THE MARQUESS OF HUNTLYrose to call attention to the depressed condition of Agriculture and Trade throughout the country; and to ask Her Majesty' s Government, Whether it is intended to institute any inquiry, by a Royal Commission or Committee of the House, into the causes affecting Agriculture and Trade? The noble Marquess said, it was not to be denied that the existing state of things was very serious, and urgently demanded a remedy; but he desired to say, at the outset, that he did not intend to go into the question of Free Trade or Reciprocity. He did not, indeed, believe that any remedy for the present depression in trade and agriculture would be found in any changes in that direction; but he wished simply to put before the House the facts that he had been able to gather. No one denied that depression—very great depression—existed, though various opinions existed as to its extent, which probably varied in different parts of the country; but, taking it at the lowest estimate, he was only too confident that temporary reductions of rent by the landlords would do but little good. Some of their Lordships, as he had read, had returned to their tenants 10 per cent, some as much as 25 per cent, off their rents. But this remission was for one year, and the agricultural depression went far beyond that. No doubt, the bad harvests of recent years had much to do with the depression of agriculture—four bad or defective years in succession were enough to affect the most substantial tenants. There was a very curious fact revealed by the agricultural statistics—namely, that since 1874 there had been a great decrease in the amount of agricultural stock in this country. That was a fact which could hardly, he thought, be fairly attributed to the recurrence of bad seasons. Another thing which affected the agricultural interest was the low freights for corn. He found that corn could be carried 200 miles on the other side Chicago and delivered at Liver-pool for less than 12s. a-quarter, freight 1968 and all charges included. This was less than the farmers in some districts could send their corn to market. So great did he believe the depression in agriculture to be, that he had made inquiries among large agents of land in several parts of the Kingdom; and he held in his hand the last copy of the Midland Counties Herald, which was an advertising paper, and which contained 63 advertisements of farms to be let. So great was the depression that, in some districts, it was absolutely impossible to get tenants for the land. Within 10 miles of Warwick there were many thousands of acres to let. For instance, near Stratford-on-Avon, the acreage advertised to let was 8,000. He knew that in Northamptonshire and Huntingdonshire many farms were unlet. This was a very serious matter, when it was considered that one-fourth of the population was engaged in agriculture. He had, he might add, a letter—one of a great number—which he might read if he were not anxious not to trespass unduly on the time of the House, and in that letter the writer stated that great difficulty was experienced in finding tenants for the grass land at his disposal, although there had been a reduction of 23 per cent on the rental. The writer added that he had been manager of the estate with respect to which he wrote for 24 years, and that he had never known farmers to be so short of money as at present. There were, in fact, some parishes in which the farms were wholly untenanted. He might mention the case of a farm belonging to himself, which, 20 years ago, let at 21s. an acre. It had been improved in every way, but five years ago the tenant had given it up, and he had let it to a tenant on a seven years' lease at 20s. an acre. The tenant, however, at the end of two years got tired of it, and he had let it to another tenant at the same rental, who, however, stipulated that he should erect new buildings and make other improvements. He did so; but this year, after two years' experience, the tenancy had been declined. He (the Marquess of Huntly) was aware that the last Returns showed that the value of the lands rated to the income tax had increased by nearly £2,000,000; but he would remind their Lordships that those Returns were based on Returns made in 1876, before the great depression of which he was speaking had 1969 begun; and that they included lands with buildings upon them, and in the neighbourhood of towns, in which case there had been no very considerable depreciation of value. This was what was called "accommodation land"—but this could not properly be included in agricultural land. Then, in addition to the great fall in the price of corn, it must not be forgotten that there had arisen a vast competition in the supply of meat. The importation of cattle from Canada, and of dead meat from the United States, was already immense, and appeared to be capable of unlimited increase. This could not but affect the prosperity of the agricultural classes in another direction. He did not hesitate to say that landlords would have to face these facts, and make a great reduction in their rents. It could not be to the advantage of the country that the land should be allowed to go out of cultivation; but that would be the upshot of it, and it might be that there would have to be an Encumbered Estates Court for England, as there was in Ireland, to relieve the landlords. Among the many modes of relief which had been suggested were that tenants should have some security for unexhausted improvements, and that there should be a remission of those burdens which now pressed upon agricultural property. With these suggestions