THE EARL OF CARNARVON, in calling attention to the Report of the Commission on the cession of the Fiji Islands to the British Crown, said:—My Lords, before I enter upon the subject, I wish in the first place to make a short explanation in reference to what might otherwise appear to be an intentional departure from an engagement. I was asked a few evenings ago to lay the Papers connected with this subject on the Table of your Lordships' House in sufficient time to enable noble Lords to read them before I made my statement. I promised to do so; but since then I have found that, owing to some mistake, which I am unable to explain or account for, they were not delivered to your Lordships till this morning. That being so, however inconvenient it might have been to defer my statement, I would not have proceeded with it without the consent of noble Lords who have taken an interest in these Islands. It is owing to their forbearance I now proceed to make a statement to your Lordships, which I will endeavour to render as brief as possible. Tour Lordships are aware of the geographical position and character of the Fiji Islands. Their history and present state may be shortly described. It is some 20 years since they were colonized by English settlers who had come from our adjacent colonies. Some of those colonists bought land, domesticated themselves in the Islands, set themselves 180 to improving the places where they now live, and engaged themselves in various occupations. But, as is sure to happen in all such cases, new interests arose, jealousies sprang up, and difficulties were experienced, and from time to time appeals have been made to this country-to take the Islands under its direct protection. The first formal proposal for a cession dates back, I think, to 1859. At that time Consul Pritchard, acting very much on his own authority, encouraged and endorsed a cession of those Islands. I think Lord John Russell was then Colonial Secretary, and he declined the offer. In the following year Colonel Smythe, a very distinguished officer, was sent out to inquire as to the advisability of annexing those Islands. He drew up a Report, which is now in print, and in which, on the whole, he gave his opinion against our accepting the cession. Two years after—in 1862—the offer was definitely declined. Time passed, and in 1870 a conference of Australian Colonies was held, a noble Lord who took a great interest in this subject presiding over that Conference. The opinions then expressed were very favourable to annexation. In 1871, a formal offer being then made, it was again declined by my noble Friend (the Earl of Kimberley) who was then at the Colonial Office. In 1872 the offer was once more renewed, and then my noble Friend, in consequence of the interest which was felt in the matter, sent out the two Commissioners, who proceeded to Fiji, and whose Report is now on the Table. I should here state, with reference to the state of things within the Islands themselves, that from about the year 1865 repeated attempts had been made in the Islands to establish some form of Government. In 1871 a constitution was established—and it was, I think, a constitution not at all fitted to the circumstances of the people. It was an imitation of the system of government in this country, and the machinery of a Constitution was applied. With that Government in operation a certain number of White settlers came to the head of affairs. No doubt, that form of government was established with the view of securing the pre-eminence of the White settlers over the Natives. But, as is often the case in such attempts, that wish was frustrated. Those at the head of affairs having armed a Native 181 force, oppressed the White settlers, and pursued a course of still greater oppression towards the Natives—oppression so great that it drove some of those people to commit suicide. There were disorder and confusion all around, and a war of the most bloody character seemed imminent. Such was the state of things when the Commissioners appointed by my noble Friend arrived there, and there can be no doubt that their presence at such a time was beneficial. Immediately before their arrival, there had been a change of Government, with a new Constitution; but this second Government succeeded no better than the first. After several meetings, at which fresh offers were made, the Commissioners brought matters to an issue, and ascertained that the unanimous feeling of the settlers was in favour of a cession of the Islands to this country. I do not mean to say that the Report of the Commissioners is, in my opinion, an altogether satisfactory one. I do not think the calculations of the Commissioners are so reliable that we can trust to them on all important points, and I do not think the mode in which the cession is proposed to be made is one to which your Lord-ships would be disposed to accede. But the Report is before us, and we must deal with it, and it is my duty to lay before your Lordships the view which Her Majesty's Government take and the decision at which they have arrived. The question is, what course ought we to take? In considering this, I wish to draw attention to no fewer than four several considerations. The first is, that of the different alternatives in the form of a Government; the second is, the probable objections to a cession, to which we are bound to look; the third is, the reasonable arguments which may be urged in its favour; and the fourth is, the conditions of acceptance if a cession is to be accepted. As to the alternatives, I see four. One