Lords Sitting of 31 May 1875

MINUTES.
PUBLIC BILLS—First Rending—Intestates Widows and Children * (113).
Second Reading—Military Manœuvres* (115).
Third Reading—Seal Fishery 111(Greenland) * (80), and passed.

TRANSPORT OF FOREIGN CATTLE.

  MOTION FOR PAPERS.
  EARL DE LA WARRrose to call attention generally to the state of the law with regard to the transport of foreign cattle, and to move for Papers relating to that subject. The noble Earl said he would remind their Lordships that recently he had occasion to put a Question to the noble Duke (the President of the Council) as to whether a statement which appeared in The Times of the 22nd of April last relative to the ill-treatment of cattle on board a ship in a passage from Antwerp to Deptford, was correct. The statement had been made by Captain Sloane Stanley, an officer of the Royal Navy. The noble Duke, in his reply, disputed the accuracy of the facts. To that he (Earl De La Warr) could at the time give no further answer, and he felt bound to accept the explanation of the noble Duke; but upon further inquiry upon additional testimony, and upon a second statement by Captain Stanley which appeared in The Times, not only confirming the first, but adding that far from exaggerating, if anything he had understated the case, he could come to no other conclusion than that the facts of the case remained unanswered, and that Captain Stanley's report was in everything substantially correct. He would not trouble their Lordships with a repetition of what had already appeared in the public Press, except so far as to establish the case which he desired to bring under their Lordships' notice. In a second letter to The Times, dated May 3, Captain Stanley said—
  "As the writer of the letter referred to upon the subject of the treatment of cattle, will you allow me to say that, far from exaggerating, I if anything, understated the case? I have no object except that of humanity in acting as I have done, and I have no interest in the matter beyond that I further believe that most Englishmen witnessing what I did would be of opinion that such things should be put a stop to at once
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  and for ever. I might in my letter have narrated cases of cruelty to particular animals had I not been fearful of encroaching too much on your space, as, for instance, the violent thrashing with sticks, the twisting of the tail, and dragging by the legs inflicted on a beast that had the misfortune to fall on its side after being released from the slings. This case so excited my indignation that I shouted aloud to those who were torturing the animal—' For God's sake let the poor beast alone.' I feel confident that if the superintendent who is 'noted for his humanity' had stood by my side on the foredeck of the vessel, from which position I commanded a full view of all the proceedings, he would, as a humane man, have fully endorsed the terms of my letter, unless his perceptions have become blunted by often witnessing such scenes."
  But he (Earl De La Warr) had a further confirmation of these facts in private letters from Captain Stanley, which he would, with their Lordships' permission now read—
  "The thirst the poor brutes must suffer from is great, especially between decks, where the temperature is like that of the stoke-hole of a steamer in the Red Sea. I was so moved with pity at the sight of a poor animal that almost dislocated its neck in its frantic efforts to turn its head round to reach with its tongue a part of the deck that was a little damp, that I paid one of the crew to take some buckets of water round to some of the cattle, this one, of course being included.
  "The manner in which the poor creatures plunged their muzzles into the bucket and the eagerness that they displayed in drinking proved to me that thirst might be reckoned as one out of many of their sufferings on board. The commotion that took place among the animals on the man with the bucket of water approaching them was most marked. Their eyes seemed to light up with intelligence, and those who were distant made violent efforts to get at the water."
  In addition to these, there was the testimony of a gentleman—Mr. Liardet—living at Deptford, who said—
  "Captain Stanley's statements are true, and certainly not exaggerated. On the contrary, the inspectors of police have given me a much worse account of the treatment of the cattle than Captain Stanley's conveys. For instance, that the cattle are kept without water, and one means used by the landing people an arriving at Deptford is to hold a bucket of water close to the head of a beast which is so thirsty that it follows the man up the hold of the ship to the shore, there to undergo the goad and sickening thrashing of sticks……I have travelled several times round the world; I have witnessed the treatment of cattle in South America, and in all the Australian Colonies, and I never saw anything so sickening and cruel as practised at Deptford Market."
  Such were the reiterated statements of Captain Stanley, supported by other testimony, with regard to this case of ill-treatment of cattle at Deptford. They

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  were not made hastily or under excitement, but calmly and deliberately, as an eye-witness of what he described; and he (Earl De La Warr) could not understand in what way the noble Duke could have arrived at the conclusions which he did, except on the supposition that official information passed sometimes through a somewhat dense medium, and did not always reflect the brightest light. He came now to the second part of what he wished to ask their Lordships to have laid upon the Table of the House—namely, Copies of the Instructions issued to Inspectors of Ports in the United Kingdom relative to the importation of foreign cattle. He did this as he feared the case to which he had just referred was not a solitary instance of ill-treatment of cattle from the want of proper supervision and inspection. He was certainly somewhat surprised to find—and he thought their Lordships would hardly expect to hear—that in some of our largest ports there was not the most ordinary provision made for the proper transport and landing of cattle. He had statements from experienced and practical men—men who were largely connected with the cattle trade—which showed that there was a total absence of all arrangements for the transport of cattle to secure their proper treatment, and to protect the interests of the trade. He could give as an instance a no less important place than Liverpool—he might say one of the greatest, the wealthiest, and most important ports of the world. On the 1st of May this statement was made by Mr. Richard Hall, well known from his connection with the cattle trade—
  "Last Sunday 870 sheep were landed on the Dock Quay from the Hamburg steamer Westmoreland. They were detained on the quay till Monday at noon, in order that they might he passed by the Inspector appointed for that purpose. The whole number were turned up, and it was found that one of the creatures walked a little lame, so it was declared to be affected with foot-and-mouth disease. Thereupon the whole number were detained upon the dock quay during Monday night, without pens, without covering' or shelter, and a portion even remained till Thursday morning.
  "Monday night was cold, raw, and wet, and here were these helpless animals exposed to the inclement weather, without food, and, so far as we can learn, without drink. But this is not all. They were all condemned to be stuck upon the quay, and in many eases, before the agonies of death were passed, the suffering creatures were thrown into carts and carried to
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  the depôt at Sandhills, their lifeblood colouring the streets as they were being carted along.…. Similar instances have been very frequent during the last three months, and any appeal to remedy this cruelty and obstruction to trade made to the authorities here has been unavailing."
  He could add other testimony. He would ask their Lordships to listen for one moment to what was stated by Mr. James Odams—whose name might be familiar to some of their Lordships from his former large connection with the cattle trade. Speaking of Irish cattle, and writing on the 7th of May, 1875, Mr. Odams said—
  "At this season of the year we import thousands weekly for grazing in the Midland and Eastern districts. The state in which they arrive is simply disgraceful. Only on Monday last a considerable number were in the Metropolitan Market pictures of misery. The railway system and Channel transit of cattle require to be thoroughly overhauled, and not left to the mercenary interests of dealers and carriers."
  He further added—
  "You ask me if the state of things exists now as described in page 4 of my pamphlet. I have no hesitation in saying that it does, and in an extended degree. The Privy Council exercise no power at any of the landing places for cattle with regard to cruelty, feeding, or watering; the only duty they perform is examination as to disease and quarantine."
  He would trouble their Lordships with the testimony of one more only—that of Mr. T. Rose, a large farmer in Norfolk—
  "Suppose a cargo of 1,000 sheep arrives at one of our ports, and 100 are seen to have the disease; they are slaughtered, and the remaining 900 are allowed to go to any market, thereby carrying the disease.…. The system of in spection is bad, and perfectly useless in staying this frightful malady.…. I imagine that Norwich Market is, if not the largest, one of the largest in the Kingdom. It is virtually an impossibility to buy stock, especially cattle, at that market without their having foot-and-mouth disease.…. Of course, the flesh of sheep and cattle suffering from this complaint cannot be anything like so good as those that are free from it, as they are in a high state of fever."
  He thought he had now shown to their Lordships, upon testimony which might be relied upon, that there was a case—a pressing case—for some steps to be taken to apply a remedy. The noble Duke had stated that he was not prepared to take any further steps in the matter, or to make any regulations beyond those which at present existed. He need hardly remind their Lordships

