Lords Sitting of 12 May 1874

MINUTES.
PUBLIC BILLS—Committee—Boundaries of Archdeaconries and Rural Deaneries * (28); Betting * (47).
Committee—Report—Colonial Clergy * (43); Public Worship Regulation (re-comm.) * (30–62); Consolidated Fund (£13,000,000) *.

AFFAIRS OF THE GOLD COAST.

  OBSERVATIONS.
  THE EARL OF CARNARVON, on rising to call the attention of the House to the Affairs of the Gold Coast, said: My Lords, it is time, I think, that I should lay before your Lordships' House some statement, however general it may be, of the policy which Her Majesty's Government are prepared to adopt on the Gold Coast. I should have done so before had it not been necessary to make certain inquiries which could hardly before this be brought to a conclusion. But in bringing this question before your Lordships this evening, I shall refrain from entering into any of the causes of the recent war. I shall not discuss its origin. I shall not even consider the vexed question of the transfer of the Dutch Settlements—the manner in which that transfer was carried out—whether or no Holland gained or lost by the transfer, or whether the measures subsequently adopted were wise or imprudent. Neither shall I discuss the misunderstandings and bickerings between the various Governors and Administrators on the spot. I shall confine myself, as far as possible, to the present state of affairs and to our policy for the future. But I will at once state this in fairness—that whoever might have been the Colonial Minister, he must, in dealing with the Gold Coast, have found his task a dangerous and slippery one, and that whoever may hereafter be Minister, is likely to have there the same experience should a similar combination of circumstances ever arise. Now, there are two questions to be asked when entering on a consideration of this subject. First—Are we to stay on that Coast or abandon it? Secondly—If we stay, under what conditions are we to stay, and how are we to govern for the future? I could have wished, had time allowed,

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  to say somewhat of the past history of that part of Africa. It abounds in romantic and picturesque details; but it is enough to remind the House that towards the end of the 15th century the Portuguese established themselves there and built that Fort of Elmina, of which travellers still speak in praise. They were succeeded by the Dutch, who went there for the purposes of the slave trade; and we, in turn, succeeded the Dutch, till, after two centuries of war and intrigue, we find ourselves the sole and undisputed masters of the Coast. Yet, in looking back at the events which have occurred on the Gold Coast, we are reminded of the saying that "History repeats itself." Over and over again we come upon a recurrence of the same events. Independently of the often-repeated changes of territory between ourselves and the Dutch, three times have we acquired land by purchase; three times have we placed the Coast under the management of commercial companies; three times have we resumed it; three times has the suggestion been entertained by our Government—indeed, I might say by Parliament—to abandon our position on the Gold Coast, and as often has it been rejected. Nor need I say anything of the history of the Ashantee War, or of the causes which through more than one generation have led to it. Of the various tribes in the country beyond the Coast, the race who exercise the most important influence are the Ashantees; but it was not until the commencement of this century we first came into collision with that Power. During the whole of the last century their authority was growing under the direction of a succession of really astute and able kings, who, like the kings described by one of Homer's heroes, were stern men and did stern acts, and thus inch by inch consolidated their sovereignty until they became the dominant Power in the whole country. Their policy at home and abroad was marked in blood, and at the commencement of this century they seemed to hang like a thunder-cloud over our possessions. But it was only in 1807 that the first hostilities broke out. In 1817 Mr. Bowditch was sent on a mission to Coomassie, which his interesting and truthful sketch has made historical; but the mission bore little fruit, and in 1824 Sir Charles Macarthy
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  found or thought it necessary to engage in war. He was deserted by his Native allies, defeated, and his head was cut off, and was said, though I believe incorrectly, to have been carried to Coomassie. Two years after, that defeat was wiped out by a signal victory gained by our forces over the Ashantees. But it needed five years to secure any real results of this victory. It was then only that the Treaty of 1831 was agreed to, and Mr. Maclean assumed the post of Governor. He was the husband of the well-known but unfortunate "L. E. L.," and for a time his own fame was involved in the tragedy of her death; but he was also a man of very high administrative capacity, and exercised an unrivalled influence on the Gold Coast. My noble Friend on the cross-benches (Earl Grey) did him no more than justice in one of those interesting letters on the government of the Gold Coast which he published before the meeting of Parliament. For 17 years, with stinted means both in men and money, with everything against him except his own political genius, he governed with ability and determination, and peace was preserved all over the country. But with him passed away the period of successful and really capable government, and at last came the war of 1863, and finally the war of last year. And now, looking back to the events on the Gold Coast, and not directing the remark against any one Government, but applying it to a succession of Governments, I must say that I entertain considerable doubts as to the wisdom of the policy which has been pursued on the Gold Coast. I think it is certain that at one time at least the Ashantees showed that there was a disposition on their part to enter into friendly alliance with us; their interests and their national instincts all pointed in the same direction; and had advantage been taken of that disposition and of those circumstances, good relations might have been established and maintained. We have seen, my Lords, that in the recent war they proved themselves brave enemies, and I think our policy ought to be, if possible, to convert them into faithful allies. Before proceeding further, it is right that I should point out to your Lordships, first of all, what appear to be our main difficulties on the Gold Coast. I think these may be reduced

