HL Deb 24 April 1874 vol 218 cc1063-94
THE DUKE OF ARGYLL

rose to call the attention of the House to the Papers which have been presented relative to the Famine in Bengal, and said: My Lords, I am quite sure your Lordships will not think it unnatural that I should take the earliest opportunity which a prolonged illness has permitted me to take of addressing to your Lordships some observations and some explanation with respect to the earlier stages of the famine which now prevails in Bengal. And, my Lords, it is one of the inconveniences which attach to the resignation of a Government before the meeting of Parliament, that the Members of that Government may escape from observations upon, or criticism of, the course they have pursued. I do not know, however, that much has been lost in this case, because on all occasions the Government of India—and I think happily—has been kept apart from everything in the nature of political feeling, and I am certain that even if the late Government had remained in office, and if I had met Parliament again while still in office, as at one time I expected would be the case, not one of my noble Friends opposite would have attempted to make political capital out of this famine in Bengal. One of the circumstances which make me almost glad that I did not take the earliest opportunity of addressing your Lordships on this subject is that if I had done so, I might have appeared to show some want of confidence in my noble Friend opposite (the Marquess of Salisbury) as regards the Government of India. No inference could be move erroneous than that I felt any such want of confidence, and none could give me greater pain. I have the most absolute confidence that the honour of Lord Northbrook's government is as safe in the hands of my noble Friend opposite as I trust the honour of Lord Mayo would have been in mine if I had continued in office. But, my Lords, notwithstanding that, I cannot but feel that it would be hardly fair to my noble Friend opposite, and hardly right towards Parliament, if I left him alone to explain the course taken by the Government of India during the period when I was responsible as Minister for India. I cannot but feel that some statement is due to your Lordships, to Parliament, and to the country. My Lords, it is melancholy to think that I should remind your Lordships of the fact that famines are of by no means rare occurrence in India. "Without going back to the famines of the last century, some of which have left terrible remembrances in the recollections of the people, but going back only to the Mutiny of a few years ago, we find that, no fewer than four scarcities, amounting almost to famines, bad occurred since that time. Every Minister who has had charge of the affairs of India, however short his term of office, since the Mutiny of 1857, has had to deal with a scarcity of that kind in some part of India. In 1861–2 my noble Friend behind me (Lord Lawrence), who so long presided over the Government of India, had to deal with a serious famine in the North-West Provinces. During the time another of my hon. Friends (Viscount Halifax) held the seals of the India Office, he had to deal with the famine of 1865 and 1866; and when he handed those seals to my noble Friend opposite, he (the Marquess of Salisbury) assumed office in the very midst of a famine which has left such a bitter recollection on the minds of the people. Again, when Sir Stafford Northcote gave up the seals of office, and I took them, in 1868–9, there was then in the North-West Provinces a serious famine which cost the lives of thousands of people. And, lastly, when I retire from office, my noble Friend opposite succeeds in the middle of a calamity threatening great danger to the enormously populous district of Behar. Why do I remind your Lordships of these things? Is it to diminish your sense of the horror of such occurrences? Quite the contrary. I allude to this fact of a long series of suc- cessive famines at frequent intervals, as a circumstance which deepens our responsibility—because we know, or ought to know, the signs and appearances of these most disastrous events. I say that all the famines in India, and especially the famines of late years, are full of experience, and do throw increased responsibility on those who have charge of India at a time when scarcity is threatened in that Empire. I am willing to avow this responsibility. I accept the test, because I say the conduct of the Government in India and that of the Government at home ought to be tested by this—have you or have you not taken advantage of the experience you have had, and shaped your policy in accordance with the conclusions drawn from elaborate investigations concerning former great famines? This test I accept on the part of Lord Northbrook; and this is the test on which I wish to bring his conduct under the consideration of your Lordships' House. My Lords, the first news of the famine came in the end of October. At that time it was my first duty to consider whether the Home Government could do anything, and, if they could, what they could do, in reference to the terrible event which was so likely to occur. Now, my Lords, I am not one of those who wish to diminish the responsibilities of the office which lately I had the honour to hold, and which is now so worthily filled by my noble Friend opposite. It is a position of great responsibility; but on that account it is the more necessary to have a clear conception of what constitutes the responsibility of the Home Government. The Home Government is what it has always been, but more especially in recent times, a Government of Control—a Government having the power to control the local Government of India in its policy; but not an Executive Government, in the sense of having machinery of its own to carry out the functions of an Executive. I cannot but say that the electric telegraph is an immense temptation in this as in other Departments to assume duties which never can belong to a Home Government. It is a temptation to make suggestions which would have occurred to persons charged with the Government in India; and also it is quite possible to send fussy telegrams making inquiries which assume action on the part of the Home Government in details with which it is incapable of interfering with advantage. The most extreme caution in these respects ought to be observed by the Home Government. But there is one thing for which the Home Government is responsible, and that is confidence in the policy of the men and in the system of policy adopted in India. Parliament cannot call Ministers too strictly to account for confidence or misplaced confidence in the Government of India. For the first week or ten days after certain news of the threatened scarcity came, it was my policy to place implicit confidence in Lord Northbrook and Sir George Campbell. I did, on consultation with my right hon. Friend at the head of the Government, make one or two suggestions, and I did make one or two inquiries, which will be found in the Papers; but beyond this, having satisfied myself of the policy of Lord Northbrook, I placed entire confidence in the conduct of affairs in India by Lord Northbrook and Sir George Campbell. Now, my Lords, this was not a blind confidence. It was a confidence justified by several important considerations, to which I wish to direct the attention of your Lordships. In the first place, my Lords, I placed confidence in the Government of India on account of the time they first took alarm and intimated that they were preparing to deal with the coming evil. This important point may not strike those Members of your Lordships' House who are not acquainted with the details. The first alarm was on the 25th of October. Now, if we look to former famines we shall find that sometimes they followed after the desolation of war, but the greater number of them were due, not to the failure of rain in one season, but to its failure in several seasons—two or three generally. In the case of the present famine, however, there had been three excellent seasons preceding the bad one, and up to the beginning of September there was not the smallest alarm arising from a previous failure of rain. What happens generally is a deficiency of the ordinary rains in the months of July and August. Well, that is not very serious. It never is fatal if the rain which has already fallen is supplemented by a fall in September and October; and therefore no considerable alarm is felt till it is found that there is a deficiency in the September and October rains. Now, my Lords, this deficiency is never ascertained till about the third week in October, and that was just the time—the 25th of October—when Sir George Campbell telegraphed to the Viceroy that besides the failure of the July and August rains there was additional failure, and therefore there was cause for grave alarm. My Lords, all those circumstances justified the Home Government in placing considerable confidence in the Government of India. You will find in the case of previous famines that almost invariably the alarm had been taken at a much later period, and measures to meet the famine adopted much later. I think that in the instance of the Orissa Famine in which so many lives were lost there was no serious alarm till the month of June. There was another circumstance which induced the Home Government to place great confidence in the Government of India. I am putting it second in order, though perhaps I ought to have placed it first. There is a glib maxim which has been repeated till it is accepted as one conveying a great truth, "Measures, not men;" but I am disposed to think that the saying ought to be "Men, not measures," because no measures are so good as good men. If you have good men, you may place your confidence in that circumstance without looking very much into the measures. In the case of my noble Friend (Lord Northbrook), I know that be is a man who looks into everything for himself; and as