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  that by the Act of 1869 the Privy Council had the power, if he rightly read it, to make regulations which would obviate all existing evils. The noble Duke would, doubtless, state to their Lordships whether he had re-considered this intention to do nothing. Perhaps the blame might be thrown upon the local authorities; but if there was no power to make them act, why not apply to Parliament for a power which would surely be granted? But he believed that if vigorous measures were adopted under the existing law—if there were more stringent regulations and a better system of inspection and of licensing vessels for the cattle trade--much good would be done. Lastly, he might very briefly refer to the grave question which arose both in the interests of trade and in a sanitary point of view. The loss which was sustained by diseased cattle was enormous; and not only was the quantity diminished, but the quality was seriously deteriorated. Large numbers of diseased cattle arrived weekly at different ports. If the disease was apparent, they were slaughtered on landing, and were bought by butchers to be sold for food. By a Return issued in February last by the Veterinary Department of the Privy Council, it appeared (sec. 9) that 1,619 animals affected with foot-and-mouth disease were landed during the last month at English ports from the Continent, and were slaughtered. These—or, at all events, the greater part—were sold for human food; but as it was now known that animals suffering from this disease were in a high state of fever, a very serious question must arise in a sanitary point of view. He trusted Her Majesty's Government would give the whole question their serious attention. It was demanded for the sake of humanity; it was demanded for the interests of agriculture and of trade; and it was required for the interests of the public.
  Moved that there he laid before this House,
  "Copy of Report of the Inspector of the Privy Council relative to the case of the importation of foreign cattle at Deptford referred to by the Lord President on the 30th of April last; also
  "Copy of Letter from J. Golan, Esq., to Dr. Williams, Veterinary Department, Privy Council, of 29th April 1875; and
  "Copies of the general instructions issued to Inspectors of Ports in the United Kingdom relative to the importation of foreign cattle:
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  "And also to call attention generally to the state of the law with regard to the transport of foreign cattle."—(The Earl Be La Warr.)
  THE DUKE OF RICHMONDsaid, he had certainly had no idea on reading the Notice of his noble Friend's Motion, that he intended to go again into the whole case of alleged cruelty to animals landed at Deptford; to which case he (the Duke of Richmond) thought he had given a complete answer on a former occasion. His noble Friend assumed the accuracy of the allegations as regarded the treatment of the cattle in question; but he begged to say that he disputed altogether the accuracy of those allegations. On the last occasion when his noble Friend brought the case under the notice of their Lordships, he (the Duke of Richmond), in reply, quoted the report made by the Inspector to the Department, in which it was pointed out that the facts were not such as they had been stated to be by his noble Friend. He ventured to think that if the gentleman who had written letters to the newspapers and corresponded with his noble Friend had made inquiries of the Inspectors, and, failing to obtain satisfaction from them had addressed the Department, it would have been unnecessary for his noble Friend to have moved in the matter. It appeared from a Paper laid on the Table of the other House of Parliament that on seeing Captain Stanley's letter in The Times the Secretary to the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals applied to him, and stated that the society was ready to prosecute, if the gallant gentleman would come forward as a witness and furnish the Society with the names of the perpetrators of the alleged outrages. The gallant officer declined to accede to that request. He submitted that Captain Stanley put himself out of court by declining to appear as a witness, he being the only person who could have proved the case. His noble Friend had spoken of other reprehensible occurrences at Deptford besides those the subject of Captain Stanley's letter. If there had been such occurrences, it was surprising that nothing had been heard of them at the Privy Council Office. With respect to the cruelties spoken of by Mr. Richard Hall, of Liverpool, he could say nothing of them, because he had not heard of them before, even in the shape of Notice that it was his noble

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  Friend's intention to bring them forward; but be could not help remarking that though Mr. Hall might have had great experience in the cattle trade, he could not know very much about agriculture. That gentleman complained that in the month of May sheep were exposed to the weather. He appealed to any flock-master as to whether it was customary to have sheep under cover in-the month of May. He should think that sheep would feel very much astonished to find themselves under cover at this season of the year.
  EARL DE LA WARRobserved that a part of the complaint was that the sheep were left without food.
  THE DUKE OF RICHMONDsaid, he could not reply to that portion of the charge, for the reason he had already stated. He could not suppose that complaints had been made, and made in vain, to the local authorities; because his experience at the Privy Council Office enabled him to say that such appeals found their way very speedily to London and to the Privy Council Office, where, in this case, they would have come under his notice, and he would have directed a searching inquiry. His noble Friend said that official information passed through a dense medium. Well, perhaps, he was the dense medium to which his noble Friend referred; but he could only repeat that the information spoken of by his noble Friend had not reached him at all until he heard the statement of the noble Earl. He (the Duke of Richmond) believed the law was sufficient, and he hoped his noble Friend would be of the same opinion when he perused the Papers for which he had moved, and to the granting of which there was no objection on the part of Her Majesty's Government.
  Motion agreed to.

FRANCE, GERMANY, &c—THE PEACE OF EUROPE.

  MOTION FOR CORRESPONDENCE.
  EARL RUSSELL: My Lords, I rise to move an Address to Her Majesty, praying that Her Majesty will direct that there be laid before the House certain Papers having relation to the present state of Europe. It is fit that I should say at the commencement that I do not wish to unduly press upon the
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  noble Earl the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Whether Her Majesty's Government will produce the Correspondence, or a part of it, or whether they will deny to Parliament any such communication, I rise rather with the view of calling the attention of your Lordships' House to the present state of foreign affairs—because I think it necessary that your Lordships' attention should be directed to it under existing circumstances. My Lords, I cannot forget that on the 30th of May, 1814, a Treaty was concluded between Great Britain and Russia and Prussia on the one side, and France on the other, by which Treaty the boundaries of France were reduced to what they had been previously to 1792. I must say that on a comparison between the policy of that time and the policy which we have seen in more recent times, I have been much struck with the great wisdom and circumspection and care shown when that Treaty was made to preserve the position of Great Britain, and place her in a situation of considerable power and influence abroad. Whether it be owing to any change which may have occurred in the public mind with regard to foreign affairs, or for some other reason, it seems to me that, while in 1814 great circumspection and great vigilance were displayed in securing the position of Great Britain in Europe, there has been some carelessness in recent times, and that we run the danger of losing what the policy of 1814 achieved. In 1814, as I have said, care was taken, by the making of the Treaty of the 30th of May at Paris, that the boundaries of France were reduced to what they had been in the month of January, 1792. I cannot help comparing the situation in 1814, and the position taken up by the English Government of that day, with what occurred five years ago—in 1870. In 1870, so far from the Government of France being willing to remain divested of all territory beyond the limits of the boundaries of 1792, the Emperor of the French declared, and had no scruple in declaring, that he did not regard as binding the Treaties of 1815, by which Great Britain and. France had bound themselves. He announced that he intended to restore to France territory which she had lost on the Rhine, and to retake those fortresses which by the Treaty of 1814 France had yielded to Germany. That being the

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  demand of the Sovereign of France, I ask your Lordships to consider what would have happened if, instead of having been defeated and overwhelmed by the Germans, the French had been successful in the war of 1870–71. If the French Army, instead of the German, had been successful in that war, we should have been called upon to vindicate the faith of Treaties, and uphold what we had taken a prominent part in establishing. I do not say that at the present moment there is any danger of war, but I will recall to the recollection of your Lordships what happened in May or June, 1870. At that time my noble Friend near me (Earl Granville), who was Secretary for Foreign Affairs, assured this House and assured Parliament and the country that all the documents which came to the Foreign Office were documents attesting to the peaceful state of the European Governments. That was the declaration made in June, 1870;—and yet in July one of the most violent, one of the most purposeless and wanton wars ever waged in Europe broke out between France and Prussia. It appears to me, my Lords, that, with such a warning in remembrance, we ought at present to take means which would afford some security for the peace of Europe. This we have a right to do, in pursuance of former Treaties, by obtaining from the other Powers of Europe assurances that they will join with Great Britain in a course calculated to secure that end. In 1814 it was thought necessary to make a Treaty with Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia on the one side, and France on the other, in order to secure peace, and I cannot think that this country is safe or the peace of Europe is secure unless we have Treaties, and see that our power in respect of Treaties is fully maintained. The result of the late war was favourable to Germany, and territory which had belonged to France for 200 years was wrested from her. But, my Lords, it is impossible that there should not exist great resentment and great humiliation on the part of France in consequence of her having had to make these large concessions; and when France has again a great Army, and when she has effected what she desires on all those points in connection with the reconstruction of her Army to which she had been so
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  closely attending—when she bas a formidable Army of perhaps 700,000 men—it is not unlikely that France may make use of that Army to regain her lost provinces. On the other hand, all this is calculated to alarm Germany. We see to what a standard of strength the German Empire keeps up her military forces, and, further, that she wishes to maintain a fleet. My Lords, I do not say that either on the part of France or that of Germany there is a desire for war; but when we see the things to which I have been referring, I ask whether, in 1875, we have obtained any better security for peace than we had when my noble Friend (Earl Granville) spoke in June, 1870? My noble Friend made the statement to which I have alluded, and in a few weeks—I may say in a few days—there burst out a violent war, in which the interests of this country were greatly concerned. I feel, then, there is no security that in the course of a few days there might not again burst forth as suddenly as then a war as violent as that, and which might take a direction that might compel us to resort to the Treaties we have made. I hope, therefore, that we shall not only receive the same assurances of peace which we did in June, 1870, but that the policy of Great Britain in 1814 will be revived—that we shall see something of the spirit which was then displayed—and that this country will combine with other nations for the maintenance of the peace of Europe. I observe that Her Majesty's Government have been in communication on this subject with the Governments of other countries; and my object in asking for this Correspondence, or any part of it which may be produced without damage to the public interest, is to see whether the old spirit which used to prevail and did prevail in 1814 has been revived. I think that if Great Britain and Russia and Austria and other Powers interested in peace were to declare not only that they were favourable to it, but that they would use their means to preserve it, as England, Russia, and Prussia did in 1814, we should have a security for peace. I for one cannot rely on assurances such as those which we had in June, 1870, and I move for these Papers in the hope that an English policy—a British policy—may be declared by the Government, and that we shall no longer exhibit that indifference—that carelessness—of foreign policy

