Lords Sitting of 13 February 1879

MINUTES.
PUBLIC BILL—First Reading— Cathedral Statutes* (4).
HER ROYAL HIGHNESS THE GRAND DUCHESS OF HESSE (PRINCESS ALICE).

  HER MAJESTY'S ANSWER TO THE ADDRESS OF CONDOLENCE (DECEMBER 17).
  THE LORD STEWARD OF THE HOUSEHOLD (the Earl BEAUCHAMP)reported Her Majesty's Answer to the Address of the 17th December last, as follows:—
  MY LORDS,
  I THANK you sincerely for your loyal and dutiful Address, and for your expression of Sympathy and Condolence with me on the loss of my beloved Daughter.
  The assurance of your interest in all that concerns my domestic relations and your wishes for the happiness of myself and my family have given mo much satisfaction.

BUSINESS OF PARLIAMENT.

  MINISTERIAL STATEMENT.
  THE EARL OF BEACONSFIELD: My Lords, the circumstances under which Parliament was called together, at the end of last year, rendered it impossible that your Lordships' attention should be directed, in the Speech from the Throne, to any other subject than that which was the occasion of our having been so unexpectedly assembled. It would not have been prudent—I may say it would not have been possible—at that period to have indicated the measures which Her Majesty's Government might have thought it their duty to introduce to the consideration of Parliament. Nevertheless, everyone must feel the inconvenience that would follow from the omission of that Constitutional custom which makes it the duty of the Government, at the commencement of the Session, to communicate generally to the two Houses the character of the measures which they are about to introduce, and the general course of Business. I have therefore
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  thought, on the part of Her Majesty's Government, that it would be desirable that I should, upon this occasion, take the opportunity of indicating the measures which, under ordinary circumstances, would have been recommended to your notice in the Speech from the Throne at the opening of the present Session. But, my Lords, before doing so, it may not be considered intrusive if I make a few remarks on the general situation of affairs. At this moment, the thoughts and feelings of the country are engrossed by the terrible news just received from South Africa. My Lords, it is not wise either to depreciate the importance of such an event or to exaggerate it. It is a military disaster—a terrible military disaster—but I think we may say it is no more. It is not a military defeat arising from the failing energies or resources of the country. It is from accidental and, at this moment, not clearly understood circumstances that the calamity has arisen. I have no information to give your Lordships which is not in your possession by the usual means of intelligence; and it would, I think, be desirable that no one should hazard an opinion as to the causes of the disaster until we receive those official and authentic accounts which are, of course, now on their way. Nothing, indeed, at this moment, is certain respecting this sad occurrence except the valour of our troops. They have shown, in this difficulty—as they have ever shown—the utmost devotion and bravery. Those who have fallen will be remembered, and will be mourned; but we must not forget the exhibition of heroic valour by those who have been spared. At this moment, I am sure, the recollection of those 80 men, who, for 12 hours in a forlorn hope, kept at bay 4,000 of the enemy, and ultimately repulsed them, will prove that the stamina and valour of the English soldiery have not diminished. All I will now say, on the part of the Government, is that we shall avail ourselves of every possible means to place before your Lordships all the information that reaches us. My noble Friend the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies has given Notice that in a few days—I am in hopes on Saturday next, but certainly on Monday—you will have the Papers which will complete the history of these events. I can fur-

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  ther assure your Lordships that we are taking measures, in conjunction with those who are intrusted with these matters, to put our troops and the Colony in a position of security. The reinforcements which we are sending to the Cape are in numbers much beyond what have been applied for by the General in command; and I think we may expect to see that affairs in South Africa assume a very different aspect from that which they bear at present. My Lords, had it not been for this melancholy incident, the slight allusion which, in deference to your Lordships, I should have had to make in my statement to-day to the state of our foreign relations would, I think, by all candid minds, have been considered satisfactory. The progress in the accomplishment of the provisions of the Berlin Treaty—which all of us, whatever may be our general opinions—must wish to be the foundation of an enduring peace in Europe, has been regular, certain, and considerable. The great majority of the provisions of that Treaty have now been carried into effect. By the Supplemental Convention which was signed between the Porte and the Emperor of Russia very recently, the last traces of the Treaty of San Stefano have been abolished; and I believe I may say that at this moment the Russian Army has commenced its retrograde movement, which will result in the complete evacuation of the Dominions of the Sultan. The provision which had been made for the exchange of territories in Asia between the belligerents has already been fully accomplished. The arrangement with regard to the boundary of Montenegro—a most difficult part of the settlement—has been carried into complete effect, and Podgoritza and Strailetz have been relinquished without bloodshed and without those incidents of horror as were anticipated by some. Again, the occupation of Bosnia has been accomplished, and tranquillity reigns in that Province. The tranquillity of Crete is complete, and I have reason to hope, and indeed to believe, that the institutions established in that island obtain the confidence of persons of all classes and creeds. The negotiations for the rectification of the boundaries of Greece have already commenced, in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty of Berlin. With regard to other diplomatic incidents
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  which are, in a certain degree, connected with the Treaty of Berlin—or at least with the general settlement then devised—I think there has been some rather harsh measure dealt out to the Sultan in the insinuations—which have been rather profuse—against his sincerity or ability to carry into effect those reforms in his Asiatic Dominions upon which the prosperity of his Kingdom and his own power mainly depend. We should not forget that the Sultan has had the most difficult task in the world engaging his energies at the moment when he was called upon or expected to exercise those energies on other points. He has had to free his dominions from a conquering and invading host, and that has naturally absorbed his energies and his resources. It must not be forgotten that during all this period the Sultan has had to maintain an army of 300,000 disciplined men with an exhausted Treasury. But, notwithstanding these circumstances, the communications and arrangements that have taken place between Her Majesty's Government and the Porte have been of a satisfactory character; and I have learnt to-day that the Imperial Commission which was instituted by the Sultan himself to consider and report on the changes which should be made in the government of the various Provinces of his Dominions, has drawn up its Report and sent it in to the General Council of State. During this period, there has been more than one instance in which the Sultan has shown his anxiety to act in the spirit of those principles of reform which he had proclaimed—such as the nomination of Midhat Pacha for a period of five years to the government of Syria—this being an indication of the policy to be pursued throughout the various Provinces of the Turkish Empire. My Lords, I have little to say beyond what I have already said respecting the Island of Cyprus. Last year I made a statement on what I considered the highest authority—that of the Admiral commanding in those waters, and of the distinguished soldier now in command of the Island, and the personal experience of some of my Colleagues. I wish to enter into no controversy on the subject. Time brings truth, and I believe the opinion of the country at the present moment has been enlightened generally on the subject. There are, however, two points which I think it my duty

