LORD CAMPBELLrose to call attention to the recent circumstances of the Eastern Question; and to move for copies of all the Imperial decrees, capitulations, and conventions of any kind which entitle Great Britain to intervene against abuses in the government of the Porte and in favour of the races subject to it, without reference to the Treaties formed after the Crimean War for upholding the independence and integrity 1423 of the Ottoman Empire. The noble Lord said that he could not but think that the postponement of his Notice on a former occasion had been beneficial, inasmuch as it had given the noble Earl the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs the opportunity of thoroughly searching the archives of the Foreign Office—so that he would now probably be mere completely able to answer his inquiries than he would have been had he brought on his Motion on the previous day. The object of the Motion was to ascertain whether, if the Treaties of 1856 were to be considered as of no effect, we had any legitimate foundation for intervention in the affairs of the Ottoman Empire. It might be argued that before those Treaties we had interfered in the affairs of the Porte. No doubt, that was the case—especially at the time that Lord Stratford de Redcliffe was our Ambassador at Constantinople; but then it should be remembered that during the whole of that time we had interfered either as a defending Power, or a Power ready to defend. It was far from his intention to deny the probability of war in existing circumstances; but still peace was not as yet to be despaired of. The influence of Great Britain at Berlin and even at St. Petersburg might not be altogether exhausted. As Louis Philippe once said, there was a great difference between contemplating war and actually levying war; and in the present instance there was one favourable circumstance which was not present previous to the Crimean War—namely, that no personal ambition was at work. No effort which might have the effect of preserving peace ought to be left untried; but if war actually occurred, their Lordships would agree with him in the proposition that it was most desirable that all ambiguity about the Treaty obligations of this country should be put an end to. The immediate and practical obligations of the country were embodied in a Treaty of April, 1856, and in reference to that Treaty he would call in as arbiter between those who had differed as to its interpellation Lord Odo Russell, our Ambassador at Berlin. The noble Lord —then Mr. Russell—had been sent on a special mission to Versailles during the Franco-German War. In a despatch written at Versailles at that time, Lord Odo distinctly averred as his opinion that when the event provided for by the 1424 Treaty arose, we were bound to engage in war in defence of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire with or without either France or Austria. It occurred to him that there could be no more decided refutation of the new fantastic theory that the Treaty of 1856 had no force unless we were called upon to fulfil its obligations by France and Austria. It was impossible to foresee the causes which might induce France or Austria to hold back:—the circumstances of France being disabled, or Austria being unprepared were the cases contemplated by Lord Odo Russell. It might be found that adherence to the Treaty was less hazardous than at first it would appear. It engaged this country to concert measures with the Porte in a certain eventuality. The first step, therefore, would be an easy one; and if we made and carried out an offer of assistance to the Porte, several advantages would follow from it. By the use of our Naval power the Treaty would be sufficiently adhered to, and the presence of our Fleet in the Bosphorus would have this effect—it would restore and preserve order in Constantinople; it would secure time for the development of the new Constitution; it would baffle a descent on Constantinople from the Asiatic side, and would do a great deal towards preventing a descent from the European side; it would release the commander of the Turkish Navy, Hobart Pasha, for operations in the Black Sea, which would not otherwise be possible; and it would give us a locus standi for making an appeal to Austria to fulfil her Treaty obligations in the matter; and it would save British interests, by making it impossible for Russia to occupy Constantinople. Another most important question was—What would be our future policy in regard to the Mediterranean? No doubt, the consideration of those points had occurred to the Government. The point upon which it seemed to him most necessary to say a few words was not as regarded those probable results, but as to whether there were not some obstructions at that moment which rendered it impossible for the Government to carry out their Treaties. Now, how could that be known? The mode by which the voice of the country was arrived at was by a General Election of Members of Parliament; and what Election had declared that the results of the Crimean 1425 War ought to be abandoned, and its greatest advantages reversed? As