PAPERS PRESENTED (BY COMMAND). (Hansard, 20 March 1874)

§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY

My Lords, I have to lay on the Table Papers respecting the Bengal Famine, and I think it may be convenient to 93 take this opportunity of making some observations with reference to the nature of those Papers in order that your Lordships may understand the principles which have guided the Ministers in presenting them; and I wish also to make a few observations with reference to the policy which is being pursued by the India Office and the Viceroy. These observations need not be long, because the public have been practically kept well informed of all the proceedings which have been taken, and have been put in possession of all the information at our command. Of course, the Papers in possession of the Department with reference to the famine, including all the reports from the first, are exceedingly voluminous, and it would be taxing too highly the patience of Peers and Members if the whole of those Papers were laid on the Table. We thought, therefore, that it would be a more judicious plan if we made a simple abstract of those Papers which had been received at the India Office in the early days before the famine actually broke out, and to lay that abstract on the Table. It contains the substance of all the despatches sent from India up to the beginning of February, and those which have been sent from India since that time will be laid on the Table in their entirety. Now, my Lords, I think some of the criticisms which have been passed on the conduct of the Viceroy deserve some notice from me, though I should very much wish it had fallen into better hands than mine to deal with them. The Duke of Argyll fully intended to be present at the meeting of Parliament, and to make a statement in reference to the proceedings of the India Office in the early days of the famine; but unfortunately he has been prevented by illness from appearing in his place in Parliament. I think the main controversy carried on with respect to the Viceroy's policy is as to the expediency or the reverse of arresting the export of grain by an act of the Executive power. As to this policy, it may be impugned under two heads. You may look at it as a mere question of finance, and consider whether the course taken was the cheapest that could have been taken; or you may look at it in a more important light, as part of the machinery of dealing with the famine, and inquire whether the Viceroy's policy has imperilled 94 the supply which could otherwise have been brought to the homes of the starving population. Only in the latter light can the question be looked at as very serious. As a question of finsnce—as to whether it would be cheaper to buy grain before it went to Calcutta rather than procure it as imported at other ports—I do not think it necessary to trouble your Lordships, because the point is one on which different opinions may naturally be held, and it is one of which the pecuniary importance is not very great. But as to the far more important question whether the Viceroy, by not arresting the export of grain, has imperilled the supply for the distressed districts, I think there is one thing that has been forgotten. It is that the grain which has been exported has not been exported from the districts which are suffering. It is true that grain has been exported from Bengal; but there is a large surplus crop in some parts of Bengal, and the difficulty has been, not to procure grain, but to bring the supplies to the homes of the starving population. No grain to speak of has boon exported from Northern Tirhoot—our difficulty is to get the grain up there. What advantage, then, would it be to stop the export of grain from other parts of Bengal when the difficulty is to convey it from the stations of Eastern India to the Northern Districts where it is wanted? Therefore, I do not think this question has so important a bearing as is generally supposed on the difficulties with which the Government had to deal. For present purposes the supply of grain is abundant—the difficulty is one of carriage. Then, it must be remembered that while you would not have appreciably relieved your embarrassments by stopping the export of grain, you might have incurred considerable danger by such a policy; because the one terror which appears to have been before the Viceroy's eyes was lest he should paralyze the operations of private trade. If he had taken so violent a measure private traders would have been seized with a panic, and would have abandoned the idea of attempting of themselves to convey grain into these parts of the country, and the result would be that the real famine would be aggravated by an artificial one. At the beginning of the famine the Commissioner at Patna proposed to traders to take up grain to 95 the distressed districts. The reply was that they were not accustomed to it and did not understand it. They were accustomed only to export. I understand, however, that since then confidence in the prospects of such a trade has changed their feeling, and, as I have been informed, the private traders are carrying their stores to those districts, and that grain is by those means pouring into the distressed districts at a greater rate than that which is carried up by public agency, and amounts to nearly 2,000 tons a-day. So much for the more serious question. As to the question of economy, there is a great deal that may be said on both sides, and I will not discuss it; but there is another part of the Viceroy's conduct which has been questioned, and, as I think, inconsiderately. I mean his conduct with regard to the labour test. It has been supposed by some that this test is to be applied to persons unaccustomed to labour and to persons too exhausted to labour; and it has also been said that persons of education would be driven to undergo that degradation before obtaining relief. Now, I have hero the Minute of the Viceroy on that point. It is among the Papers which I will lay on the Table. It bears date February 13, and I find in it this passage— In connection with this subject, I am to observe that where distress, as is the case there, arises from a general deficiency of the food supply of a large area of country, which deficiency cannot be met by