LORD CAMPBELL, in rising to call attention to the Correspondence on the affairs of Turkey and the present position of matters with reference to the 274 Russian evacuation of the territory on this side of the Pruth, and to move an Address to Her Majesty on the subject, said: My Lords, I know how hard it is to draw attention to the subject of this Notice when the mind of Parliament is agitated by another set of circumstances. At present, except upon South Africa, the grief it has occasioned, the vicissitudes it offers, nearly everyone is doomed to find unwilling ears, or make unwelcome observations. I will, therefore, pass at once to a few details, which may be easily recalled, and which, at least, show that the topic now before us is appropriate and necessary to the moment. It is now the 14th of July. On the 3rd of August, the whole of the foreign territory occupied by Russian Armies ought to be evacuated. Nothing has been said of late as to their movements. The journals are nearly silent with regard to them. According to a paragraph which has reached me from Constantinople, so late as the 25th of June two regiments were still in East Roumelia. Whether the great body are there, or in Bulgaria, or concentrated between the Danube and the Pruth, if known at all, is only known to the Government. My Lords, we should remember, here, the evacuation had two stages, according to the 22nd Article in the Treaty of Berlin. The first stage was not completed at the period assigned for it. I cannot venture to repeat what has been said before in this House upon the subject, or go back to a controversy with which, perhaps, your Lordships are fatigued; but the more it is examined the clearer it becomes that, at the end of nine months, East Roumelia and Bulgaria ought both to have been quitted. Such, I am convinced, was the original impression of the Government, as it appeared to be the language of their Representatives and organs. A deficiency having occurred upon the first stage, not only suggests a deficiency upon the second, not only offers a temptation to it, not only raises a specious argument in favour of it—which it would be imprudent to exhibit—but really makes it harder to avoid it. If Russian troops had not remained beyond the legal time within the territory of the Sultan, the three months allotted as a margin would have more easily sufficed to march across Roumania, as the Treaty contemplated, or, if that method was preferred, to gain 275 Odessa from a port of embarkation. On the whole, then, there is little reason to anticipate the final exit on the 3rd of August, without new efforts to obtain it. The Address which I submit, although no censure is involved in it, would be an effort of this kind. It would unavoidably sustain the efforts which the Government are making, or hasten those they are preparing. Had something of the kind been done in the middle of April, we should probably have now been in a different situation. But it would then have had the aspect of gratuitous, and thus of hostile, admonition. It is now dictated by experience of something which has happened, and of something we regret. My Lords, although I have not spoken very long, the whole case is now, in some degree, before your Lordships. Everyone can see that the observance of the Treaty on the 3rd of August, after the damage it incurred on the 3rd of May, is, prima facie, improbable. But doubt may possibly arise as to the importance of delivering the territory, whether it is termed Roumania, or Moldavia and Wallachia, at the stipulated period. Men may ask whether it is worth while to be tenacious, however justly, on the point, after the great events and hazards they appear to have surmounted? The answer is—that the War of 1854 was brought about by nothing but the occupation of the Danubian Principalities. When that occupation ceased peace might have been negotiated, although a separate attempt, a new departure, was resolved on. The alliance of France, Sardinia, and Great Britain, the Expedition which left our shores, the resolution to embark on war after an interval of 40 years—these new and mighty elements of policy—had, as their immediate aim, to clear from Russian Armies the Danubian Principalities; although, according to the Czar, those Armies were not directed against the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, any more than the existing ones profess to be. Indeed, it is remarkable that on the day "when Russia passed into Moldavia in 1853, as Mr. Kinglake, the historian, has mentioned it, the four Powers, then acting together, sent out their protest to discountenance the movement. We have, therefore, their authority, with that of Lord Clarendon, Count Cavour, and Napoleon III.