§ VISCOUNT CRANBROOKMy Lords, it now becomes my duty, the war with Afghanistan having been happily concluded, and a Treaty of Peace having been signed with the Ameer, to call your Lordships' attention to the services which have been rendered by those who had charge of the conduct of the war in that country. The sole object of the Resolution which I will propose will be not a discussion of the policy of the war, upon which your Lordships have already given an opinion, but simply to look at the military operations which have taken place, and which are of a character, as your Lordships will agree, creditable to this country, and have justified the con- 3 fidence that was felt in the Officers by whom those operations have been carried on. It is my intention to look now at the Treaty which has been concluded, not in its political aspect, but simply as bringing the war to an end—at the peace which has been established and at the work done by our soldiers in the field. I will not trespass up on your Lordships now by discussing the Articles of the Treaty—we may have an opportunity of doing that hereafter—at present, as I have said, I regard it merely as the conclusion of the war and the beginning of the peace. Although, in the Resolution I shall propose, there are some whose names have not been mentioned among those who have been conspicuous in the field, still I think your Lordships would not feel justified in passing them over. Among them is the name of that distinguished officer who negotiated the Treaty with the Ameer and brought the war to a conclusion, Major Cavagnari. Before the affairs in Afghanistan his name was not much known in England; but now it is deservedly well known for the intelligence and sagacity which enabled him to bring about the Treaty of Peace which, in less skilful hands, might have failed. His power of understanding the Afghan Ruler, and his insight into the Native character, enabled him in a shorter time than, perhaps, any person with less skill and penetration into character could have done, to bring to a conclusion a Treaty of Peace which is likely to have the best results. I am sure that Major Cavagnari will bring to the conduct of the business with which he is intrusted at Cabul the same skill, tact, and prudence which have raised him to his present position, and which in the future, I believe, will obtain for him still greater recognition. Perhaps your Lordships will also allow me to say one word about another officer, Major Sandeman, who had charge of the negotiations at Khelat. He was placed in a position of great responsibility—it was necessary that all his proceedings should be in perfect harmony with all that was doing elsewhere, and the satisfactory relations into which we have been brought with the Khan and the useful results as regarded the conduct of the war in Afghanistan are in no small degree due to the admirable qualities which Major Sandeman brought to bear upon the mission which he had in charge. There- 4 fore, I have thought it right to mention Major Sandeman before I pass on to consider the services which were rendered by the officers who actually conducted the campaign. But, my Lords, before referring to these special services, there are some special circumstances connected with the campaign to which I should like to allude. I will mention, first, that which has been spoken of in the newspapers during the last three or four days in terms which gave me great pain, because I thought there was great exaggeration. No doubt, there was at one time some anxiety as to cholera; but, according to the official information, this has, in the main, passed away. The statement that the 10th Hussars and the 17th Regiment had suffered very severely from disease was very much exaggerated. It is true that the 10th Hussars did suffer very much in coming back from Afghanistan to their quarters beyond Peshawur. It was also said that the officers were very much to blame for having led their men back by long marches through such a country at a period of the year when there is so much greater danger of cholera than at other seasons. Now, I have been allowed to see a private letter from one of the most distinguished officers serving in the Khyber Pass; I believe I may mention his name—it is Colonel Jenkins, who commands the Guides. He says—
The march down was very trying. The heat was very great, and at every 100 yards of the route there was a dead camel or bullock. Besides this, there was cholera, and some of the regiments suffered very severely. In spite of all this, I am convinced the Government did right to get the army hack from Afghanistan. If the troops had refrained on the road between Peshawur and Gandamack all the hot weather, they would have lost far more than they did in marching down, and they would still have had the march to do in the autumn, which is the most unhealthy part of the year.It is not true, then, that the officers who marched the men back have acted with rashness and imprudence. On the contrary, they acted with the greatest caution in getting the troops into a position in which they might suffer less. I come now to another point. Your Lordships will have observed in the history of this campaign that until the period at which the troops were marched back very little disease has been mentioned. I am, therefore, fully justified in calling attention to the services of the 5 Medical Staff, and to the great skill and judgment which, looking to the healthy condition of the men, they must have exercised. Then, as to the Transport and Commissariat, no one can suppose that any great expedition, such as this, conducted on three lines, could be effected in a smooth and easy way. Much has been said of the difficulties with which the Transport and