OBSERVATIONS. QUESTION. (Hansard, 24 March 1879)

LORD CAMPBELL

said: My Lords, it is not in order to address the House on any new phase the Eastern Question has arrived at that I have put this Question on the Paper; but only with a view to the two inquiries it contains, and which it seems to me the present moment calls for. It has been alleged in a variety of quarters, and according to the ordinary channels of intelligence in the other House of Parliament—that the Fleet has left the Sea of Marmora where it had so long continued. It will hardly be denied that your Lordships 1500 are entitled to an official declaration on a matter so important, and one which in this House has been so seriously canvassed. Should the answer be that the Fleet continues where it was, the second Question has not any special urgency at present. But should the answer be that it has gone back to the Mediterranean, the second Question unavoidably suggests itself. The presence of the Fleet in the vicinity of Constantinople tended on many grounds, which this is not the moment to go into, to promote the backward movement of the Russian Armies, according to the stipulation I have mentioned in the Notice, in nine months over the Danube, in three months more across the Russian frontier. Should the Fleet have therefore been withdrawn—a step on which I offer no opinion—it seems desirable to know how far, in other ways, the execution of the 22nd Article in the Treaty of Berlin may be depended on. In a despatch dated January 26th, which cannot be too widely known or accurately studied, the noble Marquess the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has explained, that Russia has neglected to conform to other portions of the Treaty. As regards the Article in question, it is evident that there are many motives to leave it unperformed, and a variety of pretexts for neglecting to adhere to it. There are even symptoms of reluctance to observe it, if it is true, as I have lately seen in a Constantinople journal, that 40,000 troops have lately come from Russia, to replace those which seem to be departing. In that respect, the distant wars in which we are engaged must add to what we may perhaps consider the temptations of St. Petersburg—first, because they carry off and occupy the military power of this country; next, because they lull the vigilance with which the events of Eastern Europe used to be regarded in it. Whatever may be the case with individuals, the public at large are not inclined to the labour of keeping three considerable subjects in the memory together. The House may therefore wish to know whether the Fleet has been withdrawn; and, if it has, whether the complete evacuation on the part of Russia of a position menacing to Europe, is secured?

§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY

My Lords, your Lordships will have seen, by the Papers which are on the Table, that in the course of last autumn 1501 —I think in September—Her Majesty's Government caused it to be signified to the Russian Ambassador at Constantinople that as soon as the Russian troops evacuated what I shall call, for convenience sake, Southern Roumelia—that is to say, the Turkish Empire outside Eastern Roumelia—the British Fleet would retire from the Sea of Marmora. The reason for so doing was obvious. The presence of the British Fleet in that sea was for the protection of Constantinople; and as soon as the Russian Forces had retired beyond Adrianople, it could not be said that the presence of the British Fleet in the Sea of Marmora contributed effectually to the protection of Constantinople, or that Constantinople was any longer the subject of pre-occupation on the part of the signatory Powers. It was for these reasons that we gave the undertaking which will be found in the Blue Book. The evacuation of Southern Roumelia was delayed much longer than we expected—much longer, perhaps, than we had a right to expect; but it was not possible for us to remonstrate with what was, at all events, a departure from the Treaty; because Russia placed it in a parallel line to a similar departure from the Treaty of which Turkey was guilty in not evacuating the fortresses of Spütz and Podgoritza. As soon as these fortresses were evacuated, the movement of Russian troops out of Southern Roumelia commenced. It is perfectly true that there are still other obligations of the Treaty which Russia has in due time to fulfil. She will have, at periods indicated in the Treaty, to evacuate Eastern Roumelia, Bulgaria, and Roumania. The noble Lord asks, as I understand, what provision we have taken for insuring the performance of these obligations? We have taken the only provision by which it is open to us to insure the performance in the future of any particular act by any particular Power—namely, a Treaty engagement from her that she will do so. That Treaty engagement Russia has repeatedly acknowledged, and she has told us, in the most formal terms, that she is fully resolved to execute it. It is not open to us—and certainly it is not open to me—to suggest a doubt that that promise will be fully performed. Even if it were so, I do not suppose that the waiting of the British Fleet in the Sea of Marmora would be of any 1502 use in respect of the performance of that particular portion of the Treaty. If that portion of the Treaty is not executed, and if the Sultan thinks that the presence of the British Fleet, either in the Sea of Marmora or in the Black Sea, will tend to secure the execution of the Treaty, he is authorized to ask for the assistance of his Allies; and when that request is made, it will be open to any of the maritime Powers that are signatories to the Treaty to send their Fleets through the Straits, through the Sea of Marmora, or the Black Sea. But I certainly do not contemplate any such contingency. I only allude to it for the purpose of showing the noble Lord that to have left our Fleet in the Sea of Marmora merely for the purpose of anticipating a contingency which is not likely to arise, would not have been an advantageous proceeding—it would in no way have forwarded the end we have in view, and might have exposed our own motives and actions to misconstruction.