regarded Parliament, immense majorities, recruited from both sides, were ready to support the policy of those Treaties. Some persons had referred to the meetings throughout the country; generally speaking, these meetings had very little authority; but amongst the many which had been held only one had recorded conclusions against the Treaties, and that was the one at St. James's Hall—from which the public were excluded—at which meeting it seemed to him that philosophers had left their sense behind them, and to which professors did not bring their erudition. Let it be granted that there had been errors, were Great Britain and Europe to be punished for them? The conclusion was absurd. It was next assumed that the Porte had not followed the counsels of the Allies. But could it be said with truth that the Porte had not done so? During the insurrection in Herzegovina did she not follow their counsel in accepting the Andrassy Note? Did she refuse the Berlin Memorandum? Did she not act in accordance with the feeling of Europe in deposing a corrupt, tyrannical, and arbitrary Government? Was the Sublime Porte acting against counsels offered by Allies to whom she was bound to listen in granting a constitutional regime? Had she acted against the wishes of any Ally entitled to her reverence? There were only two occasions on which it could be said that the Porte had declined to follow the counsels of her Allies. She repelled the propositions of the Conference, and she objected to the language of the Protocol. But in one case the hand of Russia was apparent, and in the other case it was proclaimed. In either case it was apparent that if the Porte accepted Russia's schemes—even though they should be discussed as British propositions—she would be entering upon her destruction; and in refusing these proposals Turkey had avoided that suicide against which the noble Earl the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, in answering some of the autumnal deputations, thought it right to warn her. He felt quite convinced that the more closely the noble Earl the Foreign Secretary reflected upon what had taken place during the past two years, the more distinctly would he perceive that those 1426 two occasions were the only ones on which such a sweeping accusation could be founded against Turkey. Therefore, unless the schemes of Russia were mere skilfully disguised than they had been hitherto, we had no right to be astonished that they should continue to meet with the same reception from Turkey that they had met with hitherto. Then another obstacle had been often referred to, and it was that of a great authority —the ex-Prime Minister. It was said that no policy could be followed while the ex-Prime Minister opposed it. That was a most extraordinary doctrine. What would be the effect of a change of Government if the outgoing Prime Minister assumed, without responsibility of office, the duty of dictating the policy of his Successor? What was the tenour of the last General Election? It was that the country, when challenged by himself, by overwhelming majorities decided that ho should not guide it any longer—not even in finance, in which he was so great a master. Would any one, then, maintain so laughable a proposition as that the result of that Election was to enthrone the right hon. Gentleman over foreign affairs, in which he was a novice. Was the design of the electors at the last General Election to render the right hon. Gentleman omnipotent in respect of calamities for which he was sufficiently responsible? But it was said that no harm would arise from an attempted occupation of the Turkish Provinces by Russia. It was against the laws of Nature and Providence to anticipate any desirable result without making any efforts to attain it. If an enemy were on his way to invade the English shores, would it not be madness to conclude that his attempt would be harmless, because, without any exertion of ours, the winds, or famine, or some other such cause, would destroy his forces? If Russia saw that we had done nothing, and had abandoned Treaties, whether she failed or succeeded, the dishonour of sacrificing Treaties would fall on ourselves. If a country were struggling with insolvency, or under some necessity by which its resources were impaired, he would not urge that the abnegation of a Treaty should not be pardoned; but there was not a shadow of excuse for ignominiously avoiding it. He should not, however, think it unsatisfactory if, by the 1427 effacement of the Treaty of 1856 despatches like that of September became impossible. The noble Lord concluded by moving for the production of the documents to which he had referred.
§ Moved that an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty for, Copies of all the Imperial decrees, capitulations, and conventions of any kind which entitle Great Britain to intervene against abuses in the government of the Porte and in favour of the races subject to it, without reference to the Treaties formed after the Crimean war for upholding the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire."—(The Lord Stratheden and Campbell.)
