VISCOUNT GREY DE WILTON, in rising to move that an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty in reply to the Speech from the Throne, said: My Lords, I have not often spoken in this House, and it is no light thing for a man to stand up and inflict himself on such a distinguished audience as this for the first time in a tight coat (alluding to his uniform), and I therefore crave the kind indulgence you are in the habit of showing to persons in my situation. I propose to detain your Lordships for a very short time, as I have no doubt you are anxious to hear the words of a younger Peer than myself, who is sitting below me on the Treasury Bench, and who will probably address your Lordships this evening. The first 10 or 12 paragraphs in Her Majesty's Speech are devoted to the all-absorbing question of the day, and in the presence of the three principal British actors in that great drama, it would be most unwarrantable for me to occupy your time by even the faintest sketch of the history of the past two years. That history will be told—I have no doubt well—by those who are competent to give you information, and upon their narrative, taken in conjunction with the Papers which have been promised us, you will 8 form your judgment, unprejudiced, I hope, by the speeches of those who, in various parts of the country, have thought fit to attack the Government, although unfurnished with that information without which no true or just judgment can be formed. As might have been expected, the more hot-headed of the British public have already ranged themselves on one side or the other. There has been a Turkish and a Russian faction. A great deal of zeal has been manifested, not always, however, with discretion, a certain amount of injustice has been done, and a great many extravagant proposals have been made. For instance, I believe that in some quarters the Russian Emperor has been rather hardly dealt with, and his pacific declarations have been somewhat rudely pooh-poohed. It may be said that he cannot always speak for his Army, which on some occasions has got out of his hands; but the pacific assurances which he made to Lord Augustus Loftus were of so solemn and earnest a character, that it would have been wiser and more courteous to have given him credit for the sincerity of his intentions and for his ability to execute them. On the other hand, I cannot admire what has been termed the "bag and baggage policy," advocated, if not originated, by a very distinguished person. That cannot be a practical policy unless we are prepared to carry it out by force, which we are not. Even if we were, the offenders must live somewhere, and I cannot see the justice of forcing them, with all their sins, on another part of the globe, where they would probably be equally objectionable. One result of the wide discrepancy of opinion has been that the Government have received a great deal of miscellaneous advice, much of which has been of a nature rather to hamper than to assist it. I was not present to to hear the will of the Nation proclaimed in St. James's Hall, because I was not furnished with the necessary ticket; but when I read the report next morning, and observed the nature of some of the advice, and, indeed, some of the orders showered on our Plenipotentiary, I could not help regretting that some, at least, of the orators had not remembered a useful precept which I have often read on board steamboats—"Do not speak to the man at the wheel." Some, however, do not take that view of the 9 Conference at St. James's Hall, and I have heard it said that the voice of the people, expressed in the utterances to which I have referred, has compelled Her Majesty's Government, very much against the grain, to make a considerable change in their policy in reference to affairs in the East. There are those sitting below me who at the proper time will give explanations on that point, and I shall be much surprised if it be not found that Her Majesty's Government have, in fact, not made any material change in their policy. I believe it will be found that they have adhered, and still adhere, to the spirit of the Treaty of 1856—that though that Treaty had been considerably mutilated in 1871, and is by some considered a dead-letter, it is still in force, and that Her Majesty's Government have based their policy, and continue to base their policy, on the two cardinal points of that Treaty—namely, the preservation of the peace of Europe, and, secondly, the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire. Her Majesty's Government believed—and, indeed, it was obvious—that the last point involved this further position—that the Christian subjects of the Porte should, as far as was practicable, be in full possession of their liberties. In pursuance of these objects a Conference was assembled. The Members of that Conference deemed it necessary that the Porte should submit to certain guarantees for the performance of the promises which they had made. The guarantees demanded, originally of a very stringent nature, gradually assumed a milder and milder character; but they were alike rejected by the Porte, which practically declared that it would be bound by nobody but itself. The Conference, therefore, may in that sense be said to have failed; but in certain other respects the Conference has not been a failure—it has borne some fruit. It has demonstrated the unanimous desire of the six great Powers to preserve the peace of Europe, and it has extracted from the Porte a measure of reform unparalleled in Mahommedan annals, in the shape of a Constitution, promulgated with great ceremony, solemnly sworn to by the Sultan and his Ministers, and one which cannot but effect much good if it were only faithfully carried into effect. But will it be faithfully carried out? Well, I hope, at any rate, 10 that we shall have patience, and allow the Turkish Government time and opportunity for working out these reforms. According to the intelligence that has reached us the successor of Midhat Pasha is bound to follow out the principles laid down by his predecessor in respect of the new Constitution. However that may be, I think that on a calm consideration of the whole of the subject, in all its bearings, your Lordships can hardly come to any other conclusion than that the conduct of Her Majesty's Ministers has been wise, dignified, and consistent. It may be that this question will eventuate in a European war, in which, sooner or later, the interests of this country will be directly or indirectly involved. In that event a heavy weight of responsibility will rest upon those who have the conduct of foreign affairs; and I am happy to think that the honour and interests of the country are safe in the keeping of my noble Relative below me. Nor can I doubt that my noble Friend will receive the approbation and support of the great majority of his fellow-countrymen. My Lords, I am happy to find that the assumption of the Imperial Title by Her Majesty at Delhi has been welcomed by the Chiefs and people of India with expressions of loyalty and affection. On the other hand, your Lordships will be grieved to hear that a part of Her Majesty's dominions in India have been visited by a famine, which has overspread a large part of the Presidencies of Madras and Bombay. The sufferings of the people of these districts have been, and must I fear continue to be, great; but we have already gained experience from former calamities of the same nature, and the despatch forwarded a few weeks since by the noble Earl (the Earl of Carnarvon), who has been acting in the absence of the noble Marquess the Secretary of State for India, will show that the authorities in that country are alive to the exigencies of the case, and are fully prepared to take the best possible means for preserving the lives of a population who are only too apt, in times of calamity, to resign themselves to their fate. My Lords, I am happy to find by the next paragraph of the Royal Speech that under the wise administration of the noble Earl the Secretary of State for the Colonies the prosperity and progress of our Colonial Empire continues unchecked, 11 and we may fairly hope that the apprehensions that have arisen from the proceedings of the Transvaal Republic will, under the provident management of Her Majesty's Government, pass away without injurious consequences to our own fellow-subjects of the Cape Colony. My Lords, I do not propose to allude at any length to the various Bills announced in the concluding paragraphs of the Royal Speech. The Bill relating to the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge will, I suppose, be of a similar nature to the one affecting the University of Oxford introduced last Session. I can only hope that this measure will be more successful than the Bill of last year in "another place," and that the noble Marquess who has charge of it (the Marquess of Salisbury) will have the satisfaction of hearing it receive the Royal Assent. As to the measures relating to Bankruptcy, and Letters Patent for Inventions, I dismiss them, as too technical for me, with a hope that they may be found capable of dispelling those mists of inconvenience, which serve usually to obscure these objects. The Prisons Bill, I hope, will be successfully carried through Parliament; for, though some of the magistrates are naturally loth to part with their local control over prisons, there is a general feeling that some legislation is necessary, and that a better organization and a more efficient management will be effected under the Bill. A similar hope may be entertained with reference to the Valuation of Property Bill; because it is the principal stepping-stone towards settling the important question of local taxation. The Bills relating to Factories and Workshops are interesting and important, both to the working and to the manufacturing classes, and they may, I think, be safely left in the experienced hands of the Home Secretary. The Irish Judicature Bill will be complementary of the Judicature Act passed for this country, and will have the effect of constituting one uniform system of judicature for the two countries. The Scotch Bills I may safely leave to my noble Friend who is to second my Motion, and I am sure that the noble Earl will do them justice. The programme put forth by the Government is not heroic in dimensions or constitution; it embodies an honest attempt to deal with the most pressing wants of the 12 day. I venture to think that it is a manageable programme; and we may fairly hope that most of the measures will, with due co-operation from both sides, escape the annual July Massacre. But that co-operation is a very important factor; and I am sure it will not be necessary to appeal to the fairness of noble Lords opposite. They will doubtless watch the action of the Government with vigilance; they will probable criticize them with severity; but they will assuredly give their generous assistance to the passing of good and useful measures, knowing, as they well know, that they are measures devised by men who are only vieing with them as to who shall most contribute to the honour, interest, and welfare of the country.
My Lords, I will conclude by moving that an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, thanking Her Majesty for Her Majesty's most Gracious Speech from the Throne, as follows:—
MOST GRACIOUS SOVEREIGN,WE, Your Majesty's most dutiful and loyal subjects, the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, in Parliament assembled, beg leave to offer our humble thanks to Your Majesty for the most gracious Speech which Your Majesty has addressed to both Houses of Parliament.We humbly thank Your Majesty for informing us that the hostilities which, before the close of last Session, had broken out between Turkey on the one hand and Servia and Montenegro on the other, have engaged Your Majesty's most serious attention, and that Your Majesty anxiously waited for an opportunity when Your Majesty's good offices, together with those of Your allies, might be usefully interposed.We humbly thank Your Majesty for informing us that this opportunity presented itself by the solicitation of Servia for mediation, the offer of which was ultimately entertained by the Porte.We humbly thank Your Majesty for informing us that in the course of the negotiations Your Majesty deemed it expedient to lay down and, in concert with the other Powers, to submit to the Porte certain bases upon which Your Majesty held that not only peace might be brought about with the Principalities, but that the permanent pacification of the disturbed provinces, including Bulgaria, and the amelioration of their condition, might be effected.13We humbly thank Your Majesty for informing us that these bases, agreed to by the Powers, required to be expanded and worked out by negotiation or by Conference, accompanied by an armistice; and that the Porte, though not accepting the bases and proposing other terms, was willing to submit them to the equitable consideration of the Powers.We humbly thank Your Majesty for informing us that while proceeding to act in this mediation, Your Majesty thought it right, after inquiry into the facts, to denounce to the Porte the excesses ascertained to have been committed in Bulgaria, and to express Your Majesty's reprobation of the perpetrators.We humbly thank Your Majesty for informing us that an armistice having been arranged, a Conference met at Constantinople for the consideration of extended terms in accordance with the original bases, in which Conference Your Majesty was represented by a Special Envoy, as well as by Your Majesty's Ambassador.We humbly thank Your Majesty for informing us that in taking these steps it has been Your Majesty's object throughout to maintain the peace of Europe, and to bring about the better government of the disturbed provinces, without infringing on the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire.We share Your Majesty's regret that the proposals recommended by Your Majesty, and by Your Majesty's allies, have not been accepted by the Porte; but we trust that the general agreement among the European Powers, as shown by the Conference, will not fail to have a material effect upon the condition and. government of Turkey.We humbly thank Your Majesty for informing us that the armistice between Turkey and the Principalities has been prolonged, and. we join with Your Majesty in hoping that it will yet lead to the conclusion of an honourable peace.We humbly thank Your Majesty for informing us that Your Majesty has acted in cordial co-operation with your allies, with whom, as with other foreign Powers, Your Majesty's relations continue to be of a friendly character.We rejoice that Your Majesty's assumption of the Imperial title at Delhi has been welcomed by the Chiefs and. people of India with professions of affection and. loyalty.We share Your Majesty's deep regret that a serious famine has overspread. a large portion of the Presidencies of Madras and. Bombay, but we are confident that every resource will be employed to meet the calamity.14We humbly thank Your Majesty for informing us that the prosperity and. progress of Your Majesty's Colonial Empire remain unchecked, and that measures have been taken with a view to the safety of Your Majesty's subjects in South Africa.We humbly assure Your Majesty that our careful consideration shall be given to the measures which may be submitted to us, and that we earnestly trust that the blessing of the Almighty will attend our labours and. direct our efforts.
