Lords Sitting of 17 March 1879

MINUTES.
PUBLIC BILLS—First Reading— Marine Mutiny Act (Temporary) Continuance*.
Second Reading — Rivers Conservancy (20); Mutiny Act (Temporary) Continuance*.

RAILWAYS (IRELAND)—THE LETTER KENNY RAILWAY AND THE WEST DONEGAL RAILWAY BILLS.

  RESOLUTION.
  THE EARL OF REDESDALE (CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES),in moving—
  "That it is desirable before the Letterkenny Railway and the West Donegal Railway Bills be further proceeded with that the Board of Trade should report to Parliament whether the character of the country through or of the traffic for which these lines are to be made renders it necessary or expedient that either or both of them should be constructed on a three feet gauge, with the reasons on which their Report is founded,"
  said, the existence of two gauges in England had been found so inconvenient that, though sanctioned in certain districts by public legislation, one had been, for the most part, and probably, before long, would be altogether got rid of. A discussion had taken place on the subject of the advisability of allowing narrow-gauge railways to be constructed in certain districts in Ireland, when the general opinion arrived at was that it might be necessary in some cases; but that before Parliament legislated in the matter it would be desirable to have a Report of the necessities of each individual case made by an Inspector of the Board of Trade. These two Bills opened the question of the general introduction of a narrow-gauge in Ireland, whereby a serious interruption would be

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  caused in the uniformity of gauge of Irish railways, as settled by public legislation, which might lead to considerable inconvenience. He therefore had felt it his duty to move the above Resolution, in order that Parliament might have that information in regard to these lines which the Government had declared was desirable before such a change of gauge was sanctioned.
  Moved to resolve, That it is desirable before the Letterkenny Railway and the West Donegal Railway Bills be further proceeded with that the Board of Trade should report to Parliament whether the character of the country through or of the traffic for which these lines are to be made renders it necessary or expedient that either or both of them should be constructed on a three feet gauge, with the reasons on which their Report is founded.—(The Chairman of Committees.)
  THE DUKE OF RICHMOND AND GORDONsaid, he could not agree to the Motion of the noble Earl. He could not see that sanctioning these two lines of railway would be equivalent to sanctioning a double line of gauge over all Ireland. It had been decided only the other night not to postpone these two Bills, and the suggestion which he threw out as to having a Report from the Board of Trade referred to future Bills and not present ones. Those Bills had now been referred to a Select Committee, and it would put the promoters to great expense if the Motion was carried, as they had no Notice that any such change was in contemplation.
  LORD ABERDAREregretted that the Government had come to the decision they had. The disturbance of the general gauge in a country was a question of national interest. It was the business of the Government to report through the Board of Trade upon the general principle; and he failed to understand why, in the present case, that had not been done. He thought it was desirable that the Select Committee should have all the information which could be obtained put before it before it came to a decision; and the Report of an Inspector of the Board of Trade who had inquired into all the circumstances of the case would be of great assistance to them in coming to a just and proper decision.
  THE LORD CHANCELLORsaid, he knew nothing about the merits of the particular measures under discussion; but thought it would be unfair to the promoters of the Bills, seeing that they
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  had been read a second time, to suspend the whole proceedings in order that a local investigation might be made, as to which no Notice whatever had been given. He knew of no case in which the progress of a Bill had been suspended after the second reading in order that the Board of Trade might conduct a local inquiry, the result of which was to be laid before Parliament. Such a course of proceeding would cause great loss and inconvenience to the parties interested. In the present case, the promoters were prepared to go on with the Bills, and they had no reason to anticipate that such a Motion would be made. It could not be supposed, as had been said by his noble Friend the Lord President of the Council, that the sanctioning of these two Bills would be sanctioning narrow-gauge railways all over Ireland; and he would point out that the discussion the other day showed the necessity of sanctioning them in these two particular districts. He differed from the policy of his noble Friend (the Earl of Redesdale), who, in his opinion, carried his enthusiasm for a uniform gauge a little too far. In Ireland the only choice in many cases was between a three-feet gauge and nothing.
  THE EARL OF KIMBERLEYsaid, he thought it would be better to adopt the Motion, so that a full investigation of the special circumstances of the case should take place. The present case was not like a suit in which parties would be debarred from taking action because no notice had been given. All that was now proposed was that the Committee should not be debarred from getting that information which was always desirable in the case of Bills of this kind. There was no idea that a general rule affecting all cases should be laid down.
  THE EARL OF REDESDALE (CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES),hoped the Resolution would be carried, as he thought it would be an advantage to Parliament if the information he desired were laid before it. To sanction these Bills without due inquiry might establish an undesirable precedent, and all he wished was to prevent the adoption of a narrow gauge being agreed to without further information being obtained. He had brought the matter forward in the public interest, and should press it to a Division.
  On Question? Their Lordships divided: —Contents 28; Not-Contents 36: Majority 8.

  CONTENTS

  Bedford, D.

  Aberdare, L.

  Airey, L.

  Lansdowne, M.

  Carlingford, L.

  Northampton, M.

  Clinton, L.

  Ellenborough, L.

  Monson, L.

  Airlie, E.

  Romilly, L.

  Cowper, E.

  Sefton, L. (E. Sefton.) [Teller.]

  Derby, E.

  Doncaster, E. (D. Buccleuch and Queensberry.)

  Silchester, L. (E. Longford.)

  Stanley of Alderley, L.

  Dundonald, E.

  Strafford, L. (V. Enfield)

  Ilchester, E.

  Kimberley, E.

  Sudeley, L.

  Lucan, E.

  Suffield, L.

  Redesdale, E. [Teller.]

  Thurlow, L.

  Templetown, V.

  Zouche of Haryngworth, L.

  NOT-CONTENTS

  Cairns, L. (L. Chancellor.)

  Ashford, L. (V. Bury)

  Auckland, L.

  Bagot, L.

  Northumberland, D.

  Cottesloe, L.

  Richmond, D.

  De L'Isle and Dudley, L.

  Somerset, D.

  Dorchester, L.

  Salisbury, M.

  Elphinstone, L.

  Forester, L.

  Amherst, E.

  Gerard, L.

