§ THE EARL OF DENBIGH,who had given Notice to move the following Resolutions:— 1458
said, when I put these Resolutions on the Journals of the House, it was with the anticipation and belief that the whole question involved therein would have been previously fully discussed in "another place," and enabled your Lordships and the country generally to appreciate the arguments on each side. That there are cogent and weighty arguments to be urged on the opposite side I am well aware; but as this discussion in the other House has been defeated by a manœuvre, I prefer not to take up your Lordships' time by entering at length on this important subject, and I will confine myself to exposing in a very few words some of what I may term the popular fallacies which have lately been reproduced publicly, and endeavour to show that they will not bear the test of close examination. These are—first, the Declaration is of the nature of a Treaty, 1459 and equally binding; secondly, that we are gainers rather than losers by it; thirdly, that it abolishes the vexatious Right of Search. First, that the Declaration was a portion of the Treaty of Paris, and equally binding upon the co-signatories—the Treaty of Paris was signed on March 30, 1856, hut the Declaration on Maritime Law was not mentioned till 8th April, when it was introduced by Count Walewski. The proposal took the assembled Plenipotentiaries so much by surprise that Count Orloff and Count Buol thought it necessary to apply to their respective Courts for instructions before giving any opinion. So far from this having any of the character of a Treaty, I was informed officially that it had never received the Royal Sanction; we know that it has never received the approval of Parliament; and I challenge that Government whom Lord Clarendon was sent to represent, to show that he even received formal instructions from the Foreign Office to accede to these propositions. We are therefore bound only as by a pack-thread to conditions which strike at the very root of Great Britain's power as a maritime nation, and involve her very existence as a firsts-rate Power. The obnoxious principle laid down in the Declaration of Paris was that the neutral flag covers enemy's goods except contraband of war. It is argued that we as the greatest carriers should gain as neutrals more than we should profit as belligerents by the maintenance of this principle, and that without it we should have been sufferers in, for instance, the Franco-German War, not only as losing the advantages of a neutral carrier, but also as exposed to the intolerable hardships of being continually liable to search for enemy's goods. This is a fallacy, and will not bear examination. If we are to profit under the declaration as a neutral carrier, our obvious policy will be to remain neutral under all political complications, and, abdicating all active interference in European quarrels, to return once more to that inglorious policy of absolute non-intervention which caused us for many years subsequent to the Crimean War to be but as a geographical expression in the face of Europe, a political dummy. The very fact of the general surprise and satisfaction caused by the independent action of England in a late transaction is evidence that the people of this country 1460 as a body would reject the proposition that England should play the inglorious rôle, perhaps best expressed by a French term, "le rôle ďépicier." It is not true to say that by the declaration we are delivered from the intolerable liability of having our merchantmen searched. As long as it is held lawful to confiscate contraband of war, every merchant ship, of whatever nation, is liable to be boarded and have its papers and cargo overhauled and examined. If we become belligerents under the Declaration of Paris, our condition will be deplorable. All our carrying trade will depart from us, because freights will be increased 50 per cent. With the merchandize will go the sailors, the nursery of our naval reserves; our merchantmen will rot at their anchors, and our men-of-war will want crews. We have a powerful fighting navy, it is true; but in order to make it available for either offence or defence, we must find an enemy's navy that will meet it at sea, and not shut itself up, as the German navy did, in a harbour protected by torpedoes. The Declaration of Paris once signed, Russia knew we were impotent to prevent her violating the Treaty of Paris, and when we took stock of our military position we found we were powerless to prevent it, and so swallowed the leek with the best face we could. Withdraw from this fatal Declaration, break this pack-thread which binds England's right arm to her side, and you have her free once more, as she was in her most glorious days, when she successfully maintained, against Europe in arms, the right to seize her enemies' goods wherever she could find them—a principle maintained as a natural right by all standard writers on international law, with the exception, I believe, of De Hautefeuille, who wrote as against England. War cannot be waged with kid gloves. It ought to be rendered intolerable to our adversary, while at the same time we endeavour to be humane and to spare human life as far as possible. By paralyzing your enemy's commerce you deprive him of the sinews of war, and reduce him to terms without the necessity of blowing up his ships and their crews with the various diabolical engines of modern warfare. I might go on to show that it is no argument that, because you find it unnecessary to seize private property in military operations 1461 on land, you are thereby debarred from touching it on the high seas; but it would be entering more deeply into the question than I propose doing on this occasion. I am content to remember that in 1856 Mr. Disraeli himself denounced in the strongest terms this ill-omened Declaration, as did also my noble Friend who holds the Seals of the Foreign Office (Lord Carnarvon); and should Her Majesty's Government not have taken some steps towards withdrawing from this Declaration before the next Session, I shall be prepared to move analogous Resolutions to those which I now beg leave to withdraw.