THE EARL OF HADDINGTONsaid, that in seconding his noble Friend's Motion he also must claim that indulgence which was invariably extended to those who for the first time addressed their Lordships' House. He was sure it was a subject of heartfelt pleasure, not to their Lordships only, but to the nation at large, that Her Majesty had once again been able to realize her intention of opening Her Parliament in person. Since Her Majesty performed that function last year, a new dignity had been added to the Crown; and though in the eyes of Englishmen no additional luster could be shed upon the Crown thereby, yet in India the new title of Empress of India had been hailed with much satisfaction, and had called forth the expressions of pleasure from Her Majesty's feudatories of their just appreciation of Her illustrious protectorate. Before adverting to the various topics mentioned in Her Majesty's Speech, he could not but congratulate their Lordships on the first appearance among them there as a Peer of the noble Earl at the head of Her Majesty's Government. He would not attempt to pay compliments to the noble Earl; but lie congratulated the House of Lords on the accession to its ranks of one who in the other House of Parliament had never taken part in a debate without elevating its tone. Referring now to the various topics mentioned in the Speech from the Throne, they all remembered with what gloomy forebodings the last Session was closed—hostilities were then being waged in Eastern Europe between Turkey and Servia, and the last gleam of hope that European peace might be maintained seemed to have gone—when they heard with rejoicing t hat owing to the judicious attitude of Her Majesty's Government 15 Turkey and Russia had been brought face to face, and had been induced to pause and to weigh the issues of a threatened conflict in Europe, and by these means, for the present at least, the dangers of a general war had been averted. And if the efforts of those assembled in Conference at Constantinople had, to a certain extent, failed to adjust the difficulty in the way that was desired, yet they had at least brought about an indefinite adjournment of the threatened occupation of the Christian Provinces, had brought the Porte face to face with her responsibilities; and the fresh life and vigour introduced into existing Treaties were some proofs that the policy of Her Majesty's Government, in unison with her allies, had to a great extent been successful. He would not enter into details, but he might repeat what his noble Friend the Mover of the Address had said—that the basis on which the policy of the English Cabinet had been formed had been adherence to existing Treaties, to ameliorate the condition of the Christian subjects of Turkey without hazarding the peace of Europe or infringing the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. Within the last few days an unforeseen event had occurred, the exact result of which it was at present difficult to foresee; but they might hope that the fall of the Minister who inaugurated the policy of reform would not involve the destruction of his schemes, and that his successor would prove to be a statesman who was able and willing to carry out the much-needed changes proposed by Midhat Pasha. With regard to the reference which the Speech from the Throne contained to our Colonial dominions, it was satisfactory to find that peace had not been seriously threatened, while what had occurred afforded an additional reason for the extension of the principle of federation which had been successfully carried in some of the Colonies. He looked with satisfaction on the proposed legislation in respect to roads and bridges in Scotland and the Scotch Poor Law, which he hoped would result in economy and efficiency. The noble Earl concluded by seconding the Address. [See page 12.]
§ EARL GRANVILLEMy Lords, I rise to address a few observations to your Lordships—more in deference to long-established custom than from any 16 belief that any discussion can be advantageously raised on our side of the House without further information. My Lords, the noble Earl who seconded the Motion for the Address (the Earl of Haddington) only gave utterance to a feeling entertained by the entire House when he said your Lordships must all rejoice that the present Session of Parliament has been opened by Her Majesty in person; and I am glad that the Speech from the Throne is framed so as to make it not only easy for, but incumbent on us to adopt the Address moved in reply. My Lords, the attention of Parliament, in common with that of the whole country, seems to be concentrated at this moment on one question of foreign policy, of the importance of which we have evidence in the fact of so many paragraphs on the subject being inserted in the Queen's Speech. No doubt we shall hear a good deal of that question this evening; but it would be quite idle for us on this side of the House to attempt to debate it in the absence of full information on the question. I am glad that, contrary to the precedent of last Session, the Papers are to be laid on the Table forthwith. I am not equally glad to have seen it officially announced in The Morning Post and Daily Telegraph that the whole documents extend to not fewer than 1,200 folios.
And now, before proceeding to notice some of the topics referred to in the Queen's Speech, may I say one word expressive of my pleasure in hearing the agreeable manner—the facility of speech tempered with that genial tone which is peculiarly agreeable to your Lordships—in which an old friend of mine, and the son of a still older friend, moved the Address in Answer to that Speech. The noble Earl who followed my noble Friend, alluded in graceful terms to the circumstance of the Prime Minister being now a Member of your Lordships' House. I am not sure that it is particularly my part to express unmixed feelings of satisfaction at such an accession to the benches opposite, or that one so great a master of debate should be added to our opponents already on those benches; but without any undue compliment to the noble Earl, I may say that a seat in your Lordships' House is not an unworthy reward for a statesman who has spent a long public and Parliamentary life. And while on personal 17 subjects I may observe, my Lords, that I should not be doing justice to my own feelings, nor to those of noble Lords on this side of the House who are accustomed to act with me, if I did not state that the admirable temper and tact of the noble Duke the Lord President of the Council (the Duke of Richmond and Gordon), who naturally waives the place of the Leader of this House to the noble Earl the Prime Minister, have contributed very largely to the satisfactory character of the debates in your Lordships' House.
I will not trouble your Lordships with any remarks on the Bills which Her Majesty's Government announced their intention of introducing. Some of them are old friends, but old or new, I will not now enter into the merits of them; but there are one or two omissions to which I think I may be pardoned for calling attention. The subject of Burials is one which has excited much attention and feeling in the country. Last year the noble Duke gave what, I think, was gratefully accepted by the right rev. Bench as a pledge that the Government would themselves take charge of a Bill relating to Burials. I regret to observe that in the Speech from the Throne there is no allusion to any such Bill, except it is contained in the words "other measures." I think that there should have been more explicit reference to a measure of such importance if it be the intention of the Government to introduce a Bill. My Lords, there is one phrase in this Speech which we have sometimes heard before now. I allude to the words "economy and efficiency," which on this occasion are used in reference to the management of the Prisons of the country. In former times it had a wrong significance. I must say in reference to "economy," that, though in times of great prosperity the word became somewhat unpopular, there are symptoms that among all classes—the agricultural as well as the commercial classes—it is likely to recover something of its former popularity. With regard to "efficiency," it puts me in mind of another omission. Last year I called attention to a scheme for the improvement of Dover Harbour, and I showed that it was a question, not merely of local convenience, or one of convenience to commerce or Continental traffic, but one which, having been examined and 18 reported upon by all the military and naval authorities of the country, had been declared for years to be absolutely urgent and necessary to the proper position of the naval and military defences of this country; so much so that Her Majesty's late Government agreed upon a self-supporting scheme, which the present Government naturally considered. It was referred to a Committee; that Committee recommended that the scheme should be proceeded with, and threw out the suggestion that it might be well to consider whether, for a very small cost, even greater facilities might be given. Her Majesty's present Government thereupon took 18 months to look into that suggestion; and at the end of last year I asked my noble Friend the question whether the Government had abandoned the scheme altogether; and he, without an absolute pledge, gave me an encouraging answer. When we got the answer, exactly 10 days before our notice could be given, it was a distinct intimation that the Government did not mean to go on with the scheme, and that if we could get the sanction of the War Office, and of the Admiralty, we were at liberty to take any steps we liked. At another time I might show that that delay is one which will be very injurious to the scheme. I might mention another small incident illustrating the mode of doing business on the part of the Government. In the beginning of November we, the Harbour Board, proposed to take over the Admiralty Pier. We were hurt at getting no answer for two months, but on the first day of this year a storm arose, the ocean was roused, a great portion of the pier to which I refer was thrown into the sea, and I can assure your Lordships that all our sensitiveness has disappeared under the consolation that some £30,000 or £40,000 will remain upon the public taxpayer instead of on the locality. With reference to another paragraph of the Queen's Speech, it is satisfactory to learn that the prosperity and progress of the Colonies remain unchecked; and with respect to the Papers bearing on the proceedings of the Transvaal Republic, I venture to express a hope that when the information on that subject is printed we shall not have to wait twelve months, as in the former instance, before the information is distributed. A very serious matter for consideration is to be 19 found in the state of South Africa—it is unquestionably a very grave question. An article has recently been given to the public, in which my noble Friend the Secretary for the Colonies is extolled to the skies, and in which the late Secretary for the Colonies and myself were, I am afraid, sent to a very different place. It is not for me to dissent from an estimate of the personal worth of any individuals; but I do hope and expect that the policy of the Secretary for the Colonies will not be governed by the policy laid down in that article, and that the adoption of more judicious views will load the efforts of my noble Friend to a successful termination. I am glad to see that my noble Friend does not dissent. At the same time, I am happy to congratulate my noble Friend on the appointment of Sir Bartle Frere to the post to which he has been appointed in South Africa, and I hope that all apprehension in respect of our colonial possessions there will soon be at an end. There are two paragraphs in the Speech from the Throne which refer to India, and which remind us sadly of the inevitable manner in which in this life the brilliant and mournful sides of affairs are commingled. With regard to the assumption of the Imperial title at Delhi, there have been criticisms, and there may be more; but the advisability of giving emphasis to that assumption appeared intended to meet the views of those who have held that it would be of the greatest use in India, and to allay the feeling of the minority in this country who feared some tampering with the title in this country to which we are all so much attached; and, without reference to particulars, I am disposed to think that, on the whole, some display was wise. Now, as to the Eastern Question—I shall only speak as to what is, more or less, within the knowledge of all of us. It does appear to me, notwithstanding what has been said by my noble Friend on the other side who moved the Address, that there have been two phases in the policy of Her Majesty's Government on this question. I quite agree with my noble Friend that the policy of Her Majesty's Government was the maintenance of the Treaty of 1856, and non-intervention on our part, and on the part of the other Powers, in the internal affairs of Turkey. Those may have been desirable objects; 20 but they have been strained to the utmost. I venture to assert, as I asserted last year, that the rights conferred on Turkey by the Treaty of Paris were not unaccompanied by the moral claims and rights which that Treaty gave to all Europe in reference to the Christian subjects of the Porte. And perhaps I may here be allowed to say a word about the Treaty of Paris. My Lords, I am not one of those who think that the Treaty of Paris is gone. I am not one of those who think that the Treaty of Paris ought to go. On the contrary, I think that Treaty is one of very considerable importance, and of great use to all the Powers