of them was indicated in the Despatch of my noble Friend to the Commissioners—I refer to the establishment of Consular Courts—a plan which has been tried in Japan and China. Now, at best, such Courts only exercise a feeble and inadequate control. In the case of these Islands such a plan could be regarded as no more than a stop-gap at best, and ultimately it would be necessary to substitute another form of Government. That course, therefore, 182 did not seem feasible in this ease. The second alternative is one which seems to have found favour with my noble Friend opposite (the Earl of Kimberley), though there has been a somewhat doubtful experience of it in other instances. I allude to the annexation of those Islands to some of the neighbouring Australian Colonies, to be governed by the Colony to which it is annexed. When my noble Friend suggested that, no doubt he had before his eyes one or two precedents which had not been unsuccessful. The colony of South Australia does at this moment hold a dependency in a district of North Australia, at 1,000 miles distance by land—and the difficulties of government arising from such a distance by land are not less than would be the difficulties arising from a distance of 1,000 miles by sea. There is another instance—that of a new colony in South Africa, the government of which was to have been administered at the Cape. However, that scheme has never been carried out, and the new colony is still administered by the Colonial Office. There is an objection to this plan on another ground. As it seems to me those colonies in Australia are not yet arrived at a state of development which would fit them for undertaking such responsibilities. Their own burdens are very great, and though there is good will on their part and they possess a great share of political ability, they have not yet arrived at that state when they can take upon themselves the administration of the affairs of a young dependency. That is my view of the matter. The third alternative is to at once make the Islands a Crown Colony. I can only say that if these Islands be ceded to us and we are to accept them, no form of Government can be entertained for them but that of a Crown Colony. Looking at the past history and to the future of those Islands, I should say that a Crown Colony of a rather severe type is the form that should be adopted. There remains the fourth and last alternative—namely, leaving the Islands to themselves. My Lords, I think this last alternative is simply impossible under present circumstances. The difficulties have attained to such a height that civil war in those Islands has been prevented only by the presence of one of the ships of the Royal Navy. There are English settlers there in such numbers, English capital is so 183 largely embarked, and English interests are so much involved in the peace of the Islands, that it would not he safe to fold our arms and say we would not have anything to do with the Islands. But, my Lords, I must now state some of the difficulties. In an interesting description of those Islands written by a botanist and geologist who visited them, I find the author states that in no place ever visited by him had he found it harder to arrive at the truth than he had in the Fiji Islands. Having myself read a good deal about them, I agree with the author as to that difficulty. There are obvious practical difficulties to which I must allude. There are 200 Islands, and the Native population is 160,000. Of these, 140,000 are in a state of comparative civilization; but the same cannot be said of the remaining 20,000, who live in the mountains and are utterly barbarous. Experience teaches us that there are considerable difficulties of government when there is a small colony of settlers surrounded by a largo Native population; but I fairly own I do not think the problem so difficult in this ease as in others which I could name. The Natives are scattered over 200 Islands; they are divided in feeling by certain local jealousies; and with the exception of the 20,000 mountaineers, they are a milder and gentler class of Natives than those with whom we had to deal in New Zealand. The old barbarous customs are dying out. A few years ago, slavery existed and women were sold for five dollars each, widows were strangled on the death of their husbands, whole villages were massacred, and, worse than all, cannibalism was practised. That is all gone. Idolatrous temples have been demolished, and in the great square where the most horrid orgies were celebrated, a Christian church has been erected, and the population is rapidly passing into a milder and more advanced state of civilization. I am bound to point out that great difficulty lies in the question of land. The public land is much smaller in extent than would have been expected, and the private land is complicated by tribal relations and claims which no doubt are very perplexing, and many of the titles of the White settlers did not rest on indisputable foundations. If the cession of those Islands be accepted, one thing is clear—namely, that the Crown must 184 have a right of pre-emption in all lands. The land must follow the rule which has been adopted elsewhere, and all grants of it must issue from the Crown. All parties must be prepared to give up something, and we may reasonably call on them to do so, because from the moment English sovereignty is established the value of land will be not doubled, but quadrupled or quintupled. My Lords, there is another difficulty. The Commissioners report that the debt of these Islands