Lords Sitting of 14 February 1879

MINUTES.
SELECT COMMITTEE—INTEMPERANCE, appointed and nominated.
AFGHANISTAN—THE RUSSIAN MISSION AT CABUL.

  OBERVATIONS. QUESTION.
  EARL GRANVILLE: Your Lordships must have thought me, during the observations with which I troubled you last night, of a somewhat inquiring turn of mind. I asked many Questions of Her Majesty's Government, none of which—as sometimes happens to me—were answered. I remember that Lord Lansdowne (the third Marquess) was much amused by an Irish Peer, after asking a witness a question in a Committee, telling him that he asked the question because he knew what the answer would be. I have no idea how some of the Questions which I asked yesterday might be answered, and probably Her Majesty's Government are in the same predicament; but there is one Question which related to a matter of fact, which I take the liberty to repeat. Your Lordships will remember that in the despatch of the Secretary of State for India describing the policy of the war in Afghanistan the objects were stated to be that that country should be "strong, friendly, and independent." Yesterday, the First Lord of the Treasury described the results of the war, and he interrupted me while I was speaking—as he had a perfect right to do—and said he had not used the words "strong" and "friendly"—which I admit it would have been impossible for him to say—but "independent" and "self-governed." I asked for further information as to how this desirable end was to be obtained, and also asked whether there had been any communications with the Russian Government on the subject; and, if so, whether with any result, and if that result could be communicated to Parliament without inconvenience to the Public Service? It will not be thought unreasonable if I now repeat the Question.
  THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: There are some communications which are now in the hands of the printer; but which, I hope, will be in your Lordships' hands before long. I am afraid I did not hear all the Questions which the noble Earl put; but perhaps he had better wait before discussing the question of communications with Russia on the subject until the Papers have been produced.
  EARL GRANVILLE: I am afraid the noble Marquess only entered the House as I was finishing my Question. It is, whether there has been any result to the communications with Russia on the subject of Afghanistan; and, if so, whether he has any objection to communicate it to Parliament? If the noble Marquess thinks there is any objection, I am the last person to press him for an answer.
  THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: There were some communications with Russia just about the time Parliament separated for the short Recess. The result of those communications was the withdrawal of the Mission from Cabul. The nature of those communications will be explained by the Papers, which, I hope, will be in the hands of the noble Earl in a day or two.

THE VOLUNTEER FORCE—FINANCE AND ORGANIZATION—REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE.

  OBSERVATIONS.
  VISCOUNT BURY: My Lords, I have the honour of laying on the Table the Report of the Committee appointed some time ago by my noble Friend (Viscount Cranbrook), when he was Secretary of State for War; and it is thought desirable that in doing so I should, on the part of Her Majesty's Government, give some short explanation of the circumstances which led to the appointment of the Committee, the course of its procedure, the recommendations they have made, and also the course Her Majesty's Government are prepared to take with regard to those recommendations. I make no apology for troubling your Lordships with these details, because anything which relates to the Volunteer Force of Great Britain is of enormous importance to the country, and of great interest not only to many Members of this House, but to a large body of our countrymen. The Volunteer Force has very much changed its character in the last 20 years, during which it has flourished. Its history, briefly—although I hardly need remind your Lordships ofit—is that in 1859, under circumstances which we all remember, the Volunteer Force was established by the authority of the Lords Lieutenant of the counties under the old Act of 1804. In 1862, two or three years after, a Royal Commission

  1163
  was appointed, which advocated the payment of a certain sum to Volunteers by way of assisting them in their expenses. It was not, at that time, thought that the whole of the expenses of the Volunteer Force ought to be borne by the State. The Capitation Grant originated in 1862, and in 1863 the present Volunteer Act was passed. There was a Departmental Committee in 1869–70, in consequence of the recommendations of which certain additions were made to the sum which had been laid down as necessary to be given as a Capitation Grant by the Royal Commission of 1862. In 1871, there was another and a very considerable change in the constitution of the Force. In that year, the Regulation of the Forces Act removed the controlling power from the Lords Lieutenants of counties, in whom it had resided before, leaving only to them the power of recommending for first commissions in the Volunteer Force, and transferring the control to the Crown. In 1873 another, and, perhaps, in its effects a still larger, change took place. The Force had increased greatly in numbers, strength, and efficiency; and the Mobilization Committee appointed to inquire into various military matters, recommended that the Volunteer Force should be amalgamated into the body of the Army. From that time they were considered practically as soldiers, differing only from other soldiers in their terms and conditions of service, which were strictly defined and extremely limited. Those are the principal legislative changes made in the Volunteer system during the 20 years of their existence; but during that time there were also great changes in their personnel, organization, and degree of efficiency. At first, it was not contemplated that the State should pay the whole of the expense. At first—it was not, perhaps, unnatural—the expense of the Force was met partly by local subscriptions, aided by the Capitation Grant. In course of time these local subscriptions, if they did not disappear, have become so diminished that it is obvious if the Capitation Grant, or aid from the State in some form or another be not fixed at a sum sufficient to meet the requirements of the Force, that Force could hardly be held together. Again, under the peculiar circumstances of the Force, at its commencement a great deal of
  1164
  power was left in the hands of individual commanding officers. I will not say that every man did that which was right in his own eyes; but every commanding officer throughout the country had to overcome local difficulties, and to meet local requirements by his own personal influence, and with such means as were available. It was not to be supposed that there could result from that system anything like sufficient homogeneity, if I may so call it, to enable it to dovetail into our other Forces, when, in 1873, the great change was made which converted it into an integral portion of the Army. Under those circumstances, there arose a general belief that the constitution and organization of the Force required revision, and revision outside the Force itself. There was an absence of supervision which, however inevitable, and, perhaps, salutary in the early days of the Force, was no; longer desirable; and it became a matter of serious reflection when considered in connection with the future position the Force was to occupy. It is a curious fact that almost every commanding officer I have talked with considers himself to have been placed in an exceptional position. If I asked any commanding officer—and I appeal to the knowledge of all those noble Lords who have at all associated themselves with the Volunteer movement—how he met any particular difficulty, he invariably answered—"My position was exceptional, but this is the way I dealt with it." Such being the circumstances, it is evident that some alteration was necessary, and that it should be effected by the Government. The then Secretary of State for War, in the beginning of last year, appointed a Committee to look into the condition of the Force. The orders which he gave to that Committee were—
  "(1) To inquire into the necessary requirements of the Volunteer Force, and whether they were met by the grant; (2) whether if the grant was not sufficient for the purpose, in what form assistance should he given; (3) whether any alteration in the organization of the Force was necessary: (4) whether increased efficiency was desirable, and, if so, in what direction it should be attempted; (5) whether, if the present system of Capitation Grant was extended, it would, or would not, tend to economical administration."
  Your Lordships will see from these items the full and extensive character of the