regards Sir George Campbell, Lieutenant Governor of Bengal, on whom finally the responsibility rests, I would ask your Lordships whether there is a more efficient man in the whole of the Civil Service? As Chairman of the Orissa Commission, appointed at the instance of my noble Friend opposite to inquire into the causes of the Orissa Famine, Sir George Campbell is the author of a most able and elaborate Report on the history of Indian famines, which is accessible to every member of the Government of India. When the present famine threatened, he was in a position which would enable him to carry his own doctrines into practice, and I felt convinced, from his known character and ability, that no measure would be neglected which could possibly prevent or mitigate the impending calamity. I may mention another circumstance which induced me to place this confidence in the Government of India. It was the nature of the measures which, within 12 days of the first alarm, were announced by Lord Northbrook as the outline of his policy. When I say this I think I shall be able to prove it. In the very first Resolutions then adopted there was indicated action on every point on which inaction had led to previous loss of life. There was not a point of policy which was not touched, and touched as clearly as so short a document could touch on it, in the Resolutions of the 7th of November. One point to which I particularly call the attention of your Lordships I am about now to refer to. The experience of former famines in India has been summarized in a vast mass of Papers in the India Office; but three documents in relation to these famines are of primary importance. On the famine of 1861–2 Colonel "Baird Smith made a very full Report; on the Orissa Famine an elaborate Report was drawn up by the Commission of which Sir George Campbell was Chairman; and on the famine of 1868–9 Mr. Henvey made a Report which contains much information. This latter Report is important for the further reason that it relates to the first famine which occurred after the Orissa Report was made, and this Report on the Orissa Famine stands first of all for completeness and for the advice contained in it as to the policy to be pursued in a time of famine. Now the subject of famines in India is so large an one that noble Lords may be excused for not being acquainted with all the contents of those Reports; but the main conclusions come to in them may be reduced to three or four general conclusions. The first is that trade will do nothing for those who cannot buy. The second is closely connected with the first, and is that trade will do everything for those who can buy far better than any Government can do it, and that consequently the less you interfere with it the better. The third conclusion is that in certain extreme cases the Government must not only buy, but import, and possibly for those who can buy as well as those who cannot. Lastly, the fourth conclusion is that the Government must not supersede local efforts and local charity, but must back and help and organize them. I wish shortly to direct the attention of the House to the consequences which follow from these general conclusions as to the course the Government ought to take. I am almost afraid your Lordships may think I am trifling with your Lordships when I dwell upon a conclusion so obvious as that trade will do nothing for those who cannot buy; but, like many principles in science which are just as obvious, a long time seems to be required before people can be got to understand it. The fact certainly is that its non-recognition in former famines cost thousands of lives. It was a common thing in former famines for the Government of India to quote a sentence from Mr. John Stuart Mill. He was a great authority on political economy with most men, but owing to his long connection with the India Office he was naturally an authority of the highest weight with the officials of India: and the sentence to which I am about to refer your Lordships has been quoted over and over again by them when asked to take effective measures for the supply of food in a time of famine. The sentence is this— Direct measures at the cost of the State to procure food from a distance are expedient when, from peculiar reasons, the thing is not likely to be done by private speculation. In any other case they are a great error. Private traders will not in such eases venture to compete with the Government, and though a Government can do more than one merchant, it cannot do nearly as much as all merchants. A curious and unfortunate circumstance in respect of this sentence is that those who have been in the habit, of quoting Mr. Mill on the point have quoted the latter part of the sentence without the previous part. That is to say—they have not quoted Mr. Mill's limitation of his proposition—they did not see the bearing of it: but when we come to examine the point properly we see the enormously difficult duty cast upon the Government, because the first thing they have to do is to see what is the number of people which the rise of prices will deprive of the means of buying. This is really most difficult, because what in one district may be a famine price may not be at all so in another. The first duty of the Government is to estimate the number of the pauper population for whom they will be obliged to provide in consequence of the failure, and of the inability of these people to buy food at the enhanced rates. No doubt it was most unfortunate that in former famines stress was laid on the latter part of that sentence, without reference to the previous part. In this, as in many other cases, political economy was charged with what it was not guilty of; the real error being in the partial conclusions drawn by particular individuals from principles which are in themselves correct. Certainly it was a great error when in former famines the Government omitted to purchase for those who could not buy for themselves. Inmost countries, and in India, perhaps, of all others, there is a large class of the population who are always bordering on mendicancy—on pauperism. To say the least, that class is not less numerous comparatively than in any other country. Then there is another duty of a Government in time of famine, when dealing with a large able-bodied class, as far as they can be called able-bodied, and who live from hand to mouth on their daily wages. One of their first duties is to provide the coolie class with timely public works. It was not in the middle of the famine, when the people were reduced in strength from loss of food, that these works should be provided—you ought to begin before they lose their strength and supply them with labour on the public works early enough to sustain them in good physical condition. With regard to the next principle laid down in these Reports—that trade can do all for those who can buy—I think I need hardly prove that to your Lordships: but there are very many people in this country by whom the principle is pooh-poohed. I doubt, my Lords, if in this country there is an adequate idea of the extent and energy of the private trade of India. By the last census the population of Bengal was 70 millions. Just consider what must be the amount of private trade to provide for that population, with such an enormous proportion of it; living from hand to mouth. Just consider the number of private traders who must carry on business in Bengal to provide for the daily feeding of that people! I believe it is true what is said in Sir George Campbell's Report on the Orissa Famine—that there is no country in which greater energy is shown by the private traders than in India. And remember that all these transactions are founded on the mercantile notion of the hope of profit. Conceive any Govern- ment interfering with that trade—any Government letting it be understood for a moment, or letting it be misunderstood, that they were about to supply food to the whole population! Only conceive, my Lords, what effect that must have on trade and on the food supply of the whole population. You will readily understand, my Lords, why it is constantly stated in these Papers, and why it was constantly in the mind of Lord Northbrook, and in that of every Viceroy who preceded him, that no action should be taken by the Government which could tend to arrest the operations of the enormous trade on which so very many millions depend for their supply of food. There is a reality in the danger which I am quite satisfied the public mind of this country has not realized, and I doubt whether it will be easy to bring it home to them. An early and emphatic declaration as to the intentions of the Government on such a point was essential, because any mistake in the matter might have led to a famine with which previous famines would have borne no comparison. With regard to the importation of food by the Government, it is to be remembered that there are districts of India which are almost entirely importing districts. Orissa is one of them, and on the occasion of the famine there, the monsoon having set in, the sea was impracticable for vessels. The consequence was a want of food, even for those, who could buy. That circumstance had impressed itself on the minds of those who have to deal with the present famine. It was perceived that in districts which private trade could not or would not supply the Government must do it. This is an important point to which I must refer—because I am sorry to say that in the famine of 1868–9 there was, unfortunately, a neglect of this precaution in regard to one or two isolated districts of Central India, which are nearly surrounded by native States; and I am afraid that neglect led to very calamitous results. The loss of life owing to the neglect of that precaution was estimated at something like 25 per cent of the population. The last conclusion in the Reports to which I have been alluding is that the Government ought not to attempt to supersede local efforts. There was