Lords Sitting of 10 August 1876

MINUTES.
Public Bills—First Reading—Companies Acts (1862 and 1867) Amendment* (218); Legal Practitioners* (220); Suez Canal (Shares)* (221); War Department and Post Office (Remuneration, &c.)* (219).
Second Reading—Municipal Privileges (Ireland) (211); Police (Expenses) Act Continuance* (212); Tramways (Ireland) Acts Amendment (Dublin)* (213); Forfeiture Relief (210).
Committee—Elementary Education (204–226); Pollution of Rivers* (207–227).
Third Reading—Cattle Disease (Ireland)* (195); Erne Lough and River* (189); Ardglass Harbour* (193); Metropolitan Board of Works (Loans)* (190); Exhausted Parish Lands* (186); Tralee Savings Bank* (202), and passed.

MUNICIPAL PRIVILEGES (IRELAND) BILL—(No. 211.)
(The Lord Waveney.)
MUNICIPAL PRIVILEGES (IRELAND) BILL—(No. 211.)

  SECOND READING.
  Order of the Day for the Second Reading, read.
  LORD WAVENEY, in moving that the Bill be now read a second time, said, that a Bill dealing with the same subject was introduced into their Lordships' House in the year 1874. That Bill,

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  however, was rejected. The objects of the Bill of 1874 were larger than the present Bill, and, besides dealing with the appointment of sheriffs, dealt with the question of clerks of the peace. The present Bill had passed through the other House with the assent of all parties, and its object was to give to the municipalities of Dublin, Cork, Limerick, Waterford, Kilkenny, and Drogheda, which were counties in themselves, the right of appointing sheriffs, now enjoyed by such corporations in England. Care had been taken to eliminate from this Bill the features which had excited suspicion and disapproval among their Lordships in a similar measure. For example, instead of giving to the six municipalities the sole right of appointing a sheriff, they were merely to select three qualified persons, one of whom would be appointed by the Lord Lieutenant. Another point which this Bill dealt with was the jury panels. The sheriff now had the power of partially appointing the jury, and this measure now proposed to do away with that power. It was further provided that the office of sheriff should not be deemed one of profit, and that no person should be disqualified from being elected an alderman or a councillor of the borough by reason of his having been appointed sheriff, nor should any person be disqualified from being sheriff by reason of his being an alderman or councillor. Another provision in the Bill would enable corporations in Ireland to grant the honorary freedom of their boroughs. At present they could not confer this honour, but there seemed no valid reason why they should be subject to this disability. For reasons also which their Lordships would understand, Clause 10 of the Bill provided that no person who had been convicted of felony should be capable of being elected to the rank of honorary burgess. The advantages of the Bill were so manifest that he had little doubt it would receive favourable consideration at the hands of their Lordships, and therefore he moved with full confidence the second reading of the measure.
  Moved, "That the Bill be now read 2a."—(The Lord Waveney.)
  THE EARL OF LIMERICK, in moving, as an Amendment, that the Bill be read
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  a second time that day month, said, he was intimately acquainted with one of the cities in Ireland affected by the Bill, and he must say that, after making careful inquiries, he had not found that there was any great anxiety felt about this Bill. Nor was he aware that any Petitions had been presented to their Lordships in favour of the Bill. He admitted that, to some extent, this measure was an improvement on the Bill of 1874—namely, that the clerks of the peace were not included in it. But some of the other provisions rendered it more objectionable than the other Bill was. His noble Friend opposite had not in any way attempted to state that the election of sheriffs by town councils would be good in itself, but simply advocated it because he said it existed in some towns in England, and therefore he thought it ought to exist in Ireland. Now, he thought that nobody would urge more strongly that the circumstances of England, and Ireland were not exactly similar than the hon. Gentleman (Mr. M. Brooks) who introduced this Bill in "another place." He must say that he thought the election of sheriffs by municipal corporations would add considerably to the difficulties which already existed. He feared that persons would not be chosen because of their personal fitness to discharge the duties of the office, but that they would be chosen to carry out the law for having sailed very near the wind in a political sense. With regard to the city with which he was most acquainted, he could not feel any confidence that the elections would be conducted in a manner that would add to the dignity of the city. He remembered an election at which the room in which the town council met was occupied by a furious mob, and a town councillor in a sworn examination said he was unable to exercise his vote, because his life would have been in danger if he had done so, and he believed that this case was not a solitary instance. He could not believe that a Bill of this description would tend to promote the dignity of the sheriffs. He knew it would be said that this Bill differed from the previous Bill, inasmuch as that the corporations were not to elect the sheriffs, but were to recommend three persons to the Lord Lieutenant for election. He must call the attention of his noble Friend opposite to this, because it

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  appeared to him that the title of the Bill was at variance with the Preamble. The title said that it was a Bill to extend to the municipal corporations of Ireland the same privileges as those enjoyed by corporations in England. Now, he knew of no case in England in which a corporation or any other body had to recommend three persons for an office, as was proposed by this measure. He considered such a provision to be mischievous, and more mischievous than any other provision in the original Bill, because it would be perfectly competent to select two men of straw who would fulfil the requirements, and a third person who might be most objectionable. In such a case the Lord Lieutenant would naturally have to elect the objectionable person, and it would appear to the world as if the Lord Lieutenant had selected out of the three candidates the person who might be most objectionable. He should like to ask his noble Friend opposite why two cities, which he believed were also counties, had been omitted from the Bill—namely, Carrickfergus and Galway? Besides all the objections he had named, he should most strongly appeal to Her Majesty's Government, and the noble Duke who was Leader of that House (the Duke of Richmond), whether it was right that a Bill which was objected to, and rejected on a division by their Lordships the year before last, should be read a second time on the 10th of August, when, if all they heard was true, the sitting of Parliament would end on Wednesday next. He hoped their Lordships would not assent to the second reading of the measure.
  Amendment moved to leave out ("now") and add at the end of the Motion ("this day month".)—(The Earl of Limerick.)
  EARL SPENCERsaid, the noble Lord complained that the Bill came on for second reading at so late a period of the Session. It was true that his noble Friend behind him (Lord Waveney) had reproved the Government for reading another Bill a second time at so late a period of the Session; but he hardly thought that the noble Lord who had just sat down could compare that Bill with the present measure. The Bill which was now before their Lordships was one which had been debated in that House before, and there could be no difficulty
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  in carrying a simple measure like this even at this late period of the Session. He thought they ought to consider that this measure had excited considerable interest in Ireland, and had also attracted considerable attention "elsewhere," and he therefore thought that some slight discussion should take place on it. He desired to put before their Lordships the reasons why he should not follow the noble Earl into the Lobby on his Motion for the rejection of the Bill. He said that whenever they found a grievance was felt by a particular law, and whenever they found that by altering that law they were not in any way endangering the State, then he thought it was right to assimilate the laws of England, Scotland, and Ireland. Then he thought that all those requirements were to be found in the Bill now before their Lordships. In England they found a very considerable number, he thought as many as 20 corporate towns which had the ancient privilege of electing their own sheriffs. Some of those towns were very small; but when they went across the Channel they found larger and more important towns which had that privilege taken away from them; and, further than that, they knew that it was considered to be a great grievance by those municipalities across the Channel that those ancient privileges had been taken away from them. There would not possibly be any danger to the State in carrying this small measure. The sheriff's office in Ireland was an office of dignity. An Act had been passed this year—he meant the Juries Act—which would now become the law of the country, and he felt sure it would do great good in Ireland by removing the impression which existed in the minds of many persons as to partiality in the election of juries. No doubt, the sheriffs had the power of partially selecting the juries; but this Bill would take away that power altogether. This Bill was introduced into the other House in 1874, and after a discussion was referred to a Select Committee, and it came out from that Committee with some Amendments. On that Committee were the Chief Secretary for Ireland (Sir Michael Hicks-Beach), his Colleague, the late Chief Secretary for Ireland (Lord Carlingford), and the present Lord Chancellor of Ireland (Dr. Ball), and he thought their Lordships would incur a serious responsibility if