is not less than £87,000. How that enormous sum has grown up I do not know. I do not know even the original price of the stock issued. All I do know is, that in the course of two years so reckless was the financial administration of the Government there, that £124,000 was spent, and a debt of £87,000 remains as a legacy. If there should be a cession, Her Majesty's Government must prepare themselves for a full inquiry into the financial question with full liberty of dealing with them in the way they consider right and just, and in accordance with the demands on the revenue of the Islands. The calculations of the Commissioners are not as satisfactory as I could have desired—in-deed, I think they are illusory—but I entertain very little doubt that by a prudent financial policy the revenue of the Islands may be made sufficient for their requirements. The first few years will be years of difficulty, but there is no reason to doubt that at a later period the resources of the Islands will be sufficient for all wants. It only re-mains for me to point out some of the principal reasons that would seem to indicate that it might be advisable to accept a cession. The geographical area of those Islands is not very large; some of them indeed are larger than the larger Ionian Islands or than Malta, but they may become as fair a possession as any one of our smaller possessions. The exquisite loveliness of the Fiji group and the beauty of the climate are well known. Members of this House have seen them, and travellers have described them. No frost ever comes there. The temperature is at all times comparatively mild. The internal resources of the Islands are considerable, for the soil is very productive. The cotton plant, the sugar cane, the palm, the banana, all grow there. Then, look at the position of these Islands. They are 185 in the track of all ships passing between the new World of America and the still newer World of Australia. They possess unquestionably fine harbours, and one of them would be a desirable intermediate station for the coaling of steamers running between America and Australia. In the next place—though I do not advance this as the sole argument on which this cession rests—we should not forget the labour trade which has grown up in the seas around these Islands, or the utter iniquity and barbarity with which the traffic is carried on. Bishop Patteson, as true a martyr as ever sealed his faith with his blood, offered up his life in an effort against that atrocious kidnapping-trade, and no Government, whether it sits on this side or the other, can view with anything but deep interest everything that offers a means of putting down that iniquity. Those Islands, though they do not cover the whole area of the kidnapping trade, rise, as it were, in the centre of it, and are a convenient post from which it may be watched and brought within those wholesome and legitimate limits within which it becomes a blessing instead of a curse. I am loath to use words which seem too strong for the occasion, and therefore I hardly like to say that England has a mission to extend her policy of colonization in this part of the world, but at all events it does seem to me that there is an indirect duty which lies upon us, as far as we can, to take under our protection a place into which English capital has overflowed, in which English settlers are resident, in which, it must be added, English lawlessness is going on, and in which the establishment of English institutions has been unsuccessfully attempted because they were of such a character as not to be suited to the circumstances of the case. I cannot, moreover, be blind to the fact that there is a strong wish on the part of almost all the adjoining Colonies that these Islands should be taken under English sovereignty. Not only is this so, but I have received from New Zealand and New South Wales cordial offers of co-operation in any efforts which may be made to carry out the policy of annexation; and I believe further that the last named colony would be ready to bear a fair share of the burdens which would be involved, if those burdens could be properly and legitimately placed upon it. I hope it may be possible, if 186 this cession is accepted, to take advantage in some degree of that co-operation; but while repeating that I do not think it would be possible to annex these Islands as a dependency to any existing colony, I must express my opinion that such an offer as the one I have just mentioned—an offer which is almost new in the history of the world—should be heartily recognized and cordially dealt with. We ought at least to express satisfaction that an English colony is willing to come forward and volunteer its help in bearing the common burdens of the Empire, and so to show that in this, as in other respects, our Colonies are bound to us by common ties, and that there is a real partnership in the great Empire of which we are all members. On this general review of the circumstances your Lordships will not be surprised to hear that it is the feeling of Her Majesty's Government that they cannot decline the duty of accepting these Islands. If we do not decline them, we accept them; and it then becomes important to know how this is to be done. The view of Her Majesty's Government is that there is but one single condition on which the cession can be accepted—the condition is that in all material and essential respects the cession shall be absolutely unconditional and that we shall have full freedom to administer the affairs of the Islands. It would ill consort with