he fully agreed, for he thought that every inducement ought to be given to persons to invest their capital in land. As long ago as 1846 a Committee of their Lordships' House sat to inquire into the burdens affecting real property. That Committee recommended a remission of taxation. Another Committee also sat, and in its Report said the relief of the poor was a national object towards which every description of property ought to be called on to contribute; and the Act of Elizabeth contemplated such contribution according to the ability of every inhabitant. The land paid most unfairly for the support of the poor, and the recommendation of the two Committees had never been acted upon. The taxes paid by an owner of land amounted to 16½ per cent on his income; the taxes paid by an occupier of land to 12½ per cent; by an owner of house property to 14½ per cent; by the owner of railway and mineral property to 13½ per cent; by the owner of personal property to 1970 8¾ per cent. These figures had been criticized, but not refuted. As to the justice or injustice of placing the public taxation upon this especial species of property, he desired to quote the opinion of the noble Earl the Prime Minister, who, in 1874, said—
The system of raising taxation for general purposes from one particular kind of property involves as great a violation of justice as can well be conceived.It was not, however, to these points that he desired so especially to direct their Lordships' attention, as to the third question—the subject of local taxation. In 1871, the noble Earl the present Prime Minister, then leading the Opposition in the House of Commons, moved for a Committee of Inquiry on the incidence of Taxation. The noble Earl then said—That the income of the country being £249,000,000 sterling, an assessment of one-fourth of that amount was defrayed by local taxation—which, in other words, meant the maintenance of the poor, the keeping up of the roads, and all the costs of internal administration, and asked on what principles of justice this great charge was put upon one section of the taxpayers alone.Again, in 1850, when he was supported by Mr. Gladstone, the noble Earl said—It was impossible to look at the poor rate without being struck with its inequality of incidence. It was said that it was a tax inherited with the land, and that was true; but it was inherited together with a protective system, which was not more contrary to abstract justice than was the inequality of the poor rate.If that was the state of things then, what must it be now? To give one illustration. In a parish of 2,000 acres, in 1853, the rates amounted to £100; in 1868 they amounted to £315, and in 1878 they reached £416. In most rural parishes the rates had risen so steadily that during the past 20 years they had quadrupled. He did not ask for any special concession to agriculture; he only asked that it might be treated with equal fairness with other trades, and not oppressed by uneven taxation. There had been an extraordinary increase in the imports of food into this country—a fact which could not be overlooked. In 1858 the imports amounted to £25,000,000; in 1868 they had reached £55,000,000; and in 1878, £99,000,000; the ratio for the population per head in 1858 being 18s. 3d.; in 1868, £1 16s. 2d.; and in 1878, £2 19s. 7d. He had 1971 repeatedly heard it said that when trade got better agriculture would improve. He denied the proposition to be correctly stated—he believed it would be more accurate to say that when agriculture became prosperous trade would recover. There could be no doubt that trade throughout the country was bad—the question was how to improve it. In The Times that day the reports from Birmingham and Darlington showed there was increased depression in the iron trade—so that every day things were getting worse. There seemed to be a general consensus of opinion that the operatives were not assisting sufficiently the owners in this period of depression. From persons engaged in various trades he learnt that, although the depression was due to a great extent to over-production, still the limitation of the hours of labour and the operation of the trades unions had largely tended to prevent a revival of prosperity. The serious difficulty of getting men to work at the times and hours when it was really necessary was experienced in regard both to agricultural and to manufacturing employments. If left to themselves, the men would often be willing to work longer; but the trades unions were at the bottom of the short-hour system, by which it was sought to restrict the output. The strange idea seemed to have got possession of the workmen that lessened production meant increase of wages. The same baneful ideas were spread into the rural districts, and it was suggested to the labouring classes that the best way of keeping up wages was to reduce the products. Any notion more unreasonable than that could hardly be conceived. He did not know that legislation could touch that question. He only alluded to it for the sake of ventilating the subject. He believed that an inquiry into those matters might do much good, and might eventually lead to the diffusion of sounder views among the people. He did not venture to suggest to the Government where he remedy lay; but he thought the time had come when there should be some inquiry into the causes of the depression both of agriculture and of trade. Representing, as their Lordships did, the great landed interest, they had a right to ask the Government to do something towards relieving the land from the unequal burdens of taxation which it bore.
