Lords Sitting of 17 February 1876

MINUTES.
Sat First in Parliament—Earl Stanhope, after the death of his Father.
NEW PEER.
Henry Gerard Sturt, Esquire, having been created Baron Alington of Crichel in the county of Dorset—Was (in the usual manner) introduced.

WEST COAST OF AFRICA—EXCHANGE OF TERRITORY.—OBSERVATIONS.
THE EARL OF CARNARNONrose to call attention to the negotiations with the French Government for certain territorial exchanges on the West Coast of Africa, and said:—My Lords, I shall have to ask your Lordships for unusual patience this evening, because I am suffering from a cold so severe that I feel I shall find some difficulty in making the short statement; but, at the same time, I am aware that there is at the present so much misunderstanding on the subject of the proposed transfer as to make it desirable that at the earliest possible moment I should make a few observations to Parliament in respect of it. My Lords, your Lordships will remember that at the close of last Session, when this question was mooted, I gave a distinct promise on the part of Her Majesty's Government, that no conclusive—no final—steps should be taken which could preclude Parliament from having an opportunity of expressing an opinion. My Lords, I do not now ask your Lordships to agree to any Resolution. I desire, so to say, to lay the matter—with regard to the few points raised in which I think there is some misunderstanding—before your Lordships, in order that you may have a general idea of what is proposed. It is extremely difficult for anyone to appreciate the facts, circumstances, and necessities of the case unless he is familiar with the geography of the regions in question. Your Lordships will recollect we have three settlements on the Gold Coast. Gambia, which is the northernmost; Sierra Leone, which is separated from it by a long interval; and the newly-consolidated settlement of the Gold Coast and Lagos. The Gambia settlement, going back from the coast, is in proximity to the French colony of Senegal, and may be described as the outlying part of the national estate. I do not propose to detain your Lordships by going into all that occurred at the outset of the negotiations with France with respect to these territories. Suffice it to say that since 1866 these negotiations have been continuous. With the exception of an interval during the Franco-German War, they have been almost continuous from year to year. In 1866 proposals were made by the French Government to Lord Clarendon.

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In 1867 they were renewed; and in 1868 the French Colony of Senegal made certain advances of territory abutting on Sierra Leone, which led to apprehensions of difficulty to our Colony. In 1869 and 1870 the negotiations were still continued; and the only point to which I need direct your Lordships' attention is that up to that time what this country proposed to do was to extinguish the rights which the French had in the neighbourhood of Sierra Leone. But a very much more favour able arrangement has since been pro posed for our acceptance. As I have stated, the Franco-German War caused an interruption in the negotiations, and though they came before us from time to time nothing tangible was proposed till 1874. By that time circumstances as regards our possessions had very much altered:—the Gold Coast Colonies had been consolidated, and thus what might have been desirable had become almost a necessity, looking at it in the way of revenue. The substance of the proposals made by the French Government to me may be briefly stated as follows:—First, that the French should abandon all their rights and establishments in and around the territory of Sierra Leone; secondly, that they should abandon their posts of Assinie and Grand Bassam, and all their posts further down the Coast on the other side; thirdly, that they should abandon all territory claimed by them between the Gold Coast and Lagos; and fourthly, that they should abandon any pretensions or rights they may have east of Lagos to their own settlement of the Gaboon. Your Lordships will see that by this arrangement not only all French claims between Sierra Leone and the easternmost extremity of Lagos would be swept away, but we should acquire exclusive rights at the mouths of the Niger if we like to use them. When I say that the French surrender these rights and pretensions, it does not follow that we acquire fresh territory. So far from increasing our responsibilities in these quarters, I am prepared to con tend that by such an arrangement as that proposed we should be diminishing them; because we should be making the territory that belongs to us more compact and more consolidated, and, therefore, more manageable for political and fiscal purposes. What I think the transfer would do is this: it would re-
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move all French rights, claims, and pretensions in the places I have named, and thereby prevent the conflict of authority which now exists, and which is so extremely injurious to our interests. There has been so much misunderstanding, and I may say so much misrepresentation, with regard to this exchange, that I hope your Lordships will forgive me if I feel it necessary to go into these matters. My desire is to show that many of the objections I have heard do not really go to the point, and that more of them are founded on a total misapprehension of the facts. It has been said that an exchange of this kind involves a dismemberment of Imperial rights. I am at a loss to see how that can be the case in such an arrangement as this. If the policy hitherto pursued by Her Majesty's Government and if what we have said from time to time on subjects of this kind does not justify them against a charge of wishing to dismember Imperial rights, nothing that I can urge will. Then I am told that this is one of our oldest Colonies. But that is not the fact—it is not an old Colony, for the settled institution of the Gambia Colony only dates from 1821, and consequently it is not more than about half a century old. It is true that so far back as 1588 the original charter was given to merchants to trade on the Coast; but for many generations afterwards there was no settlement. There were disputed claims. One part of the Coast was held by the French and the other by ourselves, and it was only by the Treaty of Versailles in 1783 that the French resigned all their rights, and only by the Peace of 1814 that what they so resigned was secured to us. It was still later, not until 1816, that a small settlement was found on the Gambia, and a few years afterwards, in consequence of an attack by certain of the Native tribes, a detachment of a West India Regiment was sent there. In 1821 settled institutions were established there. What we now propose is called by some a "cession." I object to the word—it is not a "cession," but an "exchange;" and just as it is reasonable for the owner of a private estate to round off and consolidate his possessions, so it is equally reasonable to do the same for the public estate, and to make such arrangements as will enable us to consolidate a territory which at present, owing to its want

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of consolidation, is exposed to great difficulty as to its administration, political and fiscal. But then it is urged that the noble Earl who preceded me at the Colonial Office (the Earl of Kimberley) in 1870 or 1871 gave a pledge that this question of transfer was then abandoned, never to be opened again. If that allegation was true, I should attach great weight to the objection based upon it. But the fact really is that my noble Friend never made any statement of the kind. I should have been surprised if, with his caution, he had done so. But what is the fact? In 1870 Lord Kimberley informs Sir Arthur Kennedy that
"though the intended transfer was postponed, Her Majesty's Government wish him to examine into the feelings of residents, especially Natives, and the obstacles which may present themselves to the transfer when occasion for it shall occur, and to take any steps which appear to him prudent to remove those obstacles."