Commissariat Departments had to contend. Those difficulties were of a very serious kind; and the more praise, therefore, should be given to those who overcame them, though, no doubt, with considerable loss of camels and beasts of burden, and some delay in consequence. There is no period at which a march of some 500 miles from the Indus towards the North-West would not be considered an operation of a gigantic character in connection with the difficulties of route and of transport and commissariat; and great credit is due to these branches of the Service by which those difficulties were overcome, so that the men kept their health and received their rations without fail throughout the whole of that long march. And here, again, I must bring in one name which has not been mentioned in the active operations of the war. I allude to the aid rendered to the Transport Service by Sir Richard Temple. When Sir Richard Temple found that there were these difficulties he went up himself, and by his personal exertions got together 20,000 camels, and assisted in the most material way to overcome those obstacles which threatened to impede the march of the columns. I am bound, therefore, not to forget the name of Sir Richard Temple, though he is not among those whose names will be found in the Resolution.And now, my Lords, for the campaign itself. There may be those who would have been more interested had this war been one of great battles and even of great disasters; but I have no such circumstances to mention to your Lordships. I may say that every operation has been conducted with success, and with less bloodshed than has ever accompanied a war of equal proportion. I rejoice to think that it has been so. Comparatively, it has been a bloodless campaign; and had it not been for the melancholy disaster which befel the 10th Hussars, upon which we cannot help looking with great regret, and thinking 6 that blame must attach somewhere, we should have had to lament no great loss. That disaster—the facts concerning which do not appear to have clearly come to light—resulted in a loss of one officer and 46 men to that splendid regiment. That was a severe blow, and the regiment has also since that period sustained losses by cholera. Such things, my Lords, I am afraid will happen in all wars. That, however, has been the only serious disaster in this war, and otherwise the loss of life has been small compared with the great results which have been attained.
Your Lordships will remember that the time allowed by the Ultimatum expired on the 20th of November last; and upon the 21st of November, such was the diligence and care which had been displayed in the preparations, though no steps had been taken before to move the troops, and no threats had been used to the Ameer until the Ultimatum was sent, the troops immediately crossed the Frontier. I think, my Lords, you will agree with me that that reflects the highest credit on the Governor General, the Commander-in-Chief, the Generals, as well as upon the Adjutant and Quartermaster General, that 40,000 men were put on the march, that the Frontier was crossed at all points, on the 21st of the month, the day when the march began. If your Lordships will take into consideration the amount of work and labour necessary to bring about so great a result without disturbance to the Military Forces of India except at one or two points, you will see that it reflects the greatest credit on all concerned. The Frontier was crossed in three columns. General Sir Samuel Browne, a name well known in Indian affairs, crossed it on the morning of the 21st. In the course of that afternoon, he attacked Ali Musjid, his Forces turned the fortress, and in the course of the night the garrison fled up the Khyber Pass, leaving the guns behind, and were intercepted partly by the Khyberees and partly by our own troops, who, by a difficult march, cut off their retreat. Practically, on the very day and the night which succeeded the passage, Sir Samuel Browne was in possession of the fortress. This success, achieved at the very outset of the campaign, had the effect of breaking up and demoralizing the Forces of the Ameer on that side of 7 Afghanistan, and, so far as those Forces were concerned, there was no longer any opposition in that quarter. Shere Ali had gone on a different system from his predecessor. Dost Mahomed relied on the Tribal Forces; but Shere Ali raised a body of 60,000 to 70,000 troops, which he armed and trained in the European fashion. This was a course which alienated the Tribes, and broke the bond between him and them, and when the regular regiments were broken up there was no longer opposition. In a few days, therefore, Sir Samuel Browne entered into Dakka, the great military camp of the Ameer, and subsequently ascertaining that Jellalabad was undefended, and that no resistance would be offered to its occupation, advanced to that place. In consequence of these successful operations, his further advance on Gandamak was made chiefly for sanitary reasons, and that he might secure a healthy situation for his troops; but it had a very important political effect in expediting negotiations, because that movement produced the impression of a probable advance of our Army on Cabul. Negotiations were accordingly, entered into with Yakoob Khan, who sent in his submission on the 8th of May. I must not allow your Lordships to suppose that Sir Samuel Browne's column had no fighting at all other than that that had taken place at Ali Musjid. On the contrary, there was a good deal of fighting with the predatory Tribes, who made attacks on our communications. Some of those Tribes thought they were beyond the reach of European troops; but General Maude soon proved to them that this was by no means the case.