who participated in its provisions. I think it secured great political advantages. It is of great importance in respect of the freedom of the Danube, and it lays down rules which are valuable in respect to the relations of the Six Powers in checking selfish or interested views on the part of any particular Power. But, on the other hand, I entirely deny that the Turks are in the position with respect to that Treaty which they occupied when it was first made. I was a Member of the Government who were a party to the making of that Treaty; and I am not sure, now when we can look back with the eye of experience, that it would not have been better, following the line suggested in a memorandum to be found in the Life of the Prince Consort, that it would not have been better to have refused to make that Treaty except on the condition of receiving security at the hands of Turkey for the good government of the Christian Provinces. But, I believe through a chivalrous feeling towards those by whose side we had fought, we consented to be satisfied with a declaration on the part of the Porte. It must, however, be always borne in mind that the declaration in question is solemnly embodied in the Treaty itself, and I hold that the fact of the declaration having been so embodied, the Treaty gives to the Powers a right, and throws upon them the obligation, to step in and see that the declaration is not thrown aside. Some accusations on this subject have been made against the Liberal Party. It has been said, and -perhaps it may be said again, "Why did not you, the Liberal Party, during the 20 years, or the greater part of that time, you were in power, act on 21 your right and obligation in respect of that declaration? You did not do so." And, especially, "Why in 187I did you confirm this Treaty?" All I can say, in answer to the first charge, is that the Liberal Party did act in precisely the way that has been suggested in the question. In 1858, Lord Stratford de Redcliffe gave to the Porte the strongest possible intimation that it must not rely on the support of England if it did not carry out the promises contained in the declaration. Then, in 1860, when outrages of a very horrible character were enacted in Lebanon, in a short time after their occurrence, Lord John Russell agreed with the French Government that the district should be occupied by French troops. Lord John Russell, you will remember, sent out a Commission, at the head of which was my noble Friend Lord Dufferin, and that Commission gave to the population there what I belive to be one of the best models for the government of the Christians of Turkey, which has worked most successfully up to the present time. As giving you some idea of the state of matters in the Lebanon at that time, I may mention that 5,500 persons were murdered, and that there were some 20,000 women and children wandering about in a state of starvation. Your Lordships will remember that the outrages of Damascus were not suffered to pass unnoticed by the Government of this country. The Secretary for Foreign Affairs sent out a despatch, and punishment was inflicted on the offenders—the Governor of Damascus himself suffering the extreme penalty of the law. In 1871 the Turkish Ambassador came to me, and I told him that his Government must not think that Turkey could rely on this country in all possible contingencies. I made that communication also to Sir Henry Elliot; and I told him that in my opinion it was not fair that Turkey should labour under such a delusion as to suppose, that whatever she did, she could rely on the support of Europe, and of this country, and that she must look as one of her main safeguards to the good government of her Christian subjects—that she should make them feel that their lot was better under Turkish rule than under any other Government likely to be found. Last year I was at some pains to explain the alterations which were made in the 22 Treaty of Paris in 1871; and I said I considered that an improvement had been made. The noble Viscount opposite (Viscount Grey do Wilton) seemed to think we desired to mutilate it; but I remember the Turkish Ambassador immediately the Conference was over saying to me that Russia, while thinking she had gained an advantage for herself, had given to the Turks exactly the one thing they desired. The alteration made in 1871 was at a time when France and Germany were engaged in war, and when there was very great public excitement, and when it would have been madness, even if it had been necessary, which I do not admit, to open up all the questions connected with the Treaty. To return to the policy of Her Majesty's Government last year, I feel certain that extreme desire for the maintenance of the status quo was one that influenced to an extraordinary extent all the thoughts, words, and actions of Her Majesty's Government. It was this that made the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs so sanguine that in the early part of 1875 he told us publicly that we should never hear any more of the insurrection in Herzegovina. It was this feeling that made them agree to the Andrassy Note, and which afterwards led not only to the rejection of the Berlin Memorandum, but to the mode in which it was rejected. At this time last year I ventured to say that if Her Majesty's Government were right in rejecting that proposalin the then actual state of affairs, I could not conceive that they were not wrong in not meeting that proposal with a counter proposal of their own, instead of meeting that objection, as they did, with a non possumus. The course taken by the Government upon the Berlin Memorandum had a great effect upon the public mind. Well, in the Autumn, the Prime Minister, then a Peer, speaking at a non-political dinner at Aylesbury, on the very eve of the election of the Member who succeeded him in the representation for the county in Parliament, made, nevertheless, a political speech. In that speech he recapitulated the charge against the Government, and denied that there was the slightest foundation for it; he said that, on the contrary, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had at once laid down the true principles of the Eastern Question, and that the Government were in daily, and even in hourly, 23 communication with the other Governments on the subject. A noble Duke (the Duke of Argyll) has already called attention to this subject, and, so far as I can tell, there is not the slightest trace in the Papers that have been published of any such laying down of any principle in the noble Earl's communication; but the contrary. The Memorandum was written on the 19th of May; and on the 2nd of June the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs wrote to Vienna to express his regrets that he was unable to do more than express his regret at not being able to act with the other Powers who had concurred in the Berlin Memorandum. Certainly that was not the the laying down of any principle. On the 12th of June the noble Earl told Count Schouvaloff that in his view nothing remained except to allow the renewal of hostilities until success should have declared itself on one side or the other. On the 22nd of June the noble Earl told Count Beust that there was nothing to be done. On the 31st of July the noble Earl told your Lordships that the soreness of the Powers made it a bad moment to propose anything, even if they had any proposal to make. And yet the noble Earl at the head of the Government, in his speech on the 9th of November, said—
We did propose some propositions on our own part. My noble Friend lost no time in laying down the principles upon which he thought the tranquillity of the East of Europe might be secured. That is to say, he laid down the principles upon which he thought that the relations between the Porte and its Christian subjects ought to be established. These communications were occurring constantly, I may say, between Her Majesty's Government and the five other Powers. If you wish me to sum up in two sentences the result of what was, of course, daily and hourly communication between the Powers or their Representatives in England, I must tell you this—that I think that in the late Spring of this year peace, and peace on principles which would have been approved by every wise and good man, might have been accomplished. What happened? That happened which was not expected—Servia declared war on Turkey.Unless I am perfectly wrong in these facts, it follows that the memory of the noble Earl at the head of the Government, when he made his speech at Aylesbury, was confused as to dates, and that he attributed to one period events that had really happened at another. And it should be a lesson to us all that persons 24 even of great authority do not always pay attention to dates, and that it is not beneath them to be accurate even in details. It cannot be denied that about this time some change came over the spirit of Her Majesty's Government in regard to their policy in the East. The noble Viscount (Viscount Grey de Wilton) denies that there has been any change, and I saw by the papers that a Member of Her Majesty's Government denied that there had been any change in their policy on the Eastern Question. Another important Member of Her Majesty's Government, who is now the Leader of the House of Commons (Sir Stafford Northcote) has stated it to be not so much that there had been a change in the policy of the Government as that there had been a change of circumstances, and that if they had made a change it was no more than a man did who put on a great coat in winter and took it off in summer. The metaphor, however, cannot be made to stand on four legs. The case is rather that of a man who omitted to wear his great coat in winter, and who, finding himself exceedingly chilled, put it on in the dog-days. Of course he would find that he had put it on too late, and that he was almost as much hampered with it as he had been before inconvenienced by the want of it. If the noble Viscount thinks that Her Majesty's Government have not been influenced by public opinion in their foreign policy he is much in error. There was last autumn a great explosion of public opinion which I ventured to say in a letter published at the time, would be found irresistible. What was it that excited it? I pass by the motives attributed to certain persons who engaged in the agitation that arose, and will only assert that the circumstances that called forth that excitement were quite sufficient to explain the hold which the subject exercised upon the public mind. I will ask whether such horrors as those which were perpetrated in Bulgaria ought not to excite some feeling among the people of this country? I do not wish to use my own words in describing these horrors—still less will I use the burning words of the noble Duke behind me (the Duke of Argyll) lest your Lordship should think me inclined to be sensational. I will take the description given at a somewhat late period by two of Her Majesty's Ministers 25 —one of them in his official capacity. I will read a few out of several sentences which I might quote from Lord Derby's despatch of the 21st of September—Crimes, which Mr. Baring justly describes as the most heinous that have stained the history of the present century. Little or nothing has been done in the way of reparation. The Porte has been led to promote and decorate officials whose acts have been at once a disgrace and an injury to the Turkish Empire. Acts of violence will continue, and the Porte is powerless or supine.And so on. I entirely agree in the description of the horrors there given. The only point on which I disagree with them is that both Ministers attribute these horrors to the weakness and inactivity of the Porte. I have little doubt that they were the consequence of orders from home, and I should be glad to know what is the opinion of the noble Marquess (the Marquess of Salisbury) on this point. These horrors were quite sufficient to excite the feelings of statesmen of all classes in this country. I need not refer to the statements that have been sometimes made that the occurrences to which I refer were accidental, for these statements have already been disposed of. But what did we find very soon after the events of which I speak were known at Constantinople? We find that the perpetrators of atrocities had been promoted and decorated; I must say that the declarations and the promotions and the decorations given to those who were regarded as responsible for these horrors, looked very much as if they had the sanction of the Turkish Government. It did not require the audacious statement of one of the Pashas to justify us in saying that the Turkish Government made itself the accomplice of more than half the acts committed in these provinces. Well, what did our Government do after that time? I have before me a Note which was addressed to the Porte, and it contains not the slightest statement of the grounds upon which this Government had a right to dictate to an independent nation; but it went on, in the words of the paragraph in the Speech from the Throne, "to denounce to the Porte the excesses ascertained to have been committed in Bulgaria, and to express My reprobation of their perpetrators." The whole Note was couched in more imperious terms than I think ever had been used before in any Note from one Government to another independent 26 country; and it ended with a positive demand for reparation and for the punishment of offenders who were mentioned by name. I should like to ask the noble Earl the Foreign Secretary—what has been the result of the Note, if there has been any? What amount of reparation has been granted? Who are the officials who have been severely punished? Have the