Lords Sitting of 4 August 1874

MINUTES.
PUBLIC BILLS—First Reading—Supreme Court of Judicature Act (1873) Suspension* (231); Commissioners of Works and Public Buildings * (232); Irish Reproductive Loan * (233).
Second Reading—Turnpike Acts Continuance* (212); Royal Irish Constabulary and Dublin Metropolitan Police* (221); Private Lunatic Asylums (Ireland) * (216); Post Office Saving's Bank* (219); Great Seal Offices* (217); Fines Act (Ireland) Amendment* (218); Expiring Laws Continuance* (220).
Committee—Report—Registration of Births and Deaths * (208); Endowed Schools Acts Amendment * (214); Consolidated Fund (Appropriation) *; Valuation (Ireland) Act Amendment * (206); Lough Corrib Navigation* (207).
Report—Sanitary Laws Amendment* (225).
Third Reading—Prince Leopold's Annuity* (213), and passed.

ENDOWED SCHOOLS ACTS AMENDMENT BILL.—(No. 214.)
(The lord President.)
ENDOWED SCHOOLS ACTS AMENDMENT BILL.—(No. 214.)

  COMMITTEE AND REPORT.
  House in Committee (according to Order).
  Bill reported, without Amendment.
  On the Motion of the Lord PRESIDENT, Amendment made, postponing the date at which the Act should come into operation.
  Clause 1, page 1, line 6, before ("all powers") insert ("On and after the thirty-first day of December one thousand eight hundred and seventy-four"); and consequential Amendments made in subsequent clauses.
  After Clause 7, insert the following clauses:—
  Clause (A).
  "Notwithstanding the seventeenth section of the Endowed Schools Act, 1873, any scheme which has before the passing of this Act been submitted by the Endowed Schools Commissioners to the Committee of Council on Education for approval may be proceeded with.
  "Provided, that with respect to every such scheme which has not been approved by the Committee of Council on Education before the
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  passing of this Act, such Committee shall before approving the same cause such scheme, after the passing of this Act, and that notwithstanding any prior publication and notice, to be published and circulated in such manner as they think sufficient for giving information to all persons interested, together with a notice stating that during one month after the publication of such notice the Committee of Council on Education will receive any objections or suggestions made to them in writing respecting such scheme."
  Clause (B) (Definitions).
  "In this Act, so far as is consistent with the context, the expressions following have the meanings hereafter assigned to them; that is to say,
  The expression 'The Endowed Schools Acts' moans the Endowed Schools Acts, 1809 and 1873:
  The expression 'The Endowed Schools Commissioners' means the Commissioners appointed in pursuance of the Endowed Schools Act, 1869:
  The expression 'The Charity Commissioners' means the Charity Commissioners for England and Wales."
  Clause 8, page 3, line 19, after the first ("this Act") insert—
  (" and in the construction of the Endowed Schools Acts the expression 'the Commissioners' shall, unless there is something in the context inconsistent therewith, on and after the said thirty-first day of December one thousand eight hundred and seventy-four, mean the Charity Commissioners ").
  Leave out the Schedule and insert the following Schedule:—
  "Acts partly repealed on and after the thirty-first day of December one thousand eight hundred and seventy-four:—The first paragraph of section fifty two, and the whole of sections thirty-one, forty-eight, and fifty-nine, of The Endowed Schools Act, 1869; section seventeen of the Endowed Schools Act, 1873."
  Ordered, That the said Bill be read the third time To-morrow.

PUBLIC WORSHIP REGULATION BILL.

  COMMONS AMENDMENTS CONSIDERED.
  Commons Amendments considered (according to Order.)
  THE ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURYsaid, that those Amendments might be classed under three heads. Those which came under the first head were merely formal, and no doubt they would be accepted by their Lordships. Those which came under the second were certain Amendments which he thought had been made in the Bill by the Commons with the view of conciliating the persons who were most opposed to the Bill as it went down from their Lordships' House to the other House of Parliament; and, speaking in his own name and also for

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  his right rev. Brethren, he believed there would be no difficulty in assenting to those Amendments. There was, however, under the third head, another class of Amendments made in the Bill in the course of its passage through the other House of Parliament with regard to which it would be necessary to proceed more carefully. He alluded more especially to that Amendment which not having deprived the Bishop of his discretion as to allowing a case to proceed, had sanctioned an appeal from the Bishop to the Archbishop, and with regard to which he believed there would be some difference of opinion among their Lord-ships. With regard to that matter, it might be convenient before they entered into the consideration of the Amendments in detail, that he should mention to their Lordships—though his opinion might not be shared by others—that this appeal from the Bishop to the Arch-bishop was by no means, even in matters of discretion, a novelty in the Church of England. It appeared to him that such an appeal was by no means inconsistent with the maxim whereby in all cases of faculties, which were matters of discretion, there was an appeal from the Bishop's Court to the Archbishop's Court under the old law of the Church. Again, without going back to the old law of the Church he would take the liberty of reading a list of instances in which recent legislation had vested in the Archbishop the power of reviewing an act of discretion on the part of his Suffragans. The first case was that of a Bishop requiring an incumbent of two parishes to reside in the larger of the two. There the matter was one of discretion, and the discretion exercised by the Bishop was subject to an appeal to the Archbishop of the Province. The next case was that of a refusal by the Bishop to grant a licence for non-residence. If an incumbent applied for such a licence with the view of having some one to act for him in his absence, or with regard to any of the other cases mentioned in the Act, the Bishop exercised his discretion as to whether such a licence ought to be granted, but there was an appeal against the refusal of the Bishop, and the Archbishop could overrule it. Another case was that of the withdrawal of a licence for non-residence. Such a licence might be withdrawn at the discretion of the Bishop;
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  but the Archbishop was vested by the constitution of the Church as embodied in the legislation of Parliament, with the power of cancelling the order of the Bishop for the withdrawal of the licence. A further case was that of sequestration of a benefice by the Bishop for non-residence of the incumbent. In order to enable him to enforce residence, the law invested the Bishop with this power of sequestration; but there, again, the Legislature vested in the Archbishop the power of stepping in, and at his discretion overruling the order of the Bishop. Again, there was the case when the incumbent had absented himself for the second time after admonition, and the Bishop ordered a sequestration. There, too, the law entitled the Archbishop to step in and prevent the order for sequestration from taking effect. Again, when the duty of the clergyman was alleged to be inadequately performed, the law enabled the Diocesan to issue a direction for the appointment of a curate; but that discretion on the part of the Bishop was liable to be overruled by the discretion of the Archbishop. Again, in a case where, the parish being large, the Bishop, in the exercise of his discretion, directed that a second curate should be employed, the Archbishop might overrule that exercise of discretion on the part of the Diocesan. Again, there was a reference to the Archbishop in cases where, owing to particular circumstances, the Bishop decided that there should be two curates. Again, should the Bishop revoke the licence of a curate and the curate should complain that his licence had been withdrawn, even though it had been withdrawn in the simple exercise of the Bishop's discretion and not for any fault, the Archbishop was bound to review the decision, if called upon to do so, and he was entitled to overrule the discretion of the Bishop. So that it would appear there were 10 cases in which, for the benefit of the clergy, the Bishop might be over-ruled by the Archbishop, and by the appeal in those 10 cases, the clergy were protected against any injury to their rights or interests arising from the decision of the Bishop. He believed, therefore, it might be argued with considerable force that if, for the protection of the clergy, under the existing law, there were no fewer than 10 cases in which the discretion of the Bishop might be