§ LORD NORTONsaid, that the fact of the depression to which the noble Marquess had drawn attention was one which no one could deny; but whether the noble Marquess had suggested any remedy, or made out any case for inquiry, was another matter. For himself, he could testify from his own knowledge that in the Midland Counties the depression was most severe. He himself knew of large and well-managed properties on which many of the tenants had thrown up their farms. He knew of one case in particular, in which a considerable landowner in Warwickshire had all his farms thrown up, and the whole of his property was at this moment in his own hands. That indicated a serious state of things; and he was sure their Lordships felt the greatest sympathy with those—both farmers and owners of land—who were now suffering from the depression of agriculture, and with those who were equally suffering from depression of trade, in this country. But he thought the noble Marquess (the Marquess of Huntly) had hardly got in his mind all the data which must be considered together, in order to arrive at a correct judgment as to the causes of the present depression, or as to what might lead to an available remedy. In the first place, the noble Marquess had confined his statement entirely to the depression in this country, without alluding to the very material fact which ought to be taken in conjunction with it—that there was a contemporaneous depression in every country of the world. At present there was not a glimmer of light thrown across the universal darkness—except, perhaps, from the United States. It might be difficult to account for so general a depression of trade, although, perhaps, not so difficult to account for its particular existence in our own, or in certain other countries; but, at least, the universality of that depression taught them this moral—that the interests of trade and commerce, in our times, were so cosmopolitan, that one nation could not suffer without more or less seriously affecting other nations. Nor could any nation suffer natural or make artificial obstacles to its trade without injury to others as well as itself. The noble Marquess had, however, not only confined his attention to the depression of agriculture in this country, but he had not adequately taken into consideration the 1973 depression of trade in this country, which was intimately connected with it. He had, in consequence, directed his mind for a remedy mainly to the relief of agriculture from special burdens. In considering the present emergency, they ought not to turn aside their attention to that large and vexed question. It was not for their Lordships to consider in this special discussion the general principles of taxation, or whether any particular article was unduly taxed. They all knew that land was very heavily and specially taxed. Parliament was very properly developing in every way the local administration of the country; and whatever Acts of that nature were passed, whether for sanitary, educational, or other purposes, increased the burden of rates which fell on real property. Men who were not remarkably liberal of their own money for purposes of that sort, when they came as local authorities to deal with rates and public money, were often most lavish. Some school boards, in agricultural districts, had already managed to raise the local rates by 2s. in the pound, in addition to voluntary contributions, and to the Imperial taxation which was levied for the same purpose. There was also a lavish county expenditure; and the aggregate debt of our large towns made a very respectable figure by the side of that of the nation. During the last 10 years, while the rateable value of real property had increased 30 per cent, local burdens, resting exclusively on real property, had increased 120 per cent.
