Lords Sitting of 20 February 1877

MINUTES.
— PUBLIC BILL—First Reading—Public Record Office (8).
TURKEY—THE INSTRUCTIONS.

  OBSERVATIONS. QUESTION.
  THE DUKE OF ARGYLL, who had given Notice of his intention
  "To direct the attention of the House to the Instructions from Her Majesty's Government to the Marquess of Salisbury dated the 20th of November, 1876; and to ask Her Majesty's Government whether they intend to take any further measures for the attainment of the ends contemplated in those Instructions,"
  said: —My Lords, I rise to call the attention of your Lordships' House, in the first place, to the Instructions which were issued by Her Majesty's Government to the Marquess of Salisbury when he went out as their Special Envoy to Constantinople. Those Instructions had two great ends in view—the first was to obtain some security for internal reforms in Turkey, and the other was to obtain some security for the peace of Europe. My Lords, neither of those two great ends has been attained. There is no reform in Turkey, and alas my Lords, there is no prospect of peace in Europe. As regards the condition of the subjects of Turkey, I do not exaggerate when I say that there never has been a time in this century when their condition was so alarming or so precarious, and as regards the peace of Europe, we have only to look at that dark background to that dark picture to see more than half a million of men in arms on the frontiers of European and Asiatic Turkey. My
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  Lords, it is time that we should ask ourselves and the Government what have been the causes of this great failure. No doubt there are many causes, for this Eastern Question is a very old Question, having deep roots in the history of the past, and pointing to great changes in the history of the future; but I am much mistaken if two causes in particular cannot be pointed out—first, the unhappy policy which Her Majesty's Government pursued up to the end of last August; and, secondly, the half-heartedness, timidity, and vacillation with which they pursued the new policy which was imposed on them by the public feeling of the country after the Bulgarian massacres had been ascertained. These are the propositions which it will be my duty to substantiate in your Lordships' House to-night; and, my Lords, there is one great comfort in our position now, and that is that at last in the Instructions of the Government to Lord Salisbury—at last—we have a common ground which we did not possess before. If I had had to conduct this argument at the close of the last Session, I do not know where I should have begun. It is impossible to reason on any subject without some common ground to go upon. Where there are no common facts admitted, where there are no common principles recognised, where there are no common feelings sympathised in, it is impossible to come to any conclusion that can be satisfactory. But here for the first time we have an official document in which the main facts of the case are recognized, in which the main principles are admitted, and in which the feelings of the country, if they are not enthusiastically expressed, at least receive some degree of official recognition and respect. This is a great advance, and there are also other matters of great moment, even outside of these Instructions, on which we may find agreement. Allow me to refer for a moment to the significant observation which fell from the Prime Minister on the first night of the Session, when, in reply to some remarks of mine, he said I surely did not maintain or suppose that the interests of the Christian subjects of the Porte formed the only point to be considered in this great Eastern Question—that there were grave considerations of European policy involved, including the fate Of Empires. I entirely agree with the noble Earl on

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  that point. It is one of the misfortunes of a partial discussion on a great subject that one is very liable to be misunderstood. I must say that I feel the force and justice of the demands which are often made upon us who criticise the conduct of the Government, to declare our opinion on these great questions of policy to which the noble Earl adverted, and I feel its justice all the more when that demand is made to those who have had any share in the responsibility for the Crimean War. I think the noble Earl has a right to ask us, who were parties to that war and to the Treaties of 1856, whether we have fairly borne in mind that, whatever may be the case now, at the beginning of these transactions the Government were unquestionably bound by the Treaty of 1856. My Lords, I must say at once that they were so bound. I am not now entering into the question whether the refusal of the Turks at the Conference to concede the demands made by Europe has, or has not, released us from any of the obligations of that Treaty. I am simply admitting most fully that, at the beginning of those transactions, the Government were bound by the whole scope of the Treaties that existed, and that we, in criticising their conduct, are bound to recollect this great and important fact. More than that, I think the Government have a right to make another demand upon us, and to ask us whether we who were Members of Lord Aberdeen's Cabinet admit the policy which led to the Crimean War, and to the Treaties of 1856 and 1871. I do not mean to enter into the controversy about the policy of the Crimean War, or into the question as to whether a better diplomacy, or whether the presence of any other man at the head of the Government might or might not have averted that war. What I think the Government have a right to ask, and what we are bound to answer, is whether, on the whole, we think the general policy which was the object of the Crimean War, and to maintain which we were ultimately driven, perhaps unfortunately, into that war, whether we admit that that policy was a sound one, or whether we have retracted all our opinions on that subject, and retired altogether from the ground which we then occupied. My Lords, I have no right to speak for others, but speaking for myself, I may say that
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  I still regard the general policy which resulted in the Crimean War was a wise, a necessary, and a just policy. My Lords, what was that policy? It was simply and solely this—that the fate of Turkey, whatever that fate might be, was to be a matter for Europe, and not for Russia alone. That was the principle for which we contended, and for which we were ultimately compelled to fight. My Lords, I hold by that. We had a right to say that Russia should not be allowed to take steps by which she should serve herself exclusive heir to this great and splendid inheritance of the East. The fate of Turkey, whether Turkey be a sick man or a dying one, is a question for Europe, and not for Russia alone. So far as the Government have been influenced by that consideration, I think they were bound to stand by the Treaty of 1856, and by the general policy which was sanctioned at that time, and which has been acted upon by every successive Cabinet. I must further say that I am not one of those who think that the balance of power, as it is called—although many foolish and wicked things have been done in its name—I am not one of those who think that that doctrine is now no better than an old almanack, and that it is a matter of no moment to the rest of Europe whether Russia shall or shall not possess herself of territory from Siberia to the Dardanelles. Together with the other Powers of Europe, we have an interest in this matter—an interest less than theirs, indeed, but still sufficient to influence our course of action. My own views on this matter cannot be better expressed than in a very remarkable speech made by the noble Earl opposite (Earl Derby), which has been frequently quoted in the course of these discussions. I shall now quote it again—not for the purpose of convicting the noble Earl of inconsistency, but for the purpose of instructing those among his own friends who differ from him, I suspect, far more than I do, and for the purpose of sheltering myself behind his authority. The speeches of that noble Earl are very seldom made in a purely Party spirit, they are always more or less philosophical speeches, bearing the impress of careful thought and the calmest judgment; and much as I differ from his conduct in the course of these events, I hope it will not be thought that I fail to appreciate the

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  many intellectual gifts which have won for him the confidence of a large portion of his countrymen. His views, as expressed in the speech I refer to, contain the true principles of the policy which ought to be pursued by England. The speech was delivered, I believe, at King's Lynn, and the noble Earl said—
  "I confess I do not understand, except it may be from the influence of old diplomatic traditions, the determination of your older statesmen"—
  By the bye, to whom did he refer as "older statesmen?" I believe my noble Friend has a very little the advantage of me in years, and I must "declare off" from that great army of old fogies to which he refers. He goes on—
  "the determination of your older statesmen to stand by the Turkish rule. Whether right or wrong, I think we are making for ourselves enemies of races which will soon become in Eastern countries dominant there. I think we are keeping back that from which we, as the great traders of the world, would be the greatest gainers, and we are doing that for no earthly advantage, either present or prospective. I admit that England has an interest, and a very strong one, in the neutrality of Egypt, and some interest also, though to a less extent, in Constantinople not falling into the hands of another European Power; but, these two matters left aside, I cannot see any harm arising to England from any transfer of power."
  My Lords, I entirely agree with this exposition of English policy—every word of which I, for one, am willing to adopt. But, my Lords, having admitted that the Government were bound by the Treaties, I would proceed to ask—to what do those Treaties bind us? I listened carefully to the speech of the noble Earl opposite the other night, in respect to the extent of our obligations under those Treaties, and I heard nothing to which I could take exception. Ho said something, indeed, ambiguous with regard to the Tripartite Treaty, and he may be of opinion that even now if France or Austria should call upon us to interfere or to fight for the independence and integrity of Turkey, we should then be bound to do so. I will not enter into that question. I should like to see any Government of the present day, after what has happened, attempt to fight for Turkey. But I have great confidence in the Foreign Secretary. I feel quite sure that when he comes to interpret closely any Treaty which compels us to fight or do anything of that sort, his destructive
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  criticism will be amply sufficient to enable him to find a way out of it, and to retreat to the safe ground of that policy in which he takes such delight—namely, the policy of doing nothing. But there is one point in the Treaty of 1856, to which I should like to direct the attention of the House. It is the real crux — a difficulty not theoretical but practical—and that is the language used in these Treaties about the independence of Turkey—not the integrity, for this is not just now in question, but the independence of Turkey. I am afraid that the Turks, and the supporters of the Turks, put an interpretation on that word which will not stand investigation for a moment. My Lords, I hope the House and the country will look at facts, and not at mere phrases, with regard to the independence of Turkey. Now, let me call attention to some Parliamentary Papers that have been before us for a long time. We know that the late Lord Dalling, better known as Sir Henry Bulwer, was sent to Constantinople to carry into effect the policy of Lord Palmerston, to support in every way the independence of Turkey, and no man complained more bitterly than Sir Henry Bulwer of other Powers and Ambassadors interfering with that independence; but how did he treat the Turkish Government himself? He treated it as mud under his feet. In one of the despatches in the Blue Book of 1860 I find a note from Sir Henry Bulwer to the Grand Vizier, in which he coolly lays down this principle to the Primo Minister of Turkey—that all reforms which the Turks could not understand must be carried into effect by Europeans; and then ho proceeds to say that it is quite evident that the Turkish race is perfectly effete, and that it is absolutely necessary to supplant them in certain offices by European officials. Conceive such an address being sent to the Prime Minister of any country by the Ambassador of any friendly Power professing a respect for the country's independence! These are the words he addresses to the Grand Vizier—
  "It is utterly impossible to govern this vast territory in the way in which it is governed, and it is equally impossible to govern by the Turkish race alone, and without regard to Europeans. An administration upon a satisfactory basis can never be carried out without recourse to a new race, and energy can never be infused into affairs."

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  That is the way in which he talks of the independence of Turkey. Then look how the present Government have been treating Turkey. Look what they have done by way of settling the matter of the Salonica massacre, which, so far as we know, was a purely accidental massacre. The Turkish Government were greatly horrified at what had happened. They sent down legal functionaries to try the perpetrators of the massacre, and a certain number of people were convicted, and certain punishments awarded. But the Consuls of Germany and France, the countries to which the unfortunate victims belonged, not satisfied with the administration of justice, demanded that more persons should be tried, and that those who had been tried should be tried again and severer punishment inflicted upon them. What did Her Majesty's Government do? They wrote to their Minister at Constantinople, and said" You will support this demand of the other Powers so far as you think it just." That may have been right enough—I am not complaining of it; but what does it imply? It implies an absolute want of confidence in the justice of Turkey. It implies a confession, spoken from the housetop to the world, that in respect to the administration of justice, Turkey is in the position of a barbarous Power. My Lords, I need not argue this further, especially as the noble Marquess (the Marquess of Salisbury) has applied his immense talent for satire in the quiet language in which he has referred to this doctrine of the independence of Turkey. I envy the pen of the man who wrote this passage—
  "The independence of Turkey is a phrase which is, of course, capable of varying interpretations. At the present time it must be independent so as to be consistent with the conjoint diplomatic action taken in recent times by the other Powers of Europe."
  Well, I hope we shall hear no more of the independence of Turkey as a doctrine which is to prevent us and the other Powers of Europe from demanding and from insisting, under certain conditions and circumstances, that the Turkish Government shall render justice to all their subjects. Well, then, as to the guarantees of the Treaty of 1856, there is apparently no substantial difference of opinion between us and the noble Earl opposite. As the noble Earl himself said in
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  answer to a deputation, those guarantees were guarantees against murder, and not against suicide—a very good epigrammatic definition, which, however, must be interpreted to mean nothing less than this—that we have not guaranteed Turkey against any of the natural consequences which follow from misgovernment. And this is a doctrine of very wide sweep indeed—covering all the dangers to which Turkey is now exposed. The Turks are cutting their own throats, though they do not seem to know it. They are so misgoverning their own people that they are becoming an offence and a scandal to the world, and against the natural consequences of that misconduct we never have, and we never shall guarantee the independence of Turkey. Has it not been suicide which the Turkish Government have been guilty of? For 20 years, since the peace of 1856, they have been enjoying tranquillity, perfect rest, and immunity from external disturbance, and what is the result? The result is a Government bad with utter badness. If any noble Lord in this House thinks that I exaggerate, I refer him to the Papers laid before us by the Government. He will find overwhelming evidence that it is a Government under which life is insecure; that it is a Government under which the fruits of industry are insecure; that it is a Government under which the honour of families is insecure. Moreover, he will find that this insecurity arises, not from mere brigandage, not from want of law, but from the acts of the officers and agents of the Government itself. They are the men who commit murders, and under whose care life and property and family honour are insecure. Then you will find from the Blue Books that the Christian population of Turkey suffer under this most terrible aggravation of all other sufferings—that they have no hope of redress from the tribunals of the country, that there is not a single Judge in Turkey who is not venal, that there is not a single court to which Christians can appeal with the conviction that their evidence will be allowed duo weight, or, indeed, any weight at all, when they are pitted against the interests and the passions of the Mohammedan majority of the country. The evidence comes to this, my Lords—that in the Christian provinces of Turkey its Government is

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  nothing better than a permanent Government by Bashi-Bazouks. And here, my Lords, I should like to refer for a moment to an observation which fell from me on the first night of the Session on the subject of the right of insurrection, and which excited some murmurs of disapprobation from my noble Friends opposite. I have been thinking often, since then, what can have been the cause of these murmurs—and I have come to the conclusion that in all probability they expressed a feeling in which I heartily sympathize. There is a good deal of very loose language held in the world now-a-days in respect to what is called political crime. There are many people who seem to think that men may convulse the country to which they belong, deluge it with blood, and expose its inhabitants to all the horrors of civil war, and that all these crimes are rendered virtues if only they can allege some motive which they call political. Detestable doctrine, my Lords! And if noble Lords thought I was giving expression to any feeling of this kind, I do not wonder at their murmurs—indeed, I thank them for them—but what I meant was very different. My proposition was not a general but a particular proposition—applicable to the special case of the Government of Turkey such as it now is—and what I said was this—that in a country where life, property, and honour are insecure, where courts are venal and justice is not to be obtained, where the Government does not guarantee to their people any one of the primary rights of humanity, there, I say, our sympathies should be with those who rise against such oppression, and not with the Government which by such conduct challenges and justifies insurrection. Can this proposition be gainsaid in any assembly of Englishmen? Surely we cannot forget that our own liberties have been obtained by successful insurrections, and it is not for us to denounce men who have revolted against such a form of Government as that which has been proved to exist in Turkey. My Lords, you must have misunderstood me, and I must have misunderstood you.
  Well, my Lords, what happened when the insurrection broke out in the Herzegovina? I can quite understand the language of those who say that we have no more to do with cruelties or
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  oppression in Turkey than we have to do with the "Customs" of Dahomey. I repudiate this doctrine as applied to the Christian population of European Turkey—but I understand it. It is consistent at least with perfect impartiality between the insurgents and the Government of Turkey. But was this the course pursued by Her Majesty's Government? No. I contend that when Her Majesty's Government heard of that insurrection in 1875, they were not impartial, they were not indifferent; they were active partisans of the Turkish Government against the population which rose against Turkish rule. They were unceasing in their entreaties to the Turkish Government to put the insurrection down as soon as they could, and in their exhortations to other countries, and especially to Austria, not to allow interference on behalf of the insurgents by neighbouring sympathisers. ["Hear!"] I hear a cheer from a noble Lord on my own side of the House, implying, perhaps, that it was right to prevent the help of external sympathisers. But I beg you to remember who those sympathisers were. They were the descendants of men who had fled from Turkish oppression in former times—friends, neighbours, and often kinsmen of those who are now in revolt. You had no moral right to deprecate such sympathy, or to prevent the insurgents getting such help. I ask was such action impartiality? Do not tell me it was impartiality to be calling upon the Government of Austria to put down and to prevent the just and natural sympathy with the insurgents of neighbouring populations—I say it was taking almost as active a part on one side as the English Government could have taken. But that is not all. The Austrian Government, when refugees from the Turkish Provinces came into its territory, gave them out of mere humanity a small allowance to keep them alive. Now, I see that through your agents and your Ambassadors you were urging the Austrian Government to withdraw this miserable pittance—not only this—they were urging them to send back those people into Turkey at the very time when your own agents were telling you that they could give them no sort of security that they would not be murdered within a month; and, urged by the Austrian Government which was urged by you, some of those

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  unfortunate people did go back, and were murdered. I say that the Government of England, so far as their diplomatic representations were successful in urging the Austrian Government to send back those people, are responsible for their fate. Then, again, I see that you objected to volunteers. Of course, I admit that International Law forbids the enlistment of volunteers; but International Law breaks down under such circumstances as these. You cannot insist upon its maxims when dealing with conditions so anomalous, or with a Government so barbarous as that of Turkey. In your own country you have not been able to prevent English sympathisers in hundreds and thousands going off to fight against foreign Governments. This, then, is another way in which you showed your animus in favour of keeping up the Turkish Government against those who live under it at any cost to them, because, forsooth, it was supposed that the interests of England required such a policy. This is the policy which I denounced in the autumn as unjust and immoral. I denounce it as unjust and immoral still, and I hold that it was all the more immoral in this case because you had evidence before you that the rising in Herzegovina—I am not now speaking of the rising in Bulgaria, of which we knew nothing till we heard of the massacre—was not instigated by foreign agents, but was the natural consequence of abominable oppression; and, moreover, that the insurgents held the most just and moderate views as to the demands they were entitled to make upon the Turkish Government. I confess that the Blue Books have not impressed me with the accuracy or the extent of knowledge possessed by our Consuls. Almost all their information appears to be derived from Turkish sources. You almost invariably find in their reports "—Pasha told me this," or "the Turkish General told me that." The fact is, after what I have read in those Blue Books, I do not believe a word which rests alone on such authority. There were very few occasions in which the Consuls got into communication with the people themselves. There is one instance, however, in which a Consul did get in contact with the insurgents—I refer to Mr. Consul Holmes—and this is the account which he gives—
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  "I would here remark that, contrary to what is asserted in so many newspapers, the people of Herzegovina neither demand nor have ever de- served an impossible autonomy as Servian agitators would have persuaded them to do. They only ask to remain subjects of the Sultan, with reformed laws, under proper and just administration of them. How to secure this is the difficulty."
  That is the account given by Mr. Consul Holmes of the first insurgents in the Herzegovina—these men wanted nothing but security for their lives and liberties under an European guarantee, and these are the people against whom you levied the whole battery of English diplomacy, in order that the Turkish Government might put down their insurrection and that neighbouring Governments should prevent any exercise of sympathy with the oppressed people. And what is the reason? How is it that humane and honourable men—men I well know personally as humane as any on this side of the House—came to justify yourselves in acting on such a cruel and unjust policy? I believe it was entirely due to what is now known by the name of Russophobia, which makes you imagine that every insurrection in the Christian Provinces of Turkey is due to Russian intrigue. You who support the Government always speak of us, the opponents of this policy, as men influenced by sentiment, and as having no more intellect than snipes; the reasoning faculties—the brains—are all on that side of the House. I should like to test this assumption for a moment. What, I should like to know, would be said in physical philosophy, of the reasoning powers—of the intellect—of the brains of a man who, seeing in his laboratory certain results, and knowing of the presence of one sufficient cause, would nevertheless insist on attributing it to some other cause which he did not know to be present at all; and which, even if it were present, is insufficient to account for the facts? Yet this is exactly the position of the Government in regard to the insurrections in Turkey. You cannot deny that the Government of Turkey is utterly bad—you know that in that mis-government you have a sufficient cause for all the effects before you. But, no; you must fall back on Russian intrigues. It reminds one of the query in the "Rejected Addresses" at the time when in this country there was a mania against the First Napoleon