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  they rejected a measure approved of by such distinguished persons. The noble Earl opposite had asked why Carrickfergus and Galway were not included in the Bill? He believed the simple reason was, that they were not corporate towns. He hoped the Bill would be read a second time.
  THE LORD CHANCELLORsaid, that, although the Bill came before the House at a very late period of the Session, the question with which it dealt was a very simple one. It was introduced by a private Member in the other House, and as such was opposed by the Government, but after undergoing a considerable amount of modification they were able to accept it. The Bill in its then form contained the principles which were recommended and adopted by Parliament in 1838–9 for the assimilation of the laws of England and Ireland on the subject, and the Government were prepared to support it in that, as they had done in the other House. He must add that he thought there was some ground for the objection that it was not altogether in accordance with its present title and Preamble, and he would, therefore, suggest that those should be altered.
  LORD REDESDALEsaid, it was at least unfortunate that the Bill should have come up to their Lordships' House at so late a period of the Session, when there was hardly an Irish Peer present.
  On Question, "That 'now' stand part of the Motion?" Their Lordships divided:—Contents41; Not-Contents 14: Majority 27.
  Resolved in the Affirmative.
  Bill read 2a accordingly, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House To-morrow.

ELEMENTARY EDUCATION BILL.
(The Lord President.)
ELEMENTARY EDUCATION BILL.

  (NO. 204.) COMMITTEE.
  House in Committee (according to Order).
  Clauses 1 to 3, inclusive, agreed to, with Amendments.
  Clause 4 (Declaration of duty of parent to educate child).
  LORD STANLEY OF ALDERLEYmoved, as an Amendment, in page 1,
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  line 11, to leave out ("the duty of.") and insert ("obligatory for"), and in line 13 to leave out ("perform such duty") and insert ("fulfil such obligation"), because duty was the highest word in the English language, and applied only to obligations imposed by Divine law and conscience. Parliament could not create duties; it might impose obligations, and it would become the duty of the subject to obey the law. Those who objected to compulsory education would not be better pleased at being told that the teaching of writing and arithmetic was a duty.
  THE DUKE OF RICHMOND AND GORDONobjected to the Amendment.
  Amendment negatived.
  Clause agreed to.
  Clause 5 (Regulation as to employment of child under ten, and certificate of education or previous school attendance being condition of employment of child over ten).
  THE MARQUESS OF RIPONsubmitted that the operation of the clause, as regarded the personal examination of children, would not work justly or advantageously. Irish children also coming direct from Ireland, where they had attended the National Schools, and the Scottish children coming from Scotland, probably, where they had attended the public schools, would have to go through their full number of attendances in English schools before they would be able to undergo any examination. He suggested that, as regarded half-timers, Boards of Guardians should have power to make bye-laws, without the intervention of the parishes.
  THE DUKE OF RICHMOND AND GORDONmaintained that the tests which it was proposed that children should pass before going to labour were likely to work well. The Government were of opinion that it was advisable that the tests of knowledge and attendance should proceed pari passû. The standard would not be a very high one; but the Government must insist upon a certain number of attendances, because it would at least be a guarantee that the child had a certain amount of knowledge, and in the case of boys, who were naturally extremely dull, the Inspector would have a discretion to reduce the standard. The difficulty anticipated by

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  the noble Marquess in respect to Scotch children was, he believed, already met by Clause 47 of the Bill; and as for Irish children, he would take their case into consideration. With regard to half-time in the agricultural districts, he did not think it would be safe to go to the length of giving the Guardians the power of passing compulsory bye-laws. To grant such a power would in fact be to turn the Unions into so many school boards, and that was what the Government had no desire to do. The best course appeared to him to be to allow every parish to fulfil the requirements of the Act in its own way.
  THE MARQUESS OF RIPONsaid, that what he wished was that the noble Duke opposite the President of the Council would consider whether it was possible to separate the compulsory bye-laws from the half-time bye-laws.
  Clause agreed to.
  Clauses 6, 7, and 8, inclusive, agreed to.
  Clause 9 (Exception to prohibition of employment of children).
  LORD HENNIKERsuggested the amendment of the clause with a view to put some check upon the action of Committees of Boards of Guardians in suspending the Bill during the time allowed in the clause. He should like to say a few words on this clause, as he had had charge of the Agricultural Children Act in its passage through their Lordships' House. He had not a word to say against its repeal, although it had cost him no little trouble; and whatever his opinion might be as to that Act, although not perfect, going far enough for the time, he was glad the Government had gone further now. However, the Act was shown to be of some use as a tentative measure, and it was more that than anything else, from the fact that this clause and other provisions of the Bill were taken from it. The fact was that, in several cases, the Act had been defeated more or less by granting the full time allowed for suspending it. In making the application some of the applicants had acknowledged their object was to make the Act as inoperative as possible. The clause was intended to give a power of suspension in cases of emergency, when the weather was unsettled, or there was a
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  want of labour, and not to give it as a matter of course. He thought the working of the Act might be taken as a fair instance of how the clause might act. The age of 8 as against 10 for attendance at school had been tried. He thought 14 too high to begin with, and he should have preferred to see the age made 13, and no provision made such as the clause contained. In any case, he hoped Her Majesty's Government would consider the matter—whether it would not be wise to put some check on the action of Boards of Guardians—either by allowing them to suspend the operation of the Bill, with the leave of the Education Department, or in some other way.
  THE DUKE OF RICHMOND AND GORDONthought this was unnecessary, as it was only for the necessary operations of husbandry and the in-gathering of the crops that the Act could be relaxed for a period not exceeding six weeks in the year, upon due notice to the Education Department; while, moreover, in many parts of the country the school holidays were usually given at harvest time, and the children then assisted at the in-gathering of the crops. He did not think it likely that Boards of Guardians would be inclined to do anything that would be likely to impede harvesting operations.
  Clause agreed to.
  Clause 10 (Payment of school fees for poor parents).
  EARL FORTESCUEobjected to the provision that a parent, by reason of any such payment, should not be held to be a pauper. Both Houses had just agreed to a clause stating it to be the duty of every parent to provide education for his children up to a certain age, just as he was before legally bound to provide them with lodging, food, and clothing. The law could take no cognizance of the reason of a man's inability to provide for himself and his family. He might have permanently disabled himself by doing some most meritorious and even heroic act. He equally became legally a pauper by receiving relief out of the rates. In this Bill they were entering on a course of what he must call gushing legislation.
  THE DUKE OF RICHMOND AND GORDONthought that an agricultural

