THE EARL OF CARNARVON, on rising to put a Question of which he had given Notice, reminded the House that in previous Sessions he had several times called attention to the state of Armenia. He trusted, however, he need offer no apology for again directing at- 1723 tention to the subject—a subject which in itself was worthy of the best consideration of Parliament and of Her Majesty's Government. He had not the slightest wish to embarrass Her Majesty's Government in this matter, or to say anything that could injuriously fetter their action or interfere with the solution of the question; but we had now arrived in this matter, as in regard to some other points of our foreign policy, at a very serious crisis, when there was the alternative before us either of a new life for that nation, or of anarchy or annihilation. He would not go into the question as to what actually constituted Armenia; he had simply to deal with that numerous race which was scattered over large tracts of the Ottoman Empire, and to which guarantees had been accorded by the Treaty of Berlin. It was certain that we and other European Powers had undertaken obligations towards those people, and he hoped it was equally certain that both the great political Parties in this country were earnestly desirous to do everything in their power to mitigate the hard lot they had so long endured. With regard to the condition of Armenia, he might almost repeat what he had said before, and the accuracy of which no one had challenged. During the last six months two Blue Books had been issued, and it was almost impossible to turn to any one page of them and not find in it a record of oppression, of broken engagements, unfulfilled promises, and disappointed expectations. Since the war was brought to a conclusion the condition of things in Armenia had been materially worse than before. The people had suffered from pestilence and famine; the high roads of commerce had been broken up; villages had been abandoned; and the Kurds had been making their ravaging incursions on all sides. It was said that no less than 80,000 breech-loaders were in the hands of these miscreants. There was no properly constituted authority in the country. Commission after Commission —Executive, deliberative, and inquisitive—had all been issued with, comparatively speaking, no result. There had been many Reports, but there had been no measures. Baker Pasha had been sent round through several of the Turkish provinces, armed, it was supposed, with very great and extensive 1724 powers; but the officers sent with him from Constantinople had rather thwarted him in the task he had undertaken. Under the existing misrule, forced labour went on to a very great extent. Oppression and extortions were carried on under the eyes of the Pashas. The police force was venial, and in league with the robbers; and though some of the Law Courts and Councils of Judges were upright, in the great majority of cases they were simply corrupt. He did not mean to say that these miseries were exclusively borne by the Christians. He believed the Mahomedans suffered greatly also. But while the Christians were in a state of abject terror, the Mahomedans were simply ground down by excessive taxation. He had travelled in Armenia, and his own experience bore out the character given to the people, that they were industrious and honest, with vast capacities in them for all that should constitute the happiness and welfare of nations. One of the records in the Blue Books touched him deeply, for it recorded that 144 villages in the small district where he travelled had been absolutely swept away, and the inhabitants slaughtered or destroyed by the Kurds or famished by starvation. It was stated in the last of those Blue Books that 2,000 families had emigrated in sheer despair to Russia, and that about the same number had joined the Greek Communion, in order thereby to obtain some relief from oppression; and the same Blue Book stated that the Armenian peasantry were so ground down that they were glad to escape anywhere across the Frontier. Nothing could be done in the present state of things by the Local Government, and, with regard to the Central Government, the same story was repeated by every traveller who now came home. He believed that the Central Government was almost impotent at the present moment to do anything, and that its action, so far as it went, tended to mischief rather than to good. Those who composed it seemed to be perfectly bewildered, and it had alienated from it those who had given it the best advice. There was no heavier indictment against the Central Government than that which was framed by Sir Henry Layard in the last Blue Book, where it was said that they were without money, that the troops and civil functionaries were unpaid, and 1725 that it was in a state of distress and utter bewilderment. It was only a few weeks ago that the troops in one garrison were not only unpaid, but were absolutely without food, and, after they had fasted for many hours, the unfortunate men were compelled to take their copper utensils into the bazaar and sell them for what they could get. During Easter week, there was no corn in the Government mills, and had it not been for an advance made at his own risk by a single individual the troops would have been without a biscuit. He was told on excellent authority that a meat bill of the Palace, amounting to little short of £100,000, still remained unpaid. The situation at Constantinople was one of despair. They had received no help during the war, and they had got no money since. That feeling of despair was a dangerous one, for, while it made them in one sense more ready to take advice, it made them, on the other, more prone to rush into evils they would otherwise avoid. He believed that on the part of the subjects of the Porte there was a feeling of confidence in and affection towards this country; but he feared that in Armenia the people might be on the verge