  Bathurst, E.

  Harlech, L.

  Beauchamp, E.

  Hartismere, L.(L. Henniker.) [Teller.]

  Bradford, E.

  Cadogan, E.

  Heytesbury, B.

  Dartrey, E.

  Kenlis, L. (M. Headfort.)

  De La Warr, E.

  Rosslyn, E.

  Norton, L.

  Stanhope, E.

  Saltersford, L. (E. Courtown.)

  Wharncliffe, E.

  Cranbrook, V.

  Skelmersdale, L. [Teller.]

  Sidmouth, V.

  Sondes, L.

  Abinger, L.

  Stewart of Garlies, L (E. Galloway.)

  Resolved in the Negative.

NAVY—EXPLOSION ON BOARD H.M.S. "THUNDERER."—OBSERVATIONS.
THE DUKE OF SOMERSET: My Lords, I rise to call your attention to the circumstances connected with the explosion that occurred on board H.M.S. Thunderer. I am sure that I need not apologize for troubling your Lordships on a matter attended with such disastrous results. The Report of the inquiry that has been made has now been laid upon your Lordships' Table. My Lords, for the last 20 years or so—in fact, ever since armoured ships have been built—
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the great difficulty has been to manufacture guns sufficiently heavy to arm them. The experiments that have been made in the guns, in the rifling, in the projectiles, and in the powder, have been numberless, and every effort has been made for the purpose of securing the strongest cannon. Great sums — I may say millions—have been spent in these experiments, and one of the results has been the production of the 38-ton turret-gun. It was therefore with a feeling of the most acute disappointment—and, I may almost say, with feelings of dismay—that in January last we heard that one of our newest guns of the latest pattern had burst, killing all the men, or, at all events, killing and disabling all the men in the turret, and also killing or injuring 45 men of the crew of the ship. My Lords, for that terrible disaster of the 2nd January there is but one source of consolation, and that is to be found in the strict discipline which was maintained; for, notwithstanding the confusion arising out of the explosion, and the fact that all the lights in the vessel were at once extinguished and darkness prevailed throughout the ship, they nevertheless went direct to their various posts, and calmly performed every duty required of them. My Lords, I consider that the conduct pursued by them on that occasion reflected honour not only upon themselves, but upon the Navy at large. Well, my Lords, the accident having occurred, it was thought necessary that a Committee should be appointed to inquire into the cause of the explosion, and that Committee assembled at Malta on the 24th January, and at once proceeded with the investigation. Now, in the first place, it is necessary, in order that the House may appreciate the Report of the Committee, that I should state very shortly the nature of the arrangements for working the guns and the general arrangements on board the ship. My Lords, the ship is a vessel with two turrets, and in each turret there were two guns. In the after turret of the ship the guns were 35 tons; but in the forward turret there were 38-ton guns. These larger guns, being of the length of 16 feet 6 inches, it was impossible to load them in the turret, and arrangements were made to draw in the guns from their position, and lower or depress the muzzle, so that they might

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be loaded from the battery deck. In addition to this, there was an arrangement to wash out, as well as load, the guns by hydraulic power; and there was also a contrivance that when the rammer which, made like a telescope in two joints, had reached the breach of the gun, it should indicate that the washing was completed, so that it might be known to the crew if the gun was not properly washed out. There was also an ingenious contrivance by which the head of the rammer admitted water into the gun, so as to allow it to be thoroughly washed out. Those were the general arrangements connected with the gun. Well, my Lords, on the 2nd January, an order was given for an electrical broadside to be fired. It was accordingly fired, and taking the Report of the Committee as correct— and I am not going to dispute that; but taking it for granted that it is correct— according to the Report, the order having been given for an electrical broadside to be fired, out of the four guns two missed fire, one in the aft turret and one in the fore turret. The Report states that the 38-ton gun missed fire, but that none of the four men who were appointed specially to attend to the gun perceived it. When the gun was discharged there was a recoil, but that recoil was not always sufficient to admit of the gun being put into position to be re-loaded, and therefore the natural recoil was supplemented by its being drawn back by hydraulic power; after which it was depressed by means of a lever. The House must imagine an arrangement by which the lever was worked by one of the men, and the effect was that the gun was drawn back exactly into the proper position to enable it to be loaded. Now, the Committee report that the lever was drawn by the man, and that he brought back the gun without its having had the proper recoil; but the other three men who were watching the gun did not notice the circumstance, which is, to say the least, a little surprising. Then it appears that the next step was that the muzzle of the gun was to be lowered for the purpose of washing and re-loading; and according to the statement of the Committee, the men whose duty it was to re-load it knew as little of the state of the gun as the men who were above and whose duty it was to depress it. It ap-
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pears that the gun had not been washed out; but, it was said, the indicator was out of order and did not act—the consequence was that they thought the gun had been properly washed out, and therefore they proceeded to load it. Now, my Lords, the gun being 16 feet 6 inches in length, it had already a charge in it occupying no less a space than 5 feet, and the effect of their putting another charge of 5 feet into it was that out of a space of 16 feet 6 inches—the whole length of the bore of the gun—no less than 16 feet was occupied by the double charge, and it was stated that the man who loaded it never discovered it. Here, my Lords, is a picture of the gun itself, by which you will see how very small a portion of it was left after two projectiles, two cartridges, and two wads had been rammed into it. Well, my Lords, the gun having been sent up, as it was supposed, all right, it was ordered to be fired, and the effect was that it burst with the most disastrous consequences. Now, my Lords, permit me to call your Lordships' attention to the failures which took place in reference to the gun. First of all, the electrical appliances failed to fire the guns; then the men above failed to see after the first firing that the gun had not recoiled; then the men below, who had still more important duties to perform, failed to see that the gun was not properly washed out; the telescope rammer failed to ram, the indicator failed to indicate. Such, my Lords, were the failures connected with the loading of the gun. Now, my Lords, I wish to call your attention to this—If these failures happened when the men were quietly at practice, without any excitement, without any enemy, what must be expected amidst the hurry, noise, and confusion of an action at sea? My Lords, is the safety of our ships, and the honour of our flag, to be intrusted to these delicate and complex arrangements which fail even in common practice at sea where they are being worked in a quiet and leisurely manner? My Lords, this is a very serious question; but beyond that there is another question still more serious. My Lords, if, as it appears, these guns missed fire, it might also happen that the guns might hang fire, and if such an event occurred, and the gun hung fire, the men might not know it, it might be depressed for the purpose of re-load-