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  to two—the Native races, and the climate itself; and I am aware that no scheme that does not attempt to deal with these difficulties can be successful. First as to the races. I admit that there is little that is at present promising in that Fantee race which extends over a great part of the protected territory, and on behalf of whom we have incurred the risks and sacrifices of the late war. The experience of that war has not shown them to advantage. They had to be driven at the point of the lash, like slaves, to discharge the duties which were necessary for the protection of their country and their homes. That is not encouraging; but, my Lords, I am afraid that our policy towards them in past years has been in some manner the cause of that want of spirit on their part. We taught the people to lean so much on us that they seem to have lost all dependence on themselves, and we have demoralized the Chiefs by taking away from them the power of life and death. It appears to be even a question whether the population of the Protectorate has not diminished. On the other hand, the Fantees are not of a nomadic habit, but are inclined to settle down on their land and cultivate it—they are of the same race as the Ashantees—they are susceptible of the influences of money, and they are apt to learn. It has been stated to me by an engineer officer who had many of them under his command, that so ready were they to receive instruction that some of them learnt in a very short time to do within a single hour what before had taken them a whole day to perform. But the tribes in the interior are constantly pressing onwards towards the Coast, and some of them are said to be strong. Hitherto, the Ashantee power has stood as a barrier between the Natives on the Coast and those tribes in the interior; but now that the Ashantee power is broken down, the question arises, what will be the result from, and as regards these other tribes? We know that one of the tributary Kings has crossed the frontier with his people, and has asked and has received from Sir Garnet Wolseley the protection of this country. But it may be questioned whether the destruction of the Ashantee power would be politically desirable, inasmuch as the qualities of which the Ashantees are possessed are at least the qualities of an organized and disciplined
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  race, which has made some steps in the art of governing both themselves and others. It is impossible as yet to predict the result of the late campaign. It may be that the destruction of Coomassie in this case has been a real destruction, like that in Abyssinia—a total destruction of the capital and the dynasty, followed by chaos; or it may be that the overthrow of the kingdom which has so long oppressed and cowed the surrounding tribes may restore peace and trade and the possibilities of prosperity. But until we know how this is about to turn out, we hardly know the conditions on which we have to act. So much as regards the Native races. Next comes the question of climate, and it is a very serious one. No man will deny that the climate is bad—whether it is as bad as it has been stated to be is another question; but it is bad, and injurious to European health. Hence the rapid changes of Governors, of whom there have been reckoned as many as 26 since Mr. Maclean; hence the absence of anything like a fixed policy. Hence, too, the absurd schemes put forward for Fantee constitutions and self-government by some parties when my noble Friend opposite (the Earl of Kimberley) was in the Colonial Office: and hence, too, has arisen the belief, which comes out very clearly in the Blue Books laid on the Table by my noble Friend, that England was not prepared to fight in defence of her allies. But, my Lords, we have aggravated all the other evils with which we have had to deal by singling out as the seat of Government probably the most pestilential spot on the whole of the Coast. But this is not all. Successive Governments at home have made everything still more difficult by adopting the principle of starving the establishment on the Gold Coast. The persons employed there have been paid on a most illiberal scale. How can it be expected that men of capacity will go out under such circumstances? Still, my Lords, I think there are facts to show that the climate, bad as it is, is not so bad as it has been represented to be. Wherever the bush has been cleared, and Europeans have been able to ascend to higher levels, their health has improved. Nor in regard to the effects of the climate on Europeans, must we forget that they have too often been their own enemies,