a very important correspondence on this point between my noble Friend (Lord Lawrence) and the Lieutenant Governor of the North-West Provinces. My noble Friend, with terrible recollections of the Orissa Famine, was anxious that the Government should make themselves reponsible for the really helpless, irrespective of charitable institutions; but Sir William Muir remonstrated with my noble Friend. He said, in effect, that if you announce that the Government will be responsible it will be assumed that you want no assistance from private charity, and make no allowance for the local efforts of communities, large numbers of whom are in good circumstances, and able to afford aid to the mass of the population. He saw that if the liability of the State in the first instance was recognized, then there could be no ground for appeal to the public for aid towards performing an obligation devolving absolutely on the Government. The result was that my noble Friend to a certain extent gave way, and it was announced that the Government would back local exertions with an equal amount of money. That was the conclusion come to in the famine of 1868–9. In the very beginning of the present famine, Lord Northbrook impressed on the local officers their responsibility, and directed preparations to be made for the supply of those districts which private trade would not supply. Indeed, your Lordships will find every word of the conclusions to which I have called your attention embodied in the Resolutions drawn up by Lord Northbrook; but I wish to rectify one or two mistakes which have been made in reference to those general conclusions of policy as sketched out by the Viceroy. Your Lordships will recollect that when first the people of this country were informed of Lord Northbrook's relying on public works in relief of the famine, there was an immediate cry of remonstrance through the Press by various persons, some of whom are of very high authority. One of them is my friend Sir George Balfour. I received in private also a great number of remonstrances from friends of mine who are intimately acquainted with India. They objected to the public works, and pointed to the Irish Famine in proof of the soundness of their objection. There was great truth in some of what was urged, and I called the attention of Lord Northbrook to it, in order that he might act as he thought fit on reading those objections. But there was one great mistake. People confounded the public relief works in India with works such as those had recourse to in the Irish Famine, and which were not begun until the people had been weakened by starvation. The relief works in India were works intended for the able-bodied before they began to suffer from famine, and it was the duty of the Government having to feed these people to get from them such labour as they were able to give in return. Such works as these are exactly in accordance with one of the recommendations in the Report on the Orissa Famine. I wish on this point to direct the attention of the House to what Sir George Campbell says— Very great reliance was placed on this means of relief, but our remarks have already shown that in the districts west of Calcutta they were wholly ineffectual to prevent extreme famine. It was before the districts had lapsed into extreme and general famine that such works might have been carried on in a way at once useful to the State and beneficial to the people. In all those districts it may be said that both the state of the people and the nature, of the seasons required that anything effectual that was to be done in that way should be done before the 1st of June. We must pronounce that up to that time nothing effectual had been done. Works were not attempted on a sufficiently large scale; those that were attempted were not conducted on a footing calculated to relieve the famine-stricken; and above all, food was not supplied. The course there recommended in respect of relief works is the one adopted by Lord Northbrook. There is another mistake, but one which not unnaturally arose out of the Abstract presented to Parliament of the Correspondence between Lord Northbrook and the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal. In this case Sir George Campbell asked for a vote of credit of £500,000 sterling. Lord Northbrook demurred to that demand. From this it has been argued that Sir George Campbell was left without means—without straw to make his bricks. This is a perfectly natural mistake for anyone to make who reads this Correspondence by itself. But in reality there was no question of money; it was a question of account. In accordance with a rule made during the Governor-Generalship of Lord Mayo each district is to have a provincial budget; and Lord Northbrook, aware that at the time when Sir George Campbell made the application there was a considerable surplus in the hands of the Bengal Government for provincial purposes, thought that until that surplus was exhausted money should not come from other sources— The Government of India replied on the 13th November to this letter, forwarding a précis of the discussion at the Conference, and stating that, while thinking the grant of a credit of 50 lacs at present premature, it was prepared to support the Government of Bengal with such financial means as might be deemed necessary. The action of Government was to be at first limited to providing for the consumption of those employed on the relief works, but this decision was not to debar the Government of Bengal from acting on its own responsibility in case of any sudden emergency. There was another request made by the Lieutenant Governor at that time, to which Lord Northbrook also demurred. He was asked, "Are you prepared to undertake to supply food not only to those who labour, but to those who cannot?" What was his answer? He said he was not prepared to make an announcement that Government would provide for the entire population, irrespective of the questions of local exertion and local charity; but he was prepared to do what was done in order to back local charity and bring about local organization where it could not be done without the assistance of Government. That, I think, was a wise resolution. Depend upon it, my Lords, it would have been dangerous to the pauper classes themselves as well as to the Government for Lord Northbrook to have given any other answer. It would be impossible for any Government to adhere to proper principles, and give any other answer. One other misunderstanding has arisen with regard to the policy of Lord Northbrook, and this is in reference to local transport. My noble Friend opposite (the Marquess of Salisbury), in a speech delivered by him very early in the Session, did what I think was entire justice to Lord Northbrook, and I hope my noble Friend will allow me to say that I regard that speech as worthy of his high character and his high position. He alluded to the fact that Lord Northbrook had said the preparations for local transport were several weeks behind. That is perfectly true, but the blame does not rest with Lord Northbrook. Now, Sir George Campbell is almost as much a personal friend of mine as Lord Northbrook; but I ask—Can anyone reading these Papers say with truth that Lord Northbrook neglected the local transport? In his comments on the weekly reports sent in to him "local transport" was a cry of his that invariably found a place: and if your Lordships will look at the Papers laid upon the Table I think you will find that up to the 15th of January all the reports of the local officers stated that the preparations for local transport were going on satisfactorily. It is impossible for the Governor General to be everything. He makes a demand on those who are informed of his policy and are to assist him in carrying it out, and he could make that demand of no abler man than Sir George Campbell. Unfortunately he was in enfeebled health, and, of course, he relied more or less on the local officers—to whom I must do the justice of saying that it was difficult for them to make any accurate estimate what preparations would be required—for the reason that the area of the famine was changing from week to week. By the dispensation of Providence, rain fell in the winter, and as every shower narrowed the area, it was impossible to say where the danger had passed away, or where the real famine spot would be found. Consequently, for a time the local officers had very little means of ascertaining what would be the magnitude of the exertions required of them. Great allowances must therefore be made. Nevertheless, after local inquiries, and after receiving so many of these weekly reports stating that the preparations for local transport were going on satisfactorily, Lord Northbrook said, "I am not satisfied:" and he said to Sir George Campbell, "You are not able to go." but with the concurrence of Sir George he took the best stop that could have been taken under the circumstances—he sent Sir Richard Temple, who was to succeed him in the Lieutenant-Governorship: and we must all rejoice at the energy and ability he has shown in seeing to the local preparations. For the last two years Sir Richard Temple has been under a cloud of unpopularity as Finance Minister, which he by no means deserved, and I believe the sole cause was that he carried out what had been the uniform policy of my noble Friend behind me (Lord Lawrence), and Lord Mayo and myself, in respect to Income Tax. There is no more able or accomplished man connected with the Government of India. There is another important point to which I wish to draw attention, and perhaps some of your Lordships will think that I ought to have come to it sooner. It is the question whether Lord Northbrook was right or wrong in refusing to prohibit the export of food horn India. My Lords, I am certainly willing to rest my defence of that policy on the most able, clear, and statesmanlike argument of Lord Northbrook himself. It is contained in the Papers that have