Government or have they not any information as to what has been stated in the newspapers that cruelties of a horrible description are still being perpetrated by the Turks upon the Christians? My Lords, I do say that Her Majesty's Government had changed their policy when they began writing such Notes to a friendly and independent Government. I have no doubt that some proposals were afterwards made which very much resembled the proposals that were made by the Russian Ambassador before Servia declared war; and as to which I stated last year, I could not conceive why they were refused by Her Majesty's Government. All these different acts do show a very great change of policy on the part of Her Majesty's Government; and I desire in the most absolute manner to state that I think such a change requires no defence. It was most wise and most statesmanlike on the part of Her Majesty's Government to make such a change, and to concede something to what after all formed the great mass of public opinion in dealing with such a subject. It is curious how history repeats itself. In 1791 Mr. Pitt, out of dread of Russia, and in consequence of the want of success in reconciling Russia and the Porte, proposed to Parliament to increase the fleet, which in the language of the day, was called the Russian Armament. It appeared that he did so in opposition to the views of some of his Colleagues. In the Lords an Amendment was immediately moved by Lord Fitzwilliam, and supported by Lords Loughborough and Porchester (the Whig ancestor of the noble Earl opposite), by Lords Carlisle, Stormont, and Lansdowne. In the Commons, Mr. Coke, of Norfolk, moved an Amendment, and the proposal of the Government was opposed by all the great Whigs of that day—Fox, Grey, Wyndham, and Burke. Mr. Fox made a most eloquent speech — we should think it rather a violent speech in these days. He used the strongest language against the 27 Prime Minister. He said the Prime Minister had enveloped himself in mystery and importance and had explained nothing; that his speech was like the speech in the play—finely confused and very alarming. Mr. Fox denounced the Turk. He said that all that was holy in religion, and all that was moral and humane, demanded an abhorrence of everything which would strengthen the power of that cruel and wasteful Empire. Mr. Pitt, notwithstanding his large majorities in both Houses, yielded and withdrew his proposal, and grounded his explanation on the fact that in this country it was necessary to act in concurrence with the general opinion of the people. Lord Stanhope, in briefly narrating the story, states that this concession to popular feeling averted a Parliamentary danger. "But," he adds, "the whole transaction tended to dim his Parliamentary fame. Here was manifestly a miscalculation, and a failure in his foreign policy." I need hardly say, my Lords, that I do not look forward to any such fate as respects the policy of those who hold power at the present period. I ought to add one thing which happened in the autumn—namely, that the usual rumours prevailed that there were dissensions in the Cabinet. I am too old a bird to be caught by the chaff of outsiders on the subject of "dissensions in the Cabinet." I have known them so frequently wrong, and in this case their nonexistence is placed absolutely beyond doubt by the assertions of the President of the Council and Sir Stafford Northcote. I must say, however, that this time the outsiders have a little more to say for themselves than they usually have. In the first place, the noble Lord the Secretary for Foreign Affairs had some years ago not only formed, but published his opinion as to the utter decrepitude of the Turks and the wisdom and policy of conciliating the Christian subjects of the Porte. Another very eminent Member of the Cabinot had some years ago been rather harshly reproved by the noble Earl opposite, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, for his very indistinct notions with respect to the relations existing between the Turks and Christians. At the same time there have been the greatest differences in the expressions used in public by Members of the Cabinet; and we all remarked the differences in tone between the speeches 28 of the Foreign Secretary and those of the Prime Minister, which became still more remarkable after their change of policy. The noble Earl the Secretary for the Colonies was thanked by the pro-Christians in this country for the sympathy he had shown with the calamities of the Bulgarian population—he had not a single word to say on behalf of the Turks. The Home Secretary used very strong language in the same sense, and Sir Stafford North-cote not only denounced the atrocities, but gave us the best possible advice—which I was glad to hear repeated by the noble Lord the Mover of the Address—that it was wrong to be too distrustful of Russia, and that we ought to behave in a friendly way towards her. Now, what has been the line taken by the Prime Minister? When the Marquess of Hartington came back from Constantinople in October he had to speak in public almost immediately. No one sees things more clearly than the noble Marquess does; and in that public speech he said—My chief experience at Constantinople was this—that the difficulty of moving the Turks is their conviction that whether they did these things or not England would support them in the end.What did the noble Earl the Prime Minister say? Speaking at Guildhall, he ridiculed the political steps taken by Russia, and taunted her with her inability to carry on a lengthened campaign. He did more than that; he entirely omitted to mention that declaration made, on his solemn honour, by the Emperor of Russia to our Representative. I say that that declaration of the Emperor, whether the noble Earl attached any importance to it or not, was a matter of fact which ought not to have been concealed. The only explanation I can give of these differences of language is one suggested by a friend of mine, who has not been in a Cabinet. He said he had often understood that Cabinets agreed to differ in private and agree in public, but in this case Her Majesty's Government seemed to have agreed to agree in private and to differ in public. They may act on the principle of a French nobleman who, being asked once a year by his Monarch how many children he had, invariably answered, "Two," until on one occasion he said, "Six;" and on the Monarch expressing some surprise said—"I am afraid of 29 boring your Majesty by always saying the same thing." Perhaps some such reason as this may be the explanation of the differing opinions expressed by the Members of Her Majesty's Government on this subject. Passing from this to the Conference, I have next to remark that we labour under some difficulty in dealing with that subject, owing to the absence of the information which we hope to have soon. We do not know what were the Instructions given to the noble Marquess on going out, and what were the Instructions sent to him while at Constantinople; we are not aware, from official sources, what communications passed between the different Powers; and we are imperfectly informed of what passed at the Conference itself. All this will require to be known before I will venture to give any opinion with reference to the Conference, or to the manner in which the negotiations were carried out. I trust that on reading the Papers we shall not be tempted to repeat the language of a Leader of the Opposition in the House of Commons in July, 1864, in reference to another Conference. He said—One word with respect to the Conference. I never was of opinion that the Conference would arrive at any advantageous result. I could not persuade myself, after reading the Papers, that, whatever might be the cause, any one seriously wished for a settlement. The Conference lasted six weeks. It wasted six weeks—and, like a carnival, it lasted as long as a carnival—it was an affair of masks and mystification. Our Ministers went to it as men in distressed circumstances go to a place of amusement—to wile away the time with a consciousness of impending failure."—[3 Hansard, clxxvi. 743.]Some one of your Lordships will probably have some recollection of having used this language. I am quite sure, whatever effect the Papers may produce as to the seriousness and earnestness of other persons, we shall find that the noble Marquess was sincere and earnest in his work at that Conference, to which he went with the approbation of the whole country and of all classes of political opinion, even including those to whom exclusively Party motives have been attributed. There is one more point on which the people of this country are still more desirous to learn something. They wish to know what is to be the result of the Conference? My noble Friend, in moving the Address, stated that the Conference was not a failure, 30 inasmuch as it had introduced a much better understanding between the European Powers, and I am very glad to find that this opinion is confirmed by Her Majesty's Speech. I have no desire to question that opinion. I think in all probability it is true, and I rejoice in the thought that the good understanding between the European Powers has been promoted and the proper influence—I do not mean the overweening influence of this country—has been renewed after being disturbed by what occurred immediately after the Berlin Memorandum. The paragraph in Her Majesty's Speech in relation to this point states that—The proposals recommended by myself and my Allies have not, I regret to say, been accepted by the Porte; but the result of the Conference has been to show the existence of a general agreement among the European Powers, which cannot fail to have a material effect upon the condition and Government of Turkey.Now, my Lords, that can be interpreted in two different ways. It is as much as to say—and I thought the noble Viscount indicated that to be his view — that we mean to make use of our influence with the other Courts of Europe, while maintaining our protest against the conduct of Turkey, to watch whether she carries into effect her promises towards her Christian subjects; and that, although we have taken the very strong step of recalling not only our extraordinary Ambassador, but also our ordinary Ambassador, we are not to proceed any further—that we are to look upon the Constitution which has been promulgated as a real and practical measure for the amelioration of Turkey, and not one which was properly treated by the Conference as something very like a sham, invented for a special purpose. If that is the line we are to take ourselves and try to induce the rest of Europe to adopt it, what will be the result? One of two things will happen—Either Russia, from policy or caution, moderation or weakness, may abstain and do nothing — in that case does anyone seriously believe that, Europe remaining with leer arms folded, the Christian population will be a jot better—on the contrary, will they not be in a much worse condition than that which they now hold? On the other hand, strengthened by the position which we have undoubtedly given to Russia by our past conduct, that nation might be induced to act on the declaration made by the Emperor 31 at Moscow. I for one would deeply deplore it—such a thing would be pregnant with inconvenience and danger. The remedy suggested that we alone should join with Russia in the work, though perhaps it might a little mitigate, would certainly go a very short way to diminish those dangers and inconveniences. But if we take another course, it would be this—I would take the principles laid down by not unimportant Members of the present Cabinet—the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Home Secretary. The latter said—The time has now come when this country should refuse to be put off with paper currency.—They should demand to be paid in solid coin.And Sir Stafford Northcote said—I believe it to be impossible really to secure the peace of Europe unless we took steps to improve the administration of the provinces of Turkey. As long as you leave that door open—as long as you do nothing to remove the causes of these disturbances—any peace you may secure for the moment will be a hollow peace—no better than putting a piece of sticking-plaster upon a wound when there was festering matter beneath.I believe these are wise words. I am glad, my Lords, to think that the influence of the Government has been promoted by the Conference; and I believe that if that influence was exercised in persuading Europe as one body to come forward and insist — as they have the moral and the just right to do — that Turkey shall perform her promises, you would successfully deal with the danger which remains. It may be said you will not be able to persuade the other Powers of Europe. I am not quite sure that an impression does not prevail that England is not the only obstacle in the way of obtaining such an understanding. But even if it were not the case, would you be any worse after making the attempt than you are now? Another objection is that this means coercion. Logically it may mean coercion; but will anybody tell me that if once the Turks got into their heads the belief that not only England, but the whole of Europe, was absolutely in earnest in this matter, they would resist the united voice of Europe? I believe it would then be unnecessary to have recourse to coercion. I trust the last construction put will be the one we shall hear from the authorized Representatives of the Government. If they follow that course they will meet with great success—and I am sure it will be 32 a success which will be welcomed by the great majority of this House, and by all classes of politicians, with unfeigned pleasure and approbation.