  1165
  inquiry; but there were other subjects referred to by the same Committee, relating to important matters, but to which I do not intend even cursorily to direct your Lordships' attention this evening. I will therefore state what the Committee did in carrying out this inquiry. In the first place, they made a most minute investigation into the way in which the money was expended throughout the whole Force. For that purpose they drew up a series of questions addressed to all the officers commanding Volunteer corps, 293 in number. They were required to send in a tabulated statement of every item of expenditure, and they were to do this without reference to whether or not that expenditure was wholly covered by the Capitation Grant. If it were in excess of that grant, they were to state from what source they obtained the difference; at the same time, the Committee sent to each commanding officer a series of questions calculated to elicit from them their opinion as to the requirements of the Force, and the various changes they suggested should be carried out. The answers which came to this demand for information were very full in detail, and the consequence was that, at an early period of their proceedings, the Committee were placed in possession of the most minute details as to every item of expenditure, and also the opinion of every commanding officer as to what changes should be made and their nature. Fortified by these expressions of opinion, the Committee felt itself in a position with advantage to examine witnesses and elicit further information for themselves. They called before them a great many witnesses, some of them Members of this House and of the other House of Parliament. To all of these witnesses they addressed questions extending over a very wide scope, and having for their object the eliciting of opinion as to any great change which was thought to be necessary in the organization of the Force. After these they called before them as witnesses many prominent Volunteers throughout the country—from the Metropolis and from the great towns, from the country districts and also from Scotland. The evidence they obtained has been laid upon your Lordships' Table to-night, and I think it will be said that the evidence is most valuable in its character, and that the inquiry
  1166
  was most searching. Whether the Committee has been successful in framing, upon the information which they then obtained, a scheme at all commensurate with the importance of the subject will be for your Lordships to judge. At any rate, if I may speak in my official capacity, and not for the moment, as a Member of the Committee, I should say that they have taken great pains, that they have boon successful in collecting information, and that they have devoted great attention to it. The first point which they thought it right to recommend was that the establishment of the Volunteer Force should be defined. Hitherto there had been no fixed limit, and as many Volunteers were taken as offered themselves; in fact, the Government was only too glad to have them. Now, it has been thought that as there is a tendency in the Force to increase both in numbers and in expense, and as the Force has become part of the Military Forces of the Crown, it was necessary to follow the precedent of all other branches of the Naval and Military Services, and present annually to Parliament a detail of the numbers to be voted in that year. In technical language, to fix the annual Establishment of the Force. The proposition that we made was that the Establishment should be fixed at 250,000; but when that matter came before the consideration of my right hon. and gallant Friend at the head of the War Office, the illustrious Duke (the Duke of Cambridge), and others, it was thought that it was too high, and it was eventually determined that the Establishment should be fixed at 200,000 men. the present Establishment is somewhat above that number; but without going into details, I may say that the number of efficient Volunteers this year is 193,000; and thus, in fixing the ultimate Establishment at 200,000, we shall not necessarily diminish the number of efficient Volunteers, though we may alter the distribution of those Volunteers in the regiments, perhaps in the companies. The manner in which that must be carried out must, of course, be left to Departmental regulation. It is not a thing that can be done at once, and it will take a considerable time. There are several points in this Report on which I will not stay to comment now, and I will go straight to that part of it