been laid on the Table, and I hope all your Lordships will read it. When I see any answer to that Paper I shall believe it is a disputable policy; but I have seen no attempt to answer it—no attempt to so much as deal with it. The fact is, the objections to the prohibition of exports of food from India are so numerous that their name is legion. I venture to say-that every individual mind as it considers the question will find a new argument against it. There is one argument which has great force with me. A good deal has been said of the hardship which such a prohibition would entail on those who deal in the ordinary supplies of food—there would be a great deal of hardship inflicted on the merchants if they were deprived of their ordinary trade; but is there not another class of people who would be most seriously affected? My Lords, those who export food from India or from any other country are primarily the merchants: but who sell to them? The farmers in India sell to those merchants, and they get a better price for their produce because it may be exported. The first effect of a prohibition on that exportation is a fine on the agricultural interests—you prevent them from getting the prices which otherwise they would obtain. And who are the farmers who would be affected? A proposition is made to prohibit exportation from all the ports—from Kurrachee, many thousands of miles away; from Calcutta, Bombay, and Madras. All the farmers who supply the merchants who export from those places are to be deprived of the opportunity of getting the highest price for their produce. What would be said if anyone proposed that in case of a famine in their part of the country the farmers I of Ulster were to be prohibited from exporting their grain to the Clyde? Not only would such a measure have done no good in the present case; but I will go further, and say that if exportation from those districts had been prohibited, matters would have been worse—because in consequence of being able to get a better price for their produce the farmers in Behar have had more money to expend on labour. I need not dwell further on the subject. The point has been settled, and settled, I trust, for ever. Some complaint has been made that the answer of Sir George Campbell was not prepared. I am afraid that the omission was occasioned owing to the change of office; but I certainly gave instructions that the answer should be prepared, and I am sure that all who know the high character of Sir Henry Anderson will admit that he must have be lieved he was giving a perfectly fair representation of the case. I regret, I say, the omission of Sir George Campbell's letter, but that omission is now supplied. My firm conviction, I may add is, that Sir George Campbell was greatly influenced by the knowledge that the measure of which he speaks was the one which recommended itself to the Native mind: but, in Sir George Campbell's own letter I find no valid argument for the adoption of the course which he recommended the Government of India to pursue. I have very few more observations to address to the House. There is, I think, a very general impression in the public mind that, although Lord Northbrook is doing very well in India, he is liable to the charge of having changed his policy, and of having been for some time somewhat lax. Now that is an entire mistake. Within 12 clays of the first alarm Lord Northbrook sketched out the policy which up to this moment he has consistently pursued. There has been no change whatever in his policy, or if any, it was only such a change as occurs in the plans of every man as they become developed. It is that change which appears to take place in the plans of some great captains when after what seems to be a period of delay and confusion their columns are found to be converging on the point of attack. I am quite willing to admit that he may be premature in his anticipations of victory over I such a calamity as this famine. In those matters we are in the hands of Providence, and if there should be an- other year of want of rain I certainly cannot contemplate without a feeling of horror the duties which will be thrown on the Government of India. But there is some language held with regard to Lord Northbrook against which I now feel called upon most strongly to protest. I hear it often stated that Lord Northbrook will be judged by results. What that means I am not quite sure. If it means that he is to be condemned because there will be a certain amount of loss of life from famine, I think it is net just. It is not for us, at all events, who know Lord Northbrook's policy to stand by and say, "We have nothing to suggest. We feel you are doing everything that can be done. We see no fault in your arrangements, but nevertheless for the loss of life which occurs we will hold you responsible." That is a course to which I for one demur. We all in this country ought, I think, to speak on this subject with some modesty—When I say, "we all," I mean all public writers, all public speakers, all public men. It is not so very long since we had to deal with a famine within our own shores—a famine which was encountered by all the inexhaustible resources of the English people in wealth, in intelligence, in charitable feeling, and in organizing power; and what was the result? We ran, I am sorry to say, a losing race with disease and death. We did, indeed, save many lives, but there were many which we failed to save. But what were the difficulties of the Irish famine, confined to at most 3,000,000 of people, within a limited area, with our own resources to be dealt with by country gentlemen, magistrates, and clergy—what are the difficulties in such a case, I would ask, compared with the difficulties to be encountered by the Government of India in dealing with the famine in that country? It was observed by my noble Friend behind me then Governor of Madras, that in India we are dealing with men who will starve, though food may be brought to their very doors, because owing to the prejudices of caste they will not take it when it is placed within their reach. Such are some of the difficulties with which you have to contend, and with which nothing in this country can for a moment be compared. If, then, the Government of England, with all its power, energy, and resources, was unable to save its own population from death in Ireland, what right have yon to say that the policy of Lord Northbrook has failed even though hundreds—it may be thousands—should perish of famine in India? I was glad to find that my noble Friend opposite (the Marquess of Salisbury), who attended a meeting the other day at the Mansion House, referred to the good effect which the exertions to relieve them which were being made in England might have on the people of that country. I agree with him that the value of human life is a thing comparatively unknown in the East—it is the product of Christian civilization—but I have no doubt that the people of India will be struck by the exertions to save human life which are being made by the English nation. A right rev. Prelate who is not present (the Bishop of Manchester), but who takes an active part in social as well as other questions, in a sermon which he recently preached, condemned the Government of England for doing-all that was being done to relieve the famine in India at the expense of the people of England. I fully understand the feeling which must have animated the right rev. Prelate; but at the same time I must rejoice that Her Majesty's Government has adhered to the good old Constitutional doctrine of keeping the Treasuries of England and India separate. The sentiment—the natural, powerful, and laudable sentiment—which dictated the policy recommended by the Bishop of Manchester I can well understand. I am sure, however, after five years' experience at the India Office, that India would be the loser by any mixing of the two Exchequers. One sentence which was spoken by the right hon. Gentleman at the head of the Government during the progress of the elections did, I confess, somewhat alarm me; but, as the right hon. Gentleman has since said with great humour, and, I must add, with great good humour, "a good deal has happened since then." I shall not, therefore, further refer to what fell from the right hon. Gentleman; but I may observe that I have seen within the last few weeks some indications of a difference of opinion between the Press of India and the Press of England with respect to which I should wish to say a few words. The Press of India is beginning to affirm that the Press of England has commenced to exaggerate the famine. Now, that I do not believe to be true. I am fully convinced, with the Press of England, that had it not been for the exertions of the Government we should have lost thousands of lives already by the deplorable famine in India. I attribute the difference between the tones of the two Presses to the fact that in India the people are beginning to feel that the necessary expenditure for the relief of the famine is to be met by them and not by us. We are, I think, nevertheless right in making the people of that country pay for the famine: while we ought to remember that we derive considerable advantages from our connection with that country. I have sometimes heard it said that that connection confers no benefit on England. I believe, however, that the people of India are quite sharp enough to see through this language. They know perfectly well that, as a love of possession is one of the strongest instincts of the individual mind, so a love of dominion is one of the strongest in the life of nations. No nation, perhaps, has had it stronger than England. I believe we have administered India for the benefit of its people, and that while we have indulged the passion for dominion to the extent we have, we are fully conscious of the great uses it has served in the history of the country, the great duties it embraces, and the splendid opportunities which it affords.