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  to place before the House in connection with the subject of Cyprus. First of all, it will be satisfactory for your Lordships to learn that the question respecting the public domains, which, when the Convention was first entered into, was necessarily unsettled, has now been settled entirely to the satisfaction of Her Majesty's Government; and the whole of those domains—with the exception, of course, of the private estates of the Sultan—have been placed in their hands. The other point which I hope will be considered not less satisfactory is the one of revenue. Those who anticipated that in undertaking the responsibility of occupying Cyprus for great political objects we were entailing a vast burden on this country will learn with satisfaction that the revenue of Cyprus, even in the first year, will have not only paid the whole of the expenses of its government, but will leave no inconsiderable surplus. There is every prospect that the surplus, not only in this year but in subsequent years, will furnish the means by which those public works may be carried out which are necessary to secure the prosperity of what I must look upon as a very valuable acquisition. My Lords, in giving your Lordships this slight sketch of what has occurred in the Levant, I cannot resist the temptation to call your Lordships' attention to the great services of Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople. My Lords, that gentleman belongs to a different political connection from myself; and therefore I speak with the sincerity of one who wishes to do justice to the eminent services of one who has been, and may be again, my political opponent. I do not know any man in whom there has been a rarer or more complete combination of two great qualities—energy and patience—than in Sir Henry Layard. He is a man of great resource, and I venture to call the attention of your Lordships to him on this occasion, because I know that his health has broken down under his great exertions and sacrifices, and he must—I hope only for a time—leave the scene of his exertions and efforts. My Lords, I wish I could at this moment give you an authoritative intimation that from our experience as a Government we hope and believe that the commercial depression of this country has materially abated. Still, I
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  venture to say that I think there are some indications of improvement, and that we have seen the worst of a depression scarcely equalled for the period of its duration. I am unwilling to express myself in any phrase which might mislead; but there is one point connected with this matter upon which I may speak with confidence. I wish to express my admiration of the sincere and spontaneous spirit of benevolence which has animated the country generally in encountering this great distress. The resources of this country, both moral and material, have been employed in a surpassing manner with reference to this calamity. My Lords, it becomes me now to call your attention to those measures which it is our intention to submit for your consideration. But, my Lords, before I touch upon that point, there is one subject to which I have omitted to call your attention in what I have already said. I refer to the state of affairs in Afghanistan. Her Majesty's Government have the satisfaction of feeling that the object of their interference in that country has been completely accomplished. We are now in possession of the three great highways which connect Afghanistan with India, and I hope that this country will remain in possession of those three great highways. We have secured the object for which the expedition was undertaken; we have secured that Frontier which will, I hope and believe, render our Indian Empire invulnerable; and we have attained that object in a manner which will trench as little as possible upon the independence and self-government of Afghanistan. My Lords, I will now mention those measures which we shall ask you to consider during the course of the present Session. The first measure, which will be introduced in the other House of Parliament, will be the Mutiny Bill. Your Lordships are well aware that for many years the old Mutiny Bill has been the subject of severe, and, in my opinion, in some respects too, not unjust criticism. Some clauses are obsolete; they are not adapted to the period in which we live. The subject has been now well considered, and it is our intention to introduce a complete measure, which, while preserving the Constitutional control of Parliament over the Army, will be in its nature of the character of a Military

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  Code. The Bill as drawn will be in harmony with the recommendations of Parliamentary Committees, and with the views of those who have deeply studied the subject. The next measure we shall ask Parliament to consider will be a code of a different character—the Consolidation of the Criminal Law. A Bill will be brought in which will deal completely with that subject, and which has, in fact, been drawn up by a Commission of Her Majesty's Judges; and although neither this nor the other House of Parliament will for a moment lose their power of amending or criticizing its composition, still it will be a source of confidence and satisfaction to them to know by what means the Bill has been drawn up, and that there is no statement, or arrangement, or condition, or proviso contained in it, which has not been the result of the deep thought and consideration of the most learned authorities in the land. The next subject which we shall wish to have the opinion of Parliament upon, and which may probably be introduced first in this House, is one that deeply interests, at the present moment, the people of this country—that is, the Law of Bankruptcy. A measure will be brought in which will, I trust, be more successful than previous measures of the kind; it has had the greatest pains taken in its preparation, and I believe it is one which will meet the pressing requirements of the country. There will also be a Bill for amending the law as to Summary Jurisdiction. Your Lordships are aware that the Railway Commission expires this year, and therefore you will not be surprised that it is necessary to introduce a Bill on that subject. Then there is a Bill for establishing County Boards in England; and, at the same time, one to reform and amend the Grand Jury Laws of Ireland. There will be a Valuation Bill also introduced, and a Poor Law Amendment Bill for Scotland. My Lords, on the next occasion when Her Majesty shall be graciously pleased to address this House, either in person or by Her Commissioners, I shall be happy indeed if I can feel that all those Bills have, been passed into law. I may say, my Lords, that these measures do not by any means include all the questions with which Her Majesty's Government are ready to deal, and in fact are, if necessary and opportunity is offered to
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  them, prepared to deal. But experience has shown us that it is necessary to be moderate in these matters, and your Lordships are well aware that the increased spirit of criticism in "another place" renders the passage of Bills more difficult than it formerly was. My Lords, I have now fulfilled my promise of making you acquainted, in accordance with the wholesome Constitutional custom, with the general views of Her Majesty's Government, and the general proposals which they moan to submit to you; and all I ask and hope is that with the assistance of your wisdom they may be carried into law, and may prove beneficial and useful to the country.
  EARL GRANVILLE: My Lords, I think the course taken by the noble Earl in making the statement he has just made to the House is a perfectly fair and convenient one; and I have to thank the noble Earl for his courtesy in communicating to me his intention to take that course. My Lords, at the opening of Parliament, remarking on the Queen's Speech, I said that I could, without any great inconvenience, wait until February to learn what Bills were to be introduced, and I am glad I have not agitated myself very much on the subject in the interval. Several of the Bills now announced by the noble Earl are useful, and I certainly agree with the noble Earl in the hope that they may be satisfactorily dealt with during the Session. Some of the Bills have been before this and the other House of Parliament on former occasions; but one—the County Boards Bill—is new to us, and I should be rather afraid, unless considerable alteration has been made in the Bill as presented to the House of Commons last year, that we could not see our way to pass it ourselves. There is one feature of the list which I heartily endorse—that dealing with Bankruptcy—which subject it is impossible, I think, not to deal with after the very remarkable Memorial which has lately been presented on the subject. With regard to the Railway Commission, I think the occasion is one of very considerable importance, not only to the railways, but to the community at large. But what I very much rejoice at is that there is no announcement of a Bill, and no indication of any attempt to meet a very natural, but I think a very unreasonable, wish on the part of a good many of the

