Lords Sitting of 4 August 1879

MINUTES.
PUBLIC BILLS—First Reading—Land Tax Commissioners Names * (173).
Second Reading—Commissioners of Woods (Thames Piers) * (168); East India Loan (Consolidated Fund) (172); Turnpike Acts Continuance * (163).
Committee—Report—East Indian Railway (Redemption of Annuities) * (160); Lord Clerk Register (Scotland) * (164); Border Summons * (170).
Third Reading—Industrial Schools (Powers of School Boards) * (153), and passed.

AFGHAN WAR.
Moved, "That the Vote of Thanks to the Forces engaged in Afghanistan take precedence."—(The Viscount Cranbrook.)
Motion agreed to.

AFGHAN WAR—VOTE OF THANKS TO THE VICEROY OF INDIA AND TO THE MILITARY FORCES.

  RESOLUTION.
  VISCOUNT CRANBROOK: My Lords, it now becomes my duty, the war with Afghanistan having been happily concluded, and a Treaty of Peace having been signed with the Ameer, to call your Lordships' attention to the services which have been rendered by those who had charge of the conduct of the war in that country. The sole object of the Resolution which I will propose will be not a discussion of the policy of the war, upon which your Lordships have already given an opinion, but simply to look at the military operations which have taken place, and which are of a character, as your Lordships will agree, creditable to this country, and have justified the con-

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  fidence that was felt in the Officers by whom those operations have been carried on. It is my intention to look now at the Treaty which has been concluded, not in its political aspect, but simply as bringing the war to an end—at the peace which has been established and at the work done by our soldiers in the field. I will not trespass up on your Lordships now by discussing the Articles of the Treaty—we may have an opportunity of doing that hereafter—at present, as I have said, I regard it merely as the conclusion of the war and the beginning of the peace. Although, in the Resolution I shall propose, there are some whose names have not been mentioned among those who have been conspicuous in the field, still I think your Lordships would not feel justified in passing them over. Among them is the name of that distinguished officer who negotiated the Treaty with the Ameer and brought the war to a conclusion, Major Cavagnari. Before the affairs in Afghanistan his name was not much known in England; but now it is deservedly well known for the intelligence and sagacity which enabled him to bring about the Treaty of Peace which, in less skilful hands, might have failed. His power of understanding the Afghan Ruler, and his insight into the Native character, enabled him in a shorter time than, perhaps, any person with less skill and penetration into character could have done, to bring to a conclusion a Treaty of Peace which is likely to have the best results. I am sure that Major Cavagnari will bring to the conduct of the business with which he is intrusted at Cabul the same skill, tact, and prudence which have raised him to his present position, and which in the future, I believe, will obtain for him still greater recognition. Perhaps your Lordships will also allow me to say one word about another officer, Major Sandeman, who had charge of the negotiations at Khelat. He was placed in a position of great responsibility—it was necessary that all his proceedings should be in perfect harmony with all that was doing elsewhere, and the satisfactory relations into which we have been brought with the Khan and the useful results as regarded the conduct of the war in Afghanistan are in no small degree due to the admirable qualities which Major Sandeman brought to bear upon the mission which he had in charge. There-
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  fore, I have thought it right to mention Major Sandeman before I pass on to consider the services which were rendered by the officers who actually conducted the campaign. But, my Lords, before referring to these special services, there are some special circumstances connected with the campaign to which I should like to allude. I will mention, first, that which has been spoken of in the newspapers during the last three or four days in terms which gave me great pain, because I thought there was great exaggeration. No doubt, there was at one time some anxiety as to cholera; but, according to the official information, this has, in the main, passed away. The statement that the 10th Hussars and the 17th Regiment had suffered very severely from disease was very much exaggerated. It is true that the 10th Hussars did suffer very much in coming back from Afghanistan to their quarters beyond Peshawur. It was also said that the officers were very much to blame for having led their men back by long marches through such a country at a period of the year when there is so much greater danger of cholera than at other seasons. Now, I have been allowed to see a private letter from one of the most distinguished officers serving in the Khyber Pass; I believe I may mention his name—it is Colonel Jenkins, who commands the Guides. He says—
  "The march down was very trying. The heat was very great, and at every 100 yards of the route there was a dead camel or bullock. Besides this, there was cholera, and some of the regiments suffered very severely. In spite of all this, I am convinced the Government did right to get the army hack from Afghanistan. If the troops had refrained on the road between Peshawur and Gandamack all the hot weather, they would have lost far more than they did in marching down, and they would still have had the march to do in the autumn, which is the most unhealthy part of the year."
  It is not true, then, that the officers who marched the men back have acted with rashness and imprudence. On the contrary, they acted with the greatest caution in getting the troops into a position in which they might suffer less. I come now to another point. Your Lordships will have observed in the history of this campaign that until the period at which the troops were marched back very little disease has been mentioned. I am, therefore, fully justified in calling attention to the services of the

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  Medical Staff, and to the great skill and judgment which, looking to the healthy condition of the men, they must have exercised. Then, as to the Transport and Commissariat, no one can suppose that any great expedition, such as this, conducted on three lines, could be effected in a smooth and easy way. Much has been said of the difficulties with which the Transport and Commissariat Departments had to contend. Those difficulties were of a very serious kind; and the more praise, therefore, should be given to those who overcame them, though, no doubt, with considerable loss of camels and beasts of burden, and some delay in consequence. There is no period at which a march of some 500 miles from the Indus towards the North-West would not be considered an operation of a gigantic character in connection with the difficulties of route and of transport and commissariat; and great credit is due to these branches of the Service by which those difficulties were overcome, so that the men kept their health and received their rations without fail throughout the whole of that long march. And here, again, I must bring in one name which has not been mentioned in the active operations of the war. I allude to the aid rendered to the Transport Service by Sir Richard Temple. When Sir Richard Temple found that there were these difficulties he went up himself, and by his personal exertions got together 20,000 camels, and assisted in the most material way to overcome those obstacles which threatened to impede the march of the columns. I am bound, therefore, not to forget the name of Sir Richard Temple, though he is not among those whose names will be found in the Resolution.
  And now, my Lords, for the campaign itself. There may be those who would have been more interested had this war been one of great battles and even of great disasters; but I have no such circumstances to mention to your Lordships. I may say that every operation has been conducted with success, and with less bloodshed than has ever accompanied a war of equal proportion. I rejoice to think that it has been so. Comparatively, it has been a bloodless campaign; and had it not been for the melancholy disaster which befel the 10th Hussars, upon which we cannot help looking with great regret, and thinking
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  that blame must attach somewhere, we should have had to lament no great loss. That disaster—the facts concerning which do not appear to have clearly come to light—resulted in a loss of one officer and 46 men to that splendid regiment. That was a severe blow, and the regiment has also since that period sustained losses by cholera. Such things, my Lords, I am afraid will happen in all wars. That, however, has been the only serious disaster in this war, and otherwise the loss of life has been small compared with the great results which have been attained.
  Your Lordships will remember that the time allowed by the Ultimatum expired on the 20th of November last; and upon the 21st of November, such was the diligence and care which had been displayed in the preparations, though no steps had been taken before to move the troops, and no threats had been used to the Ameer until the Ultimatum was sent, the troops immediately crossed the Frontier. I think, my Lords, you will agree with me that that reflects the highest credit on the Governor General, the Commander-in-Chief, the Generals, as well as upon the Adjutant and Quartermaster General, that 40,000 men were put on the march, that the Frontier was crossed at all points, on the 21st of the month, the day when the march began. If your Lordships will take into consideration the amount of work and labour necessary to bring about so great a result without disturbance to the Military Forces of India except at one or two points, you will see that it reflects the greatest credit on all concerned. The Frontier was crossed in three columns. General Sir Samuel Browne, a name well known in Indian affairs, crossed it on the morning of the 21st. In the course of that afternoon, he attacked Ali Musjid, his Forces turned the fortress, and in the course of the night the garrison fled up the Khyber Pass, leaving the guns behind, and were intercepted partly by the Khyberees and partly by our own troops, who, by a difficult march, cut off their retreat. Practically, on the very day and the night which succeeded the passage, Sir Samuel Browne was in possession of the fortress. This success, achieved at the very outset of the campaign, had the effect of breaking up and demoralizing the Forces of the Ameer on that side of