That is not the language of a Minister giving an assurance that the question would never be stirred again. Again, in 1870, in reply to certain merchants, the noble Earl says—
"Her Majesty's Government state that, owing to the war, the negotiations for cession are suspended for the present."
And in August, the same year, our Ambassador at Paris informed the French Government
"that the negotiations could not he continued during the war, but that Her Majesty's Government reserve to themselves liberty to consider before renewing them the objections which have been raised to the transfer."
It is perfectly clear from this that, whatever course might have been ultimately adopted by the late Government, they had most carefully and jealously guarded themselves against any such pledge as that which they were alleged to have given. If this had not been the case, having regard to what the French call the solidarité which ought to exist between successive Governments, I should have paused before renewing the negotiations for the transfer. Another objection urged against the transfer is that there is an unanimous objection to it on the part of the Colonists. I take it upon myself to say that I have evidence that so far from there being a unanimous, there is scarcely a fractional objection to it, and, forming my own opinion from Papers in the Colonial Office, I have no doubt that the Colony is at the utmost
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indifferent to the whole transaction. If I for a moment supposed that there was any validity in this objection I would not be the one to make this proposition. I have a horror of trafficking in populations. I think such transactions are most foul, and can be adopted only in furtherance of the most base policy. To my mind nothing can be more reprehensible than to tamper with the feelings of populations in such a manner. But what is the state of facts as to the population of Gambia? That population consists mainly of Natives, and of a comparatively insignificant number of Europeans. The Native population is stated to be 14,000. What is the European? In the year 1851 it was 191. Twenty years afterwards it had dwindled down to 50; in 1872 it had diminished to 30; and in 1874 it had fallen to 20; and perhaps it may be below that number at present. Such is the population of Gambia. Now, let us see what the representation made by that population amounts to. During the time the negotiations were in progress under my noble Friend opposite (the Earl of Kimberley) a Petition was sent to him against the transfer signed by 502 persons; and in the course of last year there was forwarded to me a Petition with a similar prayer signed by 152 persons only. But I am bound to inform your Lordships that as regards the latter Petition the Governor states that of the 152 petitioners many were boys; others were what he describes as "men of straw;" and he adds that in numerous instances it was obvious that the signatures were written by the same hand. I do not think your Lordships will attach much importance to such a Petition as that. When it is urged that there is a strong and almost unanimous feeling on the part of the population against the transfer, words should be more carefully measured, and facts more strictly tested. Within the last few days I have been told by some gentlemen who take a great interest in the question that Gambia is very valuable to this country. Now I should not think it right to sacrifice a Colony simply because it did not pay its own expenses; but it is only right that your Lordships should be put in possession of the facts on this financial point. What is the real state of the case? It can be told in a very few words. Gambia has but few natural

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products. My noble Friend on the cross-benches (Earl Grey) once indulged in the hope that cotton might be grown there; but that dream has passed away. The cotton cultivation of Gambia was proved to be visionary. On the other hand, English trade, while I would not say it has absolutely and positively diminished, has been overshadowed by the French trade. It is not too much to say that the trade there has passed, or is passing, from English traders into the hands of French colonists. During the last seven years, with the exception of 1871, the revenue of Gambia has been in deficit. From 1821 to 1871 there had been Parliamentary grants in aid—sometimes large and sometimes small; but since 1871 no such Vote has been taken, and the consequence has been that there has been an increase of the debt, which from £75 has risen to £4,890. In addition to that, none of those works which are the life-blood of such a colony can be prosecuted in Gambia. It has been repeatedly pointed out that roads which are necessary for trade and for the defence of the country remain unmade. Mail steamers do at present touch at the Colony; but why? Because they are subsidized by the Treasury, which spends £1,200 a-year on them. The Colony can contribute nothing to the service; and when it has been found necessary to employ a detachment of troops in the Colony, the Imperial Government has been obliged to bear the expense. But it has been said that Gambia will ultimately have the trade of Central Africa. If that prediction is well-founded it is strange that it has been so long unverified. There are as yet no signs of that trade. There is another argument which has struck me as being the strangest one of all. It is alleged that Gambia has a healthy climate. Now, my Lords, whatever the other merits of Gambia may be, I never expected to hear that statement, and I heard it with astonishment. The climate along that West Coast differs in degrees, but it is in degrees of badness. The only question is which part has the worst. Nothing gives me so much pain as the receipt of the accounts which reach the Colonial Office of the mortality and sickness of the officers serving along that Coast. Last week I heard of the death of four, who within a very short time had been swept
