§ EARL GRANVILLEMay I ask the noble Viscount the Secretary of State for India a Question—of which I have given him private Notice—Whether he has any further Papers to lay on the Table with reference to the war in Afghanistan; and, if so, whether, when laying them on the Table, he will be prepared to make a statement on the part of the Government as to the objects of that war? Perhaps, also, the noble Viscount 512 will state when it is likely he will produce such additional Papers, if there are any?
§ VISCOUNT CRANBROOKMy Lords, the Papers relating to Afghanistan are principally military, and have been for the most part already published in The Gazette, and, if desired, can be laid upon the Table. There are at present no others which can be produced, nor has the time arrived for discussion. I can, however, inform the noble Earl that no time will be lost by me in making them known to Parliament when the proper time for so doing arrives, or in communicating anything which I think interesting to your Lordships.
§ THE MARQUESS OF RIPONsaid, that a Paper, which was lately laid upon the Table and circulated among their Lordships, contained an address of General Roberts, dated the 26th December last, to the Chiefs of the Khost and Kuram Valleys. In that document, General Roberts informed the people practically that those districts would be annexed to our Indian Empire. He could not for a moment imagine that General Roberts would have taken such a step without authority on the part of Her Majesty' s Government, and he wished to ask the noble Viscount, If such authority was given; and, if so, whether it issued from the Home Government or the Government of India; and, whether he was prepared to lay the instructions to General Roberts on the Table?
§ VISCOUNT CRANBROOKWhen I was first asked about this address, it had only appeared in one or two newspapers, and I did not know whether it was authentic or not. I therefore inquired of the Government in India whether such a speech had been made, and if so that it might be sent to me in extenso. It has just reached me, and I have already laid it on the Table. I am not aware that any authority was given to General Roberts to make that particular speech; but, no doubt, authority was given to him, as it was to other Generals in like circumstances, that they should endeavour to withdraw the allegiance of tribes in the districts through which they have to advance; and in order to detach those tribes, it is necessary to give them an assurance that they would not again fall under the old dominion. No doubt, that was the object of General Roberts had in view when making the speech. It 513 was an assurance to those Tribes that they would not be again brought under the old dominion of the Ruler from whom he had detached them. And, without saying what form of government may be adopted for that district, it is the intention of the Government that they should not return under the dominion of the Ameer.
§ LORD LAWRENCEsaid, that, as he understood the address of General Roberts, that gallant General gave an assurance that the district was to be annexed to the British Empire. If that were so, it meant that Her Majesty's Government had decided to extend the Frontier of British India considerably beyond its original limits, probably not less than 70 or 80 miles. That appeared to him to be a very serious matter. It was customary, he did not deny, for a General in command of troops to issue addresses and proclamations, on passing events and the like, to the people of the country. He had, however, never known a case in which the General commanding our troops had told the people that their country would be taken from the Ruler who had hitherto governed it and be annexed to the British Empire; orders to that effect had always, when determined on, been given by the Governor General himself. If, in this case, those orders had been issued, the country to be annexed would extend, at least, up to the Peiwar Pass, and bring us to within five or six days' march of Cabul. Under such circumstances, it would appear that we waged war with the people of the country, and not, as was set forth in the late Ultimatum, with Shere Ali, and with the view of obtaining "a scientific Frontier," and not simply of avenging an insult. It would also become necessary for us, in order to secure a continuous and connected boundary, to carry out an annexation to the extent of probably 60,000 or 70,000 square miles. The Premier had stated in December last that the meaning of the term "a scientific Frontier" was one which could be defended by few instead of many troops. He had no hesitation in saying that to make such a Frontier as the one proposed secure would require a greater number of troops than the present boundary demanded. In a Memorandum drawn up in 1867 by Lieutenant-Colonel Peter Lumsden, now Adjutant-General of the Army in India, and lately re- 514 printed by order of the House of Commons, which seemed to be the authority on which this particular extension of the Frontier was advocated, it was estimated that this extension would involve the additional employment of some 4,000 or 5,000 troops. If the Frontier generally was advanced westward to a similar extent, the number of troops required for its occupation would have to be very considerably increased. He submitted that this was a very serious consideration for Her Majesty's Government and the country.