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  Afghanistan, and, so far as those Forces were concerned, there was no longer any opposition in that quarter. Shere Ali had gone on a different system from his predecessor. Dost Mahomed relied on the Tribal Forces; but Shere Ali raised a body of 60,000 to 70,000 troops, which he armed and trained in the European fashion. This was a course which alienated the Tribes, and broke the bond between him and them, and when the regular regiments were broken up there was no longer opposition. In a few days, therefore, Sir Samuel Browne entered into Dakka, the great military camp of the Ameer, and subsequently ascertaining that Jellalabad was undefended, and that no resistance would be offered to its occupation, advanced to that place. In consequence of these successful operations, his further advance on Gandamak was made chiefly for sanitary reasons, and that he might secure a healthy situation for his troops; but it had a very important political effect in expediting negotiations, because that movement produced the impression of a probable advance of our Army on Cabul. Negotiations were accordingly, entered into with Yakoob Khan, who sent in his submission on the 8th of May. I must not allow your Lordships to suppose that Sir Samuel Browne's column had no fighting at all other than that that had taken place at Ali Musjid. On the contrary, there was a good deal of fighting with the predatory Tribes, who made attacks on our communications. Some of those Tribes thought they were beyond the reach of European troops; but General Maude soon proved to them that this was by no means the case.
  I must now take your Lordships to the other two lines. Coming to the Candahar Column, General Biddulph was continually pressing on from the period I have mentioned in December, and I think that he reached his destination at the mouth of the Khojak Pass on the 9th of December. There he was joined by General Stewart, and the columns then marched together on Candahar. This march was through a comparatively friendly country, though the difficulties of the ground and of the Khojak Pass were very great. The columns reached Candahar on the 9th of January, where they were received with great courtesy by the Deputy Governor and the principal inhabitants of the place. There have been, it is true, some
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  isolated acts of fanaticism perpetrated by individuals. These columns still remain in possession of Candahar, until the time shall arrive for its being handed over, as agreed upon, to the Ameer. It was found necessary to feel in different directions for the enemy, and, accordingly, General Biddulph went 75 miles further to Girischk, while General Stewart made his way to Khilabi Ghilzie. With the exception of an attack made on General Biddulph as he retired towards Candahar, there was no great occasion for fighting; but that attack afforded an opportunity of showing that our Cavalry, under that gallant and able officer, Colonel Malcolmson, were far superior to the Afghan Cavalry, who were put to flight. And here I may remark that on his way back to India General Biddulph rendered a great service in exploring and making known to us a tract of country and a route available for troops and artillery with which previously we were unacquainted.
  General Roberts, with some 5,500men, crossed the Kurrum River. He found that the Army of the Ameer had retired 40 miles on that side, and that the Ameer was preparing to make his great defence on the Peiwar Kotal. There were rocks of great steepness, the position was in front impregnable, and the place was defended by some 4,000 men. General Roberts took three days to make reconnaissances, and on the 1st of December, by a circuitous and most difficult march, he turned the position, and with a force of Highlanders, Goorkhas, and Sikhs, and at the height of 8,000 feet, attacked it in the rear and captured it. General Roberts commenced his attack early in the morning, was admirably supported by Kelso with his guns, and it was not till dusk that the enemy gave way, and, upon his executing another flank movement which would have intercepted their retreat, fled in the direction of the Shutur-Gardan Pass, followed closely up by General Roberts. From that height he looked down upon the plains of Cabul, but withdrew, and contented himself with watching the Pass until it was effectually closed by the snows, and has since been in quiet possession of the Kurrum Valley to Ali Keyl.
  I must here mention one officer—Wigram Battye, of the Guides—who greatly distinguished himself, and whose

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  death India and England must deplore. In truth, however, India is rich in officers of that description, and others have been found in his family—men of great military capacity, who are always ready to sacrifice their lives gallantly in the service of their country.
  My Lords, I have not attempted, in making these remarks, to show that this was a great campaign in the way of battles; nor have we, I am glad to say, to bewail any grave disaster. These men have served their country with courage and devotion, their leaders have received honours from Her Majesty, and it now remains for the Houses of Parliament to do honour not only to the officers in command, but also to every soldier who has fought under the flag, and they are embodied in the Resolution I am about to move. I am sure there is not one of your Lordships who does not recognize in this campaign the bravery of the soldiers who have been employed in it. I ask you to give due honour to their patience under hardship, to the gallantry which they have displayed in every encounter, and to that great combination of military qualities which has enabled them, in an incredibly short time, to achieve a great success—bloodless in its character, but one which, I hope, will secure the permanent peace of India. In thanking all those who have been engaged in this campaign, you will encourage others to take a like course to that which has been followed by those who have won such honours for the name of England. The noble Viscount concluded by moving the Resolution.
  Moved to resolve,

  1. That the Thanks of this House be given to the Right Honourable Lord Lytton, Viceroy and Governor-General of India, for the ability and judgment with which the resources of the British Empire in India have been applied to the support of the Military operations in Afghanistan:

  2. That the Thanks of this House be given to

  General Sir Frederic P. Haines, G.C.B., G.C.S.I.; Lieutenant-General Sir Donald Martin Stewart, K.C.B.;

  Lieutenant-General Sir Samuel James Browne, K.C.B., K.C.S.L, V.C.;

  Lieutenant-General Sir Frederick Francis Maude, K.C.B., V.C;

  Major-General Sir Michael Anthony Shrapnell Biddulph, R.A., K.C.B.;

  Major-General Sir Frederick Sleigh Roberts, R.A., K.C.B., V.C.;

  and the other Officers of the Army, both European and Native, for the intrepidity,
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  skill, and perseverance displayed by them in the Military operations in Afghanistan, and for their indefatigable zeal and exertions throughout the late Campaign:

  3. That this House doth highly approve and acknowledge the valour and perseverance displayed by the Non-Commissioned Officers and Private Soldiers, both European and Native, employed in Afghanistan, and that the same be signified to them by the Commanders of the several Corps, who are desired to thank them for their gallant behaviour:

  4. That the said Resolutions be transmitted by the Lord Chancellor to the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, and that his Lordship be requested to communicate the same to the several Officers referred to therein.—(The Viscount Cranbrook.)

  EARL GRANVILLE: My Lords, I rise with great pleasure to express my warm concurrence in the Vote of Thanks to the Army which has been proposed by the noble Viscount. In proposing this Motion, the noble Viscount has properly adhered, on several points, to the precedents which bear most closely upon the present case. The Resolutions, mutatis mutandis, are the same as those proposed at the close of the last Afghan War, and nearly the same as those proposed at the final suppression of the Indian Mutiny. He has also adhered to those precedents in abstaining from making any observations on the policy or results of the war. But there is a point, and an important one, on which he seems to have entirely departed from previous precedents. Charges have been constantly brought against Her Majesty's Government of the extraordinary economy with which they furnish information to a Parliament which is always ready, by a large majority, to register facts accomplished without their knowledge. Her Majesty's Government always repudiate and deny this accusation—it is unlucky that, on this occasion, their proceedings tend to support this accusation. On looking back to the case of the close of the last Afghan War, I find that the Duke of Wellington and Sir Robert Peel gave a fortnight's Notice of the Vote of Thanks—explaining that they postponed it for so long in order to comply with former precedents; that Papers containing full information with regard to the military operations should be in the hands of Peers and Members for a considerable time before they were asked to vote

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  Thanks. I find that four more days were given to both Houses, in order to give more time for consideration of these Papers. We are now asked to vote, without, as far as I am aware, a single scrap of Paper having been laid before Parliament on the subject. The technical objection to this proceeding seems so strong that I hardly know how Her Majesty's Government could, with propriety, resist if we were to press strongly for a delay until the Papers were laid before us. On the 10th of March I asked when a statement would be made, and when Papers would be presented regarding this war? The noble Viscount replied that it would not be convenient at that moment to do so; but he promised that, on the earliest opportunity, he would do both. Five months have now elapsed, peace has been made, a Treaty signed, and we have had no statement and no Papers bearing on this particular question. The noble Viscount has given us a clear and interesting account of the military operations; but he has not supported that account by a single despatch. We have been up to this time left to gather our information as we best can. I am, however, bound to say that I cordially accept what the noble Viscount has told us about the services of the Army. All the accounts which we have received concur as to the judgment, energy, and ability of our officers, and the discipline, courage, and endurance of their men. They have fully and nobly fulfilled the prognostications made with regard to them, and their only regret was that of a soldier—but is one in which we cannot agree—that the foe did not prove to be more worthy of their steel. Have we, however, the same assurance as to the Governor General, whose name—I admit, according to precedent—has been introduced? On the occasion of the Thanks to Lord Canning, Lord Derby in this House, the noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Beaconsfield) in the House of Commons, while they stated that they reserved their final opinion, made strong attacks upon Lord Canning. The noble Earl opposite spoke of Lord Canning's inconsistency, and of his incoherence—of his want of vigilance and energy; and he blamed him, curiously enough, for having during the Mutiny gagged the Indian Press. I imagine, at this time, the noble Earl would not be the
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  last to acknowledge that never was a man suddenly placed in a more responsible position than Lord Canning, and that in that position he showed the wisdom of a great statesman, the energy of a great administrator, and the justice and calm courage of an English Christian. The moral I draw from this is, that in Opposition we may be too prone to blame, and I do not wish to form any rash judgment as to the manner in which Lord Lytton has shown ability and judgment in applying the resources of India to this war. But we are asked to affirm a certain proposition, without any Papers, and with nothing but a statement of a most general character from the Secretary of State for India. And as to other sources of information nothing can be more absolutely contradictory. On the one hand, correspondents—evidently in possession of information, sometimes of a semi-official character—have been loud in their praise of the ability, decision, and energy of Lord Lytton. On the other, exactly opposite language has been held; and not only censure applied, but particular facts alleged. Thus, it has been stated that Lord Lytton, without authority from Her Majesty's Government, gave positive orders for an attack upon the Khyber Pass without an adequate Force, which must have ended in a great disaster, and which was only stopped by the obstinate determination of the Commander-in-Chief. Sir Frederick Haines; and that since that time the relations between the Governor General and the Commander-in-Chief have not been of a cordial character. It will be satisfactory if Her Majesty's Government can deny these allegations. It would be still more satisfactory if they could, like Lord Palmerston, refer to a letter from the Commander-in-Chief referring in enthusiastic terms to the great services rendered by the Governor General to the military authorities. It has been stated in the same way that the march of General Stewart on Candahar, as it turned out, was successful; but it was due to an accident on which the Governor General had no right to rely; that snow generally falls in Bolan and round Quetta in November—it did not fall on this occasion till the end of February; that, if the season had been an ordinary one, at the time we had 12 regiments and batteries struggling through the