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away by the remorseless fevers of that country. I admit that the Gold Coast may be worse than Gambia; but I say that at best Gambia is only one degree better. Though there may not be at the latter place the chronic and persistent illness there is at the former, still Gambia is subject to epidemics which sweep over it from time to time. Within the last 10 years there have been three of those epidemics. In 1866 yellow fever raged there; in 1869 cholera; and in 1872 yellow fever again. "In the rains the Europeans die, and in the cold the Africans." This was what was said by the Administrator in 1866. It is urged that the River Gambia is an important river. I admit it is a fine river, but its value is more than doubtful. It is not suited for ships of large burden; and my noble Friend opposite, who was at the head of the Foreign Office in 1870 (Earl Granville), said he could not conceive what the value of the Gambia could be, unless it were for the purpose of concealing sailors who might run away and wish to hide themselves in time of war. No doubt, it did render important service in former times; but those days are past, and the necessity for us to have that river no longer exists. As to its use as a coaling station, the Admiralty established a small coaling station on the Gambia which proved to be of so little value that after the experience of a few years it was abandoned. Again, we are told that the tribes in the neighbourhood of the settlement are amicable. I observe that if at any time the Colonial Office proposes to do anything which is regarded as rash towards a colony, they are reminded immediately of the amiability of the surrounding tribes; and I believe there never was less foundation for the assertion than there is in this instance. For what is the real state of the case? We have on our frontiers a large tribe of Mahomedan fanatics, who have gradually descended from the interior to the sea coast, sweeping all before them. They are eminently warlike and averse to order; and so far from having any reason to suppose they are amicably disposed towards us, we have very good grounds for believing that they are quite the reverse. Within the last two years since I have been in the Colonial Office we have been on the eve of a war with them. And what has been the previous

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history of their relations towards us? In 1853 the Colony was involved in a war with them, from which it was extricated by requesting the assistance of the French Colony at Senegal. In 1855 the Colony was again at war with them; in 1861 the same state of things arose, and again the Colony had French help against the Mahomedans; and again, in 1866, a war with them broke out which lasted two years. It is, I think, impossible, with those facts before one, to say that the tribes in the neighbourhood of Gambia are of a pacific or amicable character. I hope, my Lords, that in this brief outline I have shown that there is no foundation for the objections to which I have just referred. But it may be said—" Granted that the Colony is unhealthy; granted that it does not pay its way; granted that it is exposed to the attacks of warlike tribes in its immediate neighbourhood, and yet none of these circumstances affords a sufficient justification for a transfer." Even if that were so it would not affect my proposition. I put forward what is to be gained by our West African Settlements, looking at them as a whole—looking at the whole rather than at a part. But then it is said—" Why not acquire the French settlements by purchase?" I admit that if we could accomplish what we require by purchase, a proposition to do it in that way would be well worthy the consideration of Parliament. If it could be gained in any other way I should not have advised the exchange of Gambia. But that is the price asked. The French desire Gambia, and we desire the French Settlements. It is for Parliament to consider whether the price asked is equivalent to what we are to give, or is it an excessive price. Now, what is our position on the West Coast? It is simply this—We hold a line of coast; at various intervals along that line are various French settlements, through which goods of all kinds are smuggled into the interior, and compete on manifestly unfair terms with our imports. We, at present, raise our revenue in these parts by customs duties; but it is impossible that we can secure our revenues while this state of things exists, and when we know that other parties can undersell us in every way it is necessary that something should be done. Well, not to go into detail, it has been estimated that if the transfer can be
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effected the revenue of Sierra Leone will be enormously increased, and that the revenue of the Gold Coast, which is now £70,000 a-year, can be increased to £170,000—some carry the estimate as high as £200,000. I shall not pronounce an opinion as to whether that is excessive; but there is good reason to believe that the revenue of the Gold Coast may be doubled. Now, what is meant by revenue? Revenue on the Gold Coast means everything. It means good government; it means the health of the English officers who are employed there; it means the civilization of the Natives on the Coast; and it means security against attack. I say we are not in a position of security on the Gold Coast, and to put us in that position increased expenditure is necessary. There are but two ways in which revenue for such a Colony may be obtained. On the one hand, it can be found from within; and I believe the resources of the Gold Coast with Lagos are such as to secure for us a revenue which will enable us to secure the great objects to which I have just adverted. On the other hand, if you do not get a revenue from within, there is one other source from which it can be had, and that is a Parliamentary Vote in and My noble Friend who is sitting on the cross-benches (Earl Grey), in very able letters which he wrote 20 years ago, makes some very cogent observations. In one of these letters my noble Friend observes—
"But these objects could not be obtained without a large increase of expense, and Parliament has always shown what I consider a well-founded reluctance to increase its Votes for purposes of this description. It does not appear to me that the people of this country ought to be called upon to pay for the cost of extensive schemes of internal improvement in Africa."
