HL Deb 03 July 1874 vol 220 cc986-95
THE EARL OF DENBIGH

, in rising to inquire whether Her Majesty's Government have decided on sending a Commissioner to the Conference at Brussels, and to present Petitions on the subject, said, he desired to elicit information on the subject, so that their Lordships might clearly understand what was proposed to be done. Very shortly after the Franco-German War he received, in common with many others who had devoted their attention to the care of the wounded during its continuance, a written communication from a German nobleman, whom it was not necessary to name, requesting support to a scheme having reference to the conduct of hostilities by nations engaged in war, and in especial with reference to the treatment of the wounded and prisoners of war. This scheme it was proposed to carry out by means of an International Society, to be called the "Universal Alliance," and to be worked by means of diplomatic action. This had a very philanthropic sound, and at first sight seemed very desirable. He accordingly gave a general, though qualified, approval. For months he heard nothing more; until he received one or two letters from an English gentleman, who said that, seeing his name, with that of many others, figuring as supporting the action of this German nobleman, he thought it his duty to warn him to be on his guard. The writer gave his reasons for the warning; and he (the Earl of Denbigh) accordingly wrote to desire that his name might not appear any more in connection with the plan. Soon after he received a communication from another correspondent—this time a French nobleman. He wrote to paris to make inquiries as to this person's character and antecedents, but failed to obtain any information that could be considered satisfactory, and he took no notice of the communication. He next heard of a deputation of the Universal Alliance being received by the Emperor of Russia at Buckingham Palace, and His Majesty's adoption of the project. But their Lordships ought to know the difference between the original programme of the Universal Alliance and the sheet which he now held in his hand. Originally this Society had been instituted for ameliorating the treatment of prisoners of war, under diplomatic action; but it had now developed itself into a large scheme for the "promotion of international works of humanity," and was contained in 147 Articles—a broad sheet of which he held in his hands—which, it was added— Will be submitted to a Conference of delegates from the various Governments. These will constitute a Convention analogous to that of Geneva in favour of the wounded in war, and will eventually add another page to the Code of International War. A Vienna journal gave the programme of the forthcoming Congress at Brussels, and a résumé of the principal Articles which Prince Gortchakoff was said to have proposed for the consideration of the future Congress. By the 3rd Article the very point of maritime seizure would be seen to be barred without the subject being even mentioned— 3.—Establishment of the principle that, in case of war, the armed force of one State only fights against the armed force of the other, but does not consider as an enemy the peaceable citizen who is not equipped as a soldier. This applied generally would debar our naval force from capturing merchantmen. Article 4 was as follows:— Establishment of the principle of public law that in territories occupied by the enemy the army of occupation alone is to be considered as possessing legal authority. By this it would appear that if a foreign force landed in Kent, that county would cease to belong to the Queen, and would belong to the invader. Hitherto the safeguard of a country had been thought to be the breast and arm of every citizen. However powerful the attacking force, it was at least in an enemy's country; the object now was to deprive the country attacked of that advantage. When once a pitched battle was lost the attacking force was to cease to be in an enemy's country, and all resistance to it would be considered a crime. All hostilities not commanded by Government were to be treated as piracies or brigandage; therefore, if any part of a country should be separated from the seat of Government it could no longer resist. Then the question might arise—Who were the Government? The whole country would follow the fate of the seat of Government—for the enemy might refuse to acknowledge a Provisional Government. By these laws, Osborne must be allowed to be an inviolate marine residence for Her Majesty; otherwise, if an enemy's fleet obtained possession of Her Majesty's sacred person we should have no right to continue the contest. All this was to be worked out on the pretext of insuring the good treatment of prisoners of war. But had we any such doubt of our own humanity that we needed a Congress to compel us to treat prisoners of war humanely? He would also ask, who was to enforce these regulations? Were the neutral States to have an armed force and commissioners for this purpose? In order fully to appreciate the importance of the whole question, and the reasons which would naturally impel Russia to use every endeavour to impede the maritime action of England, he would bog their Lordships to consider briefly the respective geographical position and configuration of England and Russia. England might be likened to one of those marine monsters of which we had heard, which had a small head but enormous limbs, and long and powerful tentacula. Through her maritime power she was able to scour every sea and seize her enemy's goods and annihilate their commerce at the ends of the earth. Let this power once be taken from her, let her be shorn of her tentacula, she then would become an inert and helpless mass, incapable of