ADDRESS FOR PAPERS. (Hansard, 6 March 1876)

LORD CAMPBELL
rose to move an Address for copies of the Firman on Reforms which had lately come from the Sublime Porte, and of the Austrian Note 1406 by which it had been followed. The noble Lord said, that a paragraph in the Speech from the Throne on the opening of Parliament gave more importance to the disturbances in the Herzegovina than language coming from any other quarter could impart to them. Having recently had a personal opportunity of ascertaining the opinions of persons at Constantinople qualified to judge, he found it to be the opinion of many that the Austrian Note was not adapted so much to promote tranquillity as to encourage the insurgents. That, he thought, was erroneous; but however that might be, he knew from personal knowledge that much uneasiness existed in the Danubian Principalities. If the ideas he had found to prevail at Bucharest were correct, it was now too late to do anything to calm the existing insurrection; but he thought the circumstances were calculated to call for the utmost vigilance. It was not his intention to enter into the merits or demerits of what Her Majesty's Government did during the autumn; but it appeared to him desirable that their Lordships should have before them the Papers for which he moved in order that they might see how far the Firman on Reforms fell short or exceeded what was promised by the Sultan. The origin of the insurrection was clear to all who had studied the Eastern Question. In October, 1874, the three great military Powers, whose union, however lawful or excusable, was always disastrous in its consequences to the sovereignty of the Porte, assumed an attitude hostile to that sovereignty in respect of its European Provinces. It was so regarded by the Porte; it was so regarded by our Foreign Office. Evidently it was one which would inevitably excite the races whose allegiance was always more or less disturbed, and it was quite evident at the time the debate took place last Session, that an insurrection was pending. It was not to be supposed that we could influence the foreign policy of Russia, nor were we in a position either to influence the foreign policy of Austria. One course, however, remained to us—namely, to bring the influence of Berlin, if we could, to bear upon those Powers; and if that influence were exercised in the manner he suggested, it would check the influences by which the insurrection in the Provinces was supported. He was not surprised that there should be mani- 1407 fested out-of-doors some sympathy with the insurgents; but he could not see that that sympathy could be justified on the ground by the sympathy felt towards the Greeks or the Poles, or with the Southern States of America. He thought there was no great object to be gained by Europe or by the world at large, by the establishment of a Kingdom of the Herzegovina or a Kingdom of Bosnia. Then as to the interests of the Turkish bondholders, certainly they were not advanced by the continuance of the insurrection. It should be remembered that the insurrection cost the Porte £50,000 a-day. If the insurrection did not exist that sum would be available for the bondholders, and so far the insurgents were the greatest enemies whom the bondholders had. It was also urged as an argument in favour of the insurrection that "the sick man" had reached that point of sickness that his general collapse was certain to occur at no distant day; but we could not point to a single instance in history in which a kingdom, no matter how enfeebled, had collapsed until external force had been brought to bear against it. Then there was now an opinion that the occupation of the Bosphorus by Russia would be harmless; but no one with any knowledge of the subject could be of that opinion. The elements on which the insurrection hung were so complex that we could not disregard it; the financial embarrassments were a source of temptation to those who would destroy the Turkish Empire, and at the same time those difficulties rendered the Government of the Porte less able to apply its attention to resisting attempts on its integrity.

THE EARL OF MORLEY
said, he did not rise to ask any questions which it might be inconvenient for the noble Earl the Foreign Secretary to answer at the present moment; but he thought he might, without seeking to place the noble Earl in any difficulty, ask him for some further explanation as to the policy recently adopted by Her Majesty's Government in reference to Count Andrassy's 1408 Note. Hitherto we had had no explicit statement as to the obligations we had assumed. As he understood that policy, Her Majesty's Government gave a general approval to the Note, assented to its truth, and supported the suggestions made in it; but did not bind themselves to carry out any particular line of policy now or in future, and did not preclude themselves from taking any steps which the dignity and the interests of this country might require. The question was not one in respect of which the country would be of opinion that a policy of non-interference would be best; because it could scarcely be held that obligations which we had undertaken with regard to the Christian populations could now be evaded, or that they were not as binding at the present time as they were 20 years ago. It should be remembered that at that time, when we undertook the Crimean War, it was understood that there must be an amelioration of the condition of those populations if our responsibilities were to be satisfied; and, as Mr. Cobden stated in the other House, those were obligations not to be evaded. Yet these promises on the part of the Porte had been notoriously unperformed. The Note of Count Andrassy was, in fact, an indictment against the Porte for not having fulfilled its obligations. In his Note Count Andrassy referred to the Hatti-Humayoun of 1856 and to the Iradé of October last, and recapitulated the articles in those documents to show that they had been palpably evaded. The Hatti-Hamayoun purported to deal in a satisfactory manner with the tithe question, but that question was open, and was a principal cause of irritation up to the present moment. The question whether the promises contained in the reply of the Porte to Count Andrassy's Note were to be trusted might not be very material for third parties to consider; but it was one in which the populations now in insurrection were deeply concerned, because they were called upon to put down their arms on the faith of those promises. He wished to ask the noble Earl (the Earl of Derby), whether he had any objection to produce the answer made by the British Government to the communication accompanying that Note, the communication made by the British Government to the Porte in support of the Note, and the answer of the Porte to that communication?