He then goes on to say—
"For those reasons I considered myself bound to adhere to the rule of not proposing to my Colleagues that Parliament should be asked to increase the usual grants for the civil establishments on the West Coast of Africa; and though I was most anxious for the adoption of measures of improvement which could not be accomplished without considerable expense, I thought it right in this part of the African Continent, as well as in Natal, to proceed with these measures only as their cost could be provided for by means of local resources."
Well, my Lords, that is the alternative Parliament has before it? Parliament deliberately decided to retain the Gold

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Coast Colony. It did so undoubtedly in the belief that good government could be established in that Colony, and for the improvement and the civilization of the Native races. In a great part the intentions of Parliament have been carried out; but owing to climate and other causes this has been at a much greater expenditure than would otherwise have been called for. If the Customs duties can be made available by such protection against smuggling as this transfer would secure to us, then I believe the revenue will be sufficient to meet all the requirements. If not, then I see no alternative other than that Parliament should step in. But, my Lords, there is another point in connection with this matter which ought not to be concealed from your Lordships. It is not merely ordinary goods and other articles of commerce which are imported through the French settlements, but large importations of ammunition and of most dangerous weapons of war are effected through them. This is no fanciful danger. During the Ashantee War we had evidence that immediately before it importations had been carried on which went far to enable the Ashantees to maintain that war; and it was only a short time since I received a despatch from the Resident at Coomassie in which he stated that he had seen a review of Ashantee troops on their return from some proceedings in which they had been engaged, and not only had they an abundant supply of arms of all sizes, but one detachment had been drilled in the use of the breech-loader, and apparently had become familiar with the method of handling it. During the Ashantee War in which we were engaged their weapons were bad, and, consequently, the loss of life was small:—there can be no doubt that had they been then supplied with arms of precision the loss of life on our side would have been very much larger. My Lords, to sum up what seem to me to be the arguments in favour of the proposed transfer. The exchange now proposed is, in my opinion, more favaurable to this country than any previously offered; secondly, as it is more fovourable, so it is more important at this moment, because there is now a greater necessity than ever for some such arrangement. It may be said, perhaps, that in urging such considerations I have stated the case too strongly, and that if
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the exchange was really so favourable to us, it would not be likely that the French would propose it. My Lords, from the nature of our institutions it is impossible to disguise facts in connection with such transactions as this. They must be stated for what they are worth, and it must be left to the good sense of Parliament and of the English people to deal with them. But what I have said as to the advantages to us is equally applicable to the French. They, in respect of their settlement at Senegal, are situated as we are in respect of ours on the Gold Coast. They labour under the same difficulties that we do, and it is as important to them to consolidate their possessions as it is to us to consolidate ours. At the same time, in a matter of this kind, I have no wish to force the proposition on Parliament. It is, no doubt, a question of exchange, or of giving up, in some form or other, territory which we now possess. When that is the case, I hold that the Government cannot proceed with too much caution to ascertain that it is in unison with the feelings of Parliament on the subject. I wish Parliament to understand the proposal, to sift and analyze it, and to subject it to any test that may be thought fit. I believe that the more the question is tested and analyzed, the more it will be shown that these negotiations on which successive Governments have been more or less engaged are now more important than ever. As I have before put it, there are only two alternatives if Parliament wishes to retain the Colony of the Gold Coast and to promote the civilization of the Natives, and to adopt the best measures possible for the safety and the health of the English officers employed there. You must either find means to increase the revenues in the Colony itself, or the Imperial Parliament must vote a grant in and. I believe that if Parliament gives its approval to this transfer it will do well. I submit it to your Lordships for consideration, thanking you for the patience with which you have listened to an imperfect statement of a measure which, if it cannot be called a large one, is certainly one of some importance, if we consider the interests which will be affected by the course which Parliament may decide on with respect to the proposition the details of which I have now laid before your Lordships.