of a great catastrophe which would end in the extermination of the whole race. There might come a state of chaos in which society would be reduced to its original elements. A stage had been reached at which reforms which might have been introduced some time ago were no longer practicable. There was a want of honest intention to carry them out, and there was a still greater want of money. However, he thought something might be done to avert a catastrophe, and there were two measures which he would strongly urge on the attention of Her Majesty's Government. The first was the appointment of a Christian Governor General for a limited period-—say, of five or six years. This was an object which his noble Friend near him (the Marquess of Salisbury) had constantly had in view. The second was that such officer should have the control of the whole of the local revenue, or a great portion of it, for the exclusive use of the province he governed. Such an appointment would certainly be a great protection to the Christians, and safeguard against the intrigues of the Palace of Constantinople. There would be enough found by the Armenians scat- 1726 tered all over the world for the maintenance of their own government. It was not probable that the Mahomedans would object to the appointment of a Christian, for there had been a Petition from a Mahomedan town of 3,000 inhabitants praying for annexation to the Christian Government of the Lebanon. It might be impossible to save the ship, but it might be possible to secure some planks with which to construct a raft on which, at least, some of the people might be preserved from destruction. In conclusion, he begged to ask, Whether Her Majesty's Government can state what steps the Turkish Government are taking to restore order and relieve distress in Armenia?
§ EARL GRANVILLEsaid, that the noble Earl had in his speech answered the Question which he had put. It would not be true to say of the Porte that the Government were taking no steps whatever in the matter referred to; but it was, at the same time, impossible to pretend that anything effectual had been done. With regard to the distress—he was afraid the noble Earl had not exaggerated it; but he had omitted to state that it was due to several causes. It was the result of—1, the late war; 2, the bad harvest; 3, the unsettled state of the country and raids of the Kurds; 4, the call for the arrears of taxes; 5, depreciation of the currency; 6, the arrival of destitute Lazis and Circassians; 7, the mismanagement of the grain stores by the authorities. All reports were to the effect that the famine continued, and that the prospects for the future were very gloomy. The Turks had distributed grain; but there appeared to have been no organized system, and had it not been for the assistance in food and grain supplied by our Consular offices from the funds provided by private charity in this country, the mortality must have been enormous. The famine was beyond the scope of any means which the Turkish Government had at its disposal, under the present corrupt and disorganized administration of the Turkish provinces. Any effectual remedy for the permanent relief of the country could only be found in a thorough reform of the Provincial Government. For that purpose very little had been done, although the Turks had been active in issuing Commissions of Inquiry. In 1727 February, 1879, the Porte appointed two Commissions to proceed into the Eastern part of Asia Minor and Kurdistan to in-quire into the condition of the country and the grievances of the Christians. Major Trotter accompanied the Commission in Northern Armenia, and Lieutenant Chermside that in Southern Armenia. Major Trotter characterized the proceedings of the Erzeroum Commission as most unsatisfactory, but stated that the Commission which had proceeded to Diarbekir had afforded a strong and favourable contrast. That was under Abedin Pasha, who, he was glad to learn, had been appointed Secretary of Foreign Affairs, after having distinguished himself by energetic reforms in those posts which he had lately occupied. A local consultative Commission was assembled at Aleppo. Little was expected from it at first; but Lieutenant Chermside, a very intelligent officer, reported favourably of it. These Commissions had been satisfactory in eliciting a fair expression of the wants of the populations, and showing that it was possible for Mussulmans and Christians to work together, at all events up to a certain point, for the benefit of the provinces. Some of the reform Commissions had done good in redressing local grievances. Abedin Pasha, when Governor of Sivas, succeeded in checking the mountain Kurds. Baker Pasha was sent to Anatolia. Her Majesty's Government had not been made acquainted with any of the reports of the reform Commissions, and no action whatever seemed to have been taken upon them by the Porte. The noble Marquess opposite (the Marquess of Salisbury) had proposed certain reforms to which objections were made by the Porte. The noble Marquess accepted the promise of these in a modified form from the Porte. But none of these promises had been carried out. The European Finance Inspectors had been unable to do anything practical. Some of them had resigned. The appointment of the Judicial Inspectors had been worse than a failure. The organisation of an efficient Gendarmerie still remained without progress. In short, there had been promises, but no performances. The Asiatic provinces were in a lamentable state of disorder and distress, which the steps taken by the Turkish Government were quite insufficient to redress and 1728 to relieve. It was this state of things which induced Her Majesty's Government to invite the Powers to act in concert in demanding from the Porte the fulfilment of the 61st Article of the Treaty of Berlin, to make known the steps which it had taken as required by that Article, and to enable the Powers to superintend their application.