  1167
  which deals with the constitution and organization of the Force. It is an essential characteristic of volunteering that a man should be allowed to leave on giving 14 days' notice. That is a condition which all Volunteers have hitherto enjoyed; and, as it has been found to work well in practice, the Committee decided that it would not be well to interfere with that regulation. They, however, felt that it would be advisable that some voluntary agreement should be entered into by Volunteers, which should bind them to remain for a certain time and servo for a certain number of years, if the Government would supply them with their clothing. It is obvious, if a considerable sum of money is expended in clothing a man, and he is to be permitted to leave at 14 days' notice, the Government would be at a disadvantage. We found in the evidence that, in many corps, an agreement was entered into between the men and the commanding officer, which was enforceable in the Courts of Law, by which the Volunteer bound himself, in return for his clothing, to serve for a definite number of years, and to keep himself efficient during that time; but that if, during that time, he should exercise his legal option of retiring at 14 days' notice, he should pay a proportionate sum to the cost of his uniform for the benefit of the corps. The Committee did not think it right to recommend to the Government the initiation of such an agreement; but they thought that this matter might be easily dealt with by the regulations of each corps, and that it might be left to the commanding officers. I now pass to the question of the organization and constitution of the Force. Your Lordships will remember that the scheme for the localization of the Army provides for the division of the whole country into a certain number of sub-districts, and that to each sub-district there are attached two regiments of the Line and a regiment of Militia. The localization scheme also provides that the Volunteers shall be an integral portion of the Army; and that, in case of invasion, they should be called up and attached to these sub-districts. The Committee thought a great many advantages would accrue if the Volunteers were at once permanently attached to their sub - district brigade, which
  1168
  would then consist of two linked battalions of Regulars, two of Militia, and two or more of Volunteers, according to their strength. And at this part of my remarks I may anticipate what I shall have to say presently in regard to the clothing, and mention that we propose that the Volunteer Force shall be clothed like the Regular Army. This, coupled with the association with the Regular Army, we consider will have the best effect upon the Volunteer Service. It will also have another effect—it will, I think, add to the social value of a Volunteer commission, when the Volunteer officers find themselves associated in this way with the officers of the Regular Army. It is a very complicated subject, and we found many difficulties in our way. There are a great number of small battalions and small corps scattered throughout the country; and while these exist in an independent and isolated form, due economy is hardly possible. The expense of volunteering (other than that of clothing and arming the Force) is mainly due to the charge for drill-sheds, head-quarters, and head-quarter staff; and unless some means are devised of diminishing that expenditure, a great addition would have to be made to the Capitation Grant, which the Committee have not thought fit to recommend. It would be impossible to obtain due economy of administration in the face of these arrangements; and we therefore propose that, so far as is possible, the recommendation which was made by the Committee of 1869–70 for the consolidation of administrative regiments should be carried into effect; and we do not propose to stop even there, for we further propose that in towns where a large number of small regiments exist—of course, with due respect to, and regard for, existing arrangements—that those regiments should be gradually joined together, and be made into larger ones. This would facilitate the organization with regard to the sub-district, and it would also meet another requirement in the Report of the Localization Committee—namely, that for the formation of provisional battalions. The suggestion is that, in case of necessity, provisional battalions should be formed out of the Volunteers, taking 25 per cent out of each regiment in the district. The Committee felt that, under the pre-

  1169
  sent circumstances, that arrangement would hardly be possible. To take 25 out of every 100 men dressed differently, organized differently, and unaccustomed to work together, and who are really and practically dissociated from one another, was a proceeding which the Committee thought would not work well in practice. But if this recommendation that the small battalions shall be consolidated into large battalions is carried out, and if those were to be joined with the sub-district brigades, then it would be quite easy, considering that they were accustomed to work together, to take 25 per cent for the formation of provisional battalions. My Lords, I now turn to the question of discipline, instruction, and efficiency, a branch of the inquiry to which I need not say the Committee devoted a great deal of attention; but on which, as it refers mainly to detail, I will not detain your Lordships at any length. With regard, however, to efficiency, those who have watched the Force will observe the great improvement which has taken place since the Volunteer movement began, when small companies were established which were little more than rifle clubs, and which were controlled by no military regulations. I am bound to say that every application for increased stringency and efficiency has been most cheerfully obeyed. Every time conditions have been imposed as the stipulation on which Government aid should be granted they have been complied with by the Force; and, as in the past, we have found every additional concession was made the occasion for demand of increased efficiency. The Committee thought they could not err by working on the same lines, and when they proposed that some additional Government aid should be granted in a particular direction, that they should demand in return for it increased efficiency. From the whole body of the evidence which I have laid on your Lordship's Table to-night, I think it will be seen that everything which has hitherto been given to the Volunteers has been given with a condition attached to it, and that, in all instances, the condition has been cheerfully fulfilled. While on this branch of the subject, there is one small point to which I may refer, and which, though a matter of detail, is a matter of some
  1170
  importance. We propose a small change in the interest of efficiency in regard to the number of drills required from a recruit on joining the ranks. At present, 30 are required before a man can become efficient; but in the following year he is only required to perform nine, the ordinary number of drills for a Volunteer. Taking into consideration the large number of matters in which a recruit has to be trained, and the short time at his disposal, we were of opinion that to become a fully-trained Volunteer in 30 drills was hardly to be expected. We therefore propose that the obligation to perform 30 drills in the first year should remain as at present, but that the recruit should be called upon to perform a like number in the second year, instead of nine as now. I believe that that requirement will be met with acquiescence, and I can only say, from the evidence which was laid before us, that I do not think this will in many cases entail more service than is given now in practice by Volunteers who join the ranks of some regiments where more stringent regulations are enforced. I now pass to Artillery Volunteers. Among a large body of that Force there is an idea that it would be easy to make a considerable increase in the formation of Field Artillery. We investigated that point, and the Committee came to the conclusion that it was not easy to form Field Artillery with the materials at our command. It is not that the men would find it difficult to learn the drill, the riding, or any individual thing; but Artillery is such a highly-polished arm, and involves such a multiplicity of duties, that it is impossible to suppose that Volunteers, having limited time only at their disposal, could become proficient as flying Artillery, or form a corps like the Army Field Artillery. The Committee, however, came to the conclusion that it would be possible to form Field Artillery with heavy draught horses, on some such basis as has already been seen in operation at Volunteer reviews, and that some extension of the Artillery corps in that direction would serve a useful purpose. With regard, also, to Artillery Volunteers, we find that they had very great difficulties to contend with. They ask for more instruction, which is, of all others, the kind of request least easy to refuse. They said—"We give our

