RAILWAY ACCIDENTS.—RESOLUTION. (Hansard, 27 April 1877)

§ VISCOUNT BURY

said, that in calling the attention of their Lordships to the Report of the Royal Commission on Railway Accidents and to move a Resolution, he felt that on this subject he was speaking to an assembly of experts, so large had been the share taken by their Lordships in railway legislation and in inquiries as to the working of railways. He had, however, brought forward his Motion in order that the matter might be fully and fairly discussed. The principle on which Parliament had hitherto acted was that they should exercise a general supervision over railways, but that it would be injudicious to interfere by legislation with the details of railway management. That principle had received the sanction of several Royal Commissions and Parliamentary Committees; and the Royal Commission, to the Report of which he was about to call attention, and which was appointed in 1874, having given a summary of what had been done by the Committee of 1857-8 and by the Committee of 1870, and of the results attained by the labours of those Committees and by several statutes, commenced the second part of its Report by laying down in broad and simple terms that it would be highly injudicious for Parliament to interfere with the details of railway management. But having done that, the Commission—strangely enough—proceeded to contra- 4 dict its own proposition and to make a series of recommendations which were a direct interference with the details of railway management. His noble Friend (Lord Cottesloe) had given Notice of an Amendment to the Motion, which proposed in effect the adoption of the recommendations of the Royal Commission. He (Viscount Bury) thought he was entitled to ask his noble Friend what part of those recommendations he would have Parliament adopt. Was it that part which condemned the interference of Parliament or that which, if adopted, would be a direct interference on the part of the Legislature? It might be well, in the first place, to consider in what our railway system consisted. When, in 1846, railway losses became so severe and the profits on railways almost nil, shareholders' railways were no longer constructed. Small lines were then amalgamated, and the great trunk systems were formed by amalgamations. The public was not satisfied with that state of things; every market town wished to have its line to the Metropolis; and railway contractors discovered the means of "financing" railways and so perpetuating the schemes by which they had become rich and prosperous. Thus the railway system of the country was extended in a hap-hazard manner, and was not based on any sound conditions. Taking all Europe, there were three systems of railway management. Under one of those, railways were entirely subject to Government control. Under another the railways were governed by Railway Boards, but were subject to Government supervision; and under the third the Railway Boards were subject only to Government interference. Now, he thought it could be easily shown that from the earliest period of railway legislation in this country the principle steadily adhered to had been that Parliament should not interfere in the details of railway management or take in any degree from the responsibility of a Railway Company for the safety of its traffic. Lord Campbell's Act, under which compensation could be obtained for injuries on railways, went on that principle; and it was obvious that for the State to enter into the details of railway management would be a hopeless undertaking unless it took the railways into its own hands. Except in the latter circumstances, it must acquire its experience through 5 railway managers, and could only be their mere mouthpiece. What he objected to, therefore, in the Report of the Royal Commission was that, by the 12 Resolutions therein contained, the Commission subverted and controverted the general principle with which its Report set out. The Commission had shown very considerable industry, for it had asked about 40,000 questions. The noble Earl (Earl De La Warr), who succeeded the Duke of Buckingham as Chairman of the Commission, had also shown great ability throughout the inquiry, and upon upon him, in the first instance, devolved the labour of drawing up a Report; but unfortunately the Commissioners were not of one mind, and instead of having one Report to guide them, their Lordships would have to consider a number of Reports. Only four of the Commissioners signed the Report of the Commission without comment; and Mr. Ayrton, one of the ablest men on the Commission, refused either to sign the Report or give any written opinion of his own, though he had closely attended to the labours of the Commission during the examination of the witnesses. The noble Earl (Earl De La Warr) drew up a separate Report; and Mr. Harrison—a late President of the Institute of Civil Engineers and a most able man—though he signed the Report of the Commission, signed a separate one also, in which he quarrelled with the Commissioners on nearly every point of their Report. So that the Report was not only discordant with itself, but was signed without comment by only four of the Commissioners. He would remind their Lordships as to the present state of the law and as to the authority under which the