Moved that an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty for,

Copies of the Annual Report on the Revenue and Settlement Administration of Oude for the year ending 30th September 1872:

Copy of the Despatch from the Secretary of State in Council relative to that Report, dated February 1874:

Copy of the Report for the same Province for the year ending 30th September 1873.—(The Duke of Argyll.)

THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY

My Lords, having had an opportunity at an earlier period in the Session of making the observations which I felt it my duty to offer with reference to the policy that had been pursued in India, I will not weary you by attempting to repeat them on the present occasion. But I cannot do otherwise than express my gratification that my noble Friend opposite (the Duke of Argyll) has thought fit to give us, not only the pleasure of hearing a most instructive and most eloquent speech, but also that defence of his conduct while he was responsible as Indian Minister which every responsible Minister owes to the public of this country. For I quite agree with him in thinking that anomalous, difficult, and intricate as the duties and the position of the Secretary of State occasionally are, there is undoubtedly—with respect to all that is done in India, a great responsibility resting on him to the people of this country; and that acceleration of the means of communication to which my noble Friend alluded, if it is, as he says, in some sense a temptation, is also a great addition to the responsibilities of the Secretary of State. He is bound to keep himself fully acquainted with all the Government of India is doing; he is bound to see that the Viceroy of India is in no degree and at no tame uncertain as to the policy which he himself is prepared to sanction; and yet he must do this without diminishing, without trenching unduly on the responsibility—above all, without lowering the dignity and high position—of that great Officer whose estimation in the eyes of the people of India is the mainspring of the Government of that country. My Lords, the matters to which my noble Friend has referred are detailed fully in the Papers now on your Lordships' Table. It has been said that the time has not yet come for judging the Viceroy's conduct. I confess I cannot see what future revelations or what future events can place the Parliament of this country in a better position to judge of it than they are now. The Papers have been laid on the Table. Even that temporary lacuna which has been attributed to Sir Henry Anderson—of whom my right hon. Friend has not expressed too high an opinion—has been supplied and placed within the reach of all. I will not dwell at length on the circumstances of the Viceroy's policy. I think we are all agreed that in every particular except one he did everything which we, looking at his proceedings after the event, would desire that he should have done. There was one deficiency—a deficiency which he has himself acknowledged, although the blame for it rests in no degree on him. I have no doubt that the transport arrangements were delayed for too long a period. If I could put my finger on any one point of that kind, it would be to say that considerable embarrassment and some suffering might probably have been spared if the Durbhanga Railway, leading to the districts affected had been made sooner than it was. But, as my noble Friend has said, the Viceroy must rely on the opinions of others, the same as the Governor of Bengal; and no one can blame the local officers who could not bring themselves to believe either in the terrible aspects of the phenomena themselves, or in the singular and marvellous rapidity with which they burst forth. It was the sudden rise in prices, the sudden failure of resources, the sudden destitution of the population which took so many of these officers by surprise. They thought it would come on them to some extent gradually. Misled by the too sanguine tone of a certain number of those local officers, I believe it is true that the Viceroy delayed the transport arrangements too long. That deficiency has been fully made up now, and it was, it seems to me, the main deficiency that can be attributed to the Viceroy's Government in this crisis. It appears to me that Lord Northbrook has shown marvellous energy and foresight. The resolution to maintain his own opinion between two adverse forces of criticism acting on him at the same time in a capricious and fitful manner, and yet with extreme violence—the resolution to adhere steadily to the views he had formed upon thought and inquiry, and to carry them out to a successful issue—these are, my Lords, the qualities which do not, perhaps, at the moment earn praise, but they are qualities which make a great administrator and secure lasting and never-failing fame. It has been the duty of my noble Friend to dwell upon and justify the past policy of the Viceroy, and of the Office over which he (the Duke of Argyll) presided. I will not follow him further into that subject, and my only excuse for detaining your Lordships any longer is that I wish to allude to one or two points which refer to the policy of the Viceroy as it has been developed during the period that I have been connected with the India Office. There is one point to which I am glad my noble Friend adverted. A very great authority—a noble Friend who was formerly Viceroy of India—has been arrayed against us on the financial policy of this Government towards that of India. My noble Friend has laid it down that it was the duty of the English Government—and I think he has rather reproached us for want of generosity and humanity in falling short of our duty—to have given India the benefit of an English guarantee. Now, two policies have been recommended for the relief of the Indian Treasury—namely, the one to make a gift to India from the Imperial Exchequer, and the other to help her by a guarantee. I think anybody who cast his eyes this morning on the telegram giving the financial state of India would see how absurd is the proposal that a gift should be made to her from the Treasury of England. There is not one of our fifty Colonies which would not have the right to come in and ask for the same thing. Why, what is the state of the Indian Treasury? There is a certain item called "Extraordinary Expenditure," which may, perhaps, mislead the ordinary reader. This "Extraordinary Expenditure" is an expenditure for remunerative purposes. It is for irrigation canals, railways, or other works, which will yield to the Government a return on the money laid out. It is, therefore, no more a part of the ordinary Budget of the country than an outlay for draining his lands or reclaiming his waste would be part of the "ordinary expenditure" of a landlord. Well, excluding this extraordinary expenditure and also the famine expenditure, what is the state of the case? For