I must now take your Lordships to the other two lines. Coming to the Candahar Column, General Biddulph was continually pressing on from the period I have mentioned in December, and I think that he reached his destination at the mouth of the Khojak Pass on the 9th of December. There he was joined by General Stewart, and the columns then marched together on Candahar. This march was through a comparatively friendly country, though the difficulties of the ground and of the Khojak Pass were very great. The columns reached Candahar on the 9th of January, where they were received with great courtesy by the Deputy Governor and the principal inhabitants of the place. There have been, it is true, some 8 isolated acts of fanaticism perpetrated by individuals. These columns still remain in possession of Candahar, until the time shall arrive for its being handed over, as agreed upon, to the Ameer. It was found necessary to feel in different directions for the enemy, and, accordingly, General Biddulph went 75 miles further to Girischk, while General Stewart made his way to Khilabi Ghilzie. With the exception of an attack made on General Biddulph as he retired towards Candahar, there was no great occasion for fighting; but that attack afforded an opportunity of showing that our Cavalry, under that gallant and able officer, Colonel Malcolmson, were far superior to the Afghan Cavalry, who were put to flight. And here I may remark that on his way back to India General Biddulph rendered a great service in exploring and making known to us a tract of country and a route available for troops and artillery with which previously we were unacquainted.
General Roberts, with some 5,500men, crossed the Kurrum River. He found that the Army of the Ameer had retired 40 miles on that side, and that the Ameer was preparing to make his great defence on the Peiwar Kotal. There were rocks of great steepness, the position was in front impregnable, and the place was defended by some 4,000 men. General Roberts took three days to make reconnaissances, and on the 1st of December, by a circuitous and most difficult march, he turned the position, and with a force of Highlanders, Goorkhas, and Sikhs, and at the height of 8,000 feet, attacked it in the rear and captured it. General Roberts commenced his attack early in the morning, was admirably supported by Kelso with his guns, and it was not till dusk that the enemy gave way, and, upon his executing another flank movement which would have intercepted their retreat, fled in the direction of the Shutur-Gardan Pass, followed closely up by General Roberts. From that height he looked down upon the plains of Cabul, but withdrew, and contented himself with watching the Pass until it was effectually closed by the snows, and has since been in quiet possession of the Kurrum Valley to Ali Keyl.
I must here mention one officer—Wigram Battye, of the Guides—who greatly distinguished himself, and whose 9 death India and England must deplore. In truth, however, India is rich in officers of that description, and others have been found in his family—men of great military capacity, who are always ready to sacrifice their lives gallantly in the service of their country.