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  which I regret we have in recent times allowed to prevail. The noble Earl concluded by moving the Address.
  Moved, "That an humble Address he presented to Her Majesty, praying Her Majesty to communicate to this House so much of the correspondence between Her Majesty's Government and the Governments of France, Germany, Russia, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain, and Portugal relating to the peace of Europe which has taken place since the commencement of the present year as can be made known to Parliament without injury to the public service."—(The Earl Russell.)
  THE EARL OF DERBY: My Lords, with regard to the Motion which the noble Earl has made for the production of the Correspondence relating to the late European crisis, I think that the noble Earl himself—of whom and to whom I wish to speak with the greatest possible respect—has by anticipation indicated the answer which I shall feel myself reluctantly compelled to give him; because the noble Earl more than once said it was not his intention to press for any Correspondence the production of which might be injurious to the public service. I can quite understand and sympathize with the curiosity—the natural curiosity—and the deep interest with which your Lordships and the country must have been watching the course of foreign affairs during the last few weeks, and I can quite appreciate the desire for information with respect to the details of what has passed. And, my Lords, as far as Her Majesty's Government are concerned, there is nothing we have said or done which we have the slightest desire to keep from the knowledge of this House or the other House of Parliament or the public. But there is this objection to the production of these documents—that it would be impossible to give anything like such an account of these matters as Parliament and the country would expect without making use of confidential communications as to the opinions and policy of other Governments, and those other Governments would object in the strongest manner to our disclosing this confidential information. We could not in fairness disclose it without their consent; but even if we could, I do not think that in good policy we ought to do so—because the result would be to give other Governments reason to conclude that whatever passed into the hands of British diplomatists
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  would be sure to be published. The consequence of that conviction would be that British diplomatists would receive very little confidential information in future. Therefore, my Lords, the production of the whole of the Correspondence is impossible; and I do not think the production of the Correspondence mutilated or severely edited would answer any useful purpose. If published in full, its publication would be unfair to other Governments; if published in a mutilated form, it would be useless. But, my Lords, there is another consideration—which is that the points of difference were of such a nature that they are liable to occur again—though I hope they will not—and, therefore, looking at it from that point of view, I do not think it would be in the interest of European peace to give wider publicity and a larger circulation to all the details of the negotiations. Indeed, I cannot conceive anything more calculated to revive and exasperate those feelings of irritation and mutual uneasiness which as your Lordships know did unfortunately exist; and therefore I believe your Lordships will have anticipated the answer I feel called upon to give, when I say I think that on every ground it would be undesirable to produce these Papers. As to the action taken by the British Government in the course of the negotiations, I feel that Parliament and the country have a right to know what we have been doing, in order that they may not seem to favour any policy which they do not approve; but while I say that, I am bound to confess that I can give your Lordships very little information of which you are not, in substance at least, if not in detail, already in possession. Everyone knows that great uneasiness existed a few weeks ago in respect of the relations of the Governments of Prance and Germany. Language had been held by persons of the highest authority and position—statements had been made by the semi-official Press of Germany—to the effect that the French Army was being increased to a degree which was dangerous to Germany and exceeded the requirements of France, and that the course being pursued in respect of that Army manifested a determination on the part of France to renew the war of 1870–71 at the earliest period at which she would be in a position to do so, It was further

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  said that if such was to he taken as the object which France had in view, it might not be the duty of the German Government to wait until France had completed her preparations, but that, in self-defence, that Government might feel itself called upon to take the initiative. It was said that Germany did not desire war, but that if war was to be avoided, it seemed necessary that the French armaments should be discontinued. My Lords, those statements were as I have observed, made by persons in high position in Germany, and they were repeated in other countries. In France, of course, they caused great uneasiness, and the French Government disclaimed all such intentions as those which were thus attributed to them. I am bound to say that I accepted, and I still accept, that disclaimer as one made in all sincerity. I do not believe that any public man in France contemplates a renewal of the war of 1870–71. After the misfortunes which they have undergone and the humiliations which they have endured, the French very naturally desire to keep up such an Army as shall not only give them security at home, but shall give them such power and influence in Europe as they feel their importance as a great nation entitles them to. The existence of such a feeling on the part of the French cannot be disputed, nor is there any reason why it should not exist. But it is one thing to desire to be safe and even strong at home, and it is another to be arming with ulterior motives. We believe that the apprehensions that have been entertained on this point have been unfounded. One of the greatest difficulties that we have had to encounter in the matter was that the French, on their side, seemed hardly able to understand or to conceive that these apprehensions which were felt on the part of the German Government were genuine or sincere, and that they—I will not say the French Government—but the French people, undoubtedly looked upon these apprehensions as being put forward by Germany as a more pretext for a fresh attack. Now, that was the situation with which we had to deal, and it appeared to Her Majesty's Government that in such a state of things a mutual misunderstanding existed which might lead to the very gravest consequences. On the one hand, if the German Government
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  continued to entertain these apprehensions of the designs of France which they expressed the next step on their part might be a formal request to France to discontinue arming. Had such a request been made it would have been very difficult to preserve peace, and the cause of quarrel between the two nations might have been revived. On the other hand, it will be obvious to your Lordships that if the French statesmen believed that the apprehensions entertained by Germany were not genuine, and were merely put forward as a pretext for war, such a belief on their part was not unlikely to lead them to accelerate and redouble their preparations, and thus confirm the suspicions of Germany and complicate the situation. Under these circumstances, therefore, it appeared to Her Majesty's Government that much good might be done by endeavouring, quietly and unostentatiously, to calm down these feelings of mutual suspicion and distrust entertained by the two countries. It appeared to us that when two great nations are determined upon going to war with each other, it is of very little use for their neighbours to attempt to interpose in the cause of peace; but that when the feeling between them is not so much one of violent irritation, as of extreme mutual suspicion and distrust there is room for the friendly offices of a third party. We did not think that France was contemplating a renewal of the war, neither did we believe that the German Government were contemplating an act so entirely repugnant to the moral sense of Europe as that of rushing into an unprovoked war with the intention of completing the destruction of her former opponent. We found that the Russian Government were determined to use their best efforts in the interests of peace, and the late visit of the Emperor of Russia to Berlin furnished us with a convenient opportunity of supporting—as far as support appeared to be necessary—the representations in favour of peace which we were led to believe the Emperor of Russia intended to make in the course of his visit to the German capital. That is substantially what has occurred in reference to this question as far as we are concerned. I can assure the House that I do not in any way wish to exaggerate the part Her Majesty's Government have played in the matter, neither do I wish to claim any particular merit for