§ THE EARL OF DERBYMy Lords, I am bound to say that in the generally fair, moderate, and temperate speech of the noble Earl opposite there are some points in which I am compelled to differ from him; but there are also some in regard to which I entirely agree. I agree with the noble Earl in the well-deserved compliment he paid to the noble Lord who moved the Address. I also agree with him in the expression he gave to your Lordships' feelings with regard to the accession to this House of my noble Friend at the head of the Government. But, my Lords, there is one subject, and one subject alone, which so occupies and monopolizes public attention, that I feel I should be wasting your Lordships' time if I were to dwell on any of those minor and comparatively unimportant questions which are mentioned in the Speech from the Throne. It is the question of Eastern politics, and that question alone, that occupies the general attention, and it is one of such magnitude that I feel some difficulty in attempting to deal with it. And even after the speech of the noble Earl, to which I listened with the utmost attention, I find it difficult to ascertain what are the precise points in those long and complicated negotiations, which have lasted 18 months, to which he takes exception. Probably, when the Papers are in your Lordships' hands we shall be enlightened on that subject. I am able to say that these Papers will be presented this evening, and will be circulated, I hope, to-morrow; and though they are of a voluminous character, the noble Earl will agree with me that that is a necessary evil, and much better than that there should be the omission from them of any material circumstance. The charge against us on which the noble Earl chiefly dwelt, and of which we have heard a great deal out-of-doors, is that we have changed our policy. The noble Earl was just enough not to impute motives—
§ EARL GRANVILLEI said I approved the change.
§ THE EARL OF DERBYIf the noble Earl says he approves our changed policy, that means that he condemns our former policy. My contention is that there is no room for such condemnation. 33 When a change of policy is spoken of, it may mean one of two things—it may mean that, the circumstances being the same, we have at different periods dealt with them in a different spirit—and to a change of that kind the reproach of inconsistency justly applies: or it may mean that, the circumstances becoming altogether different, we have modified our course of action in order to meet the altered condition of the case—and that, as I conceive, is no reproach at all. It is simply what every Government in every country always has done and always must do when dealing with international questions. If, therefore, the noble Earl means that, the circumstances being the same, we have pursued different policies, I say the imputation is unfounded; but if he only means that, the circumstances being different, we have in some degree altered our course of action to meet those altered conditions, that seems to me reasonable. Now, what was our course of action? Some 18 months ago, as the noble Earl has reminded us, we were extremely unwilling to take diplomatic action—that appears sufficiently from Papers already published. For my own part, I neither deny the fact, nor think it requires any apology. My Lords, at the risk of seeming to assert a paradox, I will repeat a statement I made as long ago as September, 1875,—namely, that the insurrection in Herzegovina was in the beginning a very unimportant affair, and that, with the most ordinary display of energy and skill on the part of the Porte, it might have been suppressed in a few weeks, and probably without any appreciable loss of life. The insurrection was encouraged by the sympathy which was extended to the insurgents from outside, by the almost incredible apathy of the Turkish authorities, and by the bankruptcy of the Turkish Empire. But in itself it was a small affair, and it appeared to us that there was a disposition in some quarters to give the matter a degree of diplomatic importance which it did not deserve. Then came the Andrassy Note. It did not originate with England; it was assented to by us, but not very readily; but we assented, for this reason among others, that the Porte itself preferred that we should take part in the intervention, since intervention was to take place. That Note was accented by the Turkish Govern- 34 ment. But, as your Lordships know, the insurgents had their own ideas of what they wanted, and they were not inclined to be pacified by the reforms promised. They went on fighting, and I do not recollect that at the time there was any great desire to press on them the acceptance of the conditions offered, though they had been pressed with so much eagerness on the Porte. Negotiations took place, with the result already known. Then came the Berlin Memorandum. We refused to join in that Memorandum; and I venture to say that our resolution not to join in it was thought right by all parties in England with insignificant exceptions. I explained last year our reasons for the course pursued. Setting aside questions of detail, we had two reasons for that conclusion, and time has thus far rather strengthened than weakened them. One was that the engagements imposed on the two parties respectively were one-sided and unequal. The Porte was to be bound, the insurgents were not. The other reason was—I did not mention it at the time, but I may without scruple mention it now—that, if we accepted the Memorandum, we should, as I conceive, have bound ourselves to concur in those "efficacious measures" by which diplomatic action was to be supported; and I think the experience we have since had excludes any reasonable doubt that what was meant was that we should join in a military occupation. To that policy we did not assent; it is a course we have always repudiated and rejected. We did not wish to stand aloof—we were quite ready to advise, to warn, if necessary to mediate; but from the first we have carefully guarded against the risk of being drawn to join in any armed coercion to be applied to the Porte, which probably might have involved us in a war inconsistent with our interests, and, as we believe, with justice. Later, when we went into the Conference we told all Europe at the outset—as I think it was our bounden duty to do—that we would not take upon ourselves to enforce its conclusions by force of arms, although we stated at the same time that, if the Porte refused to follow the advice which might be given, we should not hold ourselves bound to protect the Sultan against the consequences of his own acts. These are the views we held in the middle of last 35 year. I know there is an idea in the public mind that at the time of the refusal of the Berlin Memorandum we were ready to go to war in behalf of Turkey, but that, an agitation springing up in consequence of the outrages committed in Bulgaria, we suddenly changed our course in deference to the feeling so shown. To that I will give a very simple and conclusive answer. In May last, just after the Berlin Memorandum had been rejected, and when the Fleet had been ordered into Besika Bay, I warned the Turkish Ambassador that times had changed since the Crimean War; that the state of things was no longer the same as it had been, and that the Porte would not act wisely in relying on more than the moral support of England in case of war. I think that is a sufficient answer to any charge that on the decisive question of peace or war we altered our policy in consequence of a change in public feeling. The noble Earl (Earl Granville) repeated to-night a remark which he made last year—that when we rejected the Berlin Memorandum we ought to have proposed some substitute for it. One answer to that remark I gave at the time. I told your Lordships that it seemed to me that the moment when we had refused a proposal strongly pressed upon us by all the Powers was not one when we could reasonably expect the Powers to listen favourably to our suggestions. But another reason, which I do not hesitate to give now, was that if, as we believed, the Berlin Memorandum was intended to lead to a policy of joint military occupation—that being a policy in which we could not agree—no plan was likely to be accepted by the Powers which did not lead to that result. My noble Friend (the Earl of Beaconsfield) made a speech at Aylesbury to which reference naturally has been made by the noble Earl this evening. My noble Friend was quite right in saying that negotiations—or I should rather prefer to call them discussions—with the Powers did not cease after the rejection of the Berlin Memorandum. It is quite true also, as I stated, that we had no proposal to make at that time; and I am not surprised that it should have been thought that there was some discrepancy between those statements. But the discrepancy is in appearance only. The fact is that I had no proposal to make because, after an 36 almost daily communication with the Representatives of the various Powers, I had become satisfied that there was no immediate opening for any proposal of united action. Some scheme of the character of administrative autonomy was frequently discussed; but objections were taken to any such proposal, because on the part of one of the Powers, at least, it was believed that this administrative or local autonomy would shortly turn into complete autonomy. These differences were lessened, but not wholly removed, when the war with Servia began, and the negotiations were interrupted. Well, what did we do? When the Servian war broke out it did not require any great foresight to see that the insurgents would not long be enabled to resist the arms of Turkey, and that an attempt would be made to obtain the mediation of the Powers. We anticipated that application. Under the pressure of no agitation—for agitation at that time did not exist—we simply, as a thing in the interest of European peace, advised Her Majesty, in the Speech which closed the Session, to offer our good offices in the event of an appeal from Servia. That happened which we anticipated. The request was made, and we complied with it. Then came a suspension of hostilities, followed by that long series of negotiations for the re-establishment of peace of which we have not yet seen the end. These negotiations I need not now recapitulate, partly because they are fully related in the Papers which will be laid before your Lordships, and partly because, up to the time immediately preceding the Conference, a statement of what had been done is already before the public. Parliament not being assembled and the interest on the subject being very great, I thought it desirable that there should be some authentic and public record of what occurred, and I accordingly directed a despatch addressed to Lord Augustus Loftus, and containing such a record to be published in the newspapers. Then came the Conference itself; and as to that, your Lordships and the public will have the fullest opportunity of knowing what occurred. I am glad to see that full justice has been done not only to the course taken by the Government in sending my noble Friend (the Marquess of Salisbury) upon his mission to Constantinople, but also to the exceeding ability 37 with which he has discharged his arduous labours. But notwithstanding the ability thus shown by my noble Friend, I have heard it said—it was said only the other day by a very eminent, but certainly not a very dispassionate critic of those affairs—that the Conference had been a woeful and signal failure. Well, before coming to the conclusion that the Conference has been a failure, you must first consider what were the objects we had in view in assisting at a Conference. Of course, if you look upon it in the light that all Europe united to press upon the Porte the one particular scheme of reform on which the Conference insisted, and that that scheme of reform was rejected; if you regard that scheme as an end in itself, there has been a failure to accomplish it. But I say, and I am quite sure that my noble Friend (the Marquess of Salisbury) would also say that the immediate plan brought before the Conference was not in itself an end, it was only a means to an end. The object we had in view was two-fold—first and mainly, the preservation of European peace; and, next, such an amelioration of the internal administration of the Christian Provinces of Turkey as would secure Europe from a return of the disturbance and anxiety experienced during the last two years. Now, having in mind these objects, it does seem a little premature to say that the Conference has failed in bringing about either of these two results. Of the prospects of European peace I am bound to speak with reserve. Practically, the decision rests with a single Power—almost with a single man; and a graver responsibility than that which at present rests on the head of the Russian Empire never perhaps devolved upon any human being. But I will say this—that if peace is desired—and I sincerely hope and believe that it is—the Conference has done much in various ways to prepare and to smooth the way for peace. In the first place, it has gained time. That may be thought a small matter; but in diplomacy it is often anything but a small matter. The state of opinion which exists in Russia is now, so far as we can ascertain, very far removed from that which existed a few months ago. Then report told us of general excitement, of general ardour and enthusiasm for a new cru- 38 sade. Now the re-action has come, and I am assured that among influential persons in Russia there is a growing disposition to consider calmly and coolly the chances and risks of war, and not rush into them hastily. My Lords, taking all these circumstances into consideration, if nothing else had been gained by the Conference than the interposition of two or three months before the course of the Russian Government had to be decided, I should say that, even from that point of view, the labours of my noble Friend and of his Colleagues would not be thrown away. But that is not the most important part of the work which the Conference has done. It has enabled us to know more clearly than we knew before what it is that Russia asks—or, rather, perhaps I ought to say, what Russia will be prepared to accept. We know, on the other hand, what the Porte is willing to concede. I do not lay much stress, any more than the noble Earl