- "1. That the object of the Declaration of Paris respecting maritime law, signed at Paris on the 16th April 1856, was, as expressed in the preamble, 'to endeavour to attain uniformity of doctrine and practice in respect to maritime law in time of war:'
- "2. That it is, moreover, obvious that the whole value of any such declaration, as changing the ancient and immemorial practice of the Law of Nations on the subject, must necessarily depend on the general assent of all the maritime states to the new doctrines:
- "3. That the fact of important maritime powers, such as Spain and the United States, having declined to accede to the Declaration of Paris, deprives that document of any value as between the governments that have signed it:
- "4. That the consequence of some powers adhering to the new rules whilst others retained intact their natural rights in time of war would be to place the former at a great and obvious disadvantage in the event of hostilities with the latter:
- "5. That Great Britain being an essentially naval power this House cannot contemplate such an anomalous and unsatisfactory condition of international obligations without grave misgivings:
- "6. That independently of other considerations the failure, after twenty years negotiations, to bring about general adhesion to its terms necessitates the withdrawal of this country from what was necessarily and on the face of it a conditional and provisional assent to the new rules:
- "7. That this House, while desiring to leave the question of opportuneness to the discretion of Her Majesty's Government, and having confidence in the repeated declarations on the subject of individual members of the present Administration, think it desirable to record an opinion that no unnecessary delay ought to take place in withdrawing from the Declaration signed at Paris on the 16th April 1856 on the subject of Maritime Belligerent Rights,"
§ THE EARL OF DERBYMy Lords, after the brief statement of my noble Friend, I need not detain the House with any lengthened remarks. At the same time I feel some difficulty in offering even the few comments I intend to make, as he has announced his intention to withdraw these Resolutions and has only given Notice of Resolutions which, under certain circumstances, he will be prepared to move next Session. This being the condition in which my noble Friend has left the matter, I hardly see what it is I have to reply to. I do not know that your Lordships desire that I should go into a general discussion on a purely abstract question—more especially as the subject is one of extreme importance, very complicated, and not capable of being treated adequately in a few words. I have stated that the question is a very important one, but I do not think that it is a subject which deeply agitates the public mind at the present time. A few persons hold strong opinions on the question, and they are in the habit of repeating their opinions in various forms; but, without laying too much stress on what may have been the effect of mere accident, I cannot ignore the fact that within the last few days discussion was invited in "another place;" and I do not think that it is consistent with the general experience of Parliamentary life that the House of Commons declines altogether to entertain the discussion of a subject in which any considerable number of the public are interested. The noble Earl (the Earl of Denbigh) has gone so briefly into the general question that I feel bound to follow his example; but there is one point to which he adverted on which I wish to make a few remarks. 1462 He seems to be under the impression that the Declaration in question is not binding upon this country because it was not in the form of a Treaty, and because it never received the ratification of Parliament, or, in any formal manner, of the Crown. I observe also that another noble Friend (Earl de la Warr) has a Notice on the Paper to ask me, to what extent such a Declaration is binding, and how far it has the force of a Treaty? That is a difficult question to answer, unless we accurately define our terms. Everybody knows there is no tribunal—no external authority—which can enforce the observations of a Treaty. It is an obligation of honour and good faith, and no penalty is provided for its violation. Therefore I do not see that the binding force of a Treaty can go beyond this—that it is a promise or engagement to do certain things on the part of the highest authority in the States concerned. Although in the case of this Declaration the formal proceedings referred to by my noble Friend were not observed, nevertheless we have the fact that this Declaration was issued 20 years ago upon the authority of the Executive Government of the day representing this country. From that time to this it has been frequently discussed in both Houses of Parliament. It has, therefore, been again and again brought under the consideration of Parliament; and Parliament, knowing that pledge to be given to foreign Nations, and knowing the tendency of the Declaration, has never from that time to this thought fit to interfere and say—"This is not an engagement which ought to be maintained." In these circumstances, the observance of this declaration