EARL GRANVILLE: My Lords, I am extremely sorry to hear of the indisposition from which the noble Earl (the Earl of Carnarvon) is suffering, but I congratulate him on being able, notwithstanding that indisposition, to give your Lordships so clear a statement of his views as that to which we have just listened. I presume the noble Earl does not intend that the House should on this occasion enter upon a discussion of the proposed transfer; because, considering that the Papers on the subject were only delivered a few hours ago, it would hardly be reasonable to expect that noble Lords should be prepared for such a discussion. But as, in a certain sense, I have been appealed to, and as the Government with which I was connected had something to do with negotiations on this subject, perhaps the House will allow me to at once say a few words. They shall be few, for when I say I shall not be long I always adhere to that promise. I will first allude to what was done by the late Government. But before doing so I would observe that on the question of the connection of our Colonies with the mother country two sets of opinions are held which are not only extreme in themselves, but are entirely opposed the one set to the other. Some people hold that our Colonies are a loss rather than a gain to the mother country, and that it is an advantage to us to lose rather than to acquire colonial possessions. These persons maintain that our Colonial Empire may be surrendered without disadvantage. On the other hand, there are persons who contend that to hold our colonial possessions must be an advantage, and that the giving up of any of them must be a loss, because it is a diminution of our Colonial Empire. I am happy that the noble Earl opposite has adopted the course taken by previous Colonial Secretaries, and has not ranged himself with either of the parties who hold these extreme views. I am glad to think he considers that each case should be decided on its own particular merits. My noble Friend, in his statement to your Lordships, has laid stress on his view, that the scheme which he brought before us is not a "cession," but an "exchange." I am inclined to think it is a cession. He said that it is not a cession, because we get something in exchange; but I think that the transfer of a Colony may
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be a cession without that fact militating against the transaction:—because I am not prepared to hold that, if a colonial dependency is found to be a burden to us, and might be a benefit to some other nations, there are no circumstances under which we should be at liberty to part with such a dependency to that other country. Therefore, my Lords, I do not quarrel with the word cession. My Lords, as to my share in negotiations for a transfer, while I was at the Colonial Office, what happened was this:—It was represented to the Government here that the climate was so bad that no one could remain two years in those parts, except the unfortunate officials who were sent there by the Government; and that not only was our trade small, but the imports of the English houses were daily diminishing, while the French were increasing their trade and carrying it on in such a way as was sure to do injury to the English. It was further stated in the communications from the Colony that the Colony was a difficult one to manage in consequence of the character of the neighbouring tribes. That being the state of things, and there being no longer any advantages from the possession of the Colony in the way of suppressing a slave trade which no longer existed, I thought that the Government would be acting quite within the spirit of the recommendations of the Committee of the House of Commons in receiving proposals and entering on negotiations such as those spoken of by the noble Earl. I may say that when I left the Colonial Office the great difficulty that was felt was as to the feeling of the Natives, which we felt bound to consult. I am glad to hear that no such difficulty exists now. Thus matters stood and I left the Colonial Office absolutely unpledged to the French Government. My noble Friend beside me (the Earl of Kimberley) took up the business of the Colonial Office and we acted entirely in concert. The unfortunate Franco-German War broke out, and we were of opinion that that put an end necessarily to any negotiation in the matter. The noble Earl (the Earl of Carnarvon) was full right in saying that my noble Friend did not give any pledge that the question would not be revived again. How could my noble Friend give any such pledge? Then the noble Earl said that there were advantages in the present arrangement

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over that which was contemplated by us. I certainly cannot give an opinion on that subject. It may be that there are advantages—it may be that there are disadvantages; but I am glad to hear that the noble Earl considers that there are advantages. It is incompetent in me to oppose the proposition of the noble Earl, but I own it appears to me rather an unusual course to make such a statement as that to which we have just listened. The usual course is for the Government to make up its mind as to the policy it will recommend, and then, by bringing forward a Bill or in some other manner, to elicit the opinion of Parliament in reference to it. The noble Earl, however, in laying the Papers on the Table, has, notwithstanding his indisposition, been good enough to make the explanation we have heard. "What I rather gather is this, that the Government have not now quite made up their minds, although a short time ago they thought they had made up their minds, and that they think it better to ventilate the subject, and see how the cat jumps, leaving the ultimate result to the noble Duke and the Chief Justice. That, I believe, is what is behind; but, mean-while, I thank the noble Earl for the interesting statement he has made.
THE DUKE OF SOMERSETsaid, he trusted the Government would not take further steps in this matter until Parliament had received more information than had been laid before them. The information they at present had before them was very meagre; they knew a very little of what they were asked to do, and Parliament ought to have complete information before it was asked to assent to the proposal now made. They knew something of the country which it was proposed they should give up, but they knew nothing or very little of the territory which it was suggested they were going to receive. The noble Earl (the Earl of Carnarvon) had told them that Gambia owed £5,000, and that it was very unhealthy; but that was a very small sum, and the sanitary condition might be improved. On the other hand, Gambia was a place well situated for trading with, and the civilization of Central Africa was a matter which was becoming of more and more importance to this country. All that they now knew of the interior of Africa, and all that he had heard from naval officers, led
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him to believe that the river Gambia would be a valuable means of communication with the interior. This country had made a bargain with the Dutch for the acquisition of some of their settlements; and what did either party get from the bargain? He believed that it got us into a war from which we had got out with some credit and much cost; while the Dutch had got into a war from which they had not yet got out. He found among the Papers, that we had nearly got into a small war on the Gambia through a very small matter. A panic had arisen among the residents; the Governor applied to the Colonial Office; the Colonial Office sent to the Admiralty; and the Admiralty dispatched a small vessel of war to the river; and then it was found that this grave complication had originated in a fraudulent message purporting to have come from an African king. The only person disappointed was the lieutenant in command, who, no doubt, expected to get his C.B., or perhaps to be made a Baronet. Their Lordships had been told that the Gold Coast was very unhealthy. Then, why should they increase their territory in that direction? It was said that though the Gambia was navigable for 300 miles it was a very unhealthy river. Well, was the Niger not also unhealthy? He believed the navigation of the Niger was not so good and the climate not healthy. Why had Gambia been so much depreciated? Trade had fallen off there because the traders had for 10 years been expecting to be transferred to the French Government. Why did the French Government want Gambia with its insalubrity, no trade, and with a large Mohammedan force around it? There must be some good reason for their wanting it. It might be that by means of it they would find easy access into the interior of Africa and they would be able in time to cut off the trade of this country up the Niger. This was a matter which must be much more fully looked into before Parliament could sanction it. There ought, he thought, to be a Committee to inquire into the whole question, as at present Parliament had heard only one side of it, and this possession might become very valuable to this country in the future.