THE EARL OF ROSEBERYsaid, that he disagreed from so much that the noble Lord had said that he almost felt himself to be speaking from the other side of the House. He thought it best to follow the noble Lord, because he knew that only one articulate utterance was to be expected from the Government —so that critics had to take the earliest opportunity of making their remarks or inquiries. However, he did not propose, at present, to enter into any criticism of what the Government had done or had left undone—indeed, he thought that the time for Party criticism had either past, or had not yet arrived, and therefore no good result would be attained by pursuing such a course. Certainly, the Government had tried more than one remedy. They had blown hot and they had blown cold. They had recalled the Ambassador, and had sent another in his place; they had tried the Conference; they had tried the Protocol; and they had tried the Declaration: none of these efforts had been attended by any marked diplomatic result; and at the present moment their triumph—in that House, at least—appeared to be achieved when the noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Derby) boasted of the absolute nullifying and emasculation of the Protocol, as if, instead of a pricked bladder, it was some valid and binding instrument which would secure the peace of Europe. Of the objects of the Government — the maintenance of peace, the maintenance of the Treaties of 1856, and of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and the amelioration of the condition of the Ottoman subjects—he wished only to touch on one—the maintenance of the Treaties of 1856. He wished to inquire into the case of one of these Treaties. Whatever had happened, there was one instrument 1428 which could hardly escape the attention of their Lordships—he meant the Treaty of April 15, 1856, commonly known as the Tripartite Treaty of 1856. The questions he wished to ask the noble Earl were, what were the views of the Government in regard to the obligations of that Treaty, and whether they had made any arrangement with the other signataries by which they had released themselves from those engagements? The language of that Treaty was so strict that it left no loophole—it guaranteed in the most absolute form the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire. How was it possible for any of the three Powers parties to the Treaty to escape from the engagements then made? It did not stand on the same footing as the Treaty of Paris of the same date, because it was not confirmed by the Treaty of 1871; but the reason was that the Tripartite Treaty had never been confirmed because it had never been impugned. In 1871, however, the Plenipotentiaries put their hands to an instrument which, as it seemed to him, made the Treaty of April, 1856, still more stringent, for Representatives of the great Powers then agreed to a declaration, in which they recognize—
That it is an essential principle of the law of nations that no Power can liberate itself from the engagements of treaties, nor modify their regulations unless with the consent of the contracting Powers by means of an amicable arrangement.He (the Earl of Rosebery) was anxious to learn if any such amicable engagement had been entered into in regard to this Treaty. He had heard it said that they were not bound by this Treaty, because the Turks had not fulfilled their engagements; but, in the first place, Turkey was not a party to that Treaty; and, next, no breach of engagements on the part of the Turks would justify us in withdrawing from it. It was said that the Turks, by the atrocities they had committed or permitted, had placed themselves outside of the European pale. But were Turkish atrocities a new feature in the history of that country? There was the massacre of Scio in 1822, when, out of a population of 120,000, only 900 were left alive; there was again a massacre in Syria, six years after the signature of the Treaty of Paris — and yet that Treaty was afterwards ratified. He desired, therefore, to know 1429 what change there had been in the Turkish character which would justify us in treating the Turks as if they were worse now than they were then? He would take higher ground. We had often boasted that we alone maintained our Treaties with rigid and scrupulous fidelity. Assuredly, if we chose to disregard the validity of this Treaty, a vital blow would be struck at the validity of all Treaties. Did this seem so very distant a contingency? The question was actually knocking at our doors. We did not know what was the attitude of the various Powers. Austria was awaiting, in sullen silence, the course of events; Germany had not shown her hand; and we could not tell what the course of events might be. We could not, indeed, imitate the proceedings of Russia. We could not, at the present moment, by force of arms, extend to the Christian subjects of the Porte the inestimable privilege which Russia offered to them. We could not profess to mask by professions of humanity preparations for war. But in spite of all the noble Lord (Lord Campbell) had said with regard to the feeling of this country, we could not send a horse or a man to maintain the degenerate country which this Treaty bound us to protect. He maintained, therefore, that we might some day be placed in this position—that we should either have to fight for Turkey, a war which the conscience of this country would refuse, or to draw back from our pledged word.