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  by recourse to stimulants, which not only weaken the body but destroy all vigour and originality of mind. In India, we have had before now to contend against the same difficulties; but there, by prudence, by the observance of proper precautions, and the adoption of better sanitary arrangements, a great improvement in the general health of Europeans has been effected. I may mention—though I do not desire to draw much argument from it, because the season was favourable, and the lives, though exposed to hardships, were picked lives—that taking the whole number of deaths that occurred during the late campaign, including even the deaths which have followed the return of the troops, the mortality was not quite 23 per 1,000, which is about the same as the death-rate in the metropolis, and lower than the death-rate in some other English towns. My Lords, I do not mean to attach undue weight to that fact, but I think it one which I ought to mention while on the subject of climate. Now, my Lords, I come to the important question—Are we to retain our colony on the Gold Coast, or to abandon it? In considering it, two considerations present themselves. One is that of trade, the other that of obligation. I do not think we can resolve the question of retention or abandonment into one of a mere balance-sheet in the national ledger. It ought not to be settled on a mere consideration of profit and loss. There are many things which do not pay pecuniarily—honour, religion, morality, bring in no direct money return—but we do not treat these principles as of no account in the national consideration. A great nation like ours must be sometimes prepared to discharge disagreeable duties; she must consent to bear burdens which are inseparable from her greatness; but in this case the real question is—What are our obligations? They are of two kinds—written and unwritten. Our written obligations in respect of the Gold Coast are but few in number. They are only three. There is, first, the Treaty of 1831, to which I have already referred; secondly, a bond entered into with the Native Chiefs on the subject of human sacrifices and barbarous customs; and, thirdly, there was the poll fax imposed for a time during the period when my
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  noble Friend on the cross-benches (Earl Grey) held the seals of the Colonial Office. There is, doubtless, something in those written obligations, but I do not think there is sufficient to make it necessary for us to continue our occupation of the Gold Coast. But, my Lords, there are unwritten obligations—moral ones—and these appear to me to be very strong. First, we have taught these people, by a very long system of protection, to lean upon us. They have lost their manliness and independence of character, and if we abandoned them at this moment, the probability is, that the Ashantee Power would spread itself over the Protectorate. We should, in fact, hand them over to the tender mercies of exasperated enemies; and to abandon them at this moment would be an act of virtual cruelty and treachery which this country would not and ought not to sanction. Again, though our influence on that Coast has not been as great as we could have wished it to be, it has not been without considerable and humanizing results. It has been the means of inducing these people to abandon some of their most barbarous customs; it has mitigated and greatly softened the worst features of domestic slavery; life and property have been rendered comparatively secure. I am informed that when a murder is committed a couple of policemen will arrest the murderer even at a long distance from Cape Coast Castle, and bring him to justice without a fear of resistance; and, lastly, we have given the people a system of education, though, it is true, a very imperfect one. Without exaggeration, we have led them a certain distance along the road to civilization. But, my Lords, it is the opinion of the soundest authorities that if we were to retire from the Coast at this moment our work would be undone, the wheel of progress would run backward, and even human sacrifices would be seen at Cape Coast Castle within a year. Under all the circumstances I feel—and Her Majesty's Government feel—that we are acting in accordance with the instincts of Parliament and of the country when we come to the conclusion that, at such a moment as this especially, it is impossible for us to terminate our occupation of the Gold Coast. Having thus stated our decision on this important point, I will now explain what are

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  the conditions under which in future we propose to administer affairs there. I need not go into a geographical description of the country; but it is right to remind the House that at present the Gold Coast is administered in connection with three other Settlements, two of which are at a very great distance from it. The first of the three is Lagos, about 200 miles distant from the Gold Coast; but the second, Sierra Leone, is 800 miles distant; and the third, Gambia, 200 miles distant from Sierra Leone. Now, the distance of the Gold Coast from the two last of these Settlements is far too great; and, though probably this is not generally borne in mind, the politics, the trade, the social condition, the general interests, of those places differ. Now, we propose to consolidate Lagos and the Gold Coast into one Colony, and to consolidate them very much on the principle of the organization of the Straits Settlements. When I previously held the Seals of the Colonial Office, the organization of those Settlements was established, and I think it has worked in a satisfactory manner. I have never heard any complaints of it. We propose, then, to apply, with some slight modifications, the same principle to Lagos and the Gold Coast. We propose to have a Legislative and Executive Council of small numbers at the Gold Coast, but to require that it shall hold its Councils three times a year at Lagos. We have already at the Gold Coast a small squadron of three vessels, which will keep up the communications between the two places. But one of the greatest, if not the chief difficulty, lies in the choice of a Governor. He must be a man of great influence of character. We hope to choose the best man we can get; to give him large power, and to exact from him great responsibility. I believe more may be done in such a place by a strong Governor appointed on these terms than by any other system. I hope to effect a reduction in the number of officers, but to increase their salaries in cases in which we think they are underpaid. We propose that for the consolidated Settlements there shall be appointed one Colonial Secretary; one Treasurer for both, with a sub-Treasurer at Lagos, as it is for the present at all events necessary to have separate accounts; one Auditor; one Chief Justice; a Queen's Advocate; one commanding Officer of Armed Police,
