Lords Sitting of 16 June 1873

MINUTES.
PUBLIC BILLS—Committee—Sites for Places of Religious Worship (re-comma.)* (128–159).
Committee—Report—Municipal Corporations Evidence* (129); Railways Provisional Certificate* (111).
Report—Vagrants Law Amendment* (130); Fairs* (131).
Third Reading—Metropolitan Tramways Provisional Orders (No. 2)* (114); County Authorities (Loans)* (124); Game Birds (Ireland)* (127), and passed.
Royal Assent—Consolidated Fund (£12,000,000) [36 Vict. c. 26]; Customs Duties (Isle of Man [36 Vict. c. 29]; East India Loan [36 Vict. c. 32]; Marriages Legalization, St. John's Chapel, Eton [36 Vict. c. 28]; Matrimonial Causes Acts Amendment [36 Vict. c. 31]; Juries (Ireland) [36 Vict. c. 27]; Registration (Ireland) [36 Vict. c. 30]; Local Government Board (Ireland) Provisional Order Confirmation [36 Vict. c. 1xi]; Oyster and Mussel Fisheries Order Confirmation [36 Vict. c. lxii]; Pier and Harbour Orders Confirmation [36 Vict. c. lxiii].

PETITION OF LEONARD EDMUNDS, ESQUIRE.
LORD REDESDALE,in rising to move—
"That the petition of Leonard Edmunds, esquire, presented on the 26th day of May last, be referred to the Comptroller and Auditor General, with directions to him to examine the several accounts mentioned therein, and any other accounts which may be submitted to him relating to the matters set forth in such petition, and to report thereon to the House,"
said, that he had been induced to call their Lordships' attention to the case of Mr. Edmunds, because he considered that without the examination he proposed it would remain for ever doubtful as to whether their Lordships had acted justly towards Mr. Edmunds. He was certain that every one of their Lordships would admit that it would not be honourable or fair on their parts if they did not act with full and perfect justice towards a gentleman who had for so many years held an official position in their Lordships' House. The subject ought not to be considered as a party question. For himself, he could truly say that he had taken no steps in the matter that could indicate that his desire was to make it a party question.
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He had not asked for a single vote from any noble Lord, and only wished that the House would deal with Mr. Edmunds as one gentleman ought to deal with another. ["Hear, hear!"] He was glad to hear that expression from the opposite side of the House, as it was an assurance that the question would not be regarded in that quarter as a party question. In order to make the matter intelligible to their Lordships, he would just state as briefly as he could the facts of the case, which were as follows:—Mr. Edmunds had passed 34 years and upwards in the public service, for 17 of which he was Reading Clerk and Clerk of Out-door Committees to their Lordships, and he was appointed to the office of Clerk of the Patents by the Crown on the 23rd of August, 1833, holding the office until the 29th of July, 1864; and during those 31 years no less a sum than £1,516,888 passed through his hands, of which there was no audit whatever in reference to the items involved in that large sum. He might here observe that so satisfied were their Lordships with Mr. Edmunds' conduct as Clerk in their Lordships' House that, on his resigning the appointment in 1865, the usual acknowledgment of it was made by the House, and a pension was granted to that gentleman. Soon after doubts arose as to the propriety of granting that pension, in consequence of certain transactions in connection with Mr. Edmunds' conduct as Clerk of the Patents. Considering the length of time that Mr. Edmunds held the office of Clerk of the Patents, and the large sum of money that had passed through his hands of which there was no audit, it was not surprising that some complications might arise. But that was no reason why there should not be a full inquiry into the whole matter. The result, however, was that an inquiry was ordered by the Treasury, upon whose finding certain Reports were consequently drawn up. And here he might say, in passing, that he did not think that Mr. Edmunds had managed his case well; he had not exercised due judgment, which, however, might happen to any one of their Lordships if they had to conduct a case in which they were personally concerned. It was then determined by their Lordships to appoint a Committee, though he (Lord Redesdale) objected to the unfairness of

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examining a man who might be prosecuted for a criminal offence, and who was not allowed counsel or to examine witnesses. The inquiry took place, and all the evidence brought forward consisted of the Reports prepared by the Treasury with regard to the accounts. The Report of the Committee went against Mr. Edmunds, and he appeared in Court on the charge of misappropriation of public moneys, where he failed, from the vastness and complexity of the accounts, and the length of time over which they ranged, coupled with the fact that as little indulgence as possible was afforded him, in satisfying the Committee of his want of culpability in the matter. The order for his pension was rescinded; and. not only so, but their Lordships refused his request to be heard at the Bar of the House before judgment should be given against him. That was a hard measure on the part of their Lordships' House, for now Mr. Edmunds' character was destroyed, his pension had been taken from him, he had been subjected to proceedings which had brought him almost to ruin, and now he came to the House in his old age, praying for a statutory audit of his accounts. He (Lord Redesdale) contended that the inquiry which that gentleman asked for was necessary, if their Lordships desired that the case should be fully investigated. He urged that Mr. Edmunds had been obliged to accede to arbitration, and the result was that the accounts were never properly examined. It seemed to him that the question lay between the House of Lords and Mr. Edmunds, and that the House of Lords having granted and then taken away the pension, it was only right that Mr. Edmunds should be allowed full opportunity of clearing up anything in connection with the matter that might be in doubt. In 1868 the case was tried before the late Lord Justice Giffard, Mr. Edmunds having previously submitted his accounts to a public accountant, and laid a statement with regard to them before the Court of Chancery. In his judgment, Lord Justice Giffard stated that the defendant's evidence had removed any imputations that could be justly or fairly cast upon his character, his liability having arisen from a mistake under difficult circumstances, partly due to the refusal of the audit he had asked for; and that, hay-
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ing regard to all the circumstances, the very difficult position in which he was placed, and the fact of the audit being refused, he certainly should not make the defendant pay any costs. Surely their Lordships would not deny Mr. Edmunds the opportunity of again bringing forward that evidence, so that the truth might be ascertained. The matter, however, did not rest there. At the instance of the Government it went to arbitration, Mr. Edmunds at first declining it, and, after having been persuaded to agree to it, vainly trying to get out of it. He believed that had the arbitration resulted in Mr. Edmunds' favour, the House of Commons would very probably have refused to vote the money awarded him until the accounts had been submitted to the statutory audit; and he contended that the Government, instead of proposing arbitration ought to have submitted the accounts to the audit prescribed by the Act passed the year after the Report of their Lordships' Committee. As to the arbitrators' award, it was based entirely on the Treasury Reports, no audit being entered into. If their Lordships were to determine to reject this Motion, they would be laying down the principle that it was not necessary to have accounts like these submitted to audit. For those reasons, he did hope their Lordships would be prepared le do Mr. Edmunds that justice which he asked at their hands. The case was this—They had granted him a pension for his services in that House, and they subsequently took it away from him because of certain charges which had been brought against him. Now, these charges were involved in the question of audit of those accounts, and unless those accounts were audited in the manner he proposed, their Lordships could not come to the conclusion that they had not done him an injustice. The objection to re-opening the matter he would meet by urging that the arbitration did not fully bring out the merits of the case, and that failing the statutory audit now asked for by Mr. Edmunds, the House could not be satisfied that they had shown justice towards a gentleman who long served them with satisfaction and fidelity. He could not see what possible objection could be urged against the Motion, or who could oppose it, unless those who, having

