QUESTION. OBSERVATIONS. (Hansard, 8 February 1878)

§ LORD HAMMOND,
on rising to put a Question of which he had given private Notice to the noble Earl the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, said, that if their Lordships permitted him to do so, he would wish to say a few words on a subject respecting which there was much misconception. He referred to the waterway of the Dardanelles and of the Bosphorus. The first Treaty bearing on this point—a Treaty only between Great Britain and Turkey—was the Treaty of the Dardanelles, the date of which was January 5, 1809. Article 11 of that Treaty stated— As ships of war have at all times been prohibited from entering the canal of Constantinople—namely, the Straits of the Dardanelles and of the Black Sea—and as this ancient regulation of the Ottoman Empire is in future to be observed by every Power in time of peace, the Court of Great Britain promises on its part to conform to this principle. The next Treaty bearing on the question was the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi between Russia and Turkey, and dated July 6, 1833. The secret Article of that Treaty was in these terms— The Sublime Ottoman Porte, in lieu of the succour which in case of need it is bound to afford, in conformity with the principle of reciprocity of Patent Treaty, shall confine its action in favour of the Imperial Court of Russia to closing the Strait of the Dardanelles—that is to say, to not allowing any foreign vessel of war to enter therein under any pretence whatever. That Treaty came to an end in eight years. The next Treaty referring to the matter was the Quintuple Treaty between England, Austria, Prussia, and Russia on the one part, and Turkey on the other, and dated July 15, 1840. Article 4 of that Treaty, after providing for the 1316 provisional protection of the Straits of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles by the four Powers against any attack of Mehemet Ali, such measure being considered as exceptional and as adopted, at the request of the Sultan, solely for the purpose specified, thus proceeded— That, saving that exception, the Sultan declares his firm resolution to maintain for the future the principle inviolably established as the ancient rule of his Empire, and, as long as the Porte is at peace, not to admit any foreign vessel of war within the Straits of the Bosphorus and of the Dardanelles. [At that time there was considerable discussion with France as to affairs in that part of the world. France was not a party to that Treaty. In fact, she was almost assumed to be hostile to the Allied Powers in respect to it. The Article went on to say]— On the other hand, the other contracting Powers engage to respect this determination of the Sultan's, and to conform themselves to the principles above set forth. An arrangement was effected by which the accession of France was secured, and on the 13th of July, 1841, there was a Treaty between the five Powers and the Porte, Article 1 of which stated— His Highness the Sultan, on the one part, declares that he is firmly resolved to maintain for the future the principle invariably established as the ancient rule of his Empire, and in virtue of which it has at all times been prohibited for the ships of war of foreign Powers to enter the Straits of the Dardanelles and of the Bosphorus, and that so long as the Porte is at peace, His Highness will admit no foreign ships of war within the said Straits. The five Powers, on the other part, "engage to respect this determination of the Sultan, and to conform themselves to the principle above declared." So matters went on until the eve of the breaking out of the Crimean War; but on October 4, 1853, Lord Stratford, in concurrence with the French Ambassador, and in consequence of the state of excitement at Constantinople, which gave serious reason to apprehend an outbreak, of which the Rayahs or Europeans would be the first victims, and which would even menace the Sultan's Throne, the Ministers of the Porte sharing the alarm, summoned, as did also the French Ambassador, two ships of war to Constantinople. In approving this course, Lord Clarendon said, September 23, 1853— 1317 Under ordinary circumstances, and as long as the Sultan does not declare war against Russia nor demand the presence of the British Fleet, we must scrupulously observe the Treaty of 1841, and your Excellency's original instruction in this respect remains in full force. But when it appears that the lives and properties of British subjects are exposed to serious danger and that the Turkish Government declares itself unable to avert that danger, it is clear that the Treaty has no longer a binding force upon us, and that urgent necessity supersedes its provisions. Your Excellency is therefore instructed to send for the British Fleet to Constantinople, and, in conjunction with the Admiral, to dispose of it in the manner you deem most expedient for protecting British interests and the personal safety of the Sultan; and Her Majesty's Government have no doubt that the Turkish Government will without hesitation furnish the necessary firmans for that object. Baron Brunnow, in a note dated September 13, 1853, said— That if it was true, as he learned, that the Sultan has summoned within the Straits foreign ships of war while peace continued to exist and had not been declared by any public, patent, formal act to be broken, he would assert that the Sultan had failed in an engagement imposed on him by a Treaty which he (Baron Brunnow) had signed, and that to his great regret he was bound at the same time to declare that the British Government, by complying with the invitation of the Sultan, contrary to that engagement, without previous deliberation with the other contracting parties had not acted in conformity with the principle which the Treaty of July 13 imposed on the Powers the obligation to respect. To this Lord Clarendon replied on the 1st of October,1853— That from the day on which the Principalities were occupied the Treaty, in accordance with its own provisions, has been suspended, and it rested with the Sultan and with Her Majesty's Government to determine at what time and for what purposes the British Squadron should enter the Dardanelles. The Porte has ceased to be at peace from the moment when the first Russian soldier entered the Danubian Principalities, and from that moment the Sultan had a right to invite the British Squadron into the Straits, and Her Majesty's Government had a right to send the British Squadron into, and, if necessary, through the Straits. Her Majesty's Ambassador had called up a portion of that Squadron not to favour an object on the part of the Divan of opposing fresh obstacles to the work of conciliation, out exclusively from apprehensions of local dangers to British life and property. The Treaty of March 30, 1856, respecting the Dardanelles was identical in its provisions with that of 1841. Prince Gortchakoff, in his Note of October 31, 1870, denouncing the neutralization 1318 clauses of the General Treaty of 1856, said that—"the so-called Straits Treaty closed the Straits only in time of peace to men-of-war." The Treaty of March 13, 1871, Article 2, said— The principle of the closing of the Straits of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus, such as it has been established by the separate Convention of March 30,1856, is maintained, with power to His Majesty the Sultan to open the said Straits in time of peace to the vessels of war of friendly and allied Powers, in case the Sultan should judge it necessary in order to secure the execution of the stipulations of the Treaty of Paris, March 30, 1856. It was clear that the closing of the Straits to ships of war of foreign Powers was only applicable to a state of things when the Sultan was at peace. He was not so now, and therefore we were free to go up with or without the consent of the Sultan, and specifically for the protection of British subjects and property; and therefore he now asked his noble Friend (the Earl of Derby) this Question, Whether any adequate provision had been made, or would be made, for the protection of the lives and property of British subjects at Constantinople, in the event of any popular outbreak by which they might be endangered?

