing which is opposed. 80, at least, I find it in my case, and I will, with your leave, proceed to tell your Lordships why. I do not argue the religious question. I do not pretend to oppose the sanctioning of this measure because it is forbidden either in the Old Testament or the New. I have no pretence to the scholarship which would enable me to appreciate the Old Testament argument; and I can see nothing in the text of the New Testament, at any rate, in terms directed against this marriage. But if it were otherwise, I should deliberately refuse to argue the question upon any such grounds. Such reasons, if they exist, are no doubt binding on the consciences of those who believe in their existence; but they have no force for those who do not, and it is useless—it is merely irritating—to attempt to silence an adversary by an authority which he does not acknowledge; it is a waste of time to argue except on common ground and from premisses which are admitted. Thus much, and thus much only, I think, may be said from a religious point of view. We are standing upon an existing state of things; to change it will, in the opinion of many persons entitled to respect, be a breach of religious obligation. Without disputing whether it be so or not, you who wish the change ought to have some very strong reasons of another sort to justify you in changing the law when the change will so heavily affect many good and honourable men. Thus far, and thus far only, do I feel inclined to push the religious argument. Furthermore, I freely admit that the whole question of marriage is more or less one of convention. Reflection shows us that there is, with hardly an exception—parent and child is probably no exception—no abstract right or wrong in these things. The marriage law of any country as to the degrees within which marriage is to be contracted is the result of what the cultivated intelligence of that country thinks wisest and best for the regulation of that sacred and intimate relation from time to time. It is obvious that connections from which we now quite rightly shrink, and which we quite rightly esteem as unholy and impure, and therefore as unlawful, were sometimes, must have been under some circumstances, pure and chaste and lawful. There is not a trace that Abraham's marriage with his half-sister shocked the feelings of the writer of the Book of Genesis. The Ptolomies and Cleopatras, following in this the customs of the Persians, allowed marriages between brothers and sisters of the whole blood apparently without scandal. To the nobler civilization of the Romans this connection had become intensely repulsive in the time of Juvenal. His condemnation of the Jewish King— Barbarus incestæ dedit hunc Agrippa Sorori. is familiar to your Lordships. Yet to the Romans themselves the marriage of an uncle and a niece from the time of Claudius and Agrippina to the days of the Christian Emperor Constans was allowed without offence by the public law of the Roman Empire. It would be tiresome and pedantic to multiply examples. What I wish to draw from those with which I have troubled you is the consequence that you cannot argue conclusively from any former times that in this matter of marriage you must get, if you can, at the general sentiment, and aim at the general good, and that you should maintain that which conduces to the general good and which the general sentiment approves. Now, can it be said that the general sentiment approves this marriage? Go back 20 years, and no one can say that the current of opinion has, on the whole, been in its favour. The House of Commons has repeatedly rejected it. Even in the Parliament of 1868 the majorities in its favour steadily and largely diminished. Your Lordships' House—not a popular elective Assembly indeed—yet in this, which is not a Party question, no bad index of the sentiment of educated men—has steadily rejected it. The richer and well-to-do are classes at least much divided on it. The poorer—I rejoice to think that we have nothing of the exploded nonsense as to its being a poor man's question—are, as far as I may presume to speak of them in my part of England, certainly against it. Scotland is not, perhaps, unanimously, but largely, against it. So, happily, without distinction of creed, is Ireland too. In all this I am speaking of men, and of men only. But to every marriage besides the man there is another party, and that is the woman. And whatever unpopularity may have been incurred, justly or unjustly, by woman's rights and by those who advocate them, it will, I suppose, hardly be disputed that in such a matter as this women have rights, and equal rights with men. If the vast majority of Englishwomen in point of number, if the great majority of refined and cultivated Englishwomen are opposed to this measure, if it is abhorrent to their feelings, what right have we, even if we were all agreed, to overbear them and disregard their wishes? That the women of these Islands in an enormous majority are opposed to it I absolutely believe. Such a matter as this is not easy of demonstration. I can but speak as I believe. I know that many women who shrank from any public action some years ago did not shrink from petitioning against this Bill. I know that amongst my own acquaintances I scarcely know one who supports it. I know that, as a rule, men most in earnest in support of the measure have admitted to me with regret that the women, as a whole, dislike it. I do not deny to Englishmen the legal power; I do deny to Englishmen the moral right to pass a law of marriage contrary to the wishes and repulsive to the feelings of the great body of their countrywomen. It is not generous, it is not manly, it is not, in my opinion, just. That there are some men who wish to contract this marriage, and some women too, of course I am not so foolish as to deny; but that the majority of those who support this measure are eagerly desiring to marry their sisters-in-law I must entirely disbelieve. It is, and always has been, the result of an agitation for which