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ing, and if it went off when it was so depressed, it would infallibly sink the ship. A similar catastrophe might also follow if the sponge failed to work properly, for in that case the new cartridge might be prematurely ignited by the smouldering remains of its predecessor; it might explode in the process of loading, and the effect would be, probably, to blow out the side of the ship below the watermark. Now, my Lords, in these days of scientific slaughter, our sailors are liable to be killed in a variety of ways; they have to encounter in their front these monster guns; they have Grading guns pointed at them from above, and torpedoes in the water beneath them; and if, in addition to these dangers, they are to have guns that are apt to burst in the process of firing, I want to know how we can expect our sailors to go into battle with the resolute courage which has heretofore distinguished them? As to the Committee, I have noted what they say is the cause of this disaster, and I have looked with some attention to the evidence which was taken. It seems to me that the Report is not drawn in accordance with the evidence. The witnesses as to the recoil of the gun declare that it is impossible to suppose that the hydraulic action of the lever could have been mistaken for the natural recoil. However that may be, and whether they are right or wrong, it appears to me that it is necessary that there should be a most careful inquiry into the subject, because it is impossible to allow these heavy guns to be loaded and fired upon this principle without making provision for the safety of the men, and without making an improvement in the arrangement by which the guns are loaded. The Committee recommend the retention of this system of loading, but that improved arrangements should be made. My Lords, there is a great responsibility incurred by those who advocate the continuance of this mode of loading, and that certainly is a part of the subject which ought to be fully and carefully looked into. With regard to the Report of the Committee, I have examined the evidence, and find that Captain Noble, who is a member of the firm of Sir William Armstrong, was one of the witnesses, and the tendency of his evidence, it appears to me, was to throw the responsibility on the men and not upon the gun. The gun,

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it is true, was blown to pieces; but the pieces remain; the men, however, are dead and cannot be heard, so that there are no means of testing the accuracy of the evidence. But the Committee have accepted Captain Noble's view of the case, and attribute all these failures to the men to whom the arrangements for the working of the gun were intrusted, and the Committee think that it is shown conclusively that the gun itself was not to blame. I do hope that, after the Report of the Committee, the authorities will bring home the fellow-gun, and test it under exactly similar conditions. That is what the Committee recommended. The importance of the subject cannot be over-estimated, and therefore I trust that there will be a thorough inquiry, by scientific men acquainted with artillery, into these guns, as well as into the system adopted for loading them, and that that will be followed, if necessary, by the introduction of improved arrangements in order to restore that confidence to the minds of those who are engaged in the Naval Service of this country, in the working of the large guns which it is all important they should possess.
LORD SUDELEY: My Lords, I quite concur w7ith the noble Duke (the Duke of Somerset) that this is a question of the greatest possible importance. So far as the Report of the Committee is concerned, it shows conclusively, I think, that the form and construction of the guns, and the manner in which they are welded together, is undoubtedly good. The noble Duke has criticized somewhat strongly the system of hydraulic loading; but it must be remembered that that system is being adopted by other nations, although it can only be regarded in its infancy. It is quite impossible, in the present day, when naval armaments are constructed of such enormous magnitude, that the working of the guns could be accomplished by manual labour, and, therefore, the use of machinery is a necessity. My Lords, the witnesses who were examined before the Committee have shown that two very satisfactory conditions have been proved by the explosion — First, that the hydraulic gear and loading apparatus is not really thrown out by concussion, and that the turret itself is not liable to jamb. So far as the loading apparatus is concerned, it is a remarkable fact,

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and one which has not been in anyway disputed, that, notwithstanding the enormous concussion which must have taken place, the hydraulic apparatus was not destroyed, and the other turret gun was capable of being used immediately after the explosion. It may be, therefore, considered that that point concerning the suitability of the apparatus to the turret itself is disposed of satisfactorily. The Committee then proceed to point out the cause of the accident, which they attribute to three errors, which all occurred together, and they state that if the three had not occurred simultaneously the accident could not have arisen. First of all, the gun missed fire; secondly, the man having charge of the lever did not watch the gun when it was supposed to be fired; and, thirdly, the indicator of the rammer had been broken and had not been replaced. It appears, then, that if these errors had not occurred, the accident could not possibly have taken place; but still experience has now shown that dangerous accidents of this nature may be expected, and I therefore trust that the noble Lord will be able to assure the House that the Admiralty see no difficulty to making such improvements as will prevent the possibility of such an accident occurring again. There appears to me to be no good reason why all danger of such accidents should not be removed. I do not want to trouble your Lordships with any lengthened remarks, but I must say that, in my opinion, the noble Duke was a little severe in his criticisms of Captain Noble. That gentleman is well known as a great artillerist, and has a worldwide reputation as one of the most competent authorities on explosives. My Lords, I have ascertained that the Italian Navy, who have some of the largest ordnance worked by hydraulics on board their ships, have given orders that all matters connected with the management of the motive power to work the guns shall be placed in the hands of the officer who alone is authorized to touch the levers, and I think the same precaution should be taken in our ships. My Lords, we have now, not only 38-ton guns, but 100-ton guns, and everybody must be aware that it is absolutely impossible to do anything with them, except machinery is employed; it is therefore the duty of the Government to do all that they can to prevent
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the recurrence of such accidents. Your Lordships are perhaps aware that, during the last eight or ten years, numerous improvements have been made in naval gunnery; and Sir William Armstrong has discovered, in experimenting with a number of guns, that he is able to produce guns which, weight for weight with the present gun, possess double the penetrating power. This is a matter of enormous importance, and is effected by giving a larger powder chamber and considerably lengthening the guns—in fact, making them 26 calibres instead of 16. I think that it is most desirable that this matter should not be allowed to stand over, but that a competent Committee of artillerists and gunners should be appointed to consider the question. I am told that the Admiralty propose to reappoint the Ordnance Select Committee; and, indeed, after the occurrence of this calamity, I think it is absolutely necessary that it should be re-appointed. I hope, also, that, if it is appointed, it will be a judicial Committee, and not an inventors' one; and that if any officer on that Committee became an inventor, he should at once retire from it. What we want is a thoroughly unprejudiced Committee, who shall be appointed to consider all these questions. With reference to the disaster itself I should like to say one word more, and that is, that the explosion of the gun on board the Thunderer having called general attention to the construction of our guns, I trust the Government will see the necessity of ascertaining whether it is not possible that some alteration should be made, and that, instead of the Admiralty being compelled to take all their guns from another Department of the Government—thus involving a double responsibility on it—they should be allowed to go into the open market and avail themselves of the assistance of persons possessing the highest skill and knowledge —as the Admiralty have the power of doing with respect both to ships and engines. It is a deplorable thing that on every occasion they should be obliged to hold themselves aloof from improvements, because they have not the authority of another Department to adopt them. On the first occasion when this ship was armed, 35-ton guns were put into her; but the Admiralty shortly afterwards discovered that that gun was no better than a 25-ton gun; and then,