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  overruled by the Archbishop, there was no violation of the constitution of the Church in the proposal, that in one case, for the protection of the rights of the laity, the discretion of the Bishop might be so overruled. The laity had a right to the lawful performance of the Church service in the parish church. If the parishioners complained that the service according to law was not performed in that church, it was only just that the Bishop should have a discretion as to whether a suit should be commenced; and, for his own part, he considered that the Diocesan was fully qualified to exercise that discretion, and therefore he wished that it should be left to the Bishop; but if it appeared to their Lordships better that there should be an appeal from that discretion to the discretion of the Archbishop, he did not think there would be any invasion of the constitution of the Church in giving in one case for the benefit of the laity, what had already been given in 10 cases for the benefit of the clergy. He, however, repeated for himself, and he believed he might say the same for his most rev. Brother (the Archbishop of York), that the Archbishops had no wish for this Amendment giving them the power of overruling the discretion of the right rev. Bench. He and his most rev. Brother believed the better course would be to vest in the Bishops a discretion which he felt sure they would use for the benefit of the Church, and with a deep conviction of the importance of their decisions in every case. His only object in now addressing the House was to show their Lordships that they might deal with this matter in either the one way or the other, without the fear that they would be trampling upon the constitution of the Church. It was possible that in the discussion of the Amendments, another mode of dealing with the point might be brought before their Lordships, and it might be suggested that, whereas there might be something derogatory to the Episcopal Bench in having their discretion overruled, it might be more agreeable to them—though he did not know whether it would be—that the Archbishop and the Bishop should consult together as to the exercise of the discretion in the first instance. He desired to point out that the law of the Church was open to
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  such a solution of the difficulty, and that there were various cases in which the concurrence of the Archbishop and the Bishop in the exercise of a discretion was provided for by law. It was necessary in licences for non-residence in cases other than those enumerated in the Act. In the renewal of a licence for leave on the ground of the dangerous illness of a near relative, the concurrence of the Archbishop was necessary. Again, in the case of the infliction of penalties for non-residence, the Bishop made his ruling in concurrence with the Archbishop. Again, in the cases of separating or uniting of benefices the concurrence of the Archbishop was required. From all those instances it appeared to him that the law was open either to an appeal to the Archbishop or to such a limitation of discretion as might be obtained by requiring the concurrence of the Archbishop and the Bishop in the first instance. With regard to other Amendments of the Commons which were more doubtful, he would not enter into them now further than to say that he thought that in some of them certain verbal Amendments might be made which would remove objections, while fulfilling the intentions of the authors of those Amendments. He was sure, however, he was expressing the opinion of all those who were interested in the Bill, when he said that they had every reason to be deeply obliged to those hon. Gentlemen who had devoted so much time and attention to the difficult and intricate matters which came before them in the discussion of the measure. Although the Bill was introduced in their Lordships' House so long back as early in April, and four months had passed since then, scarcely a day had been lost in the discussion on the various stages. Great divergence of opinion had been manifested during the progress of the Bill through both Houses; but he felt confident that by that divergence of opinion, the Bill had been so improved that it was now a satisfactory measure. He knew that with reference to a Bill of the kind there must be great differences of opinion, and that it would be some time before it would be understood by the country, but he was convinced that if their Lordships so far assented to the Amendments of the Commons, as to enable the Bill to be

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  come law, all feeling against it would soon disappear. And if, when the Bill became law, it was administered in a calm and temperate spirit, but with a strong hand, it would conduce greatly to the peace of the country, and would in no way diminish the influence of the Episcopate, but rather increase it. He was of opinion that the great majority of the cases would he decided by the Bishop, sitting in his Court of Reference, and that where in contentious proceedings the jurisdiction of another Court would he invoked, it would be exercised more rapidly and inexpensively than had hitherto been in the higher Ecclesiastical Courts. A great cause of the disorders and of that spirit of lawlessness which it could not be denied had arisen in the Church was the unsettled state of the law. Men did not know what the law was, and not knowing what the law was, it was not unnatural that they should be unwilling to abide by it. He hoped and believed that under this Bill the law would be understood, and that being understood, it would be in the vast majority of instances loyally obeyed.
  Then some of the Commons Amendments agreed to; some agreed to with Amendments.
  Moved, to agree to the Amendment made in page 5, line 17, after ("provided,") insert—
  ("Or in case of cathedral or collegiate churches, any three inhabitants of the diocese who have signed and transmitted to the Bishop under their hands the declaration contained in Schedule A under this Act, and who have, and for one year next before taking any proceeding under this Act, have had their usual place of abode in the diocese within which the cathedral or collegiate church is situated.")
  THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURYsaid, he felt bound to enter his protest against the policy of the Amendment. It put the cathedrals in a worse position than even any of the churches of the country-would be under the Bill, and for this reason—while the parish church would be subjected to the operations of the Bill on the complaint of three parishioners; a cathedral would be subjected to them on the complaint of any three inhabitants of the diocese; so that all security against proceedings under the Bill was taken away from the deans and canons. That was all the more invidious and offensive, because of the fact that
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  the moment the deans and canons were passed and a higher order was reached, the policy of the Bill was exactly the reverse of what it was in their case. The deans and canons were exposed to more of the fury of this Bill than the parish clergy, while the Bishops were excepted from it altogether. It was difficult to believe that there was not some moaning in that. The cathedrals belonged to a class of sacred buildings which by their Lordshipis' House had been deliberately excepted from the provisions of the Bill, and, he believed, most wisely. Not only had they been excepted, but college chapels and private chapels had also been excepted. They were safety valves for the zeal of those who were influenced by particular feelings; but the House of Commons had stopped up every hole by which that zeal could escape. He deeply regretted that policy. This was an attempt to bring about a rigid and absolute uniformity under penalties which amounted to compulsory secession from the Church. If the school against which those penalties were levelled had no real foundation, and which the slightest touch of the fire of persecution would wither in a moment, there would not be much difficulty in carrying out the provisions of this Bill, and that school would be stamped out; but if that school had any foundation, and if those manifestations against which the Bill was directed were not a pretence and a show, he feared that the task would be more difficult, and that by its uncompromising legislation Parliament was entering on a contest which often in the history of nations had been waged between the civil power and religious bodies, and from which the civil power had seldom come out the victor, and had never come out without injury. The spirit embodied in this Bill would require further sacrifices, and he believed we were at the beginning and not at the end of legislation which those who were now most anxious for it would live to regret.
  Question put, and agreed to.
  Moved to agree to the following paragraph inserted by the Commons in Clause 9—
  "Provided also, that if such bishop shall be of opinion that proceedings should not be taken on any representation, it shall be lawful for the person making such representation to cause

