HL Deb 04 August 1879 vol 249 cc30-42

(The Viscount Cranbrook.)

Order of the Day for the Second Reading, read.

Moved, "That the Bill be now read 2a."—(The Viscount Cranbrook.)

THE EARL OF NORTHBROOK

said, that he had expected their Lordships would have received from the Secretary of State some explanation of this measure. He (the Earl of Northbrook) had expressed his opinion on a former occasion that the Afghan War had been the direct consequence of the state of affairs in Europe, and had not arisen from anything immediately connected with our Indian Empire, and, therefore, that the charge ought not to be thrown on the Indian finances. Her Majesty's Government had intimated that they might do something to relieve India; but, if this Bill was intended to carry out that intimation, no more unsatisfactory result could be imagined. The question resolved itself into this—had the war in Afghanistan been undertaken purely for Indian purposes, or had it not been rather for European purposes? If the war was an Indian war, it was a very bad precedent that assistance should be given to India from the Consolidated Fund. If, on the other hand, the war had been undertaken mainly for European purposes, then England ought to bear some substantial share of the cost. This was a miserable proposal. The Government of this country proposed to assist the Indian Government to the extent of £60,000 a-year for a few years, and would then throw on India the task of repaying £2,000,000 by yearly instalments. It might be much less inconvenient to Indian finance if the Government of India were to borrow the money in the open market. The death of Shere Ali had enabled the war to be rapidly brought to a conclusion. He hoped that Yakoob Khan—for his (the Earl of Northbrook's) intervention on whose behalf he had been taken to task by the noble and learned Earl on the Woolsack a few months ago—having been well treated by the Government of India in times past, would be loyal to his engagements, and that the results of the Afghan War in the future would be satisfactory. But he confessed he looked with apprehension to some of the terms of the Treaty which had been laid on the Table, as he believed the effect of them would be to throw upon Indian finances burdens of a very serious nature. As yet no explanation had been given, though on several occasions, both in that and the other House of Parliament, Her Majesty's Government had promised to make a statement of their objects and intentions with respect to the rectification of the North-West Frontier. He had learned from the ordinary sources of information that the Chancellor of the Exchequer said that he had forgotten the promise. It was to be hoped, however, that some statement on the subject would be made in the other House of Parliament. He had seen the other day a comment on the Treaty by one of the most competent authorities—an officer of the highest position, occupying a seat in the Indian Council, a member, he believed of the Political Committee of that Council, and, therefore, in confidential communication with the noble Viscount. In default of information from Her Majesty's Government, he turned with interest and curiosity to the Paper written by Sir Henry Rawlinson, and published the other day. As a question of policy, and with a regard to financial considerations, all would agree that there were three objects which should be kept in view with respect to the North-West Frontier of India. The first was to keep on good terms with the wild Tribes on the Border, so far as was possible, punishing them, of course, if they molested British subjects. The next thing we should desire was such a condition of affairs in Afghanistan that it should be "a strong, independent, and friendly Power"—words used by Her Majesty's Government on several occasions. The third was that the susceptibilities of two great nations should be considered—Russia in Central Asia, and England in India. It was desirable for the peace of that part of the world that there should be between those two great Empires some independent territory. That was the view entertained by the Governments of this country during many years. What, then, was to be deduced from Sir Henry Rawlinson's Paper with respect to these three points? With respect to the Tribes, he was sorry to say Sir Henry Rawlinson held out slight hopes that the Treaty would improve our relations with them. After enumerating the Tribes with which the new Frontier would bring us into contact, the names of which would be unfamiliar to their Lordships, Sir Henry Rawlinson added that— Our relations with the independent Afghan Tribes must be largely developed, and therein lies the danger, or rather the inconvenience, of the new situation. Some time ago, the Prime Minister recounted the different expeditions during many years against those Tribes, and said that since 1848 some 60,000 men had been employed in those expeditions. But the noble Earl omitted to notice that during the last 10 or 12 years such expeditions had become very much less frequent owing to the judicious policy which had been pursued. If we pushed on our posts far from India, it must give rise to quarrels with the Tribes; these quarrels must occasion expeditions, and that must lead to disturbance and expense. As to the second point, should we have a strong as well as an independent Afghanistan? That we should have a friendly Afghanistan he hoped; that we should have an independent Afghanistan with this Treaty none of their Lordships could expect. Afghanistan had become a subordinate State as regarded the British Power. Sir Henry Rawlinson gave what seemed to him (the Earl of Northbrook)to be a most disheartening account of the position of Afghanistan