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and not until then, did they seek advice outside the Department, when it was discovered that a larger gun than a 38-ton gun could be used if loaded by hydraulic power. We should be very much behind other nations if we continued to use the old system. I cordially concur with the noble Duke in hoping that the Admiralty will carry the wish of the Committee that the portions of the exploded gun, as well as its fellow, should be brought home to be examined. I must say that I am extremely glad that the Admiralty sent out Mr. Bramwell, a civil engineer of the highest eminence, well known for his judicial character and discernment. The naval officers on the Committee could not have been better selected. Admiral Luard, Admiral Boys, and Captain Singer were, without exception, admirably fitted for the task, and I think the First Lord deserves the highest credit for having selected them. The verdict of such a Committee cannot be controverted. In conclusion, I have to thank your Lordships very much for the patient attention with which you have received these few cursory remarks.
LORD ELPHINSTONE: My Lords, I think your Lordships will agree with me that many of the questions which have been brought before you in connection with this subject are extremely important. But, in the first place, before giving my answer to them, I may mention that some of the Papers on the subject were not issued before Saturday; and I fear that many of your Lordships have not as yet had an opportunity of reading the Report of the Committee, and still less the evidence on which that Report is based. I am, however, sure of one thing, and that is that the whole of your Lordships have read the short telegraphic summary of the Report which appeared in the newspapers some weeks ago, and that all of your Lordships must have read that communication with great astonishment. How is it possible, you must have asked yourselves, that a gun, manned as that was, could have been fired without notice having been taken that one gun only went off, and not two? If the gun had missed fire, would not the fact of the absence of the recoil have given clear testimony that it had not gone off?—and supposing these two points had escaped notice, is it possible to conceive any-
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thing more unlikely than that one charge should have been rammed home on the top of another without the fact being discovered, when we remember the enormous weight of the charge, especially when, as in this case, the charge occupied a space in the bore of the gun of no less than 4 feet 9 inches, upon which was rammed one of 4 feet 7 inches? These are questions, my Lords, which I say must have occurred to every one of your Lordship's minds, and they are questions which we might find it difficult to answer. Now, in order to make myself clear, or better understood, I may, perhaps, briefly explain the construction and working of the turret, although the noble Duke who introduced this question (the Duke of Somerset) has touched upon it. The turret may be described as a circular heavily-plated shield, revolving upon its own axis, about 31 feet in diameter, and weighing about 400 tons. Inside the turret there are two gun-slides placed parallel to each other, on which are the gun carriages bearing two 38-ton guns. These guns are loaded by hydraulic power, applied by means of a lever placed at the side of the turret and under the control of one of the gunners. Immediately below the firing port are two other ports, which open to what is called the battery-deck, which is below the other deck, and through it the operation of loading is carried on. The turret, when the gun is being loaded, is swung round until the ports are opposite to the hydraulic loading apparatus on the battery-deck, the muzzle is depressed, and the charge is pushed home by means of an hydraulic rammer, which I will explain presently more at length. The Thunderer had two turrets, one fore and one aft; the one aft being furnished with two guns of 35-tons each, worked and loaded by hand, and requiring 22 men in the turret; while the fore turret was furnished with two guns of 38-tons each, worked by the hydraulic apparatus, with 10 men in the turret as against the 22 required to work the lighter and shorter guns. I do not know that I need give your Lordships a detailed description of the turret, because it is described very clearly in the Report of the Committee, which is in your Lordship's hands; but I will at once proceed to answer the questions which have been suggested, and which really are but three

