EARL GREYrose to ask, Whether Her Majesty's Ministers have any reason to believe that the Turkish Government would have agreed to a Protocol to the effect of that of which a draft was published in The Daily Telegraph of the 19th of April; and whether any attempt was made during the recent negotiations to induce both Turkey and Russia to consent to an arrangement on the principle laid down in that document? The document in question was alleged to be the composition of "a high official personage "at Constantinople; and at the close of the debate on the Eastern Question last Thursday night he put a Question to the noble Earl the Secretary for Foreign Affairs on the subject of the the draft Protocol; and he understood the noble Earl to say that it was probable the document had some foundation. The substance of the draft Protocol was that Turkey engaged herself solemnly towards the Guaranteeing Powers to accomplish progressively, and with as little delay as possible, the reforms accepted by the Conference; that the Guaranteeing Powers should take notice of this declaration, the execution of which would be looked to by the Commissioners; if the reforms should not be realized to the satisfaction of the Guaranteeing Powers, they would consider in common what measures should be taken in order to oblige Turkey to keep her engagements; these reforms being the necessary consequence of an amelioration of the financial situation, which could only be obtained by the reduction of the military expenses, Turkey would reduce her effective force to a peace footing, and on her part Russia would demobilize her armies of observation. That was the substance of the alleged draft Protocol, and as it was calculated to promote the welfare of the inhabitants of the European Provinces of Turkey, he was at a loss to understand why it was not assented to. As it appeared, however, that war had actually begun, their 1734 Lordships ought to know whether or not that calamity might have been averted. In his opinion, the agreement proposed in the draft Protocol was fair and reasonable, and in striking contrast to the terms contained in the Protocol and the Russian Declaration accompanying the latter document. No doubt it would have given a certain time for carrying out the required reforms in the Christian Provinces, but they all knew that time for that purpose was absolutely necessary. It was clear, as the Turkish Government had over and over again observed, that it would be absolutely impossible for them to carry out those reforms while they wore under apprehension of an attack by Russia, because they were compelled to keep together a large army on the frontier. It was utterly impossible for them in these latter circumstances to apply themselves to the carrying out of the real work of reform. However, the concessions made by Turkey in the draft Protocol were very large, because it recognized the right of the European Powers to consider the means to be taken in order to oblige Turkey to keep her engagements. Under the provisions of such a document the Powers were invited to adopt the most stringent measures in such an event—they might even go to the extent of withdrawing the Christian Provinces altogether from Turkish rule and substituting some other government in its place —and he could not but express his opinion that what was called "coercion" could be applied in no other manner than that of taking the Christian Provinces from under that rule and placing them under some different authority. Improvements could not be effected by a Government acting under coercion—a Government so circumstanced must be powerless—its hands would be tied, and it could not succeed. He must say that all through the negotiations there appeared to him to have been an unwillingness to face the real truth, which was that there were only two courses likely to succeed. one was to leave Turkey, to manage her own affairs according to her own judgment; the other to deprive her of a portion of her European Provinces. It was a mistake to talk so much about guarantees—the only two alternatives were to leave Turkey entirely to her own responsibility, or to deprive her of a portion of her territory. But instead 1735 of viewing matters in that way, reams of paper had been consumed by diplomatists in making all sorts of proposals and suggesting all sorts of verbal alterations and amendments until there was a haze of confusion which it was almost impossible to see through. If the diplomatists had put this clearly to Turkey: —" We must have improvement, or we must concert measures for transferring the Christian Provinces to another authority," a different state of things might now exist from that which had been announced to their Lordships. He would direct their Lordships' attention to the fact that while in the Protocol that had been agreed to by the Powers there was an arrogant invitation addressed to Turkey to disarm, there was not a word said in it on the subject of disarmament on the part of Russia. What was said on this subject was said not in the Protocol, but in the Declaration of the Russian Ambassador, and in this Declaration it was said in a manner most offensive to Turkey, and was accompanied by conditions not likely to be accepted. The large Turkish army had been brought together entirely in consequence of the attitude of Russia, and it was evidently impossible for Turkey to have removed her armies from the frontiers while those frontiers were menaced by the enormous Russian forces massed on the other side. He was in ignorance and he believed their Lordships were in ignorance of what immediate object Russia proposed by her advance. It was impossible to suppose that the Turks could carry out improvements in the face of that advance. On the other hand, if Russia proposed to take upon herself the government of the Christian Provinces of Turkey, was not that a somewhat serious measure towards the other Powers of Europe? He believed that if the real welfare of the Christian inhabitants of those Provinces was the object uppermost in the mind of Russia, it was perfectly competent for her to accept an arrangement based on the proposal to which he had drawn their Lordships' attention. Even were the extreme measure of coercion to have been adopted—in the event of the failure of the Turks to carry out the required reforms in a reasonable time—it was obvious that if the Powers acted together there could have been no serious resistance on the part of Turkey, and a transfer of the 1736 Christian Provinces might have been accomplished without war. But, before giving their last word of warning, the Guaranteeing Powers should have settled what form of Government should be adopted in the Provinces affected. But, owing to their jealousies, the European Powers had not come to any real agreement as to what should be the European policy towards Turkey. Europe was now witnessing the commencement of a bloody and desperate war, in which it was probable that in the end Russia would be victorious; and this might give rise to greater difficulties than even those which existed now. Let this war end how it might, one thing was perfectly certain—namely, that it would bring most fearful calamities on those Provinces for the sake of which it was nominally undertaken. It was perfectly obvious that whether the war ended in the subjugation of Turkey or not it must cause a cruel destruction of life and property in those Provinces, which would be devastated during its progress.