after the war. He said there was already an insurrection in one of the Northern districts, that there was reason to apprehend a similar revolution at Herat, and that a pretender was prepared to come down and try his chance at Balkh. If this was a correct view of the prospects of Afghanistan—and no one had better sources of information than Sir Henry Rawlinson—in his (the Earl of Northbrook's) opinion, it was out of the question that Afghanistan should be so strong as it was in the time of Shere Ali, or in the latter years of his father, Dost Mahomed. With regard to the third point, as to an interval between the Russian and the British Dominions in the East, Sir Henry Rawlinson, or some friend of his, appeared to have been told by a high Russian functionary that the Afghan War would compel the Russians to take Merv, whether they liked it or not— Our Empire," he is reported to have said, "is founded on prestige as much as yours; and it becomes, therefore, a matter of State necessity that we should redress the balance in Central Asia. What Her Majesty's Government had done would, in his (the Earl of North-brook's) opinion, have the effect of producing the very result which it was desired to avert—namely, that the Russian Empire would become conterminous with the British Empire. He could not come to any other conclusion than that this peace would have the effect of throwing greater and increasing expenses upon India. Her Majesty's Government ought, in his judgment, to have accepted some, at any rate, of the liabilities which had been thrown upon India, not, as he contended, for Indian interests, but for some other purposes that had not yet been explained. In the winter of 1877, the noble Marquess the present Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had to consider two very important proposals which were made to the Government of India. One was a proposal for making an alteration in the administration of the North-West Provinces, and Lord Salisbury, in a despatch dated the 29th of November, 1877, addressed to the Governor General of India in Council, said— A policy of conquest on your north-west frontier would lead to no advantage which would in any degree countervail the certain financial and political embarrassment it would cause. Another matter of importance came under consideration in the year 1877—namely, the occupation of the post of Quettah. While approving a temporary occupation, Lord Salisbury gave strict injunctions that nothing should be done which would lead to the supposition that British troops were to remain permanently at Quettah. His Lordship, in a despatch to the Governor General of India, dated the 13th of December, 1877, said— It is a grave matter for the Indian Government to undertake the pacification, or the control, of any portion of the wild district which lies outside its frontier. It cannot lightly abandon responsibilities it has once acknowledged. It cannot recede at will from any position it has once occupied. Dangers and difficulties, of which the chances ought to be deeply weighed before any advance is made, will not furnish subsequently a justification for a retreat; on the contrary, they may make it impossible to withdraw from an undertaking of which the inutility has been recognized. The opinion given by Her Majesty's Government was that an extension of Frontier would be detrimental to the interests of India, and that opinion was expressed after the suspension of our relations with Shere Ali, and the withdrawal of the British Native Agent from his Court. Pending further explanation from Her Majesty's Government, he was entitled to assert that there must be a reason connected in some way with the policy of Her Majesty's Government in Europe that had dictated arrangements which, in his opinion, and in the opinion of Lord Salisbury in the winter of 1877, were injurious to the interests of India. Speaking of the question of expense, Sir Henry Rawlinson frankly said that he did not pretend to look on the new Frontier arrangements as economical, and that he should be surprised if they did not entail an increase of expenditure. The moral to be drawn from the war, now fortunately concluded, appeared to him (the Earl of Northbrook) to be that we need no longer give credence to those persons who had been trying to frighten us with apprehensions of danger from Russia. He believed he was not wrong in saying that the difficulty of transporting the ammunition and provisions of the small Force we sent to Candahar was at one time so great that it would have been impossible for us to make any material further advance in that direction. Instead, then, of making the recent extension of our Frontier, it appeared to him that we ought to have been content with what we had done. We ought to have seen that the success of our arms was sufficient to establish the prestige of this country, and that the difficulties of transport in those districts were so great that we need not be afraid of any attacks from without. For his own part, he did not believe in our weakness. He thought that we were strong in India, and that we could afford to despise altogether the panic-mongers who, from time to time, endeavoured to frighten the people of England. The real danger to India was increased taxation. There were some taxes imposed on India, especially the licence tax, which were oppressive, and which ought to be taken off at the earliest possible opportunity. He regretted that Her Majesty's Government had not placed a fair share of the expenses of the war on the Imperial Exchequer, instead of throwing the whole burden, as this Bill practically did, on the people of India, who were scarcely able to bear the charges at present imposed upon them.