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in number. The first is as regards the sound. I know of more than one instance of miss-fire in which one gun went off and the other did not, and in either case it was thought by those within the turret that both guns had gone off. It is clear, therefore, that sound in itself is no indication whatever of the gun's having gone off—and it is a curious fact that the guns in the after turret being fired at the same time as those in the fore turret, it was found that one of them had missed fire also. Sound, or the absence of sound, therefore, being no indication as to whether the gun had gone off, what is to be said with reference to recoil, or the absence of recoil, which is more difficult to explain to your Lordships? All the witnesses who could have given evidence on this point, with the exception of one man, were unfortunately killed, and his evidence goes rather to prove that the gun did not fail, and that the recoil did take place; but on the supposition that he made a mistake—and the Committee evidently considered that he was mistaken—the absence of recoil not having been noticed may be explained in this way. In the first place, the recoil was not of itself sufficient to bring the gun in far enough for loading, and it had to be assisted by hydraulic power. The gun is fired and the recoil is checked by water compressors or buffers at the time of firing, and has to be supplemented by hydraulic running-in-gear. The man who has the lever in his hand has to apply it at the moment the explosion takes place, and in this instance he applied the hydraulic power directly he heard the explosion. The guns, at the time the accident occurred, were to have been fired simultaneously by electricity, not from the turret itself, but from the pilot-tower on deck, so that no one in the turret knew when to expect the discharge. The man stationed at the running-in-lever very likely—I do not say that it was so, but it is more than likely was not watching the gun at the time of the recoil, and then directly he heard the explosion, naturally thinking that both guns had gone off, he applied the lever, and the gun came in, though slower, it is true, than would have been the case if it had been discharged and the recoil had taken place. Then, I think, the gun being fired to windward, it is very likely, as
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the Committee suggest, that a good deal of smoke came back into the turret, so that the officer could not see. Your Lordships will recollect that it is only the first part of the recoil that is caused by the filing, the second part being caused by the hydraulic power. Under the supposition that both guns had gone off, the turret was brought into the loading position, and the order was given to "sponge and load." The loading was not effected there, but the gun was run on to the battery-deck, and a new charge was pushed into it by means of the hydraulic rammer. That rammer is telescopic—that is, it consists of two parts, an inner and an outer tube, and in loading the outer tube advances first and carries with it the inner tube, and when the outer tube has reached the fullest extent of its thrust, the inner tube commences to work and completes the ramming; so that, though the first part of the ramming can be seen by the men outside, the latter half—that is, the part done by the inner tube—cannot be seen. One of the experiments tried by the Committee was to see whether it was possible to double-load the gun without knowing it.
"January 29.—Experiment F.—The object of this experiment was to ascertain whether two separate charges could be rammed home by the hydraulic rammer without the men attending the loading being made aware of it by the peculiar working of the rammer when sending home the present charge. The right gun of the foremost turret was loaded with a battering charge (dummy), Palliser's shell and wad, and then with a full charge (dummy), common shell and wad. Result.—Tho men attending the loading could not have noticed, by any peculiar working of the hydraulic rammer, that the second charge was being sent home."
I myself tried the same experiment on board the Dreadnought on Friday last. I had the gun double-loaded, and then the rammer forced home, and there was nothing whatever to indicate to me that there were two charges in the gun. The only way we have at present of knowing the position of the rammer within the bore of the gun is by means or" a "tell-tale" to which is attached a piece of string secured to the rammer head; but this often got out of order, and we know at the time of the explosion the tell-tale was not in order. My Lords, I have now endeavoured to show—first, that sound is no guide; secondly, that the absence of the recoil, not being

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noticed, might be accounted for; and, thirdly, that two charges could be rammed home one on the top of the other without being noticed, provided that the tell-tale was out of order. What happened was this—the miss-fire was not noticed by those inside the turret; it was, of course, unknown to those outside the turret; the order was given to "sponge and load," and a second charge was rammed home;—the gun was fired, and burst. What followed I cannot describe better than by reading Captain Chatfield's own simple statement—
"On the morning of the 2nd of January the squadron was dispersed for target practice, the guns were loaded with battering charges and Palliser shell. An electric broadside was fired at the target about 400 yards. The guns were then loaded with full charge (86 lb.) and a common empty shell, and the order was given to fire the guns independently—turret on the move. The right gun of the fore turret was then fired at 1,000 yards at the target. About two or three minutes afterwards the left gun was fired at about the same range when it burst, explosively, destroying the top of the turret and damaging the inside, but not sufficiently to prevent firing the right gun and moving the turret. The gases from the explosion went down below into the shell-room and aft through the stoke-holes into the engine-room, knocking down the stokers who were in the after stoke-hole attending the fires, and putting out all lights. The bulkheads on both sides of the shell-room were destroyed, and pieces of broken metal—turret and gun— damaged the deck in several places; otherwise the ship was not damaged. There were one officer and nine men in the turret at the time of the explosion; seven men and one officer were killed; captain of turret lived two days; captain of the gun that was fired, though severely wounded, is still alive; one officer and one man were killed on battery-deck and 35 men wounded. The burning material was blown in the shell-room by the explosion. The magazine and whole of the lower part of the ship were filled with black smoke, and the battery-deck was filled with burning materials. The 'still' was sounded immediately after the explosion, the fire-bell rung. Every man immediately went to his station. The shell-room was partly flooded, and the fire was almost immediately extinguished, no part of the ship itself having taken fire. The shell-room party went below into the shell-room and extinguished the fire without waiting for orders. Two men caught hold of the powder cases, containing 85 lb. of powder each, and took them upon the upper deck, the lids of one of the cases having been blown off by the explosion. I immediately signalled for medical assistance and steamed down to the Fleet."
Here, my Lords, it is plain that two charges were fired at once, and, therefore, there could be no doubt as to the cause of the accident. Here we have a
1012
ship engaged in simple gunnery practice; and, therefore, there was a total absence of that excitement which leads men to forget danger in action. In one moment, without warning, men were knocked down, lights were blown out, the deck below was filled with smoke, and burning materials were forced even into the shell-room. Within the turret all but two were killed, and without the turret the dead and wounded were mixed together in darkness. No one knew what had happened. The ship might be damaged, or she might be sinking. The "still" was sounded, and no one moved. The "still," I may explain, is a bugle-call, which, when sounded, obliges everyone, no matter what he is doing, to stand still and wait for the next order. The fire-bell was then rung, and everyone immediately went to his fire station. What I say is this—and I am sure your Lordships will admit it— that such conduct reflects the highest credit on Captain Chatfield and the crew, and shows the admirable state of discipline which must have prevailed. Well, my Lords, a Court of Inquiry was ordered, composed of the senior officers present; and they came to the conclusion that the gun had burst, owing to the projectile having slipped forward in the bore, leaving an air space between it and the cartridge. On the arrival of the ship at Malta, a second Court of Inquiry was held, consisting of three naval officers and three officers of the Royal Artillery, and their Report is in your Lordships' hands, and I think it is one of a most exhaustive character. They have made a series of experiments, in order to ascertain whether the charge slipped forward on the withdrawal of the rammer; and, although the projectile might have slipped, if not secured by a wad, the cartridge never slipped. But, as a fact, a wad is invariably used, and, on trial, it was found that it required a very considerable amount of force to move the wad after its having been rammed home. The Committee, therefore, looked, as your Lordships will, for some other conclusion than that which was come to in the Sea of Marmora. The evidence shows that it took the united power of four men to bring the wad down, and I have been, informed by a telegram sent by Captain Noble that several experiments have been tried with respect to striking the wad in the bore, at distances