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  community to introduce some panacea for the general depression to which the noble Earl has alluded. Any such measure would be in violation of those principles of political economy in which I am a sincere believer. The Secretary of State for the Colonies, indeed, has talked of "the dead bones of political economy," but perhaps it was out of deference to the feelings which unfortunately exist in some of the Colonies with which he is connected; but the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the House of Commons has taken public occasion to discourage the idea that Her Majesty's Government had any intention to yield to the temptation to meet any popular cry on this subject. The noble Earl has informed us of the general state of our external affairs, and especially of that which has occupied the attention of the public so long—the Berlin Treaty. I find myself in some difficulty in approaching that subject. There was a time when the Opposition proposed to itself the duty and privilege of criticizing the acts of the Government. There has lately been a desire to take away that liberty. If we talk of what has passed, we are begged to let bygones alone, and not to waste any time in discussing historical reminiscences. If we speculate on the future we subject ourselves to ridicule, not altogether undeserved. But if we wish to speak of the present, we frequently find that it is concealed from us; and if we complain of concealment, we are immediately accused of using personal language. As to the virulence of abuse with which we are charged by Her Majesty's Government, it does not appear to me to vary very much from language which I have heard ever since I have been in public life. I think that even in this august House I have heard Lord Lyndhurst, the late Lord Derby, and Lord Ellenborough attack a Liberal Government with a great deal of energy and power. I am not quite sure I have not heard even some of my noble Friends opposite speak of the late Government in a manner not absolutely overflowing with the milk of human kindness. One Member of Her Majesty's Government has thought fit in the last few weeks—I might say in the last few days—to describe us as an ambitious, unscrupulous, and unpatriotic Opposition. There is one subject to which I
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  must refer connected with the Eastern Question. It is the rejection of the Berlin Memorandum. I read in the newspapers that on Tuesday the First Lord of the Admiralty introduced the subject into his speech at Westminster, and is reported to have said that the course pursued by Her Majesty's Government in respect to the Berlin Memorandum was
  "not questioned by the Leader of the Liberal Party in the House of Commons, but was deliberately approved of by Lord Granville himself in the House of Lords."
  I think this hardly represents the course I took in regard to the Berlin Memorandum, and I will refer your Lordships to Hansard for what I really did say. Your Lordships will find that on the 31st July, 1876, I am reported thus—
  "I stated in the House a month ago that I could give no opinion till I had seen the document. After reading that paper, I agree that it would not have been wise to accede to that document. … As to the substance, I think that, as a whole, it was not acceptable; but, as sometimes is the case, the reasons given for objecting to everything in it do not appear to me sound, and in no case do I think it was wise to drop the matter so completely. … I cannot say that the war has broken out in consequence of the refusal of the Berlin proposals, unaccompanied by any suggestion from Her Majesty's Government for any other policy. But, on the other hand, it is impossible for them to deny that this may be the case."—[3 Hansard, ccxxxi. 89–90.]
  I find from the Papers that the objections I then made to the rejection of the Berlin Memorandum, without proposing any suggestions of our own, were exactly those which the French Government so forcibly urged. I have done with that subject, but I have thought it of sufficient importance to correct an unintentional mistake of the First Lord of the Admiralty. Well, but I find it has been very often said that we on this side of the House could have but little title to criticize the policy of the Government on the Eastern Question; because, as Mr. Smith said on the same occasion, we had no policy at all, or, if we had a policy, it was that of letting matters drift, or of joining hands with Russia and fighting Turkey. That is not an accurate statement of the case; for I find that in February, 1877, I expressed my fear that the Emperor of Russia, strengthened by the part we had taken in the Conference, might act upon his declaration at Moscow, and go to war.

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  I said, that I, for one, should deeply deplore it—such a thing would be pregnant with inconvenience and danger. The remedy suggested—that we alone should join with Russia in the work—though it, perhaps, might a little mitigate, would go a very short way to diminish, those dangers and those inconveniences. I then quoted the principles laid down by Sir Stafford Northcote and Mr. Cross, the latter saying that the time was come when this country should refuse to be put off with paper currency; they should demand to be paid in solid coin. The Chancellor of the Exchequer said—
  "I believe it to be impossible really to secure the peace of Europe unless you take steps to improve the administration of the Provinces of Turkey. As long as you leave that door open—as long as you do nothing to remove the causes of those disturbances—any peace you may secure for the moment will be a hollow peace, no better than putting a piece of sticking-plaster upon a wound when there is festering matter beneath."
  Grounding my appeal on those words, I urged upon the Government that if they would use their influence to persuade Europe as one body to come forward and insist, as they had a moral and just right to do, that Turkey shall perform her promises, they would successfully deal with the danger which remains. [3 Hansard, ccxxxii. 30.] This might be a good or it might be a bad policy; but it was certainly not a policy of letting things drift or of joining Russia alone against Turkey; and it was a policy of which I have as much right to assert that it would have been successful as the noble Earl the Prime Minister, then the First Lord of the Treasury, had to assert, as he did last summer, that a policy of a diametrically opposite character, which, notwithstanding his great Parliamentary strength, he did not adopt, would have succeeded. And the case is still stronger as against the policy which was adopted and which failed in preventing the war. It is said that we might not have succeeded in obtaining the co-operation of Europe. But we were considered the obstacles to that co-operation; and it appears from the Blue Books that Austria herself made a proposal to that effect; that Italy was in favour of it; that France urged it; and that the German Emperor twice stated to the noble Marquess (the Marquess of Salisbury) that without it no success
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  would be obtained. It was said that such a policy might lead to war. I believe the risk to have been infinitesimal; but remember that what you said and what you did brought the country to the brink of war in Europe, and has indirectly led to war in Asia. The noble Earl has given us some information with regard to the execution of the Berlin Treaty; and he has said, with perfect truth, that it would be the desire of all of us that peace should ensue, and that a satisfactory settlement should be adopted by Europe. Then he gave us some facts, as considerable steps that had been taken with regard to the fulfilment of that Treaty. I do not deny that something has been done. When the Government take some credit to themselves for having strengthened Turkey by taking away from her Provinces not alluded to in the San Stefano Treaty, but which they say were really sources of weakness to her, I quite agree with the noble Earl that, so far as that strengthening process is concerned, the Berlin Treaty has been completely carried out. But as to the Greek Frontier question, it appears to me that it has been left very much in the hands of the French Government, and has not been sufficiently attended to by Her Majesty's Government. I think the Russians are likely to leave Turkish territory at the time appointed, but when that happens the difficulty will arise as to what is to be done in the territory South of the Balkans—the new Turkey in Europe with some 60,000 square miles and some 6,000,000 of inhabitants; and the question which I should like to have answered is whether there is likely to be a peaceable transfer of the country to the Turkish Government—whether that Government will take possession by the free-will of the Bulgarians, and if, not, whether they will do so by force?—or whether Her Majesty's Government have been engaged in any negotiations respecting a joint occupation which they themselves refused before the war, and which might have prevented it? The noble Earl incidentally alluded to the Anglo-Turkish Convention. There is one point in connection with that Convention, and that is the liability in the future, and in all circumstances, to do that which we might have done during the last war, with everything in our favour, but which we did not do