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  time and attention, and we are willing to find everything except money." The same thing applies to the Engineers; and here I should like to say that, in my opinion, the Artillery and Engineer corps have devoted fully as much time and attention as any other branch of the Volunteer Force to the duties imposed upon them, and that they are in every way worthy of encouragement. The Committee have recommended the Government to give some consideration to the claims which they have advanced for increased facilities for instruction, and my right hon. and gallant Friend is inclined to adopt the suggestion all the more willingly that it will not be much additional expense. I come now to "Clothing and Equipment." The Committee went very thoroughly into this matter. The records of our investigation in this direction are very voluminous, and I need not trouble your Lordships with them. It will be sufficient for me to say that we propose that the different regiments of Volunteers shall be clothed, like the corresponding arm in the Regular Service, in the national colour of scarlet; that the clothing shall be supplied out of the Capitation Grant, so as to involve no additional expense to the country. It is true that, theoretically, the Force can now be supplied with clothing out of the Capitation Grant; but in practice that is not so. The Volunteer earns his Capitation Grant in one year, and it is paid in the next—it is, therefore, always in arrear. Articles supplied, out of the Government stores must be paid for on application. It is therefore impossible, unless he obtains an advance from his banker, or pays for it himself, that a commanding officer can obtain the clothing from the Government stores. We felt that it was quite impossible that our recommendation should be carried into effect, and the Capitation Grant be made to bear the charge, unless some facilities were given to a corps to avoid their running into debt. We propose, therefore, that the clothing should be supplied on application from the Government Clothing Department, not on the principle of immediate payment, but on the principle of taking 10. per man per annum till the whole of the debt is paid. The consequence is that in between three and four years a suit of clothing made to wear four years would be paid for by the corps; and if
  1172
  the alteration we have suggested in regard to the four years' service agreement should be carried out, on the one hand, the Government would not suffer, and, on the other hand, the Volunteers will be supplied with clothing on easy terms, and the corps will be very much less liable than hitherto to run into debt. We have found that the present method of clothing the Volunteers is most expensive. The men have been obliged to go to local contractors, who could not hope to be paid for a very considerable time, and who, of course, in consequence added something to their price. We found it to be one of the great reasons for the corps running into debt that they were under the necessity of providing the clothing for their men on such unfortunate terms. I think I have suffiiciently indicated the direction of the Committee's recommendations in regard to clothing, and I now pass on to another matter. The main point, my Lords, to which the attention of the Committee was naturally directed, was whether the Capitation Grant was sufficient for the service. Your Lordships will allow me to read a few of the items in which the money of the Volunteers is spent. "Expenses at head-quarters, including the ordinary drills, the care and maintenance of arms, marches out, reviews, repairs of arms, gun and drill practices, payment of the permanent staff, band, refreshments, interest on loans, prizes, and expenses of Artillery training, expenses for national and county associations, payment for loss of time in camp, reading, gymnasium and recreation rooms, allowance for treasurers, quartermasters, &c, &c." I have just named a few of the items to show how vastly divergent are the claims which come on the Volunteers for their money, and how difficult it must be on the comparatively small sum of 30 s., or a little over 30 s. per annum per head, to keep a regiment quite clear of debt. Generally we found, in the great majority of corps, that the total military expense was in excess of the amount received from the War Office—it was only in a few instances that a corps was supported on what was received from the War Office. It would not be safe to assume that because a few corps kept within the amount of the Capitation Grant that the Capitation Grant was sufficient; nor was it safe to assume the converse of the proposition,

  1173
  and say that because only a few corps kept within the grant, the grant was necessarily insufficient. The Committee, therefore, came to the conclusion that the point could only be decided by a very detailed analysis of the Returns. They, therefore, first proceeded to determine, as a standard for their own guidance, what items of expense were in reality, necessary for the efficient maintenance of the corps, and which would, therefore, be properly chargeable against the public; and, secondly, whether the Capitation Grant was sufficient to cover the expenses which thus had been laid down as, in the opinion of the Committee, necessary. This the Committee thought it necessary to do, in order to establish which I may call a standard of comparison; and, keeping that standard in their own minds for their own guidance, they proceeded afresh to analyze the Returns of the expenses before them. When they came to that, they found that a very curious state of things was disclosed. They found that out of 278 corps that sent in the Returns, only 38 of these corps kept their total expenses within the amount of the Capitation Grant; while 240 exceeded the grant. But then a close examination of the figures in the Returns showed that, in a great majority of instances, the excess occurred in items not properly chargeable against the public; only 83 of the corps had exceeded the Capitation Grant in items which could be properly charged against the public; and upon that ground the Committee felt themselves bound to answer the question put to them, as to whether the Capitation Grant was not sufficient for legitimate purposes, and to say that they could not recommend any addition to the Capitation Grant. My Lords, I am perfectly well aware that to a great number of people the decision of the Committee will be a very great disappointment, and I can only thank your Lordships for having allowed me to enter into the details on the matter, because I felt that it was not only your Lordships I was addressing. And I wish to convey to the general body of Volunteers, as well as the public, the fact that the Committee which has been investigating their affairs was not appointed to register a foregone conclusion; but honestly to inquire whether or not the Capitation Grant was sufficient for its purpose, and to decide upon the
  1174
  evidence alone. The War Office felt that they were not in possession of the information which would enable them to satisfactorily settle that point, and the Committee which for 11 months has been sitting inquiring into this matter, has, in the most single-minded way, been directing its attention not to support a foregone conclusion, but to form their own conclusion on evidence brought before them; and therefore, though it may be a disappointment, and probably will be a disappointment, to a large number of Volunteers, to find that the Capitation Grant is not to be increased, and that the Committee have not been able to see their way to recommend that increase—they must remember that there were on that Committee more than one officer of 20 years' Volunteer experience—men who would be much more likely to err in the direction of leniency towards the Volunteer Force than in the way of stringency in refusing the increase which was possibly expected. But though the Committee recommend no increase in the money grant, they find that in practice the Capitation Grant will not be sufficient to keep up a corps, unless great economy is practised in the administration of the various corps. That economy must be attempted in clothing, in head-quarters, in rifle-ranges, and in various other matters. In respect to the matters of clothing and rifle ranges, the real panacea for existing evils, and the real way to reduce the expense and thus help in the due administration of the Capitation Grant with economy, is, I believe, consolidation. There were one or two items of expense—I think there were three items—which the Committee were of opinion could not be well borne out of the present Capitation Grant. But the Committee thought it would be better, as these items were necessary to keep up increased efficiency—to give a separate allowance for those items on condition of increased efficiency on the part of the Volunteers, rather than to add the money on to the Capitation Grant. One of these items was in the matter of camps. The Committee were of opinion—founded on evidence brought before them—the Committee arrived at the opinion that a week in camp was equal to nearly the drill of a year in forming the Volunteers. The men in camp are associated in considerable numbers; they