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  Bolan Pass, that Pass would have been swept by hurricanes of wind and snow, rendering all progress impossible. As there is neither food nor forage in the Pass, any compulsory halt would have caused the death of both horses and baggage animals, besides great mortality among the men. It is said that General Stewart was opposed to an advance into Afghanistan until seven months' supplies had been collected for his column at Quetta; but that he was ordered on; and in order to do so he had to take on 20,000 camels which the Commissariat had collected there for the conveying of supplies at Quetta; that not one of these camels ever got back to Sukkur, and that the consequence was that when Biddulph and Stewart's united columns got to Candahar the transport train which was to have supplied them with food from their base on the Indus was no longer in existence, and to preserve them from starvation 8,000 men were immediately withdrawn to India; that about 4,000 men remained in Candahar; but carriage was so deficient that even this small Force could not have moved collectively for 50 miles in any direction—that it was in fact isolated, and, if the resistance of the Afghans had not collapsed, would have been in great danger. Whether these allegations affecting the question of the judgment of the Governor General which we are called upon to praise are true or not I have no means of knowing. The facts must be known to the Government, and it will be satisfactory if they give some explanations. In our state of doubt, it would be better not to be called upon to give a vote. My only excuses for agreeing to do so are these—that the noble Earl himself gave me an example, when he withdrew his Motion of the Previous Question in the case of Lord Canning, on the ground that the Government had avoided calling upon the House for any expression of opinion on the policy of the war. A still better excuse is my strong desire that nothing should occur which can diminish the appearance of cordial and complete unanimity with which a brave and successful Army receives the great compliment of the Thanks of this House. The late Lord Lawrence and my noble Friend the late Governor General (the Earl of Northbrook), although strongly opposed to the war, always maintained that the invasion of Afghanistan by our Army
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  would be almost certain of success. The Army has nobly fulfilled these prognostications, and is entitled to the best Thanks of this House.
  THE DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE: My Lords, I desire to say a few words on this Motion, which I most cordially support—entirely, of course, upon military grounds. As Head of the Army, it is my duty to be fully cognizant of all circumstances connected with the operations of war in any part of Her Majesty's Dominions; and it has, therefore, fallen to my lot to follow with great care the advance of the separate columns forming the Army which executed the recent campaign in Afghanistan. The noble Viscount the Secretary of State for India has so well given the details connected with those three columns that it is unnecessary for me to go over them again. But I entirely endorse every word he has said on military grounds as to the ability with which those columns were conducted, and as to the energy displayed both by those in command and by the troops under their orders. There can be no doubt that the great difficulty of this campaign has been that of transport. I will only say that this campaign has not been singular in that respect. The real difficulty of all our campaigns, particularly in recent years, has been that of transport. People are disposed to think that transport can be easily found when great operations are to be undertaken; but it is the very thing which you cannot find under such circumstances. My noble Friend who has been in India (Lord Napier of Magdala) and also my noble and gallant Friend on the Cross Benches (Lord Strathnairn) must be aware of the immense difficulty of finding transport and of the enormous amount that is required there. I think it ought to be clearly under-stood that it is impossible to improvise the transport which is necessary, and that if we are to have it available when it is indispensable, we must keep up permanently a very considerable nucleus of transport, whether in India or elsewhere. As regards the conduct of these operations, whether by General Stewart and General Biddulph, who acted in concert, or by General Roberts, General Browne, or General Maude, I cannot think that there is anything to choose between these various officers. They have all had very grave and difficult duties to

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  perform, and they have performed them in a manner not only thoroughly worthy of the high reputation they had already won before this war commenced, but also so as to add largely to that reputation. The late campaign in Afghanistan has been short, and comparatively bloodless; but it has been attended with great difficulties. One of those difficulties has been connected with the keeping open our communications. Communication through the Khyber Pass, especially, has been a very great difficulty. Sir Samuel Browne was in command of the troops at Ali Musjid, and then went to the front; and another division followed under General Maude, who, in conjunction with some of Sir Samuel Browne's troops, kept up the communications—a task requiring great tact and judgment. There was one misfortune, which we must all deplore—namely, that which befell the 10th Hussars; but I believe it was simply one of those accidents which must sometimes occur in war. I do not believe there was anyone to blame in the matter. It is always a difficult matter for mounted troops to cross a difficult ford in the night; and, at the same time, it is often essential that it should be done at night, because if not conducted at night the object of the operation would be frustrated. The risk, therefore, had to be run, and, unfortunately, a good many men and one officer were drowned; but after reading the evidence given at the inquiry I really believe that no special blame can be attached to anyone. Besides, it is not certain that there was not a freshet of water that would carry the horses off their legs, and which would subside as suddenly as it had arisen. I do not know that I need say more, except that, while I feel satisfied from all I hear that the European troops of Her Majesty's Army have behaved in a manner highly to their credit, and in a way deserving of your Lordships' commendation, they were cordially and fully supported by the Native troops. This is the largest campaign we have had in India for some time, and we have had no recent opportunity of seeing of what kind of troops our Native Army was composed. I think the result is highly satisfactory, and shows the Native Army to be in a very serviceable condition both for the field as well as
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  for garrison work. The officers have always been conspicuous for their gallant conduct, and the recent war has shown that they are now as brave and efficient as they ever have been. Another point is the question of the Cavalry. We have heard it said that the days of Cavalry are gone by, and that they are an expensive arm of the Service, and that they can now be dispensed with, and that such a step would greatly tend to economize the expenditure for the Army. My Lords, I believe that no greater mistake was ever made. I believe that Cavalry is as essential as ever, or even more so, because movements in the field are now much more rapid than they used to be; so that unless you have a good body of Cavalry, to be the eyes and ears of your Army, you would be in a most dangerous position. The Cavalry in India, whether Native or European, have displayed the utmost gallantry. They have performed acts of great valour now, as on all former occasions; they have showed themselves in every respect good soldiers, and highly qualified for the duties which they are called upon to perform. The highest tribute is also due to the Commander-in-Chief in India and to the Quartermaster General. They have acted in the most cordial manner with the various authorities in regard to the different operations of the war. I must also say one word in regard to Sir Neville Chamberlain, who was acting Military Member of the Council during a part of the war, and whose experience and assistance were most beneficial to the Governor General during the period that he acted. He took the place of another gallant and distinguished Officer—Sir Allen Johnson—who was absent from ill-health, but who was able to return to his duties before the war was over. I think it right just to state their names. My Lords, I cordially and entirely support the Vote of Thanks which has been proposed.
  THE EARL OF NORTHBROOK, as he had the honour of being personally acquainted with nearly all the officers who had filled high commands in the war, and as he had upon a former occasion expressed his confidence, both in the Army and in the measures to taken to make the campaign successful, wished only to say that he most heartily and cordially joined in the Vote of Thanks.