the present year there is a surplus of £1,818,700. In the same way, for the following year there is a surplus of £1,192,000—that is the surplus calculated upon for the year 1875. Then, the famine expenditure represents a yearly charge of £200,000, and with what face could a country with a surplus of £1,818,700 come to England and say, "You must relieve us of this extra charge of £260,000?" It would be the most shameful piece of national mendicancy ever heard of. I now come to the suggestion of a guarantee. I have always thought that this question of a guarantee was a question rather of words; because I have never been able to contemplate a state of things in which the credit of England would survive after the debt of India was repudiated. But that may be a matter of opinion. The question is—Is this guarantee which my noble Friend (Lord Lawrence) is so anxious to obtain out of the English Treasury worth having? Now, there is nothing which the English people are so vain about as their guarantee. But figures do not always support the dictates of national vanity in that respect; and I think when my noble Friend said you must gain three-quarters per cent advantage by getting the English guarantee for the Indian Loan, he could hardly have looked at the Share List of this morning. If he consults that valuable document, he will find the Turkish Guaranteed Loan, which happens to bear the same interest as the Indian Loan. It was contracted during the Turkish War, as my noble Friend opposite will remember, and with some difficulty a guarantee was obtained from the House of Commons for the amount of that loan. Of course, I do not pretend that Turkish credit is all that can be desired—but the value of a guarantee of course depends on the credit of the guarantor, and not on that of the country for which the guarantee is given. Well, my noble Friend will find that the Turkish Loan guaranteed by England is at 4 per cent. and that the minimum price of it is below the minimum price of the Unguaranteed Indian Loan—so that the only effect of that magnificent promise of an English guarantee would have been to lower the price at which the Indian Loan would have stood. This Turkish Loan stands at a premium of one, and the Indian Unguaranteed Loan at one-and-a-quarter; so that the benefit which my noble Friend intends to obtain for India is a minus quantity. This may seem extraordinary; but the value of stocks depends not only on the credit of the country which borrows, but upon whether they are large enough to be easily sold or bought. Small stocks are not in favour with the investor, because they cannot be got rid of when he wishes, and they consequently bear a lower price than loans of larger amount. The great advantage of ordinary Indian loans, as of Consols, is that they are so large and held by so many people that one can always purchase or get rid of the stock. A small stock guaranteed by England of £3,000,000 or £4,000,000 would not have been sought by investors; so that it would have been in the position now occupied by the Turkish guaranteed loan. I trust that on referring to the Share List the noble Lord will be satisfied that even from his own point of view the English Government has been guilty of no want of generosity to the people of India in not offering a guarantee. The only other point to which I desire to allude is the condition of the food supply in the distressed districts. There has been considerable anxiety out-of-doors on this point. There is an impression that the Viceroy has not made sufficient provision, and that as the famine goes on—as it undoubtedly will—lasting into months when the transport will be more difficult, a deficiency will be found. Just before the meeting of Parliament the Viceroy telegraphed that he expected at the worst period to have something under 3,000,000 on his hands for three months, from the end of May to the end of August; a smaller number in April, May, and September; and still fewer in March, October, and November—adding that there would be distress, but not general, in nine other districts, and that the Government stores of rice were 420,000 tons. Taking the well-known allowance of 1½1b. a day for each recipient, and assuming three quarters of his full charge in April, May, September, and one half of his full charge in March. October, November, I found that this would absorb 413,000 tons, and I confess I was rather alarmed to find so small a margin. We pressed him earnestly to increase his purchases, acting under the impression that after a certain period it would not be easy to obtain rice in Burmah. The Viceroy, in reply, promised to increase his stores: but assured us it was quite within his power to obtain a larger supply from Burmah whenever he might feel the need of it; while in the Punjab there is an enormous store of grain from the last harvest, and the coming harvest promises to be one of extreme richness and abundance. Being pressed very strongly, the Viceroy distinctly told us he was under no apprehension of the failure of the supply. Knowing his decision and his means of knowledge, I have no doubt he has quite satisfied himself, and that we may be perfectly secure, whatever happens, against the failure of relief for want of the necessaries of life. His policy is one which the noble Duke can best defend, but with which I have no fault to find, and which has been carried out with a vigour and energy beyond praise by those under him. We cannot now tell at what period the famine will reach its worst, nor can we judge how much suffering will be its result. Only the other day I had a letter from the Viceroy, pointing out that the mortality among children is necessarily beyond the power of any Government to control. Parents often will not bring their children until it is almost too late to rescue them, and any attempt to take them forcibly would be at once interpreted as a covert design to force them to become Christians. It is, therefore, impossible for the Government in many instances to avoid disease, and in some instances death. I quite concur with my noble Friend in earnestly protesting against the notion that in judging the Viceroy by the results of his policy we are to take the losses that may arise as a necessary proof that he has failed. We must judge of it by the evidence that lies before us, and I have no doubt that when the confusion and panic that have recently prevailed have cleared away—when people have forgotten the scenes that have been so powerfully depicted, but which are in some degree likely to mislead—when they can judge dispassionately of the dangers that had to be met and the enormous difficulties to be overcome—they will wonder at the energy and foresight displayed, and will pronounce that England has proved herself, at least in this instance, worthy of the tremendous task she has undertaken in governing the vast dependency intrusted by Providence to her care.