Railway Companies carried out their functions. As their Lordships were aware, a special Board was constituted in 1845 which exercised powers similar to those now vested in the Board of Trade. But in 1861 this separate Board was abolished, and the Board of Trade was restored to the provision assigned to it by former legislation, and resumed the authority which it had formerly exercised. The functions of the Board of Trade in this respect were derived under several Acts of Parliament. The Board granted certificates to Railway Companies authorizing them to enter into agreements with each other, and to enter into provi- 6 sional contracts. No railway might open for traffic till the Board of Trade gave it a certificate. In the case of a disagreement between various Railways the Board of Trade might, with their consent, arbitrate between them. The Board of Trade might authorize the construction of bridges over level crossings, condemn illegal and dangerous gauges, regulate the speed of mail trains, sanction bye-laws, and, in certain circumstances, authorize the abandonment of schemes and extend the time for taking lands. But no Act of Parliament conferred anything like executive authority on the Board of Trade in respect of railways. It could not initiate any new policy or command anything to be done. To confer executive authority on the Board of Trade could only be justified by some failure of the present law that could only be obviated by such a step. Was it true that railway accidents had increased so much of late years as to render it necessary to depart from the present system? He found from the Report of the Commission that the number of passenger journeys in the years 1872-3-4-5 were, in round numbers, 1,863,000,000; and during the same period the number of deaths caused by accidents to trains was 155: so that the proportion of passengers killed by causes beyond their own control amounted to 1 in 11,500,000, and the proportion of passengers injured 35 in 11,500,000, No doubt the total number of persons injured was considerable; but when the extent of railway travelling in the United Kingdom was considered, he thought it could hardly be said that our railway travelling was otherwise than extremely safe. In speaking of the causes of railway accidents the Commissioners, adopting a word invented by Captain Tyler, stated that "human fallibility" was the great cause. It was impossible to eliminate the carelessness of human beings from the calculation of railway accidents. Human fallibility was the principal thing to be guarded against. That might be done by discipline and improved machinery; but legislation would not be effectual against it. The Report of the Commission recommended the extension of the civil liability of Railway Companies for accidents to their servants and of the criminal liability of the latter for negligence endangering human life. The noble Duke (the Duke of St. Albans) 7 had before their Lordships a Bill relating to the liability of Railway Companies in respect of their servants. If there was to be legislation on that subject, it would be better in the form proposed by the noble Duke than in that recommended by the Commission; but he did not believe that such a Bill was necessary, because the subject could be dealt with in the general question of masters and servants, which was before the other House of Parliament. Then, as to the recommendation that there should be a tribunal for the trial of cases of unpunctuality by railways, that was not desirable—and for the obvious reason that where the traveller passed over several lines in the course of his journey the question of responsibility for the unpunctuality might be an intricate one. To fasten the offence on the last of the concurring lines might be very unjust; and therefore he did not think that any tribunal could deal cheaply, speedily, and satisfactorily with such questions. Then, as to brake power, the Railway Companies were at present in communication with the Board of Trade on that subject; he thought the Board of Trade would be able to come to a satisfactory conclusion; but he thought the Railway Companies themselves might be left to make their own regulations on that head. An important point involved in the question of brake power was the excessive speed at which trains were now run. He believed that if the speed were diminished the enormous brake power of which their Lordships had heard so much would not be required, and that a great source of danger would be thereby eliminated. The Commissioners did not report that excessive speed was a source of danger; but he thought common sense showed that excessive speed constituted a real and fruitful source of serious casualties. Only for excessive speed there would be no occasion for extraordinary brake power. When trains were driven at a speed of 55 or 60 miles an hour great weight must be placed on the driving wheel of the engine to make it bite the rail, and the engines of such trains must have driving wheels of very large diameter, or otherwise they could not effect the revolutions with sufficient velocity. The consequence was that those express trains running at enormous velocity knocked the line about in a manner 8 that trains running at moderate speed—say 40 miles au hour—did not. There were a great many railways on which