§ THE EARL OF DERBY
I do not think that my noble Friend who began this conversation (Lord Campbell) or your Lordships will expect me to follow him through those very interesting, but, if I may say so without discourtesy, rather discursive, remarks which he has addressed to your Lordships upon the subject of the present position and possible future prospects of the Turkish Empire. My noble Friend has given great care and attention to this subject. He has studied it at Constantinople and in other European capitals; and he has very naturally and properly availed himself of this opportunity to give us the advantage of the information which he has obtained and the impressions which have been made upon his mind. But, my Lords, although it is proper and right for my noble Friend to speculate on the acts of foreign States in regard to those questions now pending, I cannot, without impropriety and without injury to the public service, display the same unreserve. I quite agree with some of the propositions which my noble Friend laid down. Nothing could be more natural than that those who are threatened with the loss of their money should show themselves angry, and should seek to revenge themselves by favouring the cause of the insurgents. But that certainly is not a course likely to improve their interests. It would be very like what is vulgarly described as cutting off your nose to be revenged on your face. I also agree with my noble Friend that, badly administered as the Turkish Empire was and still is, it has nevertheless very great resources remaining. I think it would in the event of a life and death struggle put forth a degree of strength, under the influence of religious fanaticism and patriotic sentiment, greater than most people give it credit for. But I do not think it necessary to use any argument to convince your Lordships that it is not our interest or the interest of the world in general that all Eastern Europe and those Provinces inhabited by a mixed population of Mahomedans and Christians should be put into a state of disturbance and anarchy which would probably end in a widespread war of religion and of race, and in which all these acts of cruelty would be perpetrated which fear and fanaticism tend to produce. It is clearly not desirable that this 1410 question should be settled in that manner. Therefore, I do not think that many people will differ from what was said by the noble Earl who spoke last (the Earl of Morley) to the effect that the position in which we find ourselves, and considering our past connection with this question, a policy of absolute non-interference was impossible. The noble Earl wishes to know what our obligations are under the recent correspondence with respect to Count Andrassy's Note. The noble Earl said that we have given a general support to the Andrassy Note. That we did so, and, with some reservations, urged the acceptance of that Note on the Porto, is quite true; but I think that the noble Earl carried his argument a little further than he ought, when he said that because we had done that we had made ourselves responsible for every statement in that Note. That is not the case. We had nothing to do with the framing of that Note. We only saw it after it was framed, and when the question was practically this—What course ought we to take in regard to it? Whatever course we might take it was certain that the Note would be sent to the Porte and would be supported by the three great Powers. The question was, should the Porte be advised to accept or to reject it? As between the two alternatives we had no hesitation in saying that it was the interest and duty of the Porte to accept it. That advice we accordingly gave; but beyond that we have given no pledge; and apart from Treaty obligations of old standing, which are not affected by anything recently said or done, we are as absolutely free to act in such a manner as our duty and the circumstances of the case may require as we were before we gave that advice. The noble Earl (the Earl of Morley) has reminded us of the obligations which we, in common with former Governments, are considered to owe to the Christian populations of the Turkish Provinces. I have no doubt that when 20 years ago we guaranteed the independence and integrity of the Turkish Empire, we acquired the right in the case of extreme misgovernment to remonstrate on behalf of oppressed populations. I think it does not require much argument to prove that. All protection involves a certain right of control. But, my Lords, there is extreme delicacy 1411 and difficulty in endeavouring to lay down the precise line of demarcation between what may be regarded as a proper and reasonable interference and what may, however, well merit here the appearance of an attempt to over-ride the independence of Turkey, which it was the very object of the war to maintain. I have always held that it is our right and duty to watch over the interest of the various populations of the Turkish Empire, not as setting class against class, race against race, Christian against Mahomedan, but looking to the interest of all and to those of humanity and justice generally. I am sure your Lordships have no wish that I should go more into detail in the absence of the Papers which have been asked for, and which are in preparation. I hope that before long it will be in my power to lay them on the Table of the House. The present state of the case is this:—The Porte, as we all know, has accepted the Note of Count Andrassy with some reservations; but which reservations refer to questions of detail, and seem to be not unreasonable. Neither Russia nor Austria—nor any other Power—has attempted to interfere between the Porte and its subjects in the insurgent Provinces, but they have recommended certain reforms which, if adopted, will tend to prevent any further increase of the insurrection, and have given a pledge that they will use such moral influence as they may possess in favour of the restoration of peace, both with the insurgents and the inhabitants of Servia, Montenegro, and the Principalities. It is idle to attempt to predict to what extent it will be successful influence; but, for my own part, I believe they are acting with sincerity and in good faith, and that they are anxiously desirous of preventing the further spread of the insurrection. I have been asked why the Governments have not interfered sooner and more effectually; but it is obvious that where two countries have a long line of frontier running for the most part through a mountainous and difficult country, and where on the Austrian side there is a population which has strong sympathies with the insurgents on the other side, it is not easy even with the best will on the part of the authorities to enforce an entire neutrality. If I wanted an illustration of that I should not have to go very far. I should 1412 only have to remind your Lordships of what took place a few years ago during that civil war in Spain which is now happily ended. On the side of the French authorities there was every desire to fulfil the obligations which International Law imposed upon them, but they were entirely unable to prevent a great deal of help being given by Carlist sympathizers on the French side of the Pyrenees to the combatants on the other side of the French frontiers. I do not object to the Motion of my noble Friend (Lord Campbell) with respect to the Papers which he has asked for. But with regard to those asked for by the noble Earl (the Earl of Morley), not being aware that he intended to apply for them, I must, before giving any pledge off-hand, look into them again; though at present I am not aware that there will be anything to prevent our laying them on the Table. I shall be ready at all times to state the course which the Government will be prepared to take; but at present I do not see that there will be any advantage to the country in making further observations on the subject.