Lords Sitting of 3 July 1876

MINUTES.
PUBLIC BILLS—First Reading—Saint Vincent, Tobago, and Grenada Constitution* (156).
Second Reading—Wild Fowl Preservation (134).
Committee—General Police and Improvement (Scotland) Provisional Order (Lerwick)* (122).
Committee—Report—Slave Trade (135).
Report—Industrial and Provident Societies* (148).
Third Reading—Metropolitan Commons (Barnes)* (119); Elementary Education Provisional Order Confirmation (Tolleshunt Major)* (114); General Police and Improvement(Scotland) Provisional Order Confirmation (Paisley)* (112)—(Perth)* (113); Public Health (Scotland) Provisional Orders (Irvine and Dundonald)* (118); Provisional Orders (Ireland) Confirmation (Coleraine, &c.) (107),* and passed.

TURKEY—RUSSIAN OFFICERS IN THE SERVIAN ARMY.—QUESTION.
THE EARL OF CAMPERDOWN: My Lords, I rise for the purpose of putting a Question to the noble Earl the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, of which I have given him private Notice. It has been stated in the papers that a Russian
824
officer holding the rank of General in the Russian Army has now a high command in the Servian Army. It has also been stated more than once that Russian officers have been crossing over into Servia—presumably with the object of joining the Servian Army. I beg to ask the noble Earl, Whether those statements are true; and whether he can give the House any information as to the number of Russian officers who have entered the Servian service?
THE EARL OF DERBY: I presume that the officer alluded to in the noble Earl's Question as holding the rank of General in the Russian Army is General Tchernayeff. There is no doubt that General Tchernayeff was formerly employed in the Russian Army, and attained high rank in the Russian service. He subsequently, I am told, quitted that service, and became the Editor of a journal which supports the Sclavonic cause. I am informed that he has since accepted the command which he now holds in the Servian Army. As to the other part of the noble Earl's Question—that relating to Russian officers who may have crossed into Servia with the view of entering into the Servian Army—I am afraid that I cannot answer it. Everybody knows, however, that there is a strong sympathy felt among the Russian population for the cause of the Servian insurgents; and it is possible and not improbable that various persons who have held rank and been employed in the Russian service may be serving as volunteers in the Servian Army. But on that point I cannot speak with any certainty; and I have no reason to believe that they do so with the assent, still less with the authority, of the Russian Government.

MALAY PENINSULA.

  RESOLUTION.
  LORD STANLEY OF ALDERLEY,in rising to call the attention of the House to the Malay Correspondence, and to move—
  "That this House regrets that the Colonial Department did not bestow more attention on the affairs on the Malay Peninsula from the time of the Pangkok Treaty in January 1874 to October 1875,"
  said: Before addressing myself to the subject before the House, I desire to make

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  one or two preliminary observations. I am not going to call in question the acts of any other person than those of the noble Earl the Secretary of State, because he is technically responsible for all that has taken place; and also morally responsible—but I desire to qualify that statement by another. I am not so unreasonable as to expect from the Secretary of State a sufficiently careful reading of all the Papers sent from the Straits Settlements, added to all the mass of documents from all the other Colonies, but the country has a right to expect that that duty should be efficiently performed by the officials of the Colonial Office. If I do not say more in exoneration of the noble Earl in this respect, it is to avoid giving him an opening for saying that I am attacking those officials who are not here to defend themselves. It also well may be that the Staff of the Colonial Office is short-handed for the work it has to do, and I would gladly see the noble Earl take measures to strengthen the Staff of his office. I also feel bound in duty to state to your Lordships that which I have had the pleasure of saying in private, that I am grateful to my noble Friend, and that I feel the gratitude of the country is due to him for his conduct with regard to Sultan Ismail, and for having preserved the country from the disgrace which would have attached to any precipitate court martial or mock trial of Sultan Ismail, such as some persons in the colony were desirous of. I wish now to make an observation on the method of the Colonial Office in the matter of Parliamentary Papers. The Fiji Papers were given to your Lordships on the day of the debate; the Gambia Papers were delivered only one clear day before the discussion. The Malay Blue Book, No. 1,111, was delivered in the beginning of August last, though it professed to have been presented July 31st, 1874. This Blue Book may be called the undiscussed Blue Book, and the noble Earl appears to wish that it should be indiscutable, since it was delivered too late for discussion last Session, and February of this year was too early. One of the Blue Books lately delivered, No. 1,320, also professes to have been presented August 6th, 1875, and these Blue Books were only delivered to the other House on the day of a debate there. I will not say that this method of delivering Parliamentary Papers is intended to
  826
  prevent Parliamentary discussion, though it has that effect; but I say it is a strong proof of the procrastination and dilatoriness of the Colonial Office, which have in a great measure contributed to the recent unfortunate events in the Malay Peninsula—and I would ask the noble Earl why he took nearly two months to answer Sir William Jervois's despatch? Now, this House has already, in the Address in reply to the Speech from the Throne, expressed its regret for the loss of valuable lives during the recent military operations in the Malay Peninsula, and it will, no doubt, also regret, though in a lesser degree, the expenditure which has been caused by those operations; it will probably also regret that military operations should have taken place which must have had the effect of indisposing towards us the inhabitants of the Malay Peninsula. And it may be also supposed that it regrets the loss of life amongst the Malays, who were as much patriots as the Poles or any others who have had the sympathy of this country; and if this House regrets all these circumstances, or even if it should confine its regrets to the loss of the valuable lives of Her Majesty's troops, then it must also regret the cause of that loss, and that cause will be found to be principally the want of timely attention on the part of the Colonial Office. The Blue Books contain a discussion between the Secretary of State and the Governor of the Straits Settlements, chiefly turning upon the point of whether the Residents appointed by Sir Andrew Clarke had, or had not, assumed the administration of the countries where they resided. The Governor says they had; and the Secretary of State maintains, in his despatch of December 10, 1875, that the Residents were merely advisers; but I will show your Lordships that all this was clear to the Colonial Office before Sir William Jervois proceeded to his post, and that the Colonial Department approved of all that the Residents did, until Mr. Birch was killed and a dead body was found at their door, and then they did like the people in the Arabian Nights, who endeavoured to remove the dead hunchback from their own to another door. I do not wish to exonerate Sir William Jervois for having gone beyond his instructions, and there is much to object to in the unseemly tone of his despatches; but he has received hard

