HL Deb 09 July 1877 vol 235 cc947-58
THE DUKE OF BUCOLEUCH

rose to move a Resolution designating the place and precedence in which the title of Mar be called at all future elections of the Representative Peers for Scotland. The noble Duke said, he would not enter into the controversy that had been raised by the rival claimants to the ancient Earldom of Mar—he would merely remind their Lordships that at the death of the last Earl of Mar, 32 years ago, two claimants appeared to the title, the Earl of Kellie, and Mr. Goodeve Erskine. They claimed their right to the Earldom on different grounds and under different circumstances; but he would not detain their Lordships by going into details— suffice it to say that the claims of the two parties were heard by their Lordships' House, that the hearing occupied counsel on both sides were heard at the Bar, and he believed that upwards of 500 documents, charters, and writs were produced. It was decided by the Committee of Privileges, and afterwards adjudged by that House, that the Earl of Kellie had made good his claim to the Earldom of Mar, created by Queen Mary in 1565, and that Mr. Goodeve Erskine not had made good his opposition to that claim. What was usual in that House when a Scotch Peerage was decided was done on that occasion. An order was immediately given to the Lord Clerk Register in Scotland to insert in the Roll of Peers of Scotland called for at the elections of Representative Peers, that Peerage at its proper place and precedence. He had a list of the cases in which this had been done on previous occasion; but he would not trouble their Lordships with the several cases, but would refer to some Peerages which appeared in the Union Roll. Before doing that, however, he would state that great misconception prevailed as to what that Roll was. It was not embodied in the Act of Union, neither was it to be found in the Treaty of Union, but it was a copy of the Great Roll that used to be called in the Parliament of Scotland. In May of 1707, when the Act of Union was passed, an Order was sent from this House to the Lord Clerk Register to send up an authentic list of the Peerage of Scotland as it then stood. In 1708 a List was according sent up to this House, and a Committee was appointed to consider it. The Committee reported upon it, and it was accepted as an authentic list of the Peerage as it then stood. The Peers were entered upon the Roll according to precedence given to them by the Decreet of Ranking of 1606; but this was not final. It was styled an interim Decreet, and it was open to any Peer who felt himself aggrieved by being put too low or not in his proper place, to apply for the rectification of the Decreet of Ranking. This was done in the case of the Earl of Buchan, who applied to the Court of Session to produce the Decreet of Ranking, because he alleged that he had been put below certain Peers, and it was decided in his favour. That decision was confirmed, ratified, and approved by an Act passed through the Scotch Parliament in 1633. He mentioned that as an instance in which the Decreet of Ranking was not final. Several Peerages had been added to the Roll since, among which were Lord Braemar in 1703, Lord Colville of Culross and Somerville in 1823, the Marquess of Queensberry in 1812, Lord Morton in 1835, the Marquess of Huntly in 1838, Lord Hemes in 1858, and Lord Kinross in 1868. He need not mention other Peerages which had rather been restored to the Roll than entered upon it. The noble Duke concluded by moving his Resolution.

Moved to resolve, That upon tearing the petition of the Earl of Mar and Kellie this House doth order that at all future meetings of the Peers of Scotland assembled under any Royal Proclamation for the election of a Peer or Peers to represent the Peers of Scotland, the Lord Clerk Register, or the Clerks of Session officiating in his name, do call the title of Mar in the Roll of Peers of Scotland in Parliament called at such elections in the place and precedence to which it has been declared by the resolution and judgment of this House on 26th February 1875 to be entitled according to the date of the creation of that Earldom, and in no other place, with a saving nevertheless as well to the said Earl of Mar and Kellie as to all other Peers of Scotland, their rights and places upon further and better authority showed for the same.—(The Duke of Buccleuch.)