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  labourer with five or six children might be unable to pay for the education of the whole of his family and yet might not be a pauper.
  Clause agreed to.
  Clause 11 agreed to.
  Clause 12 (Proceedings on disobedience to order of court for attendance at school.)
  THE MARQUESS OF RIPONsaid, he had considerable doubts as to the wisdom of this provision. The Industrial Schools Acts laid down a category of children who might be sent to industrial schools; that category was very wide, but the proposal in the Bill would make it still wider. He thought the clause objectionable on two grounds—first, because it gave an advantage to improvident parents; and, secondly, because it might interfere with the efficient working of those industrial schools. He would like to know from his noble Friend opposite the President of the Council what class of children it was intended should be sent to those schools?
  THE DUKE OF RICHMOND AND GORDONsaid, he thought the clause applied to the class of children whom his noble Friend the Vice President of the Council had called "wastrel," children who did not attend school, and could not, unless the school fees were paid for them.
  Clause verbally amended, and agreed to.
  Clause 13 agreed to.
  Clause 14 (Licence to child sent to industrial school to live out while attending school).
  EARL FORTESCUE, who moved the omission of the clause, said he objected strongly to throwing on the ratepayers the expenses of industrial schools. Such a course would discourage voluntary aid. He contended that this and the following three or four clauses were objectionable, as they tended to break down the principles on which all the legislation dealing with pauperism for half a century had been founded. The children of labourers, though not paupers, would be educated at the expense of the ratepayers. That was most undesirable in itself, and full of danger as a precedent.
  THE DUKE OF RICHMOND AND GORDONsaid, that schools founded on
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  the same principle were found to work well in Scotland, and would form the means of inculcating useful habits among the children. For these reasons he was unable to assent to the Motion of the noble Lord.
  Amendment negatived.
  Clause agreed to.
  Clause 15 (Amendment as to provision of industrial school by school board).
  EARL FORTESCUEobjected to the proposal to give meals to children in day industrial schools at the expense of the ratepayers, because it was still more undesirable in itself and dangerous as a precedent.
  THE DUKE OF RICHMOND AND GORDONsaid, there was a certain class of children who could not be got to school by any other means except industrial schools, and who, if they were not educated, would at a later period of life fill our gaols. The clause involved no new precedent. The system was not only strongly recommended by the Rev. Sydney Turner, but was working with remarkable success in Glasgow, Aberdeen, and Bristol. It was an experiment, and, if it failed, the Secretary of State would withhold his certificate. But it would be unwise on the part of the Legislature not to try this experiment, because these day industrial schools, which were much cheaper than the industrial boarding schools, reached children who could not otherwise be got at, and because it was hoped that that these schools would not only benefit the children, but, by implanting among them habits of order, cleanliness, and discipline, would have a civilizing influence in the homes of the parents.
  EARL FORTESCUEdid not undervalue the influence of these institutions, but there was a wide difference between such as were supported by private individuals and such as were maintained out of the rates. The Rev. Sydney Turner's authority on such a question was deservedly high; but at a conference of members of Boards of Guardians, and of the Charity Organization Society, and other benevolent persons eminently qualified to discuss this subject, Mr. Turner was almost alone in maintaining the expediency of the course adopted by the Government. Lord Shaftesbury and Mr. John Macgregor were also opposed

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  to this proposal, and against such an array of testimony he could not accept Mr. Sydney Turner's authority as conclusive. He, unlike some political economists, approved of industrial day schools supported by private benevolence. But perhaps their greatest value consisted in eliciting sentiments of gratitude in children accustomed to ill-usage and neglect, by making them feel the benefits and believe in the existence of evidently disinterested kindness and care. Education and food, provided out of rates and taxes, would be grudgingly given and thankfully received. Industrial day schools would lose the most valuable part of their moral influence under this Bill.
  Clause agreed to.
  Clause 16 (Establishment, &c., by day industrial schools).
  THE MARQUESS OF RIPONobjected to the sub-section which provided that the 2s. a-week, if recovered from the parent of the child, should be paid over to the local authority. The school might be mainly established by benevolent persons, yet the fees were to be paid over neither to the Treasury nor to the managers. It was quite right that the Treasury should pay the schooling for the child, and be then recouped for the advance; but he thought it very wrong that the managers should not get the surplus, if there were a surplus. The system adopted in the day industrial schools was a much better one.
  THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURYsaid, these children could only be sent to the industrial schools whose managers were willing to receive them, and thus the managers would be able to make what bargain they liked with the local authority. If they did receive a child, they could do so on what terms they pleased. It cost more to restrain at school a vicious child than a well-conducted one; but that was the nature of all control, and larger sums thus expended were a necessary expenditure that was not in any way in the nature of a premium.
  THE MARQUESS OF RIPONdid not think there would be a power for the local authority to make a bargain with the conductors of industrial schools.
  Clause agreed to.
  Clause 17 agreed to.
  Clause 18 (Contribution for fees of children who obtain certificates).
  EARL FORTESCUEexpressed his apprehension that a too high standard of education would attract the lower classes of children to higher pursuits than those which they had hitherto mostly followed. The really pre-eminently able and energetic among the wage class had now in this country far greater facilities for self-culture, and raising themselves to wealth and distinction than they had ever had before. Such examples, however, must always be few and exceptional. But there was great danger just now of those engaged in what political economists called the work of verification becoming too numerous in proportion to those engaged in the work of distribution, and above all of production. The verificatory class consisting of lawyers' clerks, accountants, and such like, together with a large number of the distributing class, were engaged in writing, cyphering, or other kinds of the lightest manual labour; and there was now notoriously a severe competition among those who were hereditarily and naturally candidates for such employment. While of the producing class, upon the result of whose work both the other classes depended, the large majority were engaged in heavy bodily labour; and of these, as the great rise in wages latterly proved, the supply was now rather short. It was particularly unwise, therefore, just now by this clause to tempt some of the rather more intelligent boys all over the country to quit their natural sphere of labour, where they were wanted, and would help to elevate and enlighten their fellows, for the sake of pushing into the already overcrowded ranks of the verifiers and distributors. He must protest against such sentimental legislation contrary to sound principle and the requirements of the present time.
  THE DUKE OF RICHMOND AND GORDONreplied that the object of the clause was to improve the education of the children by the offer of what corresponded with the small scholarships of the Universities for the higher classes.
  Clause agreed to.
  Clauses 19 to 42, inclusive, agreed to, with Amendments.
  LORD STANLEY OF ALDERLEYmoved, in page 21, after Clause 42, to insert the following Clause:—
  "Nothing in Clause 14 of the Act of 1870 shall be construed as excluding the 'Ten Commandments,' the 'Lord's Prayer,' and the 'Apostles Creed,' from the teaching in schools provided by school boards,"
  and pointed out that though Clause 14 was not intended to exclude the Ten Commandments and Lord's Prayer, yet it had been so interpreted in many cases. Only a few weeks ago a member of the London School Board handed in a protest against the Fourth Commandment having been asked for in an examination of boys for some prizes, and the Chairman had received the protest. A noble Lord had told him that a Government Inspector had upheld the view that Clause 14 prohibited the Ten Commandments and Lord's Prayer; another noble Lord had told him that this view was quite wrong, and that if any one applied to the Court of Chancery, it would upset it. How was a poor labourer to apply to the Court of Chancery—this was like the Judge who, on sentencing a labourer, told him he ought, instead of doing as he had done, to have sued for damages, and then come to their Lordships' House for a divorce. Under the late Government the vicar of Macclesfield had been told by the Education Office that it was illegal to have the Ten Commandments suspended in a building temporarily used for board-school purposes. This was to put a sort of slur on the Ten Commandments, and he would ask with what face could any justice of the peace sentence a boy for theft who had been brought up in a board school where the Ten Commandments were never taught?
  THE DUKE OF RICHMOND AND GORDONsaid, he could not accept the Amendment. In the great bulk of board schools throughout the country the Ten Commandments and the Lord's Prayer were already taught; and it was not because one of the members of the London School Board protested against the teaching of the Fourth Commandment that such an Amendment as this should be passed, and to pass it would not advance religious teaching at all, which the Government was quite as desirous to advance as the noble Lord could be. Those who did not desire religious teaching would remain as they were now and would not give religious
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  teaching, while those who gave religious education now would not be benefited by the clause.
  THE ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURYthought the noble Lord would act wisely in withdrawing the clause, because it might throw doubt on that on which he hoped there was no doubt whatever—namely, that it was competent to any school board to teach the Lord's Prayer, the Ten Commandments, and the Creed under the existing law. As a matter of fact they were now taught in board schools.
  LORD HAMPTON, for the reason given by the most rev. Primate, also urged the noble Lord to withdraw the Amendment. If the parents would not permit their children to receive such instruction it was not the fault of the school boards.
  LORD STANLEY OF ALDERLEYsaid, that after the statement of the most rev. Primate (the Archbishop of Canterbury) which had been anticipated by the noble Duke (the Lord President of the Council), he should be happy to withdraw his Amendment.
  Amendment, by leave of the House, withdrawn.
  Clause agreed to.
  Remaining clauses agreed to.
  Schedules agreed to.
  The Report of the Amendments to be received To-morrow; and Bill to be printed, as amended. (No. 226.)