  1175
  are subjected during a period of some days to military regulation; they are under what practically amounts to military law; in fact, they perform all the duties of soldiers in camp, and learn to do soldiers' work. They are on the spot, and are available for drill at any time, and there is a sort of military atmosphere about the whole proceeding which is extremely essential to their military well-being; and, therefore, taking all these matters into consideration, the Committee are of opinion that if any additional amount was to be given to the Volunteers it ought to be given in the way of encouraging camps among them. The Committee have therefore recommended that view to the Government—subject, of course, to what may be done in the matter in "another place" when the Estimates are presented; and I think I may say that my right hon. and gallant Friend the Secretary of State for War is prepared to recommend the adoptino of the proposal of the Committee in that respect. The proposal is that for every man going into camp 2s. a-day shall be allowed, besides certain small travelling allowances. What the aggregate cost of this proposal will be it is impossible to tell until it actually comes into operation; for we cannot tell how many men will take advantage of the concession, and of what size and what number the camps will be. It is, however, a very substantial addition to the present allowance of the Volunteers in camp; and I have reason to believe, by the experience we have gained in the sittings of the Committee, that it will be a very satisfactory one to the Volunteers themselves. There were two other items—namely, "bands" and "interest on loans." With regard to the first subject, we thought it impossible directly to sanction bands, which are not recognized in any of the other Auxiliary Forces. But it is proposed to excuse bandsmen from musketry drill, which I believe will give considerable facility to the formation of bands. With regard to the interest on loans, under the new arrangement by which the uniform will be paid for out of the Capitation Grant, it is anticipated that the necessity for borrowing money for clothes will disappear, and consequently the "interest on loans" will disappear with it. I will not weary your Lordships by recapitulating all the recommendations of the Committee
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  there were several other points which were inquired into—one was the condition of the old adjutants—that is, officers appointed previous to the new system, under which Volunteer adjutants are officers on full pay of the Army. These officers had a grievance, and those grievances were fully inquired into and investigated. I will not detain your Lordships with further detail; all further information will be found in the Papers which are laid on the Table of your Lordships' House. There was one point in regard to the medical officers, and the formation of a new medical department, on which the Committee have made certain recommendations. I will conclude by saying that it is only right that the Committee should bear their willing testimony to the general sound and efficient condition in which they found the Volunteers. It is a Force which has increased from year to year, and has always answered cheerfully every call made upon it. Some of the proposals of the Committee involve an expenditure of public money; and therefore, of course, these proposals will have to be discussed in "another place" before they can be looked upon as finally agreed to. In conclusion, I wish to remark that the recommendations of this Committee have been approved in principle by my right hon. and gallant Friend the Secretary of State for War, who, however, wishes to reserve to himself, as regards the details, a wide liberty of action if it should be necessary to exercise it. Within the limits I have mentioned he has generally approved of the principle of the recommendations of the Committee. I have now only to apologize to your Lordships for having detained you so long, and to thank you for the patient and courteous hearing which you have given me.
  VISCOUNT CARDWELLsaid, he had listened with great pleasure to the greater part of the statement just made by the noble Viscount, and during almost the whole of it he thought he could agree with everything that had been said. In his concluding remarks, however, the House was told by the noble Viscount that the Secretary of State reserved to himself perfect latitude in regard both to principles and details; and, if that were the case, he did not understand what had been the use or advantage of making the statement at all. He