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  them. We have only done what it seems to me it was our obvious duty to do, and what we could not have avoided doing in the interest of peace and in the interest of justice. My Lords, it has been asked in some quarters whether the results which I am happy to say have been brought about were secured by any sacrifice on our part of our freedom of action, either present or prospective, and whether we had entered into any engagements which may bind us in future? I am glad to have this opportunity of stating that such is not the case. We have used no language, we have entered into no engagement, and we have given no pledges that will fetter our freedom of action in the future, and if we were to quit office to-morrow we should leave our Successors neither embarrassed nor committed by anything said or done by us in reference to this matter. I will not enter into the wide and complicated question as to the rule which the noble Earl said ought to guide our foreign policy. I do not believe that it is possible for us to lay down any formula or any general rule which shall bind us in our foreign policy for all time and on all occasions. We must deal with the circumstances of each case as it arises. I believe that the policy of non-intervention in general in Continental disputes is the one which finds most favour with the people of this country; but a policy of non-intervention does not mean a policy of isolation and indifference, and it does not mean that England either is or can be indifferent to the maintenance of European peace. I will not enlarge on this subject, and I can only end as I began by expressing my conviction that it is not desirable that we should lay the Correspondence which has been asked for before the House.
  EARL GRANVILLE: I wish to observe, in the first place, that I have no distinct recollection of the statement which the noble Earl (Earl Russell) says I made in May or June, 1870, to the effect that all the despatches which we had received were of the most pacific character. I have no recollection of having given any assurance of that kind. The noble Earl suggests that in making that statement I was not expressing my own views, but that I was quoting the language of my noble Friend (Lord Hammond), who, all parties agree, discharged the duties of Under Secretary
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  of State for Foreign Affairs with such eminent success. Since I can find no record of my statement in Hansard, it would be indiscreet of me to say positively what that statement conveyed. What I believe, however, I stated on that occasion was, that my chief reluctance to take the office vacated by the death of the Earl of Clarendon was the suddenness with which the responsibility would come upon me; and that my reason for finally accepting that office was that my noble Friend (Lord Hammond), then Under Secretary of State, had informed me that I should find much less work in the office then than I had found 20 years previously, and that there never was a time when to all appearance a Foreign Secretary would have so little to do. I have nothing to find fault with in the announcement of the noble Earl the Foreign Secretary with reference to the Papers asked for. I think that the production of such Papers should be left to the discretion of Her Majesty's Government. On the one hand, it is their duty, and very much to their interest, to keep the country informed as to what they are doing with regard to political affairs abroad; and, on the other hand, were they to produce confidential Correspondence they would destroy the sources of information for the future. If you hastily publish what you have yourself done in influencing foreign politics, you will be very apt to weaken the influence you hope to exercise over foreign Governments in the future. I know nothing about the Papers asked for, nor about what the Government have done in the matter, and therefore I can express no opinion on the determination at which they have arrived on the point; but if, as has just been stated by the noble Earl, Her Majesty's Government have without ostentation usefully put themselves forward in a spirit of complete neutrality to endeavour to remove misconceptions on each side, I think that they have pursued a right course. I am glad that the noble Earl did not assume on behalf of Her Majesty's Government any extraordinary credit for the course which they have taken in this matter—because there is rather too much of that sort of thing done in other places, where it is said that this country has obtained something like a diplomatic victory by having brought matters to a successful

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  and peaceful termination. I believe that any assumption of that sort is calculated to weaken our influence in the future. On the whole, however, it seems to me that Her Majesty's Government have acted in a wise and judicious manner.
  EARL RUSSELLsaid, he did not do-sire that any Correspondence should be produced the production of which the noble Earl thought would be injurious to the interests of the country; but this he did say—that their policy with regard to foreign nations ought to be communicated to Parliament and to the country, that they might know what was really the course Her Majesty's Government were pursuing.
  On Question? Resolved in the Negative.

ARMY—EFFICIENCY OF THE ARMY.

  QUESTION. OBSERVATIONS.
  VISCOUNT HARDINGErose to ask His Royal Highness the Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief, Whether his observations on the efficiency of the Army made at a public dinner on the 24th of April last have been correctly reported? He ventured to put the Question on the Paper, because he had reason to believe that the illustrious Duke on the cross-benches was anxious to offer some explanation to their Lordships in consequence of a misconception which had arisen in the other House of Parliament as to some remarks in the speech which His Royal Highness delivered on returning thanks for the Army on the occasion of a dinner which his Royal Highness attended, and which was given by the Metropolitan Board of Works. He was sure that their Lordships would be most desirious of hearing any observations from His Royal Highness on a subject so important as the efficiency of the rank and file of Her Majesty's Army. Their Lordships would recollect that about five years ago Lord Sandhurst brought for-word a Motion in that House to the effect that no soldier under 20 years of age should be sent to India. The noble Viscount (Viscount Cardwell) was at that time Secretary of State for War. In consequence of that Motion the Government of the day accepted the regulation, and no soldier under the age of 20 had since been sent to India. One result was that the home Army was full of the young soldiers whom they were obliged to recruit because of the high
  1102
  price of labour and other causes. That did not so much matter in the days of long service, because though they enlisted young soldiers as they did now, they kept them for 12 years, and at the end of that time they were either discharged or re-engaged; but under the short-service system it was very different—'especially in view of the fraud and deceit practised by recruits—a boy of 15 years of age would represent himself as 16, and those who were 16 stated they were 17. That was one of the evils of short service, and it was one which the Government of the day was bound to consider and to face. Those boys only served six years and were then placed in the Reserve. A Return as to boys in the Army had been moved for in "another place" by Colonel Mure, which he was sorry to say showed that the standard had been lowered, and that the lowering of the standard had occasioned a deterioration of physique among the recruits: and it was known that the Guards and the Royal Artillery could not get the stamp of men they required to get up to their full establishments. It was fair to state, on the other hand, that the Report of the Inspector-General of Recruiting, which had been laid before Parliament, stated that he was perfectly satisfied with the physique of the recruits; and statistical tables had also been laid before Parliament which showed that the majority of the commanding officers were also satisfied with their recruits; whereas the minority of the commanding officers abused their recruits and spoke of them in very unmeasured language. This, too, was a subject which deserved and he hoped would receive the attentive consideration of Her Majesty's Government. He knew that there had been a Committee on Recruiting sitting at the War Office; but the result of their deliberations had not been made public. Our Army was small and was very expensive, and it was the bounden duty of the Government, if they accepted short service, to see that the Army was as efficient as possible. With respect to the Reserve, they knew that two years ago Lord Sandhurst brought the subject before their Lordships' House, and anyone who read his speech could not but infer that the Reserve was a mere paper force. In fact, Lord Sandhurst said that when Commander-in-Chief in Ireland he issued invitations

  1103
  to the Reserve to attend the Autumn Manœuvres at the Curragh Camp, and that only half-a-dozen men responded, and he thought they might do some service in this direction. If they were to have a Reserve, the Government should see that it was reliable and efficient; and if there was any suspicion of the truth of the assertion let the men be called out, so that their effective strength might be ascertained. They were said to have 7,000 men, first-class Army Reserve, but he believed that if they were required to-morrow they would not be forthcoming in any large numbers. So far as he was aware these men had neither arms nor accoutrements. That ought to be seen to. At all events he hoped the illustrious Duke would tell them whether the Reserve was merely a Reserve upon paper, or whether it was a bonâ fide Force. When men were required to fill up the regiments for the Ashantee Expedition, volunteers from other regiments, and not the Reserve, had to be sought for. He could not but hope that this branch of an important subject would not be lost sight of by Her Majesty's Government. They had a strong majority at their back and had already carried out some useful reforms in regard to the Army. He trusted that their Lordships would excuse him for putting the question to the illustrious Duke of which he had given Notice, but he believed they would all be interested to hear the opinion of the head of the Army on its present state and efficiency, especially as to its rank and file.
  THE DUCK OF CAMBRIDGE: My Lords, I have been appealed to by my noble Friend who has just sat down (Viscount Hardinge) to make an explanation on the subject to which his Question refers. I confess I should not have thought that observations made by me at a public dinner would have been deemed worthy of so much notice as has been taken of them; and I confess, too, that some observations made in "another place "in reference to them caused me some surprise. I am extremely obliged to my noble Friend for asking me the Question, as it enables me to state my sentiments distinctly—although I admit that in the other House of Parliament my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War at once pointed out to the noble Lord who spoke on the subject
  1104
  (Lord Elcho), that he must have been very much mistaken as to the view I intended to convey. Before I reply to the Question of my noble Friend, I am bound to say frankly that when the statement was made, I considered it my duty to have some communication with the noble Lord who had referred to my speech in the other House, and to ask him for an explanation as to the meaning he put upon my words. The noble Lord most frankly expressed regret for having misunderstood me, as he perceived from my letter to him that he had. At the same time, he said that every military man and civilian with whom he had conversed, and who had read my observations agreed with him in the view he took as to what I meant to convey to the public. That mistaken view, therefore, being accepted, I would now venture to explain what I really did say and mean. A great deal was said just about that time as to the efficiency of recruting for the Armiy; and it became so serious a matter that I confess I thought the time had arrived when, if I had an opportunity, I should try to convey my views as to whether those statements were correct or not. Incidentally and accidentally—for it was purely by accident—I was at a review at Aldershot a day or two before the occasion on which I made the speech in question, and having seen before me the regiments there quartered, my attention was particularly called to them by Lieutenant General Sir Thomas Steele, who had just been appointed to the command there, and who told me that he never saw regiments with whose physique he was better satisfied. He asked me, in this view, to look through the regiments myself, and I did so. I stated my opinion that I had never seen regiments with whose physique I was more satisfied. I looked most carefully at the regiments as a body, and to every recruit pertaining to those regiments; and having referred merely to the physical condition and power of the men, I said they were such as I believed they always had been during the whole period in which I had been in the service. I referred to their physical power when I said that I was ready to take them anywhere and to do anything. I never intended to convey that the men I saw were in any respect on a war footing, and I could not conceive it possible—