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  and unequal measure, for the despatch, addressed to him on the 10th December last would have been an admirable despatch, if it had been dated March, 1874, and addressed to Sir Andrew Clarke. And there is another person besides Sir Andrew Clarke upon whom the noble Earl should lay blame, and that is upon himself for not having more closely watched the proceedings of the Straits officials, for not having earlier checked departures from instructions, and from what he now states were his intentions; and the noble Earl has proved that he himself is conscious of this, by his not having recalled Sir William Jervois. Now in proof of this it will only be necessary to place before your Lordships the outlines of certain proceedings along with the dates of the reception at the Colonial Office of Reports upon them. The Report of Captain Speedy was received at the Colonial Office on the 10th May, 1875. From this Report it is clear that Captain Speedy was the chief, it may be said, the sole administrator. Mr. Skinner in his Report says—"Flogging is a more frequent punishment (under Captain Speedy) than in our Courts." The Secretary of State replied on the 25th May, 1875 (No. 24, p. 84), that he had read Captain Speedy's Reports with interest, and that it was desirable to obtain, if practicable, the abatement of debt slavery. This being a Malay custom was one of the matters the Residents were precluded from interfering with by the Pangkok Treaty. Sir Andrew Clarke had anticipated Sir William Jervois in giving the title of Commissioner instead of Resident to the British officials sent to Sunghie Ujong. Captain Dunlop's Report of his proceedings in that country was received by the Colonial Office on the 30th January, 1875, and on the 4th of March the Secretary of State approved of these proceedings. The Datu Klana of Sunghie Ujong applied to the Governor, Sir Andrew Clarke, for an officer and also for a British flag, "so as to be under the protection of the Great Governor. "This Sir Andrew Clarke granted him, describing the flag merely as a compliment to the British Government. The Datu Bandar, however, a Ruler with powers nearly co-ordinate with those of the Datu Klana, objected to this hoisting of the flag, and a quarrel ensued between the two Chiefs. The
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  Straits authorities intervened with an armed force in December, 1874. Sir Andrew Clarke informed the Datu Bandar on the 3rd October, 1874, that if he makes war against his Chief, the Datu Klana, he will in truth be making war upon the Queen. Captain Dunlop relates in his Report that he seized three Chinese head men who were suspected of having assisted the Bandar with money. He first pronounced them traitors and rebels who had incurred the punishment of death and confiscation; but relenting from this view he imposed a fine of $3,000 on each, and as one of them was not ready with his money next morning he had him flogged. There is no word of disapprobation in the Blue Book of such proceedings, and granting that the Klana assented to it, it is not fitting that a British officer should inflict such punishment on behalf of one Malay Ruler on the adherents of another. Captain Dunlop then settled the ways and means of Sunghie Ujong, leased the opium, spirits', and pawnbrokers'monopolies, and established a gambling farm—and the Blue Book does not contain a syllable of protest against a British officer sanctioning the establishment of gambling houses as one of the civilizing elements of the Residential system. In replying on the 4th March, 1874, to the Governor's despatch, forwarding Captain Dunlop's Report, the Secretary of State merely "regrets that the Governor has found himself so soon called upon to resume hostile operations against any of the Malay Chiefs. "It is impossible to account for this absolute acquiescence in a course so diametrically opposed to the professed policy of the Colonial Office, and I can find no other answer than either that the Secretary of State never read the Papers, or that he had no other policy than that which his subordinates chose to adopt. It is unnecessary to trouble your Lordships with further instances to prove that from their first appointment the Residents did not confine themselves to advice, but undertook the administration of the country, and it is only for the sake of the dates that I have referred to them, because the noble Earl has since admitted, in his despatch of June 1st last to Sir William Jervois, that—
  "It is indeed clear that the Residents have exceeded the function of counsellors, which they were intended to discharge."

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  To turn to another matter, the want of attention or of due diligence on the part of the Colonial Department has been strikingly shown in the selection of the Residents. The noble Earl was as fully conscious as everybody else of the importance of this selection when he wrote to Sir Andrew Clarke on the 4th September, 1874, that—
  "It was essential that these very responsible posts should be filled by officers of the highest ability, and on whose conduct complete reliance may he placed."
  Now first, with regard to Captain Speedy. He has done very well according to his lights, and left as he was without guidance; but it does not follow that because he has done pretty well in Larut, he should do well in Perak, since in Larut he had hardly any people but Chinese to deal with. But what was known of him on his appointment? All that was known of him in the Straits was that he arrived there after the Abyssinian War, in which he took some part, and that he was appointed police superintendent at Penang; that shortly after he threw up his appointment and actually entered the service of the Mantri of Larut, who was asserting his independence of the Sultan of the country, and went to India to raise sepoys for his new master. At that time he caused some flutter in India and Indian circles about this matter, and some legal question as to whether it did not fall under the Indian Penal Code or some Act of Parliament. It was in the service of the Mantri that Sir Andrew Clarke found him, and it was a singular appointment to recommend, and one over which the Secretary of State might well hesitate. Next, with regard to Mr. Davidson. He was a Scotch lawyer in good practice at Singapore. He was unconnected with the public service, and if he had been appointed to any other place but Salangore, I should not have called his appointment in question. But on the 10th of May, 1874, I wrote to the noble Earl, telling him there was a report that Mr. Davidson would be appointed to Salangore, and asking him to ascertain something about his relations and pecuniary interests in that country, and that I hoped to hear from him before I gave Notice of a Question on the subject in the House. To the best of my recollection (and subject to the noble Earl's correction if I am wrong) he informed
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  me that he did not believe there was any such intention. I also stated to your Lordships on the 19th May, 1874, that Mr. Davidson had lent money to Tunku Dhya Udin, but I did not mention his name because his appointment was not certain. It might have been expected, however, that the noble Earl would have cautioned Sir Andrew Clarke not to make such an appointment. Now, these were the pecuniary interests of Mr. Davidson, who since has administered Salangore as Resident. Tunku Kudin, brother of the Sultan of Keddah, came to Salangore and married a daughter of the Sultan. After pressure and interference, by the Straits' authorities, he was established as Viceroy of Salangore under his father-in-law. Meantime he had visited Singapore and made friends with the merchants and officials, and borrowed largely from Mr. Davidson. Before Mr. Davidson was named Resident he had obtained, in March, 1873, a concession of a monopoly of tin mines in Salangore for 10 years, and he and his friends tried to get up a company in England. From an advertisement in a London paper of July 6th, 1874, The London and China Telegraph, which, I presume, is taken in at the Colonial Office, it appears that the nominal capital of this company was £200,000, and £100,000 was to be paid to Count Gelois and Mr. Davidson, the concessionaires or vendors of the concession. When the United States Government has lately objected to one of their Ministers holding shares in a company, which he had bought with his own money, we should not be less scrupulous with regard to our Residents. Was a man with private interest of this kind in the country a suitable person to appoint as Resident there? Even Sir Andrew Clarke, who proposed the appointment, felt the incongruity, and so it was arranged that Mr. Davidson, before entering on his office, should transfer his pecuniary rights to some other person; but his letter announcing that this transfer would be made, shows that it was a mere formality. We then find that Mr. Davidson asked for the intervention of the Government to get the Sultan of Salangore to confirm the concession of the tin monopoly, and Sir Andrew Clarke objected to do so, unless the exclusive character of the concession was removed; and the concessionary was limited to one year for marking out the