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  —namely, to defend the Asiatic Provinces of Turkey. I imagine that our liabilities remain just as they did, and therefore I come to the question of reform. I have read with interest the Correspondence on that subject which has taken place between the noble Marquess (the Marquess of Salisbury) and the Turkish Government; but the demands of the noble Marquess have been met with a non possumus. The despatch of the Turkish Minister is throughout an argument against doing what Her Majesty's Government proposed should be done; and what was the rejoinder? I expected to find a vigorous reply to the objections raised by the Porte; but, on the contrary, the noble Marquess labours to prove how wrong he was, and how right the Turk is. As the Turk did not require to be told this, it is difficult not to think that the despatch was not addressed to him, but was meant for home consumption, to convince us that the failure was not complete. As regards Cyprus, I would like to know why the Government of that Island is under the Foreign Office and not the Colonial Office. I cannot understand why this Island should not have been placed under that Department. The Colonial Office has had great experience in the civil administration of our military posts; men of remarkable ability at the head of that Department have had to deal with an infinite number of Crown Colonies; and I cannot understand why, with the machinery at its command, the Colonial Office should not take charge of Cyprus. The only reason that might be suggested for not adopting that course is that it was not really a Colony, and that, therefore, it could not be placed under the Colonial Office; but surely that is hardly a sufficient reason. I am aware that Cyprus is not a colony. I am aware that we hired Cyprus on an uncertain tenure. I know that there are questions with regard to the right of foreigners, and that other difficulties may arise; but be that as it may, you must, for a long or a short time, govern Cyprus as a Crown Colony; and I think it would have been wise if Sir Garnet Wolseley had had all the advantages of the additional knowlege of the Colonial Office to guide him in the civil administration of Cyprus. I have a little mistrust as to the information which the Government get about the Island of
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  Cyprus. It was said by the Government that, before acquiring Cyprus, they had adequate information on the subject; but a gentleman who accompanied Sir Garnet Wolseley has stated that he went out without any adequate information whatever. That statement has been published, and I am not aware that it has been contradicted. At all events, I made a very earnest appeal to the Government whether, as there was a doubt in the matter, it would not be possible to delay sending the troops to Cyprus until they had adequate information as to the healthiness of the Island. My noble Friend the Lord President of the Council (the Duke of Richmond and Gordon) answered me that the opinion of Government was that the mortality and disease was three-fifths better than in Europe, and even Italy; that the Government had received information that the climate was of a healthy character. They sent out 8,000 Indian troops, who had nothing to do except to solve this most unfortunate problem in a way which we all now more or less know. The Government have not been careful in getting information. The First Lord of the Admiralty recently read a very glowing account of Cyprus from Sir Garnet Wolseley. I have heard it said that he was the only man in the Island who held such a good opinion of it. I have the greatest respect for Sir Garnet Wolseley as a soldier, but I am not so sure of his authority as a sanitary officer. The First Lord of the Admiralty was quite triumphant because he was one week on the Island without his health entirely giving way. The Prime Minister has pledged himself that before next July there will be harbour accommodation in Cyprus sufficient for British commerce. I am not sanguine as to that pledge being fulfilled. Mr. Brassey, who has gone out and written most impartially on the subject, says there is no harbour in Cyprus, although a coaling station may be established in Famagosta. We have the official authority of the First Lord of the Admiralty that it is possible to make an excellent harbour for very little money indeed at Famagosta. Information which I have received from a professional man who has resided in the Island tends to show that it is a place of a pestilential character, and that it is a most unhealthy resort; and

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  my informant feels pretty sure that if the intention is carried out of making a coaling station there, when the Meet arrives every man of the Meet will be found to be down with fever. He says it would be more economical to create a new harbour in any other part of the Island. I am inclined the more to believe that this is the case because Sir Garnet Wolseley himself describes Famagosta as a most unhealthy part of the Island. We are, it seems, to have on the coast an harbour in a pestilential climate, and a place d'armes on the plateau of a mountain higher than the mountains of either Wales or Scotland. Let us hope that all this is to be done, as has been said, for a very small sum, and that we are not going to spend hundreds of thousands. The noble Earl asks us to wait for information. But time goes on. Some of us will not live very much longer, and, in the meantime, we should like some information. It would be satisfactory to us if the Government would present to Parliament the Report of the Committee of the Cabinet that went out to investigate the Island, the Reports of the head of the medical staff, and the medical Returns. My Lords, it is a matter of regret to me that I was not able to share in the great debate and division with regard to the Afghan War. I am not going to re-open that debate, or to refer at any length to the question again; inasmuch as after the very decisive majority which resulted on that division, it would hardly seem courteous to your Lordships to do so; but I should like to say that one thing particularly struck me—namely, that the greater part of the debate seemed to turn on the want of foresight of previous Governments of India. Now, it seems to me that when the noble Earl the last Governor General (the Earl of Northbrook) received from the Government at home instructions to carry out a new policy, he informed the Government that the adoption of this new policy would very much alter our relations with the Afghan Government; that the Ameer was perfectly sure to see through any sham pretext; and spoke of the probability of throwing him into the arms of Russia. I do not see any want of foresight there. The facts we now know—that our relations would be altered and probably a war ensue—are as predicted by the noble Earl. Then
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  it has been said that the predictions of the Opposition in regard to the British Army in Afghanistan have not been carried out, and that in the place of disaster and defeat we have victory; but it has never been alleged that if properly handled and commanded our troops could not go through Afghanistan, but the contrary has been maintained, not only by General Durand 20 years ago, but by Lord Lawrence, in the first letter he wrote this autumn, by Lord Grey still more strongly, and also by Lord Northbrook. The result has shown, indeed, that our brave troops have earned the distinction which attaches to them in a remarkable degree; and if there has not been so much fighting as they might have wished, there has still been ample opportunity for the display of the utmost valour and skill. The noble Earl said our scientific Frontier was assured. But the question is what we are to do now, when our difficulties are really beginning? I hope he adheres to his assurance that this can be done with a diminution instead of an increase of troops required on the Frontier. He said our object was to have an independent and friendly Afghanistan.
  VISCOUNT HALIFAX: Friendly and strong.
  EARL GRANVILLE: Well, that is a point on which I wish to know something. Does this not entirely destroy the strength and friendliness of Afghanistan?
  THE EAEL OF BEACONSFIELD: Perhaps the noble Earl will allow me to give the correct words. I never used the word "strength," or the epithets "strong" and "friendly." I said that I trusted our arrangement would be consistent with an independent and self-governing Afghanistan.
  EARL GRANVILLE: But will it be so? Have we not produced anarchy in the country, and set the people against us? What are the intentions of the Government? Some of the most ardent opponents of our foreign policy think it necessary to occupy the country in its entirety. I should like to know whether the Government have had any communications with the Russian Government; whether those communications have led to any result, and whether it can be communicated? My Lords, when your Lordships assembled in December last,