THE MARQUESS OF HUNTLY

rose to move the Previous Question, saying that he regretted that on the subject of a Scottish Peerage there should be any difference of opinion in their Lordships' House. The noble Duke (the Duke of Buccleuch) had entered into the region of history, and traced that of Scotch Peerages from 1606 down to 1875; but he (the Marquess of Huntly) ventured to move the Previous Question on the ground that such a Resolution as that which the noble Duke had concluded by moving, was ultra vires of their Lordships' jurisdiction. He further took the preliminary objection that this Petition was not, as was the ordinary course, a Petition to the Crown. The usual and proper course was for the claimant to have presented his Petition to the Crown, and the Crown would then have referred the matter to their Lordships' House, and they would have had an opportunity of inquiring into the question. This Petition was, however, presented directly to their Lordships' House, which had propria vi not power to inquire or to make any such Order. The noble Duke had referred to the cases of other Scotch Peerages; but he (the Marquess of Huntly) ventured to say that if they could have a Return of all Scotch Peerages—-which, he admitted, would be difficult to get—which had been added to the Union Roll since the Act of Union, he would find not a single instance of a Peerage having been struck off the Roll and inserted again at a different date. In every instance the insertion of the Peers on the Union Roll of Scotland allowed them to be represented in their Lordships' House, and in not one case had there been one of the Peerages inserted on that Roll altered to a later date. All that he desired was that the Peers of Scotland should retain their rights and privileges. The Decreet of Ranking in 1606 was issued by the Commissioners who were appointed by James the First of England and Sixth of Scotland for that purpose, and all the Scottish Peers were entered on it in their order of precedence—so that he was disposed to regard it as a very important judicial document, and one certainly of much greater importance than the noble Duke seemed to think it was. In the Decreet the first Earldom of Mar was ranked at about the date of 1457—two centuries before the Decreet of Ranking was issued; whereas the second Earldom was in 1565, about 40 years before that issue. The effect of the Resolution of the noble Duke would be to extinguish the Peerage of 1457, and to substitute for it that of the Earldom of 1565, and it would be absurd to suppose that those who made up the Decreet in 1606 were not aware of this title 40 years after its presumed creation. Apparently they knew nothing of it, and this was surely a strong argument in favour of the ancient Earldom. If there had been any ground for the Resolution at all, it ought to have been moved within a month or so of the settlement of the claim to the Mar Peerage; but, inasmuch as that had taken place in 1875, surely the better course would have been to consult the Committee of Privileges; or, at all events, so long a time having elapsed, a Commission might have been asked for to investigate into all matters connected with the Scotch Peerage, rather than their Lordships should have been asked to attempt to settle a difficult Peerage case by a Resolution of this character. This was a question in which the whole of the Peerage of Scotland was concerned. They were a very small body, and he thought that any Resolution submitted to their Lordships tampering with an historic Peerage of very ancient date, which had been fixed by the Decreet of Ranking at 1475, and which was acknowledged accordingly at the time of the Union, ought to be very carefully considered before it was adopted. He hoped that this discussion would be the means of calling their Lordships' attention to the case of the Scotch Peerages —which might be truly called long-suffering Peerages. He hoped the time would come when all those who had a right to call themselves Scotch Peers would have a seat in their Lordships' House. Limited in number as they were, he believed that all of them were far earlier in date than 400 Peerages of England. Their Lordships would, he hoped, be very cautious before they struck this ancient Peerage out of its place on the Poll, and substituted for it a modern Peerage. Such a proceeding was contrary to precedent, and therefore, without entering into the controversy which had been raised as to who was Earl of Mar, he now took the liberty of moving the Previous Question.

And it was then moved, "That this Question be now put."—(The Marquess of Huntly.)