LORD BLACHFORDcordially supported the proposed cession. The ques-

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tions to be considered were—what was the national interests in the matter?—what were the local and individual interests?—and, in case those interests conflicted, which should prevail? The first point to be determined, as to the national interests, was this—was it desirable to adopt, on the West Coast of Africa, a policy of territorial extension? If it were, then, no doubt, it would be worth while to make some sacrifices to acquire and preserve small outlying settlements as nuclei of future aggrandizement; just as a person, desiring to build up a great landed property, would buy plots of land here and there in hopes of being able to purchase up to them at his leisure. Was this our case? Some persons did seem to cherish the dream of a great West African Empire. Possibly it was with some such ideal before him that a correspondent of the Colonial Office desired to retain the command of the Gambia as the shortest road to Timbuctoo. Visions of this kind would scarcely find favour with their Lordships. But a less impracticable idea was that of uniting, by continued annexation, our scattered posts on the Coast, and thus by degrees rendering England mistress of the seaboard, and charging us with the control and protection of the Natives from the French Settlements on the Senegal down to the mouths of the Niger, and as much further as British trade might call us. In his (Lord Blach-ford's) opinion nothing could be more disastrous than such a policy, because it would be utterly impossible to perform properly the obligations which it imposed upon us. Our strip of maritime possessions would have at its rear the kingdoms of Dahomey and Ashantee, the warlike Mohamedans of whom the noble Earl (the Earl of Carnarvon) had spoken, and other barbarous and slave-holding Powers of whom we had, as yet, happily no experience. Our duty would be not only to control our barbarous subjects, but to defend them against this line of enemies. And what were our means of performing these duties? Observe, to compare small things with great, how they were performed in India. You had there, perhaps, the best civil service in the world, composed of men attracted by high pay and hope of distinction, and devoting themselves to the service of their adopted country as a life-long career. You had an English army
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furnishing an example and a means of control to the Native Forces attached to it. And these great civil and military forces we had found equal, indeed, but not much more than equal, to the task imposed on them. It was well known, but not sufficiently considered, that on the West Coast of Africa the deadly nature of the climate rendered all this utterly impossible. In that country appointments to civil offices were only possible on the understanding, or, at least, on the legitimate and well-founded expectation, that if a White officer showed industry and capacity he would be speedily transferred to a less dangerous post. He (Lord Blachford) had heard a Secretary of State say, with a bitterness which did him credit, that when he made an appointment to some of these posts he felt as if he was committing a murder. In respect to the military force, matters were, if possible, worse. The Horse Guards would give you no White soldiers. Even the West Indian coloured regiments had been withdrawn by the noble Earl. The Admiralty would not give you sailors, if they could help it. You might send out English policemen, but only to get drunk and die; and you had to do your work with the Native Force collected, he did not know, and he suspected the Government did not know where, and which you would not dare to make strong enough to overawe your enemies lest you should make it—what such forces rapidly become—too strong for its masters. If, then, the policy of extension were impossible, the arguments for the counter-policy of consolidation were irresistible. Where the territories of civilized nations interlaced in barbarous countries, the difference of their methods in the administration of justice, the punishment of criminals, the collection of revenue, the treatment of slavery, and other matters, distracted the minds of savages, whose obedience was secured only by intelligible consistency, and in numberless ways rendered effective administration impossible; while the rival policies and rival alliances of the Europeans gave the savages a means of embroiling us, which they were cunning enough to use, and subordinate officers allowed themselves to be engaged in disputes troublesome on the spot and sometimes of serious consequence at home. The true interest of all was that the limits of each civilized in-

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fluence should be so determined as to afford the European Powers the utmost facility for effectively governing the Natives, and the least possible occasion for quarrelling among themselves. The exchange proposed by Government was evidently calculated to effect this, and therefore to serve the public interest. Then, as to local and individual interests. Those of the traders he did not rate very highly. The interest of British commerce was one thing, the interest of a few individual firms another. The whole profits of the trade at the Gambia did not amount to more than one large income, and the question was not, whether this should be destroyed, but whether there was ground for apprehension that it might be diminished. It was not reasonable that national policy should go out of its way on such a consideration. A much more serious question was our duty to the Natives. Great consideration was due to the interests and even sentiments of our subjects, provided, however, that the interests were real and the sentiments genuine. The noble Earl had shown that the Petition sent home against the cession did not represent the sentiment of the people. And what were their interests? Their most pressing want was of military protection. The Marabouts—a warlike and fanatical tribe of Mohamedans—had thrust themselves in between the French Settlements on the Senegal and the English Settlements on the Gambia. They had driven the inland tribes before them, and were now within a few hundred yards of our frontier. It was quite clear that sooner or later we should have to fight for the safety of our settlements. It was far from impossible that we might be fighting at this moment. Now, it might be right for the European Powers to meet hostility half way—it might be right to conciliate and temporize. It could not be right to do both. Yet this was what we were doing now. While the French were fighting serious battles with these invaders in front, the English were negotiating with them in the rear. A common course—the protection of our subjects—should dictate a common policy. This consistency would be secured by the union of this part of the coast under the French. And the people of the Gambia would be much safer under the wing of Senegal, and in the
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neighbourhood of a large military force, readily employed in their defence, than while sheltered by the mere prestige of English negotiations. Therefore, because the national interest was clear—the traders' interests insignificant—the sentiment of the Natives doubtful or divided, and their essential interests best consulted by the exchange—he gave his hearty support to the proposal of the Government.