the dignity of the Crown that conditions should be annexed to any such cession. I must mention that in the Appendix to the Report of the Commissioners there is a communication from Mr. Thurston, the so-called Prime Minister of Fiji, in which he specifies no less than 19 conditions on which the cession was to be made. I will not go through these conditions in detail, but will simply say that they are wholly and entirely impracticable. Among the conditions are one to secure hereditary rights in matters of administration and government, another for the appointment of a certain number of Fijian Chiefs to the Council, and yet another stipulating that Her Majesty's Government should, assume without inquiry the existing liabilities of Fiji. Difficult as the task of governing these Islands must be in any case, the task would be made simply impossible if the conditions were to be accepted, and therefore Her Majesty's Government 187 are only prepared to accept an unconditional cession of the Islands. With that view—while fully appreciating the exertions of the Commissioners—Her Majesty's Government feel that we have now arrived at a new stage of these negotiations, and that we should hardly require these gentlemen to go back and revise their own work and conduct the negotiations to a final settlement. We therefore propose to instruct Sir Hercules Robinson, the Governor of New South Wales, to proceed at once to Fiji, to restate the whole case, explain the difficulties in the way of the cession on the terms proposed by Mr. Thurston, and place the matter fully, fairly, and candidly, before the Chiefs and the White population I do not think a better choice could be made. The tried ability, administrative experience, and great personal and local experience of Sir Hercules Robinson point him out as the fittest representative of the Crown in the peculiarly difficult and delicate circumstances in which he would be placed. It has, curiously enough, been my lot this year to propose to Parliament two colonial policies—one with regard to the Gold Coast and the other with regard to Fiji—both touching the question of territory abroad, on a considerable scale, and which, if they differ in many respects, yet agree in this—that each of them has to be dealt with not upon general considerations, but on the special merits of the individual case. Whether your Lordships agree or disagree with me in what I have said, I hope you will do me the justice to acknowledge that I have not concealed or coloured anything. I have endeavoured to lay the whole case pro and con, as fully as possible before the House. I do not deny that there will be difficulties in the way of carrying out the scheme I have laid before your Lordships, but at the same time a choice must be made in this as in many other things. I believe the difficulties when boldly faced, will not be found to be so very formidable, provided the cession comes to us untrammelled by unworkable conditions; and although I am quite aware of the magnitude of the task, I for one shall not be afraid to encounter it.
§ VISCOUNT CANTERBURYsaid, he must be permitted to express his thanks to the noble Earl for the courtesy he had shown him, and for the course which he had pursued Referring to the early 188 history of the Fiji Islands, these Islands had been resorted to by British settlers against the wishes and advice of British authority. They were repeatedly warned that if they did settle there, it would be at their own risk. Nevertheless, their sense of allegiance to the British Crown did not prevent them from disregarding these warnings, they settled in the Islands, and swore allegiance to the Native Kings. Now, however, that untoward circumstances had arisen they did not hesitate to invoke British protection as British subjects. The noble Earl said, that the Commissioners who went to Fiji to make inquiries as to what course ought to be pursued had arranged for a cession of the Islands. With whom the arrangement had been made, the noble Earl did not say; but he (Viscount Canterbury) had reason to believe that all the authorities of the Islands had not consented to the cession. He understood that the Marku—one of the most influential of the Fiji Chiefs—was not included amongst those who had consented. Probably he had induced other chiefs to consent without doing so himself. At first he (Viscount Canterbury) attached some importance to the offer; but he attached less to it now, because it appeared that the noble Earl was prepared to advise the Crown to accept an offer which had not been made, and was not prepared to accept an offer which had been made. He considered that Consular Courts would not be satisfactory. He quite agreed that the only form of government must be that of a Crown Colony, for a strong Executive was absolutely necessary to administer the affairs of such a Settlement. Though he had had some experience in the Colonies he would not envy the position of the Governor of the Fiji Islands; for if any one of the Natives disliked his government he would appeal to one or other of the Parliaments in Australia or New Zealand, and though what they might do would not affect the Governor, yet a communication would probably follow to the Secretary of State at home. As regarded the land, he understood that the offer of cession would not be accepted unless it included the whole of the land.
THE EARL OF CARNARVONexplained that a much smaller quantity of land was available in the Islands than was generally supposed, and that there 189 would be no condition one way or the other about it.