aggression, and an easy prey to any superior military power. Russia, on the other hand, was like a huge giant with a slender throat, which could be compressed by three fingers. Her commerce consisted, for the most part, of raw and bulky materials, which necessitated sea transit—timber, hides, tallow, and minerals. Her mercantile navy had but three outlets—the Black Sea, the Baltic, and the White Sea. A small squadron sent to the Dardanelles and the Sound, would command the two first, and the British cruisers thus securing every outlet, Russia would in a short time die, as it were, of asphyxia, and be at the complete mercy of England. Two of the most able men in their several spheres—Sir John McNeill and the late Mr. Richard Cobden—had said of Russia, the first that— The Right of Search and Seizure, which constitutes the Maritime Power of England, is a providential weapon placed in the hand of England for the coercion of Russia. The second that— It is clear that Nature itself has doomed Russia to a condition of abject and prostrate subjection to the will of the Maritime Powers. So sensible was Russia of her dependent position as regarded England, that she had most consistently used every opportunity of enforcing as an international rule that the goods of an enemy not contraband of war should be inviolate in neutral ships. For this, the league called the Armed Neutrality was formed in 1796, and firmly and successfully resisted by England. At the commencement of the Crimean War, England and France were inveigled into conceding it, and after that war in 1856 we were foolish enough to agree to the Declaration of Paris, which professed to establish that fatal principle. What had been the result to France? In the late Franco-German War, the German fleet shut itself up in the harbour of Kiel, surrounded by torpedoes, and the French fleet, estopped from touching her enemy's commerce at sea, was useless. This rumoured Congress was, doubtless, proposed to give an additional sanction to these principles, and it had created great alarm in some parts of the country, and public meetings had been held at Newcastle, Sunderland, Birmingham, Keighley, and other places, when Petitions to both Houses of Parliament were agreed to, praying that an Address might be presented to Her Majesty against sending a representative to the Conference, which he would now present to their Lordships. He had also an important Petition which he wished to read to them in extenso. It was from a gentleman well known to the leading statesmen and diplomatists of his day, and admired for his genius by all who had the pleasure of his acquaintance. He was as remarkable for his untiring industry in unravelling the tortuous mazes of diplomatic action as he was for his wonderful forecasts of their result: while he, as a second Cassandra, stood warning from time to time his countrymen of the dangers which were coming upon them. The Petition was as follows:— To the Honourable the Commons of Great Britain and Ireland in Parliament assembled. The Petition of the Undersigned sheweth,— That your Petitioner, at the moment of the despatch of British troops to the Ottoman Empire, under colour of a pretended Declaration of War against the Emperor of Russia, did address to the Honourable House of Commons a Petition representing that such forces were not required to support the Sultan, and that their presence on the field of War and the use that would then be made of them would only have for effect to aid that ambition of the Czar against which it was proposed to protect the Sultan and the world. That the events of the twenty years which have elapsed have confirmed the allegations of the said Petition. That, further, your Petitioner had represented that it was in the design of this most needless but fatal War to bring upon the British Empire by means of it, the gravest injury and peril by the surrender of its strength, so that it should be deprived of the use of its natural arm for its own just defence. That this anticipation was in like manner confirmed by the so-termed 'Declaration respecting Maritime Law,' secretly signed at Paris for the suppression of the use of Privateers and of the capture of the produce and property of belligerents embarked on the vessels of neutrals. That from April, 1856, to the present day, no reason has been assigned by any public man for this surrender, and that no such man, either in your Honourable House or elsewhere, has spoken thereon without condemning it, and designating it as a ruinous, fatal, or suicidal measure. That, nevertheless, no measure has been taken and no act proposed for its reversal. That through its operation Great Britain has, during these eighteen years, been shown to be powerless as a great State, and is acknowledged to be incapable of exercising either power or influence over foreign events arising out of the ambition of the Governments whose power is exclusively territorial and military. That France, who joined in the same Declaration, although a Military as well as a Maritime Power, has, in consequence thereof, been struck down by a Government inferior to herself in the aggregate, being absolutely destitute of naval means. That Maritime Power consists entirely in the capture and confiscation of the goods of the enemy. That this power as applied to Russia, becomes, in consequence of the nature of her products and the configuration of her territory, an absolute supremacy, against which she cannot struggle and to which she must submit. That by causing the sentiment to prevail throughout Europe, and to be acted upon, that it is not proper to capture the goods of an enemy if these goods be afloat and not on land, the control actually possessed by the Maritime Powers over the Military Powers will be changed into a control of the