LORD NAPIER AND ETTRICK

said, he was sorry that, while concurring in much that had been said, he found himself in almost solitary antagonism on some points to two able Secretaries of State, to the Viceroy, and, as he was told, to the unanimous opinion of the Indian Council at home, as well as, he presumed, to the majority of the Council in India. He was also under the disadvantage of insufficient information, the Blue Book not having, as he was told a few days ago, been yet issued. He could, however, appeal to the opinion of Sir George Campbell, which could not but be deserving of attention. He did not cast anything like an imputation on the humanity of the Viceroy—no statesman had been more devoted than Lord Northbrook to his duty, or had shown a more tender sense of the interests of the people committed to his care, and he had been superior to the temptation of earning a cheap popularity by taking a course conformable to popular opinion in England, but opposed to his own sense of duty and independence—if he had erred at all it was on a matter of speculative opinion, and upon a matter as to which all were liable to err. He had been acting, moreover, with the advantage of having able counsellors. The Viceroy had also the assistance and advice of a Commander-in-Chief who took a deep interest in and possessed a profound acquaintance with The affairs of India. With all this assistance, he (Lord Napier) was nevertheless constrained to affirm his conviction that in the policy of the Government of India on this subject there had been one considerable error, and that in the recent policy of the Government of this country there had been one great opportunity of doing good lost. The particular in which he thought the Government of India had erred was this—that they had not prevented the exportation of the food of the people from the Presidency of Bengal. That export ought, in his opinion, to have been by all possible means prevented. The exportation of rice ought to have been prevented, because it was the common, familiar, and acceptable food of the people, and was preferred by them to rice imported from abroad; next, because the export of food and consequent increase of importation from abroad greatly aggravated the difficulties of transport and carriage; and, lastly, because the food imported was distasteful to the people. The export of food might have been prevented in one of two ways—by extensive purchases in the Calcutta and local markets, or by actual prohibition. He did not hesitate to say—and he had high commercial authority for the statement—that exportation from Calcutta might have been prevented without difficulty by adequate purchases in the markets, and as to the food in the interior of the country, the grain must have been either available for general export or lying under particular contract. If the former, all the Government had to do was to go quietly into the market by confidential agents, and buy the rice on their own account. If it was lying under contract, there would be more, but no insurmountable, difficulty in making arrangements for securing it. The food must have been bought with the intention of its being sold again, and why should it not have been sold to the agents of the Government? With reference to the food in the interior, it could have been secured by compacts at numerous points for its delivery at particular places and times. He could not see how any insuperable difficulty could have arisen in the purchase of the food produced in India itself. But if any such difficulty had arisen, there remained the alternative of effectual prohibition. That expedient might have been resorted to, and carried into effect without any serious prejudice to any interest whatever, seeing that from the first it must have been clear that there would be a full demand for all the production of the country. The amount of grain available for exportation from India was generally 400,000 tons from Bengal, 700,000 tons from Burmah, and 100,000 tons from Madras—an amount far in excess of the estimated requirements. But it was said that such a course of proceedings would deprive the producer and holder of the profits to which they naturally looked forward. How could that possibly be the result of the Government putting itself in the place of the foreign trader? The home market would have been just as advantageous to the producer and the holder as the foreign market could be. The only persons who could be affected by the prohibition would be the carriers; but that would be compensated by the fact that export and consequent import being prevented, the entire carrying power could have been concentrated, so far as it was available, on the transport of the grain to the districts in which it was required. For his part, he entertained a firm conviction that the policy which the Government of India ought to have pursued was to have secured the food produced in India in one or other of the ways he had pointed out. Without intending for a moment to enter into a detailed criticism of the merits of the measures which had been adopted by the Government of India for the relief of the people of that country, he felt bound to express his regret that he had not found in the documents laid upon the Table of the House fuller information upon several points connected with this subject. Thus they contained no information with respect to the steps, if any, which had been taken by the Government of India to avail itself of the assistance of the other Indian Presidencies. He felt confident that had an appeal been made to the Presidencies of Bombay and Madras, they would have responded to that appeal with all the zeal and alacrity they had shown during the time of the Mutiny. Had such an appeal been made to the English planters, landowners, and residents in India, of the services which would be most valuable, of the missionaries whose great importance was only just being recognized, and of the medical departments in all parts of the country? In dealing with the relief works it must be remembered that they were calculated to drain agricultural labourers from the rural districts, and he wished to know whether means had been adopted to return to those districts from the relief works a sufficient quantity of labour to enable the land to be adequately prepared for sowing? It would also be necessary to supply the people with a sufficiency of grain for seed to be sown in June for the November harvest. It would not be enough to provide a quantity of rice merely sufficient to preserve the people from famine until the next harvest was reaped, because rice required to be kept several months before it was fit for food, and therefore the supply of grain must he calculated to feed the people for some four or five months after harvest time. Of course, the Government of India might be fully alive to the importance of all these points, and might have provided for the difficulties he had pointed out: but his complaint was that the Papers which had been laid before the House gave no information whatever in reference to them. He wished, however, to express his opinion that the noble Marquess (the Marquess of Salisbury) had lost a very great opportunity of doing a gracious act towards the people of India by making a grant of public money towards the relief of the suffering people of India. India, with £15,000,000 of cash balances in hand, and possessing excellent credit, did not require a guarantee for a loan from this country; but seeing how the people of India had come forward in the most generous manner to assist a part of England when it was in distress, he thought that it would have been only gracious and politic on the part of England, with its immense re- sources, if, as a testimony of its sympathy with the starving millions of India, it had made a grant of money from the Exchequer. The Government of England had from age to age and from period to period signalized themselves by acts of national generosity not only to the suffering people of our own Colonies but also of foreign countries. There had been during the last 200 years a great variety of votes of this nature passed by the Parliaments of England, and among them was one which related to the earthquake at Lisbon. When the news of that calamity reached this country the King sent a message to Parliament, and the House of Commons unanimousy voted £100,000 towards the relief of the sufferers. Would it not have been a gracious act if the Government had availed themselves of this opportunity to make some similar manifestation of good-will on the, part of this country towards the poor famine-stricken population of India? If such an idea were impossible, chimerical, or enthusiastic, although he believed it would have been hailed even in this country as an acceptable expression of national benevolence, still he thought that the noble Marquess might have found it possible to direct the inclinations of the people of England into some channel where they would have been tangible and visible to the inhabitants of India. Famine invariably brought disease in its train, and the noble Marquess might, for instance, have sent out a number of medical officers, who, dispersed throughout the country, might have organized hospitals and administered relief. Any act of this nature would have been, he felt sure, gratefully hailed by the people of India. He desired in conclusion to thank their Lordships for the kindness and attention with which they had listened to him, for he felt strongly upon the subject, having in times past been brought face to face with scenes similar to those now occurring in India—scenes which no distance of time could ever efface from his memory.