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  —"Who fills the butcher's shops with large blue flies?" And the answer was Bonaparte. Well the policy to which I have been adverting was that pursued by Her Majesty's Government till the end of August or the beginning of September in last year—that is, during the months which elapsed between the proposal of the Berlin Note and the adjournment of Parliament. You were objecting to everything the other Powers proposed, and proposing nothing yourselves. Your own description of your position was that you were deprecating any interference in the internal affairs of Turkey by the other Powers; deprecating all movement in favour of the insurgents. Well, my Lords, holding up your hands in deprecation of all active exertion, in the presence of the great movements which determine the history of the world, is not a very helpful or a very hopeful attitude. And what is it the Government has been deprecating? You have been deprecating facts—awkward things to deprecate—living facts—facts which were passing before your eyes. You were deprecating the sympathies and the feelings of enormous populations—feelings and sympathies which are among the most powerful of all facts in politics. Well, but at last this policy was changed, and changed by what? We heard of the dreadful massacres in Bulgaria, and the conscience of the country then awoke to the deplorable and horrible results of this policy, supporting Turkey at all risks and costs. My Lords, I do not know what history will say regarding this repentance. I am afraid history will say that it was a somewhat late repentance; but of this I am sure—that it is a repentance, which, whether late or not, is now sincere and universal, and that it is a repentance which never will be repented of. The people and the Government of this country have now awoke to the discovery that the Government of Turkey is a barbarous Government. We have been shocked to see the horrors of African warfare in the heart of Christendom, and the horrid cruelties of Gengis Khan in the days of Queen Victoria. Well, then, before the storm of public indignation the noble Earl, I must say, with the most perfect frankness, told Turkey that it had become impossible to pursue his former policy of protecting Turkey from the
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  consequences of her own misgovernment. He gave no hint, indeed, of any repentance—of any change in his own mind. He simply said that the former policy was one which the feelings of this country could no longer tolerate. Yes, thank God, it is! Well, then, I say that during a period of many months, up to the beginning of September, 1876, you had been so impressing Turkey with the idea that you would be her friends at all costs, that there was no chance of her giving way to the other Powers. You did all you could to prevent Turkey agreeing to the demands of the Powers. You were dragged—reluctantly—into a sort of concert with those Powers in the Andrassy Note; but further than that you would not go, and directly and indirectly you were encouraging Turkey to resist the will of united Europe. But in the beginning of September you entered on a new policy; and now I come to my next proposition—that you have pursued this new policy with such half-heartedness and such timidity that it had no chance of success. So late as September 5, what was the language of your Minister at Constantinople — language, of course, held by order from home? Speaking of European guarantees for good government in Turkey, he says that this would lead to results "against which Her Majesty's Government has throughout set their face." But what must the Turks have thought if they knew that such was even then still the language of the British Minister? Why, they must have been convinced that there was no change in your policy, notwithstanding that the massacres in Bulgaria had made it impossible for you to actively interfere in their defence; that you were for the moment coerced by the popular sentiment, but that as soon as you could you would turn round again—in other words, that you were still holding to what are called "English interests," and were on the side of Turkey and against the other Powers of Europe. And now let us see what you were doing during the rest of the two months of September and October. You made great efforts to bring about an armistice between Turkey and Servia as a preliminary to peace, on terms which were to guarantee some liberty to the subjects of Turkey. With great difficulty all the Powers were at last got

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  in line, and Russia agreed to the English basis of peace—a basis which I am far from saying was not a reasonable basis. Credit is due to you for your endeavours to get all the Powers in a line, and at last you succeeded. What happened? There are no secrets of diplomacy in these days. Everything seems to be known. Many of your Lordships will remember the tone in which Lord Ellen-borough used to denounce the want of secrecy in the India Department. What would he say if he were alive to read the revelations of the present day? What you were doing was perfectly well known. It was perfectly well known that you were trying to get the Powers of Europe to agree on terms of peace, having as a basis the necessity of some European interference in the internal Government of Turkey. Well, now all this time Turkey knew, through Sir Henry Elliot, as we have seen, that you admitted this principle with reluctance. Her object was to get rid of this principle. She might reform herself, but there was to be no interference with her on the part of the Powers of Europe. So that the antithesis was this—you were laying down a basis of peace with a view to external interference; whereas, on the other hand, the great aim of Turkey was to have an armistice with a view to self-reform, and no external interference. And what occurred? On the 11th of October the Turks made a counter proposal. After you had got Russia, Italy, France, and Austria to agree to a short term of armistice, with a Conference behind, the Turks turn round and say—"No, we shall not give you that; but we will give you a six months' armistice without a Conference." What did the noble Earl the Foreign Secretary do? He jumped at the Turkish offer like a salmon at a fly, and immediately telegraphed, "By all means." What was the consequence? Austria, which after the greatest difficulty had been got to agree to your terms, came to the Foreign Office and asked if it was really true that England had abandoned her own proposals, and had agreed to the counter-propositions of the Porte—counter-proposals which were essentially different in principle and in effect. Here is the noble Earl's account of it. In a despatch to Sir Andrew Buchanan, dated the 19th of September, he says—
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  "Count Andrassy stated to your Excellency, in the conversation reported in your telegram of the 17th instant, that ho wished me to state clearly what course Her Majesty's Government are disposed to maintain and recommend in order that he might act in concert with them. Her Majesty's Government have every wish to communicate most frankly with Count Andrassy and reciprocate his wish for concerted action. It is their desire that you should inform him that, having accepted the proposal of the Porte for an armistice of six months, they will make no new proposition."
  Thus, the other Powers found that they had been thrown overboard, and that Her Majesty's Government had agreed to the counter proposal of the Turks. What did Russia do in the circumstances? It addressed a similar inquiry to the noble Earl, and asked whether it was possible that England had thrown over its own proposal for a short armistice—
  THE EARL OF DERBY, interrupting, said, that what the Government asked was that the armistice should not be for less than a month.
  THE DUKE OF ARGYLL: The mere duration of the armistice, taken by itself, is not the point—the point I wish to impress upon your Lordships is, that the longer armistice, coupled with Turkish self-reform, was intended by the Turks to negative the proposed Conference and European interference. Well, the Russian Government, mortified and confounded by the line taken by the English Government, asked whether it was really true that the English Government had abandoned its own proposals, or had ceased to press them upon the Porte? And here is the noble Earl's reply, dated October 24, 1876—
  "it was true, therefore, that these proposals (namely, the English basis assented to by all the Powers) had ceased to be pressed upon the Porte!"
  The only conclusion at which the other Powers could arrive was that they were dealing with a vacillating and timid Power, which had no backbone of policy of its own. The Turks, on the other hand, thought—and had every right to think—that the English Government would do all they could on their behalf. From the difficulty into which our Government had thus got they were delivered only by the firmness of the Emperor of Russia. The Czar said, in effect—"If England chooses to go back from proposals made and accepted by the whole of Europe, I will not be fooled by Turkey in this way!"

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  and he sent an ultimatum to Turkey demanding that within 10 days she must give a six weeks' armistice to Servia; and the English Government were relieved from their difficulty by the success of that ultimatum. What happened? Very soon after that, Lord Augustus Loftus had an interview with the Emperor of Russia in the Crimea, and the Czar then remarked that what had been done by Turkey in response to the ultimatum, was the successful result of a little firmness. My Lords, when I read that I confess I experienced feelings akin to shame. There have been days when not even a Czar of Russia could pat an English Minister on the back and say—"See, my good man, what a little firmness can do."
  Next came the mission of the noble Marquess opposite (the Marquess of Salisbury); and even in the conduct of the Government during the course of that mission I see the same timidity and half-heartedness which has ruined the policy of Her Majesty's Government in every stage of these transactions. And here I must say, that if I admired the courage and the self-sacrifice of my noble Friend in undertaking this mission before I saw these Papers, I admire that courage much more now. My Lords, it was a mission foredoomed to failure. Look at the very first step which was taken. The noble Earl the Foreign Secretary on several occasions stated that he would not consent to a Conference on Turkish affairs from which the representatives of Turkey were excluded. On the other hand, Russia objected to a Conference in which Turkey should be admitted to see the differences which might arise between the other Powers. In this difficulty some subtle diplomatist whispered into the ear of the noble Earl, as the serpent whispered into the ear of Eve, a truly wonderful suggestion. Cut the Conference into two. Have two separate series of meetings—one to be called "Preliminary," from which Turkey shall be excluded, and the second not to be so called, and to which Turkey may be admitted! And where, my Lords, do you think the Preliminary Conferences were held? Why, in the Russian Embassy! Could any device have been hit upon which combined more curiously every possible objection? Could there have been any combination of circumstances more fitted to rouse the suspi-
  654
  cions and to offend the pride of Turkey? Was it possible to ensure more certainly the refusal of Turkey to agree to any terms agreed upon under such circumstances? Turkey knew that she had nothing to fear, and, perhaps, much to hope, from you, in the event of such rejection. For I would remark, further, that on the 22nd of December in last year the noble Earl opposite, in a despatch to the noble Marquess who represented this country at the Conference, stated that—
  "Her Majesty's Government have decided that England will not assent to, or assist in, coercive measures, military or naval, against the Porte."—[Turkey, No. 2, p. 56.]
  Well, Her Majesty Government had a perfect right to arrive at any decision that pleased them as to the course which they would take; but I find that on the 24th of December—two days later than that of the despatch from which I have quoted—a most mysterious telegram was despatched from Constantinople by Safvet Pasha to Musurus Pasha, the Turkish Minister in this country. The telegram was in the following terms:—
  "I have read it to the Grand Vizier" [what the 'it' was that was read is not given in the Blue Book]. "His Royal Highness received this communication with deep gratitude, and begs you to express to his Excellency Lord Derby his acknowledgments. You will explain to his Lordship, in the name of the Grand Vizier, that the Sublime Porte reckons more than ever on the kind support of the Government of Her Britannic Majesty, under the difficult circumstances we are passing through."—[Turkey, No. 2, p. 62.]
  I ventured to hint on the first night of the Session that an intimation had been conveyed to the Porte to the effect that no attempts at coercion would be made or approved by Her Majesty's Government; but the noble Marquess opposite shook his head so violently that I was intimidated by the vehemence of his denial. Since then I have looked again into the Blue Books, and the result of my search has been the discovery of the documents which I have read—the last of which is both curious and mysterious. I should much like to know what "it" was that Safvet Pasha read to the Grand Vizier, and if no objection is raised I would move for a copy of the document furnished to Musurus Pasha and by him transmitted to Constantinople. And

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  now, my Lords, what is the result of all this? We find that the noble Marquess who represented England at the Conference wound up his part in it by telling Turkey that England was determined to leave her to her fate, she having deliberately rejected the advice which he, as England's representative, had offered to her. What did that mean? Everyone knows what that means. It meant that we would leave Turkey to be dealt with by Russia. There is no mystery about it. And this is the upshot of all our feeble policy—to leave Turkey in the hands of Russia! For the first time, when I read this, I began to mourn over the Crimean War. Alas, for all those brave men who now lie mouldering on the moors of the Crimea or have found in the Black Sea "their wild and wandering graves?"
  My Lords, what is our position now? Again let me recall to the mind of the House the position in which we are placed by the Instructions issued to Lord Salisbury. We have laid down these two propositions in language which can never be retracted—first, that we have a right to demand of the Porte some protection for her Christian subjects, and next, that we cannot trust the Turk to fulfil his own promise on their behalf. These are the declarations of the English Special Envoy—declarations to which the Government is pledged; and what I now wish to know is whether you mean to keep by those declarations or whether you mean to abandon them? I also desire to know from noble Lords opposite whether they mean to keep up the European concert? My Lords, I always understood before I read these Blue Books—and this is one of the very few points which are entirely novel even to those who have attended closely to the subject—I always understood that it had been found almost impossible to induce Austria to adopt any line which even looked in the direction of coercion. But that is not the evidence of the Blue Books. Three times in the month of September—and the latest date is the 21st—I find that Austria is distinctly recorded as having declared to the noble Earl opposite that it was not sufficient to obtain the conclusion of an armistice; that it became of the highest importance that conditions of peace should be agreed upon without delay by the Powers and "enforced by them upon the Porte."
  656
  Therefore, you have the evidence of the noble Earl himself that up the 21st of September, if not later, Austria would be willing, if you managed her wisely, and if you made proposals to the Government of Turkey which would have met with her approval, to join you in measures of coercion. Here are the words of the noble Earl as addressed to Sir Andrew Buchanan—
  "The Austrian Chargé d'Affaires called upon me this afternoon and communicated the substance of a despatch from Count Andrassy.… For these reasons it is not sufficient to obtain the conclusion of an armistice. It becomes of the highest importance that conditions of peace should be agreed upon without delay by the Powers, and enforced by them on the Porte."
  All this confirms what I have already said, that the one obstacle throughout these transactions to a firm and effective concert of the European Powers, has been the determined opposition of Her Majesty's Government to every proposal for effective action.
  And here I wish, my Lords, to refer to one observation which fell from the noble Marquess opposite on the first night of the Session. He said, have you thought out, have you spelled out for yourselves what coercion means? It means, he said, the bombardment of Stamboul, and nothing else. Now, I am not going into that subject, but I wish distinctly to say that I have thought out the meaning—all the possible meanings—of the word coercion, and that I wholly dissent from the dogma of my noble Friend that it means nothing but the bombardment of Stamboul. I have a distinct and clear opinion that if Europe had been really united—if you had used your best endeavours when it was possible to unite Europe upon just and moderate proposals, giving security to the inhabitants of Turkey, and yet not seriously interfering with either the independence or the integrity of Turkey—if you had brought Europe, as you might have done, to act together for the purpose of imposing your will upon Turkey, there are more ways of coercion than one—there are more modes than two, or three, or six, by which you might and would have brought Turkey to her knees, and the whole of this terrible danger to Europe might and would have been avoided.
  Now, my Lords, I wish for one mo-

  657
  ment to revert to the impression that was left upon many minds, and I confess upon my own, by the speech of the noble Earl the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs on the first night of the Session. It was not so much anything he distinctly said in so many words—it was the general tone and drift of that speech which gave me the impression that his disposition now is to wash his hands of the whole affair—to say we have done what we could for the inhabitants of Turkey; the Turks have rejected our advice; we have announced to them that we will leave them to their fate; we have nothing more to hope and nothing more to say. My Lords, I do hope I have put an erroneous interpretation upon that speech. I must say that I think it would be in the highest degree dishonourable if, having publicly declared through our Envoy at Constantinople that we thought it our duty and our interest and our right to procure some protection for the Christian inhabitants of Turkey, we should now give up those declarations, abandon those claims of right, and say we have nothing more to say to the matter.
  My Lords, the noble Marquess opposite asked me if I had analyzed the meaning of the word "force." Let me ask him if he has analyzed the meaning of the language held by his own Colleague when he said that the result of the noble Marquess's Conference at Constantinople was to reduce the demands upon Turkey to so small a point that it was evidently not worth fighting for. Has he analyzed the meaning of that argument? I understood the noble Marquess, when he spoke of the minima, that these minima were still sufficient for the protection of the Christian people of Turkey—barely sufficient, but that they were sufficient, and that being sufficient, he accepted them. But, my Lords, if they are sufficient, and if nothing short of them is sufficient, and if you cannot trust the promise of the Turk—and no one has said that more clearly than the noble Marquess—then, I ask, why were they not worth fighting for? If your demand was a real and not a sham demand for the good government of Turkey, then all the duty, all the obligation, to which you have confessed regarding it, lies upon you as a duty and an obligation still.
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  Now, my Lords, I wish noble Lords opposite clearly to understand what the Question is of which I have given Notice, because it has been absurdly misrepresented out-of-doors. It has been said that I wish to force the hands of the Government, and to know whether they are to go to war or not—whether they are to use coercion or not—that I wish for a declaration of their policy in principle and effect. My Lords, I have not asked that; I think I should have no right to ask it. It is a question which no Member of an Opposition has a right to ask of any Government, and I trust noble Lords opposite will keep the future in their own hands. They have already sacrificed the future far too much—they have declared what they will not do and what they will do. I wish them to keep their own counsels. My Lords, what I ask is this—"Whether you have under consideration any measure for the fulfilment of the promises which you have made to the population of Turkey, or do you mean to abandon them altogether?"
  My Lords, before I sit down, I trust that the noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Beaconsfield) will allow me to make a personal appeal to him. He is at the head of one of the most powerful Governments which this country has ever seen—he has the confidence and affection of his Party, and he has their entire and devoted allegiance in a manner and to an extent which few Ministers have ever enjoyed. My Lords, at one time in the course of this year the noble Earl gave public intimation—otherwise I should not feel myself at liberty to refer to it—that it was his desire at no distant day to retire from the fatigues and cares of his great office. That, my Lords, is an intimation which never fails to arouse sympathy and interest of all. In the generous contests of our public life we have no private grudges and no personal enmities. The noble Earl will retire when he desires to do so with the affection of many around him—of young men whom he has encouraged on their entering into public life, of older men whom he has led against all hope to victory and success. But, my Lords, the noble Earl will not retire—if ever he does retire—with any better wish from any one of these than the wish which I shall give him, and it is this—that when he looks back to this