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already made up their mind on the subject, were afraid that something in favour of Mr. Edmunds might come out upon the inquiry. Mr. Edmunds had been singularly unfortunate, for he had been defeated in every attempt which he made to have this matter put to rights, but always on some technical objection, for the Court of Queen's Bench, when refusing him the mandamus for which he applied in the matter said, that while he had no legal right to call upon the Comptroller and Accountant General to audit the accounts, yet, as a public officer, he had a moral right to such an audit; and Mr. Justice Blackburn said Mr. Edmunds had a moral grievance if the Treasury had refused it on insufficient grounds, but held that the remedy would he in shaming the Government by the voice of public opinion or of Parliament. He would, therefore, urge that their Lordships were bound to inquire whether the pension had been withdrawn on proper grounds, and that Mr. Edmunds was entitled to a statutory audit, to determine whether he had acted properly or not. That being so, if their Lordships did not take steps to come to a just and sound conclusion on that matter, they would not be doing that which was consistent with the feelings of gentlemen. He (Lord Redesdale) trusted their Lordships would accede to the proposition he was about to make.
Moved, That the petition of Leonard Edmunds, esquire, presented on the 26th day of May last, be referred to the Comptroller and Auditor General, with directions to him to examine the several accounts mentioned therein, and any other accounts which may be submitted to him relating to the matters set forth in such petition, and to report thereon to the House.—(The Lord Redesdale.)
THE LORD CHANCELLORsaid, he felt bound to state reasons which, he hoped, would satisfy their Lordships that they should not agree to the Motion of the noble Lord the Chairman of Committees. The noble Lord had said that he did not bring the matter forward as a party question. He (the Lord Chancellor) should be sorry to see the time come when a matter like that could be treated as a party question. It was a personal matter to a great extent, but it certainly involved also public considerations of great importance, and the principles of sound government and
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jurisprudence, in which all shades of politicians might well take an interest, irrespective of party. The noble Lord had moved—
"That the petition of Leonard Edmunds, esquire, presented on the 26th day of May last, be referred to the Comptroller and Auditor General, with directions to him to examine the several accounts mentioned therein, and any other accounts which may be submitted to him relating to the matter set forth in such petition, and to report thereon to the House."
He (the Lord Chancellor) was puzzled to know in what capacity their Lordships were to adopt the Motion—whether in their judicial capacity of which the noble Lord was so earnest a champion; or in their legislative capacity as one of the two Houses of Parliament; or in some other capacity with which he was not at present acquainted, it was hard to say. They could not of their own vote alter the Act of Parliament, which clearly laid down the duties of the Comptroller and Auditor General; and from a careful perusal of it, he could say neither their Lordships nor any one else except the Treasury had the power to refer to him any accounts to be audited. The Treasury, however, might, if they thought fit in their discretion, require an audit of any public accounts. Mr. Edmunds applied to the Court of Queen's Bench to give directions that his alleged accounts should be audited; but the Court decided it had no power to do so, because the Act had given that power and authority to the Treasury only. In point of fact, there were no accounts of Mr. Edmunds to be examined into, the whole matter having been disposed of by competent tribunals. The course adopted by the noble Lord last Session when he proposed an Address to the Crown, praying for such an inquiry as that which he now asked for, was not, in point of form, open to the same exception with the present Motion; and, as the form of the present Motion might be altered, if the substantial object proposed by it were right, it would now be proper to consider the substance of the case. The noble Lord, in introducing the subject, seemed to depend entirely upon the statements of Mr. Edmunds, and based much of what he said on the proceedings in the Court of Queen's Bench; but that Court itself could not, and did not, profess to know anything of the facts of the case, except as they