§ LORD NORTONBut this was not the moment to deal with the large question of the re-adjustment of taxation between real and personal property, and to attempt to apportion it more fairly between local and national resources. The present Government had already dealt largely with that question, and had transferred the burden of some £2,000,000 sterling from local to Imperial taxation. Although it might seem that by this means considerable relief had been given to the land, he was not sure that the farmers found that they had much less to pay than they had before. He trusted that the depression of agriculture and trade under which they were now suffering was only 1974 temporary, and that they would not have to wait for the settlement of questions before seeing it pass away without the interference of Parliament. No doubt, agricultural depression had been produced primarily by a succession of three or four bad harvests, which had occasioned a loss to the country estimated by Mr. Caird at £87,000,000. There was also to be taken into account the disturbance of trade occasioned by the state of things abroad, by famines in two of our largest markets, and by the wages and labour difficulties with which they had had to contend. Other causes of depression, both in trade and in agriculture, were the enormous increase in foreign competition and the closing of foreign markets against us. Consider the immense importation of foreign corn and meat. The increase in the importation of American meat during the last 10 years was 500 per cent in quantity and 300 per cent in value, while the increase in the importation of American corn had largely exceeded in proportion the increase in our population. An unusual surplus of corn had come lately into this country from the abundant harvests they had enjoyed in America, and it undersold our home production from the lowness of the freight from that country owing to the depression in the carrying trade. Another cause of the depression of trade was the hostile tariffs which had been set up against us. There had also been over speculation in foreign investments and joint-stock undertakings, and times of depression of trade in this country, from like causes, had recurred in almost regularly decennial periods since the beginning of the present century. He was glad to see that the noble Marquess did not advocate a return to the old protective system, even as a temporary expedient, to force other countries to open their ports to our manufactures. Were we to adopt that course, instead of forcing Free Trade upon our neighbours, we should merely be stereotyping, by apparent acquiescence, the evils of Protection. It would be a suicidal policy on both sides, but especially for England. Foreign competition could not be got rid of by legislation; we must trust to scientific and economic improvements to enable us to hold our own position in commerce. It must not be supposed that America would always be able to com- 1975 pete with us as she was doing now in our home supply. Her own home consumption would greatly and rapidly increase, and she would not be able to send us food at so cheap a rate as she did now; for the cost of freight would increase as commercial depression passed away, and must in time balance the cost of home productions. The thing must right itself, and this crisis would pass as other crises in the present century had passed away. The agriculture of England must be progressive and prosperous in the long run, owing to the energy of the people and the increasing capital and population. The only exchangeable article in Great Britain which was incapable of increasing was the land, and it must continue to rise in value as it had done hitherto. Foreigners were, no doubt, learning to make a great many things for themselves which we had hitherto supplied to them. This must from time to time cause losses; but when any particular investment had been superseded, English energy would find out others to take its place. There was not a corner of the globe where Englishmen had not a hand in every enterprize. The question for them to consider was this—whether any good would be derived from inquiry? He did not know what was the opinion of the Government; but it seemed to him that there were serious objections to the course proposed by the noble Marquess. In the first place, the inquiry would necessarily be a very wide one—indeed, he did not see what the limit of reference would be. Then, again, it would give scope to theories of the wildest sort which had already been propounded in various quarters among the people. It would also raise large expectations which there was no probability of fulfilling. The people should be looking to their own exertions, and not to Parliament for a remedy. Nevertheless, the deepest sympathy was due to those who were suffering at the present moment, and if there was any prospect that inquiry would suggest or discover anything to alleviate the pressure of the present distress, he was sure their Lordships would be willing to agree to it. But he deprecated a Parliamentary inquiry, which might make a panic when none ought to exist.
LORD FORBESsaid, he should be very sorry it should go forth that the 1976 farmers were the only people who suffered. He was sorry that the debate had taken the course it had, for the burden of the discourse of the noble Marquess had been directed, not so much to the depression of trade, which was the real cause of the present distress, as to the depression of agriculture which resulted from the depression of trade. If the latter righted itself, the former would come round without legislative interference. The noble Marquess had put himself in two different attitudes. In Aberdeenshire, where he (Lord Forbes) also came from, the noble Marquess was generally considered the farmers' friend; but that night he had put himself on his property in England, and appeared as the friend of the landlords. He could not see what good result could be produced by inquiry, whether by Committee or Commission. All that was wanted was patience, and he believed that patience would be the easiest and best thing to adopt.