THE EARL OF REDESDALE

said, the first objection raised by the noble Marquess (the Marquess of Huntly) was that this proceeding ought to have been by Petition to the Crown; but his position was untenable, because in all cases of dispute in respect to Privilege they were settled by Petition to that House, who were perfectly competent to do what they were asked to do by the Petition. That was a matter of universal practice, and was one which had been resorted to on numberless occasions—and their Lordships would agree that it was a reasonable and proper course to be pursued in a matter of that kind. The noble Marquess said that the noble Duke asked them to strike out a Peerage. But the Resolution did nothing of the sort—it proposed to order that that Peerage should be called in the place and precedence that had been adjudged to it. At the time that the Decreet of Ranking was made there was no Earldom of Mar held by an Erskine, the heir of that family then sitting in Parliament as Lord Erskine. The House had jurisdiction to declare the right to a Scotch Peerage, and had always held that the Committee of Privileges was the only tribunal to decide questions of Peerage. The Amendment of the noble Marquess amounted simply to this —that the House should declare that it had no jurisdiction in the matter. Having found a particular date for a Peerage, it was now proposed only to place it on the Roll at that date. Prom the time of the death of the last heir male to the Earldom of Mar, in 1377, there was no proof of anyone having sat in Parliament as Earl of Mar, except under new creations to persons in no way descended from the old Earls. But the noble Earl (the Earl of Kellie) came forward and claimed the Peerage as having been created in 1565; and showed that his ancestors sat as Lord Erskine up to 29th July in that year, and two days after as Earl of Mar, the Queen's marriage having taken place in the interval. His opponent claimed that it did not date from 1565, but from a much earlier date; but he could show no ground for his contention, and the decision of the House was that down to 1565 there was in reality no Earldom of Mar held by an Erskine; and, therefore, the person claiming from the earlier descent was not Earl of Mar, but the person claiming from the creation of 1565 was. Whether that decision was right or wrong, it was the decision of the House; and the Earl of Mar now asked, in accordance with that decision, to be called in his place on the Roll as established by that decision. The noble Marquess said that it ought to have been done at once; and he (the Earl of Redesdale) wished it had been. If it had been, it would have prevented a scene of confusion which took place at the election of last year, when a person came forward and declared the Earl of Kellie not to be the Earl of Mar that was entitled to vote. The House ought to take care that such a scene should not occur again. If Mr. Erskine could come forward and make a claim to the Earldom of Mar, and establish his claim under the earlier title, then indeed the ease would be different. His opinion was that the Earl of Mar and Kellie having established his claim, his name ought to be called in the Roll of Peers in the place determined by the House, and not in accordance with the view of the noble Marquess. He therefore trusted their Lordships would not agree to his Motion.

THE EARL OF MANSFIELD

considered there was no precedent for what had been done. The whole foundation of this claim arose from very curious circumstances. One Thomas Randolph had written a letter on the last day of July, 1565, in which he says that to honour the feast of Queen Mary's marriage Lord Erskine was made Earl of Mar; and it was stated that when the letter was produced his noble and learned Friend near him (Lord Chelmsford) said it was a gossiping letter, and nothing more—particularly the postscriptum al- luding to the Earl of Mar. He thought little importance was to be attached to the letter of Mr. Randolph. The Committee of Privileges having come to a decision on the 25th February, 1875; on the following day it was reported to the House, whereupon it appeared upon the Journals that the Lord Clerk Register should insert the name of the Earl of Mar on the Roll, dating from the creation of 1565. But when they came to do so they were very much puzzled, because they found that there was no such name there. The Committee came to the Resolution that the claim to the Mar Peerage created in 1565 was proved, but they never said one word about the Peerage created in 1457, and therefore that Peerage remained to the present moment. The Committee of Privileges, in their Report, unfortunately came to an erroneous conclusion, founded upon no facts whatever. Had that Committee taken the opinion of those versed in Scotch Law they might have avoided certain errors into which they had fallen. The Decreet of Ranking was one of the most solemn decrees that was ever passed. It was found that many misconceptions had arisen as to the titles of Scotch Peers, and that Public Business was impeded, because they were always fighting. It was, therefore, found necessary to establish the rank and precedence of Scotch Peers by the Decreet of 1606, and in that Decreet the name of the noble Earl was not to be found. He was of opinion that the Resolution proposed was ultra vires, and that they could only act upon the decision of the Committee of Privileges.