§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURYMy Lords, I fear there can be little doubt that the darkest colour in which my noble Friend behind me could paint the condition of Asia Minor would fall even short of the actual truth. It would be difficult to exaggerate the responsibility, both to their own subjects and to their own individual interests, which belongs to the Turkish Government for their utter negligence and incapacity. But when we have made that admission, I do not know that we are very much further towards the remedy. It is said, in English law, there is no wrong without a remedy; but I am afraid this is not the case in international affairs. No doubt, the step which the noble Earl opposite says he has taken is in itself perfectly regular and proper, and one which will be followed by the sympathy and good-will of all persons who desire the happiness of these miserable populations of the Ottoman Empire; but whether it will prove a highly effective step remains for the future to reveal. In the first place, I need not advert to the question of how far all the Powers, if they nominally act together, are sincere in desiring the amelioration of the Turkish Empire. But, leaving that point entirely aside, the question still remains before you, What power have you of putting such pressure upon the Turkish Government as shall produce a reform of the state of things in Asia Minor? Has the Turkish Government—even if it had the best will in the world—the means of producing those reforms? Has it men, has it money, or has it political experience? Is there anything in the past conduct of the Sultan, with whom it is evident that all power, in the minutest details, practically rests—upon whom, therefore, before history and before the world, the responsibility for all neglects and all abuses must be placed—is there anything in his past conduct to induce you to believe that true reform in the condition of his Asiatic subjects is a matter to which he will 1729 heartily address himself, or for which he will sacrifice that individual power in deference to which hitherto every other object has been postponed? My Lords, I believe the stern truth to be that, in the first place, six Powers, with different objects and with conflicting interests, never have yet succeeded, and never can succeed, in governing the country, even if the six Powers were animated by one will. I doubt whether they possess the means to press upon the Turkish Government the adoption of reforms which, in the eyes of many a true Turk, mean suicide. Even if they did possess the power of pressing those reforms on the Turkish Government, as it is constituted, the experience we have gathered slowly and painfully of the character of the present Administration in Turkey forbids us to look with very sanguine hopes upon the probability of the proposals of the European Powers—whatever their will and influence—meeting with a hearty and honest support. I do not absolutely despair for the future, but I have rather dwelt upon this point in order to countervail, as far as I could, the tendency which appeared to prevail in the minds of my noble Friend on this side, and the noble Earl opposite, to attach to the pressure at the centre an undue and excessive value. The Turkish Government is not so well organized, it is not so strong, as to be able to transmit with any force to the extremities the impulse which applies to the centre. If you desire to effect any substantial amelioration in the condition of these miserable populations of Asia Minor, you must push from your minds this exaggerated notion of what can be done by importunity at Constantinople. You must rather look to what can be done by supervision, superintendence, and active exertion in the very localities where the misgovernment takes place, and whence the oppression has to be removed. It is difficult to exaggerate the merit of the exertions made by our Consuls in Asia Minor in the cause of humanity during this terrible time. They are most able servants of the Crown, and I believe they have been able to confer great benefits on the population. It is rather to action of that kind that I look for the amelioration of these populations. The local authorities are subject to the same influences, the same passions, and the same terrors as other men, and if there is an Eng- 1730 lish man at their side perpetually pressing upon them the reform of abuses, and the adoption of salutary measures, pointing out to them, and to his superiors at home, all gross cases of oppression, bringing the evils which gnaw at the vitality of the Province fully and clearly, not only to the knowledge of the Governments on the spot, not only to the Government and the Embassy at Constantinople, but also, through the Foreign Office and the Blue Books, to the knowledge of the whole civilized world, bringing out clearly the atrocities that are committed and the abuses that are permitted to exist, I believe that in time and with patience a very great and real amelioration will be accomplished in the condition of the people. I do not mean to say that these oppressors are very sensitive to the emotion of shame; but they are sensitive to their own interests, and they know—the best of those in authority—that their power is precarious, that the ways of Constantinople are inscrutable, and they never can tell whether the outcry that comes from England and Europe echoing at Constantinople may not shake their power. The knowledge we already have from the sources I have mentioned is beginning to have its effect, and these oppressors are beginning to feel that the representations of the British Consul are not to be treated wholly with contempt. It is a slow