  1105
  although it seems I have been mistaken—that the words I used could have borne any other meaning than that which I am endeavouring to put before your Lordships. I have been somewhat staggered by many of the assertions that have been brought under my notice. What I said was—
  "Yesterday, in the course of my professional duties, I had an opportunity of going to see as much as I could of the troops at Aldershot, and all I can say is that while deprecating war, and hoping the necessity may not arise, I am perfectly prepared to-morrow, at five minutes' notice, to take every man of that Force with me and to go anywhere without seeing any reason why they should not perform their duty just as well as the British Army has ever done in times past."
  I made no allusion to the number of guns or waggons; and when fault has been found with me for stating that I was ready to take the command of them as an army, I must state that what I said was that "I was ready to go with the men I saw before me." I added—
  "I cannot deny that, when I see regiments which are not very strong in point of numbers, it would be very acceptable to me, as to all military men, to see their ranks better filled."
  What did that mean but that I thought those ranks were not very well filled at present? If my noble Friend (Lord Elcho) had read that part of my speech he would have found that it answered the Question he has put. The only point in my speech which was not quite correctly reported was an allusion to the length of the men's service. I am supposed to have said that "if we cannot get men for a little longer than six years, I, for one, shall not break my heart about it." I believe that what I did say—and certainly what I intended to say, was that if the men stayed a little longer than six years in the Army I should not break my heart to see them stay longer. One word more. I said I should very much prefer to see a regiment entirely composed of old seasoned men. If I said that, it is not likely that I should have said immediately afterwards that I should like to see a regiment of young, unseasoned men of less than six years' service. I cannot help thinking that the view I have endeavoured to express to your Lordships is the right view. I hope I have answered my noble Friend sufficiently, and I think I have shown that I have been entirely misunderstood and that it is not my fault. I do not
  1106
  think it desirable that there should be any reticence with regard to such questions as that of recruiting—I do not wish to keep anything secret at all—but having had my attention called to the matter by Sir Thomas Steele, I made a remark to the commanding officers that if they had any complaint to make, if they would come to me instead of going to the "man in the street," I should be much better satisfied. That is my professional feeling, and I hope that my statement to-night will have this effect—that if commanding officers or any other officers have any complaint to make they will come to me or to some other authority, and not go to the "man in the street." Having seen what I thought a very satisfactory condition of affairs as far as the physique of the men was concerned, and particularly after my attention had been called to the matter by Sir Thomas Steele—who was surprised to find the men so much better than he had been led to suppose by what had been stated in other places—I took the opportunity of stating that the commanding officers had probably unintentionally conveyed the idea that their regiments had not been well recruited, but that as far as I was concerned I thought they were. Well, I think so still, and I am ready to repeat it. It is quite possible and very probable that there are regiments in a less satisfactory condition, and all I can say is that if there are it is very wrong in commanding officers not to come and make their complaints to the Horse Guards. It is very hard upon the authorities that they should be held up to public contempt for not doing their duty when the officers do not report the circumstances to us. On one or two occasions, when rumours of the inefficiency of particular regiments have reached us we have sent down to ascertain the facts, and found that the reports which had reached us were gross exaggerations. The fact is that there is in some quarters dissatisfaction with everything and everybody, and therefore it is no wonder that dissatisfaction should have been expressed that a number of young men under 20 had been enlisted. No doubt it would be better to have no recruits under 20;—I should be delighted to find that every recruit who entered the service was of that age; and if you have a conscription and make it a law that every young man shall enter

  1107
  the Army at 20 you can do it, because you could oblige them to bring with them the certificate of their birth. But how are we to know a young man's age?. We are obliged to take his word for it, and sometimes he may say he is 20 when he is probably only 17. You can only judge by looking at him. I repeat that I should prefer men of 20, but it is impossible to get them all at that age. At 20 a young fellow has become a seasoned man, who has entered upon his career in life, and if he is at all a good workman or a good labourer, he will not come into the Army; whereas a boy of 18 or 19 who has not yet taken his position in life will enlist. If, however, we are told that we are not to enlist a man until he is 20, the end will be that you will have no men at all for the Army. It is utterly impossible to have an adequate number of soldiers at 20 unless you go on recruiting lads of 18 or 19. What do your Lordships suppose the order was at the end of the Great War? Why we were recruiting lads at 15. I hope we shall never do that again; but young men of 18 or 19, if they are well fed and looked after, will make very good soldiers. I strongly recommend your Lordships and the country not to throw any obstacles in the way of recruiting these young men, because they often make better soldiers than the men who enter the Army at 20, who are frequently not the lathy, athletic men you wish to see in the service. It has sometimes been asked why the Commander-in-Chief did not make these speeches in Parliament, instead of at dinners in other places? It is very seldom that he has an opportunity here of correcting a misapprehension which may prevail in the public mind. It was not my desire to give offence to any one, and I trust that your Lordships may think that I was right in taking the opportunity of making that statement, and of correcting the misapprehension to which it has given rise. I had only wished to make a short speech but I may be permitted to add that if people go on stating that the Army are "nothing but riffraff" and not worth anything, eventually it may be believed and the service will greatly deteriorate. The officers will in time begin to think so too, and then you will break the spirit of the Army, and in the end the whole organization of the regiments must be destroyed. The real
  1108
  difficulty is that to which my noble Friend (Viscount Hardinge) has alluded—the state of the labour market. I am satisfied that the Reserve question is of the greatest possible importance. You may have the cadres; but an Army of cadres without a Reserve is a most miserable excuse for an Army. But, as I have always said, if the Reserve men have good employment you might call on them in vain to join a regiment even for a week, because their chance of re-employment would be very much diminished thereby. This is the difficulty—that you have not the positive power to call out the men even for a week to join the regiment to which they belong; and unless you can get over this in some way you cannot have an Army such as we should wish to see, or a Reserve worthy of the name of a Reserve—for the Reserve at present is much more on paper than a reality. The Militia Reserve comes out with the Militia regiments, but you do not know what is the physical capacity of the Reserve men—whether they have not lost their efficiency while they have been engaged in civil life. You ought to have a Re-serve of men whom you can call out, and whose efficiency you can test. Under these circumstances, I have no hesitation in saying—I say it frankly—that if you are to have these cadres and this Reserve, and to send the men rapidly through the ranks, you must be prepared to pay. You cannot have men at small cost without conscription; and conscription, I say, is perfectly inconsistent with our institutions—it would be most unacceptable to the country; and it would be almost impossible to carry it out, even if you passed a law for that purpose. The only conscription, I believe, we can have would be in connection with the Ballot for the Militia. That is the law at present, and that is the only conscription to which we can look in accordance with the institutions under which we live. That being so, I repeat if you wish to keep up the Army and to have short service you must look to the labour market and pay your men accordingly. I am much obliged to my noble Friend for putting this Question, and I hope I have given to your Lordships a satisfactory explanation, in nothing inconsistent with the position which I have the honour to hold as Commander-in-Chief.
  VISCOUNT CARDWELL: My Lords, notwithstanding the great pleasure with which I have listened to the speech of the illustrious Duke, refuting as it does a great many statements which have been so rashly made, there were one or two observations which fell from the noble Viscount opposite (Viscount Hardinge) which I think call for some remarks from me. With regard to conscription, I entirely agree with the observations with which the illustrious Duke concluded. I am quite persuaded that in this country you will not carry conscription through either House of Parliament, and I am further persuaded that even if, in a moment of rashness, Parliament passed such a law, and it were bound up in the Statute Book, no Minister would have power to enforce it in this country. Therefore, it becomes a matter of the Estimates. If you would rather see fuller battalions the Chancellor of the Exchequer must be prepared to consent to fuller Estimates. That is a question which the responsible Ministers of the Crown will have to consider every year with reference to the foreign relations of the country; and in a time of peace I do not believe the present Government or any other would venture to submit largely-increased Estimates for this purpose to the House of Commons. The illustrious Duke has referred to the guns and Cavalry; but he did not mention their numbers, and I fear if I did not say one word about them it might be supposed that the Cavalry and the guns had been reduced. Now, that was by no means the ease, inasmuch as the Cavalry were increased both in men and horses during the time I held the Seals of office, and the field guns were nearly doubled in number. In respect to the Artillery and Cavalry there was a large increase in numbers as well as in efficiency; and with regard to the Infantry, I think I may say there never was a time of peace since the country was a country when the numbers of men in the Kingdom were so large as during the last two or three years. I strongly recommend to my noble Friend (Viscount Hardinge) the careful consideration of two documents. The first is the pamphlet by Sir John Burgoyne on our Defensive Forces, published with a new preface in 1870, in which it was stated that in 1854—
  "England was unable to maintain an effective
  1110
  force in the field of 25,000 men. We must dismiss from our minds any idea of the Militia and Volunteers being available for an effective augmentation of the Regular Forces until great changes are made in their organization. The readiest way for a rapid increase of the Regular Army would be clearly by adding soldiers to the cadres of regiments, kept habitually weak, but fully officered; thus, even raw recruits, joining previously well-trained comrades, and a perfectly prepared organized body, would, by rapid degrees, become identified with the mass, and, if they had previously been in the service, would be of equal value to those already in the ranks. It is believed that this latter advantage might be gained by a systematic enrolment of a portion of the Militia as a Reserve Force, after a first moderately short service in the Line, or even in its own ranks. With such a system, by maintaining an habitual peace establishment of 50 men per company, with a good complement of officers, and adding 50 from a Reserve, the regular force of Infantry would be at once doubled. It is considered that by vigorous measures, and by the system of organization here sketched out, we ought to be able, even with our existing small standing Army, to produce an effective force, available for general service, of 100,000 men of all arms and 300 guns, and that this might be accomplished within a very few weeks of the outbreak of war. Such a force, with no fear of invasion before us, would be sufficient to enable this country, in conjunction with its allies, to take an effective part in any Continental operations into which it may be forced for the protection of its interests."
  The second document is the Minute of the illustrious Duke, with the detailed Report of the Committee—of which General M'Dougall was the Chairman and Sir Garnet Wolseley was a member—upon that Minute. This second document was the foundation on which Parliament sanctioned the loan which is now being expended upon the localization of the forces. The first of these documents will show what, in 1870, Sir John Burgoyne considered to be necessary for the defence of the United Kingdom: the second will show how large a proportion, and what other measures besides, had been already provided for in 1872. It has been contended that the Army Reserve men ought to be called out with the Militia; but it ought to be known that before establishing the Reserve of 1870, we issued a Circular to inquire from the officers commanding in the several districts why the previous Reserve had failed? and the uniform answer had been that two reasons operated against it—first, the men felt themselves debarred of their hope of civil employment by their liability to be called out for a month's service with the Militia; the other was that the