§ THE EARL OF DERBYMy Lords, the Question which the noble Earl asks is, whether Her Majesty's Ministers have any reason to believe that the Turkish Government would have agreed to a Protocol to the effect of that of which a draft was published in The Daily Telegraph of the 19th of April; and, whether any attempt was made during the recent negotiations to induce both Turkey and Russia to consent to an arrangement on the principle laid down in that Protocol? Now, my Lords, with reference to this draft Protocol to which my noble Friend's Question refers, I must repeat, after having had an opportunity of refreshing my memory by reading the Papers, what I stated the other evening when my noble Friend first made inquiry on the subject—that no communication in the nature of this so-called Protocol has at any time or by any person been presented to the British Government. Doubtless this draft Protocol appeared in a newspaper correspondence which I have followed with some interest for the last few weeks, and which I have generally found not only very well informed, but very accurate as to facts. I have no doubt that there was a real foundation for the fact stated by the correspondent—that a paper of that kind was put in his hand by some "high official personage" in Constan- 1737 tinople, as stating the views of that personage and suggesting a basis on which an agreement might be come to. But I must point out to my noble Friend and to your Lordships, that it is one thing to say that a particular mode of settling a question is approved or even originated by an influential personage in the service of the Sultan, and quite another to say that the particular arrangement was accepted by the Turkish Cabinet and had the approval of the Sultan. Now, I do not understand the correspondent to state anything more than that this draft Protocol was put into his hands under the circumstances I have referred to. I dare say that was so—I do not doubt that it was; but there is no reason to suppose that it embodies the views of the Turkish Government; and certainly neither in any conversation which I have had with the Representatives of the various Powers, nor in any private correspondence, nor in any official Paper, do I find a trace of any proposition of this nature having been put forward on the part of the Porte. When my noble Friend asks whether there is any reason to suppose that the Turkish Government would have been willing to negotiate on the basis of this draft Protocol, he asks a question to which, from the nature of things, a positive answer is not possible—one cannot say how a proposition would have been received when that proposition was never made. But I must point out that there were two parties in the transaction—the Turkish Government and the Russian Government. It would be of very little use to put forward propositions which would be accepted on one side when there was a moral certainty that they would not be accepted by the other. The whole object of our negotiations was to bring those two parties to an understanding; and if propositions had been put forward which were of a nature to be satisfactory to the Turkish Government, I am sure Russia would have said—" No; we shall have nothing to do with them, but we shall make counter-propositions, and submit them for your acceptance." I am as certain as it is possible to be of anything which has not passed, that if any such proposition as that to which my noble Friend has called attention had been put forward on the part of Turkey, it would have been met with 1738 grave objections on the part of Russia. My Lords, we did all that it was possible for us to do—I will go further, and say that we did all it was possible for anybody to do to bring about an understanding. We have, unfortunately, failed, and those who judge after the event will no doubt say that if we had done this or that which we did not do, or taken some other course than that which we did take, the result would have been different. For my part I do not think that any form of Protocol or of agreement would have put an end to the misunderstanding. Throughout these transactions I found on the part of the Turkish Government a deeply-seated conviction that—do what they would — make what concessions they would—sooner or later war would be forced upon them. It is not for me to say whether that conviction was right or wrong, but it was fixed in the minds of the Sultan and his advisers; and, that being so, the task of endeavouring to bring about an understanding was not a very hopeful one. Looking at the matter now in the light of past experience, I must say that I do not think any other course than that which we adopted would have been more successful. I deeply regret what has come to pass; but I believe that in our endeavour to maintain peace between Turkey and Russia—au endeavour which we persevered in to the last through a sense of duty—we have been throughout engaged in the solution of an impossible problem.