Military Powers over the Maritime Powers. That these truths have been severally perceived and announced by the two men of most authority in their several branches, the late Envoy to Persia, Sir John McNeill, and Mr. Richard Cobden, the first declaring that it is the Right of Search and Seizure which constitutes the Maritime Power of England, which power he designated as a providential weapon placed in the hand of England for the coercion of Russia.' The second said—'It is clear that Nature itself has doomed Russia to a condition of abject and prostrate subjection to the will of the Maritime Powers.' That this position has not been apprehended, by the reason that the Maritime Powers (with the sole exception formerly of the surrender of the Right of Search) have had no other will than that of Russia, seeing that the Ministers of the Crown of Russia are abler ministers than those of the other Crowns of Europe. That in 1780 the Government of St. Petersburg first put forward the maxims contained in the Declaration of Paris, with the avowed purpose of destroying, through their general acceptance, the power of England. That the advantage for which an able Government has toiled for a hundred years, must be for itself very great, as also the difficulties that it has had to encounter. So proportionately great must be the injury which it expects will be thereby inflicted on the other Governments, to circumvent whom its care has been given. At that period it succeeded in obtaining the adhesion of all the Powers to a measure without advantage to them, but nevertheless ultimately failed, through the opposition of the British Government, acting under a duo sense of its duties and its rights. That this same Government of St. Petersburg, in 1856, abstained from appearing to suggest or enforce their adoption, but really did obtain them through indirect means. That in 1870 France might have resumed the exercise of her Maritime means; in view of such a contingency the English Minister for Foreign Affairs addressed a despatch to Paris, calling on the French Government not to depart from the rules laid down in the Declaration of Paris 1856. A similar despatch was addressed to Berlin which was without meaning, Prussia not having any maritime power to exert. That France, if again attacked and now enlightened as to the effects of such surrender, might resume those rights. That England might do the same. That to bar such contingency it must be and is the design of the Government of St. Petersburg to obtain such sanction for the Declaration of Paris, as shall prevent, in future contingencies, the Naval Powers from putting forth their naval strength. That having failed, during eighteen years, to obtain such sanction through the Crowns or Parliaments of either of these countries, other means will be employed for the attainment of this end. That this end can be attained through what is called 'Public Opinion.' That 'Public Opinion' is to be made to believe that it is desirable, for the common good of humanity, that the property of belligerents shall enjoy immunity when coming within reach of maritime belligerents, in other words, 'sparing private property at sea.' That this design has been brought so far towards maturity that a mixed Congress of anomalous nature has been summoned at Brussels, under the personal influence of the Emperor of Russia, to determine the new laws that shall regulate the action of belligerents. That Representatives, not only of the different Sovereigns, but also of the various departments of the separate Governments, are to constitute this new extra National Legislative Assembly. That your Honourable House, together with the other House of Parliament, and the Queen, can alone alter the laws of England. That all three cannot alter the Law of Nations in its fundamental parts, such as that of forbidding a nation to use its natural means of defence. That the measures proposed are contrary to, and subversive of, the laws of England, as well as of those of Nations and of Nature. That the object in view is to deprive England of the power of resisting any and every unjust demand, and to repeat with impunity a further partition of France, and the infliction on her of a further ransom. Tour Petitioner therefore prays your Honourable House in your wisdom to perform the service of advice due on your allegiance to the Queen, by presenting a humble address warning Her Majesty of the danger of affording, by the presence of Her Representatives, any colour to such an anomalous assemblage, but instead thereof to declare null and void the Declaration of Paris of 1856. And your Petitioner will ever pray, DAVID URQUHART. Carstairs House, Lanark. He (the Earl of Denbigh) would now invite his noble Friend, who would perhaps toll him that naval questions were not to be imported into the discussions, to give some such answer as the following to the invitation to join the Congress:—"We have already become aware of our error in consenting to the conditions laid down in the Declaration of Paris. So far, therefore, from consenting to take any fresh obligations of a similar nature upon ourselves, we here declare that we withdraw from those conditions. We desire to remain at peace, but should we ever again be engaged in war, we intend to employ our full powers as a Maritime Power to which we are entitled by a natural right, and England shall be herself again." He begged to ask his noble Friend the Question of which he had given Notice—whether Her Majesty's Government have decided on sending a Commissioner to the Conference at Brussels? The noble Earl presented Petitions from Keighley and other places praying that no representative might be sent from this country to the Congress at Brussels; and also for the abrogation of the Declaration of Paris.