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  did not see that their Lordships had much to thank the Government for; for all the questions that had been glanced at were questions exclusively for the other House of Parliament, which alone had jurisdiction in matters of finance. He understood, however, that, in so far as they had any power, their opinions would be asked. He would assume that the Committee had very carefully considered the question—that their recommendations would be communicated to their Lordships, and the grounds on which they were made; and, assuming that the opinions of their Lordships were to have some force, he was happy to agree with almost everything that the Committee appeared to have approved. As regarded the Force itself, he was happy to say that, in proportion as the Volunteers had had demands made upon them, they had most cheerfully responded. He had said more than once, in "another place," that when Englishmen undertook a duty they wished it to be a reality; that the Volunteers did not want to play at soldiers; and that to make their service substantial would be, not to diminish the inducement, but to increase it. They were a growing Force, and one of which the country had reason to be proud. He rejoiced extremely that the noble Viscount was proceeding on the lines of the localization system which he found before him. He did not think that a limit should be fixed to the Establishment of the Volunteers. What would have happened if they had placed a limit to the number of of the Force 20 years ago? It was still a growing institution, and it would be wise not to place a limit. He could not avoid referring to the death of General Peel, of which they had just heard, of which he might, in some sense, be considered the originator. Twenty years ago, General Peel wrote to the bench of magistrates, of which he (Viscount Cardwell) was a member, asking their support in the first formation of Volunteers. Who could have imagined, 20 years ago, that from the beginning, then so small, they would have seen in the first 20 years the present noble Force? He regretted General Peel had not lived to hear the approval given by Her Majesty's Government to the continuance of the Force. So far as he had collected from the statement of the
  1178
  noble Viscount what the Report was, he agreed with all the other recommendations of it; and he trusted that whoever might live another 20 years would see as favourable a result from their proposals as they now saw from those adopted 20 years ago from the Circular of General Peel.
  EARL COWPERquite concurred with the noble Viscount that it would be a mistake to fix a limit to the numbers of the Volunteers. They had gone on steadily increasing, and it would be a damper now to tell the Force that no more of it was wanted—for that would be the practical effect of the recommendation. He regretted that it was decided the Volunteers should go into scarlet. They had worn gray for 20 years, and had become attached to it; and, at the same time, it should be remembered that the Regulars might not be well pleased to see the Volunteers presenting themselves in the professional colours of regularly trained soldiers. Moreover, there were many men who looked very well in gray who would not look well set up in scarlet. He was of opinion it would be better to proceed cautiously in the consolidation of administrative battalions. Some of them were composed of companies very far apart, and the internal arrangements, particularly the finances, were better managed by the captain on the spot than by the colonel at a distance. He was sorry to hear there was to be no increase in the grant, as officers at present had to be chosen for their pecuniary rather than for their military qualifications; but he was pleased that the position of Volunteers as a part of the defensive Force of the country was now regularly recognized, not only by the public, but by the Government.
  LORD TRUROsaid, there were several points in the Report of the Committee which had been referred to that did not give anything like universal satisfaction to the friends of the Volunteer Force. One of those was the question of uniforms. Again, he thought the recommendation of the Committee on the subject of drills was not satisfactory. He thought many would be deterred from joining the Force if they were compelled to undergo 30 drills in two successive years; for it would be too great an interruption to their regular occupations. From all that he had

  1179
  heard from the noble Viscount that evening, he could come to no other conclusion than that the recommendations made would not, on the whole, be advantageous to the numerical force or to the military efficiency of the Volunteer Force.
  VISCOUNT BURYreplied briefly, and, in so doing, reminded the House that he had brought the matter forward in an unofficial manner, believing that that would be the best mode of bringing the subject under the public attention.
  EARL GRANVILLEpointed out, as a matter of procedure, that the noble Viscount who had just addressed the House had made two speeches based on a Paper not yet before their Lordships; while, earlier in the evening, the noble Marquess the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had deprecated any discussion upon another matter until Papers were laid before their Lordships. He thought the old Rules had better be adhered to.

SOUTH AFRICA—THE ZULU WAR— THE REINFORCEMENTS.

  QUESTION. OBSEBVATIONS.
  LORD TRUROrose to ask Her Majesty's Government, Whether application was at any time made by the Civil or Military Authorities at the Cape of Good Hope for additional military forces; and, if so, on what date it was received; whether the same was entertained; and, if so, the date on which the reinforcements were despatched; also the number and description of the forces applied for, the strength of each battery and regiment when embarked, and the number of volunteers taken to complete their complement respectively? The noble Lord said, he trusted the Question would not be considered premature, seeing that at present they had received no details of the disastrous affair, the announcement of which had been communicated to them, or to the various steps which had been taken by the Government. He had put the Question on the Paper with a view of obtaining information which would satisfy the public mind whether the steps taken by the Government antecedent to the present crisis were sufficient, or whether, on the other hand, there had been any omission
  1180
  which would in any way render the Government responsible for what had happened. He desired, also, that the public might have the means of judging whether the steps which had been taken were taken in such a manner as to be effective and in consonance with the soundest judgment which had been given them. A part of the Correspondence relating to the subject of his Question had already been referred to. That Correspondence showed that no less than three applications were made to the Imperial Government at various times for assistance in the shape of officers, troops, and regiments. He knew it was stated that the Papers would be laid on the Table of the House on Saturday or Monday—they would show, beyond doubt, that the requests made by Sir Bartle Frere and Lord Chelmsford had not been fully complied with—but what was the real position of things with regard to their applications? The first application was made at the desire of Lord Chelmsford through Sir Bartle Frere. It was an application for two special classes of officers, for two regiments of infantry and one of cavalry. ["No!"] The words of the despatch were that the presence of "one regiment of cavalry would be of enormous importance." At first there was a distinct refusal to give any additional support whatever, with the exception of certain officers. He could not see the advantage of sending those officers to drill Native troops, seeing how impossible it was to train them to order within a short space of time, and he looked on their services in that respect as valueless. Then, after having refused all those troops, the Government subsequently, upon a third application, sent two regiments of infantry.
  THE EARL OF LONGFORDsaid, he had to apologize for interrupting the noble Lord; but he wished to know whether he was asking his Question or answering it?
  LORD TRUROsaid, he was making some observations with a view to elicit a reply to his Questions from the noble Earl the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies, who, speaking last night, appeared to be under some misconception. His (Lord Truro's) desire was to show that the first intention and policy of the Government was that there should be no attack made on Zululand. They