private traders, stringent labour tests are not applicable. The labour test was tried during the earlier portion of the Irish Famine; it failed, and ultimately gratuitous distribution of cooked food was substituted. It was under the latter system, coupled with the sale of grain at market rates by Government, where private traders could not supply it, that the Irish Famine was at last successfully dealt with. The circumstances in India are not entirely similar, but it appears to his Excellency that, where they differ, the difference would point to an extension of the system of gratuitous distribution of food, and especially to the establishment of a system of advancing supplies of food to cultivators. When distress extends to whole classes of the population, his Excellency relics upon the local knowledge of the persons intrusted with the distribution of relief to prevent abuses. My Lords, I think the extract I have read shows that the Viceroy has restricted the labour test within the narrowest limits, and only applies it where it can be legitimately applied. My 96 Lords, there is another point on which the Viceroy's policy has been questioned, and upon which it appeals to me there is more to be said. I refer to the question of dilatoriness in the preparations for the transport of food. I think there can be very little doubt—indeed, the Viceroy himself admits it—that these preparations have been in arrear, and that whatever misery there has been may be attributed in some degree to that arrear. I think, however, that we are accustomed to exaggerate the distress which has occurred. I have heard and read of estimates of many hundreds of lives having been sacrificed—and language even stronger than that has been used. I can only say that if there has been any such sacrifice we are not aware of it at the India Office. We believe the mortality has been confined to a very few cases. That there has been suffering and distress cannot be doubted, and I am afraid there is diseaso; but the mortality has been limited, and whatever suffering there has been has resulted from the arrears in the preparations. Now, how far was the Viceroy to blame? In the first place, we must remember that for a long time it was uncertain whether there would be a famine, and, if there were, where it would strike. It was known in October that there would be a scarcity; but until the rains had fallen in January there could have been no accurate opinion formed as to what would occur. It might be that the danger of famine would altogether pass away, or it might be that the famine would extend over a country inhabited by 30,000,000 of people. It has been limited in its severity to a country inhabited by 7,000,000 or 8,000,000 of people, and the number who will be on the hands of the Government when the famine is at its worst will amount to certainly 3,000,000. But the exact locality of the distress could not have been ascertained till the season had advanced, and therefore the providing the means of transport was delayed to a later period than at first sight might appear to have been desirable. But I admit, and the Viceroy admits, that the preparations were not as far advanced as they might have been. As showing that the subject had not escaped the notice of the Viceroy, I may read this passage from one of the Minutes— 97 These documents have been laid before the Government of India, and the Governor-General in Council cannot but express the disappointment which he feels at the local officers having for so long neglected fully to appreciate the requirements of those parts of the country, and thereby occasioned the postponement to the present time of arrangements for transport which should have been made many weeks ago. My Lords, it appears to be a law of nature that the official mind can never readily conceive that the machinery with which it has to deal can go wrong, and I am afraid that the officials of India are not exempt from that law. There was a terrible exemplification of it in Orissa, where we had, indeed, a dreadful mortality resulting from the inability of officials to see that the ordinary routine would not suffice to avert an extraordinary calamity. But I cannot think that in the present case the local officers, who are both the eyes and the hands of the Viceroy, will indulge in such sanguine anticipations as those which delayed and prevented the preparations in Orissa. I trust and believe that no very serious injury has arisen from the delay in this case; but, even had very much more serious injury resulted from it, I do not think you could have blamed the Viceroy, because he was unable to supplement from his own knowledge the information sent to him by those on whom he depended. That is what I have to say with reference to the past policy of the Viceroy; but I should not be doing justice to my own feelings if I did not say how much reason we have to be grateful for his exertions, and how much reason we have to admire the vigour, judgment, and self-denial with which he has applied himself to his tremendous responsibility. All of us on this side of the House always admired his ability; but we had no notion how his powers would expand under the pressure of responsibility until we saw the measures he had adopted and the conduct he had pursued in the terrible position in which he found himself placed by this famine. My Lords, we have every reason to repose confidence in him, and I have no doubt that at the end of the year he will have the satisfaction of feeling that millions of human beings owe their lives to his exertions. He has been ably seconded by Sir Richard Temple and by the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, one of the 98 most able officers who have ever served the Indian Government; but I am sorry to say that for some time he has felt his health unequal to the strain upon it, and he will have to come home in April. Sir William Muir has also suffered, and I cannot help contemplating with some anxiety the resolution of the Viceroy to remain in Calcutta during the whole summer when I remember the nature of the climate of that part of India and the dangers that may arise to one whose life is so precious to his country. My Lords, I have now something to say as to our future policy. A Bill will shortly be brought up to