§ THE EARL OF BEACONSFIELDMy Lords, although the appearance of this House to-night is not one which shows that interest in the subject which the noble Marquess probably anticipated, that is not, I am sure, occasioned by any want of sympathy with the suffering classes of this country. Myself, I should have been quite prepared to leave the matter in the hands of those noble Lords who have dealt with it, had not a direct appeal been made to the Government by the noble Marquess; but I feel I should be wanting, not only in my duty, but in courtesy to the noble Marquess, if I allowed that appeal to pass unnoticed. The noble Marquess has called our attention to the depressed state of agriculture and of commerce and trade in this country; but he has not offered us any information in detail upon any head of his Motion—or rather of his inquiry—except with regard to agriculture. I am sure the noble Marquess will pardon me, if I venture to observe that I think his treatment of that subject was not characterized by novelty or by that adequate acquaintance with the proceedings which have occurred in both Houses of Parliament upon the subject upon which he chiefly dilated—namely, the peculiar burdens upon real property—which might have been expected. The noble Marquess seems to have founded his inquiry to-night in a great degree upon 1977 some speeches which I myself made—I made in "another place" and in another generation. Then I thought it my duty to open a subject which had been very seldom entered into; and at a time when the agricultural interest of this country was deeply suffering, and was by no means hopeful as to the future, I endeavoured to show that some relief might be obtained by a more equitable adjustment of the public burdens. It was impossible to deny the justice of the principle upon which those Motions were made. Indeed, although I was then, as the noble Marquess has reminded us to-night, the Leader of the Opposition in another House of Parliament, on every occasion on which I brought that subject before the consideration of the House of Commons my Motions were supported by numbers which almost equalled the majorities which, for the moment, defeated them. Many of your Lordships will remember that, though the justice of the plea was undeniable, still at no time was the relief contemplated of a character or amount adequate to meet a state of affairs like the present, and to be a competent remedy for the evils to which the noble Marquess has called attention to-night. The noble Marquess should remember that the answer to my appeal to Parliament at that time made by those who resisted, not the justice, but the adequacy, of the remedy I proposed was that if a re-adjustment of local burdens did take place, the relief of the land, which then only was suffering, could not be measured by the amount of local taxation. It was shown at the time by the Chancellor of the Exchequer that, taking the sum of £85,000,000 a-year as the amount of rental upon which rates were charged 30 years ago, the amount on which the landed interest was assessed was only £40,000,000. But the noble Marquess should be, and no doubt is, aware that during those 30 years two things have happened. In the first place, there has been considerable relief afforded to the real property of the country, of which land forms a large portion; and, secondly, that the proportion in which rates, in so far as they fall upon land, is much reduced, so as to be levied now on no more than one-third of the real property of the country. If these are facts—and they are founded on official Returns—I cannot for a moment 1978 bring myself to believe that some small re-adjustment of our local taxation can bring such relief to the land as will re-animate it under the unexampled depression it now endures. Then the noble Marquess omitted to remember that there has been, in fact, a considerable amount of local taxation removed from real property during the period from which he originated his speech; and he also should have recollected the circumstances in which that reduction was made. The adjustment of our local taxation ceased to be a Party question in the House of Commons. The Gentleman who of late brought it forward was a county Member (Sir Massey Lopes), and his political connection was with the Party that was then in Opposition, and of which I was the Representative and the Leader. But it was not a Party Motion, and he carried it by a majority of 100, because it was acknowledged, on both sides of the House, not to be a Party Motion, and because those who peculiarly represented the house population of the towns perceived that they would themselves have the lion's share and principal benefit of any considerable remission of local taxation. All this must be known to the noble Marquess, and I am surprised that he did not hesitate before he recommended a remedy for agricultural distress which, on reflection, he must perceive to be utterly inadequate to give the relief which is required. No one, I think, can deny that the depression of the agricultural interest is excessive. Though I can recall several periods of suffering, none of them have ever equalled the present in its intenseness. Let us consider what may be the principal causes of this distress. My noble Friend who has addressed you (Lord Norton) has very properly touched upon the effect of the continuous bad harvests in this country. If we are to accept the figures of the highest authority upon agricultural subjects and statistics, the loss on a bad harvest such as we had in the year 1875 was no less than £26,000,000 sterling. It is, however, true that at that time the loss and suffering were not experienced or recognized as they were