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  which we propose shall be enlisted for the united Colony; one Colonial Engineer; and one Chief Surgeon. I have stated that we propose to increase salaries; and without pledging myself too closely, I think I may say that the increase of salaries, as measured by the present establishment, will not in the aggregate exceed £6,000 or £7,000 a-year. This will not be regarded as a heavy additional expenditure, seeing that the revenue of the Colony, which in 1867 was not more than £11,000, was, according to Sir Garnet Wolseley, estimated for the present at £52,000. Now, though expenditure has always a tendency to increase with the income, I think it is probable that there will be a sufficient surplus to meet the future reasonable requirements of the Colony, when the present exceptional period of difficulty is successfully past. It will be my object, as far as possible, to induce competent men to take employment in the Colony; but up to this time, I think many circumstances have operated against their doing so. I may take as an illustration the rate of pensions. For Civil Servants there are two rates of pensions—the English rate and the tropical rate. By a curious anomaly, those doing duty on the Gold Coast—as unhealthy a settlement as any under the British Crown—have been put on the English instead of on the tropical scale. I propose to reverse that, and to put them on the tropical scale. Again, whenever it has been possible to give free passages home to naval and military officers engaged on that Coast it has been done; but owing to some existing regulation, the privilege has been withheld from the Civil Servants. I think there ought to be no difficulty about that. Those engaged in civil employments will for the future be entitled, equally with military and naval officers, to free passages home whenever it is possible. The next question is, Where should the seat of Government be placed? In connection with this question there are three considerations—the military, the commercial, and the sanitary. So far as the two former are concerned, I am not aware that Cape Coast Castle has any special advantages; but as regards its sanitary qualifications, it is, perhaps, the very worst place that could have been selected. The soil is saturated with sewage; there is decaying vegetable

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  matter in abundance everywhere about, the houses are crowded on one another, and burials take place under the very buildings of the living. Not only will horses not live there, but even cattle cannot exist at Cape Coast Castle. It deserves more than, perhaps, any other place the appellation of "The White Man's Grave." This being the case, there must be a change; the seat of Government must be moved, but for obvious reasons it must still be kept on the sea coast. Now, there would seem to be a choice of one or other of two places—Accra on the east, and Elmina on the west. Accra appears to be the most desirable as regards health. It is surrounded by open country, it seems to offer facilities to sportsmen—from which a fair inference may be drawn; horses and cattle will live there; and, as we are proposing the consolidation of the Lagos and the Gold Coast Settlements, it has this advantage—that it is about midway between the two. As against those advantages, the landing-place is bad. On the other hand, Elmina is in the neighbourhood of hills, there is a good water supply there, and there are facilities for sanitary improvements. The port, which at present admits craft of 40 or 50 tons, may be made available for much larger vessels. At present I am not prepared to say to which place we shall be disposed to give the ultimate preference. But, my Lords, while some town on the Coast must be the nominal seat of the Government always, and its real seat in time of war, the seashore can never be a place in which health can be maintained at its highest point, and in which, therefore, public business can be done in the most effective manner. But at a distance of some 30 miles from Accra is a country of hills. In these hills missionaries have lived for a long time, and their children have been born and have grown up there. European flowers and vegetables grow, and the conditions of European life and health exist there. I think that in these hills there may be founded a station, which would be to Accra or Elmina what Simla is to Calcutta. Simple and inexpensive buildings which may be stockaded could be constructed, and a detachment of armed police may be kept there. It may be connected with the seat of government on the Coast by roads and the telegraph, and
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  when this is accomplished the English Governor and his officers may live there for at least a great part of the year. It would have great advantages in a sanitary point of view, and health is necessary to the efficiency of government. Of course, certain conditions must be annexed to his residence there. He may live there while there is complete peace; but in case of war he must immediately come down to his seat of government on the Coast to avoid the danger of being cut off. But a central government is not enough. In barbarous times and in uncivilized countries, roads are the first condition of improvement; and here it will be our first duty to open and secure the maintenance of roads and trade-paths. As to the expenses connected with them, I see no reason why they should not be in a great measure provided for by the Natives, very much as is the case in