LORD STANLEY OF ALDERLEY

said, besides the reasons stated by the noble Earl who had just sat down (1he Earl of Northbrook) why Her Majesty's Government should have charged the expenses of the Afghan War upon England and not upon India, there was this, that Her Majesty's Government said that India had a surplus available for it. But this surplus was not available, since it was the Famine Fund raised by an increase of the salt tax—that most oppressive of all taxes—and Sir John Strachey had promised that this Famine Fund should not be diverted to any other purpose. The discontent as to this had now extended from the Natives of India to the English, and we now heard that the language of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce on the subject having been disapproved of, the Chairman, Mr. Yule, and the Committee had resigned, and had been reelected. The noble Earl who spoke last referred to recent beeches of Lord Salisbury. In one of these he said that the North-West Frontier of India was fixed and immovable. Her Majesty's Government would have to ask themselves which words would be most enduring—their own words, that they wanted a scientific Frontier; or the words, "Cursed is he that removeth his neighbour's landmark?"

VISCOUNT CRANBROOK

admitted that the noble Earl (the Earl of North-brook) was in his right in bringing forward, on the second reading of this Bill, any question connected with India which he might desire to submit to the con- sideration of the House. He should have thought, however, that it would have been more consistent with the courtesy due from one noble Lord to another, and with the practice usually pursued in this House, if public or private Notice had been given of the attack which the noble Earl was about to make on the policy of Her Majesty's Government. That Bill was simply a question as to whether this country should advance £2,000,000 to India for a certain number of years in order that, under her extreme pressure from Famine and other causes, India might not have to bear additional taxation. The noble Earl opposite complained of want of opportunity, but had a perfect right to put on the Notice Paper any Motion he pleased since the Treaty of Gandamak had been laid on the Table—it had been laid upon the Table some time since, and no notice had been taken of it. There was no want of time in that House for discussion of any great question. As to the Government coming down to the House and making a statement, he had never undertaken to do anything of the kind. He told the noble Earl that he should have certain Papers when they were in a condition to be produced, and so he should; and one despatch which had arrived would be put on the Table as soon as possible. The noble Earl spoke of the war being for British and not Indian interests. What did the noble Earl mean by "Indian interests?" and how did he separate them from the interests of this country? For himself, he had intimated from the beginning that it was his opinion that India ought to pay for this war, and that it was a war waged for the interests of India, and to give her security and peace. When the balance was struck of the cost incurred by England for her Indian Possessions, directly and indirectly, it would be found that she had not been niggardly. When the noble Earl assumed that the article written by Sir Henry Rawlinson had been written under his inspiration, he must say that he did not even know that Sir Henry Rawlinson had written the article until he took up the copy of The Nineteenth Century, in which it appeared, on Saturday, to read another article it contained, which, from its authorship, demanded attention. It was a remarkable thing, however, that those who thought with the noble Earl, and he thought the noble Earl himself, referred in the most depreciatory tone to Sir Henry Rawlinson's writings, and called their author a Russophobist. The article now in question was not written to order, but written in conformity with Sir Henry Rawlinson's private opinions, expressed before in all forms and shapes. He had nothing at all to say to its publication, and was not responsible for a single word of it. But, having read the article that day, he said that the noble Earl had misread or misrepresented it, and that, so far from being against the Treaty with Afghanistan, the article was in its favour.

THE EARL OF NORTHBROOK

explained, that he had brought forward from that article certain statements, and those statements—which he had read accurately to their Lordships—bore out the opinion he had himself expressed. He had not further alluded to the article.