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happened to be then represented to them by Mr. Edmunds. What the Lord Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Blackburn said was, that an accountant to the Crown, having unsettled accounts, which he wished to get audited and passed, ought to have the means of doing so, and of thereby obtaining his quietus. To that proposition, no exception could be taken by anybody. But, in Mr. Edmunds' case, there were, in fact, no unsettled accounts to be passed; and there was not a single word in the Act of Parliament which empowered the House or the Treasury, or the Auditor General to do what was proposed. Nothing could be a greater mistake than to suppose that Mr. Edmunds was then an accountant to the Crown, or had any account whatever to pass or to render. Upon that point, he would shortly explain how the facts really stood to their Lordships. Mr. Edmunds' own statement was, that he was from 1833 to 1864 a principal public accountant to the Crown, or otherwise accountable, within the meaning of the Exchequer and Audit Act of 1866. He admitted, and the fact was incontrovertible, that the employment and receipt, in respect of which he alleged himself to be so accountable, terminated in 1864. At that time, there was no provision made by law for any audit, by any public authority, of the accounts of the office held by Mr. Edmunds. But there was another method of passing and settling those accounts, more conclusive than any audit—namely, by having theta taken, either in the Court of Exchequer or in the Court of Chancery. This method the Crown determined to adopt; and, accordingly, in May, 1866, more than a month before the Exchequer and Audit Act of 1866, received the Royal Assent, and nearly a year before that Act came into operation the Attorney General filed an Information in Chancery, for the express purpose of taking the whole of Mr. Edmunds' accounts; asking, at the same time, for declarations from the Court as to the principles on which those accounts should be taken with reference to certain disputed points. This Information Mr. Edmunds resisted. He denied his liability to account to the Crown at all in Chancery; he asked that the Information should be dismissed. That point, however, was decided against him at the hearing—as were all the other disputed points—by Vice Chan-
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cellor Giffard, who expressly said—"A decree for an account in this Court would, beyond all question, be a complete discharge." That decree was accordingly made: that complete discharge, subject only to his paying what might be found by the result of the account to be due from him, Mr. Edmunds—although against his will—obtained. The whole account was ordered to be regularly taken in the Court of Chancery; and it would have been so taken, if Mr. Edmunds had not himself preferred that it should be done by arbitrators rather than by the Court. The only effect of that substitution of arbitrators was, that their award took the place, by the consent of both parties, of a final judgment by the Court. It was equally binding and conclusive in law; it was an equally complete discharge to Mr. Edmunds, provided only that he paid the money found due from him. It put at end, once and for ever, to the former position of Mr. Edmunds, as an Accountant to the Crown; there was afterwards no further or continuing account, which could, by any possibility, be audited. To suppose that what might have been done under the decree in Chancery, or what was done by means of the arbitration, ought to have been, or could have been, clone by a public audit under the Exchequer and Audit Act of 1866 was a complete mistake. Not only was the Suit in Chancery already pending when that Act passed and came into operation—not only was there nothing in that Act which could possibly deprive the Crown of the right to continue the prosecution of that suit—but the powers and duties of the Auditor General, under that Act, were wholly inadequate to the decision of the questions raised in the suit between Mr. Edmunds and the Crown. The Auditor General was not a Judge with the authority of a Court of Law; he could only pass, or refuse to pass, any accounts which might be laid before Min. If he passed them, the debtor obtained his quietus; if he refused to pass them, the debtor did not get his quietus; but he would not be bound by law to submit to any disallowance, or surcharge, which the Auditor General might have thought it his duty to make, and the Crown, notwithstanding, any opinion on such points which the Auditor General might have formed or expressed, would still be obliged to go into a Court of Law or Equity

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to enforce its rights against the defaulting accountant. One, at all events, of the most important questions raised in the suit, and that on which the largest claim of the Crown against Mr. Edmunds was eventually established by the award—the question of Mr. Edmund's liability for profits made by him by discounts on stamps purchased with public money—could never have been raised at all in the ordinary course of an audit of those accounts. Mr. Edmunds, however, seemed to have succeeded in persuading the noble Lord that he was aggrieved by the proceedings of the Arbitrators, and that the award itself ought to be treated as a nullity. The noble Lord had, apparently, been content to take his law, as well as his facts from Mr. Edmunds; but he could assure the noble Lord that if their Lordships were to allow themselves to be made a Court of Appeal for suitors against whom awards had been made, they would find there were disappointed suitors without number who, after awards or decrees were made against them, would make representations, quite as plausible, and as probable as any now made by Mr. Edmunds, as to the circumstances under which they had failed in their suits; so that, if their Lordships were to permit themselves to be constituted in those matters Courts of Appeal for the redress of such supposed grievances, they would soon have plenty to do. As for the conduct of the arbitration, he knew that the two gentlemen chosen—the present Baron Pollock by Mr. Edmunds himself, and the present Mr. Justice Denman by the Treasury—were as honourable, able, and experienced lawyers as could have been selected, while the Umpire they named, Mr. Manisty, was also an able lawyer. There was no foundation whatever for Mr. Edmunds' notion, that it was not competent for the Crown when it filed the information and obtained the decree to take an account afterwards to refer it to arbitration. It was as competent for the Crown to refer the matter to arbitration, as it was for any other person to adopt such a course under similar circumstances; and, in fact, as he had said before, it was not the Crown but Mr. Edmunds who wished the matter to be referred to arbitration. The reference was made a Rule of Court, and when the award was made, no attempt was made to set it aside; and yet they were asked to
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give credit to the statement, that the Arbitrators rejected valid evidence, and that they had failed in their duty. That was precisely the sort of thing disappointed suitors always said. It was not the habit of Courts of Justice to listen to such after-assertions, and, except he mistook their Lordships very much it would not become a habit of theirs. The decision of the Arbitrators was as binding in law as any judgment pronounced in their Lordships' House. There were no longer any accounts to be audited or passed, and Mr. Edmunds had got his quietus, which resulted in his ascertained liability to the Crown in a large sum of money. He was no longer an accountant, he was a judgment-debtor, to the Crown. With respect to the merits of the case, he did not wish to press upon Mr. Edmunds with any undue harshness; but he was compelled to remind their Lordships that the case had been three times investigated, and always with the same result. First, by Messrs. Greenwood and Hindmarch, to whom the accounts between Mr. Edmunds and the Crown were referred by Lord Westbury and the Treasury in 1864, two very honourable and very competent Gentlemen, of whom no one could say that they had any personal motives for doing injustice to Mr. Edmunds. They investigated the matter and reported that a very large sum was due from him to the Government. Upon the footing of their Report, in October, 1864, Mr. Edmunds voluntarily paid £7,872 as due from him to the Crown, of public money that had not been previously accounted for by him. That sum was paid by him, and received by the Treasury, without prejudice, on either side, to the question, whether he was or was not under any further liability. Messrs. Greenwood and Hind-march considered that there were further claims, of large amount; and the matter was not suffered, by either House of Parliament, to rest without further inquiry. In 1865, a Committee of their Lordship's House, including men so eminent, so just and honourable, as the Duke of Somerset, the late Lord Derby, the late Lord Clarendon, the Duke of Montrose, Lord Malmesbury, Lord Chelmsford, and Lord Taunton, examined the whole matter most carefully and impartially. They took the evidence of Mr. Edmunds himself, during the whole or part of five days; they heard every-