THE DUKE OF MANCHESTERsaid, that though he regretted to do so he must oppose the proposal of the Government, because he regarded it as unwise, improvident, and unjust. The noble Earl (the Earl of Carnarvon) had correctly described the proposed exchange in his despatch to the Foreign Office, in which he said—
"By the arrangement now proposed France would receive, in exchange for one small isolated post, and certain claims to influence and jurisdiction of, to them, little appreciable value, an old-established European Settlement, with the command of the Gambia, which is one of the finest rivers in Africa, navigable for 300 miles into the interior for vessels of 10th. draught.
The noble Earl might have gone further, for the Gambia was navigable for vessels of 100 tons for a distance of 400 miles from its mouth, and the Native traders came from Timbuctoo, the journey occupying 46 days. The whole case did not depend so much on the advantages of the Gambia as a settlement, as upon the question whether the proposal of the Government would attain the end it had in view. It was proposed that the French should give us two rivers and stations to the west of the Gold Coast in exchange for the Gambia. Now, the French had no jurisdiction, exercised no authority, and levied no duties in those places. The English trading there had just the same rights and position; and the Portugese were in much the same situation. Our object in obtaining the cession of these stations was stated to be to levy customs duties on all the goods imported, and to prevent the introduction of warlike stores and intoxicating liquors. So far from this object being attained by the cessions proposed to be made by the French for the 100 miles of coast which would be acquired, there would be left 800 miles of coast over which we could have no control; and all along this coast there were stations of Portuguese, Danes, and Spaniards,

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who could import as much of warlike stores and spirituous liquors as they chose. As to the other river proposed to be ceded by the French to the north-west of Sierra Leone, that river had at its mouth certain islands which belonged to America, and, as the possession of those islands carried with it power to close the river, he could not understand what advantage the cession of the river would confer. As to the cessions to be made to us on the east of the Gold Coast, he could not gather from the Papers what the distance was to the head of the Bight of Benin, but it seemed to be about 10 degrees of longitude, and in that distance we had got only one station—Lagos—a small island in the most westerly mouth of the Niger—by means of which we could control these 10 degrees of coast. Altogether he thought this an unwise and improvident arrangement, and one most unjust to the people proposed to be transferred; for none of them had expressed approval of the transfer. The Papers endeavoured to make out a case for transfer; but Sir Arthur Kennedy had not ventured to say that even the French traders in the Gambia did not prefer the rule of the English Government, and the civil, religious, and commercial liberty they enjoyed under it, to the petty and vexatious restrictions which they knew would follow their subjection to French Colonial policy. For his part, he hoped the Government would re-consider the decision they had come to, and that they would abandon the project and endeavour to secure a more effectual control of the commerce along the Coast.
LORD STANLEY OF ALDERLEYsaid, that the ill results of the last transfer of territory, the bad effects of which subsisted still, were such as to make great caution necessary before sanctioning another, and as the Colonial Office had more on its hands than it could well attend to, in the Malay Peninsula, and the South African Colonies, it would be well not to undertake another affair which would cause further troubles. The noble Earl (the Earl of Carnarvon) had said that only a fraction of the Colony of the Gambia had petitioned against the transfer, and that there had been a change of opinion in the Colony since the late Government had first proposed the exchanges, but this was not so, for a further Petition with 400 signatures was now on the way here. The
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French were only able to cede a post on the Mellicourie River, they could not cede the populations, and now that the noble Earl had published the opinion of one of his Governors, that we were not a military nation, these populations might resist the cession. The noble Earl said he was going to remove a conflict of fiscal authority, and to do this he would have to occupy 800 miles of the Gold Coast with customs officers. He would read an extract from a letter of an African merchant, formerly President of the Marseilles Chamber of Commerce. After saying that the French residents in the Gambia Colony preferred that matters should remain as they were now, because change would disturb their trade, and the expense of the French Government would be higher; he wrote—
"I do not mean to say it is impossible to occupy the sea-coasts of these countries, but we must look forward to the most formidable opposition from the King of Dahomey, who will never agree to farm the Customs, nor to give up his territory. At Porto Novo I anticipate great difficulties also, and it seems quite certain that for a long time trade will be stopped and political complications will arise among the Natives."