I have neither sympathy or respect. And, further, I believe that a like case and a like agitation might be got up for legalizing marriage with any other kinswoman of the wife. Certainly, for example, with the wife's niece, if the same trouble were taken and the same money spent. I could have some sympathy and some respect for an agitation which had for its object a reconsideration of the whole marriage law, which went upon some principle which distinguished, for example, broadly between consanguinity and affinity, between kinsfolk and connections. I do not say I should agree with, but I should respect and understand an argument founded upon a sensible distinction which said that the kindred of the wife were not the kindred of the husband, nor the kindred of the husband the kindred of the wife. But this Bill is founded on no principle; it sets man free, but it leaves woman bound. It lets the husband marry his wife's sister, because it is said she is not his sister; but it forbids the wife to marry her husband's brother because he is her brother. Where is the justice, where is the common fairness of this? Suppose it were stepchildren, where there is no blood in common, would anyone bear for an instant with a proposition that a man might marry his wife's daughter, but that a woman might not marry her husband's son? My noble Friend knows that he dare not bring forward a measure founded upon any principle. He knows that the whole feeling of the country would rise against it with indignant scorn. Is it unfair, then, to say that this is advocated to please a few men who have broken the law, and to set free a few men more who wish to break it, but who are firmly determined that the liberty they claim themselves they will deny to their widows? My Lords, I deny that the general sentiment supports the Bill. I deny also that it is for the general good. It is not easy to overstate the benefit which the whole of society derives from the social relations at present possible between the husband and the wife, and the family of the other. Affection into which passion does not enter is the great civilizer of mankind. Passion we share with the brutes. The lowest savages equal in passion the most civilized races in the world. But unpassionate affection refines and lifts up, and is the source of half the graces and more than half the beauty and delight of social life. Now your wife's sisters are your own, and the circle of unpassionate affection is largely widened. But pass this Bill and they become to you like any other women, and the circle of unpassionate affection is at once contracted. My Lords, I admit that, as a rule, you should be tender to minorities. I admit that, if possible, you should indulge men's affections. But this is a case in which you cannot indulge the wishes of the minority without doing a great injustice, and inflicting a terrible hardship on the majority. Let me explain. Most men do not lose their wives, and for them this Bill has no significance. To some men there comes a time when a great shadow falls upon them, when the light of their life goes out and hope dies within them. Some of them recover, form fresh ties, begin their lives again, and marry another woman. The majority of such men do not wish to marry their sisters-in-law, and for them, too, this Bill is of no use, but may be most mischievous. There remain those who do not recover, and who do not desire to form new ties of marriage. To these men and to those who do re-marry, till they re-marry, the society of a sister-in-law is a blessing perfectly unspeakable. Who can count the sum of innocent delight and comfort which this relation has given to men who most need such comfort, and at a time when they need it most? Why, for the sake of the few who do want to marry their wives' sisters, are sisters-in-law to be abolished for the vast majority of those men who do not so wish? Because you do abolish them. I said many years ago, and I venture to repeat it here because it is true, that by passing this measure you point out by statute the sister-in-law as the proper Parliamentary successor of the wife, and what modest woman will put herself in the way of a succession when most people will say that she is manifestly seeking it? Why is this hardship to be done to the great majority who are contented with the law for the sake of a very few who want to break it? My Lords, I will admit that the law of marriage having been altered in some of our Colonies, and altered in the direction of this Bill, somewhat complicates the question. As to some of them I do not deny that the law of marriage is within their competence to alter. Disliking this marriage as I do, I myself, when Attorney General, advised, I believe— the noble Earl the Secretary of State for the Colonies will correct me if I am wrong—that Colonial Statutes, at least in the ease of some Colonies, for such an object were not illegal. But much as I regret this, and disagreeable as some of the consequences may be, I cannot admit that we are to change a law which we in these Islands think for the general good because our Colonies have passed a law which we do not think wise or beneficial. I will not speak of dragging down or dragging up; but I say that if in a matter of social concern affecting the tenderest and holiest relations of life, one or the other is to give way, it ought not to be this great country, the mother of nations, the home of a domestic purity and happiness, I will not say unequalled, but I will say unsurpassed, in the whole history of the world. There is much more to say, but I will not longer abuse a patience which I know I must have tried; and on these grounds, most inadequately and imperfectly stated, I ask your Lordships to reject a measure which tampers dangerously with a most delicate yet a most important subject upon no fixed principle, without sufficient reasons, with aims which are not entitled to respect and sympathy, and which I believe will lower the morality and impair the happiness of the great mass of the people.