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  I expressed my great surprise that so great and critical a question as the war in South Africa should have been entirely overlooked and omitted from Her Majesty's Speech, and I was still more surprised that the noble Earl the Prime Minister following and answering me did not make the slightest allusion to the subject. It really looked as if the Government were hardly alive to the gravity of one of the most anxious questions which have arisen for years connected with our Colonies. The dreadful calamity which has occurred has dispelled any apathy or indifference in any quarter. The marvellous organization of modem journalism, assisted by steam and electricity, has for one of its results that any great joy or great calamity strikes the hearts of the population as if they were one and the same man. The First Lord of the Treasury carefully and wisely abstained from treating this question controversially. I freely admit that this disaster, great as it is, does not necessarily affect the question of the justice or policy of the war; although, of course, it raises questions as to how it ought to be carried on. But it has called the attention of the public to the matter in all its bearings, and when the proper time comes I am sure that Her Majesty's Government, as much as any other, will desire that the gravest consideration should be given to all the antecedent circumstances as bearing on the present state of affairs and on our future policy. I may state, in no hostility to Her Majesty's Government—I may state generally what appears to me to have been the state of circumstances, as far as can be gathered from the Papers delivered at the end of July, from the newspapers, and from an exceedingly cursory perusal I have, through the courtesy of the Colonial Office, been enabled to have, a few hours ago, of the Papers laid this evening on the Table of the House. There is one question which is separate from this incident, but which is intimately connected with the whole subject, and that is the position of a colony as to its Government. There is the old Cape Colony, with the power of self-government and the duty of self-defence; but if it has not power to defend itself it can come to the Imperial Government, and then the Imperial Government would consider if it would
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  give assistance, and, if so, on what terms. It so happens, however—and it is a strange anomaly—that we are now forcing troops on the Cape Colony, and a responsible Minister has remonstrated against that. This is not a satisfactory state of things. With regard to Natal, there are a very small number of White inhabitants, and an enormous number of Black subjects of the Queen, who have been attracted by the safety of your Government; and you must keep absolute power over those two bodies, and if you do that you are bound to protect them. The Queen's Government has been carried on there for some years, and I think I may venture to appeal to those noble Lords who have been Secretaries of State for the Colonies whether it is not one of the most remarkable things that the Government has been carried on—and carried on with tranquillity—with a comparatively small number of White inhabitants and something like 200,000 Blacks. But in regard to the policy we have adopted towards the Zulus, it must not be forgotten for how many years, whatever may be the adverse opinion formed as to the mode in which he annexed the Transvaal, and changed his policy towards the Zulus, the services of Sir Theophilus Shepstone in the administration of Native affairs in Natal have been invaluable. Sir Bartle Frere is a man of the highest character, of great ability, and great experience. From a Memorandum written by him in defence of the policy of the Government in Afghanistan, and which probably had a great share in determining that policy, it is quite clear what his general views are with regard to a Frontier policy for our great Dependencies. He is not disposed to be content with existing Frontiers, but is disposed to extend them. It is evident that he thinks that in the case of any possible future difficulty it is better to go at once to the most decisive measures, even if those measures involve war. He has a strong opinion that it is necessary to have a predominating influence over all neighbouring States—over all States adjoining our own. This policy with regard to India has been approved of by Her Majesty's Government, and sanctioned by this House; and this is the policy which has been adopted at the Cape.

  1059
  It is a policy which would certainly find favour with the Colonists of the Cape, who like the lavish expenditure of a large British force, and would be delighted with a war carried on at the expense of the Imperial Government and with Imperial troops. In the ultimatum to Cetewayo—and no one can deny that it was nothing less than a declaration of war, for acceptance of it was impossible—the first point touched upon was the international grievance—the taking away of two women from British territory who had escaped in consequence of a charge of adultery, the forcing two surveyors to Bit down but without further injury, and a raid into a disputed territory. It is impossible to imagine that such things as these should be the cause of an immediate recourse to war. If we dealt in this manner with all our Dependencies, with savages in their own immediate neighbourhood, we shall soon be at war in all quarters of the world. Then, as to the King of Zululand himself, no doubt he is a monster, and the system of government adopted by him is indefensible. But I leave it to your Lordships to say how far we ought to go to war to introduce good government in a barbarous State when there is no chance of our Army remaining there to enforce it. I can quite conceive that the presence of an enormous army of 40,000 armed—and not inefficiently armed—men, is a great danger to the Colony. It is a point on which I give no opinion at present as to the best way with which it can be dealt; but, as a measure of justice, it is questionable by what abstract right you could demand that the whole army should be disbanded in the face of the Native enemies of the King and the hostility of the Boers. Now, as to the reinforcements, there is a matter on which I have some doubt, and which requires to be hereafter explained. It is this:—In No. 83a, paragraphs 2 and 3, General Thesiger, on the 14th of September, asks for more officers, and says that an addition of two regiments would be essential, and that the presence of a cavalry regiment would be of enormous advantage; and Sir Bartle Frere, on the 23rd of September, says—
  "I find that the urgency of supporting General Thesiger's request is much greater even than I supposed. I trust there will be no delay in complying with his request to its full extent."
  1060
  As I understand, the answer of Her Majesty's Government was that they did not see the necessity of sending those troops.
  THE MARQUESS OF SALISBUEY: Troops were sent.
  EARL GRANVILLE: I think that was afterwards. The answer at the time to which I refer was in the negative. Her Majesty's Government did not see the necessity of sending the troops. But, in order that there may be no mistake on this point, I will ask Her Majesty's Government whether the two infantry regiments and the regiment of cavalry were sent out?
  EARL CADOGAN: Not the cavalry.
  EARL GRANVILLE: That is exactly what I understand. I could understand Her Majesty's Government saying—"We leave the matter in your hands, and we send you all you desire;" but Her Majesty's Government seem to have continued their objection to the war, and to have sent out just enough troops to enable the First Lord of the Admiralty to tell us, as he did the other night, that General Lord Chelmsford had enough troops for the purpose, and yet they deprived him of the cavalry regiment which he said was of enormous importance. This is what I cannot understand, and it certainly requires some future explanation. But this—the first day when Parliament meets after this disaster, unequalled for so many years—is not the time for squabbling whether Her Majesty's Government is to blame, or the local Government, or the military authorities are to blame. I must say that I think there is great danger in the sort of language which Members of Her Majesty's Government are in the habit of using as to the desirableness of the extension of our Empire. I was surprised when I saw within the last few weeks that the Colonial Secretary had actually boasted that the policy of the Government was annexation in all parts of the world. I think that language of that sort, backed up by language about the extension of the Empire, has a tendency to encourage our Representatives abroad to think that any go-a-head policy on their part is likely to meet with the approval of the Government. But, my Lords, what we have now especially to consider is not the past, the present, or even the future policy of the Government. The question is what can