1013
of 2, 3, and 4 feet, and not the slightest damage was done to the gun. The noble Duke said—and I am bound to admit it—that the captain and two of the company are of opinion that three shots left the ship on that occasion; while, on the other hand, four men, stationed aloft, one of them a signalman, whose special duty it was to watch the firing, maintain that only two shots left the ship. Now, the third shot was safe in the 35-ton gun of the after-turret, and two only left the ship. What, then, became of the fourth shot, unless it was left in the gun owing to a miss-fire? The Committee rely, however, greatly upon the evidence of the gun itself—and that is a silent witness that cannot make a mistake. In the first place, the recoil, when the gun exploded, smashed the buffers in the rear, which, with one charge, could not have occurred; and, as I have already mentioned, the recoil has always to be supplemented by hydraulic power, in order to bring the gun sufficiently far in for loading. Then, there are marks upon the broken portions of the gun that show most clearly that a projectile passed down the bore in the roar of the charge that burst the gun, and part of a stud that had belonged to the shell first rammed home was also picked up; added to which, Captain Noble, who was examined at great length and whose evidence is well worth reading, maintains that an air space, even if it existed at all, would not have caused the bursting of the gun. The Committee, therefore, came to the conclusion that the explosion was caused, not by an air space, but owing to the gun having been loaded with two charges, and they came to that opinion unanimously. I say unanimously, for, in order to prevent the possibility of any one member of the Committee being biassed in any degree by the opinion of any other member, the president called upon each member to write his opinion on a slip of paper. They all did so, and when the papers were opened, not only were they unanimous, but the very words used were almost identical. My Lords, I will not dwell any longer on this part of the case. All that I will say is that the Admiralty fully approve of the Report, and accept the verdict given. I know that there are some men who do not accept it, and among them men whose opinions are entitled to great weight. Some men who
1014
are capable of weighing evidence do not accept it. But an opportunity will be afforded shortly for a settlement of this question; for I have to inform the House that it is the intention of the Admiralty to act on the recommendation of the Committee and bring the remaining 38-ton gun home, when it will be subjected to a series of test-trials which cannot fail to be of the greatest value. Now, my Lords, I will for one moment allude to the steps that are proposed to be taken to prevent the recurrence of such an accident. In the first place, I may say that the gun was a Woolwich gun, and not an Armstrong one. It is proposed that the hydraulic ram should be altered, so that the inner tube shall be the first to move, instead of the outer-one, as at present, and so that we shall be able to watch the action of the last part of the ramming. It is also proposed that two "tell-tales" shall be used instead of one, so fitted, that if one of them gets out of order, the other will act; but if both of them get out of order, the rammer itself shall cease to work. It is proposed that the gun shall be searched after it has been fired, and before being re-loaded, in order to make sure that it has gone off. It is also proposed that there shall be a general order given that the charge shall be tested in the gun after loading and before firing; and by an improved mechanical arrangement the lever for running the gun in shall be so altered that it will not act until after the recoil of the gun; and, further, that greater facility for communication between those inside and outside the turret shall be provided, and—what is very important indeed—that a new kind of electric tube shall be supplied, which will be much less liable to miss fire. It will be a satisfaction to your Lordships to know that the materials and workmanship of the gun were everything that could be desired, and there does not appear to be the most remote reason to apprehend any danger in firing this description of gun with the heaviest charges. The hydraulic gear is not damaged, the turret was capable of revolving, and the remaining gun could have been worked after the explosion. As to the mode of loading, we do not propose to make any change, and for this reason—that owing to the length of the 38-ton gun, it cannot be loaded in any other way, unless