EARL GRANVILLE

The noble and learned Lord who has just sat down has said what really amounts to a truism— namely, that this question is not a Party question. His putting it so clearly encourages me, in my personal capacity, and entirely apart from any Party connection or feeling, to say a few words, although I am not prepared to make any elaborate speech on this subject. The noble and learned Lord asked why it should be thought that this question should recommend itself more to the Party with which I am connected than to the Conservative Party. I can give no answer to that, except that the idea may have originated in the fact that the tendency of the Liberal Party is to think that any restriction upon freedom requires to be carefully justified on the ground of the public advantage. The noble Baron who has introduced this Bill used an argument derived from the position of their Lordships with respect to the Nonconformists, and has urged that this House, being composed chiefly of Churchmen, should be careful to remove any restrictions bearing unjustly upon Nonconformists. But, in supporting this Bill, I do not claim it as a measure of justice to Nonconformists, but quite as much as a measure of justice to those Members of the Church of England who believe they are morally entitled to form this sort of marriage. I claim it as much for the parishioners of the late Dr. Hook as for the Nonconformists. The noble and learned Lord made certain admissions not made by the noble Baron opposite, for he put the religious question out of court in considering this matter; but I cannot for myself personally consent to put the religious question entirely out of Court. Certainly, if it were shown to me that this particular marriage is against God's Word, and that it is forbidden in the Old and New Testament, I should most decidedly be influenced to give my vote against any Bill of this sort. When the noble and learned Lord makes a merit of putting the religious question aside, I cannot help remembering that at the beginning of this agitation against the law as it stands at present—a law which is not so old as has been represented, and was only passed 45 years ago— the chief arguments used by its opponents in this House and "elsewhere" were almost exclusively founded on the statement that such marriages as this Bill contemplates were contrary to God's Word and Scriptural text. I believe, however, that this kind of argument has now been almost entirely abandoned. The noble and learned Lord talked about Colonial and American marriage laws, and I entirely agree with him that we are not bound to adopt a law because it happens to have been passed either in the United States or the Colonies. But I think we may learn from their experience, and when we find that bad results do not in our Colonies follow from such legislation as is now proposed, that we may reasonably be encouraged to make the change, if we deem such change desirable. The noble Earl opposite (Earl Beachamp) sought for an argument against the Bill in the number of American divorces in States where, it must be remembered, unusual facilities exist for divorce; but it appears to me that that is a matter entirely unconnected with the question whether a man should be allowed to marry his deceased wife's sister. The noble and learned Lord made much of the prospect that this Bill would destroy the sanctity of our present family relations. Well, I am not sure that we are not suffering from some delusion upon this point. The noble and learned Lord says that the relations of a man's wife are his own relations. As to that, I can only say that I am very fond of my wife's relations; but they are not my relations, and nobody can make them so. In the same way, I would tell the noble and learned Lord that we do not all wish to marry our wives' sisters. As for myself, I solemnly declare that I have not the slightest wish to marry any one of my wife's sisters, though I dote upon them all. The fact that I do not wish to do so is, however, no reason why others should be debarred from contracting the marriages in connection with which this legislation is proposed. Is it, I would ask, so perfectly clear that a man's sister-in-law can enter his house and take care of his children and remain indifferent to everything but domestic duties? I have known recently a case where a lady moving in your Lordships' society deprecated, in consequence of the painful trials to which she herself had been exposed, the constant intercourse of a young widower with a young sister-in-law. With regard to any young daughter or sister of mine, I should not object, if the present legal prohibition were removed, to her marrying her sister's widower, and thus becoming the mother of her sister's children; but I should certainly strongly object to any such young person entering the household of a young widower merely to look after his children. The noble and learned Lord thinks that it is "rubbish" to say that this is a poor man's question. It certainly cannot enfeeble the argument in regard to the poor that the only person to whom the poor man, who has the misfortune to lose his wife, can look to for the care of his children is her sister; whom he, perhaps, employs as a servant, while the rich man with a family has ample means of providing governesses and others to take care of his children. I was quite astonished to hear it said that the cases in which a widower and his wife's sister share the same home are very few. I believe, on the contrary, that in certain parts of the country they are very numerous indeed. The noble and learned Lord says this is a question to be decided entirely by the cultivated minds of the community, and that the cultivated women of the country do not desire the change. Well the law does not oblige these cultivated women to marry, and there is not the slightest obligation upon them to marry their sisters' widowers; but it surely would be wrong, because they may not wish to do so, to deprive others of that which they believe would be a great consolation to them. The noble and learned Lord stated that the feeling in Scotland was opposed to this Bill. But only a few days ago a Memorial in favour of this Bill was presented on behalf of the Convention of all the Royal and Parliamentary Burghs in Scotland, after a resolution had been passed by an enormous majority in support of the measure. It was stated at the time that in Scotland the practice of marriage with a deceased wife's sister was largely followed by the poor, and was rapidly spreading among the middle classes, and that these marriages were contracted without exciting the slightest moral or social reprobation in the circles in which they took place. In conclusion, I wish to say that no real reason has been given us why this amendment of the law should not be made; and, therefore, I, for one, will cheerfully give my support to the second reading of the Bill.