  1061
  be done to deal in the best way with what the noble Earl has justly described as a sad calamity. I do not wish to take a desponding view of the state of affairs in South Africa; but it is certainly exceedingly grave. There is one point which is exceedingly satisfactory. I mean that wonderful defence of the fortified post at Rourke's Drift. I am not sure that that successful resistance has not been the means of saving both the Colonies in that part of Africa from destruction; and it is a defence which will teach the Zulus that however successful they may be in an ambuscade, or in an expedition carefully prepared, it is very dangerous for them to face British troops in the open field or in any fortified position. As regards the Black population of Natal, who are nearly related to the Zulus, it seems to me that it was a very great fault to drill and train them to the use of arms. That is, I think, a great danger in the case of an uncivilized people like them; but it is impossible not to hope that their knowledge of the numerous blessings and benefits which they have derived from being under British government, and, on the other hand, their knowledge of the cruelties, massacres, and despotism of the King in Zululand, will make them remain perfectly faithful and loyal to the Queen. That this may be the case I most heartily wish. It is unnecessary for me to add that Her Majesty's Government may rely with the greatest confidence that we on this side of the House shall give our most hearty and cordial support to the best efforts which they can make, and most quickly make, in order to secure the safety of our gallant troops, and of all Her Majesty's subjects in South Africa.
  EARL CADOGAN: My Lords, I will not follow the noble Earl in his discussion of matters of policy connected with this unfortunate war, inasmuch as your Lordships have only this afternoon received Papers, a careful study of which is necessary before an accurate opinion can be formed as to the merits of the case. When the proper time comes for a review of the whole subject I shall be perfectly willing to discuss with the noble Earl all the points which he has raised. The noble Earl has told us that he has only had the opportunity of glancing at these Papers cursorily; but when he has further exa-
  1062
  mined them, I think he will admit that some of his criticisms admit of easy and, I hope, satisfactory explanation. I must, however, express my regret that the noble Earl should have assisted in the dissemination of the erroneous view that the reinforcements asked for by Lord Chelmsford were not granted him by Her Majesty's Government in their entirety, or in the shape in which Lord Chelmsford asked for them. That this impression is an erroneous one will be shown by a Paper which has been laid on the Table this afternoon by my noble Friend the Under Secretary of State for War, containing a despatch from General Thesiger to the Secretary of State for War, which despatch has boon inadvertently omitted from the Papers now in your Lordships' hands. The despatch, written at Pietermaritzburg, is in the following terms:—
  "Sir,—I have the honour to enclose for your information a Memorandum showing the number of Imperial troops that will be necessary in the event of operations taking place against the Zulus, and how they would be probably utilized. The Memorandum also shows the manner in which the officers already sent out on special service have been employed, and the necessity in the above contingency of their number being increased, likewise of officers of Transport Service being despatched.—I have, &c, "FRED. THESIGER, L.-G.
  "Memorandum.—In the event of an invasion of Zululand being decided upon, I am of opinion that it will be necessary to operate on the five following lines:—1, Durban, Fort Williamson, on Tugela River; 2, Pietermaritzburg, Grey Town, and Middle Drift, on Tugela River; 3, Ladysmith, Rourke's Drift, on Buffalo River; 4, Newcastle, Utrecht, Blood River; 5, Middleburg, Derby, Pongolo River. Each of the columns on these five lines ought to have a complete battalion of eight companies of British Infantry=five battalions. At the principal base of operations, Pietermaritzburg, there should be a reserve of one battalion plus one depôt company. At the intermediate bases of Durban and Fort Williamson, Grey Town, and Middle Drift, on Tugela River, Ladysmith and Rourke's Drift, Newcastle, Utrecht, and Blood River, Middleburg, Derby, and Pongolo River, it will be necessary to leave a company for protection of stores and of our lines of communication. For this duty, therefore, 12 companies will be required. With each column there should be a detachment of Royal Engineers. Two complete companies (or 240 men) will not be in the least too large a reinforcement, as there will necessarily be a very large amount of engineering work to be done with each of the five columns. It is most important that companies should not be denuded of their officers by their being taken away for Staff employ. It is absolutely certain that the number of Zulus opposed to us will be at least

  1063
  in the proportion of 10 to 1 of our total regular force; and if a concentrated attack were made upon one of the columns before it had effected a junction with any of the others, this proportion might possibly rise to 30 or 40 to 1. The personal influence of company officers would under such circumstances he very valuable."
  The General then goes on to state his requirements as to special service and other officers, and he concludes by giving a detailed list of the troops required, which is as follows:—

  Companies.

  "Five columns

  40

  Pietermaritzburg

  9

  Durban and Fort Williamson

  2

  Grey Town and Middle Drift

  2

  Ladismith and Rorke's Drift

  2

  Newcastle, Utrecht, and Blood River

  3

  Middleberg, Derby, and Pongolo River

  3

  Pretoria

  3

  Lydenburg

  2

  Total

  66

  Eight battalions and two companies.

  Troops available.

  Battalions.

  Transvaal, 13th and 80th

  2

  Cisvaal, l–3rd, 1–24th, 2–24th, and 90th

  4

  Required.

  Complete companies.

  Royal Engineers

  2

  Available.

  Field Officers

  2

  Captains

  0

  Subalterns

  2

  N.-C. Officers and Men

  19."