VISCOUNT CRANBROOK

said, again, that the article was in favour of the Treaty, and the noble Earl led the House to believe it was not; but he (Viscount Cranbrook) would appeal to all who heard the noble Earl whether such was not their impression. He took exception to another point in the noble Earl's speech. The noble Marquess the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (the Marquess of Salisbury) had left the House; and the noble Earl, having given him no Notice, took occasion to quote certain passages from the noble Marquess's speech or despatch, without giving his noble Friend an opportunity of contradicting him, or of giving such an explanation as he himself had just given in respect to Sir Henry Rawlinson's article. He supposed that the noble Earl was going out of town, and thought it so important that the world should know his opinions, that, departing from his usual courtesy, he snatched the occasion of this Bill for discussing the whole policy of the Indian Government. He was ready to meet the noble Earl; but the occasion was not a fit one, when no Notice had been given, and the House was empty. The noble Earl was taking advantage of the House, and of those who were absent, in calling upon them to engage in such a discussion now. He would only say he believed that that war was justly undertaken in the interest of India, and to give security to India; and when the noble Earl quoted Sir Henry Rawlinson's article, and stated that there was no danger or apprehension, he said—without expressing any opinion of his own on the article—that Sir Henry Rawlinson held that there was a danger which they were guarding against by the stipulations of that Treaty. The noble Earl would lead people to believe that he had never negotiated with respect to Russia, and had had no dread of her. What, however, was the meaning of the negotiations with regard to their having a neutral zone between Russia in Central Asia and Afghanistan? Why did the noble Earl, when Viceroy, telegraph home that the late Ameer was afraid of Russia, and say he wished, in certain circumstances, to support the late Ameer with men, arms, and money—the very things provided for by the new Treaty? Yet the noble Earl now turned round on that which he had himself proposed. He said that the Government were taking steps for the security of India, and for economy connected with that security. In India there were many unhealthy posts which might be given up in consequence of the acquisitions or assignments which they had received. And when the noble Earl said they were going too far, and undertaking too much—why, the noble Duke (the Duke of Argyll) admitted that he would not have endured that Russia should have an Envoy at Cabul, but thought that was a little too strong for him. Neither told their Lordships what course they would have adopted to get rid of him. Reverting to the Bill before the House, the noble Earl said that to lend £2,000,000 to India without interest was a shabby proceeding. Those who were responsible for the finances of India did not so regard the measure. Her Majesty's Government had told them that they could not undertake to bear the cost of that war, which was an Indian war, just as the former Afghan War was, and as were all the wars for the protection of the Frontiers of India. And when the noble Earl said that Russia would not come there, or do this, or that, he asserted that it was for the interest of India that they should show they were able to prevent Russia from doing those things. We had our positions and our men in them, and the Government meant to maintain them, and to act in the spirit which had hitherto guided them. They regarded the connection of India with England as being for the interest of India; and they thought that India ought to know that, when pressed down by the Famines which had almost crushed her to the dust, England would at such a period lend her money for a time, in order that they might not have to impose on her any of those taxes to which, owing to the repeal of the Income Tax by the noble Earl, they might otherwise have been driven to resort.

THE MARQUESS OF RIPON

admitted that the article written by Sir Henry Rawlinson in The Nineteenth Century, which had been alluded to, was one in favour of the Treaty of Gandamak, so far as it went; but it was an article which, from beginning to end, was based on the supposition that that Treaty was only an instalment of a policy which ought to be pushed further. Its very last sentence told them that, in the present state of affairs in the East, it was simply fatuity if they did not, in spite of the Treaty, occupy Candahar. It also said that nobody supposed the arrangements with regard to the Frontier Tribes and the ceded districts were permanent, but were only the transition stage between independence and annexation. It was all very well for the noble Viscount to throw contempt on Sir Henry Rawlinson, as if he were a small authority. Last autumn, Sir Henry Rawlinson was the great authority of Her Majesty's Government. He was the real author and teacher of the policy which they had been pursuing. The Government were, perhaps, not very apt pupils; and the civil words which he used towards them were, doubtless, intended to induce them to follow him step by step. Sir Henry Rawlinson pointed out the legitimate conclusion to which the course in which the Government had embarked must lead them. They had also another authority in Sir Bartle Frere, and the public had had ample opportunity of judging of the value of his authority. It was, therefore, rather too much, when the noble Viscount threw over Sir Henry Rawlinson—an officer of great experience, ability, and knowledge. He strongly recommended everyone who was interested in these affairs to read this article, because in it they would find a true statement by a most competent witness of the end towards which the policy of Her Majesty's Government was advancing. The noble Viscount had taken exception to a question of this kind being raised upon the present Bill; but he (the Marquess of Ripon) should have thought that his Parliamentary experience would have taught him that, this being a finance Bill, it was one upon which a discussion of this nature might very properly be raised. This policy was part of the general European policy of Her Majesty's Government; and, if that were the case, it would be a very harsh and undesirable proceeding to throw the whole of the ultimate charge of this war upon the finances of India. The Government appeared to have a fixed and settled determination to give to Parliament and the country no explanation of the policy of the Afghan War. At its commencement, they had been told one thing by one Minister and something else by another—the insolence of Shere Ali, and the necessity for securing a scientific Frontier, were both held out as the causes of it. But, in the opinion of Sir Henry Rawlinson, those were only the ostensible causes of it, and he indicated that there was something else behind. The noble Viscount had denied that he had given any promise to make a statement on the subject; and his right hon. Friend, in "another place," appeared to have forgotten all about a promise he had made there to the same effect. All this was quite consonant with the previous policy of Her Majesty's Government, which appeared to be to keep them without any definite information with regard to the war. All that they had given was a piece of paper containing the terms of the Treaty.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