  1111
  pay they received was not sufficient. What were the remedies we took? "We doubled the pay; and with regard to training them after they joined the Reserve, we took power only to do that in such a manner as to interfere as little as possible with their civil employment. The intention then was, and I suppose is still, that they should be trained at those local depôts which are now in progress and which are to be under the command of officers of the Regular Army, where they can be trained without giving rise to any dislocation of their local employment. But my noble Friend (Viscount Hardinge) says it is a Reserve on paper. It is not a Reserve on paper, for if the Returns of the present War Department are to be trusted—as I have no doubt they are—you have got a Return showing that on a particular day only 50 per cent were absent from their place of payment, and no doubt on subsequent days the larger proportion of that small percentage would appear. The law requires, I admit, to be strengthened, and the illustrious Duke knows that during the time I was in office the Judge Advocate General was desired to frame and submit to Parliament a provision to remedy that defect. I wish the noble Lord would compare the statement made to-night by the illustrious Duke with the statement made by the Duke of Wellington in 1829—because some seem to think that a blight has suddenly fallen on the whole system of recruiting, and that there used to be no difficulty whatever in other times in obtaining recruits for the Army. It has always been the case, ever since literature began, that the men of the writer's day were inferior to the men who went before them. It is not Parliamentary to quote Greek, and therefore I shall say nothing about Homer except this—that you will remember every page of the Iliad is full of comparisons between the puny men who lived in Homer's time and the great and powerful men who lived before them. The same comparison obtains in Virgil. I believe that at the Eglinton Tournament, nearly 40 years ago, the champions who went there expected to find that the armour of those who went before them would be so large that they would not be able to fill it. But the fact was there was not a coat of mail into which any of them could get. And so it has been since the
  1112
  world began. I wish my noble Friend would refer to the Report of the last Royal Commission on Recruiting, because he would there find how many men under 20 years of age were in the British Army in 1846, when enlistment was for life, and how many in 1866, when the present short service had not been introduced. I believe he would find that in 1846 there was the largest number, the next largest in 1866, and the smallest in one of the years when I had the honour to hold office, of which the particulars have recently been laid upon your Lordships' Table. But much disparagement has been made of the quality of the recruits who have recently been raised. Well, what did the Duke of Wellington say in a Memorandum of the 29th of April, 1829? He said—
  "In the moments of greatest distress in the country (not when wages rose and the labour market was disturbed) recruits cannot be obtained for the Army. The man who enlists into the British Army is, in general, the most drunken and probably the worst man of the trade or profession to which he belongs, or of the village or town in which he lives. There is not one in 100 of them who when enlisted ought not to be put in the second or degraded class of any society or body into which they may be introduced."
  Now let my noble Friend look at a Return laid on the Table by the present War Department for the current year, and let him bear in mind what sort of men were recruited in 1829. Let him also look at the table which speaks of the Courts-martial, and he will there find that the number brought to trial has gone on diminishing. Let him look at the good-conduct pay, and he will find an ample increase. Of the age and chest measurement I need not speak, because the illustrious Duke has, I trust, for ever set at rest the questions raised on these points. Let him look at the Return on Education, and he will see the extraordinary improvement which appears to be going on. And if he wants to know what the behaviour of these men is, let him ask the illustrious Duke how the 30,000 men behaved who, in 1872, went into the district of Salisbury, where the people had not seen a soldier since the days when William III. marched from the West. There was, I believe, at first some apprehension what might be the consequences of the influx of so large a force. But these men conducted themselves

  1113
  in such a manner that they left behind a reputation which, I can tell him, not only endeared them to the inhabitants of the district, but produced a marked effect on some of the most distinguished foreign officers who were present. Well, then, I ask you, my Lords, is it patriotic—I would almost say decent—to be perpetually speaking of these men, engaged to defend us against a foreign enemy and to fight for the honour and interest of their country, as if they belonged to the most comtemptible and worthless portion of the community? I want to know from what other portion of the community you would select 30,000 men and march them into a strange country, as was then the case with Salisbury, from whom there should be no case to go before a magistrate and no instance of abuse? My noble Friend has spoken of the Ashantee War, and finds fault with the mode in which the numbers of the 42nd Regiment were filled up from the 79th. Did he read the Report which three years ago was laid on the Table of the House, founded on the Minute of the illustrious Duke, and signed by General M'Dougall, who had a principal share in the organization of the Volunteers of Canada? General M'Dougall has shown what measures are to be taken so that the preparations made in time of peace shall be used to form a powerful Army in time of war. But for an Expedition like that to Ashantee, the national emergency did not arise on which the Sovereign is authorized by Parliament to call out the Reserves. It was, therefore, not our business to call upon the Reserves in order to fill up the three battalions going to Ashantee. Our business was, in the first place, to fill them up out of the men of the linked battalions. And here I may take an opportunity of correcting an error as to the way in which the 42nd was filled up. It is quite true a small bounty was given—and very properly given—to the men from the linked battalion who filled up the 42nd. That bounty might not have been given if the system had been in complete operation: when the men in both battalions would have been enlisted not for the separate battalion, but for the brigade. But you could not deal with men except on the terms upon which they were enlisted, and when called upon to join the 42nd these men received the bounty to which
  1114
  they were entitled. The noble Viscount has referred to the difficulty in recruiting for the Guards. Well, if there has been a difficulty, permit me to say that the Guards do not come under the new system at all, but are left to the influence of the system they had before. Therefore, it cannot be owing to the new system that there has been any deficiency. But I believe I am correct in saying that after the Guards had experienced considerable difficulty under their old system the aid of the new system was brought to bear. The result I do not know, but I believe that if the aid of the brigade depôts has been frankly invoked for the recruitment of the Guards, there will have been no difficulty in obtaining the supply. I think I have sufficiently answered the arguments of my noble Friend so far as they have not been more fully answered by the illustrious Duke. I believe the case to be this—that you have in this country a larger Army than you have ever had before; that you have a greater number of men than you have ever had, and that you have a Reserve, growing rapidly, well trained, and who as soon as the new depôts are finished, will be trained continually by the commanding officers of those depôts; that these men are now always present, and may be relied upon to be present when their country calls on them, and that they do not consist of such men as the Duke of Wellington described in 1829; for however lamentable the amount of desertion may be, yet crime, in the sense of civil crime, is extremely rare in the Army. What is called crime in the Army consists of breaches of discipline and military offences; but if you speak of crime in the sense in which the Duke of Wellington spoke in 1829, the men we have got in the Army may be compared with the most exemplary portion of the people. As long as you have a voluntary Army, any Minister or Commander-in-Chief who has to deal with it will have difficulties to deal with. But these difficulties are far less than they have been in former periods of our history; and if we have been proud of our Army before, with still greater reason may we be proud of it now.
  EARL GREY: My Lords, I think your Lordships and the country have reason to thank the noble Viscount (Viscount Hardinge) for eliciting these explanations, and especially have reason to