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  places where he desired to dig, and two years to begin work. This was consented to. But the Sultan's deed of confirmation contains a remarkable stipulation; it is that, though the tax on other people's tin may be raised, the tax on the tin of the concessionary may not. Was this the stipulation of the concessionary or of the Resident? it matters not, they were the same person. What did the noble Earl say of this? He simply "feels an interest in it, as a promising attempt to extend British enterprize." I would here observe that no balance-sheet of the revenue has yet been published for Salangore or Perak. I come next to Mr. Birch and Mr. Braddell, formerly Attorney General at Singapore. Of the unfortunate Mr. Birch, for obvious reasons, I desire to say as little as possible. Mr. Braddell, though residing in Singapore, has taken part in all the proceedings in the Malay Peninsula as Secretary for Native States; and with regard to these two gentlemen I shall confine myself to reminding the noble Earl that in August, 1874, he received letters of Mr. Aitchison, which, to say the least, showed that the pecuniary relations of these gentlemen with Malay Rulers and others made them unfit for the duties which they subsequently have had to perform. On the 20th November, 1874, the Government and Council of Inquiry into Mr. Aitchison's statement reported upon them. That Report was so palpably unsatisfactory that it should have been sufficient to prompt the noble Earl without my communication of March 2, 1875, to provide better men for a public service, the exigencies of which he was fully aware of. If the noble Earl disputes this view, I must ask him to lay before your Lordships the Report of the Court of Inquiry, and the Correspondence relating to it. There has been a controversy between the Colonial Office and Sir William Jervois as to the cause of the outbreak against Mr. Birch. The Colonial Office has thought it right to attribute the murder of Mr. Birch to the change of policy introduced by Sir William Jervois. In my opinion it was unpremeditated, it arose immediately out of the imprudent act of the interpreter striking a Malay; at the same time I do not believe that act would have had the fatal result which immediately followed, if a store of hatred and ill-feeling had not accumulated in the
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  minds of the Malays. I find a witness saying that when the affair took place, Maharaja Lelah, the Chief of the village where it occurred, shouted from the steps of his house—
  "This is not the will of the Raja, or his order; it is our will, because we cannot stand it any longer. Others' houses have been burned, and where are we to go to, if our houses are burned too! It is better that we should die at once."
  This allusion to burning is cleared up by a letter from a writer on the spot, which appeared in The Times of December 25th, which says—
  "He (Mr. Birch) had made many enemies among the small Chiefs of Perak. The Chiefs are a bad lot, and on several occasions he had to resort to strong measures, such as burning the houses of refractory head, men, by way of example."
  So that while the Colonial Office fancied that the Resident was acting by advice, he was advising by burning. But as the noble Earl wrote to Sir William Jervois, April 8th, 1875, that he had been unable to satisfy himself that they (the Residents then in office) will possess the special qualifications which are absolutely required, and left to Sir William Jervois an opportunity of considering the whole subject, Sir William Jervois, and not the Secretary of State, must bear the responsibility of having left Mr. Birch in a position for which he was unfitted. I think I have now shown that there has been on the part of the Colonial Department dilatoriness and neglect in watching over the conduct of the Residents, and the selection of them, and a habit of leaving the officials to do very much as they thought fit; in short, a want of attention and due diligence at a critical time, and the consequence has been loss of life and expenditure, and that the whole Malay Peninsula has been set in a blaze, and the inhabitants, many of whom have been driven from their homes, have been made hostile to us, and we must either retrace our steps to non-intervention or assume the responsibility and the cost of securing proper government for the people we have now deprived of their independence. I wish to make a few observations on the future policy of this country with regard to the Malay Peninsula. There are said to be three courses which might be pursued—namely, letting it alone without intermeddling; meddling