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  notice to be served on such bishop (which notice may be served by depositing the samo in the registry of the diocese), and also on the person complained of, that it is his intention to appeal against the decision of such bishop to the archbishop of the province within which such diocese is situate, and thereupon such bishop shall cause a copy of the representation, the declaration, and the statement aforesaid, deposited in such registry, to be sent to such archbishop, and such archbishop shall within one month return such documents to such bishop with his decision thereon in writing confirming' or annulling the decision of such bishop, which several documents shall be deposited in the registry of such diocese; and if the decision of such archbishop so require, such bishop shall within twenty-one days after receiving such decision proceed as is hereinbefore directed in the case of bis deciding that proceedings shall be taken on the representation."—(The Lord Archbishop of Canterbury.)
  THE ARCHBISHOP OF YORKsaid, that great complaint was made by some persons of the power which this proposal would give to Metropolitans; but let their Lordships ask themselves, whether Diocesans ever had more power than they would enjoy under this Bill? When the Bill left their Lordships' House there was no appeal to the Archbishop; but the matter had been twice considered in the House of Commons, and by a very large majority on one occasion, and a somewhat smaller one on another, that House determined that there should be an appeal. One great security in the Amendment was, that the Bishop must publicly state his reasons for refusing to allow the case to go on, in which case an appeal would be made to the Archbishop, who would either decline to reverse the decision, or reversing it, would allow the case to go on. It might be said that that was a course of proceeding that placed both Bishop and Archbishop in an invidious position, for the simple reason that as the Bishop would know more about the case than the Archbishop the appeal would be a nullity, and that the Archbishop in most cases would agree with the Bishop; but under the 1st and 2nd Vict. c. 106, there were a great many cases in which the Archbishop and the Bishop must concur in acting. The case of admitting a colonially-ordained clergyman to hold a cure in England was one which had not been mentioned, and there was the case of the sale of glebe, which was another. In both these there was a concurrence of action by the Archbishop and the Bishop. Their Lordships would therefore be acting quite within precedent in the law
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  of the English Church if they agreed that, in respect of cases under the Bill, the Archbishop and the Bishop should have a concurrent authority. He thought they might very well ask the House of Commons to accede to that. He saw that a clause had been prepared by the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack by which it was proposed that 10 days before the Bishop published his award, he should send his reasons to the Archbishop if he thought that the case should not proceed; and the reasons were to be returned by the Archbishop within a period of 10 days, with a statement as to whether he agreed with them or not. If he did agree with them, the hands of the Bishop would be strengthened, and he would send forth his award on the joint responsibility of himself and the Archbishop. On the other hand, if the Archbishop and the Bishop did not find themselves in agreement, the papers in that case would not become matters of public record, and the case would go on as if the Bishop had never wished to stop it. He did not say that he would have suggested such a mode of meeting the difficulty; but as, except in respect of the clause, there was complete accord between the two Houses, he was willing to adopt any reasonable means of finding a way out of the dilemma. He thought it was hopeless to think of getting the Commons to give up their Amendment. On the first decision in the other House there were three to one in favour of the Amendment; and on the second, in spite of the Government, in spite of the protest of the Leader of the Opposition, and in spite of its having been stated that the most rev. Primate and himself were opposed to the Amendment, it was agreed to by a considerable majority. He could not, therefore, help asking their Lordships to agree to the proposal which the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack was about to make as a means of getting over the difficulty.
  THE BISHOP OF WINCHESTERsaid, it was as certain, historically, that the Church from the time of the Apostles was governed by Bishops, as it was that Rome was governed by the twelve Caesars. But he would put the question not on the basis of ancient history, but on a principle more modern and easily appreciated. Unless episcopacy was be

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  lieved to be a Divine institution, its maintenance was wholly unjustifiable. If he did not believe that episcopacy was a Divine institution, he would give up his episcopate and trample his robe on the ground; because unless there was Divine authority for the episcopate, it would be a most schismatical act for the Church of England to maintain it, when large religious bodies had given it up, and now looked upon it as being unlawful. Unless the Church of England believed episcopacy to be a Divine ordinance, she was acting now schismatically, when, by throwing it off, she might bridge over the gulf which was between her and many other religious bodies. But then the very fundamental principle of episcopacy was that the Bishop was ruler and judge in his diocese. It was ruled from the very first by those great General Councils which the Church of England had always fully accepted, that no Bishop should on any pretence go into another Bishop's diocese. There rose up in the course of time—but not till the end of the third century—an order or sub-order of Bishops called Metropolitans, not by any Divine ordinance, but from ecclesiastical convenience and expediency. At first the Metropolitans were merely Presidents of Episcopal Councils, to gather those Councils together and to hold consultation with their brother Bishops. After a time, appeals were carried from Bishops to Metropolitans. And he admitted the value of such appeals, for though episcopacy was a Divine institution, Bishops were, like other men, liable to err, and it was much to be desired that their judgments should not be absolute, but referred to a higher tribunal; but the difference between Bishops quâ Bishops, and Metropolitans quâ Metropolitans, was that Bishops were Bishops by Divine ordinance—whereas Metropolitans existed simply by human ordinance. He need not go back to first principles or early history for this. This was admitted to be true by the English law. In the famous case of "Lucy v. Watson, Bishop of St. David's," Chief Justice Holt laid down the principle that Bishops and Archbishops were equal jure divino, but that Archbishops were superior to Bishops jure humano. He would venture to add that the Church itself was not a human, but a Divine institution. In letters addressed
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  to the public papers we had heard it called the Church of Parliament. He did not deny that in a certain sense it was the Church of Parliament, as Parliament was the representative of the English laity, but in a higher and truer sense it was the Church of God; and though he admitted a right in Parliament to deal with it, and with the episcopate, which was a constitutional part of the Church, whilst yet he claimed for the clergy, too, a voice in legislation for the Church; still he urged that an institution so sacred should be dealt with with the utmost tenderness—not dealt with as children played with those india-rubber dolls which were sold in toy shops, twisting them into one shape and then into another, with every momentary caprice. As regarded the trial of Bishops alluded to by the noble Marquess, he would observe that the Archbishop already possessed most unusual powers. In the case to which he had before alluded—"Lucy v. Bishop Watson"—Chief Justice Holt had declared that the Archbishop of Canterbury possessed powers equal to those of the Patriarch of Constantinople—that was, powers greater than any Prelate in Christendom, except only the Pope. And in the case of Watson, the Archbishop, in his own Court, deposed and excommunicated the Bishop; and though Bishop Watson appealed from Court to Court, his appeal was disallowed, and he died deposed and excommunicated, buried even without the funeral service. So the Archbishop already possessed powers greater than any other mere Archbishop in Christendom; and it was easier to try a Bishop in England than in any other Church in Christendom. He did not grudge the power which the most rev. Prelates now possessed; but if this clause were passed, an entirely new kind of authority would be vested in them. For the first time, the Archbishop would be enabled to interfere in the affairs of a diocese with reference to matters which had not been the subject of decisions on the part of the Bishop. If the Bishop deemed a charge against an incumbent to be a frivolous charge, as to which no action ought to be taken, it would be open to the Archbishop under this clause to oblige him, against his better judgment, and notwithstanding his knowledge of the circumstances of the neighbourhood, to send the case