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  Government, of which he is the distinguished head, he may be able to say that he has wielded the great influence and power of England for the purpose and with the effect of procuring some measure of tolerable liberty for the Christian subjects of Turkey, and that in procuring that measure of tolerable liberty he has secured it on such conditions as will guarantee them for the future not only against the odious barbarism of the Turks, but also against the crushing autocracy of the Russian Czars. My Lords, the Question I have to put to Her Majesty's Government is, not what measures, but whether they have any measures in contemplation for the fulfilment of the promises which they have held out to the people of Turkey to protect them from further cruel oppression?
  THE EARL OF DERBY: My Lords, no man who has listened to the speech of the noble Duke, whatever may be his opinions on the question at issue, can fail to admire its eloquence and power, or to respect the sincerity and obvious earnestness which have inspired the address we have just heard. I have listened to that speech with no desire to complain of the course taken by the noble Duke. I think that the condemnation he passed upon the policy of the Government is not borne out by the facts of the case; of one thing, however, I am glad — that the noble Duke should have taken the earliest opportunity in his power to bring this question before your Lordships' House. It is not possible for any new arguments to be brought before your Lordships on the part of the Government. Our case has been already laid without reserve before Parliament and the country in the Blue Books, and I have no new facts to offer. I have only such explanations to give as would naturally suggest themselves to the candour and judgment of any fair-minded man who reads the Papers on your Lordships' Table. It is, I need not say, a satisfaction to us, who are re- sponsible for the conduct of affairs, that after a long period of vague criticism and of unfriendly comments and of charges to which it was impossible to reply, and which it was sometimes even difficult to understand—it is satisfactory to be able to meet face to face the charges of inconsistency, vacillation,
  660
  and change of policy which have been made against us—to feel assured that we know all that can be said, and that there can be no other accusation in reserve against us. I shall, I think, discharge my task best if I attempt to follow the noble Duke through the proceedings to which he referred. The noble Duke began by an observation from which I take leave to dissent. He said that the Instructions to my noble Friend, which he took as the foundation of his remarks, were intended to accomplish two objects—first, the improvement of the internal administration of Turkey, and next the maintenance of European peace. I agree that these were the two objects which we had mainly in view, although as a matter of style I should have put the maintenance of the peace of Europe as the first and most important. And the noble Duke went on to assert that in both these objects we have failed. Now I do not want to repeat the remarks I made a few days ago; but I must again ask your Lordships whether it is not a little too early—whether it is not a little premature—to talk of the action of the Government and of the proceedings of the Conference at Constantinople as having failed in accomplishing both these objects. It cannot yet be said that the peace of Europe has been broken: nor can it be predicted with certainty that no improvement in Turkish administration will result from the Conference. Changes and improvements of a fundamental character in the administration of any country cannot be made in a day; nor can it be said, because the particular scheme recommended by the Conference has not been adopted, and because the desired guarantees have not been conceded by the Porte, that the Turkish Government have a fixed purpose to reject all internal reforms. The noble Duke contends that the failure of which he speaks was owing to two causes—one being the policy which Her Majesty's Government pursued until August, and the other the feebleness and faintheartedness with which they followed up their policy when they entered upon a new course. I do not admit either the failure or the reasons assigned. I do not want to go into detail, but I must observe that when this charge of a change of policy was advanced by the noble

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  Earl (Earl Granville) the other night I endeavoured to meet it. I said that so far from leading the Turks, at the time of the rejection of the Berlin Memorandum, to believe that we were willing to fight for them, we announced as early as the month of May last year that the course we should pursue was of an entirely different character. I stated then, and I repeat it now, that in that respect there had been no change in the policy we adopted. Of course, I admit that we have been obliged to modify in some respects our course of action as circumstances themselves have altered. This is a change which every Government must have gone through that has been placed in similar circumstances. Any one who has filled a responsible post must know that every Government is called upon to alter its course in certain cases; and it was only natural that at a moment when there was imminent danger of an European war we should be willing, in order to avert that war, to do some things, and to accept some things which we should not have done nor accepted if there had been nothing more in question than the suppression of a petty, local insurrection. The noble Duke has referred to a speech that I made more than 12 years ago—in the year 1864—and he seemed to contrast the language I then held with the action of the Government of which I am a Member. I do not mean to suggest as an excuse that the language of anyone in a position of irresponsibility and speaking of questions of policy in an abstract manner must necessarily be very different from that which would be held by a person responsible for the conduct of affairs, though something might be said for that view of the case. But what was it, after all, that I said in 1864, and that is so contrary to our present position? I said that the Turkish Government was in a very bad way; and I am afraid that there can be no doubt upon that point. I said it was a mistake to support that Government in such a manner as to make ourselves enemies among those subject Christian races who were before many years likely to become the dominant races of the Empire. I do not know after 12 years' experience — part of the time at the Foreign Office—that I have anything to retract in the speech I then made, although I may have been a little too sanguine in the
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  expectations I then formed as to the future of the Christians of Turkey. We have always held that the Turkish Government could only be maintained by the amelioration of its internal administration. That language has been used by ourselves and by our predecessors since the year 1856, and from that language we have never swerved. I mentioned Egypt and Constantinople as the two great points in which English interests were concerned in this Turkish question, and I say the same now. Where, then, is the inconsistency? The noble Duke, in referring to the Treaty of 1856, said he hoped he would hear nothing more of the independence of the Porte. I agree with my noble Friend the noble Marquess when he said at Constantinople that "independence was a very relative term." In all parts and in all ages of the world a State which is not able to protect itself is exposed to the dictation of stronger neighbours, and that may have been the case with Turkey; but I do not think that the instances to which the noble Duke referred as showing our disregard of Turkish independence helped him much. He quoted some language held by Sir Henry Bulwer long ago; but whatever that language may have been (and it is new to me) I do not see how the use of it bears upon anything done by the present Government. He referred to the action of the Government in the affair of the Salonica massacre. Ours was, of necessity, a secondary part on that oocasion. The French and German Consuls had been murdered. Their Governments took the matter up; and with a view of keeping the peace and preventing matters from going to extremities by excessive demands on the part of those Powers or by undue resistance on the part of the Porte, we directed our efforts to bring about a peaceable settlement of the matter. I do not see that this showed any disregard of Turkish independence. We should have taken the same part in the case of any quarrel between European States, where we had a hope of being able to mediate with effect. The noble Duke referred to a remark of mine that we might be bound to protect the Turkish Empire from murder, but it was no part of our duty to protect it from suicide. He seemed to found on that remark an argument that I claimed the right to

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  interfere with the independence of the Turkish Government. So far from that, my language pointed to an exactly opposite conclusion. If I had intended any interference in the internal affairs of Turkey, the language which I should have used would have been, not that I would not, but that I did undertake to guarantee the Porte against suicide. The noble Duke has spoken with great severity—perhaps in language somewhat over-coloured — though I am not prepared to say with entire injustice of the administration of the Turkish Provinces; but when he enlarged on the opportunities of improvement which Turkey has had he went a little too far. He said that during the last 20 years Turkey had been enjoying peace and perfect tranquillity; but the fact is that during that time the Turkish Government has had two serious insurrections to put down; and, though it has had an unlimited supply of European capital, unfortunately that supply of capital has done more harm than good, for very little of it has been expended in the way of improving the administration and developing the resources of the country. Coming to more serious matters, the noble Duke finds fault with the course we adopted at the first outbreak of the insurrection in Herzegovina. He said, substantially—"I can understand your saying that we have nothing to do with it; but I do not understand your taking part with the oppressors against the oppressed." But what are the real facts with regard to that matter? In the first place, I observe, in passing, that there is not a single fact connected with that rising in Herzegovina which was not known to the noble Duke and to your Lordships when these matters were discussed last year, and it is rather late to go back to transactions which have already been under the notice of the House. The noble Duke says—"You entreated the Turks to put down the insurrection." My answer is, it was in its origin a petty local disturbance, and as far as in the circumstances of the time any human judgment could foresee certain to end in the failure of those who promoted it and to bring about a useless loss of life. It was only, I believe, owing to the excessive apathy and indifference of the Turkish authorities that it was allowed to grow into a serious matter. The noble Duke himself admits
  664
  that nothing can justify insurrection where there is not a reasonable hope of success. If that be so, and if the judgment of the matter which I formed at the time was what I admit it was, I do not think there was anything unreasonable in what I said. What we looked to, and what was more important than the merely local question, was the danger which might ensue to the Empire and ultimately to Europe if disturbances of this kind were allowed to go on. What occurred might have ended in a general disturbance of the peace of Europe; and was it unreasonable to say that Europe had an interest in its suppression? No doubt when you put down an insurrection, force is one element of pacification; but it is not the only element, nor the main element, and it is not fair to quote words written and spoken by me as if it were to be implied that we had been doing nothing but press upon the Porte the duty of suppressing an insurrection by force. It is quite true I frequently warned the Austrian Government as to the manner in which Austrian volunteers were crossing the frontier and entering Herzegovina. If Austria from the beginning had not professed to stand altogether neutral and to take no part we should have had no locus standi in making these representations, and I assuredly should not have made them. But recollect what was the position of Austria at that time. Austria professed a sincere desire to see this insurrection brought to a close. It was with that view that at her instance the Consular Commission was issued and the Andrassy Note was framed. Was it unreasonable or was it not—was it a breach of neutrality, or justice, or fairness to the two parties concerned—that we told the Austrian Government, as we did—"It is of no use your making diplomatic efforts to put down this disturbance or resorting to Consular Commissions, so long as your own people keep it alive, and your own officials, seeing all this, allow them to do as they please?" As to sending back refugees to the frontier there to be murdered, I can only say that the impossibility of referring at the moment to the despatches renders it impossible for me to follow the remarks of the noble Duke; but assuredly no advice was ever given by Her Majesty's Government to send back refugees where personal danger to

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  those so sent back was probable. I cannot at the moment ascertain what it is to which the charges of the noble Duke would point when he speaks of cutting off allowances to starving people. It is possible that allowances made to help the refugees in their distress were diverted to improper purposes and appropriated to the purchase of arms and the support of military operations; and, if so—though I have no recollection of' the transaction referred to—I cannot see that there was any objection in pointing out that as a breach of neutrality. The noble Duke ridiculed the idea of our looking for Russian influences or Russian agencies for the cause of these disturbances when ample cause was to be found in the maladministration of the country. I say nothing as to the action of the Russian Government—it is not my duty or my wish to go into that question; but if I affirm that local residents officially connected with the Russian Government were among the most active agents in stirring up these disturbances and assisted the insurgents in various ways, I only state that which is perfectly well known, which can be abundantly proved from the Blue Book, and which I do not suppose the Russian Government would deny. The Russian Consulate at Ragusa was described to me as being the head-quarters of the insurgent chief's, and when one of the most noted of them was killed in the course of the campaign, the. Russian Consul General attended the funeral with every public mark of respect and sympathy. The noble Duke can hardly contend, in face of the published evidence, that Russian influence had nothing to do with these disturbances. The noble Duke then went on to speak of a change in our policy about August or September. If he meant that those lamentable occurrences in Bulgaria, when they became fully known, exercised some influence on our judgment of the situation, he says that which no human being would dispute, and which I have not the slightest wish to deny. That such massacres should have taken place, though confined to one district, undoubtedly shows a degree of' feebleness and a want of controlling power in the central Administration of Turkey which was beyond what we could reasonably have supposed to exist. And if in the autumn of last year we adopted a system of in-
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  terference more active and pronounced than we had done before the Bulgarian outrages, they may to some extent have influenced our course, but the influence which they exercised was altogether secondary, and the main cause of our action was this — that Servia, as we know, had joined in the fight, that the Servian Army was almost entirely composed of Russian volunteers, and that, as a consequence, Russia was in fact, though not in form, in the field. Every Servian defeat was felt in Russia as a Russian defeat, and the danger was that the feeling in that country would become excited until a war with Turkey was inevitable. That was the imminent danger which, in the interests of Europe, we were bound to consider. The noble Duke then went into the long and complicated series of negotiations which ended in an armistice and a Conference: and in doing this the noble Duke only followed a large number of persons in ascribing to the Government a change—hardly a change of policy, but a change of procedure—that never occurred. The fact is, in the first instance, we asked for a suspension of hostilities; but the Turks, whose military affairs were then prospering, were not unnaturally reluctant to stop. They were willing to grant a truce for a few days, but had a strong objection to its being longer than was absolutely necessary. Russia thought that was not sufficient, and desired an armistice for a definite period. There was absolutely no question at the time of an armistice of two months being too short or six months too long. What we were endeavouring to obtain from the Turks, and what they were unwilling to concede, was the granting of an armistice for more than a few days. We asked for one of not less than a month or six weeks, and the Turkish Government replied by offering one of' six months — or more accurately, at that time one of five months and a few days. We accepted that offer as being what we had asked and a little more. And I must say I never was more surprised than when I heard that complaint having previously been made of the former suspension of hostilities as too short, the Russian Government had now changed its ground and objected to that armistice as being too long. By pressure on the Porto Russia succeeded in obtaining an armistice of two months. But it is

  667
  curious enough that in the result the original proposal was justified, because the Turkish armistice has been extended from two to four months, with the probability of a further extension, which will bring it to the term originally fixed. Then the noble Duke said the Turks proposed a long armistice, without a Conference; you were for a short armistice followed by a Conference, yet you gave up your own plan and accepted theirs. The fact is, we never gave up the idea of a Conference at all; we simply postponed it for the moment, our first object being to stop the fighting and prevent the extension of the war; and we naturally thought that when that object was secured there was no danger of our not being able to bring about the Conference. That is what the noble Duke describes as a policy with no backbone in it, and which he contrasts with the more manly policy of Russia. But the result is the test: we gained our object, and that quite irrespective of the shortening of the armistice by Russian agency. Then came the mission of my noble Friend (the Marquess of Salisbury) to Constantinople. I entirely agree in the just compliments which the noble Duke paid to my noble Friend; but he says the mission of my noble Friend was foredoomed to failure because we stated to the Turkish Government that we did not intend to enforce our demands. I will come to that bye-and-bye. The noble Duke then touched on the question of the preliminary Conferences held without a Turkish plenipotentiary being present. He said the course which my noble Friend adopted combined the inconveniences of both forms of Conference, and either that the Turkish Representative should have been present all through, or should have been altogether excluded. Well, our feeling was that it was more friendly, more courteous, and, if I may use the expression, more respectful to the Porte—which may be allowed to have something to say on its own affairs — that the Turkish Representative should not be called to attend those preliminary and informal meetings at which the details of intended reforms were discussed until they were in a state to be submitted to the Turkish Government. It would have been putting the Porte into a false, if not an absurd, position if the head of their Foreign
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  Department as one of the Members of the Conference, concurred in arranging the plans which were afterwards to be submitted to the Government of which he was a Member, and to be received by him in his capacity of a Representative of that Government. There was no intention at any time that the scheme of the Conference should be peremptorily imposed on the Porte and accepted or rejected without the opportunity of fair consideration. It has been stated that the plans proposed to the Turkish Government were considerably modified from what they were when first submitted to the Conference, and the noble Duke has referred to a mysterious telegram expressing the gratitude of the Porte, in reply, as he supposes, to the intimation which I had made to the Turkish Government, that we did not intend to coerce them. Now, I am not quite sure to what that telegram refers, but of one thing I am sure—it does not refer to this question of coercion. It could not do so, for I had taken good care that all with whom we had to deal should know what our intentions were in going into the Conference. I do not wish to read long extracts from these despatches, but there is one addressed by me to my noble Friend, from which I may be allowed to make this extract. It is dated January 8, 1877—
  "The Turkish Ambassador left with me on the 24th ultimo the telegram from Safvet Pasha of which I enclose a copy. His Excellency did not inform me of the text of the communication from him to his Government, of which mention is made in it. I noticed subsequently the expression used in the telegram that, 'the Sublime Porte counts more than ever on the friendly support of Her Britannic Majesty's Government in the difficult circumstances through which Turkey is passing.'"
  I was a little surprised at the expression, for I was not aware of anything having been said to give rise to it; but I was anxious that no misunderstanding should exist. The telegram goes on to say—
  "Being anxious to avoid the possibility of any misconception as to the line of policy followed by Her Majesty's Government, I addressed a private note to his Excellency reminding him that in an unofficial conversation which had passed between us on the 19th ultimo, I had informed him that although Her Majesty's Government did not themselves meditate or threaten the employment of active measures of coercion in the event of the proposals of the Powers being refused by the Porte, yet that Turkey must not

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  look to England for assistance or protection if that refusal resulted in a war with other countries. I added that this language, which had been held by me again on subsequent occasions, represented the settled decision of the Government, and that I ventured to repeat it in writing as it was very important that the Sultan's Ministers should he under no misapprehension, and should clearly understand that they must not expect from this country any support in resisting the arrangement now offered to them."—[Turkey, No 2, p. 182.]
  ["Hear, hear!"] Am I to understand from that cheer of the noble Duke that the policy which he supports points to this—that if the reforms of the Powers were not accepted by the Porte, we should proceed by the union of all the European Powers to enforce them on Turkey? I can only say if that is the policy he would recommend, such is not the policy of Her Majesty's Government. My Lords, I came prepared for the discussion of that question of coercion if the noble Duke had gone more fully into it. If the noble Duke or any other Member of your Lordships' House desires to raise it, as applicable to our present policy, I should be prepared to justify the language I hold. I should be prepared to show that coercion is unmeaning, unless it means war, and that war would be fraught with every possible danger to the peace of Europe. I do not enter into that question now, because the noble Duke has not raised it in so direct a form as to justify me in discussing it. The noble Duke says, You have told us what you will not do; but he has abstained from putting the question which naturally follows. Now, tell us what you will do. That, my Lords, is a question which no man in my position can be expected to answer, We have to consider the disposition of other Powers and the possibility of success in any undertaking we may propose. But I may say that ever since the proceedings of the Conference have closed we have not been inactive. We have pressed on Sorvia and Montenegro the extreme importance of making peace with Turkey with the least possible delay. What may be the effect of our efforts in that direction a few days will show. If peace is made, one half at least of the object of the Conference will have been accomplished. There remains, of course, the question of internal reforms. As to that I am not prepared as yet to express a definite
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  opinion. But I was much impressed by a suggestion thrown out by Midhat Pasha luring the Conference, that the Porte should have a reasonable time allowed to consider what had been suggested and to work out its reforms in its own way; and if within that reasonable time, whatever it might be, nothing was done, he considered that, so far as he was concerned, the Powers would have a right to demand guarantees. But we are now only at the beginning of the Session, and whatever we do or whatever we propose to do for the next five months will be subject to the criticism of Parliament. As we do not yet know what the other European Powers may do, it is not in my power to make a more explicit statement at present. The question of peace or war between Turkey and the Principalities remains still unsettled. If there should be war, I fear that complications may arise which would materially affect the result. If there should be peace, then we shall be free to deal with this question of internal administration and internal reform; and I think your Lordships will admit that the natural course in any country is peace first and reform after. No country can re-organize its administration when it has something like half a million of men under arms watching against invasion, and when its finances are strained to the utmost for the purposes of war. Under such circumstances a beginning may be made; but it can hardly be more than a beginning. It may be reasonably asked by any country intending to work out a plan of reform that there should be at least a possibility of successfully doing so. Time and peace may be fairly asked by the Porte to work out its plans, but without peace there can be no hope of success. My Lords, all I can say at present is that, as I need hardly assure you, I shall be at any time ready to communicate in this House, with the utmost frankness, all the information which the state of affairs may permit.
  THE DUKE OF WESTMINSTERsaid, he did not conceive that there was any need to offer any defence of the share lie had taken in the St. James's Hall Conference, nor did he propose to do so; but he might venture to say that that meeting was entirely constitutional, and that it was perfectly competent for those who attended it to discuss passing events. He