APPELLATE JURISDICTION BILL.

  COMMONS AMENDMENTS.
  Order of the Day for considering the Commons Amendments, read.
  LORD DENMAN, in pursuance of a printed Notice as to Clause 5, objected to three Law Lords being necessary to form a quorum.
  The LORD CHANCELLORobserved that the Amendment of the noble and learned Lord was not relevant to the Bill.
  LORD DENMANsaid, that as an Amendment had been made to the clause in another place, he had a right to move an Amendment. He accordingly moved that the clause be not agreed to. By this clause not only Lord Kingsdown, if

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  he had still been a Member of their Lordships' House, would have been insufficient to make up a quorum of three, but also the noble Lord the Chairman of Committees (who had carried a Standing Order to the same effect) would have been considered insufficient, even if desired by both parties (in an Appeal) to be one of three. He read to their Lordships a letter from Lord Hatherley, in which his Lordship wrote that it would be "idle to call the new tribunal the House of Lords, though his Lordship hoped it might be made a very good Court." By the measure the character of their Lordships' House as an Appellate Tribunal was entirely changed, and he thought so important a matter should not be determined without the fullest consideration.
  LORD REDESDALEsaid, he could not agree with the purport of the noble and learned Lord's (Lord Denman's) Amendment. The noble and learned Lord was wholly mistaken in thinking that the character of the House as an Appellate Tribunal would be altered. The Appellate Jurisdiction of the House would remain what it was, and all that the Bill would do was to secure the necessary attendance of Peers, who would be qualified by their legal attainments to advise the House on difficult legal questions. In 1873 the Leaders of both Parties agreed to recommend the taking away of that Jurisdiction from their Lordships; and that course was approved of in 1874 and 1875. Then a change came over the mind of the House, and public opinion was strongly expressed in a variety of ways against the removal of the Appellate Jurisdiction from the House. It was very remarkable that the change in public opinion was spontaneous, and uninfluenced by the leading Parties on either side. Ultimately, it was resolved that the Jurisdiction of that House should be retained, the consideration of the manner in which that should be done being deferred to the present Session. The Bill did not take away the privilege of any noble Lord to attend the hearing of appeals, and under it the Appellate Court would be as much the House of Lords as it ever was. He believed the country was satisfied with the tribunal of the House of Lords, and he hoped that the Bill would become part of the law of the land this Session, for there was a prestige attaching to
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  that House as a tribunal which could not be acquired for generations by any other Court of Appeal which might be substituted for it.
  THE LORD CHANCELLORsaid, that the Question before the House was simply the consideration of the Amendments which the Commons had made in that Bill, and he therefore could not enter upon a discussion of its principle. The great subject of that Bill sent down to the other House was the question of this House as the Tribunal of Ultimate Appeal of the country; and he thought he was correct in saying that on that subject the House of Commons had made absolutely no alteration in the measure, but had only supplemented it by those financial provisions which could only spring from the other House, and could not be introduced in this House. He could not refrain from expressing his feelings of gratitude at the course taken by the other House in the matter. The provisions of the Bill on that subject were matters on which different opinions might well be entertained, and actually were entertained by various persons in the House of Commons. Those opinions were placed in abeyance, and that Bill now came back to their Lordships in that respect exactly as it had been sent down to the other House. Though there were several Amendments made in the Bill there were only two of importance. One, to which he thought no objection could reasonably be offered, related to the Intermediate Court of Appeal, and the position of things with respect to that Court was this—Under the Act of last year the Lord Chancellor had power to take from each of the three Divisions of Queen's Bench, Common Pleas, and Exchequer one Judge to assist in the work of the Intermediate Court of Appeal. When this Bill went to the other House considerable objection was taken to that provision. It was said that its working would be uncertain and unsatisfactory, that there would be a change in the Judges, and that the object should be to obtain Judges who would be permanent. The first important Amendment was to meet that defect. A provision was introduced for the actual transfer of three primary Judges to the Intermediate Court of Appeal, but these Judges might be required to go on Circuit. The second important Amendment provided that rules might be made to insure.