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  to the Court for trial. Thus, for the first time, a power of initiative in the diocese would be given to the Archbishop. In the opinion of many persons, the Bishops were already damaging episcopacy by giving up their own Courts. They had, no doubt, made a great concession in this matter, with the view of removing obstacles in the way of the present Bill; and that being so, it would be hard to oblige them to prosecute charges against their judgment. The most rev. Prelate had quoted 10 precedents in favour of overriding the discretion of the Bishop; but they did not apply to the present case, inasmuch as they referred to matters in which a distinct judicial decision had been come to by the Bishop. One related to the withdrawal of a curate's licence; but in this case the Bishop must have made full enquiry and come to a formal decision, and from that formal decision there was a natural and legitimate appeal. Another related to a refusal to an incumbent to be non-resident, in which case again the Bishop must have concluded on apparent reasons to forbid non-residence. His act in such case was virtually judicial. Another referred to the case in which a Bishop found that a parish was neglected, and ordered that the incumbent should keep a curate. In this case the Bishop had to proceed by formal process, issuing a commission and then deciding on their report; and so his decision was a strictly legal decision, and an appeal from it naturally lay to the Metropolitan. The clause in question, if carried, would not give an appeal after judgment, but would give the Archbishop power of control in the initiative, which was a power contrary to all the constitutional principles of the Church. He did not question the power of Parliament to interfere with the principles of the Church in all that was not essential to its character as a Church. But the action of the Bishop in his own diocese was a fundamental principle, and what abolished that would abolish that which made the Church to be what it was. He would rather see the discretion of the Bishop withdrawn altogether than his constitutional discretion overridden by a superior authority. The Bishops had done all they could to smooth the passage of the Bill through Parliament and through the country, although they could not but feel that by carrying it,
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  they were parting with much of their ancient authority and jurisdiction. It would be hard on them, and on the Church of which they formed an integral portion, if by one of the many turns which this Bill had taken in Parliament, they should lose not only their Diocesan Courts, but also that which was their inalienable right, their right to regulate judicial proceedings within their own dioceses, and that, by a clause introduced at the very end of a Session.
  THE BISHOP OF LINCOLN: My Lords, I venture to express a hope that your Lordships will not agree to this Amendment which has been brought to us from the other House. In so doing, I trust that I may not be suspected of a desire to claim for Bishops any power which does not rightly belong to them, or to detract from Metropolitans any authority to which they are justly entitled. So far from wishing to exalt unduly the privileges of the episcopate, I confess that I should not have been sorry if the operation of the Bill had not been limited to priests and deacons, but had been extended also to Bishops. A good deal of irritation and disquietude has, I believe, been produced by the opinion that in this Bill, Bishops are resorting to Parliament for powers to enforce laws upon the clergy which they do not obey themselves. It has been said that Bishops wish to impose the Purchas Judgment, which forbids the clergy to wear certain vestments, while Bishops themselves do not obey the Purchas Judgment, which enjoins them to wear a certain vestment in their cathedrals at certain times. It has been alleged—I report what I hear—that Bishops desire to constrain the clergy to obey ambiguous rubrics, while they themselves violate clear rubrics—for example, in the administration of confirmation, in which they are required to lay their hand severally on each candidate, while they say certain words which give an assurance of Divine grace to each candidate, singly and individually. This rubric contains an important doctrine, and it is sometimes violated, not from the fault of Bishops. I impute no blame to them, because the population and extent of their diocese are so great that compliance with it is almost impossible. But the remedy for this is not in the violation of the rubric—I heartily wish that we were obliged to obey it—but in the subdivision of our

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  overgrown dioceses, and in the increase of the episcopate. And that leads me to observe that the true remedy for irregularities in Ritual is in the improvement of our diocesan and parochial organizations. We cannot govern the clergy by repressive and coercive legislation, but we may conciliate them by kindness and love. Not all the Public Worship Regulation Bills that ever can be framed and passed, will have any salutary effect unless we bring the episcopate nearer to the hearts of the clergy and people by a sub-division of some of our dioceses, and unless we make the clergy of a diocese feel that they have in their Bishop a counsellor and friend, and an affectionate father in God. I earnestly hope that the noble Lord opposite, whose name is so honourably identified with the question of the increase of the Home Episcopate, will apply his energies and abilities to the promotion of that great work. My Lords, we are informed that next Session we shall have a Clergy Discipline Amendment Bill, for the correction of false doctrine and viciousness of life in ecclesiastics. Is this also to be limited to the clergy? Are Bishops to be exempt from it? Great mischief has been done to the Church by Ritual excesses and extravagancies, but I doubt whether that mischief is comparable with the injury that has been inflicted upon it by the writings of a single English Bishop, who has shaken the faith of hundreds and thousands at home and abroad in the inspiration, genuineness, and authenticity of the Old Testament. And are such offences to escape with impunity? My Lords, I have ventured to refer to these matters, lost I should be charged with exaggerating the authority of Bishops, and with seeking unduly to claim immunities and prerogatives for them. I have no such ambition; I only desire to vindicate that just authority in their dioceses which the laws of the Church and of the Realm have given them, and which they are bound to maintain. And now let me advert to Metropolitans. I trust that I shall ever be ready to pay that deference to Archbishops which they have a right to claim from their Suffragans. But look, my Lords, at the present Amendment. The Bishop of a diocese is there rightly required to state in writing his reasons if he desires, in the exercise of his discretion, to stay legal
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  proceedings against a clergyman of his diocese. But the Archbishop is to be empowered to overrule this exercise of discretion on the part of the Bishop without assigning any reason whatever for setting that discretion aside. The Archbishop's rescript to the Bishop may simply be—
  Sic volo, sic jubeo; stet pro ratione voluntas.
  Consider, my Lords, the effect of that. It is not only a humiliating degradation of the office and person of the Bishop in the eyes of his diocese and of the Church, without any cause assigned, but it will be most disastrous to the Church at large. The action of a Bishop staying proceedings may, perhaps, occasionally be a denial of justice in a single diocese; but the Archiepiscopal abolition of episcopal discretion and of episcopal authority will be the infliction of injury on the whole Church of England. Suppose, my Lords, that this Amendment had been law in the first half of the 17th century. Then the Primacy was occupied by Archbishop Abbot. If episcopacy had then been put into commission, and had been absorbed into the will of the Archbishop, as this Amendment proposes, the Church of England would have been Puritanized. And who was Abbot's successor in the See of Canterbury? Archbishop Laud. I do not share in the common prejudices against that great man; he had doubtless his infirmities and failings, but he was a noble-hearted Prelate, and wrote one of the best books in our language against Popery; but if this Amendment had then been law, then the popular cry would have been that the Church would be Romanized by it. And who held the Archiepiscopal See of York in the latter days of Laud? Archbishop William's, Laud's most bitter opponent in Church and State. Such things may occur again if this Amendment becomes law. England may see a Pope at Canterbury and an Anti-Pope at York. My Lords, appeals have been made in the course of the debates on this Bill to the principles of the English Reformation, and to the authority of the Act of Uniformity. I regard the English Reformation as one of the greatest blessings that was ever vouchsafed to this Church and Realm; and I loyally recognize the authority of the Act of Uniformity. I take my stand on these principles, and appeal to that authority, and I therefore