appears to my mind to be a matter in which the honour and good faith of the country are involved. I do not say that we are of necessity to be perpetually bound by it, or that at a suitable time and on ample notice it would not be competent and proper for this country, if it so determined, to undo what was done 20 years ago, and withdraw from the engagement: but I think we should be putting ourselves in a position of considerable difficulty if we were to adopt the course proposed by the noble Earl. Not only have the principles embodied in the Declaration of Paris been accepted by us, but during the past 20 years we 1463 have been pressing them upon other countries—in some instances with success. We have induced various Powers to adopt them; and if, without special reasons, and merely on general grounds of policy, we were to withdraw from our engagements, those Powers who have framed their policy in accordance with our example, would have some right to charge us with inconsistency. Then, apart from the abstract principle involved in the question before us, it would be difficult to conceive any time more inconvenient than the present for signifying an intention on our part to withdraw from the Declaration of 1856. Everybody knows that there exists at the present time in Europe, and, perhaps, to some extent in this country, a general apprehension—an apprehension which I believe to be unfounded—as to the course which events may take. Obviously it is our duty and our interest to remove so far as we can, that feeling of uneasiness, and to refrain as far as possible from doing anything which might tend to encourage mutual alarm and distrust among Continental States. Now, my noble Friend must see that if, at the present moment, without any external pressure, and without any change occurring in our positions either internally or internationally, we were suddenly to reverse what was done in 1856, we should set every Cabinet and every politician in Europe speculating as to our motives, and the inference that would naturally be drawn from the facts would be that, whatever explanation we might give, yet we were in our minds persuaded that war was impending, and that we were making what seemed to us the best preparation for it. And I am sure, whatever may be the abstract principle involved, that is not an impression it would be desirable to produce.
§ THE EARL OF DENBIGHreminded the noble Earl that he had said he was quite content to leave the matter in the hands of the Government; but that if no action were taken, he would bring the matter before Parliament next Session.
§ THE EARL OF DERBYIn that case I think I shall do well to abstain from entering into any general discussion of the merits of the question. It is more to the present purpose that I should state what are the views Her Majesty's Government take on the subject; and I am bound to guard myself against any 1464 possible misapprehension by saying that, fully admitting the question to be one of great difficulty, and one upon which the opinions of eminent men on both sides have been at variance, I myself am not prepared to assent to the opinion that it would be wise on our part to withdraw from the Declaration of Paris.
§ EARL GRANVILLEI think the noble Earl (the Earl of Denbigh) was judicious in withdrawing his Resolutions; but I disagree with his reasons for doing so. So far from thinking that this House should not discuss a subject merely because it has not been discussed in the other House, I am of opinion that there are many subjects which we can perfectly well discuss, although the House of Commons may have paid no attention to them. While I think the noble Earl is discreet in not asking your Lordships to come to a decision upon his Resolution, I should be sorry to appear to wish to avoid any discussion upon the matter, having belonged to the Government to whom the chief responsibility in regard to it attaches, and which at the time of the Crimean War found it absolutely necessary to put the whole case with regard to the position of neutrals in the form of the statement which was embodied in the Declaration of Paris. To withdraw from that Declaration would, I believe, be an immense mistake on the part of this country, which is one of the greatest maritime Powers in the world. In the event of a war in which we were neutral the Declaration would be of the greatest advantage to us; and I believe that if we were involved in a war with any powerful maritime country, the effect of its abrogation would be to enlist every other maritime Power in the world on the side of our opponents and against ourselves. Therefore it was with no feigned satisfaction that I heard the final declaration made by the noble Earl. It was quite evident from what took place in the other House a few nights ago that the Government, together with an enormous majority on both sides, did not think it opportune to make any change, and I am delighted to hear the personal opinion expressed by the noble Earl confirming that impression.
§ EARL DE LA WARRexpressed great satisfaction with the statements made by the noble Earl the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and said that he 1465 should not put the Question of which he had given Notice.