in the old days when the system of protection existed, because the price of the food of the people was not immediately affected by a bad harvest; and it was not till the repetition of the misfortune by two bad 1979 harvests in further succession that the diminution of the wealth of the country began to be severely felt by the people generally—not by the agriculturalists only, but by those who were interested in trade and commerce generally. The remarkable feature of the present agricultural depression is this—that the agricultural interest is suffering from a succession of bad harvests, and that these bad harvests are accompanied, for the first time, by extremely low prices. That is a remarkable circumstance that has never before occurred—a combination that has never before been encountered. In old days, when we had a bad harvest we had also the somewhat dismal compensation of higher prices. That is not the condition at present; on the contrary, the harvests are bad, and the prices are lower. That is a new feature that requires consideration. There can be no doubt that the diminution of the public wealth by the amount of £80,000,000, suffered by one class, begins to affect the general wealth of the country, and is one of the sources of the depression, not only of agriculture, but also of commerce and of trade. No candid mind could deny that this is one of the reasons for that depression. Nor is it open to doubt that foreign competition has exercised a most injurious influence on the agricultural interests of the country. The country, however, was perfectly warned that if we made a great revolution in our industrial system, and put an end to the policy of Protection, such would be one of the consequences that would accrue. I may mention that the great result of the Returns we possess is this—that the immense importations of foreign agricultural produce have been vastly in excess of what the increased demands of our population actually require; and that is why such low prices are maintained. I have here the average import of wheat in the years 1867 and 1868, and in the years 1877 and 1878. Stated in quarters, the quantity was 8,000,000 quarters in 1867 and 1868, and 13,848,000 quarters in 1877 and 1878. Now, 3,000,000quarterswouldhave been quite sufficient to meet the wants of our increased population; but the actual increase of 5,000,000 quarters is equal to the supply of more than one-sixth of our whole population, or nearly twice what was required by its actual increase. 1980 That is to a great degree a cause of this depression. You have, then, in the first place, continuous bad harvests, which would in any case bring depression not on the agricultural interest only, but, by the diminution of the public wealth, on trade and commerce generally; and, secondly, you have, as far as the agricultural interest is concerned, this greatly increased competition from abroad. I think there is another cause; but, as it is not peculiar to agriculture, I will leave it while I make one or two observations on a subject very slightly treated by the noble Marquess, and not so fully as I could have desired by my noble Friend who has addressed us. It has been assumed throughout this debate that there has been on the part of the trade and commerce of the country a depression not only equal to that which the agricultural interest is labouring under, but that that depression was identical and similar in its effects and causes to those by which agricultural distress has been produced. Now, so far as I can form an opinion from the documents I have seen, the case is the reverse. That there is immense depression in trade and commerce no one can deny; but instead of the depression of trade and commerce resembling at this moment that of agriculture, it is quite the contrary. Agriculture just now is producing much less than it did before—nearly 1,000,000 acres have gone out of cereal cultivation—and it is suffering from foreign competition, which even in its own home market it has unsuccessfully to encounter. That, however, is not the condition of our foreign trade. The volume of our foreign trade is not at all diminished. It is perfectly untrue, so far as I can form an opinion on the subject, that we have lost the markets of the world, or that any branch of foreign industry—generally speaking of course—is successfully competing with the English. That there may be occasionally, in the multifarious transactions of English commerce, some particular article that may find itself for a moment shut out from the markets, or that, owing to a combination of circumstances, it might meet with a successful and unexpected competitor, is one of the necessary consequences of that multifariousness. The great fact, nevertheless, remains that after a period of con- 1981 tinued depression, the volume of production has been exactly the same. There has been, of course, less profit; but the volume of industry has been the same; the same quantity of goods has been manufactured; there are no markets from which we have been successfully shut out, and no competitors with whom we cannot satisfactorily enter into rivalry. Here is a Return which I think proves the case—it is a Return of British and Irish exports. I find that the exports in 1873 were, in round numbers, £255,000,000; while, in 1877, they were only £198,000,000—showing an apparent falling-off of £57,000,000. But if you value the products of 1877, which only produced £198,000,000, at the same rate as the products of 1873, which were valued at £255,000,000, you will find that the difference between them is less than £1,000,000. It is, therefore, clear that although the depression of trade and commerce is undeniable, that