THE EARL OF LAUDERDALErose to call the attention of the House to the state of the Navy. Just previous to the Dissolution of the last Parliament—the coup d' état, as he might call it, by which he might have lost his seat among their Lordships, and was compelled to go back to his constituents—just previous to the Dissolution, he had read in the newspapers certain speeches—which were mostly after-dinner speeches, either made 211 by Members of the late Government or at least under their inspiration—the purport of which was to show that the Navy of this country was never in such an effective state. In fact it was said it was fit to meet all the Navies in the world. Now, he was rather surprised at reading these statements, for he happened to be living near one of our largest naval arsenals, and when he went to such places he generally kept his weather eye open to see what was going on, and certainly from the information he received, he had come to the conclusion that our Navy was anything but in an efficient state. Then came the extraordinary statement with respect to the prosperity of our finances, and the wonderful surplus that was to be expected. No doubt, this was nothing more than an attempt to gain political capital. This was just before the dreadful balloon accident the noble Duke opposite (the Duke of Somerset) told us of a few nights ago. The statement by which it was attempted to strengthen the then Government was that they would have £5,000,000 to spare, and would abolish the income tax. "When he read that, he came to the resolution to let their Lordships and the country know the real state of the case. He would admit that if the Navy was in the efficient state that it was represented to be, the surplus of £5,000,000 was a legacy which the present Prime Minister ought to be very thankful to the late Government for leaving at his disposal. But he thought, on the other hand, that he should be able to show that so far from the Navy being in the efficient state which the country had been led to believe, it had. in fact, during the last five years, been starved, and that the late Ministry bad been attempting to keep it up by an expenditure £1,000,000 a-year short of what was necessary to keep it in a really efficient state. That, at least, was his impression. The cost of everything connected with the Navy had, within the last low years, risen at least 60 per cent; so that it stood to reason that if they wanted to keep the Navy in the same efficient condition as it was some 15 years since, they could not do it with the same money, but must add some 60 per cent to the cost. What, however, had been the fact? Her Majesty's late Government, instead of increasing 212 the expenditure, had reduced the Dockyard Establishments, sold some of the stores, and had even done away with some of the Dockyards themselves; and it was notorious, that the dockyard men, and especially the artizans had been largely reduced. Now, they could notreduce the Dockyards without affecting the naval establishment generally. The Dockyards and the Navy went together, and if they had inefficient Dockyards they must have inefficient ships. The Navy was our first line of defence. It therefore ought always to be kept in an efficient condition, and our ships ought to be in such a state as to enable us at all times to command the sea. Should our Navy be overpowered our commerce would go—in a short time we should be starved—for we depended to an enormous extent upon importation of food, which we paid for by an enormous commerce. Our imports last year exceeded £355,000,000 and exports £314,000,000, and if our trade were paralyzed, not we alone, but our Colonies would be ruined. Now, he held in his hand, a list of Her Majesty's Navy, and more particularly of the ironclads; and the question which he asked was whether those ironclads were in what was termed an efficient and sea-going condition? He must explain that this was not an official list. Every quarter a Return was made of our Navy—there was no secrecy about it, it was known to every stoker in the Navy. But when he applied to the Admiralty to be supplied with particulars of the condition of our iron-clads, he was told that it was contrary to etiquette to give such information, and that he could only have it by a Motion in Parliament for Papers. As he did not think that he ought to delay bringing the subject be-fore their Lordships, he had compiled a list himself, at much trouble, on the best information he could obtain. Now, as well as he could make out, the state of things as regarded our sea-going iron-clads was this—there were in all 33 iron-clads that ought to be, or were supposed to be, lit for sea service. But, of these iron-clads, when he came to look into them, he found 13 required new boilers; the boilers of 7 others required immediate repair, and their engines were altogether in such a shaky condition, that these vessels could not be termed fit for immediate service. So 213 much for 20 out of 33 sea-going ironclads. Of the 13 left, three were on foreign service—one on the China station, another in the Pacific, the other in the West Indies—so that you could not call upon these for immediate service at home. So that we had not more than 10 sea-going iron-clads available; and even as to these he could not say, in the absence of official information, how many had their boilers in first-rate condition, and were up to their nominal speed. It might be said that the Admiralty could not prevent boilers from wearing out and the framework of ships from rotting. That was quite true; but as they could always know the