HL Deb 04 February 1878 vol 237 cc913-21
EARL DE LA WARR

said, he had given Notice that he would ask the attention of the noble Earl the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (the Earl of Derby) to the recent Correspondence relative to Turkey, with special reference to the Note addressed to Count Sehou-valoff on the 6th of May last. His noble Friend not having been able to inform their Lordships as to the actual terms of the armistice, and as the public reports of what had occurred were, it seemed to him (Earl De La Warr), far from satisfactory, his noble Friend would, perhaps, allow him to act on his Notice. He might, perhaps, mention, in passing, that he felt the unsatisfactory position of affairs, particularly with regard to the report that the fortresses on the Danube were to be evacuated by the Turks. That would have the effect of placing nearly the whole of Turkey practically under the power of Russia for the present. It was not his intention to enter upon the many and various questions of the past connected with the war between Turkey and Russia—a war which to all appearance was involving the ruin of a great Empire and desolating one of the fairest portions of Eastern Europe, and which was marked with horrors and sufferings almost beyond all precedent; but he wished to confine his few remarks as far as possible to the recent Correspondence on the affairs of Turkey in connection with the Note of his noble Friend the Foreign Secretary addressed to Count Schouvaloff on the 6th of May last. He believed that Note represented the policy of Her Majesty's Government. It had frequently been referred to in that sense, and in the communication of Her Majesty's Foreign Secretary to Count Schouvaloff, on the 13th of December last, it was quoted as enumerating what, "in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, would most directly affect British interests." It then proceeded to say— Among these it was stated that Her Majesty's Government wore not prepared to witness with indifference the passing of Constantinople into other hands than those of its present possessors. To this the Russian Government replied on the 18th of May last— Pour ce que concerne Constantinople, sans pouvoir préjuger la marche ni l'issue de la guerre, le Cabinet Impérial répéte q'une acquisition de cette capitale est exclue des vues de sa Majesté l'Empereur. Her Majesty's Government not being satisfied with this reply—under the circumstances, very rightly, as it appeared to him, no other communication having taken place on the question during the interval—in the despatch of the 13th of December last, added that the occupation of Constantinople by the Russian forces, even though it should be of a temporary character, and for military purposes only, would be an event which it would on all accounts be most desirable to avoid. In a later paragraph of the same despatch a similar statement was made with regard to the Dardanelles. Thus far, then, up to the 13th of December last, the policy of the Government was clear, and he believed it had been so accepted by the country since the despatch of the 6th of May. Confidence had been felt that the occupation of Constantinople and the Dardanelles by the Russians would not be permitted. Then let them look to what happened on the 16th of December. Prince Gortcha-koff informed Count Schouvaloff that the Russian Government requested Her Majesty's Secretary of State to define more clearly what were the British interests which might be affected by the eventualities of the war. To this Lord Derby replied on the 12th of January, in a despatch to Lord Augustus Loftus— That Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that any operations tending to place the passage of the Dardanelles under the control of Russia would be an impediment to the proper consideration of the terms of the final settlement between Russia and Turkey. He came then to the chief point to which he desired to ask the attention of his noble Friend. The occupation of Constantinople by Russian troops was there entirely omitted as a question in which British interests were concerned. It was the Dardanelles only which were mentioned, and this seemed to him to be a matter of very serious moment. Had anything occurred to render even the temporary occupation of Constantinople of less importance than it was on the 13th of December last? Were British interests in Constantinople less now than they were a short time ago either in a military, a political, or in a commercial point of view? If so, he was not aware when the change occurred. He did not doubt, or in any way distrust the assurances given by the Emperor of Russia that he had no intention of occupying Constantinople permanently; but military reasons might be urged for doing so for a short time, and possibly other reasons for doing so for a longer time; and what was the actual position of Constantinople at the present time? Why, it was practically invested, or very nearly so, on the land side. By the recent telegrams received from Mr. Layard, it appeared that the Russians had advanced to Rodosto on the Sea of Marmora on the right, extending their line almost to the Black Sea on the left; and on the 30th of January Mr. Layard telegraphed—"The Russians continue to advance on all sides." Now, if Russia should insist on possessing Constantinople, what could be said in answer to their demand for its occupation in a military point of view? He sincerely hoped that, although omitted in the despatch to which he had referred, Her Majesty's Government would re-echo the statement, andre-assure the country that the military occupation of Constantinople as well as that of the Dardanelles would be strenuously opposed. Much as there was reason to deplore the war and its results—and he confessed he could not witness unmoved the fall of a great Empire—a nation with whom we had been a long time in alliance, a people who had fought bravely for their country, for their independence and their homes, against a powerful enemy displaying equal gallantry; indeed, it was impossible to regard these events without deep concern—it would be not a less cause of dismay and apprehension for the future if the support in Parliament and elsewhere was withheld from Her Majesty's Government which would enable them to uphold British interests, to keep good faith as regarded the obligations of existing Treaties, and to stand upon what the country had from the first believed to be the intention of the Government, and upon which the country had relied. The country believed that though the policy had been one of neutrality, yet that it was a conditional neutrality, and that one of those conditions was that Constantinople and the Dardanelles should not be occupied by Russian troops.