process; you cannot mark its steps, you cannot specify in formulas the precise manner in which it operates; but if you let in the light, and allow what these men are doing to be seen, not only by the people around them but to all the world, you will produce a substantial and beneficent effect, and that at an early date. I think I heard the noble Earl opposite say that the time is a very long one. I feel the genuineness of the sentiment, and how difficult it is for us, with all these horrors passing before our eyes, still to recognize the truth that for all remedial processes applied to long standing evils time must be allowed and patience is necessary. But, remember, if you do not listen to this stern law of nature, there is before you a terrible alternative. My noble Friend mentioned one tremendous word, which I have sometimes thought may, after all, be the solution to which the Eastern Question is etnding. He said the populations are in danger of extermination, 1731 That is the terrible alternative, if no remedy, quick or slow, can be devised. At all events, we have seen what is the result of attempting to apply those impatient remedies which did certainly commend themselves two years ago to the minds of many people. What are called heroic remedies have lamentably failed. I believe the Russian Government—I will not discuss their motives —but, as I have before stated, I believe the Russian Emperor was sincere in his desire to raise the condition of the populations by going to war; but the whole of this misery, described by my noble Friend, is primarily due to that war. Has the population been diminished, and is the land untilled in consequence? It is because that numbers have been drawn by conscription from the field, in order to assist the Turkish Government in its battles. Have taxes been levied twice or thrice over? It is because the war has brought to the Turkish Government desperate embarrassments. It is upon the Russian Government and the Russian War that the main responsibility of the calamities which have happened must rest. My Lords, I only refer to this for the purpose of deprecating the heroic remedies. Any attempt to remedy this evil by force will only aggravate those evils which it is sought to get rid of; and the only result of any further attempt to secure the ends of philanthropy by the shedding of blood will be to produce that terrible result to which my noble Friend has referred—the mutual extermination of the rival creeds and rival races of which this unhappy population is made up.
THE DUKE OF ARGYLLMy Lords, it is much more easy at this particular moment for a Member of the Opposition to discuss these questions than for a Member of the Government, because it is always possible in the hurry of debate to say something which might interfere with the active operations of my noble Friend the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. But I confess I am somewhat surprised at the language of the noble Marquess opposite, who has just had the responsible charge of the foreign affairs of this country for nearly two years. I confess I could have wished that the noble Marquess, in speaking here to-night, could have said something which would not have given the impression to the inhabitants of Asiatic Turkey 1732 that, admitting, as he does to the full, their miserable condition—a condition which he himself has told us holds out to Europe and the world the danger of their extermination—I could have wished that he had not left the impression that there is, in his opinion, absolutely no remedy for this state of things. The noble Marquess, as I understand him, deprecates the supposition that any good can be done by putting pressure upon the Central Government in Constantinople, and he said that the only hope was to leave it to the Consular Agents to make representations to the local Governments and to report to the Government at home. My Lords, this is exactly the process which has been going on for the last 35 or 40 years, and which has been utterly and entirely useless, and has gone on concurrently with a great increase of the evils complained of. The noble Marquess, therefore, has no remedy whatever, and has no hope to hold out to these unfortunate populations. Now, my Lords, this being the opinion of the noble Marquess, I cannot help referring this House to the engagements and the stipulations for which he is responsible. The House may probably not recollect the exact words of the 61st Article of the Treaty of Berlin. That Article runs as follows—
The Sublime Porte undertakes to carry out, without further delay, the ameliorations and reforms demanded by local requirements in the Provinces inhabited by the Armenians—that is, not Armenia only, but all the Provinces of Asiatic Turkey that are inhabited by Armenians, and Armenians are scattered over the whole of Asiatic Turkey—"and to guarantee their security against the Circassians and Kurds." Now, my Lords, these words were taken by the noble Marquess literatim et verbatim from the Treaty of San Stefano. Whatever hopes, therefore, the Eastern Christians have for the protection of their interests come from the adoption of the Treaty of San Stefano. Here there were inserted these words—The Porte will periodically make known the stops taken to this effect to the Powers who will superintend their application.Now, my Lords, the noble Marquess is responsible for those words, yet he could throw no light upon them. He seemed to repudiate all interference with Turkey, wishing it to be left absolutely 1733 alone, and told us that all the evils that have happened, and all the miseries that have come upon the population, resulted from the interference of other Powers.