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  The remarks of the noble Viscount the Secretary of State for India, and of the illustrious Duke, rendered it wholly unnecessary for him (the Earl of North-brook) to enter into any details. He felt sure that the Native Army would be gratified, not only with the honour conferred on them by the Thanks of the House, but also by the expression of opinion of the illustrious Duke. If there had been no very great military operations, yet there had been long marches, considerable privations, and exposure to heat and cold to be endured such as were calculated to try the discipline of any troops. It was most satisfactory to all who had been connected with the administration of the Army in India that nothing whatever had been said against the discipline or behaviour of the troops employed.
  LORD NAPIER OF MAGDALA, who was indistinctly heard, said, he could scarcely venture to make any observations after the addresses made to their Lordships by the noble Viscount and by His Royal Highness; but he rose to address to their Lordships a few words which he thought were due in justice to Lord Lytton. First, he considered that Lord Lytton deserved the greatest credit for his just appreciation of the powers of resistance of Shere Ali and his Army. Secondly, he thought he deserved the highest credit for his treatment of the Native Princes, and his just estimate of their loyalty and that of the people of India, which enabled him to conduct the war to a successful conclusion with a very slight addition to the British troops in India. There were a few remarks which were also due to the Generals commanding and their troops. He thought it had been little appreciated that war in these mountains was a warfare against the forces of Nature; and the success of our troops, with little loss, had, perhaps, led people unacquainted with the character of the mountains in which the several operations had been conducted to make light of the difficulties they had had to encounter. Those mountains abounded at every step with natural fortifications—natural citadels of the most difficult and inaccessible character. Every hill and ravine and every defile was thoroughly well known to their Native occupants, while our policy had made them a sealed book to our officers. Of course, reconnoissances were
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  most difficult where each ravine might contain an enemy who never left a prisoner alive. Too much credit could not be given to the Generals and their troops for the skill and bravery with which they overcame those difficulties. He had known and watched the rise of nearly all the principal officers engaged. They had most fully justified the expectations that he had formed of them, and he had noticed their progress with the greatest joy. The conduct of the British troops was, as it ever had been, most brilliant, and deserved every credit. With regard to the Native troops, the House was aware that there had been much discussion regarding them. No one could give too high praise to the British Army; but there were facts connected with the Native Army which he thought would cause all to admit that the policy of placing Natives in the position of officers, and not treating them merely as nonentities, as they were before that policy was adopted, had proved a just and wise policy. Therefore, he desired to bring to their notice the conduct of the Native officers of the Indian Army. Yussen Khan, an Afridi Jemadar of the 24th Punjab Native Infantry, had conducted negotiations with the Afridis of the Bazaar Valley, during Generals Tyler's and Maude's expeditions, and was mainly instrumental in procuring satisfactory terms of peace. This man was a young Afridi Mullick, brought into a direct commission in 1873. Subadar-Major Azeez Khan, of the 5th Punjab Infantry, died of wounds received at the Peiwar Pass. His commanding officer reported of him as his right-hand man, and that he could better have spared any other officer, British or Native. Reisaldar Mahomed Kahn, corps of Guides, would not desert the body of his commanding officer, Wygram Battye, in the action with the Khugiani, but remained and fell with him. Subadar Faiz Tallab, a Khuttuck of the 1st Punjab Infantry, was on detached command with 30 men in the Atehakzai country, in the vicinity of the Khojak Pass, and was warned that he would be attacked by a large body of the enemy. There was no time for him to send in for reinforcements, so he struck his tents, threw up a sunga, and awaited the attack, which was carried on by about 400 Atchakzais, whom Faiz Tallab's party drove off with very heavy

  19
  loss. This man was admitted to the Order of Merit for his conspicuous gallantry and ready resource on this occasion. Lastly, his dear friend and comrade, Gholam Hussein Khan, after fighting our battles for 30 years, and rendering us great diplomatic services, was now the Governor of Candahar, where, by his wisdom and justice, he had become most popular with the Afghans, and had won the respect and regard of everyone in our own Army. With such examples as these, he thought there could never again be a question of not placing the Native officers in positions of command.
  VISCOUNT CRANBROOK: I am extremely gratified that my noble and gallant Friend has spoken, as he informed me that he would do, in the terms which he has done of the Native Army. I feel, myself, that I made an omission in not more specially referring to the services of that Army, and, perhaps, your Lordships will now forgive my adding this one word on the subject. Besides our own Native troops there was a contingent of 4,000 furnished by some of the Native Princes, and one of those Princes has been awarded the Grand Cross of the Star of India. With regard to the absence of despatches, I felt the difficulty to which the noble Earl (Earl Granville) referred. The despatches narrating all that has happened have not yet come home. I expected that they would have been here by this time, and I understand that they are coming. The precedents of the Duke of Wellington and Sir Robert Peel scarcely apply to this case. We knew, day by day, through the public journals from their Correspondents on the spot, every incident that has taken place, and I have furnished every telegram which gave any information with regard to operations in the field. Such was not the case in the time to which the noble Earl referred. I think that it may be said that, generally, your Lordships are in full possession of the facts of the war. With regard to Lord Lytton, this is the first time that I have heard he gave any directions with regard to the force to be used against Ali Musjid. Sir Samuel Browne crossed the Frontier, and the same day he attacked Ali Musjid; and it was abandoned in the night, and occupied next day. I do not see how there could have been such orders. In
  20
  regard to the commissariat of the Candahar column, Lord Lytton gave all the orders that were necessary. The difficulties were immense; there was great difficulty in obtaining beasts of burthen, and a long line had to be maintained; and it would be rather a strong measure to hold Lord Lytton, who was at Calcutta or Simla, responsible for the conduct of the details of the commissariat on that line. General Biddulph has informed me that the difficulties with regard to the commissariat of this column have been greatly exaggerated.
  Motion agreed to, nemine dissentiente.
  Ordered, That the Lord Chancellor do communicate the said Resolutions to the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, and that his Lordship he requested to communicate the same to the several Officers referred to therein.

CRIMINAL LUNATICS.

  OBSERVATIONS.
  VISCOUNT MIDLETONrose to call attention to the Petition of the Representatives of 32 county and five borough Asylums, against the placing of criminal lunatics in county lunatic asylums. The noble Lord said, that the practice had arisen of sending persons who became lunatics during a sentence of imprisonment to county lunatic asylums. That practice was very objectionable, because county asylums were not prisons, nor were their staff and attendants warders; but not only were criminal lunatics more dangerous than other lunatics, but their presence in ordinary asylums rendered the treatment of the other lunatics more difficult. He believed that such persons could be amply provided for in one or two prisons at the disposition of the Home Secretary—the expense, of course, to be borne by the counties. The question had been considered in France and in the United States, and the separation of these prisoners from others was indispensable. He wished to ask the Government whether they were prepared to carry out some such an arrangement as he suggested?
  EARL BEAUCHAMPsaid, that the matter referred to by his noble Friend was of a difficult and complicated character, having to do with no fewer than 19 Acts of Parliament, and numerous local practices. There was, therefore, considerable difficulty connected with the subject; but he could assure

  21
  his noble Friend it had received the best attention of the Government, and reports had been asked for from persons qualified to express an opinion on the subject. The object of the Petitioners was to prevent criminal lunatics being sent to county lunatic asylums; but it should be remembered that a prisoner having undergone the punishment to which he was sentenced, and having become a lunatic, was entitled to be placed on the same footing as an ordinary lunatic. He did not propose to follow his noble Friend in the question of expense; but he was glad to hear him say that the expense of the new asylums which he contemplated would be borne by the counties. When these asylums, which would have to be constructed, were built, the question of expense would have to be considered. It was matter of great regret that some of these asylums were choked with a number of chronic lunatics. His noble Friend had spoken of classification; but the actual commission of crime, he feared, was not a sufficient test. The careful attention of the Home Secretary was being given to the subject, and he hoped the result would be some solution of one of the greatest difficulties connected with lunacy.

PARLIAMENTARY REPORTING—THE HOUSE OF LORDS.

  OBSERVATIONS. QUESTION.
  LORD SUDELEY: My Lords, in rising to call your attention to the Report of the Select Committee of the House of Commons on Parliamentary Reporting, appointed by the Government, and which Report has been communicated to your Lordships' House, I feel that it is only necessary to do so to insure a satisfactory settlement of the question. At present, and for many years past, the reports of Parliamentary proceedings in both Houses of Parliament have been entirely dependent upon the voluntary efforts, so far as the production of these reports is concerned, of the newspaper proprietors, whose interests, very often, will not allow of their giving a full report. For a more complete record of our proceedings, in both this House and the other House of Parliament, we are indebted to Mr. Hansard for the only trustworthy report of the Parliamentary debates which are in
  22
  existence. It is well known that for many years that gentleman has devoted himself to the extremely laborious task of collating, correcting, and supplementing the reports which appear in the newspapers, of the debates, both in this and the other House of Parliament; and we must all gladly acknowledge that he performs that duty with great ability and energy, and with the most untiring courtesy. Unfortunately, however, the necessity for complying with the great demands upon the space of the newspapers renders it extremely difficult to devote many columns to the publications of our proceedings. The difficulty, we know very well, is owing to the increase of population, the commercial activity of the country, the advance of science, which has rendered it comparatively easy to transmit news rapidly from almost every part of the world, and various other causes. The consequence has been that the space devoted to Parliamentary reports has become less and less. And there is another element, and that is one which, no doubt, greatly actuated the managers of newspapers—namely, that the public like to see reports of, what I may term, highly special and sensational intelligence extended to their utmost limits, far better than any details of Parliamentary debates. The result has been that, year after year, the reports of debates not only here, but in the other House of Parliament, have been everywhere curtailed. My Lords, there is also another cause which leads to the curtailment, and to the inaccuracy of the reports of the debates which take place in your Lordships' House, and that is the extreme difficulty of hearing, especially in the Reporters' Gallery; and the complaint made by the reporters is that even if they have instructions to report the debates fully they experience the greatest difficulty in carrying out their instructions. I have myself often noticed the anxious and even painful expression with which the reporters regard the speaker, and strain forward their necks in their endeavours to hear him distinctly, and some have gone so far as to say it is perfect torture. If that difficulty is felt by experienced reporters, even when those noble Lords who occupy important and responsible positions are speaking, how much more difficult it must be in the case of those