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  admitted, at the same time, that while negotiations of a serious and difficult character on an important question foreign policy were pending, every consideration ought to be shown to the Government of the day. At the time of that meeting, the 8th of December, the public could only move on the lines they then had. Those lines were furnished by the despatches in the Blue Book from the beginning of January of last year to the end of July, and the speeches of Ministers, especially those of the Prime Minister. There was one point in a despatch of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the 19th of May which guided the meeting as to the position taken up by this country towards Turkey. In that despatch, No. 278, Lord Derby said—
  "The Government cannot conceal from themselves that the gravity of the situation has arisen in a great measure from the weakness and apathy of the Porte in dealing with the insurrection in its earlier stages, and from the want of confidence in Turkish statesmanship and powers of government shown by the state of financial, military, and administrative collapse into which this country has been allowed to fall. The responsibility of this condition of affairs must rest with the Sultan and his Government, and all that can be done by the Government is to give such friendly counsel as circumstances may require."
  When the language thus used was compared with the speeches of the Prime Minister—especially with the speech at Aylesbury—the meeting and a large party in the country thought that much stress could not be laid on that despatch. There was another despatch of a more decided character, but they were not known at that time. Then came the speeches of the Prime Minister—particularly that at Aylesbury on the 21st September. The Prime Minister then said—
  "It would be affectation in me to pretend that the Government is backed by the country. The opinion of a large party in the country would, if carried out, be injurious to the interests of England and fatal to peace."
  And yet that policy was afterwards fully adopted by the Government; but at that time the policy indicated by Ministerial speeches was the only policy known to the country. While on this subject and on the speech of the Prime Minister, he would direct the attention of the House and of the noble Earl to words used by him on the same occasion, and under-
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  stood to refer to no less a person than Mr. Gladstone. He went on to say—
  "The danger at such a moment is this, that designing politicians may take advantage of such sublime sentiments [alluding to a righteous enthusiasm] and may apply them for their sinister ends. I do not think that there is any language that can denounce too strongly conduct of such description. He who at such a moment would avail himself of such a commanding sentiment in order to obtain his own individual ends, to a course which he knows, which he may know to he injurious to the interests of his country, is one who cannot be too strongly condemned. Such conduct outrages the principle of patriotism, it injures the common welfare of humanity in the general havoc and crime it may accomplish, and may be fairly described as worse than any of those Bulgarian atrocities of which we have heard so much."
  He (the Duke of Westminster) would not have ventured to refer to that language, but that it had been quoted by Mr. Fawcett at the meeting as directly affecting the reputation of Mr. Gladstone. He was bound to say that if it had been known on the 8th of December that the policy of Her Majesty's Government in the first stage had given way to the policy of the second stage no Conference would have been held. It seemed to him that it was a matter of great importance that there should have been less reserve on the part of the Government, and more confidence shown in the country; especially as the noble Earl the Foreign Secretary had said that he wished to know the will of the country with regard to its conduct towards Turkey. An eminent Member of the Government, however, had stated that the country knew nothing at all about foreign affairs. Then, with regard to Mr. Gladstone, a gentleman in the other House who, it was said, had been offered a seat on the Treasury Bench, speaking at Lincoln, said—
  "It filled him almost with despair when he saw such a man, so able, one who had served his country so long and so well as Mr. Gladstone, so indifferent and so recklessly careless and, apparently, utterly unconscious of the very first principles which ought to govern and guide the conduct of every statesman."
  Now, it was said that it was a most audacious and barefaced thing for the Conference at St. James's Hall to have assumed the title of "National," seeing that it by no means presented a national character; but he might say that had the room been ten times larger there would have been no room for Conserva-

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  tives, and the policy it represented turned out after all to be the policy of the Government, who had adopted the national sentiment of the country. He might say that Mr. Gladstone had nothing whatever to do with the meeting at St. James's Hall, except that a few days before he was asked to attend it. And surely it was very hard that such language as he had quoted should have been used towards one who had served his country so long and so well. The second stage of the policy of the Government might be said to be over. The Conference was at an end, and seemed to him to have failed indisputably. A contrary opinion was expressed by some persons on the ground that various Powers of Europe had come to an agreement as to what ought to be done. But what ought to be done had not been done, and no means were taken to make it done. Why did the Conference fail? The Government made it a point to uphold the independence and integrity of Turkey. Notwithstanding, they proposed measures in the Conference directly affecting that independence and integrity. In his opinion these were very proper measures, and not half strong enough. The noble Earl (the Earl of Derby) talked of a petty rebellion in the Herzegovina. Surely the noble Earl could not forget that longing for independence among the population which found vent in every tradition and ballad for 400 years past. The noble Earl could hardly forget these things, and it seemed strange therefore that he should call this a petty revolt. The Government, however, proposed to interfere materially with the internal affairs of the Provinces. These proposals were rejected by the Porte as an interference with its independence and integrity. There was ample warning previously from Sir Henry Elliot that this was likely to be the case; but no measures were taken to coerce the Porte; on the contrary, the Government declared over and over again against the policy of using force. An elaborate measure of reform was constructed for these Provinces, but Her Majesty's Government would not apply the necessary motive power. Now, he thought the country was entitled to know why coercion was altogether inadmissible in this case, seeing that this was the only plan by which the Turks could be brought to reason. The noble
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  Earl said that coercion meant war; but he (the Duke of Westminster) thought that joint coercion on the part of England, Russia, and Austria, not reckoning France, might have hindered any war, because such a display of force would have brought the Turks to reason. What had prevented this use of force? Was it fear of infringing the provisions of the Treaty of 1856? It could not be that the Treaty of 1856 prevented the use of coercion, because it would have been possible to raise the point with the other Powers and have revised the Treaty as in 1871. In 1863, when there was a proposal to convene a Congress of the Powers to revise the Treaties of Vienna, Lord Palmerston, in a letter to the King of the Belgians, said these Treaties were still in force and formed the basis of the existing arrangements of Europe; and he added—
  "Before we can come to any decision about the proposed Congress we should like to know what subjects are to be discussed, and what power it is to possess to give effect to its decisions. If a majority were one way, and a minority, however small, the other way, that minority including the party by which a concession was to be made, is it intended that force should be used or is Congress to remain powerless to execute its own decrees?"
  As everybody knew, the proposal for a Congress fell through; but Lord Palmerston's words were applicable to the late Conference. Would the Government be able to shelter themselves much longer under the Treaty of 1856? It had been already broken by the Turks themselves, and as many persons in this country affirmed, would be shattered in pieces before very long. Events marched through Treaties, as was shown by the rapid formation of the Kingdom of Italy and the war between Germany and France. In both these cases the Treaties of Vienna fell to the ground. After all, what had the Treaty of 1856 done for the world, and what had the Ottoman Empire done for Europe? The Duke of Wellington, in a quotation which was read last week in "another place," said in 1829—
  "The Ottoman Empire stands not for the benefit of the Turks, but of Christian Europe—not to preserve the Mahomedans in power, but to save Christians from a war of which neither the objects could be defined, nor the extent nor the duration calculated."
  But had the Ottoman Empire saved the

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  Christians from the losses and sufferings of the war of 1854? Had it saved them from the rebellions which had occurred in some of the Turkish Provinces, would it save us from the future war which was likely to occur? Had it given us peace and good government in the Christian Provinces of Turkey? Russia now held a very different position from that which she held in 1828–9, and again in 1854. Then she had her own quarrels to settle with the Porte. Now, she had both her own quarrels and those of Europe. She proposed to do our work and her own also. If the Government succeeded in preventing Russia from going to war, how would they deal with the unfortunate Christian subjects of the Porte? Would the Treaty of 1856 save us from war? He believed that Russia would move, and judging from what she had been able to do before, she would eventually find herself in possession of Roumelia. Looking at what might happen, he thought it only right that the Government should state what their course would be. The collapse of the Ottoman Empire was not likely to be far off, and on the whole there were many persons who thought that that would be a very good thing. The Duke of Wellington, speaking of the Treaty of Adrianople in 1829, said—
  "There is no doubt that it would have been more fortunate for the world if the Treaty of Peace had not been signed, and if the Russians had entered Constantinople, and if the Turkish Empire had been dissolved."
  The Duke of Wellington thought that in such case the Five Powers would have entered into an engagement as to the disposition of Turkish territory, and that there would have been an assurance that the crumbling of Turkey would lead to no war, and to no such territorial accession to any State as would alter the general balance of power. He believed that many persons in this country would not be sorry to see the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. The reforms conceded by Turkey might answer their purpose for a time, but after a time there was too much ground for supposing that they would lapse altogether. In conclusion he hoped, though he was not sanguine on this head, that in the future stages of the Ministerial policy, the whole country might be able to coincide with the Government.
  LORD STANLEY OF ALDERLEYsaid, that he would not follow the noble Duke who spoke first through all the exaggerations of his speech, but he sincerely hoped that no more speeches in favour of coercion would be addressed to the House, for if any event such as Navarino were to take place, it would almost certainly be followed by an insurrection in India. The circumstances were now changed since Navarino, and made the danger greater, for at that time the whole of India was not under the British rule; there were not at that time either steam or telegraphic communications, and Sultan Mahmoud, from his innovations with respect to the Army, had lost the confidence of the Mussulman world. Violent speeches such as that of the noble Duke (the Duke of Argyll) a few nights ago, when pronounced by one who had been Secretary of State for India, would have a most dangerous effect, and were almost criminal. It might be that the noble Duke pinned his faith on the assertions of Sir George Campbell that the Indian Mussulmans did not care for the Ottoman Empire; but as Sir George Campbell was a personal Friend of his, and he had known him for more than 25 years, he should not be supposed to intend any discourtesy to him when he said that upon this particular point his opinion was of very little value, because in the earlier part of his career Sir George Campbell was employed in Ajmir among the Rajputs, and later in Bengal, where as he was too high an official, he had little or no opportunity of becoming acquainted with the feelings of the Mussulmans. When the noble Duke pleaded the right of insurrection, and incited subjects to rebel, it might be urged in extenuation of his language that Sir George Campbell had written in a widely circulated pamphlet, that whilst all the Christian Churches had preached subjection to the powers that be, the Scotch Church alone had taken an opposite course, and embraced the cause of freedom. The noble Duke opposite (the Duke of Westminster) who presided over the St. James's Hall Conference, and who appeared to believe everything that was related by the apostle of impalement (Canon Liddon), had denied that the revolt in Herzegovina was not a petty revolt, because the people there had preserved for 400 years ballads in

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  favour of independence. Now, excepting the Poles, the Slays possessed only one epic poem, the "Osmanita" of Gundulich, the poet of Ragusa, which was in praise of Sultan Osman. His reference to the Duke of Wellington's despatches was also unhappy, since those despatches published this morning in The Morning Post justified the conduct of the Government, and showed how factious was the Opposition. It appeared to be thought that the statement that Mr. Fox opposed Pitt and obtained for the Russians the cession of the fort of Otchakoff was an argument in favour of now supporting the ambitious designs of Russia. But the conduct of Mr. Fox in sending Sir Robert Adair to Russia to thwart Mr. Pitt's national policy had been considered not only as factious, but also as bordering on treason. And to state that he did so, only proved that "Vixere fortes ante Agamemnona," or that there had been other factious leaders of an Opposition before Mr. Gladstone.
  THE MARQUESS OF BATH: My Lords, I do not rise to say whether or not the Government were half-hearted in the performance of the duties which they took upon themselves to maintain the peace of Europe and give security to the Christian inhabitants of Turkey: it is sufficient that Her Majesty's Government have acted in unison with the feelings of the country, and have shared the horrors experienced at the outrages committed by the Turks, and have recognized the insupportable character of the Turkish rule, and the little reliance which can be placed upon Turkish promises. The Government carried out those views in laying down the basis of the Conference, and in conjunction with the rest of the Powers had sought a remedy against the evils of Turkish misgovernment. The Conference has failed; but it has not failed for want of knowledge or devotion on the part of the noble Marquess (the Marquess of Salisbury) to the task ho undertook: and I am bound to admit that, so far as the despatches enable us to judge, he has received the hearty and loyal support of his Colleagues. But the reason for the failure of the Conference, and the reason why the Turks rejected the proposals made to them, are not far to seek. In the first place, the Turks never believed that the European Powers would act together; and, above all, they did not
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  realize the fact that the Government of England was in earnest on this question. We can also see, without much difficulty, why they distrusted or disbelieved in the sincerity of the English Government. Although the Turks are a half civilized or semi-barbarous race, they are by no means devoid of shrewdness and intellect, and when they read the accounts of the speeches that were made in public by supporters of the Government, almost up to the very last period at which the Conference was holding its sittings, and when they read the articles in the newspapers, which were supposed to be acting in the interests of the Government, advocating the interests of Turkey as if they were the interests of England, and defending the Turkish Ministers as if they were English Ministers, the Turks naturally came to the conclusion "there was a screw loose somewhere," and that the noble Marquess had not the full support of his Colleagues. There was another cause why the Turks were inclined to doubt the earnestness of England, and that was the unfortunate announcement of the Government in August that coercive measures were not to be used, and that moral suasion alone was to be employed. Now, I never knew that moral persuasion was good for anything unless it was to be backed up by something material. The Turks are quite intelligent enough to know how little value is to be placed on arguments so expressed. Another source of encouragement to the Turks in their resistance to the proposals of Europe, was the presence of Sir Henry Elliot at Constantinople. It is impossible to reconcile the policy advocated by Sir Henry Elliot as given in the Blue Books with the policy which was advocated by the noble Earl (the Secretary of State). When I look at the despatches of Sir Henry Elliot, and when I read the most remarkable addresses which were delivered to two deputations on his departure from Constantinople, I find it utterly and entirely impossible to reconcile the language of Sir Henry Elliot with the arguments which the noble Earl so sternly and so strenuously impressed upon the Porte. But the question which we have to consider is what is now to be done; and this is far more important than any criticism which can be offered on the past. Sir Henry Elliot speaks in his dispatches of the

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  of the good feeling existing between the Turks and the Christians; but we have in the Blue Books the full complaints of their wrongs. Then there are the Greeks, whose unfortunate jealousy of the Slav populations affords Sir Henry Elliot so much pleasure, complaining of what is proposed to be done for the Bulgarians. We were told again by Mr. Baring who is borne out in his Report by almost all the Consuls, that the Turkish tyranny in the Provinces is insupportable, and that where there is Turkish rule there must be discontent and oppression. The people of Bulgaria are described as being driven into silence by terror or suffering, and the people of Bosnia preferred dying by hundreds, either of fever or hunger, in the maintenance of their opinions rather than accept Turkish fraternity. It is true the Porte has promulgated a Constitution; but what importance is to be attached to it remains yet to be seen. The noble Earl who has addressed us to-night spoke on the opening night of the Session as if he expected reforms to be made voluntarily by the Turks, and as if importance was to be attached to the promises of Turkey; but he must know perfectly that in years past reforms have been promised by Turkey which have never been carried into effect, and he must know how valueless anything she says will be if it is not accompanied by guarantees. The noble Earl spoke of peace as being of the first importance. Well, only let it be a peace which shall give security to the Christians for their lives and liberty. The question arises—Are matters to remain as they are, and are these people to be left in the condition in which they are described in the despatches? Are they to remain until Turkey puts an end to their miseries by further massacres, or a change in European politics enables some Power to advance to their rescue? I do not think they will have long to wait. The sympathies of the people, the solemn pledges of the Emperor, and the feelings of a kindred race and common faith must force Russia to act, and then the question is, When Russia interferes what policy is it incumbent on this country to pursue? I am happy to think there seems to be little chance for any statesman in England to force us into war for the maintenance of Turkish power or rule. But if this
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  country remains neutral in a war between Russia and Turkey what will happen? There will be fresh massacres and fresh miseries and sufferings for the Christians as well as the Turks. If Russia were successful, the settlement of the question would be left with her, and the whole power of protecting English interests would, at any rate, be much diminished, and Russian power would increase. Where such a state of things would end it is impossible for any man to foretell. There are other elements of danger in Europe beside the Eastern Question. There is another Power more aggressive than Russia awaiting its opportunity. Do not believe that it is merely the ill-disciplined and ill-officered troops that are the only difficulties which check at this moment Russian advance. These difficulties can be overcome, and by Russia they must be overcome, but I do not think the outcome will be very conducive to the peace of Europe. Now, if this country, instead of pursuing a policy of neutrality, goes in cordially with Russia or any other European Power in coercing the Turks, and forcing upon them such an alteration in their internal administration as may give contentment to the people and security to the peace of Europe—if this country is prepared to do that, if a war is not altogether avoided it will be, if it arises, of very short duration. The Turks cannot contend at the same time with a Russian army and an English fleet, and such a course would leave them still open to take such measures as the interests of England required for resisting Russian aggression. For the interest and honour of England, in the interest of the peace of Europe, and in the interest of common Christianity itself, it is wise that this country should not remain passive, but should take such measures as would at the same time protect her own interests and do justice to the feelings of outraged humanity.
  LORD CAMPBELL: My Lords, the noble Marquess who has just sat down (the Marquess of Bath) has revealed with an astounding frankness the programme of those who wish to invade the Porte for the advantage of its subjects, and who have in the noble Duke from whom the Motion came so prominent a Leader. Whatever may be thought of the course the noble Duke has taken, or

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  the language he has used, to one kind of praise he is entitled—the praise of absolute consistency upon the Eastern Question. The noble Duke has not frequently addressed the House or other audiences upon it. He made a speech during the Cretan Insurrection which he appears to have entirely forgotten, together with the events which drew it forth; as he maintained to-night that the Sublime Porte since the Crimean War had been enjoying absolute repose. That speech is said to be remarkable for its declamatory eloquence; but it provoked the severe censure of the late Lord Derby, who had as Prime Minister to notice it, on the ground that it was calculated, proceeding from a quarter so authoritative, to promote the fall of the Ottoman Empire, which could not be conveniently replaced. Last autumn the noble Duke joined an agitation—and I agree with him that public meetings upon foreign questions may be occasionally, although they cannot often, be excused—an agitation of which the avowed tendency was not only to coerce the Porte, but to dislodge it. On the 8th of February the noble Duke electrified mankind. Your Lordships, as he explained, being an "European housetop," when he rises to address you by the statement that all insurrections against the Porte are justifiable, no matter what their object or their origin; and that the Sultan is not entitled to the allegiance of his subjects. And here one cannot help remarking how consummate is the wisdom, how deep the statesmanship to which men may gradually arrive if they are only long enough surrounded by a Council. The mind of the noble Duke, extensive as it is, could not alone have seized a truth so hidden and so priceless. To-day, the noble Duke comes down to explain that Great Britain ought to go to war with a Power she is bound by Treaty to defend. These four speeches might all be brought together. Their harmony is perfect. But I am not convinced that their author will be accepted as a fair exponent of Liberal opinion on the subject, or as an organ of the Party which Lord Palmerston directed in the path of reforming and upholding that Empire, which the noble Duke may possibly destroy, but which after the language he has held he retains a slender prospect of ameliorating. There seem to be but two considerations
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  urged in favour of a policy so violent. One that the Porte has assumed an indefensible position in resisting the last suggestions of the Conference; the other that unless coercion of some kind happens, the labours of the Conference are sterile, while it is incumbent on the State to render them productive. It would not be convenient now to approach so large a question as the policy or impolicy of what the Conference agreed in finally maintaining. The vindication of the Porte has been delivered in a shape the most official and elaborate — it has been delivered in their Circular of the 25th of January. Has the noble Duke replied to it? I am not aware that he alluded to it. There never was a State Paper more entitled to attention, in point of dignity, of moderation, and of argument. Those who do not take the trouble to confront it, have no kind of locus standi against the Power whose conclusion it defends. As to the second point, admitting that the labours of the Conference were bound to be productive, they may easily be shown to have been far less sterile than the noble Duke imagines. They did much to prevent the occupation of Bulgaria, which hung over Europe as a menace in the middle of the autumn. Their influence no doubt advanced the measure of the Turkish Constitution. Besides, they brought about—although without design—an interregnum of diplomacy upon the Bosphorus. For this result alone the noble Marquess the late Plenipotentiary would be entitled to the lasting gratitude of the people whom he visited. To explain the impression thoroughly is not consistent with the reticence I should desire to preserve, in spite of rather opposite examples, but noble Lords can reason for themselves upon it and judge how far it is well-founded. Having alluded to the Turkish Constitution, I cannot help referring to a most extraordinary statement with regard to it, which during the Session has come from the Bench beneath, and which tends to give a pretext to that aggression on the Porte to which we are invited. It has been denounced as a political manœuvre, improvised to baffle the united delegates of Europe. To such a version I am not disqualified for giving an emphatic contradiction. During the autumn of 1875, when no Conference was meditated, the friends of