1015
we were prepared to increase the diameter of the turret, and so increase the weight enormously. If it be absolutely necessary to have a gun of such a length, it is also absolutely necessary that it should be loaded by an hydraulic rammer, and the experience of these experiments has shown us that no part of the accident is owing to the failure of the hydraulic rammer. The noble Duke has called attention to the danger that might arise from the depression of a gun, in the event of its hanging fire; but there is no instance on record of a large gun having hung fire, and even if it did, the danger is not so great as the noble Duke apprehends, because the muzzle of the gun must naturally be above the side of the vessel altogether, even when it is depressed for the purpose of loading. That leads me to a question that has been slightly touched upon, and that is the question of breech-loading. Before I say anything on that, I must point out the great differences of opinion that exist in all matters relating to gunnery. With every civilized Power endeavouring to arrive at the most perfect weapon, it may be supposed that there is some particular form of weapon that is decidedly superior to all others. But what is the case? Here, in England, there are eminent authorities maintaining that our present mode of construction is wrong, and the principal makers are at variance, not only upon the construction of the guns, but upon the very materials to be used. Sir William Armstrong uses steel and wrought iron; Sir Joseph Whitworth uses steel throughout; and Captain Palliser uses steel and cast iron for the manufacture of guns; while in construction Sir William Armstrong uses a large number of moderate-sized coils, and Woolwich a small number of large coils. Projectiles, also, differ in form and material, and there are also several kinds of powder in use. Looking abroad, we find a similar difference of opinion existing—the fact being that gunnery is an experimental science. Certain results may be obtained by a particular gun; but it by no means follows that by increasing the size of the gun a corresponding increase of result will follow, and so it is with breech-loading. Sir William Armstrong was what I may call one of the pioneers of breech-loading; but now he, from his
1016
increased experience, prefers muzzle-loading, and for this reason—that whenever the number of the parts of a gun is increased, the more likely is that gun to get out of order. In a turret or a casemate there is this objection also, that when the breech-piece is removed to load the gun, there is likely to be a rush of gas into the turret that would drive the men out. No doubt, this may be got over; but I merely mention it as one of the various objections that have been raised, and must be met. As to the comparative value of the guns, there seems to be but little difference between those loading at the breech, or those loading at the muzzle. One of Sir William Armstrong's many experiments was testing one gun against another under precisely similar conditions—one loading at the breech and the other at the muzzle—and the result showed no superiority for either. The Admiralty have no feeling one way or the other. They have no prejudice in favour of muzzle-loading; but all they want is to get the best weapon; and if it can be shown that breech-loading is the better system, breech-loading will be adopted. I may mention at the present time that the Admiralty have under their consideration the best mode of fitting turrets for heavy breech-loading guns; and if we go on increasing the length of our guns, it is possible that a different mode of loading them will have to be adopted, and everything points in the direction of increasing the length, for with the slow-burning powder now in use the length of the gun necessarily increases the power. To illustrate what I mean, I may say that when a 35-ton gun was increased 3 feet, it then became a 38-ton gun, and the penetrating power at 1,000 yards was quite equal to the penetrating power of the 35-ton gun at 500 yards. But, my Lords, I will not dwell on these technicalities. The subject is a very large one, and one that cannot be more than lightly touched upon in your Lordships' House. It is a question that will have to be submitted to the Committee, and it is the intention of the Government that it shall be considered by the Ordnance Committee forthwith. My Lords, in conclusion, I have only to thank your Lordships for the attentive manner in which the House has listened to this somewhat lengthened statement.
VISCOUNT CARDWELL: My Lords, I do not wish to occupy your Lordships' time by prolonging the conversation upon this intricate and difficult subject; but I do not think it would be right, after the statement we have just heard, if I did not acknowledge its exceeding clearness and power, and the admirable manner in which this technical subject has been explained to the House. I cannot but acknowledge also the great propriety of the course which the noble Lord opposite (Lord Elphinstone) has indicated. What we want is the very best gun that can be obtained, and, at the same time, the very safest one. We do not want to spare the money that is necessary for that purpose; but we want to get the best gun; and of all the considerations to be kept in view, safety is the first. I believe this is the first great gun that has ever burst on service since the Woolwich system was introduced; and that both Services, the Navy and the Royal Artillery, have had in the safety of those guns an unbounded confidence. I listened with great pleasure to the statement which my noble Friend, now Secretary of State for India, made last year of the excellence of our guns, and of his confidence in the muzzle-loading system now adopted at Woolwich, both as regards material and mode of manufacture. At the same time, it is quite right that the Government should always be open to consider whether any improvement is possible; and I think it is not improbable, though I am only expressing my own opinion, that in proportion as a gun is made longer, arguments may be brought forward in favour of breech-loading which have not been clearly shown in the smaller guns. One thing is apparent, as the gun is lengthened, so the power increases. You have also introduced a milder powder, and this may prove to be in favour of the breechloader. I believe, however, the opinion of the noble Lord who has just spoken is still the prevailing one; and certainly I am not prepared to object to it. Whatever may be the opinion of the authorities of the Admiralty and the War Office as to the mode of loading, there is no question but that they are both interested in getting the best possible gun. The noble Duke (the Duke of Somerset) has brought to the attention of the House a most interesting subject, and it has been most ably treated.
1018
Some of the most experienced sailors and eminent artillerists have examined the matter very closely, and have come to an unanimous Report, with the aid of a very eminent civil engineer, which I hope will entirely disabuse the minds of any who have felt the slightest want of confidence in the guns in consequence of this accident. I trust that the Admiralty and the War Office will always work harmoniously together, and always command that confidence on the part of the community that is so necessary for the good of the country. My noble Friend near me (Lord Sudeley), in the interesting speech which he made following the noble Duke, expressed a hope that the Committee which is to be appointed will be a judicial one, and not one of inventors. I, for one, hope that it will be a Committee composed of persons in whom the country will have unbounded confidence.

RIVERS CONSERVANCY BILL.—(No. 20.)
(The Lord President.)
RIVERS CONSERVANCY BILL.—(No. 20.)

  SECOND READING.
  Order of the Day for the Second Reading, read.
  Moved, "That the Bill be now read 2a"—(The Lord President.)
  THE DUKE OF MANCHESTER,in criticizing some of the provisions of the Bill, said, he was of opinion that greater powers should be given to the Conservators to improve the navigation of the rivers, and thus prevent that accumulation in their beds which was the cause of floods. The new Conservancy Board ought to take all the existing navigation powers; because it was too often the case that when private navigation companies possessed the power of navigating the rivers, their condition depended almost entirely upon whether the navigation paid, because, if it did not, they allowed the rivers to silt up, and thus obstructions were caused. There was one provision in the Bill to which he strongly objected. It proposed to give power to rate the uplands which were not benefited by the alterations or improvements made in the river. The reason for which the proposal was made was that the floods were largely caused by the new underground drainage system; but that was a view in which he did not concur, although the Committee of the

  1019
  House of Lords did. On the contrary, he thought that underground drainage, by keeping the land dry, and thus in a condition to absorb water as it fell, tended to prevent rather than to increase floods. Most of the witnesses before the Committee asserted that under-draining caused floods, but gave no reasons for their opinion, except Mr. Bailey Denton, who stated that, if an inch of rain fell, half-an-inch went through the drains, in addition to the inch flowing off the land. He could not see where the extra half-an-inch came from. Mr. Rawlinson, on the other hand, contended that the floods were caused by the water falling on water; and he (the Duke of Manchester) was of opinion that the removal of obstructions in the beds of the rivers would materially lessen floods, and much would be done in the way of preventing the water remaining on the low-lying meadow lands. Under this Bill, however, occupiers of land in the Buckinghamshire hills would be taxed for improvements effected on the Ouse, miles away in the Fen district, and that appeared to him to be most unjust. No doubt, in some cases, very heavy works would have to be made in the outfalls; but he thought the Ouse might be easily dealt with, and that the works need not be of the very extensive character that had been proposed. It was most unfair to compel farmers, who were suffering from a succession of bad seasons, to pay a rate of this kind, which had never been demanded from them before, to effect improvements from which they would derive no benefit whatever.
  EARL COWPERsaid, he was very glad that there was to be no serious opposition to the Bill in their Lordships' House, and he hoped that the measure would be as successful in "another place," where it would doubtless be thoroughly sifted. The floods might perhaps in some cases not damage meadow lands, yet they did most serious damage in many cases, and no doubt their Lordships were asked to make some compensation in consequence. With the exception of one gentleman, all the witnesses examined before the Committee of their Lordships' House which sat upon this question in 1877 stated in evidence that the draining caused a great increase in the floods. It made the rise of the water much
  1020
  quicker than before. There could be no doubt whatever but that the question as to whether the uplands should be rated for the purposes of the Bill would be seriously considered in "another place." As to the manner in which it was proposed that the Conservancy Boards should be elected, he contended that as the Boards were intrusted with rating powers, and as a certain amount of discontent existed from the way in which the rates were distributed, it would be right to allow the ratepayers to elect the Boards, rather than have them consist of life-members appointed by the Local Government Board, with power themselves to fill up any vacancy caused by death. The concession, however, might be guarded with the proviso that the person elected must be a landowner. By granting it, they would maintain the principle that taxation should always be accompanied by representation. Another point to which he objected was the extreme caution that was shown in guarding private property. This caution was carried to such an extreme extent as to interfere, he thought, with the operation of the Bill. For instance, the power to remove obstructions in rivers should be further considered, with the view of the provisions being made to work more efficiently against reluctant owners. Many of the provisions of the Bill would have to be carefully considered in Committee; but there could be no objection to its second reading.
  THE MARQUESS OF RIPONconsidered that his noble Friend (the Duke of Richmond and Gordon) had very fairly fulfilled the pledge that he gave last year by bringing this Bill forward, which appeared to be founded altogether on the Report of the Committee of their Lordships' House in 1877. Having been a Member of that Committee, and having had his share in the responsibility for that Report, he naturally viewed the main provisions of the measure with approval; but there were one or two points connected with it on which he desired to make a few observations, and with regard to which he would be glad of some explanation from his noble Friend the Lord President. In the first place, he would not follow the noble Duke opposite into the question of the rating-powers, as regarded uplands, given under the Bill after the judicious ob-