India. One of the complaints made by the Ashantees was, that their traders when on their way to the sea coast were constantly molested by the Fantees. To meet this, and similar not unfair complaints, I propose to have certain stations on the road and detachments of armed police to hold the country, to maintain the roads, and to punish with inflexible severity any attempt on the part of lawloss people to disturb those who are engaged in trade. In this way, then, we shall, I trust, secure health for the Government and peace for the trade of the country. At the same time, we shall keep up communications, not only effectively, but rapidly, between different parts of the country; and this is the great secret of administrative success in a wild and barbarousregion. And now I will say a few words on the question of the military force. There, as everywhere else, we must have a strong military force in the background, and to economize that military force would be the worst economy of which we could be guilty. The question, however, is, what that force shall be. My Lords, I believe English troops are wholly unsuited to that climate. There is a very remarkable despatch to be found in a recently-published volume of the Correspondence of the late Duke of Wellington, which is very characteristic of that great man. You will find there a multitude of details gathered up and

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  brought to a general conclusion, in which the Duke shows as great an acquaintance with the then affairs of the Gold Coast as if, instead of being Commander-in-Chief in England, he had been Governor or Administrator there. At the same time, he deprecates in the most earnest way the employment of English troops on that Coast; and although the conditions, in many respects, have since been somewhat altered, still the main argument seems to hold good. I am clearly of opinion that the English troops are misplaced on the Gold Coast. In the same way I doubt whether the West Indian troops are much more suitable, for whenever they have been tried they have been found to succumb to the influences of climate as rapidly, if not more rapidly, than English soldiers. Therefore, I come to the conclusion that, on the whole, though it is not without risk, it is the wisest policy to dispense altogether, and as soon as possible, with English troops, and to rely entirely upon Native forces. I think these Native forces will be found to be efficient and inexpensive. As regards efficiency, the experience of the late war is a sufficient proof. Russell's and Wood's regiments and Rait's Artillery would be alone evidence of what Africans, when officered and led by Englishmen, can do; and as regards expense, and speaking roughly, I may say that of late years we have not had fewer than 300 West Indian soldiers on that Coast. Now, a West Indian soldier costs £100 a-year; whereas a Houssa costs only £30 a-year. Consequently, we could maintain 1,000 Houssas, who would be more effective, for the same amount that 300 West Indian troops now cost. But I should be sorry to have the Native force selected from one single tribe. On the old principle of divide et impera, the force should be a mixed one, and the men should be taken from all the best fighting tribes. This is an experiment which I think must be tried, as it is essential to our occupation of the Gold Coast. There ought, however, to be a full proportion of English officers attached to this force—rather a larger proportion than is now attached to Indian irregular regiments—and if there should be a few more than are wanted, they can be made available for political and general service. This nearly exhausts
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  what I have to say on the general administration of the Gold Coast; but I should like to make a few remarks on some other and rather more domestic questions. The life-blood of a Colony must be its trade and its commercial system. A great deal of evidence is in existence on this subject, and yet I candidly own I am not satisfied in my own mind as to the results. It seems clear that changes have occurred on the Gold Coast not dissimilar to those which have happened in many other parts of the world. Formerly, I believe the system might be described as one consisting of a few influential and wealthy merchants, men of education and ability, who by their residence there greatly strengthened the hands of the Government. Such were the merchants in Mr. Maclean's day. At present, I believe, a different class exists. There are many and small traders, and this affects, no doubt, in a less satisfactory degree, the general conduct of Government. We have, too, applied the English law there in all its technicalities and subtle processes. Now, it seems to me that it is a mistake and almost an absurdity to apply to negroes the refinements and complications of the English law of bankruptcy. Yet this has been done with, I am told, a dismal result, as fraud and dishonesty are the frequent consequences. Therefore I look forward to a great simplification of this and other branches of law on the Gold Coast. It is said by some that there is very little trade to be expected from the interior. I hope, however, that this apprehension is unfounded. At all events, the revenue is a rising one, and I trust that, with proper care and management, it will continue to grow. There is one point with regard to our trade which I cannot refrain from mentioning on this occasion—namely, the importation of arms. This is a very serious question. The arms supplied to the Ashantees were for the most part transported into the interior when the Coast was closed. They were imported from the west through the port of Assinee, where the French have a claim and exercise some jurisdiction. With the greatest friendliness on their part, it was impossible to prevent the importation of those arms to the Ashantees, who were supplied largely with them. But I leave it to the House to say how different