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  Midhat Pasha had resolved to advocate a system of this character. That distinguished man withdrew from office, because his programme of reform was then deemed unacceptable. It fell to my lot to approach him during his retreat, sufficiently to know that whenever he again directed public matters some kind of Constitution must arise to check the power of the Sultan. If no insurrection had taken place in Herzegovina, if we had never heard of an Andrassy Note or Berlin Memorandum, the set of men whom I allude to would sonic day have enforced the convictions they had gradually arrived at. The version I protest against is more extraordinary when it comes from men who aspire to be the Representatives of Liberal opinion in the country. Sympathy with nascent Constitutions, imperfect as they may be, untried as they must be, is among the permanent traditions of the Party. Such Constitutions have always been the object of lenient criticism, of prompt support, of generous encouragement among the Party from the days of Mr. Fox to our own. These who now deride them and discredit them forget the essence of the school in which they call themselves the Leaders. I will not detain your Lordships, I rose only because the speech of the noble Duke appeared to me to be calculated to promote hostilities, unless on this side of the House it was in some degree resisted. The noble Duke demands aggression on the Porte. Might he not insist upon a war with Portugal? Portugal is not less ancient an ally. Might he not require an expedition against Belgium? We are but bound by Treaty to defend her. According to this system, when we have decimated our allies, should we proceed to act against our Colonies? Would a campaign against the West Indies be sufficient for the noble Duke; or would nothing less than a coup de main against the executive and Parliament of Ottawa content him? If Great Britain is to be arrayed against the Ottoman Empire, how soon may we expect a dangerous expedition from the North, of which the noble Duke would be the leader. These propositions are not much more violent than that which he have heard—and scarcely more irrational. If you really want to effect certain changes in European Turkey, the path is clear; the means are tangible before you. The
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  British Embassy when properly restored has only to assert superiority to every other influence based on your fidelity to Treaties—which since Lord Stratford de Redcliffe left Constantinople it has never done—and there is not a single feasible idea in the Imperial decree of 1839, or that of 1856, or that of 1875, which may not be translated into practice. By going back to duty, you may reach the point the noble Duke would gain by moving forward to perdition. My Lords, in a few days I hope to bring before the House a Motion which aims at peace as decidedly as that of the noble Duke aspires to a rupture. I venture to engage the noble Lords who are opposed to me to deliver their speeches now, and those who think as I do to reserve them to the time when they may influence your Lordships.
  THE EARL OF KIMBERLEY: My Lords, I trust I shall not be deemed presumptuous in addressing your Lordships' House on this question, inasmuch as I held a subordinate position connected with the Foreign Office during the Crimean War, and it was my lot to be sent to Russia to watch over the execution of the Treaty by which it was concluded. I am anxious to say a few words, because I wish to place the question upon the basis of the general policy of this country in the East. I agree with my noble Friend who opened this discussion (the Duke of Argyll) in his horror and detestation of the atrocities that have been committed in Bulgaria, and if that horror and detestation could be increased it would be by the cynical Memorandum of the Turkish Minister, which I have read with disgust. But however great and just the influence of these feelings has been on public opinion in this country, we must judge this great question mainly with reference to our permanent interests in the Levant. English interests in the Eastern Question are great and abiding, and are not to be affected by passing events, however shocking. I may be, perhaps, somewhat old-fashioned in my views, but I hold the doctrine that it is the interest of this country not to be indifferent to a change which would throw the Turkish dominion into the hands of any European Power. Next to Egypt we have, I think, the greatest interest in Constantinople, which ought not to be allowed to fall into the hands of any preponde-

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  rant Power, for that would impair our position in the Mediterranean and might threaten the security of our communication with India. But while holding these views, I must say that while our interests are abiding, and the ends to which our policy must be directed remain the same, the means must be changed from time to time as the circumstances and conditions of the Levant alter. Now what I think may be charged against Her Majesty's Government is that they have not evinced an adequate perception of the change of circumstances and have been too slew, to adapt themselves to the new policy required. We have no need to turn our back upon our old policy in the East, of which the most typical representative was Lord Palmerston, who, while he steadily maintained the independence of Turkey, strenously urged on the Porte to reform its administration and secure justice and good treatment to the Christian population. Lord Stratford de Redcliffe also was unsparing in his denunciation of Turkish misrule, and resorted even to what was sometimes called "bullying" to obtain his ends; and Lord Stratford was succeeded by Ministers who pursued a similar course, upholding the independence of Turkey while endeavouring to secure the reform of its Government. In this respect the policy of this country has been consistent—namely, on the one hand to uphold the integrity and independence of Turkey, and on the other to improve the condition of the Christian subjects of the Sultan. It appears to me that the question the Government had originally to consider was whether this was a question of intervention or non-intervention. Talleyrand said he did not believe in the existence of what was called a policy of non-intervention, because a country would change its policy whenever its interests required it. You cannot lay down a fixed rule either for intervention or non-intervention, but must adapt yourselves to circumstances; and it seems to me the Government did not, from the first, form a clear and distinct idea whether they would adopt an intervention or a non-intervention policy. The impression produced by reading the Papers, confirmed by the speech of the Foreign Secretary this evening, is that the Government thought at first that it would be better to abstain altogether
  686
  from interference, fearing that they should only promote the designs of Russia if they took a decided part. In regarding the insurrection as a petty outbreak, it seems to me that they overlooked the serious elements and the seeds of future disorder which were recognized by other statesmen, whose apprehensions were fully expressed in the Andrassy Note. If the Government had appreciated the fact that the circumstances of Turkey were such as to require energy and promptitude, there would have been less risk of what the noble Earl (the Earl of Derby) called a petty insurrection, resulting in a general war. Sir Henry Elliot, in his despatches laid down in the plainest manner the right of interference—and in mentioning Sir Henry's name I must say I think he has been hardly used in these discussions. I have read his despatches with great interest, and, as far as I can judge, he appears to have done his duty faithfully to the Government, and to have dealt with considerable ability with the delicate matters with which he had to deal. The matter appeared to have presented itself to the Government at that time as one in which it was not necessary for them to interfere; and so it went on until the Berlin Memorandum was submitted, and that appears to have been a turning point in these transactions. I am far from saying that the Government ought to have accepted the terms of that Memorandum; but instead of entirely rejecting it, they should have made some proposal of their own, and thus have taken the opportunity of placing this country in the foremost place; and I believe there would have been no indisposition on the part of any of the Powers fairly to consider any proposition emanating from the English Government. Unfortunately, it chanced about this time that the English Fleet was sent to Besika Bay. The noble Earl (the Earl of Derby) has given us the assurance that the Fleet was sent there for the protection of the Christians and with that assurance I am perfectly content; but the coincidence was unfortunate, for the Turks imagined that the Fleet had come to give them protection against the demands which might be made upon them by the other Powers. Then there came the change over the minds and councils of the Government. I do not make that a matter of reproach—I do not

  687
  blame them for the change which came over their councils — it came about naturally and at a very opportune moment. They were applied to by the Prince of Servia for their good offices in procuring an armistice, and they took the plain, distinct, and direct course—they applied to the Porte for an armistice; and if Sir Henry Elliot had been instructed to use a little stronger language he would, no doubt, have succeeded, without allowing Russia to have the credit of obtaining it. Then they made the proposal for a Conference. The noble Earl the Secretary of State tells us that the Conference has not been unattended with satisfactory results, inasmuch as, on the one side, Turkey has gained a respite, and, on the other, the demands upon Turkey have been so minimized that they are much more easy of acceptance. But, on the other hand, it has given Russia time to complete her warlike preparations. However that may be, I wish to point out that in agreeing to this Conference it would have been wise to consider what should be done in case the proposals made by the Conference were entirely rejected by the Porte. When it comes to such a formal demonstration as a Conference, I think the dignity of the Powers requires that you should have some definite notion of the manner in which the proposals you have to lay before the Power, whose affairs you are considering are to be enforced, in the event of your proposals being rejected. As it was, the Conference had only the motive power of Russian arms behind it, and it was therefore doing what the Crimean War was undertaken to prevent—namely, giving Russia the position of the only Power to interfere authoritatively in the affairs of Turkey. The Government might have foreseen the possibility of failure, and that it might be necessary not to exclude from consideration the possibility of their taking part against the Porte. In these despatches there is a great deal too much of the contingent policy of inaction. If it is imprudent to announce a contingent policy of action, it is still more mischievous to announce a contingent policy of inaction, just as it is more difficult to prove a negative than an affirmative—there is declaration after declaration that in no case would they interfere, whereas the question of interference should
  688
  have been left to be determined as the necessity of the case might require. These repeated declarations unnecessarily hamper your hands, and it was a great imprudence on the part of the noble Earl to heap up the repeated announcements that this country would not act either on one side or the other. I regretted to hear the noble Earl repeat some of those declarations again to-night. In my humble opinion our interests in Turkey might possibly require our active interference. It may not be at this moment advisable; but the statesmen who formerly conducted our policy would never have made such statements as those of the noble Earl as to non-interference. In 1827, Canning—no mean statesman—did not shrink from active interference in the affairs of the Levant. In 1841, although the intervention was directed specially to Egypt, Lord Palmerston did not shrink from it; and since the Treaty of 1856 was concluded, there has been distinct armed interference by means of the French troops in 1860. All these instances show that cases may arise in which force might be necessary. I find, in looking through the Blue Books, that none of the other Powers have made these contingent declarations. Neither Russia, nor Austria, nor Germany has made such declarations, and I do not see why England should have done so. At this moment, with the Russian army massed on the frontier, and the Turks also in a state of military preparation, I wish not to say anything which would imply a desire to embarrass the Government—they have a most delicate and difficult duty to perform: but I hope from what the noble Earl said this evening, that at all events he has not given up diplomatic activity—that he is not holding his hands—but that he is endeavouring in concert with the other Powers, even at the last moment, to bring Turkey to her senses. That he will be successful in doing so we cannot be sanguine. The mission of the noble Marquess (the Marquess of Salisbury) has been conducted with great ability; yet, notwithstanding that ability, it has failed. If the noble Earl is more successful, I shall be highly gratified; but I do not augur well of his success from what ho said in regard to the Constitution which has been proclaimed in Constantinople. If I had wished for any argument to prove how vain were the hopes held out

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  by that Constitution, I should not have desired to see them placed in a clearer light than in the despatch of the noble Marquess. I do not believe in the constitutional reforms of the Porte, though I believe that something might be accomplished if guarantees had been obtained by the Powers. But after 20 years' experience of the Porte, and looking to the bankrupt condition of the country and her statesmen, we cannot build much hope on the spontaneous efforts of the Porte itself. The course of events has been to throw the matter again into the hands of Russia, and to create a similar state of difficulty to that which existed before the Crimean War. I have no exceptional distrust of Russia, nor do I feel called on to place implicit confidence in her; but if the state of affairs in Constantinople is restored to what it was before the Crimean War, we may look to forward to such a complete upset in the whole condition of the Levant as will be conducive neither to the interests of this country, nor to the peace of Europe.
  THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, the speech of the noble Earl who has just sat down (the Earl of Kimberley) was marked by great judgment and moderation, and in that respect presented a marked difference to the speech by which the present debate was opened. But though there was much difference in the fervour of the sentiments and the moderation of the language of the two speakers on the other side, the principal difference in the sentiment appears to be this—the noble Duke (the Duke of Argyll) blames us for not coercing Turkey; the noble Earl is so far from blaming us for that—he blames us for not having said that we intended to coerce. Now, does the noble Earl think so meanly of the diplomatists of Europe, or even of the diplomatists of Turkey, as to imagine that they would not have seen through such a flimsy pretence. This country works in a glass hive—all the sentiments of its public men are well known; and if any doubt as to our policy exists while Parliament is sitting, Questions can always be asked, and during the Recess deputations can be sent to the Foreign Office; so that there is no possibility of concealing the sentiments of the Government. On any vital point of English policy secrecy is nonexistent. Therefore, any attempt to
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  conduct our negotiations, as the noble Earl indicated, in such a way as that while all the time firmly intending not to coerce, we should conceal that intention altogether from the world, would have been far beyond our honesty, and certainly beyond our power. Both the noble Lords, however, have shown a true appreciation of the real nature of this question, and the real origin of the difficulties that surround us, by going back to the policy of the Crimean War. There is no doubt that to the way in which that policy was carried out the difficulties we have now to contend with are due. I do not blame the statesmen of that day for not foreseeing what was to happen; but I say that we are now reaping the harvest which they then sowed, and that we have to bear the difficulties, and in some respects the odium, for which they are responsible. They attempted what, in the nature of things, was impossible to achieve. They endeavoured to prevent Russia from reducing Turkey to a state of dependence by means of assumed claims over a certain portion of the subjects of Turkey. That certainly was a pretension injurious to the interests of other 'Powers, and contrary to the policy of Europe. But that six European Powers should undertake the tutelage of the subject population of Turkey and exercise that tutelage, not only by remonstrances, but in case of need by united naval and military action, was a chimera which it is difficult to understand how any one who has studied the history of the world could entertain. The thing was impossible. It was a matter of absolute certainty that when it came to the test, and the six Powers had to carry out that policy, some of them for good reasons or bad, others from circumstances arising out of the state of affairs, would decline the task, and then the united tutelage of the six Powers would be at an end. In that case the position of things would be as my noble Friend (the Earl of Kimberley) said, not very different from what it was at the time of the Crimean War—that is, the real influence over Turkey would fall, as it necessarily must, to that Power which was prepared to fight on behalf of the subject races of Turkey. The problem which the Crimean War attempted to solve was an impossibility. That was the origin of all our troubles, and the attempt was

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  made, not because Lord Clarendon and Lord Palmerston thought the time would come when the six Powers would have to march into the field to undertake the tutelage of the subject populations, but because they entertained an entirely false idea of the probable reform and progress of the Ottoman Empire. They indulged in an optimism which was perfectly pardonable at the time, but which has been belied by subsequent events—they thought that Turkey would reform herself—and long experience has proved that Turkey will not reform herself. But, my Lords, there is no break in the continuous responsibility of the Governments by which this country is ruled, and it is not open to any one Party or set of men holding office, together to renounce the lines of policy laid down by their Predecessors, or treat past events as though they had not occurred. We, like the other Governments which came after the Crimean War, were bound to accept the consequence of that war, to accept the Treaty by which it was concluded, and to maintain the attitude and act in the spirit of those transactions which dictated it. In the Treaty of 1856, the intention of Turkey to reform herself was recognized in the most solemn manner, and each of the Powers for itself—I am not now speaking of their mutual obligations—guaranteed in the most distinct manner to observe the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire. That Treaty was signed by the Government of which the noble Duke (the Duke of Argyll) was a Member. Pass from that to the summer of 1875. A rebellion breaks out in the Turkish Empire. My noble Friend (the Earl of Derby) speaks of not fostering that rebellion and inviting sympathizers from outside to keep it up; and then he is denounced by the very men who signed the Treaty of 1856 as though he had committed some great crime, not only against international law, but against public morality. I acknowledge the difficulty that surrounds the Treaty of 1856—I admit how much events have modified the interpretation we are to put on that Treaty; but that at the beginning of these events it should be laid as a matter of blame against my noble Friend that he did not trample under foot a solemn guarantee into which his country had entered, and that that blame should have been levelled
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  against him by one of the very Ministers who gave that guarantee was a very extraordinary circumstance. It was in the same spirit that the subsequent action towards Turkey was conceived. It soon became evident that the sanguine hopes of 1856 would not be realized, and that the exact attitude of this country towards Turkey could not remain what it was in 1856; but were we bound, were we justified in at once turning round upon our ancient ally, who had rested upon us so long and who had been encouraged by our acts and words? Would it have been just and straightforward in us suddenly to assume an attitude which would have been hard even on the part of Russia? If it was to be so—if the alliance was to be broken up—if the terrible events which took place within its borders were to have the effect of alienating the undoubted affection entertained by this country towards Turkey—surely it was our duty that we should struggle to the last against the change which forced upon us, at all events, a new and unexpected interpretation of a Treaty to which our country was pledged? Surely it was our duty to exhaust appeal, remonstrance, and exhortation? It was our duty to be the last of the nations to desert the cause which we had formerly maintained; and if you had taken any other course, the Turks, however low you may put their intelligence, however deep you think their guilt is dyed, would have had fair ground of complaint against this country. That principle is the explanation of our policy. We have changed, as my right hon. Friend (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) said in the other House, in the sense of the man who has put on his great coat in winter and taken it off in summer has become inconsistent. We have changed in so far as we were forced by the events and changing circumstances of the world; but we have not deserted our traditional alliance without hesitation and without sorrow; and we shall cling to the hope that some change may occur in the Councils of Turkey which may bring back that alliance into the same state that it was before. That, my Lords, is the reason why we went into the Conference—distinctly not as a preliminary to force, but as a means of peaceable persuasion. It necessarily followed, as the noble Earl (the Earl of Kimberley) has said, that Russia was