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thing which he had to say in his own justification; and their Report, so far as the matters in question between Mr. Edmunds and the Crown were concerned, was unanimous. As to the principal charges against him—on which the claims afterwards established by the award of the Arbitrators depended—their findings were these—
"The first charge," they said, "is for having between the 23rd day of August, 1853, and the present time, in concert and combination with Thomas Ruscoe, improperly caused to be obtained and applied partly to his own use and partly to the use of the said Thomas Ruscoe, allowances of discounts to a large amount upon the prices of stamps purchased from Her Majesty's Stamp Office, for use in Her Majesty's Patent Office, such stamps having been purchased with public monies, for which he or the said Thomas Ruscoe to his knowledge was accountable to Her Majesty."
"The discovery of the fact of Mr. Edmunds having obtained these discounts seems to have been one of 'the more serious matters relating to the conduct of Mr. Edmunds,' to use the language of the Preliminary Report, to which the attention of Messrs. Greenwood and Hindmarch was unexpectedly drawn during the early part of their inquiry. They express their opinion that the taking discounts on stamps, by a public officer, is a novel practice, introduced by Mr. Edmunds into the Patent Office.' The practice itself, however, seems from the evidence of the Master of the Rolls not to be so novel as Messrs. Greenwood and Hindmarch suppose; his Honour said—'There is great difficulty upon the whole question of discounts. Even now, upon applying to the Stamp Office with respect to the mode of paying for the stamps upon Patents, I understand that the Stamp Office say that the better way is to allow one of the officers in the department to take the discounts.' And Mr. Greenwood in his reply to Mr. Edmunds's statement seas—'No such practice—of taking discounts on stamps—was objected to by us; what we objected to was the practice of buying stamps at wholesale prices with the public money, and putting the profit into the private pocket of a public salaried officer.'
"In considering this charge it is necessary, therefore, to distinguish that part of it which depends upon the mere fact of taking the discounts, from that which relates to the alleged application by Mr. Edmunds of public money to this purpose."
They then proceeded to observe upon the results of the evidence, including the statements and admissions of Mr. Edmunds himself, concluding with the declaration of their opinion—
"That so much of the first charge as relates to the purchase with public monies of stamps upon which allowances of discounts were obtained by Mr. Edmunds is fully established by the evidence."
Then they said—
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"The second charge preferred against Mr. Edmunds for having improperly retained in his hands, or under his control, between the 9th August, 1852, and the month of July, 1864, without duly paying the same over into Her Majesty's Exchequer, divers large sums of money received by him for fees on Patents, which ought to have been from time to time paid by him into Her Majesty's Exchequer. Very little need be said on this head of charge, because it is distinctly admitted by Mr. Edmunds, that the last payment which he made to the Exchequer before the inquiry by Messrs. Greenwood and Hindmarch was of a sum of £1,722 1s. on the 9th August 1852. He says that 'by accident, certainly not by design, he, unfortunately, within the year 1853, did not pay over any sum to the Consolidated Fund. Finding that out in the following year,—in what may be called the most absurd cowardice,—he intermitted and made no subsequent payments.' It is difficult to understand how the nonpayment could have arisen in the first instance by accident. On the 14th May 1834 the Treasury, on receipt of a letter from Mr. Edmunds of the 26th April preceding, sent him the form of an affidavit prescribed for all the officers of the courts of law, by whom accounts of the receipt of fees are rendered, and requiring his affidavits to be made in that form. Mr. Edmunds says he is quite certain he never received any, such order, and yet, the very next payment which he made after the date of the Treasury letter in August 1834 was verified by affidavit in the form thus prescribed by the Treasury, and the affidavit with the account was transmitted to the Treasury and there filed. From that time no affidavits were sworn by Mr. Edmunds, last forms of affidavits were prepared quarterly by Ruscoe and. delivered to him; and during the time that he continued to make his payments to the Exchequer, he endorsed upon them the sums to be paid. From the time that he suspended his payments he appears to have paid no attention to the affidavits, although they were regularly delivered to him. The delivery of the affidavits to Mr. Edmunds is distinctly shown in the Preliminary Report of Messrs. Greenwood and Hindmarch, which states that they, having prepared an account of sums payable to the Consolidated Fund in each of the years beginning at 1852 and ending in 1864, Mr. Edmunds admitted the account to he correct, and that Mr. Ruscoe sent to him a formal account and affidavit to be sworn as directed by the Statute 3 and 4 W. 4. c. 84. in respect of each of the items.'
"There can be no doubt, under the above circumstances, that the second charge is fully proved against Sir. Edmunds.
"It might have been considered as some mitigation of the serious misconduct on the part of Mr. Edmunds, if the fact had been that the money paid into the Patent Office account had remained untouched, though unaccounted for, during so many years; but that this was not the case will appear in considering the third charge, to which the Committee now proceed."
"The third charge is For having from time to time improperly caused to be transferred to the credit of his private account with Messrs. Coutts and Co., bankers, from 'a separate account kept by him with the same bankers for