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  with Residents; and annexation. I adhere to the opinion which I have already expressed in favour of the first course, because our Empire is overgrown, and enlarging it in the Malay Peninsula will entail much expense on this country only for the benefit of the Chinese and a few merchants and officials in Singapore. But as it is now, perhaps, useless to put forward that view except with respect to Sunghie Ujong, with regard to which the Secretary of State seems to be of the same opinion as myself, I will only consider the other two alternatives. That of Residents must, however, be divided into several shades. I am glad to find that the noble Earl states that the plan of Sir William Jervois of governing by British officials in the name of Sultan, is only annexation under another name; in fact, it might be called hypocritical or dishonest annexation, if there was such a thing as honest annexation. Experience has shown that Sir Andrew Clarke's method ended in the same result as that of Sir William Jervois. There remains the plan which the noble Earl intends to carry out, and which he says he originally intended. I heartily wish he may succeed, and secure to the Malays that prosperity and good treatment which they have a right to expect from this country, which has interfered with them only by the right of might. And here I should state that I am convinced of the rectitude of the intentions of the noble Earl; I am only complaining of his dilatoriness, or inability to carry them out. But in order to succeed it will be necessary for the noble Earl to appoint a higher class of men than those that have been hitherto employed; they must be directly responsible to himself, and be independent of the Singapore Council and indifferent to the favour of the Singapore Press and mercantile body. Not only should copies of all letters from the Government to the Residents be sent home, so that the Secretary of State may not again have to complain, as he has lately done, that Sir Andrew Clarke's instructions to the Residents had never come under his eye, but the Colonial Office might do well to adopt the plan of the Foreign Office, by instructing the Residents to send their despatches to the Colonial Office under flying seal to the Governor of the Straits, in the same way as some of Her Majesty's Envoys send their despatches to the Foreign Secretary
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  under flying seal to the Embassies at Paris and elsewhere. But if the Colonial Department should not make a very careful selection of officials for the Malay Peninsula and exercise a severe control over them, further troubles, bloodshed, and expenditure may be expected; and if the choice lay between annexation and administration of Malay States by dictatorial Residents I should certainly prefer annexation, since in that case the Malays would at least obtain the protection of British law. Sir William Jervois very candidly wrote on the 16th October, 1875—
  "By ruling in the name of the Sultan the form of government will be more adapted to the conditions of the case, and will enable us to deal easily with matters that might be difficult of solution under English law."
  I will ask leave to read an extract from a letter from a gentleman well acquainted with Singapore, written in March last—
  "You will be rather astonished to find that the Singapore people (British) are opposed to annexation, and in favour of a Protectorate. This is, however, easily explained. In the former case the Malays and their land will be subject to British laws. In the latter the will of the Governor or Commissioner will be the same, and grants of land and other advantages can be easily made over to Europeans, the ultimate end being that all the good land will be in their hands before long. For this reason, as also because I believe the Malays will have a much fairer chance under British law, I am decidedly in favour of annexation. There is nothing between this and leaving them alone. In any case you had better inquire into this land question, as I hear that some large grants have already been given. Britishers seem to think that if enough rice land is left for feeding Malays that is all that is required."
  I hope the noble Earl will make inquiry as to these grants of land. The Blue Books contain no reference whatever to the burning of houses, and plunder and sale by auction of the plough cattle in the county adjoining Sunghie Ujong. The noble Earl spoke of the reports of these proceedings as "scraps of newspapers; "but I have found from the Barbadoes newspapers that he does not attach an invidious sense to that word, since he spoke of "scraps of official despatches" to a deputation of planters. But from the doubts expressed by the Secretary of State in his despatch of June 1st, as to a foreign element in the force to be employed for the Residents, he would

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  appear to have some misgivings as to Sikh, Arab, or other levies, for he could not mean Her Majesty's European regiments, and as it is essential that proceedings such as those of the Arab force under M. Fontaine should not recur again, I will ask your Lordships' indulgence for a few moments longer to prove by Christian law and theology that these men were brigands, and as far as concerns the men themselves Mussulman law is identical with Christian law, only that it is rather more precisely declared. The noble Earl called this force Native Irregulars. They were neither; they were only natives in the sense that we are all natives of some place, and they were not irregulars, which is a military term for a particular formation. Let us suppose that this expedition was French, and had invaded Siam from Cochin China, and that instead of this Arab force there was one composed of Germans. We should all say that they were mercenary cut-throats. If they had been Englishmen we should say in addition that they had violated the Foreign Enlistment Act. Now, the Foreign Enlistment Acts were not passed merely to retain Englishmen for the King's service, but in obedience to the Law of Nations. Two Acts were passed in the reign of George II., but the Act of 1819 is the earliest of which there is any Parliamentary history, and I find in it that the Earl of Harrowby used arguments in favour of the Bill founded on Grotius, Vattel, and Puffendorff, and that the Earl of Carnarvon said that—
  "He (Lord Harrowby) had marshalled all the Dutch and German jurists in his ranks, and had turned all the scraps and quotations which could be taken from them to the very best use to which ingenuity could turn them."—[1 Hansard, xl. 1414.]
  Now I have not selected this extract from that debate in order to show the hereditary origin of the use of the word scraps by my noble Friend, but in order to bar his making light of Grotius and other jurists—because he will not now willingly plagiarize his ancestor. Well, Grotius did not invent or originate the law that he lays down; he only follows the teaching of the old Catholic catechisms respecting the 6th Commandment, and he quotes St. Augustin as saying that it is not a sin to bear arms, but a sin to serve for plunder. But if Catholic Catechisms are not considered as carrying weight,
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  what was the doctrine and practice of the early Christians? In the year 286 the Roman Emperor brought the The-ban Legion, which was composed of Christians, into Switzerland, where they were ordered to attack and exterminate the Bagaudæ, a Swiss tribe, an expedition similar to that of Sunghie Ujong. This they refused to do, as it was an unlawful order. The Legion was decimated, but as it persisted in its refusal, the whole of it was massacred without resistance on its part, with its commander, St. Maurice, who left his name to the town near the lake of Geneva, where this massacre happened. M. Fontaine's Arabs were not British subjects, and by their own law were strictly prohibited from taking part in such an expedition and became brigands, and if they killed any one, murderers; and if those who offer bribes are as guilty of bribery as those who take bribes, what is to be inferred of those who enrol brigands, or sanction such enrolment? I have now the honour to move the Resolution of which I have given Notice. I do not know whether it will receive any support, but I feel certain that at least the noble Earl will, from his knowledge of the facts, yield his inner assent to it; and I would suggest to my noble Friend to alter the words of the Resolution, and to admit frankly and candidly that, from whatever cause it arose, there is reason to regret that the attention of his Department was not given more in time to the Malay Peninsula and to the acts of the Residents.
  Moved to resolve, That this House regrets that the Colonial Department did not bestow more attention on the affairs of the Malay Peninsula from the time of the Pangkok Treaty in January 1874 to October 1875.—(The Lord Stanley of Alderley.)
  THE EARL OF CARNARVONsaid, it would be extremely difficult for him, without unreasonably wasting their Lordships' time, to follow the noble Lord (Lord Stanley of Alderley) through the many subjects referred to in the discursive speech with which he had introduced his Resolution, and which was practically a Vote of Censure of a very serious character upon Her Majesty's Government. While listening to the noble Lord he could not help asking himself whether the noble Lord was in sober earnest in asking the House to