said, he desired to correct a statement which had been made by the noble Marquess who had just sat down. The noble Marquess appeared to be under the impression that his noble Friend the Secretary of State had objected that it was incompetent to make any observations with regard to the Indian policy of Her Majesty's Government on the present Bill. What the noble Viscount complained of was that the noble Earl (the Earl of Northbrook) had taken occasion of this Bill to attack the policy of Her Majesty's Government in India without the courtesy, so generally observed in that House, of giving Notice of his intention to do so. It was absolutely necessary that some preliminary information should have been given of this attack upon the policy of Her Majesty's Government, if not in the form of a Notice upon the Paper, at all events, in the form of a Notice to the individual whose character was to be impugned. The course adopted by the noble Earl opposite, however, had been so far successful that he had been able to make this attack upon Her Majesty's Government when only 10 or 12 Members of the House were present, the other noble Lords who might have desired to take part in a debate on the subject having left the House in entire ignorance that the noble Earl intended to move this question. Moreover, the noble Earl had spoken in a debate closely connected with Indian affairs earlier in the evening; but even then he had given no Notice of his intention to attack the Government on this point. The noble Marquess (the Marquess of Ripon) had stated that the Government had refused to give any information with regard to this question; but if the noble Marquess desired such information he should have taken the proper course, which was open to him, to obtain it. The noble Earl could not expect that Ministers of the Crown would be prepared to enter upon a discussion of such a subject as this without due Notice.

EARL GRANVILLE

remarked, that when the noble and learned Earl rose from the Woolsack he thought that they were going to hear some answer given to the observation of his noble Friend. The noble and learned Earl had, however, not given any such answer, but had certainly given further proof of the excitement which had come over two Members of Her Majesty's Government—an excitement which had shown itself in a degree rarely seen in that House. The noble Viscount had always shown a certain amount of animation; but the noble and learned Earl had hitherto spoken with calmness and deliberation. Tonight, however, they had rivalled each other in the excitement under which they had addressed the House. If Her Majesty's Government, when they proposed the second reading of this Bill, upon which the whole of this question turned, thought that because it had been debated in "another place," they were to pass it through their Lordships' House without any examination, they were proposing a course that was wholly new to that House.

THE DUKE OF RICHMOND AND GORDON

said, the noble Earl seemed to find fault with both his noble Friends who had preceded the noble Earl on this occasion. The noble Earl spoke of the noble Viscount the Secretary of State for India as if he had objected to a discussion on the affairs of India in connection with this Bill.

EARL GRANVILLE

I understood the noble Viscount objected that due Notice had not been given to the House and to himself that any discussion would arise upon this Bill.

THE DUKE OF RICHMOND AND GORDON

Precisely so, and he thought his noble Friend was perfectly justified in the remarks he made. He said the noble Earl was perfectly justified in calling attention to the affairs of India; but that it would have been an act of courtesy, such as was usual in that House, to have given him some Notice of his intention. He doubted very much whether his noble Friend could have made out a better case than he had done on this occasion, however long such Notice might have been; but there were other Members of the House to whom a Notice might have been convenient as to a question in which the whole affairs of India were to be discussed, the merits of the Treaty gone into, and the speeches of eminent men brought forward in support of the views taken by the noble Earl. It would have been act of courtesy to the Prime Minister if he had some intimation that such a discussion was likely to arise. The same remark was true of his noble Friend the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, who had proceeded the noble Viscount as Secretary of State for India, and whose speeches had formed the text of the noble Earl's remarks. The noble Marquess had left that House without the smallest knowledge that any speeches of his would be referred to.

Motion agreed to; Bill read 2a accordingly, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House To-morrow.

House adjourned at Eight o'clock, till To-morrow, a quarter before Five o'clock.