LORD HOUGHTONsaid, that the late Lord Aberdeen once remarked that the English people did not feel sufficient interest in the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire to undergo the sacrifice of a great war. History showed that Lord Aberdeen was wrong on this point; but it was a curious incident that the very day after his Lordship wrote those words intelligence came of the destruction of the Turkish Fleet at Sinope. He thought his noble Friend (Lord Campbell) was perfectly justified in calling their Lordships' attention to the subject, and he had certainly shown that he possessed great knowledge of it; but, for his own part, he (Lord Houghton) should be very unwilling to say a word which would embarrass Her Majesty's Government; and therefore he thought their Lordships would be justified in refusing to give his noble 1430 Friend—even after his elaborate speech —any specific declaration as to how far they did or did not regard the Treaty of 1856 as binding upon this country. A declaration of that kind would have its echo through the whole of Europe, and would be tantamount to asserting the absolute responsibility of this country in case of any attack upon the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire. His noble Friend had, he conceived, a full and excellent justification for occupying the time of the House, because he brought great knowledge to the consideration of the question, and had communicated to their Lordships much information concerning it. He thought it would have been well if their Lordships had taken the advice given to them by his noble Friend last Session. For example, if there had been a clear expression of opinion as to the continual injustice of the interference of Russia with the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire, it might not have been without effect in that country. He did not know that at any period the Ottoman Porte had shown unwillingness to receive the friendly advice of any of the Powers on the subject of her Christian populations. A most curious illustration of this was the existence of what were called the Capitulations, by which singular and exceptional form of legislation almost all the Christian subjects of the Porte were placed in legal relations with the Consuls and Representatives of the different Christian Powers, which thus had not only a moral but a legal right of interference for their benefit in case of so-called oppression, and also in regard to their general relations with the Mussulman subjects of the Porte. The feeling that better relations existed between the Porte and its subjects in time became so strong in Europe that the Capitulations were generally abandoned, with the assent of the Christian Powers, being regarded as interferences which were no longer necessary with the independence of the Turkish Government. If in recent times, and especially during the late events, a totally different disposition had shown itself on the part of the Turkish Government—namely, a resolute resistance to the interference of any Power with their relations to their subjects—this change, he thought, must be attributed to the tone assumed by certain political bodies and to the con- 1431 tinually increasing terror of Russian aggression. In the despatch from the Turkish Government on the Protocol of March 31 there was a tone almost of insolence towards the Powers of Europe. No longer did there seem to be any desire on the part of the Turkish Government to admit of any interference between themselves and their Christian subjects. He looked upon this document with very great regret, because he did not think it was at all necessary. He should be glad if his noble Friend the Minister for Foreign Affairs would inform the House whether it was the intention of the framers of the Protocol —and especially whether it was his own intention—that the Protocol should be the subject of communications between the Ottoman Porte and the Christian Powers. He could not find anything in the Protocol itself to justify any such intention. It appeared to him that the Protocol was a very useful document. The meaning of it was that the signatory Powers declare that if the present complication in the East be continued the state of affairs would be injurious to their interests in general, and that therefore, in fact, the work of the Conference might be resumed. There was a general belief, which must have some foundation, that the influence of Russia with the Principality of Montenegro was omnipotent. If that influence were brought to bear on the Prince of Montenegro there would be no difficulty whatever in bringing about an arrangement between him and the Porte. He would suggest to those who believed that the advantages following from the invasion of Turkey by Russia would be great and immediate, to recollect how long it was before the disorders consequent on the removal of the Roman power in Europe were dispelled. He was not one of those who thought that autonomy was a thing which could be at once created; for it must take a long time before nations composed of a mixed population could bring themselves into anything like accord, or before the misgovernment under which they had suffered would cease to re-act upon themselves. That being so, he looked, he might say, with equal sorrow and terror on the event of the impending contest. He hoped, however, that these apprehensions might prove unfounded, and that the peace of Europe might be preserved.
§ LORD WAVENEYjoined with his noble Friend (Lord Houghton) in hoping that some conclusion might be arrived at which would avert an European war. As one of those who had been concerned in the proceedings of the meeting held at St. James's Hall in December last, he could not express the slightest regret for the part which he had taken in an agitation which had its origin in the deep feeling of the greater portion of the people of this country. That meeting was not composed of Philosophers who had left their sense behind them and of Professors who had none—it was composed of men eminent in almost every walk of life; of ministers of religion of divers Churches, who had themselves been in some instances witnesses of the horrors of which they spoke; of men known to their Lordships in the ordinary course of domestic life; men of sound and calm judgment; as well as of a number of the representatives of our teeming industries, by whom war was abhorred as the pestilence. It was composed of calm and sensible men, and in its proceedings there was not one dissentient voice. It was a meeting of freemen, who desired to bring security and confidence and comfort to the dwellings of the oppressed. Those who had thus assembled had spoken with no uncertain sound; and, far from desiring that any political importance should be attached to their utterances, there had come from them a universal disclaimer of any feeling but one—of sympathy with outraged humanity. So long as there was a chance of peace resulting from diplomatic efforts, they had done nothing to impede the