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  the motive power of the Conference. That is not the way in which I should prefer to phrase it, but at the same time I do not absolutely deny that it is true in a sense. It is true that we went into the Conference first of all to restore peace between Turkey and Servia and Montenegro, and then to obtain good government for the Turkish Provinces; but undoubtedly we also went into the Conference to stop a great and menacing danger—namely, the prospect of a war between Russia and Turkey. This, then, being the evil which we came to avert, it naturally was in pointing out that evil that our moral influence on the Porte rested. We said to Turkey—"Unless you do this or that, this terrible danger, which may well involve the loss of your Empire is ready to fall upon you; we hope that our influence and advice may be able to avert it—indeed, we come here for that purpose—but we warn you that we shall accept no responsibility for the future if you treat our advice with disdain." Undoubtedly it was in this sense true that the fear of the result of a rupture of the Conference—the fear of a breach with Russia—was the motive force of the Conference. It seems to me, as it must to everybody else, that the refusal of the Turks is a mystery, for the infatuation of that course seems to be so tremendous. I observe that the wonder at their conduct has been very general, for all kinds of excellent and extraordinary reasons have been suggested to explain it. To myself it certainly appears that one of the causes which led the Turks to this unfortunate resolution was the belief which has been so sedulously fostered, I know not by whom, but by irresponsible advisers, that the power of Russia was rotten, that the armies of Russia were suffering from disease, that the mobilization of the army had failed, and that, consequently, the fear of war was idle. They counted upon every possible contingency. Their traditional policy had been to maintain themselves by the division of the Powers, and they imagined that the Powers would still be divided and that a general European war would save them. Still, with reference to the observation of the noble Earl, it is right to say that although it is true in one sense that the fear of the possibility of a breach with Russia was the greatest motive force which could be expected to operate on the
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  Turks, yet there was no difference in the language of the Plenipotentiaries on the question of coercion. Of course, I did not use any threat of coercion; neither did the Ambassador of Russia. I do not think that from beginning to end I heard anything which could be fairly said to be a threat of coercion in case the Porte did not accept the recommendations of the Conference. That is, I think, a consideration of some importance. When questions of personal and national honour may have consequences more tremendous to human happiness than perhaps they ever had before, it is important that it should be on record that, at least, as far as the proceedings of the Conference went, there was not anything which pledged Russia to take military action in case the recommendations were not accepted by the Porte. Now, my Lords, the noble Duke (the Duke of Argyll) still blames us because we refused to follow up the rejection of our proposals by coercion; and when I tell the noble Duke that he has not rightly established in his own mind what coercion is, he meets it, as I fully expected, not only with a flat contradiction, but he tells me that what I suppose to be coercion is not the coercion he proposes—that the sending out of a fleet is not the coercion he suggested, and that there are half-a-dozen ways of coercion which are more effective and more desirable than that. I listened to the noble Duke with the most rapt attention, because that was the one solution which, reflecting in my own mind, I had been unable to attain, and I was anxious to learn from the ingenious mind of the noble Duke the other means of coercion that remained. But my expectations were doomed to disappointment. In this strange discussion the parts of Government and Opposition are entirely changed. The Government have been all candour. Their candour can be weighed in ounces. We have absolutely poured the records of our thoughts and proceedings on the Table of the House. But for the life of us we cannot yet get from the Opposition, which is usually so frank, because it is free from responsibility, any statement of their opinion or their desires. All through the autumn they have been longing for the meeting of Parliament—they have been urging that we should summon Parliament before the close of

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  the usual Recess. The one thing necessary for their happiness was that Parliament should meet, in order that they might challenge the proceedings of an inhuman and detestable Government and bring them into accordance with the feelings of the people. Now Parliament has met, and butter will not melt in their mouths. We cannot induce them by any request, however humble and however modestly worded, to place on the Journals, in the form of a distinct opinion, the grounds on which they censure our policy and the reasons why they pursued us with every kind of vituperation their vocabulary contains during three long months. And now the noble Duke pursues the same policy. Our fault is that we did not adopt a policy of coercion. We say, "What is coercion?" "Ah!" says the noble Duke, "that is telling." The noble Duke is not going to be so indiscreet. He will blame us for not giving ourselves up to his word "coercion," but no force—not even wild horses—shall draw from him what the meaning of coercion is. Not having been able therefore to find any adversary to grapple with, I must again venture to remind the House what our position in respect to coercion is. Coercion is of two kinds. There is a real coercion when you take a man's arms and legs and make him do what you want him to do; and there is a moral coercion when you threaten to flog or to kill him if he will not do what you want him to do. The two Powers adjoining Turkey might exercise the first kind of coercion. They could pour their armies into the Turkish territory and make the authorities in Turkey do that which otherwise they would decline to do. That is the first and obvious and comparatively easy mode of coercion. The other four Powers of Europe have not that opportunity. Some of them, like ourselves, want a sufficient army, and others a sufficient navy, while all probably want sufficient money. The occupation of Turkey, I should say, would probably be within the reach of the two Powers, if any great national interest dictated such an occupation; but it could only be effected at a cost which nothing but the most vital national necessity could justify. The other four Powers are limited to coercion by means of fear. We can threaten to destroy Turkey; we can
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  threaten to punish her, if she does not accept the proposition which we have suggested to her. I do not see any mode of threatening or punishing her so simple as by taking up a fleet to the Bosphorus, if not by burning down Stamboul; but I confess I should not look to the prospect with anything like equanimity. What should have we done when Stamboul has been burnt? We should have destroyed the only Government which now keeps some thirty millions of people in some kind of order. Are we prepared to take the responsibility of the government of these people? That would be a very grave responsibility. But then I am met with the statement that there is another mode of reasoning. It said that when our fleet is opposite Stamboul the Turks will immediately yield. Nay, some people are so sanguine as to think that as soon as the six Powers announced their intention of resorting to coercion the Turks would yield. Before I went on this mission it was said that they would yield when the six Powers announced that they had agreed on their recommendations. I was always very sceptical as to this. The noble Duke seemed to laugh at me for starting on a mission which was foredoomed to failure; but I may remark that I had a very strong belief that I would fail when I left the shores of England. I thought that the differences among the Powers were so great that the chances of coming to an agreement were infinitesimally small; but for the reason I have dwelt upon when referring to the Treaty of 1856, we thought it was the duty of the Government to exhaust every contrivance in order to bring the Turks to a sense of the danger of their position. We thought it was the duty of us all to assist in that endeavour. But I should shrink from being associated with a policy which trusted for its success entirely to the probability of the Turks yielding to threats. I should be sorry—I should shrink—from being associated with such a policy, not merely because the Turks are a very courageous race, but because the question of yielding is not in the hands of those who are the most deeply interested in the prosperity of Turkey. The Government of that country is entirely dependent on the strength and power of the Sultan. There is no aristocracy, there is no governing class, there is no

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  organized democracy, there is no representative Government. There are two foundations only—Religion and the Sultan. The power of the Sultan is something which cannot here be discussed in great detail; but it must be obvious that a Sultan who succeeds to two other Sultans who have been removed by revolutionary power in a few months does not inherit all the attributes and all the autocracy of his Predecessors. And the religion is in the hands of men who are largely responsible for those revolutions, whose sincerity and devotion to their country cannot be questioned, but whose ignorance of European affairs and all that statemanship implies, and of the political circumstances and prospects of their own country, is absolute and complete. You have nothing to appeal to. You appeal to the Sultan. He is afraid of revolution. You appeal to the Revolution. It has not the faculties to listen to you. Therefore, any Ministry which attempted the policy of coercion, as I have defined it—that is to say, any Ministry which went to Constantinople with the hope of producing good government there by sheer threats—must fail. I should not say that in the case of any country such a policy was a hopeful one—I should not say it was a policy sustained by the experience of the world as successful; but in the ease of Turkey I should say it was foredoomed to certain and absolute failure. The noble Duke has practically made this point the turning point of his speech. When he asked us whether we were still pursuing the policy contained in my Instructions, of course he must well know that but one reply could be given. He must know that we shall pursue that policy as long as it can be pursued. Our policy is simply this—to try by all peaceable means in our power to induce Turkey to open her eyes to the danger which surrounds her, to awake from her infatuation, and give to the poor populations which have suffered so much some measure of liberty and safety for life and honour. But we do not yet despair. There can be no question that—I do not say it to his dishonour, for I do not doubt he was inspired by the most patriotic motives—the main adversary of the late Conference is the man who has fallen from power. It is fair that we should assume, until we know to the contrary, that the Sultan in making this change
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  has been actuated by a desire to draw nearer to the wishes of the European Powers. At all events, it is open to us to cherish that hope. We feel that the destinies of Turkey are now in the hands of men who are not pledged as a matter of consistency and honour to any opposition to, at least, the substance of the reforms which we have tried to induce them to adopt. We hope that if the substance of these reforms is adopted there is no Power in Europe which will think itself either bound or justified in trying to cut this knotty question by the sword. Our efforts have not been wanting, and are not wanting still, to awaken the Turks to the danger to which they were so blind; because if this question once comes into a military phase—if once the Powers of Europe are assured that there is no hope of preventing a war in South-eastern Europe, and if once they have to decide upon the state of things that shall be so produced, there is every reason to fear that the very energy of the considerations which have induced them now to strain every effort to avert a war will rather lead them in the future to say "This question must be settled once for all, so that no future war shall occur." That is the danger—the tremendous danger—which threatens the Turkish Empire and which we hope to avert. It is still our hope that within the brief time—it may be—of respite, the Porte may be guided by wiser counsels, and in giving the barest rights to those who have suffered so long under its dominion, it will open an era of fairer hope and nobler prosperity to one of the most ancient Empires of the world.
  THE EARL OF DUDLEYsaid, that in venturing to follow the noble Marquess, he must first observe that he had never heard it suggested that we should turn round upon those whom we supported and forget existing obligations. He thought the Government had taken a straightforward and consistent course, in admitting our position in reference to the Treaty obligations; and no Government, whatever its home politics, could have taken any other course. England existed by Treaties, and if she wished to retain her influence in the world, it must be by showing that she was the first to respect Treaties. He was, however, sorry to hear the noble Earl say that it was not the policy of this country to

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  resort to coercion in reference to Turkey. In his view their Lordships were not assembled their to review the conduct of the Government and to bring home to them any shortcomings in the past, but to ascertain what was to be the future of this great question. It did not matter whether the Government had been thoroughly consistent or not, or whether they had changed their policy—he held that they had done nothing of the sort, but had pursued a consistent policy up to the present moment; but he regretted that the Government had not insisted upon their Representatives in Turkey sending home the fullest information, and had not disclosed this information. If this course had been taken, and if the Government had been frank with Parliament and the country, all that was now being said in February might have been said in July. As it was, Parliament had separated without the information that was wanted and thus arose the demand for an autumn Session. It had been said that to hold an autumn Session would inconvenience everybody; but there were times when inconvenience was a matter of no moment. Why, then, was not Parliament called together in the autumn to settle this question? From first to last there had been a disinclination to look into the treatment of her Christian Provinces by Turkey, which was the main point upon which the nation was so deeply stirred. It had been stated in a recent pamphlet that Russia was the sole obstacle to the settlement of this question; and he agreed with this view, though not on the grounds stated by the writer. The reason why Russia had been an obstacle to a settlement of the question was that for years past there had been such an unfounded jealousy of her as to prevent anything like cordial co-operation between her and the other European Powers who were interested in the matter. He believed that if certain Provinces were removed from the power of Turkey and she were only allowed to exercise a nominal sovereignty, there would be no further difficulty. He could only attach one definition to the word coercion; and that was involved in the question of what should be done with a country which had refused assent to all the moral suasion that had been brought to bear upon it. Let Turkey remain as it was, if that was thought best; but do not let the Christian
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  subjects of the Porte remain longer in the miserable position they had so long occupied among the peoples of the world. Turkey had done nothing to show that she had the least intention of changing her policy, and he had no doubt that in the event of any future outbreak among her subjects it would be suppressed with all the nameless horrors which had in former times been committed with the consent, if not at the instigation, of the Turkish Government. So far as he was concerned he should be satisfied if Her Majesty's Government went back to what the Berlin Memorandum proposed; and he regretted that they did not accept it at the time. If no further steps were to be taken after the way in which the Porte had treated the Conference, he could only say that diplomacy had received a check from which it could never recover. He doubted whether any of the Powers who had been parties to the Treaty guaranteeing the independence of Turkey would put their forces in the field to maintain the independence of a Power whose bends were as worthless as their spoken words.
  EARL GRANVILLE: My Lords, I have no doubt that the noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Beaconsfield), who the other evening expressed his impatience to meet the noble Duke beside me in debate, is wishful to encounter a foeman worthy of his steel; and I will, therefore, now address to your Lordships the few remarks I think it necessary to make, in order that the noble Earl may not have to speak at a late hour. At the outset I wish to make two admissions of a very commonplace character. In the first place, I wish to admit that the noble Earl the Foreign Secretary and his Colleagues have had a most difficult and complicated question to deal with; and, in the second place, I wish, while denying that they have a right to claim a monopoly of feeling in reference to this matter, to admit that they have been actuated not only by a desire for the honour and interests of this country, but also for its fair fame. At the same time, I must deny the right of the noble Earl to find fault with us for criticizing, by the light of more recent occurrences, a Blue Book which was published at a time of the year when it was most inconvenient for us to discuss the blots we found in it, and two months after the time at which there existed the

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  least necessity for withholding it from publication. Something has been said about the change which has been made by the Government from their first policy. That change may have arisen from altered circumstances, or it may have occurred, as the noble Earl the Prime Minister very candidly said at Aylesbury, in consequence of the fact that the policy of the Government was not receiving the support of the country. At any rate, a change of opinion was effected, and I do not quarrel with Her Majesty's Government for having, in the first instance, followed the line of policy which resulted from the Crimean War, though, after the demonstration made by the noble Marquess opposite (the Marquess of Salisbury) of the folly and the impotent character of that policy, I am certainly surprised that his Colleagues not only followed generally in the same line, but strained it to an extent almost unprecedented. Putting aside the question of the public mind having been excited by the Bulgarian atrocities, they seem to ignore all the circumstances of misgovernment which had created a state of things in Turkey likely to lead to most dangerous results, and which could only be met by a hearty and energetic union on the part of the great European Powers. I rejoice in their change of policy; although, instead of being pursued with the zeal of converts, the Ministry have shown an amount of irresolution and indecision in carrying out the policy, which is, perhaps, not unnatural in those who lead a Party, many Members of which do not approve it. With regard to the construction of Treaties, I will not deny the claim for candour which was made by the noble Marquess opposite on behalf of the Government; but I must say that it was a strange kind of candour which induced the noble Earl the Foreign Secretary in writing to our Ambassador at Constantinople with reference to the Tripartite Treaty to lay it down that, on the one hand, we were bound at the call of any of our co-signatories to come to the rescue of Turkey, and, on the other, that it was impossible for England to obey the Treaty obligations. My object is to inquire whether it is not possible, even at this moment, to take steps to ascertain from the co-signatories to that Treaty whether by mutual consent we could not be relieved from such obliga-
  702
  tions as these. I do not wish to follow all the details which have been so deeply gone into already, and which were more or less answered by the noble Earl. I come at once to the particular Notice by my noble Friend (the Duke of Argyll) with reference to the Conference. I remember, when the noble Marquess was about to go, or had just gone on his special embassy, that the Chancellor of the Exchequer, in one of the numerous speeches he made in the country, stated that the noble Marquess had started with the full confidence of his Colleagues and of the country. I believe that with regard to the country that was perfectly true. But the Chanceller of the Exchequer stated that the noble Marquess had gone out with a full knowledge of the views of his Colleagues. Now, if the noble Marquess had not chivalrously made the assertion, I should myself have felt some doubt as to whether he would have accepted the mission had he anticipated all the difficult circumstances which attended it. It is remarkable that as early as November 12 he should have received a telegraphic message rather calling him to account for informing the Government only of the views of the Russian Ambassador, and not also of those of the other Plenipotentiaries—a very sharp reminder indeed that he was not to forget that he was to accept no propositions whatever, except for the purpose of referring them home. That must have made a considerable impression upon the noble Marquess as to the difficulties of his mission. Then, again, all the Press which supported the policy of the Government used language which I must say seemed to have been inspired, and inspired by the speech which was delivered by the noble Earl at the head of the Government at the Guildhall. Now, some allusions were made in "another place" to that speech, and what was the answer which the Leader of the House there made? He said that a wrong construction had been put upon it; that he could not remember the exact words, but that after the observations that had been made he had no doubt the noble Earl would hasten to give a full explanation of the statement he then made. Well, the noble Earl did speak, after those observations were made, but not one word did he say on the subject. I presume he was perfectly satisfied with the explanation that had

  703
  been given by the noble Earl the Foreign Secretary. And what was that explanation? Also that the speech had been misconstrued, and that neither he nor anybody else who had heard it was aware that any offence to Russia was given in that speech. Well, but do your Lordships remember what that speech contained? The noble Earl (the Earl of Beaconsfield) once gave a lesson to a Liberal Foreign Minister. He told him that sarcasm was an ornament of debate and an admitted weapon of rhetoric, but that conciliation was the proper language of diplomacy, and that the manner of carrying an intimation to a foreign Power was not by a sneer. What did the noble Earl say? He turned into extreme ridicule the policy of the Russian Government; he boasted of the unlimited military strength of this country; and he sneered at a want of endurance in the military strength of Russia. This was the language used at the first party of the Lord Mayor, after the loving cup had gone round; and I cannot understand the noble Earl the Foreign Secretary considering that such language could not possibly be thought offensive by Russia. Well, as I said, that speech—made by the Prime Minister—gave a tone to the supporters of the Government, and it is, moreover, to be borne in mind that this speech was made at a most critical part of the noble Marquess's mission at Constantinople. When the Turkish Government refused the proposals made to them, the whole Press resounded with the highest approbation of the pluck and courage of the Porte; and one newspaper, generally favoured with early information, stated, in an article, which was printed in a peculiar typo, that the noble Marquess was an impetuous nobleman, and had far exceeded his Instructions. It is somewhat extraordinary that when such language was used by the Press, and was commented upon by the whole of Europe, not one of the Colleagues of the noble Marquess at home should have found or even made an opportunity of publicly stating to us and to the world that such language as that was quite contrary to the policy of Her Majesty's Government. More than that—I never heard, in the whole course of diplomacy, of a step taken which was so calculated to be fatal to a mission such as that undertaken by
  704
  the noble Marquess as was that set out in the two despatches which have been quoted by my noble Friend the noble Duke. My noble Friend quoted a message which was put into the hands of the Foreign Secretary by the Turkish Minister, expressing the immense gratitude of the Turkish Government. [The Marquess of SALISBURY interposed an observation which was not heard.] Well, those despatches were docketed in the Foreign Office, and I find that a most important phrase was omitted from the docket. It describes the despatch as being one in which the Foreign Secretary conveys to the Turkish Ambassador that this country will not help Turkey, but not a word does it say of the most important sentence it contains. My noble Friend says that it was under pressure that the noble Earl wrote this passage—
  "Being anxious to avoid the possibility of any misconception as to the line of policy followed by Her Majesty's Government, I addressed a private note to his Excellency reminding him that in an unofficial conversation which had taken place between us on the 19th ultimo I had informed him that although Her Majesty's Government did not themselves meditate or threaten the employment of active measures of coercion in the event of the proposals of the Powers being refused by the Porte, yet that Turkey must not look to England for assistance or protection if that refusal resulted in a war with other countries." — [Turkey, No. 2. p. 182.]
  The complaint we make is not that, having adopted that policy, they should not have said something contrary to it, but that they should be so excessively candid that, at a very critical period of the Mission of the noble Marquess, they should have allowed the Turkish Ambassador to convey to the Porte that it had absolutely nothing to fear from us. The noble Marquess chivalrously undertook the defence of this step; but I must say, I think that if, when he left this country, he understood that the ground was to be so entirely cut from under any remonstances he might make or any pressure he might put upon the Turkish Government, his conduct at the Conference was not so sagacious as I had thought. If he had thought that, instead of joining the preliminary Conference—which the noble Earl told us was rather a mark of respect to the Turkish Government—a Conference held at Constantinople, and from which the Turkish Representative was excluded — instead