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  it would have been if, instead of old flint-locks, they had been supplied with breech-loaders and arms of precision, which they might have employed in the bush with deadly effect. How the importation of arms is to becontrolled from without I am not at present prepared to say; but it is a point which deserves very grave consideration, because it is very important with reference to our military preponderance on the Coast that we should have the means of, at all events, regulating the supply. Along our own frontier it is comparatively easy to do this, and I am not indisposed to give the Government a monopoly for the sale of arms. Arms are really necessary to these people, not only for hunting and self-defence, but for the ceremonies and customs of every day life; but it is a question whether the Government could not supply weapons of such a type as they might deem to be most advantageous to the Natives, each firearm bearing a particular stamp, and each being issued to a Native only on the recommendation of his own Chief. In this way we may be quit of a danger, and we may serve a political and administrative purpose. As regards the administration of justice, changes will, of course, be necessary. At this moment there is on the Gold Coast no Court of Appeal, no Public Prosecutor, and only one Judge. Now, I propose to appoint one Chief Justice for the two Settlements, one Chief Magistrate or Judge resident at each Settlement, but applicable to either, and one Queen's Advocate or Public Prosecutor. Besides this, I hope to extend, as far as possible, the principle of circuit administration. There are many cases where it is easier to bring a tribunal to the persons interested than it is to bring the persons interested to a Court, and when in 1867 it was necessary to re-organize the internal administration of justice in Jamaica, this was the principle we adopted. Further, I am bound to say I entertain very considerable doubts as to whether the jury system ought not to undergo some material modification. Though it is the palladium of English liberty, I doubt whether it is essential to a system of well ordered freedom on the Gold Coast. It seems to be clear that the Coast juries—partly through tribal jealousies, and partly through interested motives—cannot be thoroughly trusted with the
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  adjudication of inland cases which are brought before them. Nor is it possible in the consideration of this branch of the question to forget that domestic slavery exists. Slavery in any form is so utterly repugnant to all our principles that it must be the object of a Minister as soon as he can to extinguish it. It is also a constant source of embarrassment; but though difficulties are brought about by native slavery, on the other hand the difficulties involved in an immediate and compulsory emancipation of slaves would be still greater. Unless Parliament is prepared in such case to do that which is fair, to look upon the slave as property, and vote a compensation—which probably would not be far short of £1,000,000 sterling—I hardly see how you can deal effectually and honestly with that subject; but if slavery were immediately abolished, the necessary results would be an increase of our obligations, our expenditure, and of the complications in these territories. I am bound to add that I believe the hardship to the slave has been largely and happily reduced. When Dr. Madden was sent out in 1841 by Lord John Russell, who was then Colonial Secretary, he reported that the slaves absolutely refused to be liberated unless the Government would undertake to provide food. This, of course, is not conclusive; but it shows at least how full of difficulties this question is. I would gladly lay down such rules as would pave the way to the ultimate and, indeed, to the early extinction of slavery; but anything sweeping in the way of compulsory emancipation seems to me at this moment more calculated to enhance the difficulties with which we have to deal, and even to worsen the lot of the slave, than a gradual and cautious way of dealing with it. My Lords, I have gone over many of the various points which I desired to bring before your Lordships. Your Lordships will see that Her Majesty's Government propose to retain, as far as territorial jurisdiction goes, the Protectorate pretty much as it stands. Committees of the House of Commons at different times have held different language as to the extent of territorial power which we exercise—and the Colonial Office, perhaps, has not been more consistent; but, on the whole, it seems to me that though some increase is inevitable

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  in order to carry out a more effective administration, the present limits of our territorial power should not be enlarged more than is absolutely necessary. In order that there may be no misapprehension, I will sum up the various points with which I have troubled your Lordships, I fear, at too great length. In the first place, it is the wish and the intention of Her Majesty's Government in this scheme not materially to extend our territorial jurisdiction or our obligations; secondly, it is their wish that government should be made in this matter as direct and simple as possible. That I believe to be our best chance of administering affairs in these territories. It was the personal influence of Mr. Maclean which enabled him to accomplish that wonderful task which he undertook in the midst of a large and uncivilized population. So have I seen in former years and in uncivilized countries, Englishmen with no direct authority or control, but with the reputation of an inflexible justice and impartiality, attracting men from hundreds and hundreds of miles to refer to their arbitration the disputes and quarrels which no Native authority could settle. England may well be proud to have produced such men. Thirdly, the opening