LORD LAWRENCE

said, that at no period of the British rule in India had the various offices of the Government, from the highest to the lowest, been more excellently filled than they were at the present moment; and he could not but express his unfeigned admiration of the zeal, energy, and public spirit exhi- bited by Lord Northbrook. But, notwithstanding the opinion expressed during the debate by his two noble Friends, who, as Secretaries of State, had the fullest knowledge of the course of the present calamity, he felt compelled to say—and he said it with the greatest regret—that he thought that, under the circumstances, it would have been politic at an early period to have placed an embargo on the exportation of rice from the ports of Bengal. There were, to his judgment, overwhelming reasons why that course should have been adopted, although it would hare been inexpedient to have extended the prohibition to the rest of India. Had the course been adopted those interested in the produce of the country would not in any way have pecuniarily suffered, for they would have been able to command as high a price as they would get by exporting. The bulk of the rice grown was not in the hands of large dealers, and therefore the embargo would not, to any great extent, have affected the trade, while, if an early embargo had been placed on exportation, a supply would have been directed towards the famine-stricken districts, or the supplies could have been forwarded by the Government without blocking the railways, and thus much time would have been saved. It seemed to him, under all the circumstances of the case, that there would have been a certain amount of advantage in following the policy which had been advocated by Sir George Campbell. He gave that opinion, however, with great diffidence, and he admitted that there was a great deal to be said on both sides of the question. He might add that when the question was raised, it was supposed that districts extending to between 50,000 and 60,000 square miles, with a population of something like 30,000,000, would be involved in the consequences of the famine; but, by the mercy of God, the area threatened by famine had been reduced, by the fall of rain, to 12,000 or 13,000 square miles and 12,000,000 or 14,000,000 of people; still it was by no means certain even now that the famine would be limited to that area. We should not have tided over the danger until the months of October, November, or December, and it was, therefore, quite possible, notwithstanding all the efforts of the Indian Government—and they had been enor mous—that, even now there might not be sufficient food. Indeed, he was persuaded that had it not been for the extraordinary exertions and great foresight of Lord Northbrook, we should, by this time, have heard of tens of thousands of deaths. As to guaranteeing a loan to India under those circumstances, he must say he differed from the view which was taken by the noble Marquees (the Marquess of Salisbury) on the subject. The noble Marquess said that the revenues of that country were in such a flourishing condition that it would have been scandalous for India to look to this country for assistance, and that an English guarantee would only tend to damage her credit. Now, the noble Marquess, in making these observations, seemed to him to have lost sight of the peculiar position of India. The revenues of India were, it was true, very large, but the money was all required to carry on the administration of the country. Besides, it was necessary to expend considerable sums on the making of roads and canals, and on the carrying out of important works. To effect these objects, a large expenditure was necessary, and a heavy debt was contracted for which the annual charge was very considerable. It was stated, in recent telegrams, that the famine would entail an expenditure of £6,500,000; and to this must be added the indirect cost of the various works of improvement which the Government of India would have to undertake hereafter in these districts. He, therefore, thought with regard to the £10,000,000 for which the sanction of Parliament had been asked, that the Government would have done well to have given a guarantee. Had that been done, the money could have been borrowed at 3¼ per cent. instead of 4 per cent. a great saving to India would have been the result, and Indian finance would not have been injured any more than Canadian finance had suffered by the guarantee to the Dominion. It ought to be borne in mind that our countrymen had been expending their lives in maintaining the honour of England, yet that India had not cost us a farthing. England had certainly conferred upon India vast benefits, which he should be the last to underrate: yet, on the other hand, it should not be forgotten that thousands of Englishmen had gained great wealth from that country, and that if England in her corporate capacity would return only a trifle of that wealth she would show the people of India that the people of this country entertained a real feeling for India in her present distress.

After a few words from Lord STANLEY of ALDERLEY,

THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY

wished to state, in answers to Questions put to him, in the course of the debate, that it was the strong opinion of Sir George Campbell that it was not more European, but more Native assistance that was wanted. With regard to the provision of seed for next harvest, Sir Richard Temple had stated that the better class of ryots had saved seed for themselves, and that the lower class were purchasing seed from the dealers. His noble and gallant Friend (Lord Napier) seemed to think he had accused the people of India of mendicancy. That was not his purpose, and he had heard nothing to justify such a charge. He had in his mind what the position of the Government would have been if, in the face of the surpluses of Indian revenue, they had asked Parliament to advance money from the Treasury of England. He agreed with the noble and gallant Lord that it was the duty of the people of England to give the people of India a pledge of their sympathy in the present crisis; but, according to the habits and traditions of the people of this country, that sympathy ought to be shown in the liberality of individuals, and not by contributions from the Imperial Exchequer.

THE DUKE OF ARGYLL

said, that Sir George Campbell had submitted himself to medical examination, and that the verdict of the doctors was that, if he remained during another hot season in India, he would probably lose his life. Sir George Campbell had, notwithstanding, placed his services at the disposal of Lord Northbrook, and had offered to remain in India, either with or without salary. After the opinion given by the medical man, Lord North-brook was obliged to take upon himself the responsibility, and he told Sir George Campbell he could not allow him to remain in India during the hot season. Sir George Campbell telegraphed that to him, and he replied that he entirely concurred in the verdict of the Governor General.

THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY

also wished to add that as soon as he became acquainted with the facts he expressed an opinion that it was the duty of Sir George Campbell to return to England.

Motion agreed to.