THE BISHOP OF OXFORD

said, that it had been suggested that the right rev. Bench ought not to seek to impose its ecclesiastical opinions upon Nonconformists. But was it not possible that those who sat upon the Episcopal Bench should take an enlarged view of an important question quite apart from ecclesiastical considerations? He did not desire to touch upon any ecclesiastical considerations, but to deal with the matter simply as one which concerned all classes of the community. The Bill before their Lordships was, in fact, a Bill for the abolition of the table of prohibited degrees. Now those degrees were degrees of nearness; they prohibited marriage in the nearer degrees and allowed it in the more remote. The Bill allowed the near, and prohibited the more remote. A man was to be allowed to marry his wife's sister, but not the wife's niece. The Bill, in fact, would put an end to the idea of nearness of kin in relation to marriage. To talk of nearness of kin in the connection of marriage would be thenceforth idle words. He was surprised at the statement of the noble Earl (Earl Granville) that the present law was only 45 years old. He always hesitated to dispute a statement of the noble Earl; but he was bound to say that his statement was absolutely incorrect. He understood that in a leading case decided about 19 years ago it was stated by the Lord Chancellor that Lord Lyndhurst's Act made no change in the law; it only related to procedure. Moreover, the question of a deceased wife's sister was not mentioned from beginning to end of the Act. The Act made a retrospective distinction between affinity and consanguinity, and thus embraced the whole range of incestuous marriages. The House could not deal with the question otherwise than by making a broad distinction between marriages of affinity and of consanguinity. Lord Lyndhurst's Bill dealt merely with procedure, leaving the law of England exactly where it had been for 300 years. The right rev. Bench were interested in the question for other than purely ecclesiastical reasons. They were often, as a social matter, asked to advise on the question of marriage. If the Bill were passed, and they were consulted on the advisability of a marriage between persons related by affinity, they would be asked what possible ground they could have for discouraging such marriages, when the principle on which they were prohibited had been abandoned. He had not heard a shadow of reason in favour of the Bill. He should have thought that such a Bill would not have been brought in light-heartedly. It was proposed to do away with one principle without substituting another. On so important a question he thought that the advice of competent and learned men would have been sought before the introduction of such a measure. But he did not think that narrow prejudices should be inputed to the episcopal body without better reasons than he had heard that evening.