opposite, upon the new Constitution of the Porte; but, before pronouncing an opinion upon it, I should wish to see whether it is fairly and honestly put into practice, and if it is so put in practice, how it works. Before the Conference was held we knew there were certain things which the Porte was willing to entertain, and that there were certain other things which the Porte would resist. Thanks mainly to the energy and decision of my noble Friend, the original Russian programme, which there was no hope of the Porte accepting, has been cut down in material points. The question is now between that which can be peaceably obtained from the Porto and that which has been ineffectually asked from the Porte; and Europe will have to consider whether the difference between the two is so wide as to give any reasonable cause for war. But there is another point in connection with the Conference to which I must call attention. The Conference has put an end to a state of things which had become full of danger. The Servian war, as we all know, had become in fact, though not in form, a Russian war. Russian Volunteers constituted the whole fighting strength of the Servian army. A Servian defeat was therefore a Russian defeat, and was felt as such in Russia. A very little more of the exasperation which that campaign produced in Russia and it would have been difficult, if not 39 practically impossible, for the Emperor to keep a Russian Army out of the field. Well, that state of things has passed away the Russian Volunteers have gone home—not in the most affectionate disposition towards their Servian allies. The Servians are not in the least disposed to call them back; and the question is not now ostensibly one in which Russia is on one side and Turkey on the other. Russia is only one of six Powers which have taken a common part in the discussions of the Conference. The Emperor may therefore perfectly well say to his subjects that he sees no reason why he, single handed, should take on himself to resent a slight which was equally sustained by all Europe, or to enforce views which were equally those of every other European Power. What the result may be no man can foretell; but I am sure of this, that the Conference has left us in a far better position as regards the prospects of peace than that in which it found us. Then as to the other object for which the Conference met—the improvement of the internal administration of the disturbed Provinces of Turkey. The objection taken by the Porte to the proposals of the Powers was almost entirely an objection, not to the reforms proposed, but to the guarantees demanded for their execution. The Porte refused these guarantees as being dangerous to its independence. I think, for my own part, that in that respect the Porte was wrong, and that it would have been better for the Porte to do as we have often known individuals in embarrassed pecuniary circumstances do—that it would have been very much wiser that he should put his affairs into the hands of trustees and submit to conditions which might for the moment have been disagreeable, but which would have been a security against war, and which, having answered their purpose, might no doubt have been relaxed after a time, when further evidence had been given of the sincerity with which they had been accepted. But the Porte has taken on itself the responsibility of working out its own reforms in its own way. I will not venture to predict the issue; but I believe that at Constantinople the gravity of the situation is understood; that there is a sincere desire to avoid anything that can give ground of a quarrel to any European Power; and that the Ministers 40 of the Sultan see, as we do, that the best security against any such quarrel lies in adopting on their own initiative the substance at least—though it may be in a different form—of the proposals of the Conference. There is nothing to prevent their doing that if they please; and if they do, the credit of their action will be fairly due to the Conference, since without that the action would probably not have been taken. We, as I conceive, have a plain course before us. We have said from the first that though we would press on the Porte the recommendations of the Conference, we could not use, or sanction the use of, force, though at the same time we could not undertake to protect the Turkish Empire from force used by other Powers. That, as I have already said, was our language as long ago as May last. We have never varied from it, and I think it places us in a plain and intelligible position. I am not anxious to dwell upon an argument of which we shall probably hear a good deal in the next few weeks—as to whether the internal defects of Turkish administration can operate as a release to us from the Treaties of 1856. I do not think the argument a sound one, for two reasons—first, because when we made those Treaties, whatever their force may be, we did so, not on account of any disinterested affection for Turkey, but on account of the European interests involved; and next because the Treaty of Paris, dating from 1856, was formally renewed in 1871, and it can hardly be said by noble Lords opposite that to renew that Treaty in 1871 was a mistake, since they themselves did it, or that the character of Turkish administration has changed so much in the last six years that what was a duty then is an offence now. I think, therefore, that the whole question, looked at in that light, is rather pedantic than practical. Obviously a Treaty can only be held to apply to circumstances analogous to those in which it was made; and if a Power which you are bound by Treaty to protect declines your advice and acts in a different sense, you cannot be pledged to support that Power for an indefinite time against the possible consequences of its own action. This is not the time to go into an argument as to the wording of our Treaty engagements, and it is therefore only in passing that I remind 41 your Lordships of the precise nature of the two Treaties into which we entered in 1856. The first is the Treaty of Peace, bearing date March 30, 1856, by which we undertake to "respect the independence and the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire; guarantee in common the strict observance of that engagement; and will in consequence consider any act tending to its violation as a question of general interest." Now mark, my Lords, the words of that Treaty, for they are important. We undertake to respect the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire. That is easy enough for us, who certainly have no designs against Turkey. We guarantee in common the strict observance of that engagement—that is, we each undertake to observe it, and to do what we can to make others observe it; but there is no shadow of a promise in that Treaty to make non-observance by other Powers a castle belli. The words stop short of that; they carefully avoid any such pledge—in fact, they point directly to a different course of action—namely, to collective discussion and negotiation. As far as that Treaty is concerned, therefore, we are in no sense bound by a promise to fight for Turkey. And that we are not so bound is the more clear from the fact of this Treaty having been supplemented by another, which would have been superfluous if the first Treaty had imposed the obligation in question. The second Treaty is that entered into between England, France, and Austria, which is undoubtedly of a more binding character, since it pledges each of the Powers to regard any infraction of the former Treaty as a casus belli, and, on the invitation of the others, to concert measures with the Porte. But that is not an engagement entered into with the Porte. It is not an engagement to which the Porte is a party. It does not, therefore, bind us in any way except to France and to Austria; and, unless France and Austria call upon us to interfere—a step which, in existing circumstances, they are not in the least likely to take—it binds us to nothing at all. I think it well to give that brief explanation, because I have seen a good deal of confusion and misunderstanding on the subject. While I say what I have said about Treaty obligations I wish to guard myself in one respect. I am only contending for the freedom of England to 42 act or not to act as she may think fit. I am not contending that under all possible circumstances—such, for instance, as that of Constantinople being threatened—inaction would be our duty. That is a question on which it would be quite unnecessary and wholly unwise to pledge ourselves now. But I wish to point out that in the language which we held in May last, and which we have held throughout, we were not departing from the engagements into which the country has entered, but simply declining to give them a construction more stringent than they will fairly bear. The noble Earl opposite (Earl Granville) adverted—and I do not quarrel with him for doing so—to the speech delivered at Guildhall by my noble Friend the First Lord of the Treasury. He asked why my noble Friend delivered that speech when he had the pacific assurances of the Emperor of Russia in his hand. It is, of course, a very difficult thing to describe the general tenour of a speech, because this cannot be done unless you read it through and comment upon it line by line. I must say, however, that I do not regard my hon. Friend's speech as being in any sense a challenge or a menace. It was not so regarded at the time of its delivery, and I do not think that character would ever have been ascribed to it but for the accident of the Moscow declaration of the Emperor following a few days later. Everybody took that declaration as a reply to the Guildhall speech, and people said, not unnaturally, that it was a matter of regret that the provocation to utter it had been given. But we have the best means of knowing that the speech was not a reply, and that the Emperor of Russia had no knowledge when he delivered it of what had been said at Guildhall. The coincidence in time was merely accidental. Again, with regard to the pacific assurances of the Emperor of Russia—although I do not doubt his personal sincerity, it must be remembered that even an Emperor of Russia is not all-powerful. Events may be too strong for him. His hand may be forced, and he may be compelled by public opinion, or feeling, in his own country to do that which he may not personally wish to do. Therefore, while accepting his pacific declarations as sincere, I decline to accept them as a sufficient guarantee against war. I now, 43 my Lords, pass to another subject. The noble Earl opposite (Earl Granville) Preferred to the despatch which I wrote after the occurrence of the Bulgarian massacres, and I think he asked me how I could reconcile the language held in that despatch with any theory of the independence of Turkey? If I mistake not, I could recall instances in which language quite as peremptory has been used towards Powers which were confessedly independent; but if the noble Earl wishes to know by what right I used the language which I did, I would tell him that we used no menace, and threatened no coercion; but that the position in which we were placed in regard to the Porte was one which was altogether peculiar. We were engaged in the work of mediation on behalf of Turkey as well as the other belligerents; we were trying to put an end to the war between them; and in the capacity of mediators we had, I contend, the same right to hold the language which I held that a counsel has to tell his client—"If you do so and so I shall throw up my brief." There is no threat from beginning to end of all that I have written on the subject, except the threat of withdrawing our moral support. We used no menace. We simply said that if certain things were not done the Porte would forfeit our moral support as well as that of Europe. And, surely, it is no violation of the independence either of a nation or of an individual to say—"If you persist in putting yourself in the wrong, I shall wash my hands of your affairs." On the general question as to what precise extent we were justified in exercising intervention in favour of the Christian subjects of Turkey, I do not think that I ever, to the best of my recollection, either in this House, or elsewhere, used language to the effect that such intervention was forbidden by treaty. What I believe I have said was a very different thing — namely, that I did not conceive we had a Treaty right to do so under the Treaty of 1856. But as for the general moral obligations imposed upon us by our relations with the Turkish Empire, I never, to the best of my knowledge, used any language denying or disputing the reality of those obligations. What I have affirmed, and what I now repeat, is this—that interference in the internal affairs of a foreign 44 country is one of those remedies which ought to be used only very rarely, and never without real necessity. You cannot have a worse Government for any country than one composed of a committee of foreign Representatives which should undertake to regulate its action. They, in the first place, would not be likely long to pull together; in the next place, their acquaintance with the affairs of the country would be naturally very limited; and, above all, they would be altogether irresponsible. These are, I believe, all the remarks with which I need trouble your Lordships at present. The noble Earl opposite asked whether there was any further information with regard to the Bulgarian massacres to be produced. The Papers which have been laid on the Table will, I think, give the latest reports in connection with that subject. For the rest, I am quite aware that the discussion of this evening is only the beginning of many discussions which will probably be held on this question. We have done our utmost for the maintenance of peace. We believe we have done all that at the time was possible. If we have succeeded in preserving the peace of Europe, we shall be amply rewarded for the many anxieties of the past year. If we fail—and, of course, it is possible we may fail—we shall not be discouraged, and we shall continue to use such exertions as may be in our power to abridge and to lessen a calamity which we may not have been successful in wholly averting. In any case, we put what we have said and done fully before the public, and we shall appeal with confidence to the country and to Parliament.