depression does not arise, as in the case of agricultural distress, from the loss of the power of production, or from severe and successful competition with foreign industry. On the contrary, during all these years of depression we have been producing an equal quantity of goods—the same volume of English manufacture has been sent into the world—only we have been obtaining for them lower and still lower prices. That, it appears to me, is an important circumstance, and one which demands our deep consideration. I doubt not the depression in our home trade is affected very much—as I freely admitted at the first—by bad harvests, totally irrespective of the principle on which our industrial system may be established, whether it be a protective one or one of free imports. It is clear that a series of bad harvests greatly diminishes the sum of national wealth, and must materially, in any circumstances, interfere with the trade of the country. It is quite possible, as we have known from our own experience, that one bad harvest, which years ago would have created discontent and great suffering recognized by every class, might be passed over in the circumstances in which we now find ourselves. But if you cannot pass over two, you certainly cannot pass over three or four; for, although the last harvest was not bad, it was garnered under such circumstances that, so far as the farmer was concerned, 1982 it was a bad harvest. I have said I admitted that the causes of agricultural depression were principally these—in the first place, the bad harvests; in the second place, foreign competition, which the country adopted, not with haste or in rashness, which it had an opportunity of rejecting, because a considerable Party in Parliament gave it that opportunity, and on the merits of which, after it was established, the country was appealed to and a Parliament elected on the issue placed before it, and yet which it did not choose to change. The second cause, I say, is to be found in this competition which you have, not precipitately, but determinedly, adopted; and there is besides another cause, which is, in my mind, not peculiar to agricultural distress, but which is equally applicable to commercial distress, and that is the effect which the production of gold has exercised, and is at this moment particularly exercising, not only on commercial transactions, but on the value of the other precious metals. I do not know that I can put the matter more clearly before your Lordships than in this way. After the repeal of the Corn Laws there was considerable suffering among all classes. Not merely in the agricultural classes, but in trade generally, there was great discontent and dissatisfaction. I do not myself believe that it was the immediate effect of the repeal of the Corn Laws; it was probably a re-action after the great stimulus, no doubt, which had been created in consequence of the extraordinary expenditure on the railway system in England. Be that as it may, very great discontent existed. Suddenly, after three or four years, there was an extraordinary revival in trade and a great elevation in prices. How did that occur? One of the most wonderful events in the history of the world happened, and that was the discovery of gold in California. In 1852, £36,000,000 of gold were poured into Europe; and when your Lordships recollect that the business of the world until that time had been carried on by an amount of gold which, I believe, never reached £6,000,000 a-year, you can at once apprehend the effect of this discovery. In one year there came £36,000,000 of gold, and in five years £150,000,000 were poured into Europe. The effect of this was that prices were raised immensely. But a marvellous thing occurred also shortly after. There 1983 was a Commission of all the great States of Europe, who took advantage of the holding of the Exhibition at Paris to meet there, with the consent of their Governments, to consider whether a uniform system of coinage could not be established in the world; and they came to a resolution that a uniform system could be established, and that advantage ought to be taken of the gold discoveries to bring about this result. Whatever may have been the exact circumstances of the case which was in the result such as I have indicated, the Government of Germany, which had £80,000,000 of silver, availed themselves of the great change of which I am speaking to substitute gold for their £80,000,000 of silver; France resolved that her bimetallic currency should, if possible, be replaced by entirely a gold currency; and the example of those two countries was followed by Holland and the smaller States of Europe; and the great process of converting silver into gold currency continued. These vast changes have been going on for 10 years; and we cannot, therefore, be surprised at the revolution which has occurred in the price of silver, when both France and Germany, the one with £60,000,000 and the other with £80,000,000 of silver, were anxious to avail themselves of the change which has occurred, and to substitute a gold currency. All this time the produce of the gold mines in Australia and California has been regularly diminishing; and the consequence is that while these large alterations of currency in favour of a gold currency have been taking place in the leading countries of Europe—notwithstanding an increase of population, which alone requires always a considerable increase of gold currency to carry on its transactions—the amount every year has diminished and is diminishing, until a state of affairs has been brought about by the gold discoveries exactly the reverse of that which they produced at first. Gold is every day appreciating in value, and