§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURYI said from the Russian War.
THE DUKE OF ARGYLLThat was one form of interference. Does the noble Marquess think that no obligation lay on the European Powers in consequence of the stipulations of the Treaty of Berlin? The Porte promised to introduce reforms, and the Powers undertook to superintend them. Has the noble Marquess no suggestion to make as to the united action of Europe with a view to the superintendence of these reforms? My Lords, the noble Marquess never opens his lips in this House on this question without deprecating any interference on the part of Europe in the affairs of Turkey. Nothing can be done by Europe. If nothing can be done by Europe, nothing can be done for these people at all. I say that Europe, having undertaken this obligation, is bound to fulfil it. I have another observation to make upon the speech of the noble Marquess. The Treaty of Paris provided that whatever was done with regard to the Porte should be carried out by the conjoint action of the Powers, no one of them interfering before the rest had been consulted. There was no such stipulation in the Treaty of Berlin. My Lords, remember this, that every one of the Powers has a right to act separately upon the Treaty of Berlin. Therefore, if Europe does not interfere as United Europe, you have the risk and the danger that one or other of the Powers will interfere; and let me say that this is a danger — an imminent danger—which has been brought upon us by the exertions, the active exertions, of the noble Marquess at Berlin. On the 10th of July, 1878, the Russians brought forward a proposal that a clause should be added to the Treaty of Berlin binding the Powers to see to the fulfilment of that Treaty. That proposition of the Russian Government in a modified form was finally supported by the personal opinion of Prince Bismarck and by the formal adhesion of the Austrian Government. You, therefore, had Russia, Germany, and Austria, all united in recommending that a clause should be added to the Treaty of Berlin binding Europe to see to its fulfilment. Who was the opponent of that clause? The noble 1734 Marquess. By his persuasion mainly he procured this result—that England, France, and Italy, not venturing directly to oppose it, took, I must say, the extraordinary and undignified course of refusing to vote on the subject; and when it came to the vote, Austria, Germany, and Russia stood there in favour of that proposition, and England, France, and Italy went out of court, and the Turks, I need not say, were against it. Therefore, I repeat, through the exertions of the English Government, the Treaty of Berlin is without any clause entitling the whole Powers as a body to see to the fulfilment of that stipulation. Now, my Lords, this is part of the political mess to which the present Administration has succeeded—and in which all over the world the noble Lord opposite (the Marquess of Salisbury) has left the Government of England. This is part of the mess in which the present Administration finds itself when they are obliged again to try to unite the Powers of Europe in something like common accord for the fulfilment of that very Treaty of which the noble Lords opposite are so proud. My Lords, it is our desire to carry out these stipulations, it is our sincere desire, and the difficulties which we find in our way are difficulties which were imposed upon us by the active exertions of our Predecessors in Office, and difficulties which are now being from week to week increased by the constant speeches of noble Lords opposite deprecating and disbelieving the possibility of united action. Now, my Lords, I believe, quite contrary to the opinion of the noble Marquess, that the only hope of salvation for the unfortunate populations of Turkey both in Europe and Asia is to exert the united influence of united Europe at the centre of that Government. I believe the hope that our Consuls can effect any reforms of that Government by influence exercised in the Provinces are visionary, because all the Pashas are sent to the Provinces from the most corrupt motives. We cannot act through them, but only through the Central Government of Constantinople. I trust my noble Friend the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Earl Granville) will succeed in re-uniting the Powers of Europe on some common ground for the fulfilment of the Treaty for which the noble Lords opposite are responsible.