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  agree to this Vote of Censure—which should never have been placed upon the Notice Paper unless the noble Lord was prepared to support it by strong and serious argument. The noble Lord was good enough to give him (the Earl of Carnarvon) credit for good intentions; but surely it was strangely inconsistent with that view of the case to propose a Vote of Censure. The Resolution ran as follows:—
  "That this House regrets that the Colonial Department did not bestow more attention on the affairs of the Malay Peninsula from the time of the Pangkok Treaty in January 1874 to October 1875."
  This proposition raised three separate and distinct questions—first, intention; but really to ask for a Vote of Censure on such a point as that, was to turn what was a most important and deliberate act of Parliament into a jest. Secondly, the noble Lord asked the House to express its "regret that the Colonial Department "had failed in its duty. Did their Lordships ever remember before a Department thus attacked? If anybody was responsible it was himself and himself alone. He protested against such attacks upon those who were discharging the duties of a public office with self-sacrifice and self-devotion, and with so much ability—and on that point he knew he should have the assent of both sides of the House. Then the noble Lord censured him because sufficient attention was not paid to the affairs of the Peninsula. What did he mean by "attention?" It was a wholly relative term; and he denied that either the Ministers or the officials could be taxed with any want of attention. It was very difficult to disentangle the noble Lord's charge from the mass of details with which he had overlaid it; but there were, at all events, some points on which he felt bound in courtesy to the noble Lord and to the House to give such explanation as lay in his power. The noble Lord's charge, when closely examined, appeared to resolve itself into this—that by the Treaty of Pangkok the English Residents had been converted from advising into controlling agencies—and that he (the Earl of Carnarvon) as Secretary of State ought to have employed any European force during the last two years in support of the Residents. It would be in the recollection of the House that in 1867 the Go-
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  vernment of the Straits Settlements was transferred from the India Office to the Colonial Office. From that date until 1873 the burden of every despatch that had been sent out by successive Colonial Ministers to the Residents at Perak was that they should interfere as little as possible with the affairs of the Peninsula, and the avoidance as far as possible of political complications. In 1873 a change occurred which was, he believed, forced upon the Government of the day by the overwhelming stress of circumstances. In that year, matters came to a serious head. The Chinese faction were engaged in a deadly feud with the Malays; blood was spilt, the trade of the country was being destroyed, anarchy reigned—and unless the whole district was to go into sheer ruin it was absolutely necessary that some control should be exercised by our Representatives in that country. On the 20th September, 1873, the noble Earl opposite, his Predecessor in office (the Earl of Kimberley), looking to all these circumstances, wrote to Sir Andrew Clarke, who had been appointed Governor, directing him to apply a remedy to this anarchical state of things. Sir Andrew Clarke, proceeding to act upon these instructions, ultimately agreed with the Chiefs in the Peninsula upon a Treaty which settled the question of disputed succession; appointed provisional Residents; and, while pacifying the Chinese rioters, inflicted punishment upon such of them as deserved it. Shortly after this a change took place in the Government of this country, and he (the Earl of Carnarvon) communicated to Sir Andrew Clarke his approval of the arrangements he had made. He thought the subject was one which required much consideration before he expressed even a qualified approval of the course that had been taken; but afterwards he gave a practical sanction to the Treaty engagements, and more recently still he had impressed upon the Governor, in successive despatches, the importance of exercising the utmost caution in dealing with the affairs of the Settlements. During the whole time that Sir William Jervois was in office, only two despatches on the subject of the Settlements reached the Colonial Office, and these described the condition of the country as being everything that could reasonably be desired. It was, therefore, with the utmost asto-

  839
  nishment that he heard that the Governor had issued a Proclamation appointing Commissioners at the Native Courts, and making other alterations. The consequence was the outbreak which resulted in the cruel and barbarous murder of Mr. Birch, the British Resident at Perak. It was necessary at once to take strong measures. The troops on the spot were increased from 200 to 300, and after several conflicts, the measures taken put an absolute termination to the outbreak within two months of its commencement. He did not wish to go into the discussions that had arisen between Sir William Jervois and himself—those who wished to study them would find them in the despatches. He could not accept his noble Friend's views that because he saw reason to differ from Sir William Jervois on some points, though he agreed with him in others, it was his duty to recall him. He had a high opinion of that gentleman, formed on his past services, and however erroneous his proceedings in the first instance he had hastened to retrieve them. An important question at issue was whether Sir William Jervois was or was not right in making of his own motion, and without authority from home, a great and serious change in the policy hitherto pursued by England in reference to the government of the Straits Settlements, and on this point he was bound to admit that in his view Sir William Jervois was wholly wrong. In such cases as these the authority should emanate from the Secretary of State, who was responsible to Parliament for the policy adopted. The real question was—what ought to be our future policy with regard to the Malay Peninsula? The ultimate responsibility of colonial government had to be accounted for to the Crown and to Parliament, and a policy which might affect the whole Peninsula and perhaps entail a great expense must originate in the Government in England. On the general question he understood the noble Lord (Lord Stanley of Alderley) to lay down three courses as possible—in the first place, whether it was possible for Her Majesty's Government to withdraw altogether from interference with the Native Governments; in the second place, whether a policy of complete annexation was possible; and in the third whether the old system of advising by means of
  840
  Residents could not be re-adopted and continued with certain modifications. With respect to withdrawal, it was simply not to be thought of—it was an unworthy policy, and would be a dangerous policy—instead of relieving us from responsibilities, it would increase complications. It need not, therefore, be discussed. Then, as to annexation, it was a question which had excited the greatest attention at home and on the spot. He drew an extremely small distinction between a virtual and a formal annexation—on the contrary, there were advantages in a formal which did not exist in a merely virtual annexation. Now, the local pressure brought to bear on the Colonial Government in favour of annexation was very great. A great deal of intemperate language had been used, and, to show the prevailing local opinion, he would read an extract from one of the Straits papers of considerable influence. It said—
  "The serious nature of the news from Perak and Salangore suggests some reflections. We feel sure that the Government will have the hearty support of every man of common sense in the three Settlements, in taking the severest and most peremptory measures in this matter. It is the colony's quarrel; very well, the colony will settle it. We say this because we apprehend that the Home Government may possibly intervene. Nobody can say now-a-days what a British Government may do; but we distinctly think that the colony should, on its own responsibility, do what is right and proper, and, above all, do it quickly. Furthermore, if the Home Government show any signs of shrinking in this most righteous quarrel, then this colony will rebel, as it once very nearly did before, not against Her Majesty the Queen, but Her Majesty's ignorant and misguided Government."
  This language would tend to show the nature and amount of pressure which had been used. The local idea was this—that there was vast room for the development of trade, and that trade would be fostered by annexation. But there was a widely different side to the question, and it was well before deciding to count the cost. Annexation involved the occupation of a district of from 10,000 to 15,000 square miles. Even if the transaction were effected peacefully it would still be an extremely costly operation. They would have to set up the whole machinery of administration, and in any event should maintain a large military force. The mines, which were said to be a source of inexhaustible wealth, were almost universally private property.