—who cannot be forgotten in this country—for main- 276 taining that the occupation of the Danubian Principalities—whatever object is assigned to it, whatever mask it may assume—is not a state of things which Europe can assent to. If it was dangerous in 1853, it is now far more so. At that time, the line of the Danube was protected by considerable Armies, with so great a Commander as Omar Pasha to direct them. Beyond, there was a quadrilateral of fortresses, of which Silistria made itself immortal. An Army of the present Czar, in the Danubian Principalities, has nothing to intercept a march upon Sophia, unless it is a new Bulgarian Militia, which his policy has organized. Diplomatists and strategists would equally admit that the occupation of the region can less than ever be regarded with indifference. Indeed, we should remember that if it lasts a day beyond the 3rd of August a European war is justified. What justifies a war is not certain to produce a war; but it involves a fatal bar to the tranquillity so requisite to every branch of industry and commerce at this moment. My Lords, it is now worth while to reflect upon the many interests, the many recollections, which tend to a delay of the withdrawal, unless your Lordships counteract them. One ground of the reluctance to be reckoned on is connected with the position of Austria in Herzegovina and Bosnia. I leave the House to reason on the subject. To pass on, influence at Bucharest has long been assiduously cultivated at St. Petersburg. To sway the counsels of Tirnova or Sophia is a newer and, perhaps, a keener aspiration. To govern indirectly at Constantinople was an aim of Russia long before, and cannot be renounced when she has nearly been established in that capital. These objects all suggest to her delay in the withdrawal. It is encouraged by the many triumphs over the rest of Europe her Government has recently obtained, whether in luring towards her Continental States which had formerly opposed her; or in suspending wholly the resistance of this country to her efforts; or in finding zealous partizans among the authors of the War in the Crimea; or in proving the futility of Treaties to restrain her from encroachment; or in gaining at Berlin, twice over, nearly all that she was seeking; or in reducing the balance of power to a collapse unparalleled in 277 history. Another strong consideration for the delay of the withdrawal arises from, what is going on in South Africa. We have there, apparently, a Force as large as went out in 1854, however different may be the objects in their magnitude. We have there the military leader whom the public is most inclined to depend on. We have there the passions and the energies which any other struggle would require; and there we seem to be exhausting all the spirit of the country. Last of all, delay of the withdrawal is encouraged by the inevitable lassitude the Eastern Question has occasioned in the Legislature, after attention has been so long, exclusively, and painfully devoted to it. If any other proof is wanted of the Russian disposition, the Treaty of San Stefano reveals it. The Treaty of San Stefano includes an occupation of a year beyond the length eventually conceded in the Treaty of Berlin. But the Correspondence of this Session—which the Notice has adverted to—is one continued illustration of the tendency to enlarge the Treaty of Berlin into the Treaty of San Stefano. If thus, my Lords, the risk we have to deal with is established, an Address of the kind which I submit must prove at once that a large class in the United Kingdom—and not an unenlightened one—regard the matter with solicitude. Indeed, the very language of the noble Earl the First Lord of the Treasury, when he came back from Berlin, would be sufficient to defend it. At that time, the noble Earl, according to the ordinary channels, stated as the great political conclusion to which he had been led by so remarkable a Congress was that the language of Great Britain ought to be more distinct as regards the line of action she desires to promote upon the Continent. No doubt, the lesson has had many illustrations. Had her language been more distinct in 1853, it is notorious that the costly struggle which ensued might have been easily avoided. Had her language been more distinct in 1873, the three Powers would have paused before advancing in their scheme against the independence of the Ottoman Empire. In 1877, the lesson was repeated. Had the language been more distinct some months ago, Russian troops might not have lingered after the 3rd of May in East Roumelia 278 and Bulgaria. Unless it is now distinct, you have not any reason to assume that an occupation will be terminated as you wish, when there are keen and nearly irresistible temptations to prolong it. But, still, it may be asked whether this House ought to declare itself? My Lords, during five years the Eastern Question has perpetually occupied it. Numerous debates have taken place, and they have been initiated in a great diversity of quarters. Some noble Lords have come forward as the special patrons of the races subject to the Porte, some as the converted and little-qualified adherents of St. Petersburg, some as the avowed supporters of what was done in 1856, so far as it was possible to guard it. But at no time in a drama so eventful has the House been permitted to exercise the influence over