action of those who were entrusted with the conduct of affairs: they had not sought to interfere with the action of Her Majesty's Government in their laudable efforts. At the meeting at St. James's Hall there was not uttered a single expression of distrust in any of the Powers. As to Russia, the feeling of that vast audience was one of confidence. Their trust was that the Great Powers—those with whom the responsibility rested—would unite in a wise and humane policy. But now that diplomacy had said its last word, they deemed it their duty to speak out, as a portion of the people of England whose opinions should be regarded. There was a matter to which he wished to call the serious atten- 1433 tion of Her Majesty's Government. A Blue Book had recently been laid on the Table, entitled "No. 1, Russia," and purporting to contain correspondence respecting the treatment of members of the Uniat Church in Russia. This Paper was not the result of any Motion or Address to the Crown. It came "by command," and it was therefore for the Ministers of the Crown to explain with what object it had been laid before Parliament. It was said to contain "Correspondence;" but correspondence, strictly speaking, there was none. There were Reports from Her Majesty's Consul General at Warsaw, and letters from the English Minister at St. Petersburg, addressed partly to the Predecessor of the noble Earl in the Foreign Office, and partly to the noble Earl himself. It was incredible that these Papers had been laid on the Table with the object of discrediting a Power with which this country had been acting in concert, and which was at this moment an Ally of the Crown. Inferences, however, of that nature had been drawn, and it behoved Her Majesty's Ministers to give some explanation of what was the object of this publication. Coming to another point, he would ask whether the enormous magnitude of the war which seemed imminent had been thoroughly gauged; he believed that few were able thoroughly to appreciate it. It would doubtless be said that, in the event of that unspeakable calamity, it would be the object of Her Majesty's Government to localize the war. It was possible that the war might be "localized" on the Danube and the Araxes; but it was more probable that it would be sporadically distributed over the East of Europe. The moment the Turkish troops were withdrawn for the war on the northern frontier, Crete and the other Islands would throw off the yoke of Turkey, and ultimately a crisis would arise in the war between them, similar to that which took place in the Belgian revolution, when the protecting Powers had to step in and declare to Holland that they would regard any further hostilities as a declaration of war against themselves. In the Mediterranean an interruption to the peaceful commerce of the world might be expected, and it was all-important that there should be some repressing force. England by herself could do little, but 1434 England at the head of her natural associates could do all. He urged upon Her Majesty's Government the necessity of coming to an agreement with the other maritime States of Europe. Greece, Italy, France, Spain, Portugal, Holland, and the Scandinavian States could with England form a police which would be efficient for the protection of the trade of the Mediterranean. He would only observe further that he thought there was no greater error ingrained in the public mind than the idea that England was weak in a military sense on great occasions. He believed that in that respect this country need concede nothing to any Power in the world; and, for his part, he would compare the military power of England to the small weight at one end of the steelyard, which, when moved to the proper position, could weigh down whatever was on the other end.
§ After a pause,
§ THE EARL OF DERBYMy Lords, I have waited to hear whether any other Member of your Lordships' House wished to make observations—I will not say upon this question, because I do not exactly know what the question is which we have been discussing—but upon that large subject of which various portions have been handled by the speakers who have addressed us. It is quite natural that we should employ the somewhat abundant leisure which we possess in this House in taking a general survey of political events, even when they are not of a nature to admit of an immediate decision, and when no question can be put or vote taken upon any definite issue. The only objection to discussions such as we have just had is that by the very nature of the case they tend to be more or less desultory; and your Lordships will, therefore, excuse me if, in answering the appeals which have been made to me upon very various subjects, I am constrained to address you in a somewhat disconnected fashion. The last question which was put to me by the noble Lord who has just sat down (Lord Waveney) was as to the explanation which we may have to give of the publication of the Paper relating to Russian proceedings in Poland three or four years ago. The noble Lord said that that Paper appeared to have been presented "by command;" and he went 1435 on to hint, at least, if he did not express the opinion, that it was a Paper which, unless there had been some urgent necessity, ought not to have been produced, inasmuch as some of the statements contained in it tended to the discredit of a Power which was still our Ally. My Lords, I think it is answer enough to that observation on the part of the noble Lord to say that it equally applied to the publication of those Papers relating to the massacres in Bulgaria, about which so general an interest has been felt. I did not volunteer the production of the Paper to which the noble Lord has referred. The fact is, the correspondence was moved for in the other House of Parliament, and I consented to its production, because, as I understood, a considerable number of Members were desirous of having it before them, and because no political reason existed for keeping it back. My noble Friend who spoke last but one (Lord Houghton) asked whether the Protocol was intended to become the subject of discussion and correspondence between the Porte and the Powers? The answer I have to give to that question is, that when the Protocol was