My Lords, I have not attempted, in making these remarks, to show that this was a great campaign in the way of battles; nor have we, I am glad to say, to bewail any grave disaster. These men have served their country with courage and devotion, their leaders have received honours from Her Majesty, and it now remains for the Houses of Parliament to do honour not only to the officers in command, but also to every soldier who has fought under the flag, and they are embodied in the Resolution I am about to move. I am sure there is not one of your Lordships who does not recognize in this campaign the bravery of the soldiers who have been employed in it. I ask you to give due honour to their patience under hardship, to the gallantry which they have displayed in every encounter, and to that great combination of military qualities which has enabled them, in an incredibly short time, to achieve a great success—bloodless in its character, but one which, I hope, will secure the permanent peace of India. In thanking all those who have been engaged in this campaign, you will encourage others to take a like course to that which has been followed by those who have won such honours for the name of England. The noble Viscount concluded by moving the Resolution.
§ Moved to resolve,
- 1. That the Thanks of this House be given to the Right Honourable Lord Lytton, Viceroy and Governor-General of India, for the ability and judgment with which the resources of the British Empire in India have been applied to the support of the Military operations in Afghanistan:
- 2. That the Thanks of this House be given to
- General Sir Frederic P. Haines, G.C.B., G.C.S.I.; Lieutenant-General Sir Donald Martin Stewart, K.C.B.;
- Lieutenant-General Sir Samuel James Browne, K.C.B., K.C.S.L, V.C.;
- Lieutenant-General Sir Frederick Francis Maude, K.C.B., V.C;
- Major-General Sir Michael Anthony Shrapnell Biddulph, R.A., K.C.B.;
- Major-General Sir Frederick Sleigh Roberts, R.A., K.C.B., V.C.;
10 skill, and perseverance displayed by them in the Military operations in Afghanistan, and for their indefatigable zeal and exertions throughout the late Campaign: - 3. That this House doth highly approve and acknowledge the valour and perseverance displayed by the Non-Commissioned Officers and Private Soldiers, both European and Native, employed in Afghanistan, and that the same be signified to them by the Commanders of the several Corps, who are desired to thank them for their gallant behaviour:
- 4. That the said Resolutions be transmitted by the Lord Chancellor to the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, and that his Lordship be requested to communicate the same to the several Officers referred to therein.—(The Viscount Cranbrook.)
§ EARL GRANVILLEMy Lords, I rise with great pleasure to express my warm concurrence in the Vote of Thanks to the Army which has been proposed by the noble Viscount. In proposing this Motion, the noble Viscount has properly adhered, on several points, to the precedents which bear most closely upon the present case. The Resolutions, mutatis mutandis, are the same as those proposed at the close of the last Afghan War, and nearly the same as those proposed at the final suppression of the Indian Mutiny. He has also adhered to those precedents in abstaining from making any observations on the policy or results of the war. But there is a point, and an important one, on which he seems to have entirely departed from previous precedents. Charges have been constantly brought against Her Majesty's Government of the extraordinary economy with which they furnish information to a Parliament which is always ready, by a large majority, to register facts accomplished without their knowledge. Her Majesty's Government always repudiate and deny this accusation—it is unlucky that, on this occasion, their proceedings tend to support this accusation. On looking back to the case of the close of the last Afghan War, I find that the Duke of Wellington and Sir Robert Peel gave a fortnight's Notice of the Vote of Thanks—explaining that they postponed it for so long in order to comply with former precedents; that Papers containing full information with regard to the military operations should be in the hands of Peers and Members for a considerable time before they were asked to vote 11 Thanks. I find that four more days were given to both Houses, in order to give more time for consideration of these Papers. We are now asked to vote, without, as far as I am aware, a single scrap of Paper having been laid before Parliament on the subject. The technical objection to this proceeding seems so strong that I hardly know how Her Majesty's Government could, with propriety, resist if we were to press strongly for a delay until the Papers were laid before us. On the 10th of March I asked when a statement would be made, and when Papers would be presented regarding this war? The noble Viscount replied that it would not be convenient at that moment to do so; but he promised that, on the earliest opportunity, he would do both. Five months have now elapsed, peace has been made, a Treaty signed, and we have had no statement and no Papers bearing on this particular question. The noble Viscount has given us a clear and interesting account of the military operations; but he has not supported that account by a single despatch. We have been up to this time left to gather our information as we best can. I am, however, bound to say that I cordially accept what the noble Viscount has told us about the services of the Army. All the accounts which we have received concur as to the judgment, energy, and ability of our officers, and the