arrangements without which discussion seems to be a mere parade of knowledge and of argument. So far as my memory recalls it, in the whole transaction which has occupied us in so many of its phases, nothing has been brought about as yet, or been averted by your Lordships. Neither as regards the vassal Principalities, the Herzegovinian insurrection, the more momentous conflict which ensued, the settlement which followed it, has the voice of this House been fruitful or effective. At length, it may exert itself in such a way as to promote the deliverance of all the European Powers from a considerable peril. Had the Government succeeded in effecting the first departure at the proper time, there would be, of course, no ground of interference from your Lordships. As they did not succeed—however little we reproach them for it—such interference is legitimate. It is the conclusion of experience; it is the step of prudence; there is not any title to resent it. It would be a fitting close to the long, the agitating, but hitherto the unproductive toil your Lordships have devoted to the subject. It may be asked, perhaps, still more particularly in what manner the Address would tell on Russian counsels, should it be the pleasure of your Lordships to adopt it? Looking to what is known of the interior, and what our meditation would suggest to us, there are probably two parties at St. Petersburg—one desirous to close, the other to extend the occupation. One would dwell on the 279 recent discontent, not less alarming because deprived of any regular expression, the commotion which has taken place, and the transition which appears to be preparing, as a reason for bringing home the Forces of the Empire. The other may refer, with greater accuracy than I have done to-night, to all the grounds of distant policy which are calculated to prolong the tenure we object to. Except upon particular occasions, divided judgment seems to be the chronic state of Governments and Empires. The action of the House would clearly strengthen the Party who support the execution of the Treaty. It would throw weight into the scale, which at this moment may only want a little to establish the preponderance we aim at. By this view, also, an answer may be given to the only possible objection—namely, a reluctance to evince distrust in the governing authority of Russia. Reluctance to evince distrust when long experience creates it, is not the most intelligible part of statesmanship and wisdom. But let this be forgotten. Let it be granted that on special I grounds the governing authority of Russia is entitled to the deep consideration of the Legislature. But if the Sovereign of Russia is forced to oscillate between two sets of contradictory advisers, to uphold the more enlightened set is thoroughly in accord with the imagined obligation. It is a boon, because it tends to shorten painful indecision. It is a boon, because it tends to bring about the choice of safety and of honour. It is a favourite topic in some quarters that for many errors into which Russian policy is drawn the ruling power is not to be considered as accountable.- The noble Marquess the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (the Marquess of Salisbury) not long ago explained that much of what we are accustomed to protest against arises in that country, because no Department is acquainted with the conduct of another. It has been often pointed out that military leaders distinctly arrogate a power independent of the Government they theoretically act under. Distrust of Russian policy is not, therefore, distrust of the legitimate authority, but of something undefined—of some thing dark, of something surreptitious, which that authority is not sufficient to contend 280 with and to master. But if, upon the other hand, men do hold the governing authority responsible for all that has been done from the Crimean War down to this moment, they certainly are not required to withhold any step which is calculated to enforce the Treaty of Berlin and to release the territory occupied, because it may not be acceptable at St. Petersburg. The noble Marquess may point out that movements have taken' place which insure the retreat by the 3rd of August, although they have been studiously concealed from us. He will not probably recur to the position that Treaties are mechanically sure to execute themselves; that their spontaneous force in the discharge of obligations may be thoroughly relied on; that they do not want the slightest vigilance to guard them. Prepared to listen to anything by which it may be shown that such a course is not essential to its object, I move the Address of which I have given Notice.
Moved that an humble Address he presented to Her Majesty praying Her Majesty to exercise her diplomatic influence in the manner best calculated to secure the complete evacuation by Russian troops of all territory on this side of the Pruth, whether belonging to the Sublime Porte or to Roumania, at the time stipulated in the Treaty of Berlin.—(The Lord Stratheden and Campbell.)