THE EARL OF DERBY

My Lords, I think that many of the observations which have fallen from my noble Friend will commend themselves to your Lordships' attention. He commenced by lamenting the great sufferings which attended the progress of this war, and he expressed a feeling, which, if not universal, is certainly very generally concurred in by this House, of regret at the fall of a great Empire with which we have been long in alliance. My noble Friend has paid a compliment, to which I am sure none of your Lordships will take exception, to the gallantry displayed by the weaker party; and he went on to discuss the conditions of peace, so far as they are known, and the manner in which British interests are likely to be affected by them. But, my Lords, that part of the speech I can very easily pass over; because though he considers the bases of the terms of peace unsatisfactory, and though he considers that the evacuation of the Turkish fortresses on the Danube will leave a large portion of Turkish territory in Russian hands, still my noble Friend did not, and could not, point out any means by which these results could be avoided, except means the adoption of which I scarcely think he would have advised, and which, if adopted, would certainly not have been approved of by public opinion in this country. The Government of this country deliberately, and after full consideration of all the circumstances, declined to take part in the war which we hope is now come to an end. We assumed a position not of absolute, but of conditional neutrality; we defined the conditions on which that neutrality was based; those conditions, so far, have not been violated; and, that being so, we thus deliberately, by that act, put it out of our power to interfere with the results to which my noble Friend has alluded. We stated at the same time that while we claimed for this country no exclusive or exceptional privileges, we should yet, in common with the other Great Powers of Europe, claim a right to have a voice in the settlement of this question. That is the attitude we assumed at the first, which we have maintained to the end, and in which I believe we shall be upheld by the great body of the people; and I do not think, however lamentable may have been the consequences of the war, that any blame is attributable to Her Majesty's Government for them. I now come to the particular point which my noble Friend has raised, and which I am glad has been raised, because, although, for my own part, I do not think it was open to misunderstanding, the language of the Government in relation to the despatch of the 6th May has been misrepresented in some quarters in the manner indicated by my noble Friend, and some misunderstanding has arisen in consequence. My noble Friend's point, as I understand it, is this—that although in the despatch of the 6th of May we objected to Constantinople passing into Russian hands, and in the despatch of the 13th of December we say that we shall maintain our objection even to a temporary occupation, yet in our reply to the Russian Memorandum of the 16th of December, when the Russian Government asked what were our interests, we did not treat of Constantinople at all, and only spoke of the inconvenience which would arise from a Russian occupation of Gallipoli. If that is the construction which my noble Friend places upon our words, it certainly is not the construction which they wore intended to bear. We drew a marked distinction between the two questions of temporary or permanent occupation. We had stated that the acquisition of Constantinople by Russia would be inimical to our interests, and was one of those circumstances which would affect, if not put an end to our attitude of neutrality; but we said nothing, and we carefully avoided saying anything about the possibility of a temporary military occupation of Constantinople; and that was for various reasons. One was, because the two sorts of occupation—temporary, and for military purposes on the one hand, and permanent on the other—are in their nature different. Another was, that while there was no objection to saying that the acquisition of Constantinople by the Russians would be an infringement of British interests, clearly it would not have been desirable to tell the Turks that, if they wanted to drive us into war, all they had to do was to abandon Constantinople and leave it open to Russian occupation. If we had announced that to them, it was in their power to have involved us in war, whether we would or not. The language of the despatch which my noble Friend referred to was therefore purposely made general, and referred not to the military, but to the political act of taking possession by Russia of Constantinople. But, my Lords, on various occasions, and particularly one my noble Friend has alluded to—the despatch of the 13th of December—we supplemented our former communications on the point by saying that, although we had not referred to a temporary military occupation as an act which would call upon us to abandon our neutrality, still it was an act to which we entertained the gravest objection, and which we in every way deprecated. We did so on three grounds. In the first place, if allowed, it was impossible to doubt that the presence of the Russian forces in Constantinople would give a vehemence and a fresh impulse to the warlike feeling of this country which might be dangerous to the interests of peace. In the next place, it was impossible not to apprehend that even the temporary occupation of Constantinople would lead to great danger in a humanitarian point of view; because it would almost certainly be the means of raising the Mahomedans against the Christians, and the Christians against the Mahomedans, and tend to aggravate the danger which has existed at all times in the Turkish Empire, since the beginning of the present struggle, of a civil war between various religions and races. And, lastly, in our opinion, the occupation of so important a point as the Turkish capital would place the Russian Government in a position in which it was not desirable to see it placed with respect to the dictation of the terms of peace. We have, therefore, in terms deliberately considered, deprecated the temporary occupation by Russia of Constantinople. I shall quote our language, as given in a Memorandum communicated by me to Count Schouvaloff on the 13th of December— While appreciating the courtesy and friendly character of this answer, Her Majesty's Government feel that it does not sufficiently meet the dangers against which they desire to guard. They are strongly of opinion—an opinion which the course of events tends still more to confirm—that the occupation of Constantinople by the Russian forces, even though it should be of a temporary character and for military purposes only, would he an event which it would, on all accounts, be most desirable to avoid. They cannot conceal from themselves that if such an occupation appeared imminent, public feeling in this country, founded on a just appreciation of the consequences to be apprehended, might call for measures of precaution on the part of Great Britain from which they have hitherto felt justified in abstaining. It is with the view of avoiding what might endanger seriously the good relations happily maintained between the two countries that Lord Derby has been charged by the Cabinet to express to the Russian Government their earnest hope that, should the Russian armies advance to the south of the Balkans, no attempt will be made to occupy Constantinople or the Dardanelles. In the contrary event Her Majesty's Government must hold themselves free to take whatever course may appear to them necessary for the protection of British interests; but they sincerely trust and confidently believe that any such necessity will be averted by mutual understanding between the two Governments. Now, my Lords, I maintain that while we are in friendly relations with the Power thus addressed, it would not have been possible to speak more distinctly or more emphatically than we have done in that despatch. My noble Friend seems to think we have fallen back from our attitude of the 6th of May; because he says that in our answer to a further communication from the Russian Government to define British interests, we did not again mention Constantinople, but referred only to the inconvenience which would arise from, a military occupation of Gallipoli. But that is not receding from our former position. We did not imply that our former despatch was withdrawn or modified; but being asked to specify more clearly what were the English interests which Her Majesty's Government considered might be affected by the eventualities of the war extending beyond the limits to which they were restricted by the assurances of the Imperial Cabinet, we proceeded to mention what appeared to us the obvious inconvenience that would arise from a Russian occupation of Gallipoli. That was not taking away from, or altering our previous statement. It was simply something added or supplementary to what we had said before. I am quite ready to give any further explanation which any of your Lordships may ask for; but I think what I have said will be sufficient to show that we have not in any manner receded from or abandoned the position we took up from the first.