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the public purposes of Her Majesty's Patent Office, and having applied to his own use divers sums of public money for which he was accountable to Her Majesty.'"
As to this, after a short statement of the facts, the Committee said, that they "cannot hesitate to come to the conclusion that the third point is completely established against Mr. Edmunds." On all these points the subsequent conclusions of the arbitrators were in entire agreement with those of Messrs. Greenwood and Hindmarch, and of the Committee of their Lordships' House. And on the only point—that as to the allowance of the cost of parchments—on which their Lordships' Committee, in accordance with the later opinion of Vice Chancellor Giffard, held that Mr. Edmunds might have a moral claim to be exonerated from a legal liability, the arbitrators gave him the full benefit of that opinion; being, in substance, and in the practical result, exonerated from that portion of the claim by their award. Nevertheless, the sum found due from him by the Arbitrators, under the first head of charge—that of profits made by discounts on stamps purchased with public money—exceeded £5,000; making, with the £7,872 already paid by him in October, 1864, a total liability to the public established against him—in round numbers—of £13,000. As to the representations made by Mr. Edmunds concerning the manner in which the Arbitrators discharged their duty, he could not do better than refer their Lordships to the statements made in this House by Lord Hatherley, when the same subject was brought before the House last year by the noble Lord, the Chairman of Committees. His noble and learned Friend then stated, that the Arbitrators, at the desire of Mr. Edmunds, held public sittings; that their inquiry occupied many days; that they had heard able counsel on the part of Mr. Edmunds; and that, nevertheless, they were unanimous in their decisions—one of them having been nominated by Mr. Edmunds himself, and both of them being now Judges held in universal esteem—without any necessity for the intervention of their Umpire. Their Lordships would be able now to appreciate the probability of the statement—that these Arbitrators refused to receive any evidence which ought to have been admitted, and that
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they did not give Mr. Edmunds the opportunity of properly proving his case. There remained only one other subject on which a few words of explanation might still be necessary; namely, the opinion expressed by Vice Chancellor Giffard—when deciding the questions of principle raised between the Crown and Mr. Edmunds in the Chancery suit adversely to Mr. Edmunds—that the character of that gentleman had been cleared from all imputation. He (the Lord Chancellor) should have been perfectly content to leave Mr. Edmunds in possession of any advantage which he might derive from what passed upon that occasion, if Mr. Edmunds himself had not insisted on having all these matters raked up. But since those remarks of Vice Chancellor Giffard were so constantly referred to, it became necessary for him (the Lord Chancellor), having been Attorney General when the information in Chancery was filed, and having also been one of the counsel for the Crown before the Vice Chancellor, to explain to the House under what circumstances those remarks were really made. The noble Lord the Chairman of Committees assumed, and he had repeated more than once in the course of his speech, that the Vice Chancellor then had before him all the materials necessary for a final judgment, including the evidence taken by Messrs. Greenwood and Hindmarch, and the Reports of those gentlemen. No doubt the noble Lord had been led, by Mr. Edmunds' statements, to believe that this must have been the case. Nothing, however, could be more remote from the truth. Neither the Reports of Messrs. Greenwood and Hindmarch, nor that of the Committee of their Lordships' House, nor any part of the evidence taken before Messrs. Greenwood and Hindmarch, or before their Lordships' Committee, was, or could have been, offered in evidence before the Vice Chancellor; nor was any other evidence offered to the same or the like effect. On the contrary, for reasons which would easily be understood by those noble and learned Lords present, who were familiar with proceedings in the Court of Chancery, great care was taken, on the part of the advisers of the Crown to confine the allegations of fact in the Information, and the evidence offered in support of them, to what was absolutely and strictly necessary, for the purpose of obtaining a Decree for an

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Account. Their reasons were, first, that it would have been oppressive to Mr. Edmunds himself, and also contrary to the practice of the Court, to go into the particulars of the account proposed to be taken, in that stage of the Suit, when the only question was, whether any account should be taken at all. Secondly, it was necessary, for the purpose of that proceeding, to keep off the record everything like the suggestion of a criminal charge against Mr. Edmunds. He (the Lord Chancellor) had stated, when he was examine as Attorney General before their Lordships' Committee, that the advisers of the Crown, whether rightly or wrongly, were of opinion that the facts would have warranted criminal proceedings against Mr. Edmunds; but that it was not considered right to take such proceedings, having regard to the manner in which Mr. Edmunds had been interrogated, and to the acceptance by the Treasury of £7,872 paid by him, on the footing of a civil liability. It was, therefore, inconsistent with the nature and the object of the proceedings in Chancery, to raise unnecessarily any questions of character, or to aggravate the case against Mr. Edmunds by unnecessary personal imputations. If anything criminal had been alleged, the counsel for Mr. Edmunds, without admitting his guilt, might very properly have contended that the Court of Chancery had no jurisdiction to inquire, under colour of a suit for an account, into a criminal charge. For these reasons the counsel for the Crown abstained, as far as possible, in their pleadings, evidence, and arguments from all criminatory matter, and from going into any items of account, beyond such as were absolutely necessary to lay a foundation for the decree asked. On the other hand, Mr. Edmunds produced his own evidence, and that of his accountants and others, to put the colour which suited him upon the questions at issue, and to give his own version of the probable results of the account; and his counsel went very largely into arguments, founded partly upon this evidence, and partly upon the limited extent of the proofs then offered by the Crown, for the purpose of eliciting from the Vice Chancellor some expression of opinion, exculpating him from moral blame in these transactions. That they should have succeeded in this attempt, was, at the time, a
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matter of considerable surprise to the advisers of the Crown; because, although there never was a better Judge than Vice Chancellor Giffard, the expression of any such opinion, at that time, and upon such necessarily imperfect materials, before the final results of the account to be directed could possibly be known, was certainly unusual, and extra-judicial; and of this the learned Judge himself afterwards became sensible; for it was publicly stated by Mr. Denman in the House of Commons, after the award of the Arbitrators, that Sir George Giffard had told him, that, if he had been aware of the contents of the Reports of Messrs. Greenwood and Hindmarch, and of the proceedings before the Committee of their Lordships' House, he should not have said what actually fell from him in Mr. Edmunds' favour, whatever else he might have thought proper to say. He (the Lord Chancellor) trusted, that it was unnecessary for him now to add anything further, to convince their hardships, that, notwithstanding the high authority of the noble Lord the Chairman of Committees, they ought not to allow themselves to be influenced, by the mere fact that this unfortunate gentleman had been some time ago an officer of that House, to create in this instance a precedent totally unlike anything that had ever happened before, and such as he thought would tend greatly to shake the confidence of all persons in their Lordships' discernment as to matters connected with the responsibility of public accountants, and the administration of justice.
LORD REDESDALE,in reply, said, he still thought, after what had fallen from the noble and learned Lord (the Lord Chancellor) that the House was not in possession of all the information which it ought to possess in reference to that case. He, however, felt the responsibility now resting upon him, and should have desired to hear some of their Lordships express their opinion as to what ought to be done on the subject. As, however, no one thought proper to do so, under all the circumstances, he did not feel himself justified in dividing the House.
LORD DENMANsaid, that if the result had been more favourable to Mr. Edmunds we should not have heard any complaint of it. He added, that whether willingly or unwillingly Mr. Edmunds

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had named Mr. Fitzjames Stephen one of the Arbitrators, but on that gentleman's going to India he named Mr. (now Baron) Pollock. The Arbitrator named on behalf of the Crown was his learned relative Mr. (now Justice) Denman, who made it known that he would not accept a reference, as on a mere retainer by the Crown, but with a view to impartially deciding on both sides of the ease. It would be unfortunate if such an award were indefinitely re-opened, and he regretted the consequences of it to Mr. Edmunds as much as the noble Lord who brought forward this Motion.
On Question, Resolved in the Negative.