§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURYI trust I shall be able to give a satisfactory answer to the noble Lord; but I am not quite certain of the subject, for I am not absolutely sure what the points of the noble Lord's observations were. He was exceedingly discursive, wandering over a wide extent of territory. The number of troops we have in South Africa, the operations of Omar Pasha in 1853, the Crimean campaign, the state of Russian politics, the division of parties in that country, and the proceedings which took place at Berlin—all successively had the honour of his attention. I am not quite certain whether I have accurately summarized the points which the noble Lord wished to bring before the House. But as I understand it, it was this—that the Russians had been guilty, as he expressed it, of inefficiency in the evacuation of the territories referred to, and that in consequence we could not trust them for the future; and 281 he fears that they will not fulfil the Article of the Treaty of Berlin which binds them to evacuate all the territory West of the Pruth by the 3rd of August. As I understand, the noble Lord's solicitude is engaged mainly upon the position of Roumania, and the probability that if Russian Forces continue to occupy that Province there will be danger that this country would be involved in war. I do not think there is much danger of any continuous occupation of Roumania; because, by the information I have received within the past two or three days from Mr. Comberbach, the acting Representative of Her Majesty in that Principality, I learn that there is no Russian soldier within the confines of Roumania at this moment. With regard to the fulfilment of that Article of the Treaty of Berlin which binds Russia to have none of her soldiers West of the Pruth by the 3rd of August, of course, I have not the gift of prophecy, but I can only say I have received the most positive and distinct assurances from the Russian Government, and when I saw Count Schouvaloff the other day he repeated these assurances in the most distinct manner. All the information I have received from Her Majesty's Representatives in these countries, though I am unable to say what is the exact number of Russian troops West of the Pruth, leads to the belief that they are comparatively few, and that they are rapidly moving to the ports from which they are to embark. I understand that Philippopolis was yesterday to have been entirely denuded of all the Russian troops there, and that they are moving upon Varna and Bourgas, where they are to embark. All the indications which have reached me lead me to believe that by the stipulated time the Russian troops will have left all the territory West of the Pruth, and I have received no indication pointing in an opposite direction. That is the only answer I can give. The noble Lord appears to attach more force to these Motions than they really possess. He is pursued by remorse because he did not, in April last, bring forward a Motion of this kind, in which case he thinks the period of the evacuation would have been materially altered. I think it my duty to convey some consolation to the discontented mind of the noble Lord.
§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURYIf he had made the Motion, the noble Lord believes the course of things would have been materially altered. However, I can assure him that if he had made any number of Motions things would have been not in the least different, and I do not believe this Motion will have much effect in influencing the movement of the Russian troops or asserting the policy of the Government. I think any Motion indicating an unnecessary tremor upon the part of the House had better not be put from the Woolsack, and, for my part, if it is put I shall say "Not-content."
LORD HOUGHTONsaid, he had heard with great satisfaction from those who could speak with authority that the hostile population of Roumania were settling down into a state of tranquillity, and consequent prosperity, to a degree almost beyond what could have been expected by the most sanguine among us.
LORD CAMPBELL, in reply, said, that no importance ought to be attached to the contemptuous manner in which the noble Marquess the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs was equally disposed to treat his friends and his opponents. The noble Marquess had at first attributed to him (Lord Campbell) remorse; but, in point of fact, the self-reproach which the noble Marquess had incurred, for too easy acquiescence in the first departure from the 22nd Article could alone explain the uncalled-for acrimony he had introduced into the discussion. The confidence of the noble Marquess in the opinion that the Russian Army would pass over the Pruth by the 3rd of August did not seem to be greatly backed by the admission that it had not yet entered the territory of Roumania. But no one was so much interested in the final execution of the Article as the noble Marquess. While he declared himself convinced that the Address proposed would not conduce to that result, the House would naturally be unwilling to adopt it. If the retreat by the 3rd of August took place, the debate would have promoted it; if it did not, the responsibility of the Government would be much enhanced by the proceedings of that evening.
§ Motion (by leave of the House) .with' drawn.