§ EARL GRANVILLE
After the noble Earl has answered the Question of the noble Lord, perhaps he will allow me to ask—although it is a little irregular—if he will be good enough to state whether he has received any further information either from our Ambassador at Constantinople or our Ambassador at St. Petersburg, in addition to that which he gave to the House yesterday?

§ THE EARL OF DERBY
My Lords, my noble Friend who spoke first has only anticipated, by his Question, a statement which I was about to make to your Lordships, and that statement will include also an answer to the subsequent inquiry of the noble Earl (Earl Granville). I am not in a position to throw much light on the situation which was explained to your Lordships yesterday. But I have obtained from Mr. Layard the terms of the Armistice. They are, or will be, in a few minutes, laid on the Table, and will be in your Lordships' hands to-morrow. One condition of that Armistice is that the Turkish Forces are to evacuate the fortifications mentioned in it within seven days. It is not entirely clear to me, from the language used, what fortifications are included; 1319 but Mr. Layard ends his telegram by a statement to the effect that the "Turks have commenced the withdrawal of guns from Constantinople lines." It would seem, therefore, as I suggested yesterday might be the case, that the advance of the Russians has been not in contravention, but in pursuance of the conditions which were agreed on, and it also appears that the statement made by me on Mr. Layard's authority was correct—namely, that one of the conditions of the Armistice was, the abandonment, by Turkey, of the lines which protect her capital. My Lords, there is no evidence that I know of that the Russians intend to enter the city itself, though they have given no assurance beyond those which are before your Lordships' House, and which are entirely conditional, that they would not do so; but; it is obvious that as matters stand they can do so whenever they please, and that Constantinople is absolutely undefended. Well, my Lords, we have to consider, in that state of things, what are the probable, or the possible, results, and what steps it may be our duty to take. We have various communications—some very recent—and one to-day from Mr. Layard, in which he states in strong terms the danger that will exist of disorder and anarchy in the event of a Russian advance to the city. There can be no doubt that the public excitement in Constantinople is great, and that it is not likely to diminish. I am afraid I must also add that, in consequence of the policy of neutrality pursued by us during the war, it could not be expected that the same friendly feeling should exist towards us as was formerly entertained there, and that our influence there is not what it was in former years. On the one hand, any disorder in the city would be in itself a reason for Russian occupation; on the other hand, the fear of such occupation tends to produce disorder. We have many British subjects there, many vessels under the British flag, and many interests of various kinds to defend; and, after full consideration, we have thought it right that a detachment of the Fleet—not the Meet itself—should go up to afford protection in case of need—first to our own subjects, and next, if it be required, to others who may be in danger from an excited population. My Lords, we have been anxious in taking this step to avoid all appearance of 1320 menace or hostile demonstration; and we have, therefore, this day communicated to the neutral Powers our intention of taking it, and invited them to join by a similar proceeding on their part. Telegrams in this sense have been sent to Paris, to Rome, to Vienna, and to Berlin. We have also instructed our Ambassador at St. Petersburg to explain the object in view of which we have acted. I am not at present in a position to state what course has been taken by the other Powers; but I know that at least one foreign Government has, within the last 48 hours, applied to the Porte for a firman, empowering it to enter Turkish waters. My Lords, we are aware that there is a certain responsibility involved in taking this step; but we cannot forget that there is also a responsibility