LORD SELBORNE

said, that he did not propose to follow the noble Earl (the Earl of Mansfield) in his speech as to the grounds of the decision adopted by the House in 1875. They were all aware that both before that decision and afterwards there were persons who entertained different opinions on the merits of the case; but their Lordships, he thought, must hold that it having been decided in a particular way by the Resolution then arrived at, it was a question which was determined, so far as that decision went, and that it was binding on their Lordships. The present discussion must proceed upon that assumption. Assuming, therefore, that that decision was binding upon the House, he should proceed to state the reasons which led him to believe that their Lordships could not with prudence or propriety adopt the Resolution which bad been moved by the noble Duke. There were two reasons which he would put before their Lordships as grounds for inducing them not to do so. As he understood, the effect of the Resolution would be, in the first place, to do that which was not consistent with the Resolutions of 1875; and, in the second place, instead of supporting and fortifying the authority of what was then done, it would tend as much as anything could to destroy and throw discredit upon their Lordships' authority. Their Lordships ought to be careful, in a matter involving questions of law of great nicety, before they assumed a jurisdiction which, as far as he was aware, they had never before exercised. The noble Duke in the first place affirmed, that the House, on the 26th of February 1875, had declared the Earl of Mar and Kellie to be entitled to a particular precedence according to the date of the creation of the Earldom, which the Resolution of the House said was in 1565. He (Lord Selborne) did not so read the Resolution of 1875. That Resolution, after affirming that the petitioner, Lord Kellie, had made out a claim to the dignity of Earl of Mar created in 1565, proceeded to direct that at all future meetings of the Peers of Scotland for the election of a Representative Peer the Lord Clerk Register should call the title of the Earl of Mar according to its place in the Roll of Peers of Scotland called at such election, and receive and count the vote of the Earl of Mar claiming to vote in right of the said Earldom, and permit him to take part in the proceedings in such election. But that was a very different thing from saying that the title should be called according to the date of the creation of the Earldom. And not only did he (Lord Selborne) think that the natural meaning of those words was that it should be called according to the actual place in which it stood in the Roll of Peers, but he might appeal to what had been said by the noble Earl the Chairman of Committees, who virtually admitted the same thing—because he said it was a pity that what was now proposed to be done was not done at that time. The natural meaning of the words was, that the noble Earl should be called at the place in which his name appeared up to that time on the Roll of Peers. Although these questions of Peerage were in form settled by the House of Lords, they all knew that the real tribunal which settled them was the Committee of Privileges, and the Committee of Privileges had decided, on grounds inconsistent with the supposition, that the ancient Earldom had been restored, although the Decreet of Ranking was relied upon as evidence of a contrary understanding in l606. If so, the only Earl of Mar, in 1606, must have been the holder of the dignity found by the House to have been created in 1565; and every Earl of Mar, from that date till the Union, had sat in the Parliament of Scotland, and had been ranked on the Union Poll and ever since, in the particular order of precedence assigned to the Earldom by the Decreet of Ranking. That Decreet rested on Royal authority, and was, by that authority, ordered to be observed by everybody, unless it should, in any particular case, be rectified by the Court of Session, at the instance of some party aggrieved. It had, in one case—that of the Earldom of Buchan—been so rectified: and an Act of the Scottish Parliament was passed in 1633, to confirm that decision in Lord Buchan's favour. Until legally rectified —if there was any error, and error was not to be assumed—for the Crown could give an earlier precedence even to a dignity created in 1565—that order of precedence was equivalent to a declaration of the Sovereign, the fountain of honour. The place of the Earl of Mar in the Decreet of Ranking was not the only anomaly there—the Earl of Sutherland also was not ranked according to the date of the creation of that Earldom, as it had been recognized in the House of Lords. If the House took upon itself to alter the Roll in this case, why should it not do so, if asked, in the case of the Earldom of Sutherland also? The Union Roll was solemnly referred to in the Statute of 1847 as an authentic List of the Peerage of Scotland: and the House had never altered it, except by adding names when a right to any Peerage not entered in that Roll had been established. The effect of the Resolution of 1875 was not to strike out any existing Peerage, but the Lord Clerk Register was directed to call the title of the Earl of Mar in its existing place and precedence. It appeared to him to be a matter of serious importance when their Lordships were asked to interfere with the existing precedence on the Union Roll of the existing Scotch Peers. There ought to be some precedent for such a proceeding; but none had been referred to, and if there were no such precedent, their Lordships would concur with him that none ought to be made—at all events none ought to be made by a Resolution like this. He thought nothing would be more objectionable than for the House to take upon itself, in this way, to rectify any error, if error there were, in the ranking of the Peerage, and in the Decreet of 1606. Acts of Parliament had been thought necessary in 1847 and 1851, to give the House power to interfere, in certain cases, with the manner of calling the Peers of Scotland at Elections of Representative Peers, and to regulate the conditions under which that power was to be exercised. The only safe and prudent course was, to keep within the limits of that Statutory power.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