INDIAN APPEALS.—OBSERVATIONS.
LORD STANLEY OF ALDERLEY,in calling the attention of the House to the necessity of extending the powers for hearing Indian Appeals contained in the statute 3 & 4 William IV., c. 41, said, the principal objection which, he believed, would be made to the proposition that it was necessary or expedient to provide for appeals of Indian Princes in cases in which they were aggrieved by acts of subordinate officials was, that those acts were acts of State, and that appeals against them to a tribunal might weaken the Executive Government. In reply to that, he would point out that in almost all the cases that he was acquainted with an appeal was desired not so much against the decision of the Government, as against the grounds, or absence of judicial grounds, upon which the Government might have decided. This view was confirmed by a case which had recently been heard by the Judicial Committee. An Indian Court had rejected a claim on the ground that an act of State was impeached. The Judicial Committee heard the appeal and decided that there was no act of State, but it rejected the appeal on other grounds. Granting, however, for argument's sake, that the acts complained of were acts of State, he could cite precedents which wont far to prove that no such evil consequences need be apprehended from a course which would substitute the reign of law for that of caprice. It was the rule in Portuguese India for Governors before returning home, to give a strict account to law officers, who not only inquired into their accounts, but also sat in judgment over them, and received depositions
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of witnesses and any complaints which might be made. In the Philippine Islands the Chief Judge and Supreme Court exercised a supervision over the acts of the Government, and on some occasions condemned and prevented military expeditions, and in case of the death of the Governor the Supreme Court conducted the Government until the arrival of a new Governor. Again, by the Constitution of the United States the Supreme Court judged and revised or disallowed the legislation of the States in all cases in which that legislation might appear contrary to the Constitution. It was a subject of complaint in France that though all Frenchmen were supposed to be equal before the law, yet, in fact, they were not, since a Frenchman could not prosecute or sue a Government official even of the lowest class, without previously obtaining the sanction of the Conseil d'Etat. The state of Indian Princes and of the other subjects of Her Majesty in India, under the statute of 3 & 4 William IV., c. 41, was, therefore, similar to that of Frenchmen; they could not plead against Governmental acts, unless the Government itself consented to allow them to do so. Unless further powers of appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council than those contained in the statute of William IV. were granted, the Princes of India would now be in a worse position than that in which they stood under the Company's Government, and previous to the Proclamation by Her Majesty on her assuming the Government of India, which was intended to better their status and give them confidence and security, because previous to that Proclamation, India was under a double Government, or was supposed to be so, and it was by raising a cry against, a double Government that the East India Company was extinguished. But that double Government had this advantage for the Princes of India, that it was easier for them to appeal to the Imperial Government, and easier to obtain a hearing from Parliament; and there was also this advantage for the Imperial Government, that it was then easier to revise any act without appearing to retreat from a position already taken up. As the Princes of India could not be brought before Her Majesty's Courts in India, they had no locus standi for an appeal to the Privy Council. There remained to them,

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it was true, the possibility of appealing to Parliament; but Parliament had not time, nor was it a very fitting tribunal, for judging of such matters as might be wished to submit to it. But that resource was now almost cut off, because insinuations had been made, and had been repeated in public prints, which now made it very difficult for any Member of Parliament to take up any ease, however much he might be convinced of its justice. The necessity for some independent tribunal to decide between the Princes of India and the local officials, moreover, would be very much increased by the great extension of railways in India. These enterprises would necessarily give rise to disputes about property and jurisdiction, arising from the conduct of the constructors of railways, which sometimes led to quarrels even in our own country. The Princes of India, who formed part of what was the Mogul Empire, were subject to the paramount Power, and ought to possess the right of appeal of subjects of Her Majesty. It was also objected that by giving to the Princes of India a right of appeal to a supreme tribunal, they might be deprived of their Sovereign rights. But this objection was rather frivolous, since these Sovereign rights, whilst debarring them at present from a legal remedy, did not prevent their being dethroned by the Indian Government. But not only the Princes of India, but also Her Majesty's Indian subjects, were not on a footing of equality with Her Majesty's British subjects for obtaining redress, or even a hearing of their complaints. For instance, there were some endowments known as the Hooghly endowments for the education of the Mussulmans of Bengal. These endowments were taken away and thrown into the common fund for the education of the Hindus. This was done by an administrative act, and, consequently, no ground for an appeal existed. But it could not be said that the Imperial Government was interested in this act of a subordinate official or in maintaining it. The matter in question was not one of policy, but of rights, to be settled by the Law Officers of the Crown. A similar case happened at Penang, where Sir William Norris, who was Recorder of the Straits Settlements from 1837 to 1847, appropriated some endowments belonging to Mussulman schools to the education of Chinese and their con-
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version to Christianity. It would be easy to bring forward many cases in which it would have been advantageous to the Imperial Government, whose principal object and interest was to establish its reputation for justice, to have allowed an appeal, instead of simply confirming an act, often without further information than that furnished by the person whose act had given grounds for complaint; but he would limit himself to one case, in which it would be easy to show that the Government had acted without sufficient information. He referred to the case of the Nawab of Tonk. The India Office was unacquainted with the facts of the case, and even with elementary facts. It could not be supposed that the hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary of State for India would mis-inform the House of Commons, and he, therefore, must have been himself mis-informed. The hon. Gentleman stated that the deposed Nawab of Tonk was the grandson of a notorious Pindarree. Now, it was well known that the Pindarrees were Hindus of the Mahratta territory, and the Nawab of Tonk traced his descent back for 1,200 years through Mussulman ancestors. If the name of "Pindarree" was misused for "freebooter," it was equally inapplicable, since the grandfather of the Nawab of Tonk was in the regular service of Holkar. Further on, the hon. Gentleman stated that the Nawab of Tonk's men wore "Pathans, notorious cut-throats, men of the same tribe as the murderer of Lord Mayo." Now, Pathans were men born in India of Afghan descent, and had nothing in common with the Afreedees and other mountaineers born and bred in Afghanistan. So that in these two statements there was ignorance of elementary facts. He would now give an instance of ignorance of the facts of the case; the Under Secretary had stated that "there were 15 of the Lawa men killed, while on the Tonk side only one man fell." Whilst the fact was as appeared from the Papers laid before Parliament, and the depositions of seven Hindu witnesses, that 17 men were killed in all—10 men on the Lawa side, and 7 men on the Tonk side, one of whom was a Mussulman, and the other six were Hindu sepoys. He would not, however, rely much upon those errors in the statement of the hon. Gentleman, nor upon the fact that 84