  949
  to a much greater degree than at present the hearing by a single Judge of cases in the Divisions of Queen's Bench, Common Pleas, and Exchequer, so as to produce to a greater extent than could now be done the same results as were obtained in the Chancery Division, whereby points of law were decided at the hearing of cases, and it was rendered unnecessary to refer those points to the Court in Banco. Those were the only Amendments of any substance which had now to be considered. He hoped the results of the attention which had been bestowed upon this Bill would be to materially improve our system of Judicature.
  LORD COLERIDGEsaid, he thought the compromise that had been effected was a reasonable one, and one which he thought would work well in practice. He had laid on the Table a Notice that he would call the attention of the House to the working of the Judicature Act, and move for a Return to supplement one which had been previously obtained; but, perhaps, it would be more convenient and save time if he said what he had got to say on the consideration of these Amendments. Unfortunately, the controversy, if controversy it ought to be called which dealt with matters of fact, was conducted on certain inconvenient conditions, because those who really knew about the working of the Act up to this time were not, with the single exception of the person now addressing their Lordships, able to speak in that or the other House of Parliament, and of course they could not enter on a controversy in the newspapers, and those who, he was quite satisfied unintentionally, had misrepresented the facts of the case had not that definite information which was essential for dealing with this very important question. He was, therefore, sorry to find from the statements that had appeared in the newspapers and which had been made "elsewhere" that there had been very gross exaggerations as regarded the present arrears. The Act divided the Courts of Justice into the High Court of Justice and the Court of Appeal. He would take first, the working of the High Court of Justice, which, as their Lordships would remember, was divided into five Divisions, but for all ordinary purposes into three—namely, the Divisions represented by the Vice Chancellors, by the Queen's Bench, Common Pleas, and
  950
  Exchequer, and by the Probate and Admiralty Courts. The working of the Chancery Division had been somewhat slow, because the most salutary practice of vivâ voce examination had been introduced. Anyone who knew anything about the matter would see that if we tried cases by vivâ voce examination, they would take up a longer time,; but, for all that, there was no comparison between that system and the system of affidavits for eliciting the truth. Every one knew perfectly well that the result of affidavits drawn by the score, settled by the counsel, and sworn to, perhaps, without much examination, could not for a moment be compared with the result attained by examination and cross-examination vivâ voce. In the Probate and Admiralty Courts there was very little difference, except that as the Judge of the Probate Court could call in the Judge of the Admiralty, he believed, on the whole, more important work had been got out of that Division. He now came to what he understood better—namely, the working of the Queen's Bench, Common Pleas, and Exchequer Division. And, first, with regard to sittings in Banco, he had to say that there were, practically speaking, no arrears. He did not mean that there might not be some few cases standing over, but practically there were no arrears at all. Therefore as far as regarded two very important portions of the High Court of Justice, the work had been done to a greater extent than he believed had ever been done before. He quite admitted that in trial by jury cases there were very considerable arrears. He had to say, however, that as to this matter there had been gross exaggeration. The fact of the exaggeration was unquestionable. There was no kind of use in disputing about the facts. He did not invent these statements; but he desired their Lordships to know the facts, in order that they might see how far the Amendments made in the Bill were really well founded. The question was how many cases were standing for trial, and it was a question of figures and nothing else, and his authorities for the figures he had given on a previous occasion, and was about to give, were of the best kind—namely, the Associates of the Courts—Mr. Campbell, Mr. Erle, and Mr. Pollock. He said then, and now repeated a statement which he saw was

  951
  questioned "elsewhere"—that, whereas between November, 1874, and November, 1875, the Judges sat 540 days in London and Middlesex to try cases, they sat for 676 days from November, 1875, up to the close of the sittings in 1876. Some doubt had been cast upon his meaning in the use of the expression "judicial days." What he meant was, of course, that if two Judges each sat for 30 days the result was 60 judicial days; and he repeated that there had been 150 or thereabouts more days spent by the same number of Judges in the same time since the passing of the Judicature Act compared with the number of days' sittings by the same Judges in the same time and upon the same work before the passing of the Act. Further, he stated, and now repeated, that in the words of the Return furnished to him—
  "Every action which has been entered for trial since the Judicature Act came into operation has been tried within three months of its entry, and every action now left untried since the beginning of the Long Vacation will have been standing for trial less than three months."
  In his statement he made no distinction between common jury and special jury cases; it applied unreservedly to both classes. He did not mean to say that three months was no time to wait or that the arrear was not a large arrear; but he did say that to talk of the Act having broken down, of the state of things being unprecedented, was to indulge in extravagant language and to go altogether beyond what the facts of the case, as he believed them to be, warranted. Nobody could foretell what would happen hereafter, but as they began last year with 549 cases, and as they would begin the next year with 600 or 700, it was not unlikely that by the end of the year the arrear would be got rid of. It was alleged, first, that the business was shown to be declining, and yet that more time was taken to try fewer cases, which was said to prove the bad working of the system; and, secondly, it was said that the sittings of the Judges had neither been so continuous nor so long as they ought to have been. Now, it was almost a universal rule that as you amended procedure and made it more reasonable and expeditious, you diminished the quantity, but increased the quality of the business that was left. It was wholly fallacious to go back a good many years and say there were then more writs
  952
  issued, and a larger number of cases tried. That was true, but those were days when a larger number of cases were undefended, when a number of small technical questions arose for decision, and when the parties, by interlocutories and discoveries, did not know each other's hands as they did now. A larger number of such cases might be tried in the same period; they did not occupy the same amount of judicial time. But now almost every case coming before the Judge and jury was a substantial case. By proceedings in Chambers and otherwise the chaff was winnowed away, the case on both sides was ascertained, and understood, and when the parties came into Court it was upon a substantial issue. Under one of the most useful provisions of the Judicature Act it was ordered that a defendant should swear to his defence; he could no longer keep the plaintiff at arm's length, but was put to his oath. Then, again, he understood that a large portion of business which, before the Judicature Act, would come into Court, was now disposed of in Chambers, and did not figure in the returns of cases. But it was business done all the same, and in any fair and candid comparison of systems it must be taken into account as business now done in one way, while before the Judicature Act it was disposed of in another way. He ventured to say, therefore, that the amount of litigious business before the Judges was not, substantially at all events, smaller at the present moment than in previous years. The Judges, he thought, had good ground to complain of observations made upon them elsewhere, as though they had not been loyal to the spirit of the Act, and, instead of doing their best to carry it into effect, had been obstructive and prevented the proper working of the Act. He was certain that this sort of attack upon the Judges would receive no countenance from his noble and learned Friend opposite (the Lord Chancellor) who had said no more than was just—though it was generously and kindly said—in moving the second reading of this Bill—namely, that the Judges, so far from obstructing the operation of the Act, had accepted it loyally and with ardour and energy. A more unfair and unfounded accusation than to say that they had in any way obstructed the fair working of the Act was never made by