framed care was taken to avoid employing language which might require the signature or assent of the Porte. It was thought some difficulty might exist as to obtaining the signature or assent of the Porte to that document; or, at all events, that such a condition would lead to correspondence of a controversial character, which obviously under the circumstances was not desirable. The Protocol, therefore, was so framed that the Porte was not required and was not expected to express its opinion upon it. I think myself it is unfortunate that the Porte did not take that view and did not content itself with either passing over the document without comment or simply protesting against it in a different tone from that which it adopted. But that is not a matter within our control, and I only mention it in answer to the question put by my noble Friend. The noble Earl who spoke second (the Earl of Rosebery) asked what were the views of the Government with regard to the obligations contracted by us under the Treaty of April, 1856, and whether we intended to take any steps to free ourselves from those obligations? Now, my Lords, that question was raised and partially discussed in 1436 this House some weeks ago, and I then endeavoured to explain that the Treaty of April, 1856, was not a Treaty under which we incurred any obligations towards the Porte. It was a Treaty between England, France, and Austria; and any obligations which we may be held to have contracted under it are obligations to those Powers alone. That being so, the first and most material question is, Does there exist at present, or is there the slightest probability that there will exist, any intention on the part of the French or Austrian Governments to call upon us to fulfil our Treaty obligations? To that question I can give an unhesitating answer. I am perfectly convinced that neither the French nor the Austrian Government has the slightest intention of calling upon us to fulfil what we are bound to under the Treaty of April, 1856; and consequently I have not thought it necessary to take any steps in regard to that Treaty, or to free ourselves from the obligations which it involves. My Lords, I pass over some remarks of the noble Earl, not because I entirely acquiesce in their justice. Ho has said the only triumphant language which has been held on this Bench was when I boasted of the nullity and unmeaning character of the Protocol we signed. My Lords, I do not think there was any boasting in the matter. What I did say was that we had guarded against danger by reducing the Protocol which we were originally called upon to sign, and which might have been used in a manner very inconvenient to us, to an engagement which, if it led to no satisfactory result, would, at any rate, not be productive of mischief. The noble Earl spoke very strongly, and with great justice, upon the necessity of maintaining the integrity of Treaties, and went into the question as to whether the Porte had disentitled itself to claim execution of our Treaty obligations by its continued breach of its promises. My answer to the noble Earl as far as I dissent from him—or rather as far as I feel bound to qualify what he has said—would be this, that no Treaties can be or are intended to be eternal. They are framed with reference to existing circumstances, and though I do not say whether that is or is not the case in regard to the Treaty of 1856, yet nothing has been more common in European diplomacy than the recognition of the fact that Treaties do by the lapse of time and 1437 the force of events become obsolete. I do not think it would be a fair or satisfactory conclusion to come to either that you must be eternally bound by a Treaty, made long ago under conditions wholly different from those now existing, or that you are to be held guilty of a breach of faith because you consider it to be no longer binding. That is all I have to say as to the general principle. I come now to the speech of the noble Lord who commenced this conversation. The noble Lord said peace ought not to be despaired of—that between the possibility of war and the making of war there is a great distinction—that the influence of England at Berlin is not exhausted—that something might even yet be accomplished by diplomacy. My Lords, I do not like to disappoint such sanguine expectations, and I speak now under the gravest sense of responsibility. The noble Lord and your Lordships may rely upon it that if we see any prospect—any hope—of diplomatic intervention being even yet successful in averting what seems to be an impending war, no effort on our part shall be spared. But, my Lords, I am bound to tell you that the opinion of those, not in England only, but throughout Europe, who are best acquainted with the diplomatic situation is not such as to justify me, or your Lordships, in indulging in sanguine hopes that we shall be able to avert that great European calamity. As to the question what we are to do in the event of war breaking out, I am sure your Lordships will feel that that is not a matter upon which you will expect a declaration from me. I stated as long ago as May last, when negotiations in connection with the Berlin Memorandum were pending, that the Porte must not count upon receiving material support from England. I have repeated that warning on several occasions—particularly at the time of the Conference—and if I have not uttered it again within the last few days, it is because a repetition of it would be superfluous, and would only weaken the effect of the previous warnings we had given. My Lords, I will state that we do not hold ourselves bound, and that we do not desire, to intervene in this unhappy war, if war there is to be. We reserve to ourselves, however, as we are bound to do, and as every British Government must do, the right of protecting British interests if we see those in- 1438 terests threatened. Less than that I should not be justified in saying. More than that—speaking with the knowledge that every word uttered in this House is addressed to all Europe—more than that I am sure your Lordships would not think it prudent of me to say.
§ Motion (by leave of the House) withdrawn.
§ House adjourned at half-past Seven o'clock, till To-morrow, half-past Ten o'clock.