§ VISCOUNT CANTERBURYasked whether he was to understand that the question of the land formed one of the chief difficulties? for the Commissioners stated that there was not a single acre of land that was not owned. There were 4,500,000 of acres in Fiji, and when the Crown accepted the cession the first thing the Governor would have to do would be to consider who were the owners of this land. The fact was, this question of the land lay at the root of those complications which the Government would have to contend with at Fiji. He had noticed a striking inconsistency in the Report of the Commissioners, for in one part it was stated that the settlers were totally unable to take upon themselves the payment of the debt, while in another part it was stated that provided the British Government would take possession of the Islands the settlers would undertake not only to provide for the debt, but also to make provision for paying the costs of the Governor of the Islands. If this cession affected the honour and interest of the Empire then he would agree to it, but did not believe that it did. He had seen it stated that this cession ought not only to include New Hebrides, Solomon's Island, New Caledonia, and all westward of the Loyalty Islands, to a certain degree of longitude, but also New Guinea, which was an Island 1,600 miles long and 400 broad. He understood that applications had been made to the Government by two Australian Colonies in reference to that matter. It was not because he underrated the importance of the duties that attached to a great Power, nor because he was willing to abandon those duties out of consideration for pounds, shillings, and pence, nor because he weighed safety and profit against the honour and duty of this country, but because he thought that under existing circumstances the acceptance of the sovereignty of Fiji by this country was not a matter of duty and would confer upon the British Empire advantages in no degree equivalent for the difficulties that the acceptance of the sovereignty would involve, that he felt bound to protest against this proposal for annexing these Islands.
THE EARL OF BELMOREsaid, that for a long time he had not been in favour 190 of the cession of the Fiji Islands; but having watched this question with considerable interest, and. having had four years' experience in that part of the world, and after since reading the Report of the Commissioners, he had at length arrived at the opinion that the only course open to Great Britain was to annex the Islands. In dealing with the four courses which the noble Earl the Secretary for the Colonies had said were open to us in the matter, no doubt, the establishment of Consular Courts in the Islands would be a cheap way of doing what was required; but that course would not answer in this case. Again, the annexation of the Islands to one of the Australian Colonies would not answer, seeing that the latter had quite enough to do to develope their own resources, without being troubled with the government of a dependency 2,000 miles away. The noble Earl (the Earl of Carnarvon) had quoted two cases as precedents. As to the first—that in Africa—he had no knowledge of it; but, as regarded the case of what was called the northern territory of South Australia, he hardly thought it was a precedent. He had always understood that territory to be an integral part of South Australia, and it was so marked on the maps. It was also subject to the jurisdiction of its Courts. [The Earl of KIMBERLEY: Hear, hear!] The White population was not large enough for the experiment of responsible government. The third proposal—that the Islands should be governed as a Crown Colony, through a Governor, who should be responsible to the Colonial Office alone—was the best that could be adopted, leaving to a future time, when the number of the White population had sufficiently increased, the consideration of place—that the Islands should be permitted to govern themselves, under an English Protectorate. He thought the question of expense should not be allowed to prevent the best man being selected as Governor who could be induced to accept the office. It was evident that a great deal of mischief might be done by placing a per-son without sufficient experience, tact, or judgment in a position of responsibility in these Islands. The fourth plan suggested was to leave those Islands alone, on the ground that those who had gone there had gone at their own risk, and in spite of warnings which they had received; but though perhaps, strictly 191 speaking, they might have no claim to protection, yet it was our duty not to ignore the existence of a British community such as that which was now to be found in Fiji; and it was none the less our duty because those Islands had boon made the centre of many outrages connected with the labour trade, and of other outrages oppposed to all settled government—not to speak of the common feelings of humanity. It was, no doubt, true that the White settlers in Fiji, finding that Great Britain would not accept the sovereignty of the Islands, did apply to the United States; and in this, though they—the British settlers—would probably prefer to be governed by their own county, if possible, they were actuated by a desire to obtain a strong government. It should, however, be remembered that the offer was not made to the United States until after the English Government had refused to assume the responsibility, when it was offered to them by their own country-men. The question of land was, no doubt, one of considerable difficulty. The noble Viscount (Viscount Canterbury) seemed to suppose that Her Majesty's Government proposed to take possession of the land; but he (the Earl of Belmore) only understood his noble Friend to say that Government must insist on a right of pre-emption. [The Earl of DERBY: Hear, hear!] The debt would also be a difficulty, for that money had, in reality, been raised at 80 or 90 per cent. and, to some extent, upon what looked very like false pretences. A regular government and a strong government were, no doubt, required in Fiji, for the purpose of dealing firmly, among other things, with the evils of the labour trade; and, in the arrangement lately concluded, the Islanders had been fully instructed upon what terms the cession had been accepted. No doubt, when England took over the Islands, and Fiji became our chief naval station in the Pacific, law would naturally be established and order maintained. The noble Viscount had alluded to New Guinea, and considered that if we accepted Fiji, we should have to follow unauthorized settlers to New Guinea. Shortly before he (the Earl of Belmore) left Sydney, an application was made to his Government by the organizers of an expedition to that country, for assistance in the way of 192 arms from the Government stores. The application was, of course, refused. That expedition failed; but he thought it very probable that the day would come when Her Majesty's Government would be called on to deal with a settlement in New Guinea, and when it did come, it must be considered on its own merits.