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  entreat your Lordships to reject this Amendment. Bring it to the test of those principles and of that authority. The first English Prayer Book of the Reformation was printed in the year 1549. In the preface to that Prayer Book—the first Book of Edward VI.—under the title "On the service of the Church," are the following words:—
  "Forasmuch as nothing can, almost, be so plainly sot forth but doubts may rise in the practising of the same; to appease all such diversity (if any arise) and for the resolution of all doubts concerning the manner how to understand, do, and execute the things contained in this Book, the parties that so doubt or diversely take anything, shall always resort to the Bishop of the diocese, who, in his discretion, shall take order for the quieting and appeasing of the same; so that the same order be not contrary to anything contained in this Book."
  My Lords, these are the principles of the Reformation, and I trust that your Lordships will uphold them. And lest it should be said that this discretion of the Bishop was to be superseded by the Archbishop, our Reformers in the second Prayer Book of Edward the Sixth, in A.D. 1552, added the following paragraph:—
  "And if the Bishop of the diocese be in any doubt, then may he send for the resolution thereof unto the Archbishop."
  Observe, my Lords, this is entirely optional; the Bishop may consult the Archbishop if he pleases, but he is certainly not to be overruled by him against his own judgment, as is contemplated by the present Amendment. My Lords, the two clauses which I have just quoted declare the law of the Church of England from the Reformation to the present day—that is, for more than three centuries; they are contained in every Prayer Book from that time to this, and they have been sanctioned by the law of the Realm in the Act of Uniformity, which gave legislative sanction to the Prayer Book. Are we going to set aside the principles of the Reformation, and to contravene the Act of Uniformity? Because I venerate the Reformation, and respect the Act of Uniformity, I entreat you to reject this Amendment. A few words more, and I have done. My Lords, when this Public Worship Bill was brought into this House, I ventured to remonstrate temperately and respectfully, on two several occasions, against the manner in which
  1242
  it was introduced and carried forward, without any reference to the Synods of the Church. Those expostulations—backed by others from persons of greater weight—were not without their effect; and I now beg leave to acknowledge with thankfulness the gracious act of Her Majesty's Government, following in the steps of the preceding Administration, and advising Her Majesty to issue Letters of Business to Convocation, authorizing it to revise such rubrics as may seem to need amendment; and I hail with gratitude the wise and conciliatory Amendment adopted by the other House, postponing the time at which this measure is to come into operation till the 1st of July, in next year, so that the Convocation may have sufficient time to elucidate such rubrics as are obscure, and revise such as require revision, it being understood that this action of Convocation will not have legal validity without the sanction of the Crown and of Parliament. Having discharged what seemed to be a duty—a painful one it was—in remonstrating on the mode in which this measure was originally launched and pressed forward, and having performed the more agreeable one of acknowledging two graceful concessions, I shall now, my Lords, consider it my duty to exercise such influence as I may possess, however insignificant, whether in the diocese of Lincoln or elsewhere, in an honest and loyal endeavour to allay disquietude and irritation, and to persuade those whom it may concern to give this measure a fair trial, and to treat it with that respect which is due to all Acts of the Legislature; and I earnestly hope that the sanguine expectations of its most zealous promoters may be fully realized, and that it may be conducive, under the Divine blessing, to the advancement of the Divine glory, and to the firmer establishment of the Church of England in the hearts of the English people.
  THE EARL OF CARNARVONsaid, he was anxious to say a few words on the Amendment before the House, because he thought that as it now stood, taken in conjunction with some other Amendments in the Bill, it did materially alter the character of the measure as it had been sent down to the other House. When the Bill was first introduced to their Lordships the proposed judicial power was to be vested in the

  1243
  Bishops. Their Lordships disagreed, and he thought rightly, from that proposal, and a purely episcopal tribunal was converted into a lay tribunal. He went entirely along with that view, and he also accepted cordially the condition with which it was coupled—that a certain discretion should be left in the hands of the Bishops, which he thought was as much due to their office as to the natural fitness of things. As the Bill now returned to them, that discretion, as he conceived, was virtually and practically taken away from the Bishops and transferred to the Archbishop of the Province. Without using any exaggerated language, he must be allowed to say that a Bishop, compelled in that manner to submit his discretion to that of his Archbishop, was placed in a position altogether novel, altogether unsatisfactory as regarded his diocese, and one almost personally degrading to himself. That was his first objection. His second was, that he could not really understand the appropriateness of the change. The Bishop of the diocese who exercised that discretion, exercised it, among other things, for this reason—that he was conversant, both locally and personally, with the wants and interests of the diocese; he had an intimate and familiar knowledge which no other person probably could pretend to; and yet they passed over his head to transfer that power of discretion to the Archbishop, who not only must know much less locally and personally, but in nine cases out of ten could know nothing at all. Again, they assumed that the Bishop of the diocese was likely to use that discretion in an indiscreet manner, and yet in the same breath they assumed that the Archbishop of the Province, who knew nothing about the diocese, was likely to exorcise it in a discreet manner. In the next place, the Bill as it came back to their Lordships seemed to him to encourage that which it was the object of all moderate and reasonable men of every party to avoid—namely, the tendency to litigation. Why did they vest that discretion in the Bishop? Simply that he might prevent frivolous, unnecessary, and litigious suits; but by placing him under the fear and risk of having his discretion reversed, they gave him every inducement to send those suits on, and to turn them—many of them of course would be frivolous—into reali
  1244
  ties. That, again, was a source of litigation which he was sure the House never contemplated when it passed the third reading of that Bill. And, what must be the result? If practical effect were really given to that, it could but lead to a feeling of great distrust, first as between the Bishop and the Archbishop, and still more as between the Bishop and the clergy of the diocese. He was struck with the feeling that Bill had already provoked in many quiet country parishes. It was not those who had the slightest tendency to Romanism who had protested in many country districts against the measure, but the old-fashioned Conservative clergy, who were startled by it, failed to understand it, and did not put the same construction on its operation as had been put by the most rev. Primate. He, for one, heartily trusted that their anticipations would not be realized. He trusted that the Bill would work much less mischief and work more satisfactorily than they supposed; and one of his reasons for saying that was, that whereas the Bill left that House as a singleedged blade, it returned to them as a very effectual doubleedged blade, for it had been so sharpened on each side that each section of the Church would be able to put it into operation when it became law with most fatal effect on its opponents. It would need all the conciliation and all the tact and judgment of the right rev. Bench to avert to such a serious consummation as might naturally be expected. As to the Amendment which had been shadowed forth by the most rev. Primate (the Archbishop of York), but which was not yet before the House, if in any way the edge could be taken off the clause and the clause could be restored to a more satisfactory condition, he should be very glad. If he understood the nature of the Amendment rightly, it proposed concurrent and joint action between the Archbishop of the Province and the Bishop of the diocese. That would in one sense scatter responsibility, and in another would increase it. So far as it relieved the Bishop from the odious responsibility which the clause, as at present framed put upon him, so far so good; but so far as it divided the responsibility between him and the Archbishop, it was, in a judicial point of view, a serious objection. What he much regretted in regard to that measure was