trains were run at a velocity exceeding 40 miles an hour; but in his opinion, and in the opinion of many competent engineers, 40 miles an hour constituted the limit which could be obtained with safety. If the public, however, insisted on being carried at the rate of 55 or 60 miles an hour it was only right they should know that that could not be done without the risk of imminent peril, and that when under such circumstances an accident happened the responsibility rested morally on those who insisted upon being driven at such an enormous speed. Again, as to continuous brakes —he held that great danger might result from their use. There were engine-drivers who would drive at the highest speed to the last moment, and there was in consequence every chance of running 30 or 40 yards beyond the station at which the train was to stop, and then the brake would be put on, and every time they were used on a train travelling at high velocity, they would cause a strain that would initiate mischief to the rolling stock. The strain of a continuous brake on carriages recently taken from a siding and attached to a train which had been travelling would be greater than on the other portions of the train, and might cause axles to break. His opinion, and that of men who were much more competent to form an opinion on the subject, was that continuous brakes would be a source rather of danger than of safety. There was another consideration—namely, that if the use of any particular appliance was made compulsory on Railway Companies the effect would be to stop all improvement in that direction. Captain Tyler considered that if the annual reports of Railway Companies were continued, those Companies which had adopted improvements would, in consequence of their own experience, go on improving, instead of relying on what they had already done. But Captain Tyler considered that it would be extremely unwise to impose on the Board of Trade the duty of deciding between rival appliances of brake power. Having quoted the testimony of Mr. Farrer and others against allowing the Board of Trade to determine whether increased station accommodation was required, the noble 9 Lord said that all the evidence came to this—that if such a power was given them the Board of Trade must assume the total responsibility of the line. With regard to the appellate jurisdiction, Captain Tyler's evidence was conclusive, for he said that if that was given, the Companies would be relieved of their responsibility, further invention and improvement would be discouraged, and undue responsibility would undoubtedly be thrown on the tribunal. There was a great deal more to the same effect; and all the evidence he had been able to collect proved that if you increased the power of the Board of Trade and gave it, not a consultative, but executive authority, you must go further, and assume the control of the railways by the State. The amount of money at present invested in railways was so enormous that such a proposal would not for a moment be entertained. But that was not the question now. The question was whether the position of the Board of Trade should be changed —whether, instead of being a merely consultative body, with power of investigation, report, and constant supervision, it should be enabled to say to the Railway Companies that such and such things must be done. His belief was that the principle laid down by the Royal Commission was the right one, but that the Resolutions they founded on it were not right. His noble Friend (Lord Cottesloe) would, he believed contend that the Resolutions of the Royal Commission ought to be carried out. It appeared to him, however, that, instead of giving further powers to the Board of Trade, it would be far more reasonable to embody in a Bill such requirements as ought to be demanded from Railway Companies, and then to give to the Board of Trade, as the representative of the Legislature, the power of remitting those requirements where it thought that could properly be done. Such a course would save the principle, which he believed to be a just one; would not impose on the Board of Trade other duties than those which from the earliest times of our railway history had been recognized to be right, and would preserve the logical consistency of our legislation. Let it not be supposed that in the arguments he had used he had spoken in the interests of the Railway Companies. He had spoken in the 10 interest of the public safety, because he believed that interference in the details of railway management would introduce a new danger into railway travelling. He thought the Royal Commission deserved every credit for what they had done, but it was their principles and not their Resolutions that should be carried into effect. Moved to resolve, "That direct legislative interference with the details of railway management tends rather to increase than diminish the danger of accident by dividing responsibility; that Parliament in dealing with regulations for the prevention of railway accidents has hitherto always recognized this principle; and that in any legislation which may from time to time become necessary on the subject, the necessity of maintaining the undivided responsibility of Railway Companies for the safe conduct of their traffic ought to be kept steadily in view."— (Viscount Bury.)