  Your Lordships will perceive that in this despatch there is no request for cavalry, and the only mention of it in the Papers is to be found in the passage quoted by the noble Earl opposite, in which Sir Bartle Frere records a statement of General Thesiger that cavalry would prove "of enormous advantage." I think that when the Papers—which will be issued on Saturday, or on Monday at the latest—are examined, it will be found that whatever may have been the shortcomings on the part of the Government in reference to this matter, there is one thing of which they cannot be accused—namely, of refusing to furnish the reinforcements which were asked for either by Sir Bartle Frere or by Lord Chelmsford. Although we have not yet received any official despatch from Sir Bartle Frere or Lord Chelmsford on the subject since the noti-
  1064
  fication of the despatch of troops, the Secretary of State for the Colonies has received private information to the effect that they are both entirely satisfied not only with the character of the reinforcements, but also with the completeness of the arrangements made for the troops.
  THE EARL OF CARNARVON: My Lords, had I spoken on this subject a few days ago, I should have expressed my great regret at the outbreak of the war in Zululand. I should have expressed my regret on account of the expense which the war must involve, and still more the necessity it will impose on the Colonial Office of administering the affairs of Zululand. I regret that the result of the war must be to transfer to our hands an entire territory which it is exceedingly difficult to manage under ordinary circumstances, which it will be still more difficult to govern under the extraordinary circumstances that have occurred, and before we are prepared to receive this new and weighty burden. The condition of Zululand is like a ball of sand—as soon as it is touched it will fall to pieces. I cannot, therefore, but feel that had it been possible to tide over the present difficulties it would have been very judicious on the part of Her Majesty's Government to have done so, as I believe the problem would have solved itself in the course of a very few years. But this unfortunate affair has greatly changed matters. We have now, in addition to our previous difficulties, to deplore a very great reverse and a very heavy loss of life; and, what is worse in its political consequences, a great unsettlement of the Native mind throughout the whole of South Africa, and we might at any moment be the witnesses of all the horrors of a rising of the population of any part of the Colony. There is there an European community of some 18,000 or 20,000, in the face of a Native population of not less than 300,000; and in the Transvaal we have an European population of about 40,000, in the midst of a Native population little short of 1,000,000. These are highly dangerous conditions, and one reverse may endanger the whole of our future policy in South Africa and render it impossible to carry out the changes which are contemplated, and in which all parties are, I believe, agreed. But in the present position of affairs everything

  1065
  must be merged in one single consideration—that the war must be pushed to the utmost, not only for the honour of our arms, but for the safety of the White communities in South Africa. There are, of course, two considerations involved in this as in every war. One, of course, is its prudence, and the other its justice. I think we should do wisely to wait for the Papers that are promised by the Government as to the prudence of this war, and I think that in fairness we ought to be slow to suppose that there has been any imprudent action in this matter. I have therefore heard with great satisfaction the statement of my noble Friend the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies (Earl Cadogan), that no troops have been withheld that were demanded by the General in command. But as regards the second question—the justice of the war—knowing as much as I do of South Africa, I am bound in fairness to say at once that taking into account the antecedents of the case, and the engagements which have been entered into, I cannot consider that this war is unjust. I listened to the statement of my noble Friend on the other side of the House (Earl Granville) with respect to an ultimatum alleged to have been sent by Sir Bartle Frere; I hope we shall find in the Papers, when published, a fuller statement than we have at present. I have also seen in the daily papers a very severe attack made upon a recent Memorandum of Sir Bartle Frere. But my own feeling with respect to Sir Bartle Frere is that, considering his past career, it is not too much to say that he has always shown tact, foresight, and sense of justice. It was my duty, when Secretary of State for the Colonies, to ask Sir Bartle Frere to undertake the difficult task of the administration of South Africa; and so far as I was cognisant of that administration, it was exercised with a tact, judgment, wisdom, and moderation worthy of any Governor ever sent out by this country to govern a British Colony. There are at this moment in South Africa no less than three very distinguished and experienced Governors—one at the Cape, another at Natal, and a third in the Transvaal—namely, Sir Bartle Frere, Sir Henry Bulwer, and Sir Theophilus Shepstone; and I venture to say that it would be difficult to find three persons so competent, from
  1066
  their general knowledge of administration, from temper, and from an intimate acquaintance with the customs and habits of the Natives of South Africa, to deal with the class of questions now rising in South Africa. If, then, the Government are satisfied that these three men, whose opportunities of observation were so good, and whose judgment I believe to be the best in South Africa; concurred in the wisdom and justice of this war, I, as not longer in Office and with access to official knowledge, should certainly withhold any disapproval; I should, on the contrary, be inclined to believe that they were right in their judgment under the circumstances. There is one other point to which I wish to refer. When I was in Office a year ago, lam bound to say that the position of affairs in South Africa as regarded Zululand was precarious in the extreme. It was gradually growing worse and worse, and it was evident to all that a storm was in preparation. The question then seemed how long that storm could be properly averted. The conduct of Cetewayo had become insolent and aggressive. It was the result, no doubt, partly of old grievances and misapprehensions; for there was much genuine misapprehension and irritation on his part, and believe that he had some cause of grievance against the Dutch population; it was also partly the result of the cunning of a barbarian who had, for many years, played off the Government of Natal against that of the Transvaal, and who now found that the Government of the Transvaal, when it passed into English hands, no longer afforded him the same scope for his craft. It was, also, partly the result of that agitation among the younger and turbulent part of his tribe to which every nation, civilized or uncivilized, is more or less subject. I am bound to say that, a year and a-half ago, the attitude of Cetewayo was such that the Government were more than once compelled to consider the responsibilities which fell upon them from the possibility of war, and what preparations should be made to meet it; and it was only the threatening state of European affairs that made it undesirable to send out further reinforcements; and it was in consequence of the very threatening aspect of affairs that I determined, as far as in me lay, that war should not take place on that