  1115
  thank the illustrious Duke for the statement of facts which he has made this evening. I understood the illustrious Duke to say that, while we now get recruits of a good description, still, under the present system of short service, there is a larger proportion than could he desired of men serving in each regiment at the present moment who are not fit for active service; that our regiments are weak; and I think the illustrious Duke emphatically told us that weak regiments were of little or no consequence provided we had proper Reserves to fall hack upon, but that at the present moment those Reserves are not in existence. They exist only in anticipation, and to meet a sudden exigency we have no Reserves of any importance to rely upon for bringing up the Army to what it ought to be in case of danger. Now, I wish to say that in the present state of the world this is a state of things calculated to excite in our minds very grave apprehensions. You must remember that the state of the world is very different, and the character of the dangers with which we might have to deal is very different, from what it was in former days. We now see almost the whole male population of Continental Europe drilled to arms. We see, at any rate, an enormous number of men trained in the most elaborate and careful manner, and capable of being brought into the field in a wonderfully short period of time. We have a state of things also in which our Navy—say what you will of it—is not, and cannot be, the same complete protection as it used to be. The Navies of other nations have grown up nearer to an equality with our own. There are a greater number of more powerful fleets on the sea, and the new descriptions of vessels now used make it absolutely impossible that, even if our Navy were brought to the highest state of efficiency, it could be the same protection which it was to us in former times. I have no fault to find with the Navy, or the management of the Navy; but I do say that the Navy alone, without the means of putting into the field a large disciplined force, is not sufficient for the protection of the Realm. Then there is another point. My noble Friend who has just sat down (Viscount Card-well) has told us that there are a larger number of soldiers in the United Kingdom at this moment than there were at
  1116
  any former period. Yes; that is true. But, in the first place, you have to compare the increased number of soldiers we possess with the increased need which I have ventured to describe. Next, you must remember that you have obtained this larger force at home by utterly stripping your Colonies of the forces they used to have. Twenty years ago we always had in our Colonies a considerable force beyond what was immediately necessary for colonial purposes, which could be drawn to our shores upon sudden emergencies. When Mr. Canning sent his expedition to Portugal, Gibraltar furnished a considerable contingent. In the Indian Mutiny the Cape and the Mauritius furnished certain regiments whose assistance was of the utmost importance. But now the state of things is entirely different. Instead of drawing one man from the Colonies in the event of the sudden breaking out of war, you would have a great demand upon your forces at home for the purpose of supplying reinforcements to your colonial possessions and your fortresses abroad. I believe there is not one of those great fortresses and military stations which we have in different parts of the globe which would not call upon you for an increased garrison if this country were suddenly engaged in war. Then, I say that, these things being true, we have a right to complain that the defence of the country is not in the condition it ought to be. When I say this, I am far from condemning either the late or the present Government for not being able to raise a greater proportion of recruits at a greater age than at present. I am quite convinced that the illustrious Duke spoke the simple truth when he said that the notion of raising recruits over 20 was a delusion. Nay, more—I agree with my noble Friend who spoke last (Viscount Cardwell) that it is a great advantage to obtain younger recruits, who will grow up into better and more efficient soldiers than those enlisted at a more mature age. But, then, if you act upon that policy, do so openly and avowedly, and do not reckon upon untrained and immature recruits for the force on which you must depend. If you are to have a small army, and an army of short-service men, it is only wise that every man of that small army should be efficient for immediate service.

  1117
  And this result may be accomplished by the simple plan of taking care that if you enlist young soldiers they should be trained before they take their place in the regiment; that you do not reckon the strength of regiments by your untrained recruits, but that, on the contrary, having enlisted men at 17 or 18, and given them a two years' training, they should then, and only then, be treated as effective soldiers. We should know then what we have to rely upon. The British Army would be a real Army, and not an Army upon paper. Then, again, as the illustrious Duke pointed out, there must be an efficient Reserve. My noble Friend (Viscount Card-well) may be right. It may hereafter grow to be a Reserve, but he does not pretend that there is a Reserve at present of sufficient force and numbers to rely upon.
  VISCOUNT CARDWELL: I believe that, in round numbers, the number of the Army Reserve is 7,000, and of the Militia Reserve 30,000. But the Reserve created in 1870 does not begin to come into full effect before 1876.
  EARL GREY: The Militia Reserve I do not think can be included, because you reckon them twice over—in the Militia and in the Militia Reserve. Besides, the Militia Reserve have no pretensions to be really trained soldiers. What you have to reckon upon is the Army Reserve, and you do not know, I maintain, according to the present system, what proportion even of your nominal force of Army Reserve could be depended upon if they were really wanted. It appears to me that Her Majesty's late Government made this great mistake—in adopting the sound system of short service, with a trained Reserve, they neglected what ought to have been the accompaniment of that policy, and did not provide that, until the Reserve was really obtained, a stronger force should be kept up in order to secure this Reserve the more rapidly, and keep the country safe until we could rely upon our Reserve. This appears to me to have been a serious mistake, and we are suffering from it at this moment. I had no notion that this subject would be discussed to-night, or I should have referred to some more points, and perhaps should have been better prepared; but, unexpectedly as the discussion has arisen, I cannot help asking leave to
  1118
  add one word more. In my opinion, neither your recruiting nor your Reserves will ever be satisfactory until you abandon what I believe to be the great mistake of late years adopted in practically abolishing pensions. I believe the pension to which the British soldier looked forward in former times was a great means of maintaining the British Army. I have frequently discussed this subject with the father of my noble Friend now on the cross-benches (Viscount Hardinge) in former days, and he often expressed to me his strong opinion, in which I entirely concurred, that the system of allowing pensions to soldiers was not only very useful to the Army, but also of great political advantage; because it is not a wise thing in a country like this to train large numbers of men to arms and turn them adrift without having a hold upon them afterwards. If you have only short service, with no means by which the soldier may ultimately earn a pension, it is necessarily a great discouragement to men to enlist in the Army. How can you suppose that men will give five or six of the best years of their lives to military service if they know when they leave the Army that they will not be on a par with civilians of the same age, and will have no opportunity of making provision for the future? I think, now they have only 4d. a-day during the few years they are in the Reserve, and ultimately may be left to the workhouse or to charity. I believe that, as long as you act upon that principle, you will have no successful recruiting and no effective Reserve. The real remedy is to let your soldiers go out of the Army when they are perfectly trained. When a man is perfectly trained, I never would keep him under the colours if he wished to join the Reserve; and I would allow service in the Reserve to count, under whatever conditions you chose to impose, towards the ultimate acquisition of a pension. For example, let two years in the Reserve count as one year with the colours towards earning a pension. I believe by regulations of this kind you would obtain more and better recruits, and that you would also obtain a much more effective Reserve. I trust that in any case the necessity will fee seen of every man in the Reserve being compelled to do duty with some Regular regiment in the Army for a few days in every year—because no Reserve can be