  1181
  fused, in the first instance, to give any assistance to the Colony of Natal; but they subsequently complied, and gave two regiments for its protection. But what had they done now? Although they gave a limited amount of troops as compared with the number demanded for the purpose of defending Natal, they changed their policy and waged war against the Zulus, and that without waiting for additional reinforcements. It was said by the noble Earl that they had now sent a more than ample force, probably excessive reinforcements; but that they did after the disaster had occurred—in the first instance, they refused to send any troops whatever. As to the regiments going out, their Lordships knew the condition in which regiments were sometimes sent, and that to make up their full strength they were obliged to have 200 or 300 volunteers from other regiments; who, therefore, would have to fight under officers to whom they were not accustomed. They were, therefore, inefficient for immediate active service, however excellent as soldiers the volunteers might be, as they ought to be known by their officers, and know and have reliance in their officers. He hoped that the noble Earl would give their Lordships some information as to the calibre of the guns which had been and were about to be sent out to South Africa. For his part, he could not help thinking that the public mind would not be satisfied that it was not until repeated applications had been made and pressure had been put upon the Government by able, prudent, and cautious men, that they complied with the demand for reinforcements, and then sent fewer than had been demanded, and that at a time of great emergency, and when there was a possibility of the dire calamity happening which had since taken place.
  EARL CADOGANsaid, that the noble Lord (Lord Truro), in putting and answering his Questions, had endeavoured to draw him into a discussion on the general merits of the war which was now raging in South Africa. He most respectfully declined to be drawn into any such discussion. He would do his best to answer the noble Lord, although he could not promise that his answer would differ very much from that which he had given on the same subject last night. The noble Lord seemed to think
  1182
  that he was under a misconception with respect to the Correspondence. Well, he did not like to return the compliment; but the noble Lord had failed to show in what respect he had misconceived it. It was true that in Sir Bartle Frere's despatch, dated the 14th of September, stating that General Thesiger thought two regiments of infantry "necessary," he added that one regiment of cavalry would be of "enormous advantage;" but in a despatch written on the same day by General Thesiger—namely, the 14th of September—and which was not included in the Blue Book, being a despatch to the War Office, which would be in their Lordships' hands immediately, the General detailed the forces he would require, and requested that two regiments of infantry might be sent; but he made no mention of cavalry. It was true that the Government did not at first see fit to send out the reinforcements, but did send the special officers demanded. A further request was made in a Memorandum written by Lord Chelmsford, and dated the 28th of September, which concluded by stating that—
  "For offensive purposes alone the Natal and Transvaal Colonies require three battalions of infantry in addition to the forces we have already got,"
  and he added that a battalion of the 24th Regiment was already available, and requested that the remaining two should be sent from England. No request was then made for a regiment of cavalry, and the two regiments of infantry were sent out. The noble Lord asked the date at which they were despatched. He was sorry he did not know the exact date, but he thought they were sent the first week in December. The Papers, however, to be furnished by the War Office would answer the noble Lord's Question. With regard to the last part of the Question, he had only to state that if the noble Lord moved for a Return of the nature of one which had already been moved for on the same subject in "another place," there would be no objection to its being granted.
  LORD TRURO, referring to the question of reinforcements, said, he should have thought that the desire for a cavalry regiment so distinctly and energetically expressed by Sir Bartle Frere in one of his earlier communications

  1183
  would have been sufficient to have induced the Government to have supplied the want without hesitation.

THE MINISTERIAL STATEMENT.

  PERSONAL EXPLANATION.
  EARL CADOGANproceeded to say that he wished, on behalf of his right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for the Colonies, to make a statement of a personal character. The noble Earl opposite (Earl Granville), in his speech last night, was said—and in his (Earl Cadogan's) recollection correctly—to have attributed to the Secretary of State for the Colonies a statement that the policy of the Government was "annexation in all parts of the world." His right hon. Friend had requested him to state to their Lordships that he must repudiate altogether the use of the words attributed to him. Everyone who knew the noble Earl must be aware that he would not willingly impute to another language he had not used; but as his right hon. Friend had no power of addressing their Lordships, he had requested him to say that he did not know from what report the noble Earl had quoted, but that he certainly did not use the words ascribed to him, and he was confident that those he did use could not have conveyed such a meaning to the audience he addressed.
  EARL GRANVLLLEsaid, he was extremely sorry if he had misquoted the right hon. Baronet. He had not brought down the report from which he had quoted, because he was not aware that the subject was going to be brought up. He had. been struck by a passage in which, adopting a sentence which was not quite new, after talking of the competition to which this country was subject in Europe and America, he was reported to have said—"We have been subject to competition in Europe and America—cannot we then call in a new Continent to redress the balance of the old." Whether this applied to the annexation of Zululand he could not say. He further was reported to have said, referring to what he called the bold and necessary step of annexation in South Africa taken by Lord Carnarvon, that he regretted that Lord Carnarvon did not join in the same policy in other parts of the globe. As, however, the right hon. Gentleman disavowed the language
  1184
  thus imputed to him, he entirely accepted the disavowal.

THE PLAGUE IN RUSSIA—SANITARY PRECAUTIONS.

  QUESTION. MOTION FOR A PAPER.
  THE EARL OF CARNARVONasked Her Majesty's Government, What measures they have taken, either separately or in conjunction with other Governments, to ascertain the nature and most effective treatment of the pestilence now raging in parts of Russia? and to move for copies of any sanitary regulations issued as regards English ports and of quarantine regulations in force in Malta and Gibraltar. The importance of the subject could hardly be over-estimated, for although there was some uncertainty as to the nature and the best mode of treating the disease, there could be no doubt that it was of a contagious and deadly character, bearing a strong resemblance, in the majority of its external symptoms, to the worst class of Asiatic plague that had raged in former years. Perhaps there was no one of their Lordships who was more entitled than himself to call attention to this matter, because he had not only seen Asiatic plague raging, but had himself suffered from it so severely that, although the attack occurred many years ago, he still entertained a lively impression of its horrors and danger. Most of the Governments of Eastern Europe had already adopted precautionary measures against the introduction of the plague within their borders; and he thought it desirable to ascertain what steps Her Majesty's Government, for their part, had taken in regard to it. He would specially ask the noble Duke what measures had been taken by the authorities at Malta and Gibraltar. He was glad to see that the College of Physicians had already moved in the matter. So far as the existing evidence went, there was reason to believe that the most effective means of preventing the importation of the disease was quarantine; and although perfectly aware of the great inconvenience of this remedy, he trusted that, in view of the terrible interests at stake, no merely theoretical objection to it would be allowed to prevail.
  THE DUKE OF RICHMOND and GORDON: In reply to the last part of the Question, I can assure the noble