condition in which the ships were, they could always take precaution for replacing those that were wearing out. Again, if the boilers were allowed to get into bad condition, you could not long rely upon getting out of the ships the maximum speed they had when they left the contractors, and that was a very serious thing when you had to manœuvre a fleet, because you must always base your calculations upon the slowest vessel in the fleet; and if some of the vessels went at the speed of 14 knots, and others at only 10, the whole of the operations must be reduced to the latter speed. Then, again, 16 out of the 33 ironclads were only plated with 4½-inch plates. That was considered a good plate when the sides of our ships had only to resist the piercing power of the old 68-poundor. But at the present moment the 6½-ton gun was the smallest in use, and this would pierce a 4½-inch armour plate at close quarters. If that was the case with respect to the 6½-ton gun, what was to be said with respect to the 12, the 18, the 25, and the 35-ton guns? They would pierce it like paper. It was obvious that the use of armour plating of that description must be considered obsolete. Such vessels were not fit to go into line, and fight the modern iron-clads. Further, it must be remembered that part of those iron-clads were built of wood more than 10 years ago; and, in many cases, the wood work was more or less rotten. The whole question of ships and guns had totally changed, and we were now surrounded, as it were, with something like 229 armour-plated vessels belonging to foreign Powers, built or building. Russia, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, 214 in Northern Europe; Prance, Spain, Italy, Austria, Greece, Egypt, Turkey, in Southern Europe and the Mediterranean, possessed powerful ironclad fleets; and if we went to the other side of the water, not only the United States, but the Governments of South America—Brazil, Peru, and Chili—also, were in possession of this formidable class of vessels, of good construction and strength. He must, however, be permitted to remind their Lordships that his comments referred to sea-going ironclads only. He admitted that we had a number of efficient vessels for coast defence, and some that were fast cruisers; but these were not fitted to take a position in line of battle. He thought he had now said enough to convince their Lordships that our fleet was not so efficient as it ought to be, and he thought also that the late Government were not justified in spending at least £1,000,000 less upon it than they ought to have done. If it was not efficient, then the House and the country ought to be acquainted with the fact, and with the necessity of placing it in a proper condition; and he was certain that if the House of Commons were thoroughly convinced that the Navy was in an inefficient state, there would be no hesitation in voting any sum necessary to make it efficient. At the same time, he believed that it could not be done for anything like the sum which was included in the Estimates of the late Government; in fact, the Dockyard Establishments had been so reduced that it would take a long time to put thorn in proper condition. Here was an instance. The Achilles was taken into Devonport Dockyard in January last for the purpose of having new boilers, and it was estimated that she would not be able to go out until July. Now, he did not suppose that any vessel should be kept a day longer in the Dockyard than could be possibly helped, and if it took so long to repair one vessel, how long would it take to repair 13? He believed the First Lord of the Admiralty under the late Government was animated by a desire to do good, and to maintain the efficiency of the Navy; but he had no power, neither had he sufficient money at his command. Now, if he was correct in his statement, and there was any ground for supposing that our Navy was in the inefficient condition he represented 215 it to be, Her Majesty's Government, in his opinion, ought immediately to appoint a Committee to inquire into the subject.
§ THE EARL OF MALMESBURY (who rose after a pause)said, he had waited to hear his noble Friend, who had represented in their Lordships' House the late Board of Admiralty (the Earl of Camperdown) rise and reply to his noble and gallant Friend. As his noble Friend had not risen he presumed they must interpret his silence as an assent to his noble and gallant Friend's statements. He was not at all surprised that his noble and gallant Friend should have brought this subject under the notice of their Lordships, for there was no branch of the public service in which the public took more interest than they did in the Navy. Every one felt that our commerce would be paralyzed if we lost our naval prestige, and that if England ceased to be strong on the sea, she would no longer have the same influence in respect of foreign policy. Any Government, therefore, was bound to take the utmost care that our naval force was in a state of perfect efficiency. As to the questions raised by his noble and gallant Friend, he must ask him to bear in mind that the present Government had been so very short a time in office, and he was not prepared to go into details on the subject, and without complete accuracy, statements would be worse than useless. He could neither express agreement with, nor dissent from, the allegations of his. noble and gallant Friend; but he could promise him that, as soon as possible after Easter, his right hon. Friend now First Lord of the Admiralty would make to the House of Commons his report on the state of the Navy.