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Members of the other House were in favour of an Address praying Her Majesty to refer this case to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. But he thought that much weight should be attributed to the opinion given by eminent counsel to questions put on this case—
"We are of opinion that if the Nawab were treated as a delinquent he was entitled to notice that the investigation was to be made, and that he would be held personally responsible, and that according to the ordinary principles of justice, which require that a man shall be duly informed of any charge brought against him, and shall have full opportunity of defending himself. The only step we could suggest to secure the Nawab's release, or a proper investigation into the circumstances of his case, would be the presentation of a Petition to Parliament, or a Petition to Her Majesty, praying Tier Majesty to give effect to the power contained in the statute 3 & 4 William IV., c. 41."
He did not think it was a strained interpretation of that opinion of counsel to suppose that, according to it, the Nawab of Tonk's case had not yet received a proper investigation, and to show its weight he need only say that it was signed by the present Lord Chancellor, Mr. Vernon Harcourt, and Mr. Farley Leith. That case alone, he thought, was sufficient to show that some alteration in the present system was necessary.
THE DUKE OF ARGYLLsaid, his noble Friend (Lord Stanley of Alderley) had raised a very large and very important question in the most inconvenient form possible. When he (the Duke of Argyll) read the Notice, he had not the remotest suspicion of the subject to which he was about to refer. Under the form of calling attention to the necessity of extending the powers for hearing Indian Appeals, his noble Friend had raised a wholly independent question—namely, whether a new tribunal should be constituted to extend to the Government of India and to the native Princes of that country, the same principles of appeal in political and criminal jurisdiction as already existed in civil matters in the case of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. He need not explain that the subject to which the noble Lord's question referred had nothing to do with the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, which was a body constituted for the purpose of hearing appeals, in the legal sense of the term, brought by persons whose suits had been previously adjudicated upon in the
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primary Courts. As, however, there was no Court of First Instance in India that was empowered to deal with political questions, it was clear there could be no such thing as an appeal in political cases. His noble Friend might, of course, contend that a political Court should be established in this country, and he listened attentively with a view to ascertain whether he would have a Court of First Instance or a Court of Appeal from some Court to be established in India; but he could not quite collect his views on that subject. If he thought that a Court sitting in London as a Court of First Instance could decide on the many difficult questions which arose between the Government of India and the native Princes, he (the Duke of Argyll) could not conceive a proposition less likely to receive the sanction of Parliament. There was not the machinery for the purpose. How could a Court in London determine matters which depended upon local evidence, and the fact whether witnesses were speaking the truth or committing perjury? Then, as to a Court of First Instance, it would be a Court of criminal jurisprudence for the Princes, and of political jurisdiction for the Government of India. Such a Court would largely supersede the functions of the Government, for it would, of necessity, be a Court to which the Princes of India would be amenable, and it would also exercise large political powers over the Government. It would thus have the power to substitute itself for the Government of India in regard to nearly every great question that might arise. There were three possible cases in which they might have to deal severely with the native Princes. The first divided itself into two branches, one, that of suspicion of political treachery against our Sovereign power, and he need hardly say there had been such cases; the other, that of disaffection to the Sovereignty of the Queen, of which a case occurred in the person of the King of Delhi, who on the breaking out of the Mutiny, made himself particeps criminis, and he and his family were dispossessed. Another case was that of the Rajah of Sattara, who was deposed in 1838. Could the Government of India delegate the power they exercised in those cases to any tribunal whatsoever? Was it not evident that it was a political function which must be kept in the hands of the

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Government of India? Then there was the case, not of political disaffection, but of gross political mismanagement of their own territory on the part of the native Princes. That was a much more delicate and difficult question to deal with, and it was one which the Government of India must reserve to itself to settle. However cruel or oppressive Princes might be to their subjects, the British Government never allowed civil war. Were they, then, to delegate to any tribunal the decision of the question whether the government of a particular Prince had reached such a point as to justify the interference of our Government? He would refer to but one ease, that of the great Kingdom of Oude and the deposition of its King in pursuance of the decision of the Government of India and of the Cabinet of England—a decision which he, for one, did not regret. The House would recollect the long-suffering of the Government of India with regard to the King of Oude. The action of Lord Dalhousie in reference to the Government of Oude was abundantly justified, as the noble Lord would find on reference to the Papers relating to the annexation. In fact, the misgovernment of Oude had reached a point which rendered it the absolute duty of the Imperial Government to assume the administration of the affairs of the Kingdom; but such a question was for the Government and not for a Court of First Instance. Then there was a third case, not of political treachery or of general mismanagement, but of individual and particular crime—happily a very rare case, but of which there had been one or two instances in the course of many years. One took place in 1838, and judging from it, he contended that Government should have the means of dealing with particular crimes. He would not, however, say that there might not be some amendment in the mode in which the Government of India dealt with the case of native Princes accused of crime. The ordinary course had been to secure a careful report from our Political Resident after he had inquired into the case. The report went through the hands of the higher political officers until it reached the Supreme Government. In that course of proceeding amendment might possibly be suggested. Instead of taking the report of a single political officer, it might be advisable to send
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down to him a strong commission, containing, perhaps, a judicial element, to inquire and take evidence on the spot as to the alleged crime. Such an amendment as that might very well be considered by the Government of India and the Government at home. But of this he was quite sure, that if amendment were required, it would not take the form of an independent Court. He threw that out merely as a suggestion, but strongly deprecated the proposition that the Judicial Committee in London or a Court of First Instance in India should be vested with political power to intervene between the Government of India and the native Princes.