  1119
  efficient unless it is certain that every man in it is available.
  LORD STRATHNAIRNsaid, the question was not as to the spirit of our young soldiers, but as to whether we were obtaining recruits of a certain class or not. Her Majesty's Government possessed, under the rules of the service, a means of ascertaining the age of every soldier in the Army, which, with other particulars respecting him, ought to be entered in a special book for that purpose, and if a few examples were made of the boys who enlisted and made a false attestation as to their age, much good would result. As to the question of pensions, he believed that the great reason why the recruiting sergeant could not compete with other employers in the labour market was because pensions were no longer given. The Guards and the Royal Artillery, who fought so splendidly in the Crimea, had pensions to look forward to, and men would not volunteer for foreign service without having such an inducement. It was said that the Guards were still recruited under the old conditions; but what was the good of following such a course when all confidence that pensions would be given had vanished? If they restored the system of pensions they would have a better chance in the competition of the labour market, because young men would be willing to enter the Army in consideration of the certainty of a pension in their old age. Moreover, when once in the service the prospect of his pension would be a continuing inducement to discipline and good conduct, and would be the most effectual check upon those desertions from the ranks which had become almost a habit among recruits.
  THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE: I trust your Lordships will allow me to correct one or two slight inaccuracies which I think I detected in the speech of the noble and gallant Lord who has just sat down. He said that desertion had risen to an unparalleled height in consequence of the abolition of pensions, and of the introduction of short service. I would venture, with much respect, to make to the noble and gallant Lord the suggestion which my noble Friend behind me made to military critics in general—which was that before advancing propositions reflecting upon the present composition of the Army they would consult records, made from official
  1120
  sources of information, with which every Member of Parliament is supplied. These Returns give, I think, a satisfactory refutation to the statement of the noble and gallant Lord. And first as to the amount of desertion. The Blue Book states that in 1861 for 10,000 troops there were 41 per cent of desertions; whereas, in 1874, for 20,000 recruits—just double the number—there were only 27 per cent of desertions. Now, the noble and gallant Lord told them that short service was the cause of desertion, because short service could not compete with the attractions of the labour market; but if he had referred to the same authority he would have seen that of 20,000 recruits enlisted last year 12,000 had selected short service, which was therefore more and not less popular than the longer term. Then as to the youth of the Army, the noble Earl on the cross-benches (Earl Grey), said he feared that there was a larger number of young men—meaning, I suppose, under 20 years of age—now in the Army than there was formerly; but if the noble Earl had followed the speech of his noble Friend the late Secretary of State for War he would have learnt that in 1846 the number of men under the age of 20 was very much larger than it was in 1866, and that in 1866 the number was considerably larger than it is now. It is a fallacy, therefore, to say that the number of young men in the Army has become so considerable as to be a cause of apprehension relatively to what it might have been some years ago. I was rejoiced to hear from the illustrious Duke—who did not say a word as to the nominal age of the recruits—that with their physique he was satisfied. If the Commander-in-Chief of the Army was satisfied with the physique of his recruits, what more can we require? The noble Earl also complained of the abolition of pensions. It is scarcely fair to speak of pensions as being abolished, for it is notorious that a certain number of men were always intended to be long service men. It will. I hope, always be the practice of the military authorities to continue the service of a fair proportion of the most efficient men, and to permit them to serve on for pension. The noble Earl spoke of pensions of 4d. a-day as being contemptible; but the 4d. a-day allowed to the reserve was not a pension, it was a retaining fee; and

  1121
  when the noble Earl spoke of sending men back to the parish with nothing but this allowance upon which to depend, he did not remember that if the soldier enlisted at 18 he could not, at 24, when he had become a strong well-trained soldier, be spoken of as being sent back to the parish in the sense in which the noble Earl had used those words. All this criticism is based on the assumption that the great experiment initiated by the late Government has failed. I altogether deny that it has failed. It has not failed, because it has not yet had a trial. I know no trade or profession of which such strange statements are made as those which are made of the British Army. If it could be said of the Police, for instance, that men were forthcoming in sufficient numbers; that their physique was satisfactory; that increased arrangements had been made for their comfort; and that their conduct had improved, could we be told that the force was in an unsatisfactory condition? I cannot conceive how statements so depreciatory of the quality of the soldiers who fill the ranks of the British Army should be so recklessly made.
  THE DUCK OF RICHMOND: I do not know, my Lords, that I should take part in this discussion had it not been that frequent appeals have been made to Her Majesty's Government on the subject brought before the House by my noble Friend, and the advice given to them as to the course which they should adopt. I think we ought to be very grateful to my noble Friend who initiated this discussion (Viscount Hardinge) for having brought out so much interesting detail upon a matter which is so important in every possible sense in which it can be considered. I can assure my noble Friend that my right hon. Friend the Secretary for War has not been resting on his oars. My right hon. Friend is as perfectly satisfied as anyone can be that it is his duty to see that the country is possessed of as efficient an Army as it is possible for him to recommend to either the Houses of Parliament or the country to uphold and maintain. And with regard to the question of recruiting and of the Reserves, these are matters of such importance that they are the first to which he must devote his attention, with a view to see—if the present systems require improvement—
  1122
  how best they can be improved. The noble Earl on the cross-benches (Earl Grey) recommends that no recruits under two years service should be allowed to count in the battalions to which they belong. Well, if that suggestion were adopted—and I offer no opinion upon it—it is obvious that the number of men in each battalion must be largely increased, and that the Chancellor of the Exchequer must be approached for a considerable sum to acquire and maintain them. With respect to the Re-serves, I agree with what was said by the noble Viscount, the late Secretary for War, that the state of the Reserves is not altogether satisfactory. The noble Viscount said that more power was required with respect to the Reserves, and I understood him to intimate that sufficient power did not exist for the calling out of the Reserves from time to time to drill with the troops in the districts in which they were located. I believe it would be a benefit to the service if the Reserves were so called out. It is clear that if you have a Reserve upon paper of 7,000 men, you ought every year to be able to produce that Reserve in some form or other in which they may be useful. The noble Viscount said it was an error to say that the Reserve existed only on paper, as the men appeared regularly on quarter-day for the money due to them. That being so, it is worthy of the consideration of my right hon. Friend whether some mode might not be adopted by which they could be occasionally called out and shown to exist.
  VISCOUNT CARDWELLexplained that the difficulty to which he had referred arose from the fact that the depôt centres had not all been formed.
  THE DUCK OF RICHMOND: I am obliged to the noble Viscount for the explanation. I was observing that if we have a Reserve it ought to be a real and not a sham Reserve, and that there ought to be means of demonstrating its existence. Something has been said in regard to the character of the soldiers of the Army of the present day. Now, I do not think that the moral character of the British soldier of the present day has ever been assailed. I can bear testimony to the character of the men quartered at Chichester. The Returns must show that it is a very unusual thing for the men there to be brought up before a magistrate; and I think I can say for

  1123
  the people of Chichester and the neighbourhood, that the more soldiers the illustrious Duke sends us the better we shall like it. I must, however, corroborate what has been said by my noble and gallant Friend near me (Lord Strathnairn) as to the Guards not being in a satisfactory state as regards recruiting. I have a personal interest in the subject, because I have two sons in the Guards—one an Adjutant, and the other a Captain—and I am sorry to say that the Guards are at present by no means up to their strength. This may be in part because they are required to be of a better physique than the rest of the Army, and partly because from the present state of the labour market they cannot get the men they require. Before I sit down I may assure my noble Friend that my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War is fully alive to the importance of the subject. If I may be allowed to do so, I would also thank the illustrious Duke for the very able and satisfactory statement that he has made to us this evening, and so far from any apology being due from him, I think he has only performed his duty in stating the exact facts in regard to this question. It is by no means unusual for noble Lords or right hon. Gentlemen, or even for the head of the Government in this country, to take the opportunity of a convivial meeting to put the country in possession of certain facts, or to state his views or theirs on particular subjects: and it might have been expected that the illustrious Duke—indeed, if I may say so, it would have been almost culpable on his part if he had neglected to do so—would take the opportunity of saying something as to the physique of the soldiers, and to vindicate the condition of the Army under his command, and which he is seeing or inspecting almost every day. After reading the text and the context of the speech made by the illustrious Duke on the occasion in question, I cannot understand how anyone could put a different construction upon that speech from that which the illustrious Duke has told us he intended to convey. He stated that the soldiers he inspected at Aldershot were of such a physique, that he should be ready to take them at five minutes' notice to any part of the world; but he by no means said he would be satisfied with 500 of such men when he ought to have 1,000
  1124
  or 1,000 of them when he ought to have 2,000. The illustrious Duke only said in regard to the men and the stuff they were made of that they were not inferior to former soldiers of the Army. The illustrious Duke's opinion did not require to be corroborated, but it was borne out by the opinion of an unprejudiced person, Sir Thomas Steele—and there could be no more competent authority—who was astonished at the physique of the men at Aldershot. Sir Thomas Steele was an old soldier of distinction, who had served on Lord Raglan's Staff throughout the Crimean "War, and was thoroughly competent to give an opinion upon such a matter. I must, in conclusion, offer my thanks to my noble Friend for having brought on this discussion, which I think will be of considerable use in the country. I would also trust that attention will be given to the most useful suggestion made by the illustrious Duke to those in authority—that it is to the Horse Guards to which complaints should be made by Colonels and other officers rather than to the "man in the street."
  LORD WAVENEYrose to express his regret that so little attention had been given to the Militia, whose physical development and attention to drill and discipline pointed them out as a most important branch of the Reserve. Had anyone forgotten the Militia Regiments, whose physical appearance was much superior to that of the recruits of the Line, who took garrison duty in the Mediterranean during the Crimean War? A great improvement had been effected in the Militia within the period of his own observation and experience. They were stout and strong soldiers; and if the British Army had a reserve of 50,000 such men with 100 guns, such a force would go far to determine the warlike policy of the strongest State in the world. Such a reserve might easily be obtained if due measures were taken, and the services and training of the Militia would enable them to supply a Reserve sufficient for any emergency that might arise.
  House adjourned at half past Eight o'clock, till To-morrow, half past Ten o'clock.