THE EARL OF CAMPERDOWNsaid, he did not rise before his noble Friend the Lord Privy Seal because he did not understand it to be the duty of those who sat on the Opposition benches to reply for Departments of the Government. Now that his noble Friend had given an answer, he would deal in as direct and straightforward a manner as possible with the statements of his noble and gallant Friend (the Earl of Lauderdale.) Although he could not assent to all the statements his noble and gallant Friend had made, he might say that he concurred in the advice he had given. 216 He thought that in speaking of the iron-clad sea-going ships his noble and gallant Friend had made no allowance for the ordinary repairs which must be required and must be made whatever Government was in power. Again in the 20 iron-clads which he said were not efficient, he included one which would be efficient in a very few months. It was perfectly impossible that at all times every ship should be in a state of thorough efficiency and not undergoing any repairs. The noble and gallant Earl had pointed out that a certain number of those iron-clads were armoured-with plates of only 4½-inch thickness. When the noble and gallant Earl suggested that those vessels should be put under repair, he had himself suggested a sufficient reason why they were not undergoing such repairs as would make them efficient sea-going iron-clads. The question was whether, as their plates were only 4½-inch, these vessels were not effete? Would it be worth while to spend from £70,000 to £100,000 on each of them to make thorn good sea-going iron-clads? That was a subject that was engaging the careful attention of the Board of Admiralty. When the noble and gallant Earl suggested that they were useless for war purposes he could not agree with him, because it might be that by the expenditure of a much smaller sum than the amounts he had just named they might be made very useful ships for coast defence. At present, the number of iron-clads requiring repair was in excess of what it ought to be in ordinary years, and that circumstance was to be accounted for in this way:—Most of them were constructed ten years ago, when the Admiralty ordered the construction of a number of iron-clads, and ten years was the period during which their boilers were, according to previous calculations, supposed to last. It was calculated that a boiler ought to last during two commissions, or for a period of from eight to ten years. He believed it was originally intended that those iron-clads should be tried on an experimental cruise and then placed in reserve; but, as it proved, they had been used more than had been originally proposed, and the consequence was that more of them were coming in for repair at. the same time than if they had been less at sea and for a greater length of time lying 217 up in reserve. Again, the boilers of some of the ships which had been constructed within a period of ten years had not lasted the average time. That was a circumstance for which there was no accounting. Last year his right hon. Friend the late First Lord of the Admiralty went into very careful calculations as to the number of men who would be required in the Dockyards for repairing purposes during the year 1873–4. He told the House of Commons that it would be necessary to renew the boilers of six ironclads—the Bellerophon, the Defence, the Resistance, the Minotaur, the Black Prince, and the Warrior. But when those ships were brought into dock it was found that, owing to the character of the boilers and the complication of the machinery, a greater number of men were required for the repairs than that set down in the estimate. For the Warrior the number estimated was 262, the actual number employed 345; for the Defence, number estimated 114, number actually employed 300; for the Resistance, number estimated 119, number actually employed 216; and for the Bellerophon, number estimated 108; number actually employed 174. In fact, it required about as many men for four of the ships as had been estimated for six. The under estimate arose from the fact that the boilers of those vessels were boilers such as there had not been previous experience of in the Dockyards—that was in the way of renewing. Another reason why more had not been done during the year 1873–4 in the way of repairing the sea-going iron-clads was, that there was a good deal of special work in the Dockyards. The London was fitted out for Zanzibar, and a large number of vessels were brought in for alterations previously to sending thorn out with the Ashantee Expedition. This interfered considerably with the regular work of the Dockyards; but Mr. Goschen did not think it desirable to go to Parliament with a supplementary Estimate for the repairs of iron-clads; the vessels the late Admiralty had proposed to repair during the present year were the Black Prince, the Minotaur, the Achilles, the Hector, and the Valiant, and had he remained in office he proposed to employ 700 additional men this year. He thought it but fair to the present Government to state that such had been 218 Mr. Goschen's intention. As regarded the various ships of the Navy, he did not think it would be wise to state for the information of foreigners what the character of each of them individually was in the opinion of the Board of Admiralty; but with regard to the Northumberland and She Agincourt, to which reference had been made, their average speed under full boiler power was 11 knots, and they were now in commission in the Channel Squadron; and he thought that as long as a ship had sufficient speed, she ought not to be laid up until all that could possibly be got out of her had been got. His noble and gallant Friend had confined his observations to the old ships, and seemed to take no account of the new iron-clads that had been added from, year to year to our Navy since the date when these older ships were built. Since 1869, we had launched 16 iron-clads, besides 2 frigates, 9 corvettes, 7 sloops, 7 gun-vessels, and 30 gun-boats of various classes. Then he said that our Navy was now weaker than it ought to be.
THE EARL OF LAUDERDALEexplained that he did not mean that our Navy was absolutely weaker, but that every other nation was providing itself with iron-clads, and that consequently our Navy was relatively weaker.