  1245
  the speed with which it had been passed. That was the usual way in which ecclesiastical legislation proceeded in this country. They were too much in the habit of legislating from the impulse, and sometimes from the panic of the moment. There had been before now an instance which remained in the minds of many of their Lordships present, in which, under the influence of strong public feeling, called up by an unwarrantable aggression on the part of the Papal Court, an Act was hastily and inconsiderately passed, which long remained as a monument of the uselessness of such legislation. It was but a few years ago that, after having passed an inglorious existence, it was with the consent of all parties in both Houses of Parliament removed from the Statute Book and swept away into the oblivion which it deserved. He would only say, in conclusion, that while he regretted to see the character of the present Bill altered injuriously, as he thought, by the clause, on the other hand he was bound to bear witness to one Amendment which to his mind was a redeeming feature in it. He rejoiced that time had been given to Convocation and to the meeting of the clergy of this country to consider calmly and dispassionately the present position of things, and revise as far as in them lay the subject-matter of dispute. The present was a golden opportunity such as had not presented itself before for many years, and he hoped it would be accepted by Convocation as an olive branch of peace. When the heated passions which had been engendered by this Bill had cooled down, the proposals now offered might be of the greatest benefit and advantage to the Church, and he hoped that, instead of wasting precious time in recrimination and in attempting to attain moral impossibilities, Convocation would give a wide, broad, prudent, and statesmanlike consideration to the measures brought before them, and so put themselves in the position of deserving the gratitude, not only of the Church, but of the whole people of the country.
  THE EARL OF HARROWBYsaid, that from the tone of the previous speakers it might be supposed that by the Amendment Parliament was now asked for the first time to declare that Archbishops should have the authority to review the decisions of their Suffra
  1246
  gans when those decisions had been made in the exercise of a discretion intrusted to them; whereas the fact was it involved no novelty, and there was nothing in that respect which should prevent their Lordships from accepting it. The question was, whether the Bishops should have power to prevent the laity from having that access to the law which was their natural right, and which was given them by the Act of Uniformity. As the Bill left their Lordships' House the Bishops had the power which he deprecated; and he should have been willing to leave in their hands the discretionary right to use the power, governed as it must be by respect to public opinion and the necessity for giving reasons why the discretion of refusing had been exercised. The House of Commons, however, representing the feeling of the laity more strongly than it was represented in their Lordships' House, passed an Amendment extending to the laity the protection which the Bill proposed to give to the clergy, and he did not see that there was anything to prevent their Lordships from acquiescing in the decision at which the Lower House of Parliament had arrived, in their own right and in the exercise of a very proper feeling that the laity were as much entitled to protection as the clergy. On those grounds he supported the Amendment, and as a further reason for its adoption, he considered it a security that the Bishop would think twice before rejecting a complaint. He hoped that if the Amendment introduced in the Bill into the other House was not adopted, their Lordships would accept the modified proposal which was to be made by the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack.
  THE LORD CHANCELLORsaid, that when the Bill was before their Lordships on a previous occasion, he stated his reasons for supporting the policy of not allowing an appeal from the Bishops to the Archbishops on the matter of discretion. As there was in the Bill, as it stood before it went into Committee in their Lordships' House, a provision giving an appeal, and being under the impression that at that time a considerable number of Members of the right rev. Bench were not indisposed to agree to the appeal, he was anxious to repeat, in a few words, the reasons why he

  1247
  thought, in the first instance, that it was inexpedient that the appeal should be given, and the more especially so, because they did not agree with the position taken by the right rev. Prelate the Bishop of Winchester. As he understood the view of the right rev. Prelate, it was that every Bishop was a Judge in his own diocese to administer ecclesiastical law, and that to introduce the jurisdiction of an Archbishop into the diocese of any one of his Suffragans was to violate the fundamental constitution of the Church. He could admit the force of this argument if it was provided that in every case when applied to for the purpose, the Bishops were bound to put the law in force. But the Bishops did not say that. What the Bishops said was, that they claimed a right which was not claimed, as far as he knew, by any Court or Judge in any country in which a temporal law was administered. The Bishops claimed the right to say to any suitor who asked that the ecclesiastical law might be put in force—"We will judge whether it is or is not right for you to proceed with your litigation, and we claim the right to shut upon you, if we are so minded, the portals of the Temple of Justice." That was a strong position to take up, but it put aside altogether the argument of the right rev. Prelate, who claimed the ordinary jurisdiction of a Judge in his diocese, because the Bishop would not hold in such matters an ordinary, but an exceptional position. He was willing to allow the discretion of a Bishop, but he could not lose sight of the fact that it entirely altered the position of the Bishop from that of a Judge exercising his ordinary powers. The grounds on which he had, in the first instance, objected to allow the appeal to the Archbishop upon the question of discretion, were that the appeal must be onesided, being only permitted where the Bishop did not allow a case to proceed, and because the Bishop, being acquainted with the circumstances of his own diecese, and the position of the Church within his jurisdiction, might fairly be allowed to consider whether it was or was not expedient, in the interests of the Church, that there should be litigation. It appeared to him that if the discretion of the Bishop were allowed, it would not be infringing upon the privilege thus granted, to say that it might be con
  1248
  trolled by that which, after all, would only be the discretion of another man who would not know so much about the details of the matter. Those were the grounds which had influenced him, but they were grounds not affecting the fundamental constitution of the Church, but grounds of expediency. The other House of Parliament had, however, substantially re-inserted the clause, and although, for his part, he should have been glad if the other House had not taken that course, yet it was, at the same time, impossible not to see and, to a certain extent, pay respect to the principle on which the House of Commons had acted. They represented the laity of the country, and considered that the rights of the laity were involved in a free right to enforce the law of the Church where it ought to be enforced; and that if they were to concede to the Bishops the discretion of saying whether a suit should go on, they were entitled to ask for something to weigh against that discretion, and prevent it being exercised in such a manner as absolutely to stop litigation. That was the view which was taken in the other House—a view which he wished had not prevailed. But he had to ask himself this question—So far as he could understand, was it going too far to say that if the state of public feeling were observed, if the Amendment were resisted, if it were not inserted in the Bill, would not the measure be placed in imminent peril? It should be remembered, too, in considering this question—not of principle, but of expediency of detail—that although, as the right rev. Prelate (the Bishop of Lincoln) had said, there was a fear that a Puritanical Archbishop might Puritanize the Church, the Archbishop was not to sit in judgment upon the question to be decided; he had simply to say whether the case should proceed. He could not, therefore, take upon himself the responsibility of imperilling the Bill, but he would rather put in abeyance his own individual opinion, and accept the substance of the Amendment. An alteration, however, in its form would, he ventured to think, obviate the objections which had been taken to it; and with a view to get rid of that which bore something of an invidious appearance in the appeal, he would suggest the adoption of the following Amendment of the clause as it