as it appreciates in value the lower become prices. This, then, I think, is the third cause—not dogmatically stated, but only with that diffidence which becomes one who has to speak on an abstruse and complicated subject—which, I think, earnestly requires the consideration of your Lordships, and which may lead to consequences which may be of a very 1984 serious character. Now, my Lords, I do not wish to speak at too much length on this subject. I have noticed, on the part of the Government, a series of causes which, I think, have led to the present most unsatisfactory state of the public fortunes. The greatest sufferers at this moment, undoubtedly, are the cultivators of the soil and the farming class. They are a class who, if you look to the amount of labour they employ, if you look to their general character, their connection with local interests, and a variety of other considerations, must ever be deeply valued by those who value the order of society and, I will say, even the freedom of this country. There is no other country in which we find an identical class such as the British farmer; and, whatever may be the consequence of our legislation that is past, if it should be the disappearance or a great diminution of the influence and numbers of that class, it would be a political injury which never could be compensated for by any fiscal or financial results. I am sure your Lordships sympathize with that class. You are deeply connected with the land. You know well all shades of rural life—you have lived among those men; and I feel confident that the sympathy you express is as cordial and as profound as can animate the breast of man. But, my Lords, do not let us be afraid of telling them at this moment that, while we deeply sympathize with them, that while we will lose no opportunity that we can use of legitimately assisting them in the hard trials which they have to encounter—there is nothing, in my mind, which would be a more bitter mockery than to pretend by some small adjustment of local taxation that we can offer them a remedy for the distress which is produced by such vast, such numerous, and such complicated causes. If there is anything in the state of our system of taxation which acts unfairly to the British farmer, I cannot doubt that Parliament—that both Parties in the State—will be prepared and even eager to remedy it. We have shown that before by the series of relief that we have given him. When an hon. Gentleman in the other House, a county Member (Sir Massey Lopes), carried a Resolution that it became the duty of the Government to revise the local taxation of the country, and relieve real property—including land, of course, as one 1985 of the most important portions of real property—from unjust burdens, he was asked to define what were the burdens which he thought were so peculiar and so unjust; and it was then that he said the rates on Government property ought to be assessed as on all other property; that the care of pauper lunatics should fall on the State; that the registration of births, deaths, &c., should no longer be supplied by local taxation; that the Metropolitan Police should be supported out of the Consolidated Fund; that the police of the counties and boroughs of Great Britain—omitting Ireland, because that was already supplied—should be borne upon the Consolidated Fund; that local prisons should be equally sustained by the general Tie venue of the country; and so on. That was a definition of the practical claims which were then preferred, and which were sanctioned by a majority of 100 in the House. My Lords, from every one of those items during the last five years real property has been relieved, and every one of those burdens have been assisted from the Consolidated Fund. Of these things the noble Marquess has omitted to tell us.
THE MARQUESS OF HUNTLYI said, thanks to the Government, real property had been relieved by £2,000,000, but that other charges had been put on it.
§ THE EARL OF BEACONSFIELDAs to the Poor Law charges, after discussions of great length, all Parties and all Governments have come to the conclusion that to make the relief of the poor an affair of State, and to fasten it on the general income of the country, would be one of the most disastrous and pernicious measures that could be conceived. Now, my Lords, I have endeavoured to place before you some of those considerations which at this moment I think should not be absent from your minds. That the country is in a state of industrial depression seldom equalled is what Her Majesty's Government do not deny. Upon the question whether the great subjects which I have intimated may require a more public and formal examination, I am not at this moment desirous of speaking in a spirit of dogmatism. It is not impossible that, as affairs develop, the country may require that some formal investigation should be made of the 1986 causes which are affecting the price of the precious metals, and the effect which the change in the value of the precious metals has upon the industry of the country, and upon the continual fall of prices. I do not think such an inquiry need grow out of the discussion this evening. The noble Marquess has not laid any ground for it. The noble Marquess has brought forward, but only imperfectly, a case that has been submitted to Parliament before, that has been submitted to Committees, and to Commissions. The opinion of Parliament upon all these questions, and the conduct of Parliament are, I think, an answer to the inquiry of the noble Marquess. What he wants done has, in fact, been done; and what he indicates as yet possible to do would be additional injuries to those very classes whose interests he wishes to serve.