ADDRESS FOR CORRESPONDENCE.

HL Deb 28 July 1873 vol 217 cc1077-83

LORD STANLEY OF ALDERLEY

called the attention of the House to the affairs of Achin, and to move an Address to Her Majesty for a Copy of the Correspondence relating to the abrogation of the Treaty of 1824. The noble Lord said that a Convention was signed at the Hague on the 2nd November, 1871, and ratified February, 1872, between Her Majesty and the King of the Netherlands for the settlement of their relations in the Island of Sumatra. That Convention was presented to Parliament in 1872; but it did not appear to have attracted any attention till this year, when its effects made themselves felt. The Convention abrogated that part of the Treaty of 1824 between Great Britain and the Netherlands which prevented the Dutch extending their dominion in Sumatra north of the Line. No cause had been shown for signing this Convention. Its effects had been most injurious to British interests; and the interests of this country in the Indian Ocean and Straits of Malacca, which should have been carefully watched over by the Go- vernment, had been sacrificed to that department of the Colonial Office which looked after the West Coast of Africa, and which, in its anxiety to include the whole of that Coast within its jurisdiction, had saddled us with an Ashantee War, besides the other injurious effects to which he now wished to call the attention of their Lordships. The Treaty of 1824, which had subsisted for almost 50 years, had become part of the public law of the countries adjoining the Malacca Straits, as much so as the Treaty of Vienna was the public law of Europe; and Her Majesty's Government was not justified in abrogating it without regard to the interests and obligations which had grown up under it. Tinder this Treaty Her Majesty's subjects carried on trade with Bender Achin, and other parts of Sumatra, and the population of Sumatra had friendly relations with the British Straits Settlements, and trusted to the Treaty of 1824. This had been abrogated without any necessity even on the part of the Dutch, who had no grounds for quarrel with Achin, which had done them no injury. The Dutch had attacked Achin, and failed. There were grounds for hoping that they would not renew the attack, and that Her Majesty's Government might use their utmost endeavours to engage them not to renew it; for should it be renewed, and be successful, the fall of Achin would be ruinous to our prestige throughout Southern Asia, and the utmost dissatisfaction would be felt, not only by Her Majesty's European and Malay subjects in the Straits Settlements, but also by all the Malays in the Malay Peninsula, whose goodwill was very important to us. It was not only the prestige of this country, but also its commercial interests, that had been injured by this new Convention; for if the Dutch should carry out their designs of last spring the whole of the pepper trade of Penang would be lost. The Dutch system in Java, besides being one most opposed to freedom of trade, differed so little from slavery—for the Dutch called it unpaid labour—that it did not appear why Her Majesty's Government should have been desirous to promote its extension to the whole of the north of Sumatra, or why they did not make the necessary reservations on behalf of Achin, which State was entitled to expect that we should not forget its ancient independence, and a history which at some periods had been brilliant;—for Achin was an independent State at the time when Holland was a Spanish province. After that time Achin exercised a great influence in the Malacca Straits, and sent out large fleets, which frequently engaged the Portuguese fleets victoriously. Rather more than 300 years ago Achin put itself under the protection of the Ottoman Porte, and the heavy guns which Sultan Selim sent as presents to the King of Achin were still to be seen at Pidir and Pasé. This fact was mentioned in a Dutch history of the East Indian Islands by Mr. Temminck. It was now for the fourth time that Achin had sought the protection of the Ottoman Porte. It might be asked why the Dutch had attacked the independence of a free State which had done them no harm, and this at a time when they had not yet recovered from the fears which they had good reason to entertain for their own independence after the into French war—for it was well known that a party in Germany aimed at absorbing Holland and acquiring the Dutch colonies, and a still larger portion of the Germans had been persuaded into the false belief that the Dutch would be not unwilling to be united or annexed to Germany. Under these circumstances, it was not a matter for surprise that a Dutch General should have been despatched to renew the attack upon Achin, under the auspices and with the encouragement of the German Minister at the Hague. But this policy was equally shortsighted on the part of Holland and Germany; on the part of Holland, because this aggressive policy must diminish the sympathies which would otherwise be felt for that country if its independence was menaced; and on the part of Germany, because if German hopes should ever be realized, and should Germany acquire Holland and a claim to the Dutch colonies—and Germany had as much and as little right to annex Holland as Holland had to attack and annex Achin—the recognition of that claim by England would be far more doubtful if Sumatra were included with Java. In such a contingency the conduct of Her Majesty's Government was already marked out by what took place when Holland fell into the hands of France at the beginning of the century; and whilst it might be possible that Great Britain should acquiesce in the transfer of Java to other masters, it would be impossible for England to suffer Achin to pass into the hands of a strong military Power. For, as Admiral Sherard Osborn had recently pointed out, Achin was a station of extreme importance in maritime strategy; it commanded not only the Straits of Malacca and the China trade, but also the approaches to Rangoon and British Burmah. It was true that the new Convention gave to British subjects the right to trade with Indrapura, and with other Sumatran States that might become dependent on the Dutch Government; but it made a distinction between Her Majesty's European and Asiatic subjects, placing the latter under the exceptional and harsh Dutch legislation, and, as this trade was carried on by Her Majesty's Asiatic subjects, it would be much discouraged. But it was not only the policy of this Article which was bad—its legality also was doubtful; for after the words of Her Majesty's Proclamation on assuming the government of India, it was not open to Her Majesty's Government to contract to make distinctions between Her Majesty's British and Indian subjects, and the treatment to which they might be subjected and the amount of protection to be afforded them. The words of the Proclamation were— We hold ourselves bound to the Natives of our Indian Territories by the same obligations of duty which bind us to all our other subjects, and those obligations, by the blessing of Almighty God. We shall faithfully and conscientiously fulfil. And, again, Her Majesty declared her will and. pleasure—"That all shall alike enjoy the equal and impartial protection of the law." There was a case of a similar nature, that of the Free Blacks; the State of South Carolina had passed a law providing for the imprisonment of all negroes who might come to that State, and who were not slaves, for fear of their communicating ideas of freedom to the slaves. Under this law coloured sailors from the Bermudas and Bahama Islands on arriving in British ships at Charleston were clapped into prison. Lord Palmerston, however, never accepted that state of things, and protested against the validity of a law passed by one of the States in opposition to the rights of all British subjects under the general treaty with the United. States. There was one Article in this Convention which would have been perfect had it only been reciprocal, instead of being only in favour of the Dutch. The 4th Article provided that the Convention should remain without effect until it had received the approval of the States General:—and it was to be regretted that there was not a similar reservation in respect of the sanction of the British Parliament. In moving for the Correspondence relative to this Convention, he did not ask for any Correspondence with regard to the benefits to be obtained by bringing all the Gold Coast under British dominion and our troops into conflict with the Ashantees; but he asked for any Papers which would show on what grounds or by whose advice the Government sanctioned the abrogation of the Treaty of 1824, and the sacrifice of its valuable provisions without any necessity, advantage, or equivalent. Moved, "That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty for Copy of the Correspondence relating to the abrogation of the Treaty of 1824."—(The Lord Stanley of Alderley.)