THE DUKE OF ARGYLLAs I took some part in the agitation to which the noble Lord opposite referred at the commencement of the evening, I trust your Lordships will allow me to say a few words in reply. The reference was made in a speech of very great ability; but, sharing as I do fully in the feelings which have been expressed by my noble Friend behind me with regard to the accession to this House of the noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Beaconsfield), I certainly shall not comment in a tone of anything like asperity on what has recently fallen from him—for as a general rule the language he holds towards his opponents is not only full of 45 humour, but full of good humour. I, however, regret the more on that account that he should, during the past autumn, have spoken in terms of such extreme harshness of those who took part in the agitation to which he alluded. I will attribute it to momentary irritation. I do not, at the same time, consider this a fitting opportunity for that full and ample discussion by which only that agitation could be completely explained and defended. I shall, therefore, wait until the Papers are laid on the Table of your Lordships' House, and shall then take the opportunity of stating fully to the House the grounds on which I deemed myself to be justified in taking part in that agitation. I am sure no Member of this House—no Peer, no Englishman—would wish to call in question the right of public speaking—it is one of the dearest rights as well of Englishmen as of Scotchmen and Irishmen. But this I will confess frankly—that, in my opinion, public meetings in general ought not to interfere with the foreign policy of the country, which is for the most part concerned with matters of extreme delicacy and much difficulty, embracing nuances and shades which it is almost impossible to make plain to a public assembly. I therefore admit that there ought not to be such interference as that of which I am speaking, except in extreme cases; and unless I make out such a case when the subject comes before your Lordships, I will submit to any censure which your Lordships may pronounce. I wish, in the next place, to refer very briefly to the speech which we have just heard from the noble Earl the Secretary for Foreign Affairs. I am free to say that that speech has disabused us on this side of the House of an impression which was created by the language, not officially reported, but which is supposed to have been held by the noble Marquess who was the special Envoy of this country at Constantinople; and, having mentioned him, I hope I may be allowed to add my humble tribute of respect and admiration for the acceptance by him of the mission which took him to Turkey. I believe no purer act of patriotism or of public duty has ever been performed. He undertook a task from which he had nothing to gain, while he submitted, in going to Constantinople, his reputation 46 to some risk. That reputation, however has certainly not been sullied, and I know no case, although Party spirit is a thing of which I have had considerable experience during my public life, in which all Parties so eagerly united to hail an appointment as in that of the noble Marquess, and to lend him their support. No man, I may add, hailed more gladly than I did his appointment, or felt more confident that he would uphold the honour and interests of England. -My Lords, I now return to the speech of the noble Earl the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, who denies that there has been any change in the policy of the Government with respect to this Eastern Question. I wish to point out to the House what I look upon as an entire change of policy. Up to the date of the 12th of August and from the close of last Session of Parliament the public in this country had no right to suppose, and no reason that Government were shaken in the policy which they had pursued up to that time—the policy of absolute non-intervention in the internal affairs of Turkey—not only non-intervention as regards ourselves, but remonstrance with, and resistance to, all the other Powers of Europe for mixing themselves up in those affairs. The noble Earl, after the famous Berlin Note, in writing to Sir Henry Elliot, distinctly says that it was the policy of the Government to avoid and prevent all interference of the States of Europe in the internal affairs of Turkey. There can be no doubt about that, he repeats it over and over again; and up to the time of the public meetings held in the autumn this was believed to be the fixed policy of the Government. On the 11th of September, however, as reported in The Times of the 12th, a deputation of Conservative working men waited on the noble Earl and addressed to him a remonstrance with regard to the affairs of Turkey. I will read to the House the words which the noble Earl used in reply, as reported in The Times. He said—
So far as those unfortunate Bulgarians who have suffered so much are concerned, they have a right, no doubt, to such reparation as it is now possible to make, and they have a right also, no doubt to the signal, conspicuous, and exemplary punishment of those who have been the offenders. I think they have also a right that in some manner or another we shall take 47 such steps as may secure them from a recurrence of similar abuses for the future.My Lords, I say that that was an absolute change of policy—as sudden and complete as if there had been a change of Government. The noble Earl followed up what he said on that occasion by a speech addressed to another deputation, headed by the Lord Mayor of London. That was succeeded by the well-known despatch of the 21st September, in which the noble Earl made the gravest demands on the Turkish Government for the punishment of the offenders and the better security and good government of the Christian subjects of the Porte. These were obligations which the Government considered they had come under in consequence of the Bulgarian atrocities. My noble Friend (Earl Granville) was therefore justified in saying that there was a sudden and complete change of policy, but a change involving no disgrace or discredit whatever upon the Government; and if that language had been held throughout, no censure could be passed upon the Government on that account. With regard to the speech of the noble Earl, the Secretary of State to-night, I regret that I interpret it in another way—as a step backwards, and a very distinct step backwards from these public engagements. In the first place I deplored to hear from the noble Earl a reiterated and distinct statement of his regret that the Turkish Government had not succeeded in repressing the insurrection in Herzegovina and Bosnia. I admit that it is legitimate to regret that a friendly Government has not been able to suppress an insurrection, but on one ground—that you can lay your hand on your heart and say that it is a Government which you ought to support, and which treats its subjects with such tolerable fairness that you can wish it to secure its power over them. Is this the case? Can you lay your hand on your heart and say that this is a Government you ought to sympathize with, and not with the insurrection? I say distinctly in this "high place"—in this "house top" of Europe, that every insurrection against that Government is a legitimate insurrection. Human beings under that Government owe it no allegiance. I heard that declaration of the noble Earl with infinite regret, and it is not one 48 that will satisfy the feelings and consciences of the people of this country. I heard also with infinite regret the declaration of the noble Earl that he was determined in no case to use force to compel the Turks to do justice to their Christian subjects. I do not know whether the noble Earl has already made that announcement to Europe, but if so you might as well not have sent an Envoy to Constantinople. The noble Lord who moved the Address denounced what you have called the "bag and baggage" policy; but I think that is the very policy pursued towards the noble Marquess himself. The noble Lord objected to this idea, because, he said, if the Turks were sent out of Europe they would go somewhere else where they would do equal mischief. I am glad that if the noble Marquess was sent from Constantinople he has come back to us, and I hope his influence in the Government will be in favour of the oppressed subjects of the Porte—as it is reported and believed to have been at the Conference. The noble Earl the Secretary of State has told us that the object of the Conference was two-fold—to secure peace to Europe and good government to the subjects of Turkey. Have you secured good government, or even a tolerable prospect of it? That is what the people of England desire to know. You proposed certain terms for the good government of Turkey, and these terms have been refused. Have you got any others? Have you secured peace? The noble Earl declared that peace depends upon one man, and yet two sentences afterwards he declared he did not think that peace depended on the Emperor of Russia. Which is true? The declaration shows the fundamental error in the policy of the noble Earl. He does not appreciate—he has never appreciated—the forces at work in this question. Do you think this great Eastern Question, which has been brooding over Europe, and which has darkly overshadowed it for 40 or 50 years—do you think that this question which has been forced upon you, reluctant as you have been to see its gravity—do you mean to toll the House of Lords that this question depends upon the action of one man, and that man the Emperor of Russia? And then you profess the next moment to believe that the Emperor of Russia is perfectly sin- 49 cere. I say you will have no peace ill Europe, and you ought to have no peace in Europe, until the well-being of the Christian subjects of the Porte has been secured by the united action of the European Powers. And if you have sent one of your most distinguished Members to Constantinople, declaring beforehand your guns to be loaded with blank cartridge, I say you might just as well have sat still, twiddling your thumbs, as you did for three months before. The noble Earl says that the Conference has not failed, and that we have obtained by it securities for the better treatment of the Christian subjects of the Porte. But the securities have been cut down and brought to such a minimum that no human being will think them worth fighting for. That may be one way of securing peace; but will the Christian population of Turkey be restrained from fighting for something better than you have given them—does he think that the demands that will be made will never exceed this irreducible mnimium? Has the noble Earl never heard of the Sibylline leaves? Do you think that the great forces of religion and the sympathies of people with people, which are at the root of this great Eastern Question, will be satisfied with this irreducible minimum to which the claims of the Christians have been cut down, and to which the noble Marquess seems to have consented? If the noble Earl does not believe that, the Conference has failed, both in securing peace and good government for Turkey. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs says that our plain course is to do nothing—to let things drift. The noble Lord who moved the Address said it was very wrong to speak to the man at the helm. There is no man at the helm. You tell us yourselves that you will do nothing—and that you will let the vessel drift on. But you know that there are other powers in Europe besides the noble Earl the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, and much as he may despise sentimentality in politics — forgetting that sentiment rules the world—forgetting that all moral feeling is founded on sentiment—much as he may despise sentimentality in politics, I am greatly mistaken if sentimentality will not be too strong for him if some one does not seize the helm which the noble Earl says the Government has abandoned. I 50 believe that Europe will drift into a bloody and dreadful war. I am not one of those who deprecate war under all circumstances, or who think that peace under all circumstances is the object that ought to be secured by a Christian people. There are causes that are worth fighting for. There are people who desire "peace at any price," but it is price to be paid by others and not be themselves. "Anything for a quiet life;" but the quietness of life is to be for themselves and not for others. That a feeling of utter selfishness, and, my Lords, my belief is that this policy wilt end in war. Let Her Majesty's Government take the European concert in time, so that the European Powers may act together. You have been ever reluctant to take part in this united action; you refused to join with Austria in the Andrassy Note; you were the drag upon Europe; you kept it from acting together for six or eight months. It may be too late now; but, if you have the chance of preserving peace, or of limiting war to one locality or for any definite purpose, for Heaven's sake re-establish your European concord, and do not be so foolish and so weak as to say, "We shall never fight; we shall never force our will on the Turks." This course is one of utter fatuity; and my sincere belief is that sooner or later such a policy will end in a disastrous war.