  23
  who only occasionally address your Lordships, and who often speak in a tone that is difficult to be heard even in the body of the House. It is very easy to see how almost impossible it is for Mr. Hansard to collate a correct report of the proceedings under such circumstances, and it is well known that even lately, and on several occasions, speeches and even lengthened reports of the debates appearing in the newspapers have gone out to India and to the Home Colonies, having a very different tone from that which characterized them in this House, and conveying very opposite impressions of what your Lordships may have said. Now, my Lords, if this be the case in regard to the debates in your Lordships' House, it seems to me that it is high time that some remedy should be applied.
  My Lords, so long ago as the year 1877 a discussion took place upon the question of Parliamentary reporting in the other House of Parliament. In the course of that discussion opinions were expressed against having an official report; but a strong desire was manifested in favour of strengthening the hands of Mr. Hansard so that his record of the proceedings of the House of Commons should be a thoroughly good one. Well, my Lords, in the course of the following autumn negotiations were entered into between the Chancellor of the Exchequer and Mr. Hansard, and in December of that year an agreement was made that for a small subsidy of £2,000 a-year Mr. Hansard should employ reporters in the Gallery, who should report the discussions on Private Bills, by order, upon all matters in Committee on Public Bills and in Supply, and all discussions continued after half-past 12 o'clock at night; and, generally, that he should improve the tone of the debates, so far as reporting is concerned. Then, my Lords, in the following year, 1878, a Committee was appointed to investigate the whole matter. That Committee sat throughout the whole of the Session, and was re-appointed in the present Session, and have only lately made their Report. That Report confirms very fully the views which the Chancellor of the Exchequer took at that time. In their Report the Committee state that, although they deprecate an official report, they think that the temporary agreement made by the Chancellor of
  24
  the Exchequer has had a very satisfactory result, and they state that the Committee are of opinion that the arrangement with Mr. Hansard is a very good one, because it provides for a record of the proceedings which are not otherwise reported, but for which record, Mr. Hansard, not the House, is responsible, and they recommend a continuance of the arrangement; but they also express an opinion that Mr. Hansard should make provision for a more frequent publication of the debates, even although it may be attended with an increased cost, and, consequently, impose an additional charge upon the Votes, if it should appear that the present contribution is not sufficient. They further recommend that proper accommodation should be made for Hansard's reporters in the Gallery. My Lords, remarkable as it may appear, Mr. Hansard not only has no special reporter in the Gallery of your Lordships' House at all; but, at the present moment, there is not even a seat in your Lordships' Gallery which may be thus occupied. Surely, my Lords, this is a state of things that cannot be satisfactory; and not only is it unsatisfactory to the outside public, but I think that your Lordships will admit, when you receive the proofs of your speeches for the purpose of correction, that it is eminently unsatisfactory to your Lordships. I remember very well, some years ago, that the late Prime Minister (Mr. Gladstone), on one occasion, said that it took him two hours to correct a speech that only took him one hour to deliver, although he at that time had far greater facilities for comparing his speech as reported in the public Press than your Lordships have now, in order to see what you have actually said, as there were then four newspapers that reported fully. My Lords, I could quote many other instances, but I do not wish to take up your Lordships' time by doing so; but I may mention that I recently wrote a note to Mr. Hansard, and asked his opinion upon this question. I will read a letter which I received in reply. It is as follows:—
  "July 31st, 1879.
  "4, Paper Buildings, Temple, E.C.
  "My LORD,—In answer to your inquiry, I have not changed the opinion I expressed to your Lordship in 1877—that official reports of the debates in the Imperial Parliament are becoming more and more a necessity, and that the

  25
  want of such a record of the reasoning and argumentative part of legislation is of great detriment to the deliberate functions of Parliament, and to the due administration of the Executive Government.
  "It is true that since that opinion was given the defect has been materially supplied in the other House of Parliament, through the arrangement made with me in 1877–8, by which some stages of debates are now specially reported; and I am informed that the result is so satisfactory that nothing better is desired. But this applies to the House of Commons only—the House of Lords is left in the same condition as heretofore.
  "Now, my Lord, it seems to me to amount to a great defect in our Parliamentary system, that the deliberations of an Assembly which consists of, presumably, the highest educated class in the Empire, and certainly embraces within its numbers the most accomplished statesmen and diplomatists, the most experienced lawyers, and the greatest commanders and administrators, should be lost to the country.
  "And I would remind your Lordship that no small part of these cultivated intellects have been translated from the House of Commons, where their utterances were fairly reported, to the House of Lords, where they are hardly reported at all.
  "It is, I may say, a national disaster that such an Assembly should have no sufficient record of its deliberations.
  "There is no difficulty as to the remedy. A staff of skilful reporters could be readily organized or trained.
  "They should consist of gentlemen of education, capable of dealing intelligently with subjects of the highest politics, and should be provided with accommodation—as is done for the reporting staff of the Colonial and Continental Legislatures—on the floor of the House.
  "I do not think the expense should be a consideration; but it would be small in comparison with the importance of the object.
  "I have the honour to be
  "Your Lordship's faithful servant,
  "THOMAS C. HANSARD.
  "The right hon.
  Lord SUDDELEY."
  My Lords, all that I now ask is that what has been done in the House of Commons should be done in your Lordships' House; for it seems to me that your Lordships are at least entitled to have as good a report as the other branch of the Legislature, and it is of the greatest importance that what your Lordships say should be properly reported, especially as the number of hours we sit, as compared with the Sittings of the House of Commons, is extremely small. No doubt, some difficulty may arise as to where Mr. Hansard's reporters may have to sit; but I am informed that there really would be no serious difficulty in putting his reporters
  26
  on the floor of the House, and it would not be inconsistent with the dignity of this House that they should sit at the Table, as our clerks do, in wig and gown. I think we might readily find some place, if not at the Table of the House, a little behind at another table, and as it would be only necessary to provide seats for two, arrangements might be made so that they might not interfere with the convenience of the House. However, my Lords, this is mere matter of detail, which is capable of easy settlement. So far as the newspapers are concerned, of course, we cannot oblige them to give us longer reports; but I think that the proper thing to do would be to give the reporters, at any rate, an opportunity of hearing and reporting what your Lordships say, if they like to do so. It was only a short time ago that the noble and learned Earl who sits on the Woolsack made a proposal which, I have been told, was thought to be of a most revolutionary character. He proposed that the Galleries should be doubled, for giving additional accommodation for ladies; and if that is ever carried out, it seems to me that if you were to put the newspaper reporters in the centre of each side Gallery, immediately over your Lordships, a very great improvement would be made, and the reporters would hear the debates very much better. Another plan might be that the Reporters' Gallery should be brought further forward. I do hope that something will be done, at any rate, to secure at least as much as has been obtained in the House of Commons. No one can doubt that every facility should be given to the public Press for hearing in both Houses. My Lords, the Question which I have to put is—Whether the Government will take into consideration the expediency of making some arrangement for having better reports taken of the debates in this House, similar to that which has already been adopted in the other House of Parliament during the past two Sessions, and which the Select Committee have recommended should be continued and extended?
  LORD DENMAN: My Lords, I do not myself think that it is worth while to pay any individuals for the sake of a verbatim report. What is of more importance is the impressions we produce upon each others' minds by what we say in the course of debate; and if anything wrong