  705
  of using the strong and frank language which he did on all occasions to the Sultan and his Ministers, I think his only chance of arriving at a satisfactory result would have been to take an exactly different line — to have stepped into the shoes of Sir Henry Elliot, and, as far as the honesty of his nature would have permitted, to have shown the greatest sympathy with the Turks, and avoided anything likely to excite their feelings. My Lords, I do not know whether you will allow me to illustrate this now. In both Houses of Parliament attacks were made on Her Majesty's late Government in reference to their Black Sea Treaty. One point was that the Emperor of Russia declared that he absolved himself from certain conditions of that Treaty—conditions which have been attacked in this Parliament, but for which it was thought, and rightly, that a very efficient substitute might be provided. Austria, France, Italy, and Germany had previously declared to the Emperor that the provision was one which ought not to exist. That was a very delicate matter to deal with, as it was said that the declaration of the Emperor had been couched in such a manner as to appear offensive to this nation and to the rest of Europe. Well, the noble Marquess knows very well that a great deal of important business is transacted outside the Council Chamber. I have no doubt that in audiences with the Sultan and Members of the Turkish Government, as well as in private communications with the Representatives of other Courts, matters as important were discussed as any which were considered at the Conference; and with respect to the Black Sea Conference, I had to meet one of the most acute and sagacious diplomatists I have known—Prince Gortchakoff. His object was quite clear from the first—it was to make me commit myself. He wished me to state what our course would be if the Russian Government did give the assurance we required, and on the other hand to state what would be our course if they refused. My answer was the same thing every day—that I would not say one word, or give any hint of the future until I heard a retraction of that declaration. But now, if in the middle of that conversation I had told Baron Brunnow—"You may communicate it confidentially to your Government
  706
  by telegraph, that whatever your answer may be, we will not quarrel with you," do you think that that retraction would have been given in the same ample and satisfactory manner? And do you think that if, instead of the noble Marquess, an angel from Heaven, with ten times, and more than ten times, his ability, sagacity, and his earnestness, had come down, it would have been possible to persuade the Turk to agree to anything if he had been told there is not the slightest fear of any consequences? The noble Marquess says that the real thing that changed the Turk was a false report, spread about intentionally, that the Russian Army was attacked by sickness.
  THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURYwas understood to say that the report was not intentionally inaccurate.
  EARL GRANVILLE: That report, it was said, influenced the Turks, and I verily believe it. As soon as the Turk heard that he had nothing to fear from the person who was really in earnest, and that he had nothing to fear from us, he naturally resisted any further concessions. I do not know anything more creditable to the private history of a man than that the noble Marquess should have come back from the Conference and have received the increased, instead of the diminished, respect and esteem of his countrymen. The answer I obtained, on the opening of Parliament, to a nearly similar Question to that put by the noble Duke, was that when a person advises a friend and he rejects his advice, his friend's only course is to wash his hands of the matter and let it drop. That answer was, I think, somewhat modified by the subsequent speeches in this House, and the Leader of the Government in the other House said that the policy of the Government had resulted in the sincere agreement of all the Powers of Europe and a determination towards concerted action. If the Government policy was really that of washing their hands of the whole thing and seeing what would happen, it is impossible to doubt that one of two alternatives would happen—either that Russia would advance alone and engage in hostilities such as were described by Mr. Canning 50 years ago, as hostilities of which no prudence could prescribe the range, and of which no man could foresee the possible consequences; or that, on the other hand, a peace would

  707
  be made exactly of that character described by the Leader of the Government in "another place" as no peace at all, but mere patchwork—a piece of sticking-plaster placed on a festering sore. In such a case what would you have to rely upon? Her Majesty's Government have said—and it is the only declaration they have made—that they will not join in coercion against Turkey. I will not enter unnecessarily upon the question of coercion, but really the noble Marquess held language with respect to coercion from which it is to be inferred that first of all he believed coercion must ensue, and next that coercion would be resisted. I totally disbelieve it. What is there in the history of Turkey to lead us to suppose that a State which has never resisted any single Power whatever unless supported either directly or indirectly by some other Power, would dream of resisting the whole of Europe combined when really in earnest and coming forward with moderate proposals? When the noble Marquess talks of the only means of coercing the Turks being the bombardment of Constantinople, I think that is a perfect chimera. Why, no less a person than the Duke of Wellington was ready to consent to a joint military occupation of the five Great Powers, rightly rejecting Mr. Canning's proposal that England and Russia alone should do it. What is more—a military occupation has occurred in our own time, and was quite successful. And therefore to put the almost impossible contingency of our being obliged to exercise coercion, and when it came to the point being without means to carry it into effect, is surely trespassing a little on the credulity of your Lordships. After the statement of the noble Earl this evening, and still more after the statements of the noble Marquess, it is clear that the Government have not adopted a "washing-our-hands" policy. I sincerely rejoice at it. The noble Earl seemed to attach some value to the promises of Midhat Pasha. He was a very remarkable reformer, but the noble Marquess tells us this evening he was the great obstacle to the reception of our proposals. I say that as to believing the promises of Midhat Pasha, or Edhem Pasha, or any other Pasha, I would refer your Lordships not only to the history of the Ignatieff Note, but also to the despatches
  708
  of the noble Marquess passim as to the utter futility of such promises. As to the new Turkish Constitution, the noble Marquess has given us a very graphic description, from which I cannot help reading one or two sentences. The noble Marquess, writing to the Foreign Secretary, said—
  "The law of the Budget stands upon a special footing. It must be introduced at the beginning of every Session, and is voted, chapter by chapter, by the Chamber of Deputies. In this case the power of amendment is conceded to the Chamber; but, as no decision can be taken without the assent of the Ministers, this power has little practical value. If the Government desires to spend any money or to raise any revenue without the authority of the Assembly, and in its absence, they can do so, but a law justifying the proceeding must be presented in the ensuing Session. The Constitution does not say what consequences would follow in case the law of justification should not pass. Subject to the same undefined responsibility, the Government may, in the absence of the Assembly, issue a decree on any matter which they think it necessary to deal with, and (if it be not contrary to the Constitution) the decree has the force of law. The Chamber of Deputies may also pass a resolution to ask a question of a Minister; but this privilege, like others, is restrained from excess by a reservation. The Minister may postpone his answer if he thinks fit. The Ministers are declared to be responsible. Their responsibility consists in the provision that they may, if the Sultan thinks fit, but not otherwise, be tried by a procedure not yet determined on. Any doubt arising as to the meaning of any part of the Constitution is solved by the Senate, which is nominated by the Sultan. It is obvious that even if this Constitution were in operation among a people attached to liberty, and were practically worked by independent Representatives, it would have but a slender effect in checking maladministration and restraining the abuse of power. But there is no probability of the appearance of popular leaders who would work the liberties granted, such as they are, for the purpose of restraining the Government, for an unlimited power of exile is by a special enactment reserved to the Sultan, and any person exiled loses his seat as Senator or Deputy."
  I presume that Midhat Pasha is at the present moment neither a Deputy nor a Senator. I do not, however, wish to press this. The noble Marquess goes on to say—
  "The portion of the Constitution which concerns the Chamber is elaborated with considerable care. The rest of its provisions only exist in skeleton. Many broad principles are laid down, but their execution is referred to laws which are not yet in existence or to r6glements ' which are to be issued by the Sultan. The appointment, qualifications, and jurisdiction of all functionaries, the constitution of Tribunals and the administration of the provinces, are

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  dealt with in this manner. It is, of course, impossible to forecast the character of the legislation which will be adopted upon these important matters. The dismissal of functionaries at their discretion is especially reserved to the Government. These observations will enable your Lordship to judge how far the Constitution can be looked upon as a Guarantee against maladministration or a restraint upon the excesses of arbitrary power."—[Turkey, No. 2, p. 303.]
  If Her Majesty's Government really see their way to maintain peace, and if they really do maintain peace, it will be chiefly by the argument that Russia is going to war. If by any means a better administration of the Turkish Provinces can be secured, I am sure the Government would have the complete support of Parliament. The, noble Lord was good enough to admit the other night that I had spoken temperately and with moderation. I should deeply regret on this occasion—although I have freely expressed my views on some subjects raised in debate as to the past conduct of the Government, and it would be quite unintentional on my part—if I have used any language which could in the slightest degree embarrass the Government, or make it more difficult to arrive at that result which with some confidence they have promised us this evening.
  THE EARL OF BEACONSFIELD: My Lords, the noble Duke (the Duke of Argyll) has summoned us to listen to some Questions which he was going to address to us with respect to the conduct of the recent negotiations at Constantinople; but such is the clearness of his philosophic mind, and such the candour of his ingenuous disposition, that when he had concluded his able and interesting speech, he found, as a statesman, that he was not justified in addressing to us the Questions that he had announced, and I believe the noble Duke did not put one of the Questions of which he had given Notice.
  THE DUKE OF ARGYLL: May I beg the noble Earl's pardon? I said the Question I put was different from that of which I had given Notice, having changed it on account of the misconstruction that had been put upon it in the Press; but I did put the Question.
  THE EARL OF BEACONSFIELD: I am the last person to question the rights and privileges of an Opposition. Their duties and their privileges are both high. Practically speaking, they are now a part
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  of the Constitution of this country. It is their duty to watch and criticise the conduct of the Ministry; and no doubt indirectly they exercise no slight influence on the Government. But I think, my Lords, that if the policy of the Government is impugned—and directly impugned—it is better some Motion should be brought forward by which we can enter completely upon the subject rather than have these, it may be, interesting but somewhat desultory debates which have occurred here to-night, and lately in other places. I understand especially from the speech to which we have just listened—that the conduct of the Government is impugned, and the noble Earl (Earl Granville) is not the first who to-night has given expression to the same opinion. The noble Earl and his friends are of opinion that we should have coerced the Porte into accepting the policy which we recommended. That is not a course which we can conscientiously profess or promote; and I think, therefore, when an issue so broad is brought before the House it really is the duty of noble Lords to give us an opportunity to clear the mind of the country by letting it know what is the opinion of Parliament upon policies so distinct and which in their consequences must be so different. Let us for a moment take a broad view of what has been the situation and the conduct of the Government. We have been called upon somewhat unexpectedly to deal with the largest and the most difficult problem of modern politics. We have been called upon, as many eminent statesmen have been called upon before, to consider this—whether the Ottoman Empire could maintain itself; or whether, after long and sanguinary wars, its vast possessions might be doomed to partition, which probably might affect, without any exaggeration, even the fate of Empires. My Lords, the policy of Europe on this Question has been distinct, and is almost traditional. I say, absolutely, the policy of Europe, and not merely the policy of England, as it is sometimes described, has been this—that by the maintenance of the territorial integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire great calamities may be averted from Europe, wars may be prevented, and wars of no ordinary duration, and such a disturbance of the distribution of the power as might operate

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  most disadvantageously to the general welfare. The phrase "the territorial integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire" has been frequently referred to to-night, and in language of derision. The noble Duke in his opening speech alluded to it, and questioned—scarcely supposing there could be a doubt about—the propriety of the phrase. Another noble Lord followed his example. But your Lordships will remember it embodies a principle which always has been accepted by statesmen; and the proof of it is seen that in this very Conference whose proceedings we are called upon to consider to-night, the basis on which my noble Friend achieved the great feat which has been admired by the noble Duke and his friends of bringing all the Powers to consent to this Conference was their recognition of the territorial integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire. Therefore this is not a mere phrase of newspapers; but it is one used by statesmen in authority, and it has recently been used by statesmen in authority in these very momentous transactions which are now the subject of our discussion. I think there is some misconception as to the meaning of these words. By recognizing the integrity of a country you recognize the integrity of its possessions at the time that recognition takes place. It is often said, how absurd it is to maintain the territorial integrity of Turkey when Turkey has lest so many Provinces and so many kingdoms. What country is there that has not been equally unfortunate in this respect? England has lost Provinces—most precious Provinces—and was there any time, even at the signature of the Act of Independence, when any English statesman would have hesitated to come forward and maintain the integrity of the British Empire? Our gifted neighbours have recently lost two most valuable Provinces; but I believe there is no man in France who is not prepared to die for the integrity of the French Dominion. If I wished to carry the illustration further, I might point to Austria, who too has lost Provinces; but it would be astonishing if any one pretended it had no right to maintain the territorial integrity of its Empire. So, I hold, we should view the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire as a political and material fact. It may have lost Servia, Greece, the Danubian Principalities, and more than one kingdom in
  712
  Asia; still it has the right to maintain its territorial integrity, and its territorial integrity as existing at this moment is a political and material fact. I come now to the question of the independence of Turkey. That is an expression considered to be entirely indefensible. There is a great misapprehension in that view. When we recognize the "independence of a country," it is that we contemplate in that country a durable sovereignty; and such a durable sovereignty is not impaired by any partial or limited interference with its sovereign rights. For example, the independence of Turkey was not affected by the occupation of Syria; and I maintain further, that the independence of Turkey would not have been affected if the policy recommended by my noble Friend at the Conference had been adopted. Take an illustrative case—a case not of remote times, but of this century and in the remembrance of our fathers. Take the case of Prussia. Prussia is one of the most powerful States in the world, certainly the most powerful State of the German Empire. Only at the beginning of this century Prussia was subjected to more humiliating conditions than ever were imposed on Turkey. Her strong places were occupied by foreign garrisons; her Sovereign was prevented exercising the precious privilege of enlisting his own subjects in his own defence—at least, in this respect his powers were so limited that they amounted to no importance; and yet the independence of Prussia was not lost by these passing circumstances. Therefore, I do protest that, in discussing these vast questions which involve probably, as events proceed, principles and consequences which may have a great influence upon the condition of this country and the destinies of its people, we do not too loosely adopt opinions which clearly have no solidity and substance in them. All the statesmen who have had to deal with these affairs have accepted and maintained and enforced the principle that we should uphold the territorial integrity and independence of Turkey as the best security for the peace of Europe. I will not advert to ancient Treaties. I will notice only those which noble Lords have mentioned in their speeches—those with which your Lordships are familiar. These are the Treaties of the Pacification of the Levant, the Treaty for the Regulation of the

  713
  Navigation of the Straits, the celebrated Treaty of Paris, to which we have so frequently adverted, the Tripartite Treaty, and the Treaty authorizing the re-entry of France into the European concert; all these Treaties acknowledge and completely recognize the principle of the territorial integrity of Turkey in respect of her actual possessions. Depart from that principle, and we leave the ship without a rudder in our discussions. What may happen in the future I pretend not to foresee, but at present Turkey is by Treaty a member of the European concert, and we must deal with her by the full recognition of her rights and our own. Well, what has happened since the celebrated Treaty of Paris that should make us doubt that this principle, which has been adopted by the most eminent statesmen of all Parties, is not a wise and just one? In 1862 you had in hand affairs of considerable difficulty with regard to Turkey, as you have at the present moment. There was a state of things very similar to the present. There was an insurrection in Herzegovina. It was stimulated, encouraged, and supported by a Prince of Montenegro; and the Chancellor of Russia, no less than the distinguished statesman who now controls the affairs of that Government, addressed the same complaints as we have recently received as to the conduct of the Turkish Government to its Christian subjects. There was much diplomatic correspondence on the subject. The noble Earl (Earl Granville) and his friends opposite were then in power. There is a despatch of Lord John Russell addressed to a gentleman whose name has been mentioned in this debate—Sir Henry Bulwer—in which Lord John Russell—he is a Member of this House, and I ought to call him by his proper title, but I had the honour and happiness of sitting with him for many years in the House of Commons, and I am apt to call him by the name he then bore—that eminent man expressed in a despatch which lies on the Table that, in the opinion of his Government, the revolt in Herzegovina was a conspiracy. He expressed himself on that head in uncompromising terms; and shortly after addressed to a noble Lord now sitting in this House, then our Ambassador at St. Petersburg (Lord Napier), a circular, in which those views were expressed at great longth and with much fulness, and
  714
  he declared that the policy of the Government was unchanged, and that was to maintain the territorial integrity and independence of Turkey as provided and secured by existing Treaties. There was some discussion in the House of Commons on the subject. It is curious that from a casual indisposition, which rarely occurred to him, Lord Palmerston was absent. He could not be present at the discussion, for which his great talents, knowledge, and authority were so adapted; but he was represented by one of the ablest men of the day—no less a one than the eminent Gentleman who was my predecessor in the post I hold (Mr. Gladstone). It fell to that right hon. Gentleman to speak on the subject, and he vindicated in 1862 fully and completely the views of Lord Palmerston, and he maintained those particular views which were founded on the real tradition of the territorial integrity and independence of Turkey. Therefore, so late as in 1862 we find that it was completely recognized by the noble Earl; and I apprehend that the noble Duke, who was a Member of that Government, must have given his no doubt cordial concurrence to that despatch of the noble Earl then Secretary of State. Then, in 1871, a memorable event occurred. The noble Earl who has just addressed us (Earl Granville) has spoken fully on the subject. Russia determined to violate the Treaty of 1856. The noble Earl questioned that right, and, I have no doubt, really doubted the policy of such a proceeding. A Conference was held in consequence, and the result of that Conference is known to every noble Lord now present. I have been astonished to hear of late the excuses that have been made for the conduct of that Conference, so far as the laches it committed in not considering the condition of the Christian subjects of the Porte. It was said recently that, from the peculiar accidents of the time, the Conference was a hurried business with a limited purpose, summoned to calk a leak, and no more.
  EARL GRANVILLE: Was that said by any Peer?
  THE EARL OF BEACONSFIELD: No; but by one of great authority—by my predecessor in office; and as a Member of the Government of that right hon. Gentleman I am sure the noble Earl will be ready to acknowledge his great au-