THE EARL OF CAMPERDOWNThen the noble and gallant Earl spoke of the 229 iron-clads possessed by all the other nations of the world, but he had not stated what was their condition as to efficiency. He had not stated that many of them were mere gun-boats, that others had never left the stocks, and that others were a source of constant danger to all on board. The French Navy was one of the most powerful in the world; but when speaking of the wood which was becoming rotten in some of our ships, his noble and gallant Friend seemed to forget that a number of the French ships were wooden armour-plated ships, and that the wood in these ships was quite as likely to rot as the wood in our ships. Then as to speed, he did not know whether his noble and gallant Friend referred to speed "over the measured mile," or trials, or whether he referred to the speed got out of a ship under ordinary circumstances. There were many of our ships which had done 14 knots over the measured mile. Very special attention had been made in our 219 Navy to the question of speed: a circular had been issued in which all captains were directed to have a special trial twice each year of not less than 12 or more than 24 hours. In these trials—which were quite another thing than the trial over the measured mile—the ships were tried with their own crews and with the coal used every day. He did not say that there were many of our vessels which did 14 knots under such circumstances; but if British vessels were not up to such a speed, he thought his noble and gallant Friend would find it difficult to point to the vessels of any Navy that were up to it. The noble and gallant Earl said our ships were slow. They were not slower than those of any other nation. The noble and gallant Earl said they were few. What other nation had half so many? He said their boilers were wearing out. What nation had steam vessels whose boilers did not wear out? It ought to be borne in mind that we were building more vessels of war than any other nation in the world. For the last few years we had built at the rate of about 20,000 tons annually, and no other nation—no other two nations—were doing as much. An opinion as to the Admiralty ought not to be taken from what newspaper correspondents wrote, or, perhaps, even from what Englishmen said on the subject. Let them consult the intelligent foreigner—particularly the naval officers of other nations—such officers as Admiral Popoff—and they would be told that the English Government was not so parsimonious, or the English Admiralty so blind, as they were sometimes led in Parliament to believe they wore. There was no want of constructive or designing ability at the Admiralty. The country was fortunate, being served by able naval officers and men of high scientific and constructive attainment, who had placed the Navy of England in the first place among the navies of the world. What was required was a steady and firm administration of the Navy, which would not yield to suggestions because they were made by newspapers, which would look at the Navy as it was, and would regard it as not having arrived at a state of perfection, but as being not so imperfect as it had been represented.
§ THE DUKE OF SOMERSETthought the first and most important point for consideration was the condition of the 220 Dockyards, how many men, taking artificers of all classes, were required, and whether they had got them. He was aware that his administration—when he had the honour of being at the Admiralty—was considered expensive, but he had in the Dockyards 18,000 men. In the beginning of 1870, the men wore reduced to 11,200; in 1871–2, the number rose to 12,850, and in 1872–3 it increased to 13,500. On this they might rely—that the whole question of the maintenance and repair of the ships depended upon the number of men they had in the Dockyards. With respect to the question of repairs, he was unwilling to find fault with any Government, because it was always a question whether a particular ship ought or ought not to be repaired. If they referred to the Estimates, they would find that in 1873–4 the Minotaur required repairs. The same fact was mentioned in the Estimates of the previous year, and also in the Estimates of the year 1871–2. In fact, the Minotaur had never been touched from one year to another. In the same way the Warrior and the Defence were mentioned in the Estimates of several successive years as requiring repairs. It would be most unfair now to come to the conclusion that therefore those ought to have been repaired—the question was whether they were worth repairing? Take, for instance, the Defence, a very inferior vessel, which was built when there was a sort of Parliamentary panic-as to the condition of our Navy as compared with the Navy of France; it might be that that vessel would not be worth the necessary cost of the repairs she required. Some of our vessels were built in order to create a Navy in a short time, but they were not the class of vessels they would wish to see built, or which would have boon built but for the circumstances to which he had referred. He did not, therefore, blame the Admiralty because certain vessels wore not repaired. What he did wish to point out was that there had been an insufficiency of strength in the Dockyards for the work which was required; for he was strongly of opinion that they ought, to go on steadily year by year adding vessels to the iron-clad fleet. He did not pretend to know thoroughly—or indeed at all—what the state of the fleet was as to the repairs or building, but it was his intention to move for a Return, giving 221 a nominal list of all iron-clads, and the date of their first completion for sea; a nominal list of the iron-clads which had received new boilers since their first commission, and the date of putting in such boilers, and a list of iron-clads for which new boilers were in store. The noble Karl (the Earl of Camperdown) said that boilers usually lasted eight or ten years; his belief was, that they seldom lasted more than five or six years. He would ask that the Return should include the number of tons of iron-clads built up to the present date, in two ships—namely, the Temeraire and Superb, and the progress made in the Inflexible. There need be no objection to these Returns on the ground that it would be giving information to foreigners. Foreigners knew perfectly well the state of our Navy, and we knew the state of theirs. When he formerly met the French Minister of Marine they compared their ships, and he knew the defects in our vessels as well as we knew the defects in the French vessels. He observed that the subject of the condition of the Navy was shortly to be discussed in "another place," and the Return which he would move for would be of advantage to Members of Parliament and give useful information to the public.
§ THE EARL OF MALMESBURYsaid, he would submit the Notice of the noble Duke to his right hon. Friend the First Lord of the Admiralty.
THE EARL OF LAUDERDALEsaid, it was a mistake to suppose that he recommended money to be expended on rotten and obsolete ships. He had endeavoured to point out the actual state of our sea-going iron-clads, but left the repair or disposal of them entirely in the hands of the present Government.