discipline, courage, and endurance of their men. They have fully and nobly fulfilled the prognostications made with regard to them, and their only regret was that of a soldier—but is one in which we cannot agree—that the foe did not prove to be more worthy of their steel. Have we, however, the same assurance as to the Governor General, whose name—I admit, according to precedent—has been introduced? On the occasion of the Thanks to Lord Canning, Lord Derby in this House, the noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Beaconsfield) in the House of Commons, while they stated that they reserved their final opinion, made strong attacks upon Lord Canning. The noble Earl opposite spoke of Lord Canning's inconsistency, and of his incoherence—of his want of vigilance and energy; and he blamed him, curiously enough, for having during the Mutiny gagged the Indian Press. I imagine, at this time, the noble Earl would not be the 12 last to acknowledge that never was a man suddenly placed in a more responsible position than Lord Canning, and that in that position he showed the wisdom of a great statesman, the energy of a great administrator, and the justice and calm courage of an English Christian. The moral I draw from this is, that in Opposition we may be too prone to blame, and I do not wish to form any rash judgment as to the manner in which Lord Lytton has shown ability and judgment in applying the resources of India to this war. But we are asked to affirm a certain proposition, without any Papers, and with nothing but a statement of a most general character from the Secretary of State for India. And as to other sources of information nothing can be more absolutely contradictory. On the one hand, correspondents—evidently in possession of information, sometimes of a semi-official character—have been loud in their praise of the ability, decision, and energy of Lord Lytton. On the other, exactly opposite language has been held; and not only censure applied, but particular facts alleged. Thus, it has been stated that Lord Lytton, without authority from Her Majesty's Government, gave positive orders for an attack upon the Khyber Pass without an adequate Force, which must have ended in a great disaster, and which was only stopped by the obstinate determination of the Commander-in-Chief. Sir Frederick Haines; and that since that time the relations between the Governor General and the Commander-in-Chief have not been of a cordial character. It will be satisfactory if Her Majesty's Government can deny these allegations. It would be still more satisfactory if they could, like Lord Palmerston, refer to a letter from the Commander-in-Chief referring in enthusiastic terms to the great services rendered by the Governor General to the military authorities. It has been stated in the same way that the march of General Stewart on Candahar, as it turned out, was successful; but it was due to an accident on which the Governor General had no right to rely; that snow generally falls in Bolan and round Quetta in November—it did not fall on this occasion till the end of February; that, if the season had been an ordinary one, at the time we had 12 regiments and batteries struggling through the 13 Bolan Pass, that Pass would have been swept by hurricanes of wind and snow, rendering all progress impossible. As there is neither food nor forage in the Pass, any compulsory halt would have caused the death of both horses and baggage animals, besides great mortality among the men. It is said that General Stewart was opposed to an advance into Afghanistan until seven months' supplies had been collected for his column at Quetta; but that he was ordered on; and in order to do so he had to take on 20,000 camels which the Commissariat had collected there for the conveying of supplies at Quetta; that not one of these camels ever got back to Sukkur, and that the consequence was that when Biddulph and Stewart's united columns got to Candahar the transport train which was to have supplied them with food from their base on the Indus was no longer in existence, and to preserve them from starvation 8,000 men were immediately withdrawn to India; that about 4,000 men remained in Candahar; but carriage was so deficient that even this small Force could not have moved collectively for 50 miles in any direction—that it was in fact isolated, and, if the resistance of the Afghans had not collapsed, would have been in great danger. Whether these allegations affecting the question of the judgment of the Governor General which we are called upon to praise are true or not I have no means of knowing. The facts must be known to the Government, and it will be satisfactory if they give some explanations. In our state of doubt, it would be better not to be called upon to give a vote. My only excuses for agreeing to do so are these—that the noble Earl himself gave me an example, when he withdrew his Motion of the Previous Question in the case of Lord Canning, on the ground that the Government had avoided calling upon the House for any expression of opinion on the policy of the war. A still better excuse is my strong desire that nothing should occur which can diminish the appearance of cordial and complete unanimity with which a brave and successful Army receives the great compliment of the Thanks of this House. The late Lord Lawrence and my noble Friend the late Governor General (the Earl of Northbrook), although strongly opposed to the war, always maintained that the invasion of Afghanistan by our Army 14 would be almost certain of success. The Army has nobly fulfilled these prognostications, and is entitled to the best Thanks of this House.