  841
  There was no agriculture in the country on which they could depend; and the only solution of the question would be the importation of a large number of Chinese labourers which would in itself create an element of dissension and difficulty. If, on the other hand, they annexed by compulsion, of course the cost would be much greater, and they would have to deal with all the difficulties which the Dutch had to encounter. They should in a matter of this kind have regard to Imperial considerations, and should not forget that it affected not only China, but India. They were bound to scan the whole political position, and not to fix their eyes simply upon one spot when such a question arose—and in that view he was of opinion that it would be most imprudent to do anything that would lead them to a wider field, and that the Government should put down its foot steadily against any proposal of annexation. With respect to the system of Residents to which the noble Lord (Lord Stanley of Alderley) had referred—that system had been tried with great success in India, and in one place in the south of the Peninsula it had been already attended with good results. He freely admitted that they should always learn by experience, and it had been the object of Her Majesty's Government, while adhering to the system of Residents, to do so subject to certain modifications which by the light of experience seemed to be necessary. They proposed that there should be in Perak and elsewhere a Council composed of Chiefs of eminence and position in the country to assist the Resident. The use of the Councils would probably be more confined to Perak than the other States; but they would have the machinery and could apply wherever it was thought necessary. He believed that in consequence of those Councils the influence of the Government would be increased rather than diminished. Following the course which had been adopted with great success by the Dutch in Java, he proposed that each Resident should have a body-guard. Had Mr. Birch possessed a small armed force, the tragedy they all deplored would no doubt have been prevented. Lastly, he had deemed it wise to retain Abdullah as nominal Sovereign of Perak, weak and incapable as he had proved himself to be. Those who were familiar with Malay affairs
  842
  knew how much importance attached to questions of race and family, and although at some future time it might be possible to make a change, the least dangerous course at present in his opinion was to retain Abdullah as Sovereign—provided, of course, he remained true and loyal to his duties. On the whole, he believed the general effect of the arrangements now contemplated would be good. He looked among other results for this—that the Government would have a better knowledge of the real feelings of the country, and obtain to a greater degree the concurrence of the Chiefs and rulers of those territories than had hitherto been the case. His noble Friend opposite (the Earl of Kimberley), in one of his despatches, had laid great stress on that joint, and he (the Earl of Carnarvon) had done the same. The Malay was not a savage, unamenable to good treatment; he would answer to education if it were given him—and the course the Government were now taking was the most likely to educate him up to the standard of good government which was desirable. In conclusion, he would only say that what had occurred in the Malay Peninsula was but another illustration of the many difficulties and responsibilities of Colonial Empire in the East. Our authority was beset by dangers of every kind, against which the utmost watchfulness at home was sometimes of no avail. He quite agreed with the noble Lord (Lord Stanley of Alderley) that the only course to be pursued was to watch very closely the accounts which might be transmitted from the spot, and to require from our officials diligent attention to local circumstances and hearty co-operation in carrying out the policy laid down. Looking at the question in all its bearings, he submitted that the noble Lord had not made out a case for any censure of the Colonial Department.
  THE EARL OF KIMBERLEYsaid, he agreed with most that had been said in reply to the noble Lord's speech, and believing that the noble Lord the Colonial Secretary was justified in the course he had taken, he could not support the Motion. The subject was, no doubt, of very considerable importance. The position which this country occupied in the Peninsula was a very peculiar one. Formerly the Portuguese held a great supremacy there, the Dutch, succeeded