  715
  thority. And yet I am sure the noble Earl would never sanction a statement that he managed his affairs in such a hurried, haphazard manner. Germany and France were at that time at war; but Russia and England were at peace and had time enough to attend to their proper business in a regular manner, and I have every confidence in the noble Earl to believe that he must have omitted no opportunity of doing his duty to his Sovereign, to his country, and to his own feelings, and did not lose the occasion given him by the revision of the Treaty of Paris in 1871. What I want to show is this—that the Conference of 1871 was not a haphazard transaction, but one conducted with due deliberation and caution by the noble Earl, as became his high character, experience, and position, and that everything must have been done on that occasion which was considered necessary for the interests of this country, and, I will say, of humanity in general. Look to the date of this hurried affair, as it is called. Prince Gortchakoff's letter which made this extraordinary announcement of an intended defeasance of the Treaty of Paris was dated October 31, and was communicated by Baron Bruunow to the noble Earl opposite on November 9, 1870, Lord Mayor's Day—an important day it would seem in Turkish politics. Now I trust that letter was delivered to the noble Earl after dinner, for it was a disagreeable one to have received before. That was November 9. The Conference did not meet until January 17; so that there was plenty of time for the more important business of the Conference, which we have been reminded just now by the noble Earl, takes place before its formal meetings. Two months elapsed before the Conference met, and two from the date of the Conference until it terminated—or four months since the letter was received—and there were several formal sittings. Now, can it be believed, if the condition of the Christian subjects of the Porte in 1871 was such or anything like such as has been now described, that the noble Earl and his Colleagues would have hesitated to probe the wound to the very bottom and to have seized that opportunity to obtain the necessary redress? That is the point. But then I am told that this was a hurried affair and necessarily not attended to with the requirements which so great a political question
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  demanded. I must say I am under a different impression. The noble Earl will correct me at some time or other if I err; but I was always under the impression that at the Conference of London the whole fasciculus of Treaties was well considered by the noble Earl and his Colleagues. That the Treaty on the Straits was considered is a fact, because it was modified. I always heard that the Tripartite Treaty was taken into consideration, and it was considered whether the engagement should not be extended to other Powers. I do not see well how four months could have been employed about the Conference unless its acknowledged labours were such as I have intimated. Therefore I say that I have a right to believe that in 1871, when this important Treaty of Paris was revised and all the other Treaties connected with our relations with the Ottoman Porte were considered, the opinion of British statesmen had not changed, and that they were then still of opinion, and they expressed it in those revised Treaties, that the maintenance of the territorial integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire was of vital importance to the interests of Europe. Well, so great an event as the revision of the Treaty of Paris could not pass without notice in "another place," and in consequence of some comments that were made, a noble Lord now a Member of this House (Viscount Enfield), who was then the able representative of the Foreign Department in the House of Commons, vindicated the conduct of his Government and that of the Turkish Government. He said—
  "The position of Turkey since the Crimean War had been ameliorated. Turkey had been able to equip, man, and hold a Navy which was in a creditable state of efficiency, and her Army was in such a condition as would enable her to hold her own against hostile visitors. The internal condition of Turkey had also improved since the Crimean War. The Danubian Provinces had secured autonomy, and the Christian population and subjects of the Porte were no longer as hostile to her rule as formerly."—[3 Hansard, ccv. 966.]
  There was some controversy, and the Minister of the day rose and supported the noble Lord who represented the Foreign Office, and said that he perfectly accepted his view of the whole situation. That Minister was my predecessor. Therefore, as late as the end of the Session of 1871—in July, I believe—we

  717
  find that what I may call the traditional policy of England was not changed—that to uphold the territorial integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire was not considered an idle and obsolete policy. That was only five years ago, and, therefore, the views which now seem adopted respecting the condition of the Christian population of Turkey must have at least the charm of novelty for the noble Earl, because with his unrivalled opportunities and advantages for obtaining information the most accurate and authentic, the noble Earl did not consider it necessary for the Government of which he was a Member to take any action; and, indeed, in the other House of Parliament the conduct of the Turkish Government as to the condition of its Christian subjects was not only acknowledged, but eulogized. Well, then, I ask, what has happened since then to induce this change? That has happened since which curiously enough happened in 1862. There has been another revolt in Herzegovina, another stimulative action from the Principality of Montenegro, and fresh complaints from the Government of St. Petersburg of the conduct of the Porte towards its Christian subjects. Well, my Lords, I am here to vindicate the conduct of Her Majesty's Government upon that head. It is unnecessary to discuss the question as to our right of interference in the internal affairs of Turkey. That interference on our part was requested by the Porte. Appealed to, I maintain the conduct of the Government was a prudent and circumspect policy, and showed due sympathy with the distressing circumstances which were then brought before them. Those who would charge the Government with neglect of their duty in this respect utterly fail in their first step. They cannot deny that when we were appealed to to sanction the deputation of the Consuls to the insurrectionary chiefs with a view of terminating a sanguinary revolt we acceded—with, again, I am bound to say, the entire sanction of the Porte. Then it is said—"You did nothing. It is very true that you agreed to the Andrassy Note, but that Note really effected nothing, and there you stopped." It is very true that the Andrassy Note failed. I think it is not difficult to indicate the causes of the failure. I shall touch upon these points with the utmost-bre-
  718
  vity, because your Lordships are so familiar with them; but it is necessary on occasions like the present, when the Government has to meet charges, that our defence should be before the countries. Now the Andrassy Note was looked upon by Her Majesty's Government, I frankly own, as an injudicious move—it was essentially, in their opinion, an inopportune move. To attempt in a country like Turkey to carry out a social reform in provinces in a state of savage insurrection appeared to us to be perfectly idle. But we had to consider, in the first place, the request of the Porte that we would not withdraw ourselves from the European concert; and, in the second place, we had to consider that, on analyzing that document, we found that it only proposed—and wisely and skilfully proposed—that those engagements should be maintained which the Porte had entered into by its firmans and decrees. In addition to this we thought it no disadvantage that in the then unsatisfactory state of affairs in that part of the world there should be again a public recognition by the Porte of its duties and of its engagements, as well as a renovated agreement to fulfil them. Therefore, under those circumstances, we gave in our adhesion to the Andrassy Note. That Note met with that fate which was the inevitable consequence of the unhappy circumstances with which it had to contend. Well, then, your Lordships know-, that time elapsed—another year nearly elapsed — and then came the Berlin Memorandum. Our conduct in reference to that Memorandum has been questioned often—and it has been questioned to-night—I myself do not think with justice or with accuracy. Before I touch upon the course which we took with respect to the Berlin Memorandum let me advert to some remarks which were made by the noble Earl (the Earl of Dudley) who preceded the noble Lord who last addressed us. The noble Earl appears to have addressed us to-night with the hope of bringing about an Autumn Session—although I must say that in the month of February that seems a task even beyond the noble Earl's resources. The noble Earl says that he has no objection to the general policy of the Government. He approves the general policy of the Government, but he cannot support the Government in consequence of their conduct

  719
  with regard to what are called the Bulgarian atrocities. He says that we did not impart sufficient information to Parliament, and that the discontent of the country has entirely originated from that studied negligence on the part of the Ministry. ["Hear!"] The noble Earl (the Earl of Dudley) cheers that remark, and I accept that cheer as his acknowledgment that I have accurately described his views. Now I wish to give to the House the most striking illustration of the complete ignorance that pervaded, not England alone but the whole world, the whole of Europe, and especially those countries nearest to the spot whore those atrocities were committed, and whose border populations were, above all others, most deeply interested in the matter. I wish, I say, to give your Lordships a striking instance of the ignorance which prevailed at that time. When the three Imperial Powers met to compose the Berlin Memorandum they composed it with an aggravation of all their charges against the Porte. It is the custom of diplomacy—and I do not object to it—that there should be an insertion of every circumstance ad invidiam that had occurred since the publication and failure of the Andrassy Note; and yet, although Germany, Austria, and Russia were the Powers that concocted that celebrated State paper, not a single allusion is made in it to the Bulgarian atrocities, notwithstanding that they had been perpetrated a fortnight before that Memorandum was framed. So far as Her Majesty's Government were concerned nothing could be more painful and nothing more injurious to our position when we were called upon for information upon such a subject than for us to be unable to satisfy the wish of Parliament and of the country. But the truth is this—We have heard in the course of these debates something about Consular Agents and the information that could be obtained by their means: but the truth is, that these atrocities were perpetrated in parts of Turkey which are unwisely denuded of Consular supervision, there being no commercial demands for such agencies, and the Government of a past day having considerably reduced the Consular agencies in the Turkish Empire.
  EARL GRANVILLE: I am afraid that the noble Earl is not quite accurate
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  on the point. I think he will find that there were Consulates in some of the districts of Bulgaria. I do not desire to enter generally into the Consular question, but will he state what Consulates were abolished?
  THE EARL OF BEACONSFIELD: I will take care that the noble Earl shall have the information he desires; but I am under the impression that several Consulates in European Turkey had been abolished. They were, I believe. abolished in consequence of a Report of a Committee of the House of Commons, and therefore I make no charge in this respect against any Government of which the noble Lord was a Member, if indeed it was that Government which reduced them. I will now revert to the Berlin Memorandum. Well, we objected to the Berlin Memorandum upon this broad ground. There were, of course, many other grounds of objection to that document which have been stated by my noble Friend in his despatches which are upon the Table of the House; but we objected to it upon this broad ground—that to our minds it would obviously and inevitably lead to the military occupation of European Turkey. That is a policy which we have always resisted, and it is a policy which we have as yet successfully resisted. It is a policy which the noble Earl may see, by reading the Papers upon the Table, has cropped up more than once in the course of these negotiations, since the Berlin Memorandum was drawn up, and we have always resisted it, and hitherto successfully resisted it. I am perfectly ready to found the vindication of our conduct with regard to the Berlin Memorandum upon that broad ground. I think that there are many other grounds which would have rendered it impossible for us in the then state of the Porte to have given in our adhesion to it, but that one is ample justification for our refusal to join in it, and I believe the country approved the conduct of the Government in so refusing. It has been frequently charged against us in the past, and has been charged against us tonight, that having refused the Berlin Memorandum we took no steps and made no proposition of our own. Well, that is not a just observation. Ten days elapsed after the Berlin Memorandum was refused, and then a revolution happened in Constantinople; and the first

  721
  public act after that revolution was, I believe, an amnesty published and announced to all the subjects of the Porte. Well, that was thought an opportunity by which a termination might be put to those revolts, and the opportunity was not lost. It is very true that it was limited to what my noble Friend the Secretary of State properly called "communications," but they were communications of the greatest moment, and it was from those communications that ultimately we succeeded in having adopted by all the other Powers the propositions which we submitted to the Conference. Now, there were two great policies before us with regard to the Christian subjects of the Porte. There was the Russian plan, and it was one deserving of all respect. It was a plan for establishing a chain of autonomous States, tributary to the Porte but in every other sense independent. No one can deny that was a large scheme, worthy of statesmen and worthy of the deepest consideration. But the result of the deepest consideration that Her Majesty's Government could give to it was that they were forced entirely to disapprove of that scheme. This scheme of a chain of autonomous States in the Balkan country, and, indeed, in the whole of the country that during the last half century has been known as European Turkey, is a state of affairs that has existed before. The Turks did not step from Asia and conquer Constantinople—as is sometimes mentioned in speeches at National Conferences. It was very gradually that they entered and established in Europe. As a rising military Power they obtained territories near the Black Sea, and ultimately entered into Thracia, and there they remained for some time in company with all these independent and autonomous States. There was, of course, an Emperor of Constantinople, there was a King of Bulgaria, there was a King of Servia, there was a Hospodar of Wallachia, there was a Duke of Athens, and there was a Prince of Corinth. And what happened? The new military Power that had entered Europe gradually absorbed and conquered all these independent States, and, having conquered these independent and autonomous States, these kingdoms and duchies—the Empire of Constantinople being now limited to its matchless city and to what in modern diplomatic lan-
  722
  guage is called "a cabbage garden," was invested and fell. And it did occur to us that if there were a chain of autonomous States and the possessors of Constantinople were again limited to "a cabbage garden," probably the same result might occur. Well, I do not pretend to say who first introduced this word autonomy into these negotiations. If we did we must bear the blame. But against this plan of the Russian Court we proposed what was called by some one—the phrase was adopted at least—administrative autonomy, and we defined that administrative autonomy to be institutions that would secure to the Christian subjects of the Porte some control over their local affairs, and some security against the excesses of arbitrary power. And what happened, my Lords? Discussions did occur between Her Majesty's Government and the Government of St. Petersburg; and the result of those discussions was, that the Russian Government gave up their views and adopted those of England; and I had a right to say—as I said in a speech in my own county, to which I would not have alluded if the noble Earl had not done so—there was no Government that met us more cordially on this subject, or assisted us more readily than the Government of St. Petersburg. Well, there were circumstances that prevented at that moment a conclusion being reached, the greatest being the breaking out of the Servian War. But when an opportunity occurred my noble Friend the Secretary of State reverted to those views which he knew would be acceptable, and the fact that they were accepted at last by all the six Powers proves that the expectation on our part of their success was not an ill-judged one. Now, my Lords, not to weary your Lordships with unnecessary detail, I come to this Conference which we are told has failed, but which I hope may yet bear fruit. The noble Earl has made several remarks which I can hardly pass unnoticed, as they refer to myself personally. The noble Earl seems to have a doubt whether my noble Friend (the Marquess of Salisbury) had the confidence of his Colleagues, and he gave his reasons for that doubt. I had the honour, fiord the position which I occupy, to select my noble Friend for the duty which he so patriotically accepted. I selected him not merely on account of his talents, on

  723
  which in his presence I will not for a moment dwell—and it is unnecessary, because they are fully and generously recognized by your Lordships on both sides—but I did select my noble Friend because he happened to be at the head of that Department over which the noble Duke who introduced this subject (the Duke of Argyll) himself once ably presided. I selected my noble Friend because he presided over a Department where the considerations of State connected with it, where the great knowledge which he must have thus acquired, could not but be of signal service to him in the discharge of the duties which awaited him at Constantinople. I selected my noble Friend, also, because I knew that upon all the large and leading subjects which have occupied the attention of the House this evening there was between him and myself a cordial and complete concurrence. On all the grounds which I have indicated I thought my noble Friend would be found well suited for the post. But he is supposed not to have had the confidence of his Colleagues because he seems to have been attacked in some newspapers generally supporting the Administration, and because his Colleagues have not written leading articles in his defence. Every public man is liable to such attacks. No one has been more attacked in the newspapers than myself. I dare say I have had as many leading articles, mainly of a vituperative nature, written against me as anyone ever had. And yet I declare upon my honour that I do not know a single Colleague who ever wrote a single line in my defence. Yet they all possess my confidence; and I believe they have some trust in me. I therefore think that the principal argument of the noble Earl opposite—
  EARL GRANVILLE: Not the principal argument. Those were words which I did not use.
  THE EARL OF BEACONSFIELD: Then there must have been a ventriloquist in the House; because on this side of the House we were all under the impression that that was the principal argument of the noble Earl. Then the noble Earl says the statements in my Guildhall speech were never vindicated when he alluded to them the other day, and that I seemed to be satisfied by the defensive observations of my noble Friend the Foreign Secretary. Well, I certainly
  724
  was satisfied with his observations; for my noble Friend only made one observation on the subject, and I thought that one was perhaps one too much. Why, what did I say at the Guildhall? What are the statements? We hear a great deal of the "statements," and the noble Earl looked as if they were something terrible, statements that could not be mentioned to ears polite. Why does he not say what the statements were? I will tell him what they were. I said that the policy of England was a policy of peace; that there was no country of which peace was more essentially the policy than of England, because we wanted nothing. We coveted no city and no province; but I also stated that if we had good reasons for going to war, reasons which touched our liberties, our honour, or our Empire—if there was to be such a war, and we were unfortunately brought into it—we should enter into that war with a determination to carry it on until right were done. These were the statements that I made in the Guildhall. These are the statements that I now make in the House of Lords. I entirely adhere to them. They were no sneer. I was unconscious of any sarcasm. They were the sincere expression of my own feelings and I believe also of those of my Colleagues. Then the noble Earl contrasts his own behaviour at the Conference of London on the violation of the Black Sea Treaty and the conduct of my noble Friend at the Conference at Constantinople. The noble Earl asks—"If I had acted at the Conference of 1871 as the noble Marquess acted or was obliged to act, from a want of confidence or from the timidity on the part of my Colleagues, do you ever think I should have succeeded in the difficult enterprize in which I had embarked?" Now, I must say there is some courage in thus appealing to the violation of the Black Sea Treaty and the submission to it by the English Government as a proof of the noble Lord's valour and determination. I have expressed in "another place" my opinion of the conduct of the Government and of the noble Lord on that score. I do not wish to repeat it on this occasion; but as the noble Lord himself has forced me to notice that subject, I must tell him, further, that the duties which he had to fulfil at the Conference of London and those which had to be fulfilled by my

  725
  noble Friend at the Conference of Constantinople were essentially different duties. Certainly, the noble Lord would not have succeeded in his efforts, if he had commenced his business at the London Conference by saying that nothing would induce England to have recourse to any violence if she could not obtain adhesion to the proposition she made. Why, the noble Lord went there to vindicate the honour and the interests of his country; and if the Russian Ambassador had refused the compensation which he demanded it would have been the noble Lord's duty to coerce the Power which had first outraged England, and then refused to do the only act which the noble Lord could devise in order to remove that stain on her reputation. But was that the position of my noble Friend at Constantinople? Why he was there as a mediator—he did not go there to threaten: and to suppose that we could go into such a Conference and not let it be known—as I believe it was generally known — that under no circumstances England would have recourse to coercion in order to carry her mediatorial recommendations into effect—I say to have entered the Conference at Constantinople and to have concealed that determination would have been acting with great duplicity. My Lords, I cannot believe that you will sanction for a moment the view which the noble Earl has taken on this subject, but that you will see at once that the situations of the two negotiators were essentially different—that if the noble Lord opposite had failed in his demand it would have been his duty immediately to consider whether and what coercion should be applied; whereas my noble Friend had a more difficult and more humble task—he was there as a mediator, he went not to coerce but to persuade. And allow me to say, when we are told that the Conference was a failure, that certainly there was no failure of my noble Friend in the principal object of his visit to Constantinople. When he went there what was the situation? Then, the first sine quâ non was that Bulgaria should be occupied by a Russian army. We had a great many other demands of a similar kind. Who succeeded in obtaining the withdrawal of those unreasonable proposals? Why, my noble Friend. My noble Friend fell only into one error, which I should have fallen
  726
  into myself, and I believe every Member of this House would have done the same. He gave too much credit to the Turks for common sense, and he could not believe that when ho made so admirable an arrangement in their favour, they would have lost so happy an opportunity.
  My Lords, I have rather trespassed on your attention. I felt that to-night, although I regretted there was no direct issue brought before us, it was my duty in common with my Colleagues to vindicate the conduct of the Government. I hope I have shown that with respect to our general conduct we have pursued and upheld the traditionary policy of England, and because we believe it to be the best security for general peace. I hope I have shown that with regard to the secondary though important object, the condition of the Christian subjects of the Porto, our course has been circumspect and consistent, proved, as I think, by its having obtained the general approbation of the Powers. I will not touch upon the Imperial issues involved in this subject. It has been said that the people of this country are deeply interested in the humanitarian and philanthropic considerations involved in it. All must appreciate such feelings. But I am mistaken if there be not a yet deeper sentiment on the part of the people of this country, one with which I cannot doubt your Lordships will ever sympathise, and that is—the determination to maintain the Empire of England.
  THE DUKE OF ARGYLL, in referring to the telegram expressing the warm thanks of the Turkish Minister to the noble Earl the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, said that the telegram ought not to have been printed in the Blue Book, unless the noble Earl was prepared to state what was the nature of the communication for which such warm thanks were given. With regard to the Guildhall speech, there could be no doubt that in the terms in which the noble Earl (the Earl of Beaconsfield) used in reference to the ultimatum of the Emperor of Russia, that he was speaking at Russia, and in the Blue Book there appeared a communication from Prince Gortchakoff making serious comments on that speech.
  THE EARL OF DERBYwas understood to say that if there was no objection to it on public grounds, the information

  727
  which the noble Duke desired would be given.
  Moved, That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty for, Copy of the communication from the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Turkish Minister, referred to in the telegram of the 24th of December, 1876.—(The Duke of Argyll.)
  Motion (by leave of the House) withdrawn.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE BILL [H.L.]
A Bill to amend the Public Record Office Act, 1838—Was presented by The LORD CHANCEL-Lon; read 1a. (No. 8.)
House adjourned at Twelve o'clock, to Thursday next, half past Ten o'clock.