  27
  has taken place, and the report of what we have said gives rise to any misconception abroad, we have the privilege of coming down here and addressing your Lordships, and repairing the error if the reporter has made any mistake. I must confess that I have felt it a little hard, when occasionally my name has appeared in the newspapers, accompanied by the remark, "after a few words," as if what I had said was not worthy of being reported; and I would rather have my name omitted altogether. I am aware that it is said that "brevity is the soul of wit;" and on one occasion the noble Earl the Leader of the Opposition said that he wished the debates of your Lordships' House should be short; but I do hope that your Lordships will not adopt anything that will tend to make you responsible for the reports which appear of what is said in this House. There is really no authority to report our speeches at all. What we say is to convince one another, and to influence each others' votes, and I think it will be a much more dignified course to pursue if we remain as we are, and not change our mode of proceedings in any way, rather trusting to the common sense of what is uttered to secure for those utterances a proper report, thus leaving our words to work their own way, and produce their own natural effect, without the necessity of making any of the changes which the noble Lord has proposed.
  THE EARL OF BEACONSFIELD: My Lords, I think that this is rather a difficult subject, and I do not quite understand what is the real object which the noble Lord who has introduced the subject wishes to obtain. He complains, or the House generally complains, that the declarations made in this House, either by Members of Her Majesty's Government or by influential Members of the Opposition, not being reported with accuracy or at length, great misconception is occasioned thereby in foreign countries or in our own Colonial Dependencies; and, certainly, if that be so, it is a very great evil. But, my Lords, I cannot in any way collect from the noble Lord that the arrangements which have been made in the House of Commons, which he wishes to be applied to this House, would meet the difficulty, or tend to remove it in any way. The arrangement made in the House of Com-
  28
  mons with Mr. Hansard, as I collect it from the noble Lord, is, no doubt, as far as it goes, a very good arrangement for the purpose of securing for the House of Commons a correct record of what has taken place. But, my Lords, I apprehend that we want something more than that. We do not want merely to have a correct record to be found only in Mr. Hansard's Volumes, to which we may subscribe, or which we may refer to if we do not subscribe, but which will not affect public opinion, because the world in general will not take its views of what occurs in Parliament from this particular record, however authoritative it may be, as an accurate record of the proceedings of the House of Commons. But that is, really, not what is required. We want more than that. We desire that the reports of what takes place in the two Houses of Parliament should be accurately—that is to say, with fair accuracy—conveyed to the millions, I should say, who read the English newspapers. Well, you may obtain that in the House of Commons either by the journals themselves, or the Government or the Houses of Parliament establishing a body of reporters, so skilled, so accomplished, and so experienced, that they will furnish a report similar in its general character to that which we have for many years enjoyed, but still more remarkable for its finish and accuracy. But, my Lords, although you may, in the House of Commons, feel it your duty to establish a body of reporters, and thereby obtain very desirable advantages, still, in this House, where the debates are generally much shorter, where they are uncertain, but where, occasionally, subjects are discussed at much greater length, it would be almost impossible to establish a body of reporters similar to that which has been indicated as having been established in the House of Commons, and which could not be obtained without incurring considerable expense. I do not see exactly how the object which the noble Lord desires, which is that we should have a condensed record, is to be obtained by adopting the arrangement that has been made in the House of Commons. The arrangement which has been made there will, no doubt, secure an accurate record of what takes place; but it cannot secure that it shall come into the hands of the nation, so that they may be per-

  29
  fectly acquainted with what their Representatives think and say. I think that the best course we can take, under existing circumstances, is really not to endeavour to follow exactly the arrangements which the House of Commons has adopted, but to appoint a Committee of our own, and if your Lordships approve of the suggestion, I will move, next Session, that there shall be a Committee appointed to consider and report upon the question, in order to see what are the best steps to be taken to secure what you want—namely, an accurate and efficient Report of the proceedings of your Lordships' House.
  EARL GRANVILLE: I am very glad that the noble Earl opposite has come to the conclusion which he has indicated. I quite concur with the noble Lord who introduced the subject that it is one of considerable importance, and I was just saying to him that I should make the same suggestion to your Lordships which the noble Earl has made. There is, however, one point on which I think there is some misconception, and that is with respect to this House being such a very bad place to hear in. I have myself noticed, on more than one occasion, when Her Majesty has opened Parliament in person, and when the House has been crowded in every part, that every single word that fell from Her Majesty when reading the Speech has been distinctly heard from one end of the House to the other; and also that when the noble and learned Earl on the Woolsack reads the Speech from the Throne, and your Lordships are silent, every word reaches the ears of all who are in the House. I think, my Lords, that a great deal of the difficulty that occurs is occasioned by ourselves and by the tone in which we speak. We mutter; we talk to each other in colloquial tones across the Table, and we do not at all facilitate the work of the reporters. I think that if we all addressed the House in the manner which I am bound to say the Prime Minister generally does, the complaints made by the reporters of the speakers being inaudible in the Gallery would be much rarer than they are. The question is a very difficult one; but it is one that is very important to the House. Many of us, and especially those who fill, or have filled, an official position, have, I think, no right to complain of the way in which
  30
  the reporters treat us; but when independent Members make unexpected speeches, and contribute valuable remarks, which are condensed into a few lines, a great loss is sustained by the public. I think it will be an advantage if the noble Earl will carry out his suggestion, and move for the appointment of a Select Committee to consider the subject, so that we may have the opportunity of hearing some evidence, not only from Mr. Hansard, but also from those newspaper reporters who are so generally in attendance upon your Lordships' House.

EAST INDIA LOAN (CONSOLIDATED FUND) BILL.—(No. 172.)

  SECOND READING.
  (The Viscount Cranbrook.)
  Order of the Day for the Second Reading, read.
  Moved, "That the Bill be now read 2a."—(The Viscount Cranbrook.)
  THE EARL OF NORTHBROOKsaid, that he had expected their Lordships would have received from the Secretary of State some explanation of this measure. He (the Earl of Northbrook) had expressed his opinion on a former occasion that the Afghan War had been the direct consequence of the state of affairs in Europe, and had not arisen from anything immediately connected with our Indian Empire, and, therefore, that the charge ought not to be thrown on the Indian finances. Her Majesty's Government had intimated that they might do something to relieve India; but, if this Bill was intended to carry out that intimation, no more unsatisfactory result could be imagined. The question resolved itself into this—had the war in Afghanistan been undertaken purely for Indian purposes, or had it not been rather for European purposes? If the war was an Indian war, it was a very bad precedent that assistance should be given to India from the Consolidated Fund. If, on the other hand, the war had been undertaken mainly for European purposes, then England ought to bear some substantial share of the cost. This was a miserable proposal. The Government of this country proposed to assist the Indian Government to the extent of £60,000 a-year for a few years, and would then throw on India the task

  31
  of repaying £2,000,000 by yearly instalments. It might be much less inconvenient to Indian finance if the Government of India were to borrow the money in the open market. The death of Shere Ali had enabled the war to be rapidly brought to a conclusion. He hoped that Yakoob Khan—for his (the Earl of Northbrook's) intervention on whose behalf he had been taken to task by the noble and learned Earl on the Woolsack a few months ago—having been well treated by the Government of India in times past, would be loyal to his engagements, and that the results of the Afghan War in the future would be satisfactory. But he confessed he looked with apprehension to some of the terms of the Treaty which had been laid on the Table, as he believed the effect of them would be to throw upon Indian finances burdens of a very serious nature. As yet no explanation had been given, though on several occasions, both in that and the other House of Parliament, Her Majesty's Government had promised to make a statement of their objects and intentions with respect to the rectification of the North-West Frontier. He had learned from the ordinary sources of information that the Chancellor of the Exchequer said that he had forgotten the promise. It was to be hoped, however, that some statement on the subject would be made in the other House of Parliament. He had seen the other day a comment on the Treaty by one of the most competent authorities—an officer of the highest position, occupying a seat in the Indian Council, a member, he believed of the Political Committee of that Council, and, therefore, in confidential communication with the noble Viscount. In default of information from Her Majesty's Government, he turned with interest and curiosity to the Paper written by Sir Henry Rawlinson, and published the other day. As a question of policy, and with a regard to financial considerations, all would agree that there were three objects which should be kept in view with respect to the North-West Frontier of India. The first was to keep on good terms with the wild Tribes on the Border, so far as was possible, punishing them, of course, if they molested British subjects. The next thing we should desire was such a condition of affairs in Afghanistan that it should be "a strong, independent,
  32
  and friendly Power"—words used by Her Majesty's Government on several occasions. The third was that the susceptibilities of two great nations should be considered—Russia in Central Asia, and England in India. It was desirable for the peace of that part of the world that there should be between those two great Empires some independent territory. That was the view entertained by the Governments of this country during many years. What, then, was to be deduced from Sir Henry Rawlinson's Paper with respect to these three points? With respect to the Tribes, he was sorry to say Sir Henry Rawlinson held out slight hopes that the Treaty would improve our relations with them. After enumerating the Tribes with which the new Frontier would bring us into contact, the names of which would be unfamiliar to their Lordships, Sir Henry Rawlinson added that—
  "Our relations with the independent Afghan Tribes must be largely developed, and therein lies the danger, or rather the inconvenience, of the new situation."
  Some time ago, the Prime Minister recounted the different expeditions during many years against those Tribes, and said that since 1848 some 60,000 men had been employed in those expeditions. But the noble Earl omitted to notice that during the last 10 or 12 years such expeditions had become very much less frequent owing to the judicious policy which had been pursued. If we pushed on our posts far from India, it must give rise to quarrels with the Tribes; these quarrels must occasion expeditions, and that must lead to disturbance and expense. As to the second point, should we have a strong as well as an independent Afghanistan? That we should have a friendly Afghanistan he hoped; that we should have an independent Afghanistan with this Treaty none of their Lordships could expect. Afghanistan had become a subordinate State as regarded the British Power. Sir Henry Rawlinson gave what seemed to him (the Earl of Northbrook)to be a most disheartening account of the position of Afghanistan after the war. He said there was already an insurrection in one of the Northern districts, that there was reason to apprehend a similar revolution at Herat, and that a pretender was prepared to come down and try his chance at Balkh. If this was a correct view of