§ THE DUKE OF SOMERSETtrusted that, if there was to be any pressure 1735 brought to bear on the Turks, Her Majesty's Government would let their Lordships know what it was to be. He heard that the Sultan was much pleased with the change of Government in this country. He said he had used up the patience of the noble Marquess the late Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; but, knowing the noble Earl (Earl Granville) to be a most good-natured and amiable man, the Sultan hoped not to have used up his patience for a year or two. What was going to be done to unite the Powers of Europe? Europe would unite, no doubt, to give advice; but when it came to action would the united Powers agree? Moral pressure would be readily tried again as it had been tried in past years; but when that pressure failed, had the Government decided what to do? That was the real difficulty, and that was the question on which, if the Government had any definite information, he should like to hear their views.
THE MARQUESS OF BATHsaid, the noble Duke (the Duke of Somerset) had followed very much upon the lines of the noble Marquess the late Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in finding a way not to do anything. His noble Friend who had brought forward the Motion had been confirmed in his description of the state of Asia Minor by the noble Earl opposite (Earl Granville). The noble Marquess had told them that the Porte had neither the will nor the power to carry out the necessary reforms. He quite agreed that the Porte had not the will; but he was not quite sure that the noble Marquess was correct when he said they had not got the power. It was a very remarkable fact that the Porte had never failed in asserting its authority whenever it suited its purpose to do so. There had been outrages in many parts, and there had been revolts and rebellions; but those revolts and rebellions, often excited indirectly by the Porte itself, had always been put down when they seemed to involve any real menace to the Sultan's power. He was still so convinced of the fact that the Porte— the Sultan and the ruling Pashas—was determined in no way to carry out any reforms, and that, whatever pledges or promises they might give, they were still equally determined not to carry them out, that he agreed with the noble Marquess that any attempt to influence the Porte with the view of obtaining a 1736 better state of affairs in Asia Minor was very nearly, if not quite, hopeless. Action should be taken at the extremities, and not at the centre. But when the noble Marquess went on to deal with the question how to carry this out he suggested nothing. As to representations by means of Consuls, as the noble Duke (the Duke of Argyll) pointed out, that had been going on for 35 years. In fact, nobody could have watched this question without seeing there was only one way by which anything could be done to ameliorate the condition of the Provinces of Asia Minor, and that was by force. But he was not prepared to say how or by what means that force was to be exercised. Without force and troops at their command the remonstrances and representations of our Consuls would be perfectly useless and futile; and matters would remain in this position—that if the Powers did not by force back up the representations of the Consuls the whole population of Armenia would be in danger of total extermination. The noble Marquess said that the cause of the evils under which the Provinces were suffering was mainly due to the late war. To some extent that statement was perfectly correct; but only indirectly so. The real cause of the evils under which Asia Minor suffered was the fixed determination on the part of the Turkish Government not to do anything to protect the people or to improve their position; but, by encouraging the depredations and inroads of the Kurds and the plundering propensities of the Circassians, to effect the total extermination of the Christian population. It was openly boasted at Constantinople that there was only one way to solve the Armenian question, and that was by the emigration of the Armenian population out of those Provinces. The noble Marquess had alluded to the late war; but if the Powers of Europe had united in putting pressure upon the Porte, and, if necessary, had united in putting force on the Porte in support of the decisions of the Conference at Constantinople of which the noble Marquess was a Member, nobody knew better than he that the Porte would not have resisted such pressure. If now the Powers of Europe were prepared to enforce their decisions with regard to Asia Minor by force, there need be very little doubt of the 1737 Porte complying with their demands. If the Porte was convinced that for the next three years the action of England was to be limited, as during the last two years it had been limited, to mere empty remonstrances and the publication of Blue Books, be feared there was very little chance of a satisfactory settlement of the difficulty or of those evils under which the population, both Mussulman and Christian, suffered, being put an end to.