  953
  any man in anyplace, however considerable the man and however high the place. It was absolutely unfounded. In January and February so much had the work diminished that a Judge might occasionally not have been sitting. But speaking for himself and all the Judges he knew, and excepting the short statutory vacations, there had been no Judge who had not in some place or in some Court been sitting day by day from November 2, 1875, up to the present time. A good deal had been said about Circuits, and he wished to state that it was perfectly indifferent to the Judges whether they sat in London or the country; they did not care where the work was. He said that so far as he knew a full amount of work had been required from the Judges. It must be remembered that the presence throughout the country of the Judges on Circuit had an importance of its own which ought not to be measured, and which could not be fairly measured, by the particular number of hours consumed by the Judges. Indirect, yet most valuable, results were produced by the presence of the Judges in various parts of England. He altogether denied that the mode of criticism which had been applied to those learned persons was a fair, or a generous, or a right mode of criticism at all. When he saw it stated that the Judges ought to work in shifts, that they only considered their own convenience, and that they did not think of the public whom they ought to serve, he maintained that that was not seemly language, but language which the facts of the case did not in any degree or in any manner justify. So far as his own Court was concerned, he maintained that the working of the High Court had, upon the whole, been successful. He did not say he should not have preferred to state that there were no arrears in the Nisi Prius Court, but he did assert that if what he had stated to their Lordships was anything like the truth, the exaggerated statements on the subject must be attributable in a great degree to the circumstance that sufficient attention had not been paid to the figures and facts before those statements were made. We were hardly yet in a position to judge what the normal working of the High Court would be. It seemed to him to be as unreasonable to legislate on the existing state of things as it would have been to come to Parlia-
  954
  ment in January and to say—"Abolish three Judges because there is not sufficient work for them." With reference to the Amendments in the Bill they revolutionized the system of Common Law procedure, and he considered that it was inconvenient and unfortunate that a change of this great importance should have been introduced into this House on the 10thof August in a Bill which had been much altered in the House of Commons since it left their Lordships some time ago. As the Bill went from the House their Lordships fully concurred with it, but it was now sent back in an entirely different form from that in which it left. Was it unreasonable to effect a change of that very considerable importance without any consultation, or the possibility of consultation, with those who had to administer the law? A very large majority of those persons were opposed to the change, and he ventured to think there was no real reason for its being effected at all. It was said to be made with the universal assent of the Profession, but he emphatically denied that the assent of the Profession had been even asked for anything like this change. He entertained great respect for those barristers who happened to be Members of the House of Commons, but he denied that they generally represented the feeling of the Profession on the subject, and he should require a much stronger consensus of opinion for the absolute destruction of the old system of Common Law, under which there was a trial of disputed facts before a jury and an adjudication on disputed points of law by a Court in Banco. He would now read some extracts from a letter addressed to him by his excellent Colleague Mr. Justice Brett—
  "First, it is alteration in a panic of legislation hardly yet dry. This block of causes at Nisi Prius in London and Middlesex is probably only temporary. Secondly, the proposed plan ignores entirely the essential difference between the causes tried before juries and those tried before Vice Chancellors. The causes in the Common Law Divisions are those which arise in the ever-varying transactions of every-day life. There is not a month, or even a week, in which some new combination does not arise in business, and therefore some totally new application of law does not arise. It seems never to be understood by those who are not conversant with the administration of law by Judge and jury that the trial before the jury is to ascertain what are the facts of that new combination, and that the law must be applied after the facts are ascertained. Let any one look into

  955
  the Reports, and he will see how incessantly new business, which is, in other words, a new point of law, arises. It is practically impossible, from want of time and books, that each new point should be determined at the Nisi Prius trial, as Mr. Gregory's Amendment, for instance, supposes it could be. If the point were then to be determined, either Nisi Prius trials must he postponed for months or the number of Judges and Courts must be increased by 60. And if each new point were reserved for the determination of the same Judge sitting in London or for another single Judge sitting alone, it is practically impossible to suppose that the number of appeals would not be increased ten or twenty-fold. Suppose an opinion expressed by Baron Bramwell or Mr. Justice Blackburn, let us say, at the trial referred to any Judge you may think wholly inferior or whom the public may think wholly inferior, and his judgment is different from the opinion; or even if the single judgment be that of the most trusted of the Judges. The assumption is that the point or application is new. Now, is it possible to suppose that it will be acquiesced in? I will give two or three instances which are recent—the crossed cheques, the negotiability of foreign bonds or coupons, the questions now raised as to disclosures or concealments in a prospectus, customs of the Stock Exchange, &c. The truth is that the proposal would make the Court of Appeal the only Court in Banco, and so the House of Lords the first instead of the second Court of Appeal. It is only, in fact, upon the question of a suggested misdirection that the Courts in Banco are a Court of Appeal. As to points reserved or special cases or other motions, they are a Court of First Instance upon questions of law. It may be that a single Judge should more often sit to hear points of practice; but that requires no legislation. Thirdly, if the Judges are to determine each of them singly these questions of law which so constantly arise, all idea of authority, which has hitherto been the backbone of the consistency of the law, must cease. Surely it cannot be supposed that the decision of a single Judge is to be cited as a binding authority to another single Judge. Such things as reported cases, which are now more useful even to prevent litigation than to guide it, must cease. No lawyer will be able to advise his client that the point has been decided by a binding authority; at all events, not till the Court of Appeal has decided; and so, again, that appeals must multiply. Fourthly, how is the work to be distributed? Three Judges in the Court of Appeal—are these to be three sitting singly, as it were, in Banco? If so, are there to be six at Nisi Prius and one at Chambers? That gives 13. Are five to be idle? Or are there to be more than three Courts in Banco or more than six at Nisi Prius? If yes, where are the Courts and the Bar? Fifth, what is to become of the peculiar business—the Revenue cases in the Exchequer, the magisterial and other cases in the Queen's Bench, the election cases (Parliamentary and Municipal) in the Common Pleas? Sixth, is not the veiled idea the idea of doing away with trial by jury? Seventh, I should say that at present nine-tenths of the daily Common Law disputes—i.e., cases—stop at the Court in Banco, whereas under the proposed system those nine-tenths would almost
  956
  all go to the Court of Appeal. For these reasons I have no doubt as to the extreme danger and ruin of a scheme which seems to me to be utterly thoughtless."
  It was further said that the spectacle was often seen of three Judges hearing cases which, men of ordinary intellect might dispose of in a few minutes. Now, he did not aspire to the intellect of his learned Friend who made those observations; but when he spoke of three Judges frequently sitting to decide points which a clerk in a counting-house might dispose of, he could only say that was a state of things which had not come under his own observation. For his own part, he found the strain upon his mind, though, perhaps, not so long, greater since he had the honour of a seat on the Bench than when he practised as a barrister, and his learned Friend in making the comments to which he referred laboured, he could not help thinking, under an entire misapprehension. Under all the circumstances of the case, he might add, he saw no necessity whatever for altering the present system. All that was required to be done was to give the Judges power in the less important cases. At all events, nothing like the alteration proposed in the Amendments before the House was, he believed, at all necessary or would be found in practice to be at all useful. He came, in the next place, to the working of the Court of Appeal, which was, in his opinion, a question somewhat different from the working of the High Court. His noble and learned Friend on the Woolsack had been so kind as to furnish him with a Return as to the working of the Court of Appeal in regard to appeals from the different Divisions of the High Court, and he found that for a period of five years, commencing in 1871, the number of appeals from the Common Law Divisions was 245, whereas the number from the Vice Chancellors' Courts was 1,012. During portions of that time up to the passing of the Judicature Act there were, he admitted, many matters in which the decisions of the Courts of Common Law were final, and that many of the appeals from the Vice Chancellors' Courts were with reference to small matters, so that it was exceedingly difficult to say what deduction ought to be made in making the contrast upon those two grounds. Still there remained the fact of the three