  843
  to the Portuguese, and ultimately the influence devolved upon the English. Many persons supposed that we might leave the affairs of the Peninsula alone, but no one who studied the actual circumstances of the case could fail to convince himself that a policy of non intervention was impossible. When European settlements of such importance as those of Penang and Singapore were planted side by side with Malay States, it was impossible for them to avoid exercising great influence either for good or evil on the surrounding population, and with that influence came responsibility. The occurrence of the Chinese riots in Perak, coupled with the danger to the Native States arising from Europeans obtaining large concessions and employing them to acquire political influence, rendered our intervention absolutely necessary. Of course we had no right to prevent European influence from penetrating into the Malay States, but it was our duty to put those States as far as possible in a position to meet the new condition of things. All those circumstances seemed to him to have rendered it necessary to take the state of the Peninsula into consideration with a view to some change of policy. No doubt Sir Andrew Clarke went beyond his instructions, but he thought the noble Earl had done right in upholding his proceedings. He was sorry the noble Lord should have felt himself compelled to pass a reproof upon Sir William Jervois; but under the circumstances he felt bound to say he thought his noble Friend had taken the correct view of the matter. At the same time it was due to Sir William Jervois, who was a distinguished public servant, to say that he had only done what appeared to him to be his duty. He had no doubt committed an error in taking steps before receiving advice from home; but he entirely agreed that it would be unjust to recall him because of that mistake. He was a man of great abilities, and had proved himself a good administrator and Colonial Governor. On the whole, the policy adopted by the Government seemed to be the policy least open to objection. The mistake made by Sir William Jervois was to suppose that because Residents were appointed therefore it was necessary that they should have their own way, and that the States in question, being no longer independent,
  844
  ought to be annexed. But in that course of reasoning there were a great many assumptions which were not quite justifiable. It was possible to give Native States wholesome advice without taking them altogether under our control. For an example of the success of that system we had only to look to India. Our system, therefore, should be administered so as not to destroy the Malayan Governments, but to support, advise, and guide them. On the whole, looking at the position we held in the Malay Peninsula, although it might be open to all the objections to which an intermediate course was always liable, yet it was the wisest and most judicious that we could assume; and he was glad to hear from his noble Friend that in all the States where it had been tried, except at Perak, the system had succeeded.
  LORD LAWRENCEsaid, it seemed to him, as far as he could judge, that some blame attached not only to the Governor of the Straits and the Governor of Penang, but also in some degree to the Colonial Office. But the real point as it struck him was that the Governor of Penang in the first instance committed a great mistake in preferring Abdullah to Ismail. Ismail was a man of stronger character than Abdullah, and, above all, he was a man whom the people of the country and the other Chiefs preferred. That appeared to have been the origin of the whole matter. Moreover, our representatives in those parts were placed in a most trying position through having no force near to help them in circumstances of extremity. A greater amount of force—two Native and one English regiments he believed—was formerly kept at the Straits and at Penang, but it had been reduced on the ground of expense, so that when disturbance broke out and troops were wanted they had to be sent for from China, India, and elsewhere. If under the previous system of non-interference they had more troops at the Straits and at Penang, how much more necessary was it that they should have a force of some strength there when they began to change their policy; and if the policy of having Residents at the Native Courts was to be maintained, there must be a considerable increase of military force there to uphold their authority. As to whether they should

  845
  wholly give up interfering with the internal affairs of the Malay Straits—or, in other words, whether they should withdraw their Residents from Perak and Laroot—or whether they should annex the country, he thought the policy indicated by the noble Earl the Colonial Secretary was the right one. If, in the course of time, it was found that the system of maintaining a Resident at Perak would not work, it would be open to us to re-consider our position.
  LORD BLACHFORDsaid, that he expressed his views reluctantly as they differed widely from those entertained by far higher authorities. It was true that when a State fell into a condition that was a source of danger to the neighbouring States, as had happened in the case of Laroot, those neighbourshad a right to call upon the Ruler to place his territory in a position that should not be dangerous, and if he failed to do that then they had a right to take measures for our own safety, even although those measures might amount to the annexation of the misgoverned territory. But this reason did not apply to the Governments of Perak and Salangore, the practical annexation of which (for in these Provinces the advice of the Residents was not only to be asked, but "acted on,") had no such justification, and was therefore, in his opinion, improper. He respected the energy of English merchants and the public spirit of colonial officers, but that energy and public spirit was apt in the British Colonies to cause a commercial and official pressure for annexation of neighbouring territory. It was to that pressure, and to confident expectations which had proved unhappily fallacious, that the Treaty of Pangkok was due. That Treaty was, in his view, a false step, which, as far as Perak and Salangore were concerned, he would wish to see retraced. He feared that the desire to hold a consistent course would lead to what was called "throwing good money after bad. "According to the plan of his noble Friend, the Rajah of Perak, instructed by a Resident, advised by a Council, and removable if he failed to do as he was bid, appeared to him much like the Governor of a Crown Colony. In his own judgment the British Government should be represented in these States, if at all, not by a Resident whose so-called advice had to be enforced by British power, but by
  846
  an officer in the nature of a Consul, who, if his counsels were not followed, could be withdrawn without discredit.
  LORD STANLEY OF ALDERLEY, in reply, said: I will not take up your Lordships' time by replying to some of the rhetorical artifices of my noble Friend. It is, perhaps, too much to expect that the noble Earl should admit that he has not given his attention to these affairs; the noble Earl has said that he was now giving them all his attention, and that he would do so in future, and therefore it will be more graceful for me, with the permission of the House, to withdraw the Motion.
  Motion (by leave of the House) withdrawn.

WILD FOWL PRESERVATION BILL.
(The Lord Henniker.)
WILD FOWL PRESERVATION BILL.

  (NO. 134.) SECOND READING.
  Order of the Day for the Second Reading, read.
  LORD HENNIKER,in moving that the Bill be now read a second time, said, it was a Bill to prevent the present rapid decrease of wild fowl in this country. There were two causes of decrease, one indirect—namely, the increase of drainage and the reclamation of waste lands. This, of course, could not be dealt with; but the other, the direct cause, could be dealt with—namely, the shooting and destroying these birds during the breeding season. These birds had been included in the Small Birds Protection Act of 1872; but that Act had been spoilt, as far as these birds were concerned, in Committee in the House of Commons, for the penalties had been made so low to meet the case of the small birds, that the value of these birds themselves was greater than the penalty imposed. This Bill had been approved by the House of Commons this Session by a majority of 339 to 15, and it was drawn on the lines of the Sea Bird Preservation Act, 1869, which had worked very well, and led to a very satisfactory result. He might add, that the Committee of the British Association, on the close time for these and other birds, had gone very carefully into the list of birds included in the Bill.
  Motion agreed to; Bill read 2a accordingly, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House on Monday next.

TURKEY—MURDER OF THE CONSULS AT SALONICA.—QUESTIONS.
EARL DE LA WARRasked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Whether there is any objection to laying upon the Table of the House the Papers and Correspondence relative to the late outrage at Salonica and the trial and execution of the persons implicated in the murders?
EARL GRANVILLE: Before the noble Earl answers that Question I wish to put to him another of a larger nature which I understand he will have no objection to answer. I wish to ask him whether, on account of the change in the state of affairs in the East, the noble Earl can state when it will be possible to lay upon the Table the Papers which will give information to Parliament with regard to the course which has up to this time been pursued by Her Majesty's Government in the Eastern Question?
THE EARL OF DERBY: My Lords, considering that all efforts in favour of pacification have unfortunately failed, and that war has broken out between Servia and Montenegro on the one hand and Turkey on the other, there is no diplomatic reason why the Correspondence showing the general course of events and the policy pursued by Her Majesty's Government should not be laid upon the Table. The Correspondence, I may mention, is somewhat voluminous, and, as a great deal of the information which it contains has been confidentially communicated by foreign States, we shall have to consult those States as to whether they are willing to consent to the publication of it. That may cause some delay, but we shall lose as little time as possible in obtaining their consent. So far as the policy of Her Majesty's Government is concerned, I am perfectly ready to lay these Papers before your Lordships. With respect to the Question of the noble Earl (Earl De La Warr), I think it would be better to include the Papers relating to it in the general Correspondence.