THE BISHOP OF LINCOLN

My Lords, I would not have risen but for an ex- pression which has just fallen from the noble Earl (Earl Granville). The noble Earl said that he would withdraw his support from this Bill if he thought that the marriages which it proposed to legalize were forbidden by the law of God; but that he did not imagine that anyone held that opinion, and that, though it might have been formerly entertained, it was now wholly abandoned. My Lords, I feel bound to declare solemnly that this opinion has not been abandoned, and to affirm no less solemnly my deliberate conviction that these marriages are forbidden by the law of God. But, it may be asked, why, as a mere private individual, do you venture to assert this? My Lords, I do not say this as a private person, but on the authority of the Church and Realm of England, and of the Universal Church of Christ for 1,500 years. The Church of England in her Canons of 1603 (Canon 99) declares that marriages contracted within the degrees of kindred and affinity which are set down in the Table of Degrees published in the year 1563 are illegal, because they are prohibited as such by the Word of God; and in that Table of Degrees to which she there refers, she says—"A man may not marry his wife's sister." She affirms, therefore, that the marriages which this Bill proposes to legalize are forbidden by the law of God. And this affirmation, grounded by her on the Word of God—namely, on the 18th chapter of Leviticus, which chapter contains the general law of God concerning marriage—is confirmed by the judgment of universal Christendom for 1,500 years. A noble Lord opposite referred to the late revered and beloved Bishop Selwyn, and quoted him as saying that the first dispensation for such a marriage as this Bill would legalize was given in the year 1500 by Pope Alexander VI.—Borgia. My Lords, Bishop Selwyn was quite right in saying so. The first dispensation for such a marriage was given by that Pope, who was made infamous by an illicit connection with his own daughter, who was also his own daughter-in-law, Lucrezia Borgia, on whom that celebrated epitaph was written— Hoc jacet in tumulo Lecretia nomine, Bed re Thais, Alexandri filia, sponsa, nurus. Such, my Lords, is the authority for these marriages; but the authority against them is the judgment of the Church of England, adopted by the Realm of England; and it is the judgment of the Universal Church of Christ for 15 centuries. My Lords, the noble Lord who moved the second reading of this Bill referred to the position of the Bishops of the Church of England in this House, and to their action with regard to this Bill. I, for one, do not know why the Bishops of the Church are admitted to a seat in this House, if it be not for the sake of declaring the law of God on such grave and religious and social questions as these. And it is, therefore, my Lords, because I am firmly convinced, by careful examination, and on the authority to which I have referred, that the marriages which this Bill would legalize are contrary to the Divine law, that I earnestly entreat you, in the name of God, to reject it.

THE EARL OF DENBIGH

said, if they passed this Bill it would be but the beginning of the disruption of all social ties. These marriages were forbidden by the Church of Rome, which, however, in exceptional cases, would grant dispensations. No such power existed in the Anglican Church, and he could not sanction their permission without any restriction. He should vote against the Bill.

LORD DENMAN

opposed the Bill.

On Question, That ("now") stand part of the Motion? Their Lordships divided: —Contents 90; Not-Contents 101: Majority 11.