§ THE EARL OF BEACONSFIELDMy Lords, the noble Duke who has just addressed us told us that he would reserve his opinion on what he styles this great Eastern Question which darkens Europe until he had read the Papers. What may be his effusion after that function has been fulfilled, with my little experience of this House I pretend not to predict; but I doubt whether he will be able, on that occasion, to show more fiery heat than he has upon the present. The noble Duke has charged us with laying it down as a principle that in no circumstances could we advise coercion to be used towards Turkey. I listened in vain to my noble Friend (the Earl of Derby) if he gave expression to so unqualified a dogma. What I understood my noble Friend to say—and I apprehend there are few acquainted with the circumstances of the case who would not agree with him—was this—that coercion was not the policy of this country in reference to the 51 Christian population of Turkey; and my own opinion is that if we had had recourse to coercion, or if coercion had even been threatened, these massacres which we so much deplore would have been extended and aggravated. I should like to collect from the noble Duke on the subject of this great Eastern Question, the shadow of which is brooding over Europe, what he believes to be the elements of that Question. The noble Duke has treated it entirely as if it referred to the condition of the Christian subjects of the Porte. I believe there is a general anxiety among all parties in this country, and, indeed, on the part of most European Governments, to secure the amelioration of the Christian subjects of the Porte. The noble Duke says that that is a matter which we entirely discard; but surely this is not a just description of the policy of the Government. We commenced by giving our adhesion to the Andrassy Note, which certainly involved a great interference with the condition of the Christian subjects of the Porte. In my opinion, if it had been introduced more favourably to the notice and consideration of Europe, and if it had been worked out in detail, it contained practical propositions, which, in quiet times, were susceptible of effecting, for that population most of the results that were desired. Am I to understand from the noble Duke that in his mind the only element of this great Eastern Question is the condition of the Christian subjects of the Porte? I am sure that he, a statesman who has had to do with public affairs, could hardly attempt to enforce a proposition so fundamentally weak. Surely, when the noble Duke calls upon us to join with the other Powers of Europe to form a compact body in order that we may effect the object he desires, he cannot have forgotten that the assembled Powers of Europe, when they have to consider this great Eastern Question, have to consider something else besides the mere amelioration of the condition of the Christian subjects of the Porte. Surely some of the elements of the distribution of power in the world are involved in it. It is a question in which is involved the existence of Empires; and really it does appear to me we shall never come to its solution—which probably may happen in the lives of some whom I am now ad- 52 dressing, though not in my own—if we are to discard from it every political consideration, and to believe that the only element with which we have to deal is the amelioration of the condition of the Christian subjects of the Porte. To my mind it is quite clear that if the Powers of Europe work in that direction only, and work, as they probably would if they worked in that direction only without the energy necessary, their interference would only aggravate the condition of the Christian subjects of the Porte and bring about those very calamities of which we have had such recent and such bitter experience. If this matter is really to be treated it must be treated by statesmen; we must accurately know who are to be responsible hereafter for the condition of this population; we must know what changes in the distribution of territory in the most important part of the globe are to be made as the consequence of this attempted solution; and it is only by considerations of that kind—it is only by bringing our minds, free from all passion, to a calm and sagacious consideration of this subject, and viewing it as statesmen, that we can secure the great interests of this country, which are too often forgotten in declamatory views of circumstances with which we have to deal practically—it is in this way only we can secure an amelioration in the condition of the population of the Ottoman Empire. I trouble your Lordships to-night with much reluctance; I would rather have listened to the debate than have taken part in it. However, I could not but enter my protest against the view and speech of the noble Duke upon this question; and I reserve to myself to meet him on the occasion of which he has given Notice, when I shall be happy not only to hear his views, but humbly and with due modesty to offer my own.
§ VISCOUNT CARDWELLMy Lords, I do not intend to enter at large into this discussion now, but one remark, I think, is due to my noble Friend, the noble Duke behind me. He did not limit his view to the case of the Christians alone. His argument applied to the whole question, and was that the conduct of the Government in all the earlier stages of it had been a course of mischievous inaction. Have you refuted this argument? You (the Government) admit that you have accompanied all the efforts you have 53 made for the purpose of carrying out your policy by the dangerous statement that you would not attempt to enforce it. Proposals made by Governments with the statement that they will in no case be backed up by force are really worthless, and had better not have been made at all. When you acceded to the proposal for a Consular Commission, you stated that you did it in deference to the wish of the Turkish Government, and you let it be understood there would be no penalty if that Government did not meet the views of the Commission. If that Consular Commission had been backed up by our representation to the Turkish Government that it was of importance our policy should be carried out, in all probability the Commission would not have been ineffectual. Although the Andrassy Note came from the Government of Austria, which was least likely to propose hostile interference, you gave it, as you stated at the time, a reluctant and hesitating adhesion, and you caused it to be clearly understood at Constantinople that no evil consequences would follow if the Turkish Government treated its proposals with neglect. I own I am astonished to hear the noble Earl say that we were parties to the Andrassy Note, when the Correspondence makes it so clear that, though this was the proposal of United Europe, we declined to be parties to it, and that it was only because Turkey wished us that we eventually became parties to the Note. It was upon a declaration made by you to that effect that the Andrassy Note was treated by Turkey with indifference. Count Andrassy told us that unless there was united action on the part of the Powers for the purpose of effecting improvements in the provinces of Turkey, Servia and Montenegro would go to war, and Bulgaria in all probability would be drawn in. You neglected that, however; you practically refused to join Austria on that request; and your verbal adhesion was almost worse than not joining at all, for it gave assurance to Turkey that she might disregard the united Powers. You were entreated by every Power in Europe to join in the Berlin Memorandum, and you refused; you took to yourselves great credit for refusing, and for securing the co-operation of Europe in a policy of non-interference. These were the arguments of the noble Duke (the Duke of Argyll), who has been entirely 54 misunderstood by the noble Earl the Prime Minister, and whose argument was a just reply to that of the noble Earl the Foreign Secretary. I acknowledge the gravity of the question; and having no desire to anticipate the Papers which are about to be presented, I reserve my arguments until this information is fully before us.
§ THE, MARQUESS OF SALISBURYMy Lords, I must commence the few observations I have to make with the commonplace protest that I do not intend to enter on this question until the Papers relating to it are before the House. When they are, I think the noble Duke opposite (the Duke of Argyll) will not find that they support his doubts as to whether my own action at the Conference expressed the views of my noble Friend behind me (the Earl of Derby). He will there find that the words there used, whatever they were, were fully authorized by the Cabinet. But I rise rather to protest against the view laid down as to the duty of the Government with respect to coercion—namely, that we ought to adopt a course which in times past has been too popular with Governments of the colour of the noble Duke opposite, and use threats of coercion while we are hazy in our own minds as to whether we shall follow them up or not. Now, whatever other opinions may be formed on this subject, I must lay this down with some confidence—that any threat or intimation of a threat of coercion should never be made by the British Government until it is absolutely prepared to follow up the menace. It is very easy to talk of threatening coercion against the Turkish Government; but have you picked the idea to pieces in your own mind what' you mean by coercion? I know it means that your fleet may sail up the Bosphorus and threaten Stamboul. But, suppose Turkey refuses, you can do nothing more. I do not suppose that military coercion, considering the extent of the Turkish Empire, would be a course which military strategists would recommend—a naval coercion would naturally be adopted. But suppose Turkey refuses, and you proceed to the ultima ratio—you might indeed dethrone the Ottoman dynasty—that would be the signal for confusion and anarchy in every part of the Empire. You announce to all the Mahomedan population that 55 the dynasty to which they have for hundreds of years been attached, and to which they are attached still, has been struck down by a Christian Power in the cause of Christians. You make this declaration to a mixed population of Mahomedans and Christians—and the Mahomedan population being armed and the Christian population being still unarmed, what would be the result but a most frightful exaggeration of those terrible scenes of which we have heard so much as occurring in Bulgaria? The policy of coercion is, with respect to any country as regards its internal affairs, one of the gravest and most responsible policies which a Government can adopt. It used to be somewhat in fashion—we have tried it in past times; but I doubt if we have ever tried it with effect and benefit to those whose condition we desired to ameliorate. In more recent times we have sometimes threatened coercion without carrying it out; but I do not think that on these occasions we have been really kind and beneficent towards those in whom we were interested. I do not desire to make any pledges for the future. In the speech of my noble Friend the Foreign Minister there was no language pledging the Government as to the future. He stated what our policy had been in the past. He stated that he thought intervention, as a rule, was exceedingly dangerous. He stated that the grounds of it depended on considerations of high expediency, and that he would not pledge himself that there was no contingency in which inaction would cease to be our duty. I think he went as far as it is the duty of a Foreign Minister to go. It is not the duty of any Foreign Minister to announce contingent policies in this House. But I must demur to the inference that because he has not threatened coercion, and because he has not intimated what he should do in certain contingencies, that there is any want of friendliness on our part or of interest in the lot of the deeply suffering subjects of the Porte. I feel sure when my noble Friend the noble Duke reads the Papers he will be convinced that our feelings, though they may not, perhaps, be expressed with so much eloquence, are not less earnest—are not less vivid—than of those who criticise our proceedings. In the same spirit I entirely demur to the criticism passed by my two noble Friends 56 opposite upon what fell from my noble Friend the Secretary of State with respect to the insurrection in the Herzegovina. My noble Friend expressed a wish that that insurrection had been speedily suppressed, and that has been treated as language approving of cruelty. Has the noble Earl rightly considered all the sufferings that followed, the terrible dangers that then existed, and the uncertainty that still hangs over the fate of those engaged in it? I deny the doctrine that has been laid down that insurrection, even under a much worse government than that of the Porte, is always legitimate. I should prefer to lay down the doctrine that insurrection is only legitimate even under a very bad government when it has a fair prospect of success. My noble Friend measured the future, he knew the trials and the miseries that were in store for them—he was well convinced—and the event has proved that he was right—that there would follow insurrection sufferings far greater than those they, the Christians, had already endured; and he wished that relief might come through the slow process of negotiation rather than through the dangers of a bloody insurrection; and after all the events that have so deeply moved our people I think my noble Friend has shown that he was wise and sagacious in saying that the insurrection should not be allowed to continue. My Lords, I feel that we are under a great disadvantage in attempting to prolong any such discussion as this in the absence of the Papers relating to the subject. It has only been necessary for me to speak because I observed in the speeches of the noble Lords opposite an attempt to attach to the opinions we entertain and the policy we have pursued a want of sympathy with the Christian populations which have so deeply suffered. I desire to repudiate that imputation in the most distinct and emphatic manner, and to say that their interests have never been absent from our minds; but we have also had present to our minds the danger that hasty and unwise action might produce to those whom we designed to benefit. We entertained the hope, and still entertain it, that by slower and more peaceful means all our objects may be accomplished.
§ LORD WAVENEY, who was very indistinctly heard, was understood to say that by the rule which Turkey had her- 57 self adopted in the face of Europe, Turkey should be judged. As she had rejected European counsels, from European counsels let her be excluded henceforth. He did not desire to see the population of Constantinople or other places suffering from the course which the Government had adopted; but he did say that the Government and the people should be placed in such a position as would show that Europe was in earnest. He did not agree with the noble Marquess (the Marquess of Salisbury) that our fleet was the only means of coercing Turkey that we possessed. It was quite possible to separate the Turkish capital from the main sources of its supplies and resources. The fleet that had lain in Besika Bay would be strong enough to bar the entrance to the Dardanelles. Let the population of Constantinople be made to derive its daily food from the provinces of the interior, and the Turkish Government would be speedily aroused to the perception that should necessity arise we had other means of coercion than the employment of absolute force. The Christian element was the first and the most important in this question, because it was the persecution and the oppression to which the Christians in Turkey were subjected that constituted the cause of disquiet and trouble to Europe; and that disquiet and that trouble should no longer be allowed to exist. He still thought it right to protest against the assertion which had been made that there was only one way of coercing Turkey. He believed that the employment of the legitimate power of England would be found available and sufficient for all such purposes as were necessary; and available and sufficient, above all things, for proving to the Porte that there was a real and substantial power in this country.
§ Address agreed to, nemine dissentiente, and ordered to be presented to Her Majesty by the Lords with White Staves.