ARMY—THE MILITIA RESERVE—ANNUAL BOUNTY.
THE MARQUESS OF EXETER,in asking Her Majesty's Government, Upon what grounds the Annual Bounty was refused to men of the Militia Reserve who enlisted in 1868 and whose term of service did not expire till after the training of 1873; Also, whether the withholding of the bounty is not in contravention of paragraph 16 of the Regulations under the Act 9th May, 1868, and further explained by paragraph 10 of the Memorandum of Conditions of Service in the Militia Reserve, 23rd April, 1869, A (Militia) 136, in which commanding officers of regiments are expressly ordered to read and explain to the men three times during each training—said, he felt it necessary, though a commanding officer, to bring the matter before the House, because the men in his regiment had expressed themselves dissatisfied with what had been done to them. He considered that the clause was perfectly clear, and that the men who enlisted under it were to receive on attestation £1 bounty and another at the close of each annual training during the period of their service. That was a matter of much importance, and if it were desired that the Reserve men should not be dissatisfied, the payments which were promised should be made.
THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNEsaid the noble Marquess (the Marquess of Exeter) was mistaken in supposing that any instalment of bounty to which these men were entitled had been withheld. They had received the last instalment at the end of the training of

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1872. Their original engagement was made at the end of the training of 1868, when they received £1 in the nature of a retaining fee. The noble Marquess would therefore see that for their five trainings they had received £5. He felt bound to acknowledge that the original Regulation might have been framed more clearly, but as far as he was aware there had never been any doubt as to the amount to be paid, and no misapprehension had arisen except in the case of two regiments.
VISCOUNT HARDINGEpointed out that the precedent which had been made by the War Office was not a good one, and complained of the way in which the regulations had been drawn; for as they stood they admitted of two interpretations, and the men might reasonably consider that they were entitled to another £1 each. He understood that some 300 or 400 of the men to whom reference had been made were so discontented that they would not enter into a new engagement. Would it not be a proper thing for the Inspector General of Militia to look into it at once, and see if the services of these men could not be retained?
THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNEsaid, he could not understand how any misconception could have arisen.
LORD STRATHNAIRNsaid, the difficulty had, without doubt, arisen through the ambiguous wording of the Memorandum, and that it was extremely to be regretted there should have been any hitch in reference to Militia engagements.

ELEMENTARY EDUCATION ACT—SCHOOL BOARDS.—QUESTION.
LORD BUCKHURSTsaid, while he did not wish to embarrass the Government on the subject of education, it was highly inconvenient to the public that any doubt or ambiguity should exist as to the intentions of the Government with regard to a question of such great importance. He thought it might be assumed that the subject of compulsory education would not be further proceeded with by Her Majesty's Government, but still there remained the question of school boards. Now it was quite clear that there might be compulsory education without school boards and school boards without compulsory education. No doubt much good had in many in-
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stances resulted from the establishment of school boards, but it must be remembered that school boards had imposed upon the ratepayers very heavy additional burdens—and in some cases still increasing burdens. It should also be remembered that school boards possessed the very great power of compelling parents to send their children to school Under those circumstances, he thought it was not unnatural that some anxiety should exist as to the future intentions of Her Majesty's Government with regard to making school boards generally compulsory. It was not, therefore, without some surprise that he read a statement reported to have been made not long ago by a noble Earl opposite who not unfrequently represented Her Majesty's Government in that House. The noble Earl was reported to have remarked at a public meeting on educational matters, held in the West of England, that it would be a great advantage to have the system of school boards universal and compulsory, as in Scotland. Further, the noble Earl was said to have stated for the guidance of the meeting, that he had reason to believe that before long steps would be taken for the establishment of a school board in every parish or district in England. In conclusion, he begged to ask, If it is the intention of Her Majesty's Government to take any further steps relative to the establishment of school boards, and especially with reference to making them compulsory? No doubt, the noble Earl had been misrepresented, and the answer to the Question now put to the Government would possibly give an explanation.
THE EARL OF MORLEYsaid, he wished to furnish the desired explanation. The report alluded to caused him as much astonishment and consternation as it had produced in the mind of the noble Lord opposite. The words he used were most inaccurately reported; and besides, he merely expressed his individual opinion at a school meeting in his own parish in the West of England. He said there might eventually be a general system of school boards throughout the country; but he never thought his words would have found their way into the London newspapers, and still less did he think they would be considered as spoken by the authority of the Government. He had not the slight-

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est knowledge of the intentions of the Government, and, if he had known them, he trusted their Lordships were satisfied that he would not have been so injudicious as to state them on that occasion. He only expressed an individual opinion as to what might be the ultimate result of the school board system.
VISCOUNT HALIFAXhoped his answer would be equally as satisfactory as the explanation just offered. Whatever doubt there might have been as to the intention of the Government a week ago, there could hardly be any misapprehension now, after the statement recently made in the other House by the right hon. Gentleman the Vice President of the Education Department. The right hon. Gentleman paid a tribute to the great voluntary exertions which had been made in all parts of the country to establish elementary schools, and stated that he anticipated the continuance of these voluntary exertions. Under those circumstances, the Government did not think it desirable to make the establishment of school boards compulsory where they were not necessary.

VISIT OF THE SHAH OF PERSIA—THE NAVAL AND MILITARY REVIEWS.

  QUESTION
  LORD ORANMORE AND BROWNEasked Her Majesty's Government, Whether it is their intention to give directions to insure accommodation for the Members of both Houses of Parliament and their wives at the naval and military reviews, as well as at any other public entertainments given at public expense in honour of the visit of the Shah of Persia to this country?
  THE EARL. OF CAMPERDOWNsaid, the visit to the Fleet would partake more of the character of an inspection than of a review, because the iron-dads at Spit-head would be at anchor, and the Royal Yacht would pass between them. If any of their Lordships wished to be present, he had to request that they would be good enough to place their names as early as possible on a paper, which would be loft in the Prince's Chamber for the purpose, and a ticket would be forwarded to each from the Admiralty. That ticket would admit the bearer to a Government vessel, which would accompany the Royal Yacht on the inspection. Special trains would not be provided at the expense of
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  the Government, as on a former occasion; but he had no doubt that that matter would be satisfactorily attended to by the Railway Companies.
  House adjourned at a quarter before Eight o'clock, 'till To-morrow, half-past Ten o'clock.