HL Deb 01 August 1876 vol 231 cc226-36
LORD WAVENEY

My Lords, in rising to call the attention of your Lord ships to the system of mobilization recently introduced into this country, and to ask the noble Earl the Under Secretary of State for War, Whether it is proposed to mobilize any additional corps during the present drill season, I will begin by assuring Her Majesty's Government that, although I shall be obliged in the course of my observations to notice what I consider to be some deficiencies in our system and endeavour to suggest other means for carrying out the great object in view, I have no desire to cast any reflections upon them. With regard to this moblization principle so general on the Continent, it has there a double meaning. It was originally intended for the purpose of organizing expeditionary forces, but subsequently it has been used there, and especially as I apprehend it is used in the German Empire, for the purpose of distribution of troops. In our own country, according to the arrangement in The Army List, it is intended for the purposes of defence; but by that arrangement there is only one purely military corps as exemplified in Her Majesty's regular forces, and that is the first army corps, or the Army Corps of Colchester, which is composed exclusively of battalions of the Line, Artillery of the Regular service, and, with the exception of two Corps of Yeomanry, of Regular Cavalry. In the other army corps there is a much larger infusion of the Militia service. The first division is almost entirely composed, as regards the Infantry, of Regiments of the Line; but the other division is supplemented from the Militia of England, of Ireland, and of Scotland. There are six army corps provided for the defence of this country, one for Ireland, and one for Scotland. I am not disposed, by any means, to find fault with a system that brings the local soldier from one part of the Kingdom to another, because it gives him the opportunity of studying the customs and habits of his fellow-subjects, and of obtaining information which he would not otherwise have an opportunity of doing. And I may remark, in passing, that in the new Kingdom of Italy, where affairs are administered with a sagacity that gives an example to the older Monarchies of Europe, that the movement of troops from one point of the Italian peninsula to another is mainly relied upon for the purpose of welding theme from the different provinces into one harmonious and congruous force. With regard to the operations of the army corps this year, I have no fault to find. I remember that last year when I brought the subject generally before your Lordships I rather regretted that a larger system of manœuvring had not been adopted than that attained, and I was told that the system had only been in existence for three years, and that the time for extended operations had not returned: still, I do not find fault with the experiment that has been made this year, and that the movement of the troops on a large scale has been postponed, because, under all circumstances, a great gain has been achieved in the military system of this country, and we have learnt much that we should not have known unless this plan of mobilization had been put in force and carried out. I do not complain of the change of system; but it seems to me that the mobilization, so far as it has gone, has not been altogether so complete as it might have been; and I would suggest that a remedy should be found for our shortcomings in the mobilization of our troops, so as to be able to assemble the largest possible number of men and matériel in the shortest time at some given point, from which the expeditionary forces might prepare for ulterior movements. To such an extent is this carried on on the Continent, that I have seen a table in which the time is calculated with sufficient accuracy for the information of a Government in which it is possible to assemble a corps from all the points of a district, and the time that would elapse for their further movement in any given direction to the frontier. This principle has been, to a certain extent, overlooked at Aldershot; but at Salisbury a happy accident has given the Commander of the district a practical opportunity of seeing how soon an army corps can be concentrated on a given point. There is no official Report of the circumstance; but we may trust implicitly in the statements of the military correspondents of the Press as to what occurred. Some outlying regiments beyond Salisbury were assembled simply for the purpose, as they believed, of returning home. They were called upon late in the evening to prepare to march to the railway from their camping ground on one side of Salisbury. I know the ground well, and the difficulties of moving troops over it. The movement was rapidly executed, and subsequently received, the approval of the General commanding. That is one point to be gained in mobilization. There is another point about which a great deal has been said—and I think rather unnecessarily—in disparagement in the training and teaching afforded to the army corps. It has been said that the troops were inconvenienced from the want of food, and in this country I am afraid it must occasionally be the case, because we have to depend upon contractors to furnish the troops with food. In Prussia it is done by requisition. That, however, is not our position, and we are obliged to depend upon contractors to a very great extent. But with regard to transport, it would seem that a very considerable improvement can be effected. I believe that for the transport both of men and heavy matériel some very different system from that now in use is required. For