  1021
  servations which his noble Friend behind him (Earl Cowper) had made upon the point; but the whole question was a most difficult one, and it must be remembered that it had been fully considered in Committee; and he must say that he shared in the opinion at which they arrived—that uplands should bear, at least, some share of the cost. He did not altogether understand how his noble Friend proposed to deal with the different existing Conservancy Boards. One of the great evils that existed at present in regard to this matter was the great number of different Conservancy authorities that had to deal with the same rivers. These different authorities often came into conflict with each other. The Committee had recommended that this state of things should, as far as possible, be brought to an end, and that a single Board should be established for each river. His noble Friend probably intended to get rid of the numerous existing authorities by the latter part of the 38th clause; but he (the Marquess of Ripon) felt by no means sure that the words proposed in the Bill would have that effect, especially where they were not consenting parties, and he hoped that point would be considered before going into Committee. Then, with respect to the election of the new Conservancy Boards, as governed by Sub-section 5 of Clause 6. He confessed that in principle he did not like the system of secondary election; but, waiving that question in the present case, what he wished to point out was, that whereas under this Bill the occupiers of land were to pay half the rates, the arrangements made for representing them upon the Conservancy Boards were altogether inadequate. Not less than one-third of the Board was to be composed of landowners owning land to the amount of £300 a-year, and the other two-thirds were to be elected by the sanitary or Conservancy authorities; even of that two-thirds, one-half must always be landowners, in many cases the whole, or nearly the whole, would be so; the result would be that the tenant-farmers might be almost wholly excluded. Under no circumstances could they form more than one-third of the Board. The question was one in which tenant-farmers took a considerable interest, and he thought the proportion of the representation allotted to them would not
  1022
  prove satisfactory. He belonged to a Conservancy Board on which farmers sat, and had found them always intelligent and useful members; and he thought that when they had to pay half the rates they should have a much larger share in the representation of the Board than was proposed in the Bill. He did not make these observations in hostility; but thought some improvement of this sort would facilitate its passing, and, at the same time, greatly increase its utility.
  THE EARL OF REDESD0ALE (CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES)said, that some of the provisions of the Bill would require careful consideration, especially the rating clauses. To place upon the proprietors of uplands a tax which had never been suggested before, and for which they obtained no advantage, was unjust. The artificial obstructions in rivers in the floodlands' districts by dams and weirs made therein by the proprietors for their own advantage were the chief causes of the floods complained of.
  THE DUKE OF RICHMOND AND GORDONsaid, that it would be his duty to consider carefully, before the Bill went into Committee, all the points that had been raised in the discussion, and, if possible, to give effect to them. The noble Duke who had spoken first (the Duke of Manchester) and the noble Earl (the Chairman of Committees) had complained, that the uplands were to be taxed under the Bill; but all he could say was that a noble Friend told him the other night that the Bill was a good one, but he could not see why lowlands only should have to pay. In dealing with a difficult subject, his difficulties had been much enhanced by so complete a divergence of opinion as existed between his noble Friends. On one occasion complaints were made that it was proposed to tax the uplands; on another that the lowlands would be taxed and the uplands let alone. If these conflicting views were attended to, the result would be that no areas at all would be taxed under the Bill. His task, then, had been arduous; but he believed that the Bill, in all essential particulars, would be found satisfactory. It was in all essentials in accordance with the recommendations of the Committee; and with regard to the suggestion of the noble Marquess opposite (the Marquess of Ripon) as to the 38th clause, he

  1023
  thought it gave sufficient power to carry out the objects for which the Bill was undertaken. He would, however, consider that point before the Committee was reached, and if he saw his way to improving it he would certainly do so. He must make the same remark in regard to the 6th clause, and he thought the noble Marquess would give him credit for not doing anything which was opposed to the interests of the British farmer. He proposed to take the Committee on the Bill on that day fortnight.
  Motion agreed to; Bill read 21 accordingly, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House on Monday the 31st instant.

DISQUALIFICATION BY MEDICAL RELIEF BILL.—(No 6.)
(The Lord Aberdare.)
DISQUALIFICATION BY MEDICAL RELIEF BILL.—(No 6.)

  SECOND READING.
  Order of the Day for the Second Beading, read.
  THE DUKE OF RICHMOND AND GORDONsaid, that the measure had come up from the other House; and as he should have to suggest some Amendments, which would not, however, go to the extent of rejecting the measure, he should prefer its postponement.
  Second Reading put off to Friday next.
  House adjourned at half past Seven o'clock, till To-morrow, half past Ten o'clock.