CONTENTS.
Wales, H.R.H. the Prince of. Ilchester, E.
Edinburgh, H.R.H. D. Innes, E. (D. Roxburghe.)
Connaught, H.R.H. D. Kimberley, E.
Minto, E.
Bedford, D. Morley, E.
Cleveland, D. Northbrook, E.
Devonshire, D. Onslow, E.
Westminster, D. Spencer, E.
Sydney, E.
Ailesbury, M. Zetland, E.
Lansdowne, M.
Northampton, M. Bolingbroke and St. John, V.
Ashburnham, E. Falmouth, V.
Camperdown, E. Gordon, V. (E. Aberdeen.)
Cawdor, E.
Chichester, E. Gough, V.
Clarendon, E. Halifax, V.
Clonmell, E. Leinster, V. [D. Leinster.)
Derby, E.
Fitzwilliam, E. Lifford, V.
Granville, E. Powerscourt, V.
Harrington, E. Sherbrooke, V.
Ripon, L. Bp. Leigh, L.
Aberdare, L. Lismore, L. (V. Lismore.)
Abinger, L. Meldrum, L. (M. Huntly.)
Bateman, L.
Blantyre, L. Monson, L.
Boyle, L. (E. Cork and Orrery.) Mont Eagle, L. (M. Sligo.)
Brabourne, L. [Teller.] Monteagle of Brandon, L.
Breadalbane, L. (E. Breadalbane.) Mostyn, L.
Calthorpe, L. Norton, L.
Carew, L. Penzance, L.
Charlemont, L. (E. Charlemont.) Ribblesdale, L.
Robartes, L.
Churchill, L. Sandhurst, L.
Cottesloe, L. Shute, L. (V. Barrington.)
De L'Isle and Dudley, L. Skene, L. (E. Fife.)
Dorchester, L. Somerton, L. (E. Normanton.)
Ebury, L.
Elgin, L. (E. Elgin and Kincardine.) Stanley of Alderley, L.
Gerard, L. Strafford, L. (V. Enfield.)
Gwydir, L. Sudeley, L.
Hare, L. (E. Listowel.) Suffield, L.
Houghton, L. [Teller.] Talbot de Malahide, L.
Howard de Walden, L. Tredegar, L.
Keane, L. Tyrone, L. (M. Waterford.)
Kenmare, L. (E. Kenmare.) Vaux of Harrowden,L.
Kenry, L. (E. Dunraven and Mount-Earl.) Wentworth, L.
Lawrence, L. Wimborne, L.
NOT-CONTENTS.
Selborne, L. (J. Chancellor.) Strathmore and Kinghorn, E.
York, L. Archp. Waldegrave, E.
Marlborough, D. Wicklow, E.
Somerset, D. Cranbrook, V.
Hardinge, V.
Bath, M. Hawarden, V.
Bute, M. Strathallan, V.
Salisbury, M. Templetown, V.
Beaconsfield, E. Chester, L. Bp.
Beauchamp,E. [Teller.] Chichester, L. Bp.
Bradford, E. Gloucester and Bristol, L. Bp.
Denbigh, E.
Devon, E. Hereford, L. Bp.
Effingham, E. Lincoln, L. Bp.
Gainsborough, E. London, L. Bp.
Haddington, E. Oxford, L. Bp.
Hardwicke, E. Peterborough, L. Bp.
Harewood, E. Salisbury, L. Bp.
Lanesborough, E. St. Albans, L, Bp.
Lucan, E. Winchester, L. Bp.
Macclesfield, E.
Mansfield, E. Bagot, L.
Manvers, E. Balfour of Burleigh, L
Mar and Kellie, E. Beaumont, L.
Nelson, E. Botreaux, L. (E. Loudoun.)
Redesdale, E.
Rosslyn, E. Braybrooke, L.
Saint Germans, E. Brodrick,L. (V. Midleton.)
Selkirk, E.
Shaftesbury,E.[Teller.] Byron, L.
Sondes, E. Castlemaine, L.
Stanhope, E. Clanbrassill, L. (E. Roden.)
Stradbroke, E.
Clanwilliam, L. (E. Clanwilliam.) Lyveden, L.
Massey, L.
Clements, L. (E. Leitrim.) Monck, L. (V. Monck.)
Northwick, L.
Clinton, L. O'Neill, L.
Colchester, L. Oriel, L. (V. Massereene.)
Coleridge, L.
Congleton, L. Poltimore, L.
Crewe, L. Raglan, L.
Delamere, L. Rayleigh, L.
Denman, L. Ross, L. (E. Glasgow.)
De Saumarez, L. Sackville, L.
De Tabley, L. Saltersford, L. (E. Courtown.)
Dinevor, L.
Ellenborough, L. Sherborne, L.
Forbes, L. Silchester, L. (E. Longford.)
Forester, L.
Greville, L. Strathnairn, L.
Hammond, L. Sundridge, L. (D. Argyll.)
Hatherley, L.
Heytesbury, L. Trevor, L.
Ker, L. (M. Lothian.) Windsor, L.
Lovel and Holland, L. (E. Egmont.) Winmarleigh, L.
Wynford, L.

Resolved in the Negative.

Bill to be read 2athis day three months.

ELEMENTARY EDUCATION PROVISIONAL ORDERS CONFIRMATION (CARDIFF, &c.) BILL [H.L.] (NO. 100.) A Bill to confirm certain Provisional Orders made by the Education Department under "The Elementary Education Act, 1870,"to enable the School Boards for Cardiff, Liverpool, Southampton, and Walton-on-Thames to put in force "The Lands Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845,"and the Acts amending the same: And

ELEMENTARY EDUCATION PROVISIONAL ORDER CONFIRMATION (LONDON) BILL [H.L.] (NO. 101.) A Bill to confirm a Provisional Order made by the Education Department under "The Elementary Education Act, 1870,"to enable the School Board for London to put in force "The Lands Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845,"and the Acts amending the same:

Were presented by The LORD PRESIDENT; read 1a, and referred to the Examiners.

House adjourned at a quarter before Eight o'clock, to Monday next, Eleven o'clock.