instance, it is matter of notoriety to all con- cerned in the movement of heavy stores that a large cart with two wheels is far superior to a large waggon with four wheels. There is another point which is of some importance. I am now going to speak of the force as assembled at particular points. I took occasion last year to request a Return of the troops under arms on a particular day in July, in order that I might compare them with the establishment of the regiments from which they were drawn. The result is somewhat remarkable. It should be an object in our Service to bring the force upon paper, as near as possible, in accord with the force in array; but I find, from the Return, that there is a considerable discrepancy between the strength and the establishment. I find, for instance, that the strength of troops of all arms at Aldershot on the 12th of July last year was 21,762, and that there was absent from the colours on the establishment at Aldershot 5,683. Your Lordships will observe that this is one-fifth, or nearly so, of the strength of the establishment. If we were to permit this to escape our notice, and to overlook the consequences which it might have on our defensive strength, I need scarcely tell your Lord ships that calamitous results might arise. Some of these reductions from the strength are, however, inevitable. I find from another Return, which was moved for in the other House of Parliament, as regards the strength of the Infantry regiments at head-quarters, that there were present 12,447, and that there were absent 814 sick, or convalescent, 552 engaged on recruiting service, and 464 the cause of whose absence was not clearly defined, and others were detached on special duty. That shows an aggravation of the discrepancy of which I have spoken. Now, as regards the results of these manœuvres, we were anxious to see how the troops mobilized could perform their duties. There can be no doubt that the training drill and appointments of all branches of the Regular Service were very complete. I do not know whether any of your Lordships were present at the march past at Aldershot on the 22nd of July; but the guns, Cavalry, and Infantry of the Line were what we have ever seen them, and I hope always will continue to see them. The Militia attracted the observation and praise, as I believe, of all who were competent to pronounce an opinion. Those who saw what were the nature of the movements, and saw how they were performed, will admit that the Militia were not unworthy comrades of the Line. After the first march past, the column, headed by three battalions of regular Infantry, was massed on a hill, which may be familiar to some of your Lordships. The Scotch and Irish regiments belonged to General M'Murdo's brigade; but so limited was the ground on which they had to move, that being desirous of communicating with General M'Murdo, I had great difficulty in passing my horse between the columns of soldiers. I remained to see the reverse march; and I can assure your Lordships—and I am certain that if the illustrious Duke who was present on that occasion were here to-day he would confirm what I say—that the Militia disentangled themselves from that dense, but not confused, mass with the steadiness of old soldiers. There was this also to remark—that the Infantry of the Line showed that though young soldiers, not in their discipline but in their youthful form, they gave promise of what they would come to. The Militia regiments were remarked as being stout and active. But there was one element of power which was absent on that day. By some arrangement, which I will not question, the soldiers of the Reserve which had been attached to the division had been dismissed; but from other persons I heard only one opinion of these men—first, of their personal and physical qualities; second, of their readiness to be attached to any regiment where their services were required; thirdly, of the facility with which they resumed their old habits; and fourthly, as I have learned from the Returns, that of those who were summoned the number which accepted the summons was almost complete. In the preceding year the men belonging to the first class Army Reserve were invited to attend the manœuvres. From 15 of the military districts there was no result; and from the remaining districts there were only 84 volunteers, of which 62 were present. I think that the time has now come when the country may be congratulated on the possession of a Reserve force. I myself looked with considerable apprehension on the substitution of the short-service for the long- service system. In many quarters the change was viewed with disfavour, and, to a considerable extent, with apprehension; but the risk was encountered, and the country may be congratulated on the result. Year after year probably this Force will increase, and eventually give us such a force as on an emergency will be sufficient to bring up the peace establishments of our Cavalry and Infantry to the war complement. There are some points on which it seems to me improvement may be effected. In the Yeomanry, for example, I think that some alterations may well be made. Where large and powerful regiments are formed it may be easy to maintain the organization of the Cavalry of the Line; but I cannot help thinking that an organization somewhat similar to that of the irregular forces in India would be better suited to the smaller regiments of Yeomanry. In many counties, owing to the alterations in the system of agriculture, it is not so easy now as it was years ago to find the description of trooper which is especially required. The men whom it would be desirable to bring into the Yeomanry service