  33
  the prospects of Afghanistan—and no one had better sources of information than Sir Henry Rawlinson—in his (the Earl of Northbrook's) opinion, it was out of the question that Afghanistan should be so strong as it was in the time of Shere Ali, or in the latter years of his father, Dost Mahomed. With regard to the third point, as to an interval between the Russian and the British Dominions in the East, Sir Henry Rawlinson, or some friend of his, appeared to have been told by a high Russian functionary that the Afghan War would compel the Russians to take Merv, whether they liked it or not—
  "Our Empire," he is reported to have said, "is founded on prestige as much as yours; and it becomes, therefore, a matter of State necessity that we should redress the balance in Central Asia."
  What Her Majesty's Government had done would, in his (the Earl of North-brook's) opinion, have the effect of producing the very result which it was desired to avert—namely, that the Russian Empire would become conterminous with the British Empire. He could not come to any other conclusion than that this peace would have the effect of throwing greater and increasing expenses upon India. Her Majesty's Government ought, in his judgment, to have accepted some, at any rate, of the liabilities which had been thrown upon India, not, as he contended, for Indian interests, but for some other purposes that had not yet been explained. In the winter of 1877, the noble Marquess the present Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had to consider two very important proposals which were made to the Government of India. One was a proposal for making an alteration in the administration of the North-West Provinces, and Lord Salisbury, in a despatch dated the 29th of November, 1877, addressed to the Governor General of India in Council, said—
  "A policy of conquest on your north-west frontier would lead to no advantage which would in any degree countervail the certain financial and political embarrassment it would cause."
  Another matter of importance came under consideration in the year 1877—namely, the occupation of the post of Quettah. While approving a temporary occupation, Lord Salisbury gave strict injunctions that nothing should be done which would lead to the supposition that
  34
  British troops were to remain permanently at Quettah. His Lordship, in a despatch to the Governor General of India, dated the 13th of December, 1877, said—
  "It is a grave matter for the Indian Government to undertake the pacification, or the control, of any portion of the wild district which lies outside its frontier. It cannot lightly abandon responsibilities it has once acknowledged. It cannot recede at will from any position it has once occupied. Dangers and difficulties, of which the chances ought to be deeply weighed before any advance is made, will not furnish subsequently a justification for a retreat; on the contrary, they may make it impossible to withdraw from an undertaking of which the inutility has been recognized."
  The opinion given by Her Majesty's Government was that an extension of Frontier would be detrimental to the interests of India, and that opinion was expressed after the suspension of our relations with Shere Ali, and the withdrawal of the British Native Agent from his Court. Pending further explanation from Her Majesty's Government, he was entitled to assert that there must be a reason connected in some way with the policy of Her Majesty's Government in Europe that had dictated arrangements which, in his opinion, and in the opinion of Lord Salisbury in the winter of 1877, were injurious to the interests of India. Speaking of the question of expense, Sir Henry Rawlinson frankly said that he did not pretend to look on the new Frontier arrangements as economical, and that he should be surprised if they did not entail an increase of expenditure. The moral to be drawn from the war, now fortunately concluded, appeared to him (the Earl of Northbrook) to be that we need no longer give credence to those persons who had been trying to frighten us with apprehensions of danger from Russia. He believed he was not wrong in saying that the difficulty of transporting the ammunition and provisions of the small Force we sent to Candahar was at one time so great that it would have been impossible for us to make any material further advance in that direction. Instead, then, of making the recent extension of our Frontier, it appeared to him that we ought to have been content with what we had done. We ought to have seen that the success of our arms was sufficient to establish the prestige of this country, and that the difficulties of transport in those districts were so great

  35
  that we need not be afraid of any attacks from without. For his own part, he did not believe in our weakness. He thought that we were strong in India, and that we could afford to despise altogether the panic-mongers who, from time to time, endeavoured to frighten the people of England. The real danger to India was increased taxation. There were some taxes imposed on India, especially the licence tax, which were oppressive, and which ought to be taken off at the earliest possible opportunity. He regretted that Her Majesty's Government had not placed a fair share of the expenses of the war on the Imperial Exchequer, instead of throwing the whole burden, as this Bill practically did, on the people of India, who were scarcely able to bear the charges at present imposed upon them.
  LORD STANLEY OF ALDERLEYsaid, besides the reasons stated by the noble Earl who had just sat down (1he Earl of Northbrook) why Her Majesty's Government should have charged the expenses of the Afghan War upon England and not upon India, there was this, that Her Majesty's Government said that India had a surplus available for it. But this surplus was not available, since it was the Famine Fund raised by an increase of the salt tax—that most oppressive of all taxes—and Sir John Strachey had promised that this Famine Fund should not be diverted to any other purpose. The discontent as to this had now extended from the Natives of India to the English, and we now heard that the language of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce on the subject having been disapproved of, the Chairman, Mr. Yule, and the Committee had resigned, and had been reelected. The noble Earl who spoke last referred to recent beeches of Lord Salisbury. In one of these he said that the North-West Frontier of India was fixed and immovable. Her Majesty's Government would have to ask themselves which words would be most enduring—their own words, that they wanted a scientific Frontier; or the words, "Cursed is he that removeth his neighbour's landmark?"
  VISCOUNT CRANBROOKadmitted that the noble Earl (the Earl of North-brook) was in his right in bringing forward, on the second reading of this Bill, any question connected with India which he might desire to submit to the con-
  36
  sideration of the House. He should have thought, however, that it would have been more consistent with the courtesy due from one noble Lord to another, and with the practice usually pursued in this House, if public or private Notice had been given of the attack which the noble Earl was about to make on the policy of Her Majesty's Government. That Bill was simply a question as to whether this country should advance £2,000,000 to India for a certain number of years in order that, under her extreme pressure from Famine and other causes, India might not have to bear additional taxation. The noble Earl opposite complained of want of opportunity, but had a perfect right to put on the Notice Paper any Motion he pleased since the Treaty of Gandamak had been laid on the Table—it had been laid upon the Table some time since, and no notice had been taken of it. There was no want of time in that House for discussion of any great question. As to the Government coming down to the House and making a statement, he had never undertaken to do anything of the kind. He told the noble Earl that he should have certain Papers when they were in a condition to be produced, and so he should; and one despatch which had arrived would be put on the Table as soon as possible. The noble Earl spoke of the war being for British and not Indian interests. What did the noble Earl mean by "Indian interests?" and how did he separate them from the interests of this country? For himself, he had intimated from the beginning that it was his opinion that India ought to pay for this war, and that it was a war waged for the interests of India, and to give her security and peace. When the balance was struck of the cost incurred by England for her Indian Possessions, directly and indirectly, it would be found that she had not been niggardly. When the noble Earl assumed that the article written by Sir Henry Rawlinson had been written under his inspiration, he must say that he did not even know that Sir Henry Rawlinson had written the article until he took up the copy of The Nineteenth Century, in which it appeared, on Saturday, to read another article it contained, which, from its authorship, demanded attention. It was a remarkable thing, however, that those who thought with the noble Earl, and