up of trade will be a great advantage to these territories. From Livingstone downwards, we have the experience of the greatest travellers that trade is the handmaid of religion, and tends to produce order and security. Fourthly, we are bound in every way we can to discourage all the barbarous customs which still exist, and to make the Chiefs understand that if they desire the protection of the Crown, if they desire to be called allies of the English people, they must renounce those customs as abhorrent to Christianity and civilization. Fifthly, though I will not say that anything like an extravagant sum is required for the purpose, yet I wish to give fair warning that it is impossible, without some additional expenditure, that the government of this Coast can be properly carried on. Parliament and the Government will do wisely in abandoning the illiberal scale of expenditure which has for so many years past been applied to this Coast. It is not safe. It is not even economical. I do not believe the expense ultimately need be a large one, but some increase is inevitable. And, lastly, I wish to
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  say, both for myself and, indeed, for any future Colonial Minister, that whilst undertaking this new system of administration of the country, it will be open to us at any future time to reconsider our position upon this Coast. I trust that the plan we propose may be productive of good, but the difficulties, as I have endeavoured to point out, are considerable; and, therefore, I think it is well that we should be held perfectly free at any future time to reconsider our position. I sometimes hear that we ought to pave the way to an abandonment of this Coast by present preparations for such a change of policy; but I can only say that this betrays a great misapprehension of the facts of the case. The moment you begin by overt acts to pave the way to abandonment, you will provoke aggressions and render the step that you desire to take impossible. If ever the time should come to make preparations to abandon the Coast, the quicker that the execution follows on the intention the better. I have left still a good deal unsaid. Nevertheless, I have given an outline, I trust, of the scheme which we propose, and which I hope, without increasing materially our obligations, will give us a reasonable chance of maintaining more efficiently than heretofore our position upon the Gold Coast. It will always be a task full of difficulty, and possibly of danger. But difficulties are not new to us—they are the history and the heritage of the English race. Throughout the records of our career in India, there is not a single page which does not contain a story of difficulties as great as these successfully overcome, of tribes as fierce subdued, of climates as pestilential so far mitigated that English life and English government have become possible; and if, indeed, by some awful catastrophe it were to be our fate to perish and to disappear from India, we should, I do not hesitate to say, leave behind us a monument of statesmanship and power such as the world has not seen since the days of the Roman Empire. In the present instance it is certainly not a desire of selfish interests or the ambition of larger empire which bids us remain on the West Coast of Africa; it is simply and solely a sense of obligations to be redeemed and of duties to be performed. But this at least, I venture to say, that as long as we do stay there, whether our

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  stay be long or short, we must exercise an effective control, alike beneficial to the Natives themselves and worthy of the history and position of this country.
  EARL GREYwas of opinion that to abandon the Gold Coast altogether would be simply impossible without utter disgrace to this country. On the whole he concurred in the scheme sketched out by the noble Secretary for the Colonies. He thought that the administration of Governor Maclean was a model which should be studied and followed, for under that most able officer the British Protectorate had risen from a most deplorable condition to great prosperity, and though, since the death of Governor Maclean, there had never been another Governor of equal energy and judgment, still the system adopted by him had been in the main adhered to. The Gold Coast continued to make progress, though less rapidly than it might have done if better governed, till 1863. After that year a different system came into operation. The Protectorate continued, but the control which had formerly been exercised over the Chiefs and people was, by the orders of the Home Government, practically relinquished by the officers employed on the Coast. Not only merchants, but even officials testified that from that time the state of things steadily deteriorated; savage customs which had been suppressed began to be re-established, and trade became more and more insecure. It was to be hoped we were now about to revert to the old system of giving control as well as protection. He approved the proposal to keep up a Native force, and thought the proposal to construct roads throughout the Protectorate of the greatest importance. He thought the Native troops might be employed as sappers and miners in the construction of these roads as well as in keeping them open afterwards. In regard to arms, it would no doubt be highly desirable, if it were possible, to prevent their importation into Africa; but he was persuaded that it was quite impracticable to prevent it, and that to endeavour to do so would only lead to an interference with regular trade, and to a great deal of smuggling; and it would be found in the end, should a war break out, the Natives had obtained arms notwithstanding all the prohibitions. It would be much better to recognize that the importation
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  was inevitable, and to add to the revenue of the Gold Coast by subjecting the arms to a duty.