§ LORD NAPIER OF MAGDALAMy Lords, I think it incumbent on me to say a few words on this subject. The question of the war with Afghanistan has arisen upon a very small point, but it has a very broad basis. In my opinion, a war with Afghanistan has long been inevitable. Whatever our treatment of the Ameer has been, or may have been, my firm opinion is that the result would have been the same as that which has now happened. Had we complied with all his demands, they would have grown to such an extent that there must have come a period at which we must have fixed a limit, and our first refusal would have made him our enemy. Much has been said on the question of a Frontier for India. It would not have been expedient to draw up the plan of a campaign; but no one having military experience can have studied the Frontier in India itself without being aware that it is a weak Frontier, and that the Power that holds India cannot defend it on the Frontier line against a strong attack. It has always happened, and I venture to think will happen again, that the Power defending India against an attack from without must retire from the Frontier line and fight its battles on the plains of India, surrendering valuable territories to the occupation of the enemy. Formerly, the invaders were always joined by some of the discontented Native States, and therefore it is for the interest of the Empire that when the danger arises the struggle should be fought out beyond the mountain barrier. I therefore consider that the interest and the necessity of Great Britain require her to advance beyond that Frontier, and to prepare for the day when the battle of India may be fought, and to fight it outside and not inside India. India is surrounded and hemmed in by an 515 almost impassable barrier of hostile Tribes. For 30 years we have been confronted with them, and for a long time closely in contact with them. The difference between that time and the present is very slight. There is some difference. They are still hostile, and no European can enter their hills without incurring grave risks. Those hills are the very nursery of barbarism; and if ever we have to pass the barrier of those hills, whether we do it now or hereafter, we shall have the same battles to fight as heretofore, except that it will be many times more severe. I therefore consider that it is for the interest of the Empire to place our Frontier beyond that barrier. When those Tribes which have hitherto been so hostile shall have ceased to have a hostile Power to back them, they will no longer be hostile, but will come under our civilizing influence as hostile Tribes have done before. It is our reproach that a people like the Afreedees should remain so long in their present condition, closing the country to the light of civilization, and shutting themselves out from it, and making it unsafe for any stranger to be an hour in their country. It is a disgrace that this state of things should have continued so long; and now, as we are forced by the necessities of the case to extend our Frontier, the result will be that civilization and improvement will be carried to those Tribes, that commerce, to which the country has been almost closed, will be introduced, and we shall then be placed in a position to defend India in case it should be hereafter attacked. Of course, there are those who say that this is unnecessary; but we can hardly refuse to give credit to positive evidence of the advance of a strong Power to the Indian Frontier. By our advancing beyond the wall which confines ns in ignorance and helplessness—by advancing beyond that, I say, we should protract and postpone the day when two great European Powers who divide Asia may meet. In my view, it is necessary that we should rule the district of Candahar. If we can hold it by amicable agreement with the Ameer, so much the better; and we could give him the net revenue derived from those Provinces, so that he would be no poorer than he is now, and we should govern those Provinces well, and from that position we should be able to defend him and ourselves much better than we can now.
EARL GEANVILLEMy Lords, I need hardly point out that the conversation which has taken place, and which arose out of a Question as to a matter of fact, put by my noble Friend behind me, shows how exceedingly desirable it is that Her Majesty's Government should at the earliest period give us some clear view of what their policy is with respect to Afghanistan.
§ THE EARL OF BEACONSFIELDMy Lords, I agree with the noble Earl that it is very desirable Parliament should always be furnished by the Government with the best information at the earliest time consistent with the public welfare; but the noble Earl must be conscious that at this very moment it is possible—I would say probable—that negotiations, or rather communications, are going on in Afghanistan which may lead, I trust, to a satisfactory settlement of the differences which at present exist; I think, therefore, it would be very inconvenient to make any statement of the kind to which the noble Earl refers at this particular moment.