  37
  he thought the noble Earl himself, referred in the most depreciatory tone to Sir Henry Rawlinson's writings, and called their author a Russophobist. The article now in question was not written to order, but written in conformity with Sir Henry Rawlinson's private opinions, expressed before in all forms and shapes. He had nothing at all to say to its publication, and was not responsible for a single word of it. But, having read the article that day, he said that the noble Earl had misread or misrepresented it, and that, so far from being against the Treaty with Afghanistan, the article was in its favour.
  THE EARL OF NORTHBROOKexplained, that he had brought forward from that article certain statements, and those statements—which he had read accurately to their Lordships—bore out the opinion he had himself expressed. He had not further alluded to the article.
  VISCOUNT CRANBROOKsaid, again, that the article was in favour of the Treaty, and the noble Earl led the House to believe it was not; but he (Viscount Cranbrook) would appeal to all who heard the noble Earl whether such was not their impression. He took exception to another point in the noble Earl's speech. The noble Marquess the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (the Marquess of Salisbury) had left the House; and the noble Earl, having given him no Notice, took occasion to quote certain passages from the noble Marquess's speech or despatch, without giving his noble Friend an opportunity of contradicting him, or of giving such an explanation as he himself had just given in respect to Sir Henry Rawlinson's article. He supposed that the noble Earl was going out of town, and thought it so important that the world should know his opinions, that, departing from his usual courtesy, he snatched the occasion of this Bill for discussing the whole policy of the Indian Government. He was ready to meet the noble Earl; but the occasion was not a fit one, when no Notice had been given, and the House was empty. The noble Earl was taking advantage of the House, and of those who were absent, in calling upon them to engage in such a discussion now. He would only say he believed that that war was justly undertaken in the interest of India, and
  38
  to give security to India; and when the noble Earl quoted Sir Henry Rawlinson's article, and stated that there was no danger or apprehension, he said—without expressing any opinion of his own on the article—that Sir Henry Rawlinson held that there was a danger which they were guarding against by the stipulations of that Treaty. The noble Earl would lead people to believe that he had never negotiated with respect to Russia, and had had no dread of her. What, however, was the meaning of the negotiations with regard to their having a neutral zone between Russia in Central Asia and Afghanistan? Why did the noble Earl, when Viceroy, telegraph home that the late Ameer was afraid of Russia, and say he wished, in certain circumstances, to support the late Ameer with men, arms, and money—the very things provided for by the new Treaty? Yet the noble Earl now turned round on that which he had himself proposed. He said that the Government were taking steps for the security of India, and for economy connected with that security. In India there were many unhealthy posts which might be given up in consequence of the acquisitions or assignments which they had received. And when the noble Earl said they were going too far, and undertaking too much—why, the noble Duke (the Duke of Argyll) admitted that he would not have endured that Russia should have an Envoy at Cabul, but thought that was a little too strong for him. Neither told their Lordships what course they would have adopted to get rid of him. Reverting to the Bill before the House, the noble Earl said that to lend £2,000,000 to India without interest was a shabby proceeding. Those who were responsible for the finances of India did not so regard the measure. Her Majesty's Government had told them that they could not undertake to bear the cost of that war, which was an Indian war, just as the former Afghan War was, and as were all the wars for the protection of the Frontiers of India. And when the noble Earl said that Russia would not come there, or do this, or that, he asserted that it was for the interest of India that they should show they were able to prevent Russia from doing those things. We had our positions and our men in them, and the Government meant

  39
  to maintain them, and to act in the spirit which had hitherto guided them. They regarded the connection of India with England as being for the interest of India; and they thought that India ought to know that, when pressed down by the Famines which had almost crushed her to the dust, England would at such a period lend her money for a time, in order that they might not have to impose on her any of those taxes to which, owing to the repeal of the Income Tax by the noble Earl, they might otherwise have been driven to resort.
  THE MARQUESS OF RIPONadmitted that the article written by Sir Henry Rawlinson in The Nineteenth Century, which had been alluded to, was one in favour of the Treaty of Gandamak, so far as it went; but it was an article which, from beginning to end, was based on the supposition that that Treaty was only an instalment of a policy which ought to be pushed further. Its very last sentence told them that, in the present state of affairs in the East, it was simply fatuity if they did not, in spite of the Treaty, occupy Candahar. It also said that nobody supposed the arrangements with regard to the Frontier Tribes and the ceded districts were permanent, but were only the transition stage between independence and annexation. It was all very well for the noble Viscount to throw contempt on Sir Henry Rawlinson, as if he were a small authority. Last autumn, Sir Henry Rawlinson was the great authority of Her Majesty's Government. He was the real author and teacher of the policy which they had been pursuing. The Government were, perhaps, not very apt pupils; and the civil words which he used towards them were, doubtless, intended to induce them to follow him step by step. Sir Henry Rawlinson pointed out the legitimate conclusion to which the course in which the Government had embarked must lead them. They had also another authority in Sir Bartle Frere, and the public had had ample opportunity of judging of the value of his authority. It was, therefore, rather too much, when the noble Viscount threw over Sir Henry Rawlinson—an officer of great experience, ability, and knowledge. He strongly recommended everyone who was interested in these affairs to read this article, because in it they would find
  40
  a true statement by a most competent witness of the end towards which the policy of Her Majesty's Government was advancing. The noble Viscount had taken exception to a question of this kind being raised upon the present Bill; but he (the Marquess of Ripon) should have thought that his Parliamentary experience would have taught him that, this being a finance Bill, it was one upon which a discussion of this nature might very properly be raised. This policy was part of the general European policy of Her Majesty's Government; and, if that were the case, it would be a very harsh and undesirable proceeding to throw the whole of the ultimate charge of this war upon the finances of India. The Government appeared to have a fixed and settled determination to give to Parliament and the country no explanation of the policy of the Afghan War. At its commencement, they had been told one thing by one Minister and something else by another—the insolence of Shere Ali, and the necessity for securing a scientific Frontier, were both held out as the causes of it. But, in the opinion of Sir Henry Rawlinson, those were only the ostensible causes of it, and he indicated that there was something else behind. The noble Viscount had denied that he had given any promise to make a statement on the subject; and his right hon. Friend, in "another place," appeared to have forgotten all about a promise he had made there to the same effect. All this was quite consonant with the previous policy of Her Majesty's Government, which appeared to be to keep them without any definite information with regard to the war. All that they had given was a piece of paper containing the terms of the Treaty.
  THE LORD CHANCELLORsaid, he desired to correct a statement which had been made by the noble Marquess who had just sat down. The noble Marquess appeared to be under the impression that his noble Friend the Secretary of State had objected that it was incompetent to make any observations with regard to the Indian policy of Her Majesty's Government on the present Bill. What the noble Viscount complained of was that the noble Earl (the Earl of Northbrook) had taken occasion of this Bill to attack the policy of Her Majesty's Government in India without the courtesy, so generally observed in that

  41
  House, of giving Notice of his intention to do so. It was absolutely necessary that some preliminary information should have been given of this attack upon the policy of Her Majesty's Government, if not in the form of a Notice upon the Paper, at all events, in the form of a Notice to the individual whose character was to be impugned. The course adopted by the noble Earl opposite, however, had been so far successful that he had been able to make this attack upon Her Majesty's Government when only 10 or 12 Members of the House were present, the other noble Lords who might have desired to take part in a debate on the subject having left the House in entire ignorance that the noble Earl intended to move this question. Moreover, the noble Earl had spoken in a debate closely connected with Indian affairs earlier in the evening; but even then he had given no Notice of his intention to attack the Government on this point. The noble Marquess (the Marquess of Ripon) had stated that the Government had refused to give any information with regard to this question; but if the noble Marquess desired such information he should have taken the proper course, which was open to him, to obtain it. The noble Earl could not expect that Ministers of the Crown would be prepared to enter upon a discussion of such a subject as this without due Notice.
  EARL GRANVILLEremarked, that when the noble and learned Earl rose from the Woolsack he thought that they were going to hear some answer given to the observation of his noble Friend. The noble and learned Earl had, however, not given any such answer, but had certainly given further proof of the excitement which had come over two Members of Her Majesty's Government—an excitement which had shown itself in a degree rarely seen in that House. The noble Viscount had always shown a certain amount of animation; but the noble and learned Earl had hitherto spoken with calmness and deliberation. Tonight, however, they had rivalled each other in the excitement under which they had addressed the House. If Her Majesty's Government, when they proposed the second reading of this Bill, upon which the whole of this question turned, thought that because it had been debated in "another place," they were to
  42
  pass it through their Lordships' House without any examination, they were proposing a course that was wholly new to that House.
  THE DUKE OF RICHMOND AND GORDONsaid, the noble Earl seemed to find fault with both his noble Friends who had preceded the noble Earl on this occasion. The noble Earl spoke of the noble Viscount the Secretary of State for India as if he had objected to a discussion on the affairs of India in connection with this Bill.
  EARL GRANVILLE: I understood the noble Viscount objected that due Notice had not been given to the House and to himself that any discussion would arise upon this Bill.
  THE DUKE OF RICHMOND AND GORDON: Precisely so, and he thought his noble Friend was perfectly justified in the remarks he made. He said the noble Earl was perfectly justified in calling attention to the affairs of India; but that it would have been an act of courtesy, such as was usual in that House, to have given him some Notice of his intention. He doubted very much whether his noble Friend could have made out a better case than he had done on this occasion, however long such Notice might have been; but there were other Members of the House to whom a Notice might have been convenient as to a question in which the whole affairs of India were to be discussed, the merits of the Treaty gone into, and the speeches of eminent men brought forward in support of the views taken by the noble Earl. It would have been act of courtesy to the Prime Minister if he had some intimation that such a discussion was likely to arise. The same remark was true of his noble Friend the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, who had proceeded the noble Viscount as Secretary of State for India, and whose speeches had formed the text of the noble Earl's remarks. The noble Marquess had left that House without the smallest knowledge that any speeches of his would be referred to.
  Motion agreed to; Bill read 2a accordingly, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House To-morrow.
  House adjourned at Eight o'clock, till To-morrow, a quarter before Five o'clock.