LORD HAMMOND

inquired, Whether there was any objection to lay on the Table the map defining the limits of Bulgaria referred to in the 8th Protocol, and which was used at the Conference of Constantinople?

THE EARL OF DERBY

There is certainly no objection to produce that map; indeed, I thought it was on the Table already with the other Papers.

LORD CAMPBELL

said, he did not rise to detain the House for more than two or three minutes. He could not, however, wish the debate to close until he had thanked the noble Earl (Earl De La Warr), for the judicious way in which he had brought the subject forward, for the firmness of his protest against an occupation of Constantinople, and for the clearness with which he had explained that the movement on Rodosto did a great deal to invest the capital. At that moment, the essential point was not to attribute too much importance to the armistice. Political society appeared to be catching at excuses for repose and confidence instead of guarding against dangers. It was therefore worth while to recollect that the armistice was not certain to preclude the Russian advance on Gallipoli and on Constantinople, while the terms of peace were described by Mr. Layard, our Ambassador, as involving the destruction of European Turkey. The noble Earl the Secretary of State had asked what could have been done to lessen the existing complications. There never was a question easier to answer. The Fleet might have advanced to Constantinople instead of going back to Besika Bay. The Government might have persisted in the measure which Europe saw to be their own. Its retractation was a topic of regret and of dismay in nearly every circle. No cause had been assigned for it. The world was only left to view it as a sacrifice of policy by which the talents of the noble Earl the Secretary of State had been regained to the Department he pre- sided over. But this disastrous and humiliating step might be revoked. He (Lord Campbell), although he would not enter now into the argument, believed it was essential to revoke it; that only by revoking it the Government could mitigate a situation everyone deplored.