ARMY—PAYMASTERS IN THE MILITIA.

  QUESTION.
  THE EARL OF SANDWICHasked the Under Secretary for War, What allowances will be given to an officer of
  848
  Militia called up to undertake the duties of an Adjutant and Paymaster while that office was vacant? The noble Earl complained that he could obtain no allowance for the gentleman whom, under the circumstances stated in the Question, he had some short time since appointed to discharge the duties of paymaster of his regiment.
  VISCOUNT ENFIELDsaid, that about two years ago a like circumstance had happened in his own regiment. He thought a commanding officer should be simply bound to train his men, and not also to act, as he was now required to do in certain cases, as Paymaster.
  EARL CADOGANregretted that his noble Friend should have to complain of the War Office, but the Regulations relating to his Question were that during the interval of retirement of an adjutant and the appointment of his successor the quartermaster acted as adjutant under the responsibility of an officer in command, and received 5s. a-day extra pay; but in case of regiments which had no quartermaster, the rule was to require the officer in command to act as paymaster, but no pay was attached. The injustice had been felt, and it was under contemplation to make a rule that the paymasters of the Brigade Depôts should also act as paymasters of Militia regiments.

SLAVE TRADE BILL.—(No. 135.)
(The Marquess of Salisbury.)
SLAVE TRADE BILL.—(No. 135.)

  COMMITTEE.
  House in Committee (according to Order).
  LORD STANLEY OF ALDERLEYmoved an Amendment on Clause 1, the object of which was to make the subjects of Native States residing under British protection at Zanzibar and Muscat and violating the laws relating to the Slave Trade, punishable by British Courts of Law in India only upon the consent of the Native State whose subjects the offenders might be, and without which there could be no right of jurisdiction. The protection given by the British Government out of India to the subjects of the Native States, was a consequence of having precluded them by Treaties from entering into diplomatic relations with other Powers; but this protection did not confer a right of

  849
  jurisdiction, and punishment was not a correlative of protection. As the Rao of Cutch had expressed his willingness to allow the proposed jurisdiction, and as there were very few other Rulers whose subjects were concerned, there could be no difficulty in obtaining these consents, and to refuse to do so would be to be arbitrary for arbitrariness' sake.
  Amendment moved, to leave out third paragraph of Preamble, and in Clause 1, line 29, after ("Majesty") insert ("and if the consent of such Prince or State to grant jurisdiction under this Act shall have been obtained and laid before each House of Parliament.")—(The Lord Stanley of Alderley.)
  THE EARL OF NORTHBROOKsaid, the Amendment of his noble Friend was based upon an entire misconception of Indian affairs. He cordially concurred with the objects of the Bill, but thought that both this Bill and some others now before Parliament would be more satisfactorily dealt with if they had been previously referred to the Government of India. While he had no doubt the Princes of India would willingly join the Government of India in putting down the slave trade, it would be objectionable to allow such matters to depend upon their consent, as proposed by the noble Lord (Lord Stanley of Alderley).
  THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURYsaid, that with reference to the question raised by the noble Earl (the Earl of Northbrook) of submitting questions of policy to the Indian Government, he did not consider that was essential in all cases. Of course, there were cases in which such references were made; but there was no consultation with the Government of India before the great Act which re-constituted the Government of India was passed. In fact, each case must depend upon its own merits. In this particular case, if a reference was to be made, he should prefer the Government of Bombay, which was more likely to possess accurate information on it than the Government of India. He did not, however, wish noble Lords opposite to have the impression that this Bill had been brought in without the opinion of Indian authorities being taken. All he said the other night was that he had no official Correspondence on the subject to lay on the Table. Indian information was not
  850
  necessarily confined to India, for there were Peers in that House who knew as much of the circumstances, and particularly of the law involved in the case, as any one could know. With respect to the main portion of the Bill—that which related to the slave trade generally—he saw a noble Lord opposite who could tell them more than any one in India. The Government had had recourse to the best authorities as to what would be the most suitable provisions.
  VISCOUNT HALIFAXasked what Act the noble Marquess referred to? When he passed the India Council Act, there was the fullest previous consultation with the authorities in India.
  THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURYsaid, he referred to the Act of 1858.
  VISCOUNT HALIFAXsaid, that was not in his time. He was sorry to see every obstacle thrown in the way of such mutual consultation. Surely those on the spot might be expected to know more about the subject than the Home Government, or the Law Officers of the Crown.
  THE LORD CHANCELLORsaid, the Bill took the law of India as it stood, and was, in fact, intended to remedy an oversight in a former Act.
  EARL GRANVILLEsaid, if it were a mere explanatory Act no more need be said; but the explanation now placed upon it by the noble and learned Lord was very different from that given by the noble Marquess in introducing it; but his noble Friend (the Earl of Northbrook) had pointed out the desirability that not only this Bill, but some others should, as there was no necessity for immediate legislation, be deferred until the House had further information.
  After a few words from Lord Lawrence in favour of delay,
  THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURYreplied that, of course, if Parliament wished for further information, the Bill could be postponed, but delay would be exceedingly inconvenient, and put off a measure which was much wanted. At the present moment there might arise cases which the Courts, for want of such a Bill, would have to decide the wrong way.
  Amendment (by leave of the Committee) withdrawn.
  Bill reported, without Amendment; and to be read 3a To-morrow.

  SAINT VINCENT, TOBAGO, AND GRENADA CONSTITUTION BILL [H.L.]
  A Bill to make provision for the Government of the Islands of Saint Vincent, Tobago, and Grenada, and their Dependencies—Was presented by The Earl of Carnarvon; read 1a. (No. 156.)
  House adjourned at Eight o'clock, till to-morrow, half past Ten o'clock.