  957
  Common Law Courts sitting in Banco for five years with only 245 appeals, while there were 1,012 during the same time from the Courts of the Vice Chancellors. His noble and learned Friend had also been good enough to furnish him with a Return with respect to the Court of Appeal for the present year, which included the appeals from the Chancery as well as from the Common Law Divisions. From that Return it appeared that the number of appeals from the Chancery Division was 200, from the Queen's Bench Division 36, from the Divisional Court of Appeal 3, from the Common Pleas 27, from the Exchequer 45, from the Probate and Divorce Division 18, or in all 129. So that there were 200 appeals from the Chancery Division as against 129 from all the other Divisions. Those were facts which did not at all tend to encourage, in his opinion, the idea that the business of the Courts would diminish under the change which was proposed. In conclusion, he thought no Act had worked more successfully than the present, or was more generally satisfactory to the Profession; and as to the Court of Appeal, no Court, he believed, ever started under fairer auspices. It was difficult to say why it was not now viewed by them with the same favour as in the first instance. That was, he believed, due to other and temporary causes rather than its constitution. There was the great difficulty of a Court with permanent Judges as distinguished from Judges sitting from time to time, and although a difference of opinion existed among the Judges upon the point, yet he was strongly of opinion that amid much that was evil in the old system of the Court of Exchequer, there was the good that it prevented all distinctions of rank as among the Judges. Although undoubtedly there were inconveniences and difficulties in the working of the old Court of Exchequer Chamber, he must say that he thought the judgments of that Court commanded the respect of the Profession, and were looked up to. He thought that the portion of the Commons Amendments which added three Judges to the permanent Court of Appeal was a mistake, and that it would be better that all the superior Judges should from time to time take their places in the Court of Appeal. It was not a matter of sentiment with him; he held his opi-
  958
  nions because he really believed that for a considerable space of time the working of the Common Law Courts had been greatly for the benefit of the people of this country. He felt in a matter of this kind he was really in the hands of Her Majesty's Government, and he knew that in legal subjects Her Majesty's Government was his noble and learned Friend. He had submitted his views, and he left them with his noble and learned Friend on the Woolsack.
  THE LORD CHANCELLORsaid, he would not enter upon a general discussion upon the subject under consideration, as he thought it would be better to reserve whatever observations he might have to make upon the Amendments until they were put in their turn, but there was one observation which his noble and learned Friend opposite (Lord Coleridge) had made unconnected with the Amendments to which he must respond at once. His noble and learned Friend had heard that the learned Judges had placed themselves in antagonism to the Judicature Act, and that in some way they were thwarting its operations. He had been reminded by his noble and learned Friend that he (the Lord Chancellor) had borne testimony to the learned Judges, and his noble and learned Friend asked him was he prepared to repeat it? He was prepared in the most unqualified way to repeat that testimony, and he took the opportunity of bearing witness to what he called before, and called now, not only the loyalty, but the generous and most efficient manner in which the learned Judges had combined to put into operation the very large changes inaugurated by the Judicature Act. He believed they had done that not merely in obedience to the law, which they would have obeyed; he could go farther than that—he could say from his personal knowledge that the majority of the members of the Judicial Bench were not only prepared to obey the law, but were of opinion that the changes made by the Judicature Act were most beneficial and desirable changes. The other day there was an occurrence which had been the subject of remark, and there was a difference of opinion as to whether a particular action should be tried at a particular place before a jury. He did not disguise that he had an opinion as to what the law in that particular case

  959
  was, but he was not going to state now what that opinion was; but it was clear that this was a matter in which the Judges might differ in opinion as to what the law was. Whatever their opinion, they did not evince the slightest disposition on their part to fail to comply loyally and properly with the enactments of the Judicature Act. His noble and learned Friend referred to some criticisms made upon the arrangements for Circuit. He knew it was stated that a larger time was allotted for Circuits than was absolutely necessary. He knew the learned Judges were in a difficulty on this subject. Some persons thought the business would not be increased, others held a different opinion; but the learned Judges had no data by which they could tell how that might be. He must add one other observation, and that was to bear testimony to the way in which the learned Judges discharged their duties under great difficulties as to the accommodation in the places in which they discharged the Nisi Prius cases. He was sorry to say the accommodation was not sufficient. They were put into garrets and corners utterly unfit for them to sit in, and there they had to discharge labours under difficulties which other public servants would not submit to.
  LORD DENMANsaid, that as the 6th clause contained an Amendment in fixing the salary of the new Judges(which went out either with blanks or red letters), he was justified in moving an Amendment to it, he believed that two new Vice Chancellors, with power to sit as Judges of Chancery Appeal with the Lords Justices on the plan of the Exchequer Chamber, would be far more useful than the two Judges contemplated by the Bill, and hoped that retired Chancellors and Judges and those already Peers, whilst continuing to be Judges in England, Scotland, and Ireland, would not cease to give the weight of their authority and experience in cases when the House of Lords might be sitting on Appeals in vacation, or between a Dissolution and a New Parliament.
  Commons Amendments considered.
  Commons Amendments up to Clause 12 agreed to.
  THE LORD CHANCELLORsaid, he had now to ask their Lordships to agree
  960
  to the two Amendments which had been commented on by his noble and learned Friend opposite (Lord Coleridge). As regarded the first, which dealt with the Intermediate Court, with the exception of what had been said by his noble and learned Friend, whatever differences of opinion might have presented themselves to the minds of the learned Judges of the Supreme Court on the subject, he was happy to say he had received no unfavourable representations from them concerning it. The necessity for it was obvious, and his noble and learned Friend had himself admitted that the Court did not come up to his expectations. There was an Intermediate Court of Appeal, to which only three regular Judges were attached. For assistance they had to depend on the casual attendance of other Judges who might be able to spare some time from the business of their own Courts. There was another Amendment that that Intermediate Court of Appeal should sit in two divisions. Now, how was it possible for two divisions of that Court to sit in proper strength with only three regular Judges to transact the business? Of course, an addition to the number of Judges was required. Well, last year he proposed that, except at Circuit time, three of the primary Judges should be required to attend in the Intermediate Court of Appeal. That arrangement had not been found so satisfactory in practice as might have been expected, and the House of Commons therefore said that three of the primary Judges should be altogether transferred to the Court of Appeal, except during times of Circuit as before—in other words, that, except with the obligation of going Circuit, three primary Judges should be made regular members of the Court of Appeal. That was the Amendment he had now to propose. It was, it seemed to him, one more of form than of substance, and he apprehended that there would be no objection to it.
  Amendment agreed to.
  THE LORD CHANCELLORsaid, he now came to the second Amendment which related to the procedure in the primary Courts. His noble and learned Friend opposite (Lord Coleridge) had remarked that it was a very large and serious change to propose at so late a period of the Session. For his own