are the sons and relatives of the Yeomanry class of farmers; and therefore I take leave to suggest, whether it would not be wise to form provisional regiments of Yeomanry in the same way as provisional battalions of Volunteers are formed, of different strength, according to circumstances. I now come to what I may call the second phase of the question—the army corps system. I would consider it not inadvisable to establish one army corps as an absolute body complete in all its strength. If it be desirable to establish such a body, it should be in a central position, and that central position has already been indicated by the establishment at Aldershot. The principle of which I am speaking has, to a certain extent, been justified by the way in which the troops have been connected during this last mobilization at Aldershot. One army corps was completely made up of troops of the Line, Cavalry, and Artillery; and if an expeditionary force were to be sent abroad, it would be at once available for this purpose. I am afraid that I have trespassed too long on your Lordships in calling attention to the mobilization of these two corps, and I now proceed to the Question of which I have given Notice. The Question is, Whether it is proposed to mobilize any additional corps during the present drill season? I am not aware whether there be any Militia regiments still to be called out for training; and if there be no regiments, there is the marching-out season for the Line Regiments, which may be always well employed. It might, therefore, be possible for generals commanding in one district to place themselves in communication with troops occupying the next district. There would be no great difficulty in one corps placing itself in military relations with a neighbouring corps. The Chester army corps, for instance, might find itself in military relations with the North of England army corps. In such eases the marchings would not be of a very severe nature. The troops might be expected to cover, without difficulty, some 25 miles of ground, and 25 miles of ground on the one side would bring them into tactical communication with corps that had marched the same distance from another quarter. I have only now to express a hope that the remarks which I have made will induce the Government to give us their views—especially on the question of the mobilization of additional army corps.

EARL CADOGAN

said, he had heard with satisfaction the favourable opinion which the noble Lord had expressed of the scheme for the mobilization of the Army, for he was aware that not only was the noble Lord eminently qualified to give an opinion on the subject, but that he had satisfied himself by personal inspection of the various matters to which he had referred. The scheme for the defence of the country to which the name of mobilization had been given, had, perhaps, from its novelty, given rise to considerable misunderstanding, and he might be allowed to offer a few remarks in the hope that he might be able to clear up some misapprehensions existing on the subject. In the first place, the scheme of mobilization was entirely one for the defence of the country. The noble Lord had said that there were two phases of the question—one was for the defence of the country, and the other was an organization of a force for expeditionary purposes. As the scheme for the defence of the country was the only one recognized by the military authorities, he must be ex- cused if he did not follow the noble Lord into the second phase. The object of the mobilization scheme was not to re-construct, or, directly speaking, to increase our Army—its object waste organize that which they had, and to make arrangements to use to the best of their power their military strength in case of immediate necessity. With that object it was divided into army corps, divisions, and brigades; various points in the country were chosen to which the various army corps would be sent, and at which head-quarters and divisional quarters were to be situated; and routes were issued which would enable commanding officers to reach with facility the destinations to which they were sent. It was only the first part of the scheme which had been tested this year. No doubt in time of war their work would not end there. It would not be sufficient to bring the army corps to the various posts assigned to them—it would be necessary that they should be moved forward according to the exigency of the moment or of the movements of the enemy they had to meet. That did not occur this year. Having brought the men forward and placed them in standing camps, advantage was taken of the situation to drill the Militia during the period of their annual training; and that done, the troops returned to the quarters from whence they came. The fact that it was only the first part of the scheme which had been carried out might account for the various objections which had been made by the noble Lord and by others as to what had been done. The noble Lord alluded, as he understood, to the drills, and said they were not sufficient; he also objected to the transport. The authorities might be excused if they did not go into extravagance in that direction. Their Lordships no doubt knew that in the case of transport waggons they might be divided into two classes—"technical" waggons and ordinary waggons. He did not attempt to conceal any deficiencies, and he admitted they were not adequately provided with technical waggons. It was stated that the mobilization was not practical. In making this experiment of mobilization it was necessary to select a convenient time and place, and thus various difficulties had been encountered, which in the case of