your Lordships' House in which powers will be asked to raise the money necessary for the extraordinary demand in India. The actual money which will be required, at the present estimate in England will not be more than £3,000,000; but we shall ask for powers to borrow a much larger sum, because we cannot tell what the state of things will be six months hence. If the rains should fail in July, August, and September, we may be called on for further exertion. We shall, therefore, ask, in accordance with the Viceroy's request, for powers to raise a loan of £10,000,000. A question has been raised as to whether that loan should be guaranteed by English securities alone. This is not quite the place in which to discuss that question. I do not know what the House of Commons will think of it, but I have felt considerable difficulty in recommending such a mode of raising the loan, having regard to the effect that an English guarantee for this loan may have on other Indian securities. If, however, the House of Commons, in a fit of generosity, should think fit to guarantee the loan, I will not make any objection, though I suspect India will be rather a loser than a gainer in the transaction. With respect to transport, the railway—which should have been begun long ago—the railway from Durbungah, which is within the affected districts, to the Barrh station of the Eastern Railway, has been commenced. The whole difficulty is that the districts afflicted with famine lie close up against the hills, and between the Ganges and the hills, and the misfortune is that the railway is on the wrong side of the Ganges. The case is different therefore from that of Ireland, because in Ireland 99 you could approach the distressed districts from all sides, and here you can only approach them from one side. There is much water in India; but, in these districts, except during the rainy season, little can be done on the water except by small boats. The consequence is that nearly the whole of the transport has to be conducted by means of carts; and, when it is remembered that from 1,500 to 2,000 tons a day have to be transported, the difficulty may readily be imagined; but, when the railway of which I have spoken has been constructed, the difficulty will be considerably diminished. In addition to the railway the Viceroy has ordered ten small steamers to be constructed by the month of June, which, with barges attached, will be able to go up the small rivers when the rains come on, when the cart transport will to some extent be paralyzed. I may mention an illustration of the difficulties of transport. Two days ago we received a telegram stating that unless we could send out a certain number of engine-drivers the whole work of relief would be imperilled. The line of railway is only a single one, and it has been calculated that if one of the engine-drivers employed on it died, that would mean a stoppage in the transport of the food of 40,000 people. Beyond those questions lies that of supply, which has excited a great deal of interest out-of-doors. I cannot approach that question confidently, because dealing with figures communicated by telegraph is one of the most unsatisfactory things that can be imagined. At one time I was under the impression that 420,000 tons of rice was all the Viceroy had collected for the distress. If that were so, I should say that his calculation was running too fine, and that he did not allow a sufficient margin for emergencies; but it may be said that the telegrams are exceedingly obscure, and that he has probably a much larger supply in his possession or at his command. I think I may assure your Lordships with confidence that an ample margin will be provided. We and the Viceroy thoroughly feel that we must not trust too fine calculations; that we must run no risk when the penalty of that risk may be the starvation of some hundreds of thousands. We have, indeed, no doubt that an ample provision will be made, but I must say that the communications are still incomplete, and until I receive a despatch by post, I 100 hesitate to speak with confidence as to what actually has been done. Perhaps I may have already detained your Lordships too long, and I will not dwell on the remedies which we may desire to carry into effect. Of course, the public will expect—justly expect—that as far as possible the recurrence of such a calamity—at least, of such intenseness—will be prevented. The India Office has long been alive to the importance of this question. The Government of India many years ago assented to a system of railways which, whatever may be said of them in other respects, will, at all events, afford easy and cheap communication throughout the country. Some years ago the Government of India also resolved that irrigation should be carried out on a comprehensive and systematic plan; and on these two classes of public works it was resolved to spend £4,500,000. My Lords, I cannot say that I consider the position of public works in India satisfactory. There have been too many disappointments as to the accuracy of estimates to permit of our regarding them as satisfactory. I think it is not impossible that later in the Session I may ask your Lordships to give your consent to some scheme for a more organized and systematic supervision of those works. In the meantime I beg to assure your Lordships that neither the Government in India, nor the Government at home are at all unaware of the extreme necessity of carrying out in all districts where they can sec any prospect of remunerative return those works of irrigation which are the very life of India. Those are the observations which I thought it necessary for me to make. I was anxious to vindicate the policy of the Government of India in some respects in which I thought it might be misunderstood. In conclusion, I may venture to assure your Lordships that nothing that activity in preparation or abundance of provisions can secure shall be neglected, so far as we, and so far as the Government of India are concerned, in order that this terrible famine, which may last till September, may be kept within bounds.

Abstract of Correspondence between the Government of India and the Secretary of State in Council relative to the Drought in Bengal presented (by command) and ordered to lie on the Table.