could not avoid thinking that the Resolution which the noble Duke had submitted might lead their Lordships into a position of considerable embarrassment. The form of the Resolution had been slightly altered; but even in the ameliorated form in which it appeared on the Paper, their Lordships, by adopting it, would, under the guise of passing a Resolution, make a judicial, or, if not a judicial, a legislative declaration. Two years ago a Committee of Privileges investigated the claim to the Earldom of Mar, and he well remembered that the inquiry extended over a great length of time, and involved some of the most difficult questions in tracing Peerages that could well be imagined. As a Member of the Committee, he concurred in the Resolution at which the Committee arrived, although he never recollected a case in which sympathy was more elicited for the claimant who did not succeed. That gentleman had been generally supposed to be entitled to the Earldom, and he had been accepted by all who were related to the family, and, among the rest, by the particular family who afterwards became his opponents. After the most patient investigation, however, the Committee of Privileges arrived at the conclusion that Mr. Goodeve Erskine had not substantiated his claim, and that Lord Kellie had made good his claim to the Earldom which had its origin in the year 1565. That conclusion was affirmed by their Lordships' House, and, in his opinion, was conclusive. The order made on the occasion by the House was entirely affirmative; but if the Resolution of the noble Duke were adopted, the decision so arrived at would be re-opened and supplemented by that which was not a natural corollary, but something very different and much higher, and which, in the shape of a Resolution, would be a judicial declaration or a legislative act. Further than that, by adopting the Resolution, their Lordships would affect the Union Roll of Scotch Peers, which, by the Act of 1847, was declared to be an authoritative list of the Peers of Scotland as they stood before the Union. It appeared from the same Act that sundry Peerages of Scotland had since been added by order of the House of Lords at different times. There was nothing said, however, about subtracting from the list. It stood as an authentic list, and, except the additions, nothing appeared to have been done to it. That Act was a very strong expression of the view of the Legislature—that, if anything was to be done in the Union Roll, it was to be done by legislative authority, and not merely by a vote of the House. It seemed to him their Lordships would be taking a very dangerous course in doing now by Resolution of the House what was supposed in 1847 to require the authority of an Act of Parliament. Therefore, he thought they ought to hesitate before they accepted the proposal of the noble Duke. In his opinion, the most satisfactory mode of dealing with the question would be to appoint a Select Committee to consider the matter of the Petition of the Earl of Mar and Kellie and the precedents applicable thereto, and to report thereon to the House.

LORD DENMAN

said, that he had before expressed an opinion that no Resolution of either House would stand firm unless it was supported by the law of the land, and he considered that it would be a very unfortunate step to take for the House to bind itself to any particular Resolution.

THE DUKE OF BUCCLEUCH

expressed his willingness to withdraw his Motion, and to accept a Resolution in the terms mentioned by the noble and learned Lord.

Then the said Motion and the original Motion were (by leave of the House) withdrawn.

Then it was moved, That a Select Committee be appointed to consider the matter of the petition of the Earl of Mar and Kellie presented on the 5th of June 1877, and the precedents applicable thereto; and to report thereon to the House.—(The Lord Chancellor.)

Motion agreed to.

And, on Tuesday, July 17, the Lords following were named of the Committee:—