a sudden emergency would not exist. He was authorized to state, and he did so with confidence, that should war or invasion threaten this country the mobilization of the troops could be effected much more expeditiously than in the present instance. As to the number of Reserves which attended the manœuvres, the Returns now being prepared would be found highly satisfactory. He believed he might state that of those summoned to attend the manœpuvres, the absentees did not amount to more than 2 per cent; and in connection with this fact it was gratifying to observe that the men had been universally praised for their good conduct and soldierly bearing, and for their general excellence in the discharge of their duties. With regard to the disposition of the troops under the mobilization scheme—something had been said as to bringing Scotch and Irish Militia regiments such a distance to join in the exercises: but he was sure their Lord ships would see on reflection that it was advisable to give Scotland and Ireland a share in the defence of the country at those strategic points which were deemed by qualified judges to be the most liable to attack. Having now touched on the principal objections urged against the mobilization scheme, it only remained for him to state, in answer to the noble Lord's inquiry, that it was not intended to mobilize any additional corps during the present drill season. The noble Lord would recollect that an Act of Parliament would be required for such a step to be taken. Besides, the necessary funds had not been voted. The extent to which such operations might be carried in future necessarily depended on the will of Parliament. With regard to the time at which these manœuvres were to be held, he believed he was right in saying that last year he did not give any distinct pledge, but merely stated in a general way the intentions of the Government.

VISCOUNT CARDWELL

congratulated the noble Earl (Earl Cadogan) not only on the satisfactory statement which he had had to make, but also on the lucid and interesting manner in which he had made it. He regarded these experiments in the mobilization of the Army as of great importance, because they were the natural outcome of the Intelligence Department which had been recently established, and which had been found to be one of the greatest wants of our Army administration. The noble Earl had rightly said that if we had to organize an expedition to a foreign country it could not be carried out by means of a system of local mobilization. Of course the system of local mobilization was purely defensive. A continental Power might make it the means of invading a neighbouring country; but with this country the circumstances were entirely different. In our insular position the first thing to be done in organizing an expedition to foreign parts was to provide means of transporting the troops, and the next to find a base of operations in the country where they landed—matters with which local mobilization had nothing whatever to do. Another thing to be noticed was that in case of war it would not be in small local bodies that the Army and Auxiliary Forces would be employed. It might be very proper to assemble them in that way in the first instance, but the chief step would be to aggregate them into a manœuvring Army. And here, again, the present experiment would have no bearing. Local mobilization, in fact, was only a part of our system of defence; for on emergency it would be necessary to employ the railway system of the country for the transport of troops to the point of danger. With regard to the present experiment, he could not refrain from expressing his great satisfaction at the General Order recently issued by His Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief in reference to the recent manœuvres. His Royal Highness expressed his entire satisfaction with his inspection of the several regiments both of the Regulars and of the Reserves. One remarkable feature of the experiment was the large turn-out of the Reserves, inasmuch as it demonstrated the falsity of the prediction that that branch of our Forces would be found unsatisfactory. The absence of pensions, it was thought, would deter men from joining the Army; but he found that up to the year 1875 no fewer than 57,700 men had enlisted for short service. These Returns showed that when the choice was given men preferred short service and the Reserve to long service and a pension. If anybody had told him four years ago that the deficiency of those summoned in time of peace would not exceed 2 per cent he should have thought him a sanguine prophet. And what had been their character? His Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief expressed his gratification at the satisfactory condition and the exemplary conduct while under training of such portions of the first class Army Reserve as had been called out; adding that their efficiency was such that unless special circumstances should arise they would not have to be called out again. It was right to put them to a severe test, and to ascertain whether they were paper men only or men who could be relied upon; but it was not desirable to call them out unnecessarily to the disturbance of their civil employment, and any apprehension had been dispelled by the course pursued:—it had been thought proper to call away only a proportion of the men from their civil employments, and the results had been eminently satisfactory. That being the state of the case, he rejoiced that he was able to congratulate his noble Friend opposite on the statement he had made, and he could only hope that all the experiments of his Department would be attended with equal success.