§ THE DUKE OF CAMBRIDGEMy Lords, I desire to say a few words on this Motion, which I most cordially support—entirely, of course, upon military grounds. As Head of the Army, it is my duty to be fully cognizant of all circumstances connected with the operations of war in any part of Her Majesty's Dominions; and it has, therefore, fallen to my lot to follow with great care the advance of the separate columns forming the Army which executed the recent campaign in Afghanistan. The noble Viscount the Secretary of State for India has so well given the details connected with those three columns that it is unnecessary for me to go over them again. But I entirely endorse every word he has said on military grounds as to the ability with which those columns were conducted, and as to the energy displayed both by those in command and by the troops under their orders. There can be no doubt that the great difficulty of this campaign has been that of transport. I will only say that this campaign has not been singular in that respect. The real difficulty of all our campaigns, particularly in recent years, has been that of transport. People are disposed to think that transport can be easily found when great operations are to be undertaken; but it is the very thing which you cannot find under such circumstances. My noble Friend who has been in India (Lord Napier of Magdala) and also my noble and gallant Friend on the Cross Benches (Lord Strathnairn) must be aware of the immense difficulty of finding transport and of the enormous amount that is required there. I think it ought to be clearly under-stood that it is impossible to improvise the transport which is necessary, and that if we are to have it available when it is indispensable, we must keep up permanently a very considerable nucleus of transport, whether in India or elsewhere. As regards the conduct of these operations, whether by General Stewart and General Biddulph, who acted in concert, or by General Roberts, General Browne, or General Maude, I cannot think that there is anything to choose between these various officers. They have all had very grave and difficult duties to 15 perform, and they have performed them in a manner not only thoroughly worthy of the high reputation they had already won before this war commenced, but also so as to add largely to that reputation. The late campaign in Afghanistan has been short, and comparatively bloodless; but it has been attended with great difficulties. One of those difficulties has been connected with the keeping open our communications. Communication through the Khyber Pass, especially, has been a very great difficulty. Sir Samuel Browne was in command of the troops at Ali Musjid, and then went to the front; and another division followed under General Maude, who, in conjunction with some of Sir Samuel Browne's troops, kept up the communications—a task requiring great tact and judgment. There was one misfortune, which we must all deplore—namely, that which befell the 10th Hussars; but I believe it was simply one of those accidents which must sometimes occur in war. I do not believe there was anyone to blame in the matter. It is always a difficult matter for mounted troops to cross a difficult ford in the night; and, at the same time, it is often essential that it should be done at night, because if not conducted at night the object of the operation would be frustrated. The risk, therefore, had to be run, and, unfortunately, a good many men and one officer were drowned; but after reading the evidence given at the inquiry I really believe that no special blame can be attached to anyone. Besides, it is not certain that there was not a freshet of water that would carry the horses off their legs, and which would subside as suddenly as it had arisen. I do not know that I need say more, except that, while I feel satisfied from all I hear that the European troops of Her Majesty's Army have behaved in a manner highly to their credit, and in a way deserving of your Lordships' commendation, they were cordially and fully supported by the Native troops. This is the largest campaign we have had in India for some time, and we have had no recent opportunity of seeing of what kind of troops our Native Army was composed. I think the result is highly satisfactory, and shows the Native Army to be in a very serviceable condition both for the field as well as 16 for garrison work. The officers have always been conspicuous for their gallant conduct, and the recent war has shown that they are now as brave and efficient as they ever have been. Another point is the question of the Cavalry. We have heard it said that the days of Cavalry are gone by, and that they are an expensive arm of the Service, and that they can