  1249
  stood. It would, if his suggestion were adopted, run thus—
  "If the Bishop shall he of opinion, after considering the whole circumstances of the case, that proceedings should not he taken on the representation, he shall state in writing the reason for his opinion, and, unless he is himself the Archbishop of the Province, shall within ten days after receiving the representation, transmit a copy of such representation and statement to the Archbishop of the Province, and if the Archbishop shall signify his concurrence by counter-signing such statement, no further proceedings shall be taken on the representation, but the statement shall be deposited in the registry of the diocese, and a copy thereof shall forthwith he transmitted to the person, or some one of the persons, who shall have made the representation, and to the person complained of. If the Bishop shall he of opinion that proceedings should be taken, or if the Archbishop shall not within 10 days after receiving the statement signify his concurrence, the Bishop shall within 31 days after receiving the representation, transmit a copy thereof to the person complained of, and shall require such person and also the person making the representation to state in writing within 21 days whether they were willing to submit to the directions of the Bishop touching the matter of the said representation, without appeal; and if they shall state their willingness to submit to the directions of the Bishop without appeal, the Bishop shall forthwith proceed to hear the matter of the representation in such manner as he shall think fit, and shall pronounce such judgment and issue such monition (if any) as he may think proper, and no appeal shall lie from such judgment or monition. Provided, That no judgment so pronounced by the Bishop shall he considered as finally deciding any question of law so that it may not he again raised by other parties."
  THE BISHOP OF OXFORDsaid, he was of opinion that if the suggested alteration of the clause were agreed to, it would render the subsequent portion of the clause inoperative. He thought it would be very unlikely that the parties would submit to the Bishop, when he had already decided that the case should go on, and they must remember that the Archbishop would be a member of the Court of Appeal. They would overthrow, by that Amendment, the best feature of the Bill. They brought the Bishop to show his hand, and then asked the parties to submit. He would, also, remind the House that many persons thought that the Bishops possessed the powers given under the Bill by the Act of Uniformity. As he had said, he was of opinion that if the Commons' Amendment, or the Amendment proposed by the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack, were adopted, it would destroy the best feature of the Bill.
  LORD HATHERLEY,being a very earnest supporter of this Bill, and feeling deeply the necessity that existed for legislation on the subject, said, he should greatly regret the clause being left as it now stood, because he believed that it would go far to render the rest of the Bill ineffectual, inasmuch as it held out a discretion to the Bishops with one hand which it took away with the other. It was unworthy of their Lordships' House, and disrespectful to the Bishops, to show such a distrust of the Episcopal Bench as the clause implied; while the character of the measure as one of peace, intended to bring persons into harmony and uniformity, would be entirely destroyed if the Amendment introduced by the House of Commons were allowed to stand. The noble Earl who had addressed their Lordships last but two, (the Earl of Harrowby), had spoken without his usual precision and accuracy, when he said that the point that was being discussed was, whether or not they should permit the Bishop of the Diocese to close the door which had hitherto been open to the citizen under the Act of Uniformity, and whether or not it was not the duty of the House to fetter the discretion of the Bishop in the matter? The noble Earl forgot that a that the Bishop could do in the exercise of his discretion under the Bill was to leave the citizen to his old remedy under the Act of Uniformity, while he merely deprived him of the peculiarly sharp, quick, and rapid remedy he would have under the Bill. But few among the clergy would be inclined, he (Lord Hatherley) imagined, to enter upon a course of litigation that would involve them in costs to the amount of £8,000 or £9,000. The measure, therefore, was one that required great care and forethought, and had not been introduced for attacking one party of the clergy. True, the occasion for litigation was given by one party; but legislation once taking place, it must be equally applied. It was thought that by bringing in the Bill it would be the means of bringing the clergy together; but if they exposed every clergyman to the liability of being attacked and exposed to a costly law suit, it was vain to expect that any such good result would ensue. The clause professed to give a discretionary power; but what that amounted to might be seen by the fact that after

  1251
  the Bishop had decided, with all the advantage of his local and personal knowledge, that labour was to be of no use, the case was to go up to the Archbishop. If the discretion of dealing with these cases were taken from the Bishop, and were placed in the hands of the Archbishop, how could it be expected that the parishioner would be satisfied with the decision of the Bishop in a case in which he had already decided that there were no grounds for proceeding, but in which he had been overruled by his Archbishop? It was the Bishop who, knowing the parties, was the best judge in the case of a dispute arising between a clergyman and his parishioners. It was unfair to give an appeal on one side only, and an appeal in favour of the prosecution on a matter of discretion was uncommon in any legal Court. In conclusion, he trusted that the measure would not be allowed to contain any matter which would provoke those well-meaning and earnest, but mistaken men, who held particular views on the subject of public worship, and who had already been much excited at the prospect of the passing of this Bill.
  EARL FORTESCUEtrusted their Lordships would not dissent altogether from the principle of the Amendment. He thought it necessary to have some security that the just complaints of the laity should not be silenced in particular dioceses, and he know no better means of obtaining that security than giving the Archbishops power to direct that a case should be proceeded with. The Archbishops were, as a general rule, men of great moderation and discretion, and it sometimes happened—as in the case of the late Bishop of Exeter and others—that a man was chosen to preside over a diocese who would not be considered qualified to preside over a Province.
  THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURYwas of opinion that the Amendment proposed by the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack did not in the least degree alter the substance or meet the objections which had been raised to the Amendment adopted by the other House. It left the matter precisely as before—or rather it made it worse; for whereas under the Amendment agreed to by the House of Commons the interference of the Archbishop would depend upon the pertinacity or length of purse of the persons making the complaint, under
  1252
  the Amendment now proposed the Archbishop would always, and as a matter of course, interfere. Moreover, it seemed to him that the particular form of his noble and learned Friend's Amendment would be more derogatory to the dignity of the Bishop than the form of the Amendment as it came from the other House. He could not imagine any position less satisfactory or less dignified than that of a Bishop appearing in public as the author of a policy or the exponent of opinions ostensibly independent while in reality he was forced by the action of the law to act as the mere mouthpiece of a more powerful person who remained behind, and who had the privilege of dictating what was to be said. Under the Amendment sent up by the House of Commons, the Archbishop and the Bishop would each stand before the country bearing his own responsibility; but under that of the noble and learned Lord the Archbishop would decide in secret, while the Bishop would have to bear the burden in public. If the anomalous power was given to any man of closing or opening the door of a Court of Law, it ought at all events to be exercised under the full criticism of public opinion. There ought to be the security which would result from a feeling on his part that he would be praised or blamed according as in the eyes of his country he did right or wrong. But under the proposed Amendment no one would be able to say for certain whether it was the Archbishop or the Bishop who was responsible for the initiation of a prosecution; for it was a great mistake to suppose that, because it took away the appearance of appeal, the Amendment was really more favourable to the power or to the discretion of the Bishop than the Commons' Amendment—the contrary was the case. There was one consideration which he would venture to urge as a ground for rejecting the Amendment agreed to by the House of Commons, whether as it stood or in an altered form. One of the great difficulties with which the Bishops would have to deal in the administration of this law would be connected with its effect, not only on the clergy, but on those who were becoming candidates for holy orders. As to the clergy, it might be said that they had taken an irrevocable vow and must submit, whatever the three parishioners and the Bill might inflict; and Parlia