§ THE DUKE OF MANCHESTERcongratulated his noble Friend the Secretary of State upon the decision to which he had been enabled to come in regard to the annexation of the Fiji Islands. That policy had become our bounden duty. It was a clear necessity that, when Englishmen had formed settlements in these barbarous spots, English law should follow them. He did not doubt that, in annexing these Islands, we should impart to the Natives our own civilization and prosperity.
THE EARL OF KIMBERLEYsaid, he could not accept the principle that it was our duty to follow British settlers wherever they went, and to annex those countries. He would rather say that every case ought to be considered on its own merits, and according to the circumstances surrounding it. It would be intolerable if it should become a recognized principle, that British settlers landing on unoccupied ground in any part of the globe could pledge this country to the extension of an Empire which was certainly not too small at the present moment. At the same time, he agreed that there might be cases in which it was necessary to add to the territory of the Crown. The decision of the Government in a case like the present involved a great deal of responsibility; and, for his own part, as he had seen the Papers only that morning, he had not been able to come to a definite conclusion. There were, however, one or two considerations lying on the surface to which he might refer. It had been stated that when he was Colonial Secretary he made a suggestion to the Government of New South Wales that they should undertake the government of the Fiji Islands. That was scarcely correct. What took place was this. The Australian Colonies had pressed the Government to annex those Islands, and as Fiji contained a large number of colonists from Australia, he intimated that the Government would, in the event of a cession being accepted, consider any application from New South Wales for 193 taking over the administration. The Government, however, declined the proposal of New South Wales, and the suggestion came to nothing. The union, however, of British Columbia to Canada was one, the working of which could not be less difficult than some similar arrangement between the Fiji Islands and New South "Wales. Nearly all the settlers in the Fiji Islands had gone from the Australian Colonies, and the connection between the two was in many respects very intimate. The important question was how to deal with an offer of cession which had now been repeated, and whether Her Majesty ought to be advised to accept it. Her Majesty's Government had come to a wise conclusion in not accepting the cession on the terms proposed in the document laid before their Lordships; but the Government would not escape from any of the real difficulties by merely insisting that the cession must be unconditional. The land question was the real difficulty. It was impossible that we should undertake the government of those Islands without some distinct understanding and condition as to that all-important question. The people of those Islands must likewise have a clear knowledge as to their future rights and condition. Whenever European settlers went to a country in which there was anything like a settled mode of life, difficulties always arose as to the cession of land, and those difficulties frequently led to war. That had been the case in New Zealand and elsewhere; and Her Majesty's Government must feel that if they accepted the cession of the Fiji Islands, the rights as to the land must be most carefully ascertained and guarded. In Paragraph 41 the Commissioners pointed out this danger, and said that to interfere with the possession of land might entail the prosecution of a most unjust war. This showed the importance of handling the question of the land with prudence. A little further on, the Commissioners pointed out that the title to land in the Islands was not fully vested in the King or the Chiefs: it was clear that a portion of the land was held in common, that the right to its possession was of an undefined character; and even although the cession might be unconditional, yet Her Majesty's Government would see the necessity of reserving to itself the 194 right of imposing, or agreeing to, or devising, some conditions. If they meant that the land of the whole of the Islands should be handed over unconditionally, it would almost certainly follow that contentions would arise between the Whites and the Natives as to the rights to the land, and such a commencement of the new settlement would be anything but auspicious. He believed that there could be no doubt that the White settlers had acquired large tracts of land with very defective titles; so that we should find ourselves immediately involved in questions with the Natives as to their rights to land, and with the settlers as to the lands they already held. If once the Fiji Islands were made a Crown colony, the settlers who now claimed these tracts of land would find that they had got a valuable property, and they would be by no means ready to part with it. With regard to the general question of government, in the event of annexation, it might be indispensable that the Fiji Islands should be governed on the principle of a Crown colony. He wished, however, to point out that to create a pure and simple Crown colony, in the words of the noble Earl, of a "severe type," would be to do that which in modern times had never been proposed. The tendency of late years had been in the contrary direction. No doubt in Jamaica it had been necessary to recall rights already given; but they all knew that in Jamaica there was not an increasing White population. They would have to deal with an active—he would not say a turbulent—but, certainly, with an adventurous