THE EARL OF DERBY

My Lords, I am not sorry that my noble Friend has taken this opportunity of putting to me the Question of which he put a Notice on the Paper, because the subject of his inquiry is one which has attracted, and very properly attracted, a considerable share of public attention; and I cannot doubt, from various communications which I have received, and what has appeared in the public journals, that some uneasiness and some apprehension is felt in regard to it. Now, I do not think that feeling of uneasiness is, under the circumstances at all unnatural or unfounded, and I am glad that my noble Friend gives me the opportunity of doing something to dispel it. I do not think I need follow my noble Friend through his inquiry as to the origin of the Conference which is now proposed. I am not aware that I ever heard of the body calling itself the "Universal Alliance," and I suspect very few have done so. Nor do I understand how any of the Governments who are to send representatives to the Conference about to be held at Brussels can be considered responsible for the Articles to which my noble Friend has referred. All I know about the matter is that one gentleman whose name appears in the paper which my noble Friend has placed in my hands, wrote some months ago to the Foreign Office, suggesting some plan for universal agreement among European Governments as to the treatment of prisoners of war, &c.; but I did not take any particular notice of that communication, because it came with no authority. But the Conference to which we are now invited has been set on foot, as everybody knows, by the Emperor of Russia, and though in many quarters great doubts are entertained as to the possibility of its accomplishing its purpose and leading to any practical results, still all the Governments of the great European Powers, and, I believe, all the Governments of Europe, great or small, have accepted the invitation to send representatives to it. We thought it better, on the part of Her Majesty's Government, to wait to the last before giving our reply to the invitation we received. We have not given any particular encouragement to the proposal, nor have we assumed an attitude of confident expectation or belief that any great result would come from the Conference; but, considering that the object put forward is the mitigation of the suffering caused by war, and considering that all the great military Powers, without exception, have acquiesced in this Conference being held, it seemed to us that absolutely and unconditionally to stand aloof from the discussion which is about to be held would be a proceeding liable to misinterpretation, both upon grounds of humanity and upon grounds of international courtesy. We have therefore decided, not, on the one hand, to refuse that invitation, but, on the other hand, not to accept it unconditionally. We propose to accept it only under certain important reservations and conditions, and these reservations and conditions will be fully stated in the reply which I am now sending. In the first place, we shall state that we are firmly determined not to enter into any discussion of the rules of International Law by which the relations of belligerents are guided, or to undertake any new obligations or engagements of any kind in regard to general principles. We further propose to protest against any extension of the scope of the Congress which should include matters relative to maritime operations or tonaval warfare; and we have announced that unless we receive distinct and positive assurance that no such extension is contemplated, we shall decline to send a representative to the Conference. Lastly, if a representative should be sent, he will not be invested with plenipotentiary authority; he will not be empowered to consent, on the part of Her Majesty's Government, to any concession, or to the adoption of any new rule; he will be simply present to assist in the discussions which may be held, and report the proceedings to us. But Her Majesty's Government will reserve to itself entire freedom of action in regard to any proposals which may emanate from the Conference. I think that, under these conditions, even my noble Friend will consider that he has sufficient security against our being hurried into precipitate conclusions or into concessions of which we might not see the consequences. I hope to be able to lay the Papers on the Table in the course of the next three or four days. I should have done so already, but that it would hardly be courteous to the other parties concerned that they should see my Answer in the form of a Parliamentary Paper before it had reached them in any other shape.

House adjourned at half-past Seven o'clock, till Monday next, eleven o'clock.