  1067
  occasion. It is perfectly true that the terms which had been offered, and which have been alluded to by my noble Friend on the other side of the House, were terms that Cetewayo could not accept without altering the characteristic feature of his whole rule—they changed a bloody, oppressive, arbitrary tyranny into a government with some semblance, at least, of law; but the justification for this lies in the fact that for years Zululand had been a standing menace to the Colony of Natal; that it was a tyranny built upon bloodshed and cruelty; and, lastly, that Cetewayo, having deliberately entered into certain engagements for reforming the administration of his kingdom, and consequently for our better security, either could not or would not redeem the promises he had given to us. Speaking broadly, these seem to me, as far as I now can understand the case, the justification of the present war. Of course, there are other questions of policy with which they are connected; but these will be discussed hereafter. They will involve serious questions. I will now only say one word as to the prosecution of the war. A very important step has been taken by securing from the Portuguese Government a promise to repress the gun traffic. This is a question I earnestly pressed for a long time, and I trust that it will ultimately result in the total suppression of that traffic, and thus put an end to the possibility of the Zulus obtaining the supplies of arms and ammunition for which they, in great measure, depend for the carrying on of the war. Another point under the consideration of the Government well deserves their consideration—the extension of telegraphic communication between this country and the Cape. The want of this communication has been one of the greatest evils both on this and former occasions. A line of telegraphic wire to the Cape would have been worth to us three or four additional regiments; and we have, by the want of it, been left for weeks in darkness. During my tenure of Office I urged it, in season and out of season, on the Home Government; but the Treasury were unable to spare money for it. The unfortunate part of it is that, when disaster such as this occurs, these matters are acknowledged and rectified; but too late. But even now, at this, the
  1068
  eleventh hour, after this serious disaster, I would still urge upon the Government the necessity of laying a wire, even at a greater expense, and in a more imperfect manner than would be done under ordinary circumstances, in order that we may no longer be kept for weeks in ignorance of what is passing in the South African Colonies. With regard to reinforcements, I have long been of opinion that they may most expeditiously and most economically be sent from India. About two years ago there was a very serious outbreak in the Malay Peninsula, which is a very difficult country. That outbreak was crushed in the course of a few weeks—and why? Because immediate telegraphic communication was received, and we were able to send troops from India, and one regiment, I think, from China; and so the conflagration was extinguished before it had time to become general. If the Government should be able to send reinforcements from India, so much the better, even at the last moment—unless this unfortunate Afghan War has so crippled the strength of the Indian Forces that none can be spared. Certainly, it must be three or four weeks before the troops sent from England can reach their destination, and the loss of time may be productive of very serious results. I can only join very heartily in the hope which has been expressed on the other side of the House, that the Government will deal with the matter with all possible speed and vigour; for we may depend upon it that half-hearted measures would not only protract the war and involve a great deal more expense and bloodshed, but the contest would probably degenerate into one of those wars between civilized and Native races, which, of all warfares, is most productive of brutality and degradation.
  THE EARL OF KIMBERLEYsaid, he cordially shared in the sentiment which had been expressed, that whatever view might be entertained of the very difficult question of policy which was raised by the conditions of affairs in South Africa, there could be no difference of opinion whatever as to the absolute necessity of at once re-establishing our military position in that country and the honour of Her Majesty's arms, and of supporting our troops there with full vigour and energy. Nor was there any difference in universal

  1069
  sympathy felt for our gallant troops who were involved in this disaster. Not having had the advantage of even a cursory perusal of the Blue Books presented that night, he felt great difficulty in approaching the question; but he hoped it might not be thought egotistical in one who had held the post of Secretary of State for the Colonies if he warned those who had to administer South African affairs that there were no affairs which were more complicated or difficult. At the same time, he could not help doubting whether there was a real necessity for this Zulu War. The threatening attitude of the Zulus was nothing new. While he held the Office of Colonial Secretary he was always hearing of the threatening position of the Zulus, and no doubt it was a fact. But by judicious management, especially by the very judicious conduct of Sir Theophilus Shepstone, a collision was avoided. It had been his opinion that though we might come into conflict with the Zulus, it was better that that conflict should be later rather than sooner, since we were always growing stronger and they were growing weaker. Above all, he considered that we should consolidate our power upon our Frontiers before we got into an arduous struggle with a warlike people. But he was bound to admit that the position of affairs had been considerably changed by the annexation of the Transvaal. We took over a dispute with Cetewayo; and it might possibly be found that our position in the Transvaal was such that the quarrel was unavoidable. But nothing had been yet published or was yet known to convince him that by careful management, and not treating border raids—which were really inevitable with savage tribes on our Frontiers—as of too much importance, the Government could not have avoided the war. He saw in the manifesto, with some regret, that the ultimatum which was sent to this barbarian Chieftain was one which, in his (the Earl of Kimberley's) opinion, he could not agree to. It was plain to anyone who knew the character and position of the Chief that his acceptance of that ultimatum would mean the total destruction of his power, and the entire change of his relations with his tribe. If he had wished to avoid a collision with us, it was exceedingly doubtful if his position towards his tribe was such that
  1070
  he could have carried his wish into effect—at all events within 30 days. But all the Papers must be looked at together, and all the difficulties fully considered, and it might turn out that the war was unavoidable. He noticed that there was a disposition at home to be somewhat hard upon the Colonists, and he had seen some remarks upon their unwillingness to take up arms in the conflict. He thought that such remarks were made from an insufficient consideration of the circumstances of the case. The Kaffir War was carried on on the immediate Frontier of the old Cape Colony; and it was perfectly reasonable that, under such circumstances, the Cape Colonists should fight in their own defence. On the other hand, Zululand was at so great a distance from the Cape Colony that they could not be expected to render any considerable assistance to us in dealing with the Zulus. It was beyond their power to do so, and it was not reasonable to expect it. It would take all their energy and courage to defend themselves against the immense Black population upon their own borders; and we ought not to expect them to help us in the Transvaal or in Zululand. For the defence of Natal and the Transvaal, with their scanty White population, they must look to the Imperial Government; and he feared that for many years to come it would be impossible that assistance from home in money and arms could be dispensed with. Whether or not it was desirable to maintain our present relations with South Africa was a question into which he would not now enter. He earnestly hoped that the next intelligence might be of a more re-assuring character, and that it might be found that Her Majesty's Black subjects in Natal had not joined the Zulus in an attack upon the Colonists. His own view was rather in favour of their remaining quiet, for the Black residents in Natal wore principally composed of those who had fled from the tyranny of the Zulu King, and they could not be desirous to come again under his power. If an incursion were made into Natal the tribes in Natal might be compelled, whether they would or not, to join the main force; and he thought that under that compulsion they would do so; but he hoped that there would be no spontaneous

  1071
  movement, and that if the borders of Natal could be defended by our troops there would be peace and tranquillity in their rear.

  CATHEDRAL STATUTES BILL [H.L.]
  A Bill to amend an Act passed in the sixth year of Queen Anne and intituled "An Act for the avoiding of doubts and questions touching the Statutes of divers Cathedral and Collegiate Churches"—Was presented by The Lord Bishop of CARLISLE; read 1ª. (No. 4.)
  House adjourned at a quarter past Seven o'clock, till To-morrow, a quarter before Five o'clock.