  1185
  Earl that the subject of the plague has occupied the very serious and earnest attention of Her Majesty's Government, and they are already taking such measures as have seemed to them advisable in dealing with the plague, with the view of preventing its reaching this country. Germany and Austria, if I am not mistaken, have already received permission from the Russian Government each to send a competent physician to assist in an inquiry as to the origin of the plague and the best means of treating and dealing with it when it arises. Her Majesty's Government have also made a proposal to the Russian Government to be allowed to send a physician to take part in the same inquiry; and I have been in communication with the College of Physicians, and have requested that they would be good enough to recommend to Her Majesty's Government some gentleman whom they would think to be a fit and proper person to take part in such an inquiry, provided always that we receive the permission of the Russian Government to do so. I have also instructed the officers of Customs to inspect very narrowly the bills of health of all passengers and crews of ships coming from the Black Sea and the Sea of Azof; and I have been in communication with the medical advisers of the Government, requesting them to point out what goods they consider most calculated to carry infection. I have also been in communication with the quarantine officer of the Privy Council, a very eminent gentleman, and I have asked him whether anything can be suggested in the mode of disinfection employed that may be advantageously used, should, unhappily, this dreadful scourge visit this country, which I do not myself anticipate. I will read an extract from a letter I have received from Dr. Wiblin, the resident Medical Superintendent of Quarantine at Southampton. He says—
  "With reference to your inquiries on the subject of disinfection, I can very safely and satisfactorily inform you, after a very long experience, that every possible security from infection of persons and goods may be relied upon by the free employment of nitrous acid fumes, produced by pouring fuming nitric acid upon copper filings. This is very easily done, and the results are most satisfactory. No living atom or molecule or man himself can exist in these fumes for more than a few seconds, as Dr. Seaton can testify from his personal experience at the Motherbank."
  1186
  Whether that is satisfactory or not, it shows the strength of this disinfectant. He continues—
  "Any given number of plates or other convenient vessels are arranged with given quantities of copper filings, and then the acid is poured into the plates. The portholes and other openings are then closed for 12 hours or longer, and the goods subsequently exposed to the purifying influence of the atmosphere for days."
  So far as this disinfectant goes, I think my noble Friend will admit we have sufficient practical knowledge of what can be done in case the necessity should arise. I have also put myself in communication with the College of Physicians upon this subject; and I have had an interview with the eminent President of that body, Dr. Bennett, who informed me that the College are to hold a meeting upon this subject, and promised to communicate to mo the result of the discussion, and any suggestion which might occur to him or his colleagues after they had gone thoroughly into the matter. As regards the regulations on the subject, I feel that under the quarantine laws we have ample power to take any measures that may be necessary should the plague reach this country; and we are prepared to act at a moment's notice. I have instructed the Customs to detain any vessel from any part of the world if there are any suspicious circumstances connected with that vessel when it reaches this country, and that they are at once to telegraph to the Privy Council Office, when I shall take the requisite means for dealing with it. At the Motherbank there is an ample quarantine establishment of three vessels; and upon an emergency we could easily obtain, in different parts of the country, other vessels for the purpose of separating healthy passengers from those who may be sick, and preventing communication with persons on shore. It has not been thought advisable to keep up permanently a very large establishment of quarantine vessels. That would, of course, be very expensive, and it would be a useless expenditure of publi money if we thought, as we do, that we had the means of acquiring these vessels at any time, should the plague visit this country. I am informed by the Colonial Office that Gibraltar has not reported having imposed any quarantine against the plague. Malta has provisionally, and subject to rectification, imposed

  1187
  quarantine of 20 days on arrivals from Greece, Montenegro, the Turkish Empire, including Egypt (except ships passing through the Suez Canal), Tripoli, Tunis, Black Sea, and Sea of Azof—which, in case of ships of war, is reduced to nine days. The propriety of ratifying these arrangements is being considered by the Colonial Office, Admiralty, and Board of Trade. Malta has imposed this quarantine because Italy has taken a similar course, and would have imposed quarantine on arrivals from Malta if the Island had not taken this course. With regard to the regulations issued, and which my noble Friend proposes to move for, I hope he will be satisfied with having elicited this answer from me. The regulations are numerous and bulky, and it would not be convenient for any purpose that they should be laid on the Table. I can assure him that the matter has had the very earnest attention of the Government, and will not be lost sight of, though we have no ground for believing that there need be any alarm or apprehension of the arrival of the plague in this country.
  THE EARL OF CARNARVONsaid, he was satisfied with the answer of the noble Duke, and would not move for Papers.

INTEMPERANCE.

  MOTION FOR A SELECT COMMITTEE.
  Moved that a Select Committee he appointed for the purpose of inquiring into the prevalence of habits of intemperance, and into the manner in which those habits have been affected by recent legislation and other causes.—(The Lord Aberdare.)
  Motion agreed to.
  The Lords following were named of the Committee:—

  L. Abp. Canterbury.

  V. Gordon.

  L. Abp. York.

  V. Hutchinson.

  D. Westminster.

  L. Bp. Peterborough.

  E. Belmore.

  L. Bp. Exeter.

  E. Onslow.

  L. Bp. Carlisle.

  E. Minto.

  L. Hartismere.

  E. Morley.

  L. Penrhyn.

  E. Dudley.

  L. Aberdare.

  E. Kimberley.

  L. Cottesloe.

  The Committee to meet on Tuesday the 25 th of February, at Twelve o'clock, and to appoint their own Chairman.
  House adjourned at half past Seven o'clock, to Monday next, a quarter before Five o'clock.