now be dispensed with, and that such a step would greatly tend to economize the expenditure for the Army. My Lords, I believe that no greater mistake was ever made. I believe that Cavalry is as essential as ever, or even more so, because movements in the field are now much more rapid than they used to be; so that unless you have a good body of Cavalry, to be the eyes and ears of your Army, you would be in a most dangerous position. The Cavalry in India, whether Native or European, have displayed the utmost gallantry. They have performed acts of great valour now, as on all former occasions; they have showed themselves in every respect good soldiers, and highly qualified for the duties which they are called upon to perform. The highest tribute is also due to the Commander-in-Chief in India and to the Quartermaster General. They have acted in the most cordial manner with the various authorities in regard to the different operations of the war. I must also say one word in regard to Sir Neville Chamberlain, who was acting Military Member of the Council during a part of the war, and whose experience and assistance were most beneficial to the Governor General during the period that he acted. He took the place of another gallant and distinguished Officer—Sir Allen Johnson—who was absent from ill-health, but who was able to return to his duties before the war was over. I think it right just to state their names. My Lords, I cordially and entirely support the Vote of Thanks which has been proposed.
§ THE EARL OF NORTHBROOK, as he had the honour of being personally acquainted with nearly all the officers who had filled high commands in the war, and as he had upon a former occasion expressed his confidence, both in the Army and in the measures to taken to make the campaign successful, wished only to say that he most heartily and cordially joined in the Vote of Thanks. 17 The remarks of the noble Viscount the Secretary of State for India, and of the illustrious Duke, rendered it wholly unnecessary for him (the Earl of North-brook) to enter into any details. He felt sure that the Native Army would be gratified, not only with the honour conferred on them by the Thanks of the House, but also by the expression of opinion of the illustrious Duke. If there had been no very great military operations, yet there had been long marches, considerable privations, and exposure to heat and cold to be endured such as were calculated to try the discipline of any troops. It was most satisfactory to all who had been connected with the administration of the Army in India that nothing whatever had been said against the discipline or behaviour of the troops employed.
§ LORD NAPIER OF MAGDALA, who was indistinctly heard, said, he could scarcely venture to make any observations after the addresses made to their Lordships by the noble Viscount and by His Royal Highness; but he rose to address to their Lordships a few words which he thought were due in justice to Lord Lytton. First, he considered that Lord Lytton deserved the greatest credit for his just appreciation of the powers of resistance of Shere Ali and his Army. Secondly, he thought he deserved the highest credit for his treatment of the Native Princes, and his just estimate of their loyalty and that of the people of India, which enabled him to conduct the war to a successful conclusion with a very slight addition to the British troops in India. There were a few remarks which were also due to the Generals commanding and their troops. He thought it had been little appreciated that war in these mountains was a warfare against the forces of Nature; and the success of our troops, with little loss, had, perhaps, led people unacquainted with the character of the mountains in which the several operations had been conducted to make light of the difficulties they had had to encounter. Those mountains abounded at every step with natural fortifications—natural citadels of the most difficult and inaccessible character. Every hill and ravine and every defile was thoroughly well known to their Native occupants, while our policy had made them a sealed book to our officers. Of course, reconnoissances were 18 most difficult where each ravine might contain an enemy who never left a prisoner alive. Too much credit could not be given to the Generals and their troops for the skill and bravery with which they overcame those difficulties. He had known and watched the rise of nearly all the principal officers engaged. They had most fully justified the expectations that he had formed of them, and he had noticed their progress with the greatest joy. The conduct of the British troops was, as it ever had been, most brilliant, and deserved every credit. With regard to the Native