If this cession took place we should be certain to have a war with the King of Dahomey and he would have the Ashantees for allies; and the noble Earl (the Earl of Carnarvon) had just said that the Ashantees had recovered their strength. He hoped the country would have au opportunity of pronouncing on this exchange before it was carried out, and that we should not complete the arrangement in the hurry with which we made our recent exchange with the Dutch Government.
THE EARL OF KIMBERLEYsaid, he had little to add to what had fallen from the noble Earl (Earl Granville) behind him. In reference to the transaction which had been referred to by the noble Lord who had just spoken, he desired to say that no exchange of territory was made—the Dutch ceded to us certain forts they had on the Gold Coast, and we made certain concessions in regard to Sumatra; but there was no cession of territory on our side, and of course therefore no exchange. As to the proposed cession of the Gambia, the small part he had in the matter had been accurately stated; nothing that was done while he held the Seals of the Colonial Office precluded us from renewing negotiations at any time;

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and, indeed, it would have been very arrogant and rash on his part to do anything which should attempt to preclude such renewal. As to the merits of the question, it was one of considerable difficulty. The reasons for the cession had been forcibly stated; but, on the other hand, the wishes of the inhabitants against the cession were strongly expressed, and that was a material consideration to which the Government ought to give much weight. This was a matter in which sentiment could not be altogether disregarded; for it would be remembered that in the case of the exchange of territory which had occurred between us and the Dutch on the Gold Coast some years ago—an exchange which seemed mutually advantageous—the Natives resented it, the town of Commendah, which had been English, was bombarded, and other disturbances occurred, the memory of which still lingered at the time of the Ashantee War. All these things showed it was no slight matter to hand over the Natives of a Settlement from one Government to another. It might seem that the transference of Natives from one civilized Government to another civilized Government was a comparatively small matter; but the practical result was not so. The Natives clung to old habits and traditions, and there was no doubt they were attached to the flag they had been accustomed to see. He did not know what might be the results of the cession which the French proposed to make on the Gold Coast. This was a new matter, which did not enter into previous negotiations. So far as he knew, there were no actual Trench Settlements, although at Assinèe a French merchant who resided there hoisted the French flag. If we were to acquire control over Assinèe, with a view to prevent the importation of arms and spirits, the question arose, how were the objects aimed at to be attained? At present the merchants might import what they liked, and were we to establish our supremacy so as to deprive the merchants of the liberty of importation they had hitherto enjoyed? He did not say the object might not be advantageous enough if it could be attained; but it was not evident that it would be attained by the simple ratification of a treaty. From the Papers he gathered that his noble Friend had been much occupied with
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the consideration of our position to the east of the Gold Coast, where there were 300 miles of coast over which we exercised no control. If this exchange were carried out, it would be necessary to acquire something more than the right of the French, and to take possession of 300 miles of coast was rather a serious matter. It might appear on paper a great advantage we were going to obtain; but he had some doubt whether it would turn out to be so advantageous in actual result. "Without wishing to express any opinion adverse to his noble Friend on this matter, and being most anxious that the effect of the policy of the Government might be to introduce civilization into that part of Africa, he still thought that sufficient doubt rested on the subject, as now presented to them, to make it desirable that further information should be afforded by the Government as to the manner in which their policy was to be carried into effect.
EARL FORTESCUEsaid, that the West Coast of Africa Committee on which he sat in 1842 had reported unanimously that the Settlement of the Gambia possessed advantages far beyond any other British settlement on that coast, and was likely to become of the highest value to the trade of this country. But the rumour that this cession was about to be made would naturally paralyze trade there. If the cession were made we were pretty sure to be exposed to a system of commercial restriction, which would discourage the trade of every nation but that to which the Settlement was to be transferred. The French had always acted on that exclusive principle. The question was, not what our trade with the Gambia now was, but what it might be under the happier circumstances in which that Settlement and the whole of Africa might yet be placed. He feared that for the trifling immediate advantages of improved police regulations, and a greater facility of collecting the Customs duties, we were giving up, or at least, endangering a great future trade, and were jeopardizing the opportunity offered us by that great navigable river of civilizing and Christianizing the interior of Africa. Upon the whole, he agreed with the noble Duke (the Duke of Somerset) that further information should be granted to Parliament before they were called upon to ratify an arrangement, which might, indeed, be

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convenient for the moment, but which put in peril the advantages we at present possessed on the West Coast.
THE EARL OF LAUDERDALEthought that by giving up the Gambia they would virtually be giving up the whole of Northern Africa to the French. The Gambia was at all times and seasons navigable for 300 or 400 miles, and the French had been always trying to get hold of that river. There was no river on the West Coast which afforded such facilities for trading with the interior as the Gambia. Therefore, he hoped that Her Majesty's Government would consider seriously before they decided to give it up.
House adjourned at a quarter past Seven o'clock, till To-morrow, half past Ten o'clock.