  THE EARL OF KIMBERLEY: My Lords, I do not propose to express an opinion upon the whole plan which has been laid before us by the noble Earl the Secretary of State with so much ability. Through the course of political events in this country it did not fall to Her Majesty's late Government to consider the course which ought to be taken at the conclusion of the War in Ashantee. In regard, however, to my own opinions on the subject, I may say that my leaning is towards the policy which the noble Earl has announced—that, namely, of remaining on the Coast. At the same time, I would, by no means, go so far as my noble Friend on the cross-benches (Earl Grey), who seems, from his remarks to-night, and also from letters of his which have been published in The Times, to regard the matter as one scarcely admitting of argument. It seems to me, on the contrary, that there are great doubts and difficulties surrounding the question. Although it was not my duty to bring the matter for decision before the late Government, I have considered it carefully in my own mind, and I freely confess that the arguments on both sides seem to me very weighty—so much so, indeed, that I have had great difficulty in coming to a conclusion on the subject. One reason why I should be most unwilling to criticize closely the details of the noble Earl's plan, even if I had had time to give them ample consideration, is that I am conscious of the difficulties—the extreme difficulties—which surround the adoption of any policy in regard to the Gold Coast, whatever may be its character. There is but a choice of alternatives, none of which is at all satisfactory. A policy of abandonment, which some persons have recommended, might lead to great evils on the Coast. At the same time there are numerous difficulties, as the noble Earl has justly and clearly pointed out, which have to be encountered in connection with the administration of that territory. I would remark that my noble Friend was perhaps somewhat inconsistent when, at the close of his speech, he said that our position might at some future time be reconsidered. The tenor of his statement seemed to me to point to a permanent

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  administration. Now, it is almost impossible to carry on an administration if you are in a state of uncertainty as to whether you are going to remain in the territory or not. There would of necessity be an unsettled state of things, which might render the best of your schemes abortive. As to an Administrator for the Gold Coast, it is exceedingly difficult to find a man in every way suited to the position, and exceedingly difficult when you have found him to keep him there. Not only may his health break down, but you cannot chain a man to such a coast. If he be an able Administrator—and he must be an able Administrator to conduct its affairs with advantage—you cannot resist his application to be promoted to some better post. This is one of the difficulties in the way of dealing with a Colony such as that of which I am speaking. With respect to the proposal of my noble Friend to combine the Gold Coast with Lagos, it is one in the wisdom of which I quite concur. The Governor of Sierra Leone is too far off to be able constantly to attend to the affairs of the Gold Coast, even though he might be as able a man as Sir Arthur Kennedy. A casual visit to the Coast is calculated merely to unsettle the administration of the Colony itself, while the Governor who pays it has not the time necessary fairly to mature his own plans. I repeat, therefore, that I think my noble Friend has done well in uniting the Gold Coast and Lagos under one Administrator. I am glad, I may add, to find that the noble Earl recognizes the great objections to the employment of West India troops on the Coast. Those troops, it is but fair to say, have, in accordance with the testimony of all, done their duty admirably in the late war; but it is not their fault that, coming from a totally different climate, and accustomed to a more easy life, they are liable, like the White man, to disease; while they are not endowed by nature with the same energy and physical capacity. There is this further difficulty—that it is by no means easy to obtain recruits for a West India India Regiment, owing to the great demand for labour in those Colonies; and I am therefore of opinion that my noble Friend has wisely determined to organize a Native force. Then, as to the importation of arms, I entirely agree with what has fallen from my noble
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  Friend on the cross-benches (Earl Grey). I say so after having given the subject the most anxious attention. There are several obstacles in the way of regulating that importation. You must have, in the first place, the command of the whole Coast; and even if you did possess that control of the whole Coast, you could not altogether prevent the tribes in question from obtaining arms—because there is a considerable overland trade from the north, and arms thus find their way from a central depôt in Africa to the banks of the Volta. My noble Friend touched on the administration of justice, the construction of public works, and many other improvements; but without the exercise of more direct dominion—and he very justly pointed out the objections to exercising a more direct dominion over this country—I doubt whether he will be able to carry out his scheme. But whatever we do, we must not delude ourselves by imagining that by shutting our eyes to the responsibility which we have undertaken, and we must take care we free ourselves from it, that under the name of a Protectorate we do not assume all the responsibility of managing the affairs of the Colony, without the necessary power. Although I feel as strongly as any man can, the expediency of developing the resources of the Coast, still I do not believe they can be in a flourishing condition as long as domestic slavery exists. A man cannot work energetically when he does not work for himself, but as the slave of some master. Whether my noble Friend can pave the way to a better state of things by the measures which he has indicated or not, I am extremely glad to find that he is looking forward to taking some steps to deal with the question of slavery. The only other point to which I shall now refer is the proposed change in the seat of Government. Do what we may, the principal means of communication for this country must be through the Coast, and there must, therefore, be very considerable objection to establishing the seat of Government at a distance from the Coast. It would, however, be well if the Governor were enabled to pass more of his time in a healthier climate. I will only say further that I wish the scheme of my noble Friend all the success which he anticipates. Whoever

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  succeeds in producing a more satisfactory state of things on the Gold Coast will deserve the best thanks of the House and of the country.
  House adjourned at a quarter past Seven o'clock, to Friday next, half-past Ten o'clock.