  961
  part, he must say that the change proposed was certainly not a novelty, inasmuch as it had been discussed over and over again both in and out of their Lordships' House, and it was difficult to imagine the procedure of the Courts being upon a proper footing so long as there were three Divisions of the High Court in which the procedure was entirely different from what it was in another Division. It was impossible to justify having in one Division only one Judge to dispose of precisely the same kind of business as in the other Divisions was disposed of before three Judges. He was glad that public opinion had ripened so rapidly as it had done upon this question, as was shown by the fact that in the House of Commons the Amendment was agreed to almost unanimously, and there was no division upon it. His noble and learned Friend had spoken of the violence of the change, but what had been done with regard to the different Divisions of the High Court of Justice? All the Divisions were now branches of one Court, and although certain distinctive names had been kept up, a person might commence a case in any one of the different Divisions he liked. Could his noble and learned Friend give any possible reason why a case presented for trial in the Exchequer Division of the High Court and disposed of by one Judge should, if brought on in the Court of Common Pleas, require three Judges? The Chancery arrangement might be wrong; if so, let it be altered. But there could not be for one Court a rule which would not apply to another. With regard to juries, no difficulty could arise; there might be a jury in the Court of Chancery as much as in the Court of Queen's Bench. As a consequence of the new system of Judicature, the Court of Chancery was absorbing Common Law cases. The Court of Chancery, indeed, was actually becoming blocked from the number of Common Law cases which came before it, suitors being attracted to it by the greater convenience it presented. Taking the suits commenced in town during the first year of the Judicature Act, and comparing them with the Returns for the year previous, he found that the increase in the Chancery Division was no less than 33 per cent—a fact which could not be accounted for except in the way he had
  962
  said. There had been a great deal of discussion about appeals. It might now be taken as settled that there should be two appeals—intermediate and final—but if his noble and learned Friend's view were carried out there would be three appeals. There would be first the decision at Nisi Prius, then an appeal to the Court in Banco, next an appeal to the Intermediate Court, and lastly an appeal to the Final Court. Now, did his noble and learned Friend really mean to say that that was his view of a perfect system? He very much doubted whether there would be a great multiplication of appeals, and was disposed to think that when a single Judge disposed of the law of the case, he was almost as likely to be right as where there were more Judges, at least for primary jurisdiction. But even supposing there were more appeals, the Intermediate Court would have to decide more, which would be a much better thing than having three Courts of co-ordinate authority, and would, he thought, have a much more steady effect on the law. It was not meant that where facts had to be decided they were to be decided by the Judge, but by the jury, as heretofore; and the law would be applied by the Judge who had heard those facts. Had the Court in Banco been such a sacred institution, and had it had such a great effect in settling the law? The Court in Banco had sat four in number; but it might now be constituted by two Judges, and even by one. So that great palladium of justice had dwindled down very much, as it might be composed of two Judges, and sometimes only of one. It would be etter to get rid of that which was little more than a phantom, and have a single Judge to apply the law to the facts which had been tried by a jury. All that the Amendment, therefore, did, was to say that as a general rule so far as convenient and practicable the one Judge who began the case should hear it to the end and apply the law to the facts when they had been ascertained by the jury. The clause was, however, very elastic, and would enable the Judges to make rules which would leave very important matters to be decided by the Courts in Banco. He did not think that the Amendment would interfere with the practice of the Courts. In his opinion it was a most valuable one—what he had said was the substance of the

  963
  whole of it, and he was surprised that his noble and learned Friend thought it so serious a departure from present practice.
  Amendment agreed to.

FORFEITURE RELIEF BILL.—(No. 210.)
(The Earl of Limerick.)
FORFEITURE RELIEF BILL.—(No. 210.)

  SECOND READING.
  Order of the Day for the Second Reading, read.
  THE EARL OF LIMERICK, in moving that the Bill be now read the second time, briefly explained its object, which was to remedy the severe hardship caused to tenants in certain cases through forfeitures arising under breaches of covenant, however trivial might be their character. The measure left it entirely to the Court to say whether or not in its discretion the relief should be granted in any particular case. It had the sanction of some eminent Judges, and he believed that if sanctioned it would confer a great benefit on tenants without doing injury or wrong to their landlords. Beyond that there was a large consensus of opinion in favour of the principle of the Bill, which would effect an important improvement in the law; it had received the unanimous approval of the other House, and he hoped their Lordships would agree to the second reading, which he now moved.
  Moved, "That the Bill be now read 2a"—(The Earl of Limerick.)
  THE LORD CHANCELLORsaid, he had examined the Bill as carefully as he could during the short time it had been before the House, and if he had to answer the question as to what he thought of it now, he should certainly say he thought it was a good Bill, and that it would not be productive of any injury to lessors in the cases to which it referred. He believed it had, as the noble Lord the Mover of the second reading had said, met with the approval of a great many eminent Judges, and it also seemed to have been drawn with care and with considerable professional skill. But he could not disguise from himself that it was a Bill which affected in a way that was very import-
  964
  ant a great mass of private property—in fact, hundreds of thousands of leases which might be most valuable. It might affect them without doing any injury to the lessor, but that was a matter on which the lessor ought to have an opportunity of judging for himself. He did not think at the end of the Session it would be right to pass a measure which affected private property so largely, and therefore the noble Lord would exercise a wise discretion if he would postpone asking for a decision on this question until next Session.
  Motion, by leave of the House, withdrawn, and Order for 2a discharged.

EGYPT—THE KHEDIVE AND THE NEW LEGAL TRIBUNALS.—QUESTION.
LORD EMLYsaid, their Lordships were aware that the ancient Consular Courts established by Treaty between the Porte and various Christian Powers had been abolished last year; that new Courts had been substituted by agreement between the Khedive and the Christian Powers, and that the jurisdiction of these new Courts had been settled by formal arrangement. The point to which he wished to invite attention was the jurisdiction conceded by the Khedive in the case of claims of foreigners against His Highness's private estate. No mode of attaching the Khedive's private estate existed before; but by the agreement which had been made, the Khedive conceded that his private estate should be subject to the jurisdiction of these Courts. Lately, however, an action was brought by a foreigner on account of a debt for which the private estate of the Khedive was liable, and a decision was given against His Highness; but he refused to allow its execution. The grounds of that refusal were, that in the month of May, after the Courts had been established, he issued a decree by which all liabilities of the nature of the plaintiff's claim were decreed to form a portion of the Public Debt of Egypt. But His Highness stated at the time he refused to allow the execution of the decree of the Court, that he had referred his decision in the matter to the Government of this country and to the other foreign Powers with whose consent the new Courts had been formed. He now wished to ask the Secretary of State for

965
Foreign Affairs, Whether any communication from His Highness the Khedive of Egypt, inviting an expression of opinion as to his right to refuse to permit certain judgments of the new Tribunals established in Egypt has been received by Her Majesty's Government, and, if so, whether he has any objection to state what reply he had given to such communication? If the noble Earl was not at present prepared to answer the Question, perhaps, as the matter was of considerable interest, he would be good enough to lay the Papers on the Table and make known the decision of Her Majesty's Government at the earliest opportunity.
THE EARL OF DERBY: My Lords, there is no doubt of the importance to many persons, and of the importance upon general grounds, of the question to which the noble Lord has referred, and in answer I have to say I did receive a communication from the Khedive inviting an expression of opinion, and that request for an opinion is now under the consideration of the Government. The fact is that, although the question involved is not exclusively a legal one, still it turns to a considerable extent upon the construction to be placed on certain documents which have much of a legal character about them, and I was unwilling to decide without first obtaining the opinion of the Law Officers of the Crown. At this time of the year, as the noble Lord well knows, the Law Officers have a great deal of business on their hands and some unavoidable delay has arisen. I am not therefore prepared to state what reply I have given to the communication, because I have given none, and until I am advised as to the legal points involved I shall not be prepared to give one. But, undoubtedly, it is desirable that this question should be disposed of without unnecessary delay, and I hope that my answer will not be long in coming. As I am not able to answer the Question now, I think it would be proper to adopt the alternative suggested by the noble Lord and lay the Papers on the Table.
House adjourned at half past Ten o'clock, till To-morrow, Three o'clock.