troops, the House was aware that there had been much discussion regarding them. No one could give too high praise to the British Army; but there were facts connected with the Native Army which he thought would cause all to admit that the policy of placing Natives in the position of officers, and not treating them merely as nonentities, as they were before that policy was adopted, had proved a just and wise policy. Therefore, he desired to bring to their notice the conduct of the Native officers of the Indian Army. Yussen Khan, an Afridi Jemadar of the 24th Punjab Native Infantry, had conducted negotiations with the Afridis of the Bazaar Valley, during Generals Tyler's and Maude's expeditions, and was mainly instrumental in procuring satisfactory terms of peace. This man was a young Afridi Mullick, brought into a direct commission in 1873. Subadar-Major Azeez Khan, of the 5th Punjab Infantry, died of wounds received at the Peiwar Pass. His commanding officer reported of him as his right-hand man, and that he could better have spared any other officer, British or Native. Reisaldar Mahomed Kahn, corps of Guides, would not desert the body of his commanding officer, Wygram Battye, in the action with the Khugiani, but remained and fell with him. Subadar Faiz Tallab, a Khuttuck of the 1st Punjab Infantry, was on detached command with 30 men in the Atehakzai country, in the vicinity of the Khojak Pass, and was warned that he would be attacked by a large body of the enemy. There was no time for him to send in for reinforcements, so he struck his tents, threw up a sunga, and awaited the attack, which was carried on by about 400 Atchakzais, whom Faiz Tallab's party drove off with very heavy 19 loss. This man was admitted to the Order of Merit for his conspicuous gallantry and ready resource on this occasion. Lastly, his dear friend and comrade, Gholam Hussein Khan, after fighting our battles for 30 years, and rendering us great diplomatic services, was now the Governor of Candahar, where, by his wisdom and justice, he had become most popular with the Afghans, and had won the respect and regard of everyone in our own Army. With such examples as these, he thought there could never again be a question of not placing the Native officers in positions of command.
§ VISCOUNT CRANBROOKI am extremely gratified that my noble and gallant Friend has spoken, as he informed me that he would do, in the terms which he has done of the Native Army. I feel, myself, that I made an omission in not more specially referring to the services of that Army, and, perhaps, your Lordships will now forgive my adding this one word on the subject. Besides our own Native troops there was a contingent of 4,000 furnished by some of the Native Princes, and one of those Princes has been awarded the Grand Cross of the Star of India. With regard to the absence of despatches, I felt the difficulty to which the noble Earl (Earl Granville) referred. The despatches narrating all that has happened have not yet come home. I expected that they would have been here by this time, and I understand that they are coming. The precedents of the Duke of Wellington and Sir Robert Peel scarcely apply to this case. We knew, day by day, through the public journals from their Correspondents on the spot, every incident that has taken place, and I have furnished every telegram which gave any information with regard to operations in the field. Such was not the case in the time to which the noble Earl referred. I think that it may be said that, generally, your Lordships are in full possession of the facts of the war. With regard to Lord Lytton, this is the first time that I have heard he gave any directions with regard to the force to be used against Ali Musjid. Sir Samuel Browne crossed the Frontier, and the same day he attacked Ali Musjid; and it was abandoned in the night, and occupied next day. I do not see how there could have been such orders. In 20 regard to the commissariat of the Candahar column, Lord Lytton gave all the orders that were necessary. The difficulties were immense; there was great difficulty in obtaining beasts of burthen, and a long line had to be maintained; and it would be rather a strong measure to hold Lord Lytton, who was at Calcutta or Simla, responsible for the conduct of the details of the commissariat on that line. General Biddulph has informed me that the difficulties with regard to the commissariat of this column have been greatly exaggerated.
§ Motion agreed to, nemine dissentiente.
§ Ordered, That the Lord Chancellor do communicate the said Resolutions to the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, and that his Lordship he requested to communicate the same to the several Officers referred to therein.