  1253
  ment might, if it pleased, laugh at their complaints, and despise their struggles. But it was not so with the candidates for orders. They had not taken the vow, and it was well known that they exercised a good deal of independent judgment, and a judgment which might lead to great evils with regard to the dissensions which were going on within the Church. It was a matter of notoriety that for many years—ever since the era of ecclesiastical litigation began—there had been a great falling off in the number of candidates for orders; and he feared that as the fetters binding the clergy were multiplied—as their course was made more difficult—as they became more exposed to the malignity of wandering societies, and as it was made more easy to inflict degrading penalties upon them, in the same proportion it would be found that the dread to place their neck under such a yoke would increase on the part of those who had thoughts of becoming candidates. He had no doubt the Bill would work tolerably harmlessly if it were only worked tenderly; but in order to obtain that result, it must be worked by those who knew the circumstances of each case and who would bear the responsibility of their acts. If the safe-guard of the Bishop's veto were done away with, he feared that, even although there might be no resistance among the clergy, the life-blood of the Church would be drained, because the candidates for orders would fall off, not only in numbers but in the quality of the men, inasmuch as every man of independent mind would shrink from exposing himself to the dangers which the Bill, if thoroughly carried out, would involve. Much had been said of the majority in "another place" and of the peril in which the Bill would be if the clause under discussion were rejected. There was a great deal of that kind of bluster when any particular course had been taken by the other House of Parliament. It should be borne in mind that the majority was only 23, and that those who were most interested in supporting the Amendment were the very persons who, above all things, desired that the Bill should pass. It was absurd, then, to suppose that if the clause were rejected, there would not be found 12 men among them with sufficient common sense to accept the Bill without it rather than lose it altogether. He, for one,
  1254
  therefore, utterly repudiated the bugbear of a majority of the House of Commons. It was, he contended, their Lordships' duty to take the course which they deemed to be right. Upon them rested the responsibility of making a measure which could be worked with safety to the peace, prosperity, and order of the Church of England, or one which would issue in endless calamities and disasters.
  THE LORD CHANCELLORsaid, that as his Amendment did not seem to meet with much favour, he would not press it, and would put the original Question, that the House agree with the Commons' Amendment.
  On Question? Their Lordships divided; Contents 32; Not-Contents 44: Majority 12.

  CONTENTS.

  Canterbury, Archp.

  Bridport,

  Cairns, L. (L. Chancellor.)

  V. Canterbury,

  V. Hawarden, V.

  York, Archp.

  Churchill, L.

  Richmond, D.

  Cottesloe, L.

  Ellenborough, L.

  Hertford, M.

  Fitzwalter, L.

  Hammond, L.

  Amherst, E.

  Monson, L.

  Bradford, E.

  Penrhyn,

  Camperdown, E [Teller.]

  L. Penzance, L. [Teller.]

  Redesdale, L.

  Derby, E.

  Saltoun, L.

  Fitzwilliam, E.

  Seaton, L.

  Fortescue, E.

  Skelmersdale, L.

  Harrowby, E.

  Somerton, L. (E. Normanton.)

  Malmesbury, E.

  Shaftesbury, E.

  Strathnairn, L.

  Verulam, E.

  NOT-CONTENTS.

  Bath, M.[Teller.]

  Oxford, Bp.

  Bristol, M.

  Rochester, Bp.

  Salisbury, M.

  Salisbury, Bp.

  Winchester, M.

  Winchester, Bp.

  Bantry, E.

  Boyle, L. (E. Cork and Orrery.)

  Beauchamp, E.

  Carnarvon, E.

  Clements, L. (E. Leitrim.)

  Devon, E.

  Feversham, E.

  Colchester, L.

  Mansfield, E.

  Dunmore, L. (E. Dunmore.)

  Nelson, E. [Teller.]

  Pembroke and Montgomery, E.

  Elphinstone, L.

  Ettrick, L. (L. Napier.)

  Powis, E.

  Foxford, L. (E. Limerick.)

  De Vesci, V.

  Hampton, L.

  Hereford, V.

  Hatherley, L.

  Strathallan, V.

  Ker, L. (M. Lothian.)

  Lyttelton, L.

  Chichester, Bp.

  Rayleigh, L.

  Ely, Bp.

  Silchester, L. (E. Longford.)

  Lichfield, Bp.

  Lincoln, Bp.

  Sondes, L.

  1255

  Stanley of Alderley, L.

  Walsingham, L.

  Strafford, L. (V. Enfield.)

  Waveney, L.

  Zouche of Haryngworth, L.

  Templemore, L.

  Resolved in the negative.
  Commons' Amendments on Clauses 13, 14, 15, and 16, agreed to.
  On Clause (B), the clause appointing the hereditary Visitors of the Universities to exercise the powers of a Bishop under this Bill.
  THE EARL OF PEMBROKEobjected to his being made a Bishop against his will. He said that nothing could be more absurd or farcical or more likely to cause scandal than that a young gentleman like himself, who was utterly ignorant of Ecclesiastical Law, should be put in such a position.
  THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURYsaid, he also was made a Bishop. It was the wish of those most interested in the matter, that the noble Earl should be one of those to be called upon to act if necessary under the Bill.
  On Clause (C),
  THE BISHOP OF OXFORDsaid, he would propose to disagree with as much of the clause as applied to the case of the chapels of the Colleges and Halls in the Universities of Oxford, Cambridge, and Durham. There were many circumstances referring to the Colleges which rendered the Bill singularly inapplicable to them, and no accusation had been made against them which would render them amenable to the penalties of the Bill.
  THE LORD CHANCELLORpointed out that there was a difficulty in applying the clause to the Temple Church and the chapels of Lincoln's Inn and Gray's Inn, which were practically private chapels as far as the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical authorities. They were only brought under the operation of the Bill by the clause under discussion, which specified that the Archbishop of Canterbury should have jurisdiction, a proposal to which he could not agree.
  THE ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURYin supporting the clause, said, that no difficulty would arise in administering its provisions as far as the University chapels were concerned. There were two classes of offences aimed at by the Bill—the offence of altering the structure illegally, in which case it would be restored to its original condition, and the
  1256
  Bill sent to the Society; and the second was where the officiating clergyman committed an offence, in which case it appeared there ought to be a power in the Bishop to suspend him.
  THE ARCHBISHOP OF YORKobserved that the Colleges were at present under the control of the Visitor, and that being so he did not see that there was any necessity for the proposed interference with the College chapels.
  Commons' Amendment disagreed to.
  Amendments in Schedules agreed to.
  A Committee appointed to prepare Reasons to be offered to the Commons for the Lords disagreeing to some of the said Amendments; The Committee to meet forthwith; Report from the Committee of the Reasons; read and agreed to; and a Message sent to the Commons to return the said Bill with the Amendments and Reasons.
  House adjourned at Nine o'clock, 'till Tomorrow, Twelve o'clock.