population, gathered from all the neighbouring countries. Many of these settlers came from colonies which had been long under a democratic form of government. They would be re-inforced by further arrivals from Victoria and New South Wales; complaints by the White settlers would be sure to be mooted at Melbourne and Victoria, and by these means constant embarrassment would be created in the government of the Island. These circumstances would render it extremely difficult to administer the Government as a Crown colony. Crown colony meant a colony of which all the governing officials were appointed by the Crown, and in which the people had no voice in the management of their own affairs It 195 would be what was known as a "Downing Street Government," set up in a country the settlers in which had not always been easy to satisfy even with their own democratic form of government. The Government would have to discharge the most difficult and important of all tasks—to maintain equal and impartial government between a large body of Natives and a small but constantly increasing body of White settlers, and when the Government, as they would be very likely to do, leaned to measures in favour of the Natives, those measures would be sure to be extremely distasteful to the Whites. A responsible Government would also, no doubt, be open to serious objections in the first stage of the colony. But there was a middle way—a kind of intermediate Government, such as there was at Natal. If his noble Friend, however, looked at Natal, he would see how extremely difficult it was to govern a colony like this upon that principle; and though they might, after a time, give a sort of representative institutions, the experience which they had had upon the subject was by no means encouraging. It might be said that it was easy to raise difficulties; but this was the time for raising difficulties, and some of those difficulties certainly were present to his own mind when he drew up the Instructions to the Commissioners; and those Instructions showed that the Government did not undervalue the difficulties in their way. If this cession were accepted he hoped there would be conditions, which should be drawn up in the most careful and explicit manner. He hoped the Government would see that the conditions, providing for what they considered right, were plain and simple; for this was a matter in which, when steps were once taken in which the honour of the Crown and the character of the country were engaged, there could be no step backwards. He was, therefore, glad the Government had taken the prudent course of employing that very distinguished officer, Sir Hercules Robinson to make the necessary inquiries as to the state of feeling in the Islands. And he hoped they would leave him so far unfettered by his instructions that if he could not report that the arrangement might be well carried into effect, the Government would not feel themselves obliged to accept the cession.
THE EARL OF CARNARVONsaid, it was very advantageous that a difficult question like this should be subjected to fair and impartial criticism; and certainly there was no one more fitted, from his personal character and political experience, to do this than his noble Friend the late Foreign Secretary. For his own part, he must say that the institution of a Crown Colony was the only way of dealing with the difficulties that existed. Upon the whole, however, he was inclined to believe that those difficulties were less than supposed. He admitted that it would be a very hard and difficult task to hold the balance equally between the small body of White settlers and a large body of Natives, but for that very reason he thought a Crown Colony was the only form of Government under which justice could he done, and the interests of both parties consulted. As regarded the cession itself, he could only repeat that the position was this—that the Government were prepared to accept it if it were untrammelled by conditions which they considered objectionable. At the present moment, however, he might say that there was no cession at all. The inhabitants of Fiji would have full notice, with full opportunity of reconsidering their position, and putting the offer in such a form that the Government might accept it; but until Sir Hercules Robinson had discharged his mission, certainly he was not in a position to say that the cession had been accepted.
§ EARL GRANVILLEthought it very important that the Government should not be in any hurry in this matter, which was one the country had not yet had time to consider. Their Lordships had not yet had the opportunity of considering the Report which had just been placed in their hands—they had, indeed, as yet only heard what was to be said in favour of annexation. It was a very great responsibility to be under, and whether the step were right or wrong, it certainly would have been better that some public discussion should have taken place before the Government formed any final determination on the matter. He did not even now quite understand the state of matters. Was Sir Hercules Robinson empowered to carry out finally and formally an unconditional cession? Because if that was the case, surely more time ought to 197 have been given for consideration, especially as their Lordships had only had the Papers in their hands a few hours. It was impossible to have listened to this hasty conversation, and to have heard what had been advanced pro and con without feeling that there was much to weigh and consider. He repeated he thought this a matter for mature and very grave consideration. He feared they were taking something like "a leap in the dark" at a very long distance indeed; and the Government should not act hastily, but give more time for consideration.