which attaches to the opposite course—the responsibility of leaving undefended those whom we are bound to protect and whom it is in our power to protect without difficulty or risk. My Lords, so long as the Armistice was unsigned, so long as military operations continued, it was at least open to argument—and to me the argument seemed conclusive—that to send any naval force to Constantinople was an unwise and dangerous policy. It might be regarded by the Turks as an encouragement to continue a resistance which had become hopeless; it might be taken by Russia as an act of hostility, or, at least, of defiance; and it might be considered by the people in this country as a first step towards a war which all but a very small section would deprecate. My Lords, I do not think these objections apply now. There is no Turkish resistance to encourage; there are no military operations in which we should even seem to be taking part. The great issues of the war are to be referred to European decision. The crisis is not over; far from it; and it is possible that the circumstances may be more difficult and more grave than they are at present; but matters have passed into a new phase. If this step had been taken unexplained, or when Parliament was not sitting, and prompt explanation was impossible, it might have led, no doubt, to misconstruction and alarm. But, with the explanation I have given, I think your Lordships will be satisfied that we do not propose to depart, in any respect, from our long-avowed and 1321 steadily maintained policy. In fact, if we had intended war, it would have been, not merely impolicy, but madness, to wait until the forces of Turkey were crushed in order to enter upon it. My Lords, we have lost not a day—hardly an hour—in explaining our course to Parliament, and thereby to the country, and to Europe; and we believe it will not be misunderstood.

§ EARL GRANVILLE
May I ask the noble Earl whether Her Majesty's Government have received permission from the Porte for the entrance of the detachment of the Fleet; and, if not, whether they have issued any instructions to the Admiral, in the event of such permission being refused? My Lords, in reference to what has fallen from the noble Earl, I will say but a word or two. There is no doubt that the step which Her Majesty's Government have taken is a grave one. Of that, I repeat, there can be no doubt. But, speaking on the impulse of the moment, I wish to express my satisfaction that, as it has been taken, measures have been adopted to guard it by giving to it as much as possible a European character; that the object of it has been clearly defined in a friendly communication to Russia; and that the noble Earl has explained to this House, and therefore to the country, an act of so much gravity in so perfect a tone and manner.

EARL DELAWARR
Will my noble Friend state what is the duration of the Armistice?

THE DUKE OF ARGYLL
Will my noble Friend state the terms of the Armistice? I understand they have been communicated to the other House.

§ THE EARL OF DERBY
I regret I have not with me the Paper containing the summary of the terms of the Armistice, but it will be in your Lordships' hands to-morrow morning. In reply to the Question of my noble Friend behind me (Earl De la Warr), the duration of the Armistice is indefinite; but if I am right in my construction of its terms, it may be determined at the expiration of three days. But that is probably nothing more than a formal notice. With regard to the very important Question of my noble Friend opposite (Earl Granville), it will be in the recollection of your Lordships that some time ago we applied for and obtained a firman from the Sultan for the passing of our Fleet through the 1322 Dardanelles. That firman, in consequence of circumstances which have been stated to your Lordships, was not acted upon; but the Porte conveyed a request to us that in any future case sufficient notice might be given, to prevent the possibility of any misunderstanding or confusion in the instructions to be given to the commanders of the forts. We assume that firman to be still in existence, and have given notice of our intention to act upon it; but have not applied for any fresh leave for the passage of the Fleet.