EARL GRANVILLE

was understood to say that he had followed the policy commenced by the Earl of Clarendon, and pursued by the Earl of Derby, in regard to this question. He had been unable to follow his noble Friend's speech with perfect clearness, but he would answer it in the best way he could, The Treaty of 1824 failed to prevent the gradual annexation of the island by the Dutch. Under it England ceded to Holland all her possessions in Sumatra, and engaged to form no British settlement and conclude no treaty with any native Power there. This concession was made, in part requital for the cession of Malacca to England, and the withdrawal of Dutch objections to the British occupation of Singapore. Security against Dutch encroachments injurious to British trade was thought to be given by the Article which bound either party not to conclude treaties with native Powers detrimental to the other. But the Dutch annexed the territories of those Powers, and thus put their ports outside the Treaty by making them Dutch territory. The British Government protested in vain; and the Dutch continued their encroachments till in 1858 the whole of the East Coast which faces our Straits Settlements was in their hands except the kingdom of Achin. The latest annexation was that of Siak, in taking which the Dutch took certain districts the sovereignty over which was disputed between Siak and Achin. But the Dutch were galled by our protests; though they neglected them; and when it became obvious that the Treaty of 1824 afforded no protection to our trade with Sumatra, we resolved to change our policy and endeavour to obtain that protection in exchange for our power of protesting. This is the principle of our conduct in the negotiations which have been pursued for the last 10 years and have now been brought to a successful issue. The Dutch have agreed to place British trade on an equality with Dutch trade in all the ports of Sink, and in any districts of Sumatra that may hereafter be annexed by them; and we in return have simply abandoned our right of protest against encroachments, past and future. In other words, we allow the Dutch to civilize Sumatra if they can, we ourselves being absolutely precluded from doing so; and we have gained substantial concessions in favour of British trade, which we could not have gained but for the growing liberal feeling in Holland. The supposition that we made a sacrifice in Sumatra in order to gain territory on the Gold Coast is exactly the reverse of the fact; for by taking over the possessions of the Dutch in the Gold Coast we conferred a benefit on them; and by concluding the Sumatra Treaty they have conferred a substantial benefit on us, since we have gained solid advantages whilst losing nothing. Nor is there any ground for the idea that we have treated Achin badly. In 1819, we formed, by Treaty, a defensive alliance with Achin, accompanied by an engagement that she should exclude the subjects of all Powers except England from a fixed residence in her dominions, and should not conclude a Treaty with any foreign Power without our consent. When, in 1824, we undertook to withdraw altogether from Sumatra, this Treaty became impossible; and it was consequently agreed that it should be modified into a simple arrangement for the hospitable reception of British subjects and vessels in the port of Achin. The modification was made, not by a formal deed, but by practice which, for half-a-century, has been fully under- stood both by England and by Achin. England has never claimed the exclusion of all Europeans except Englishmen from Achin. But, if our repudiation of the Treaty of 1819 has been negative, that of Achin has unquestionably been positive; for, in 1857, she ratified a Treaty of peace, friendship, and commerce with Holland. placing her in the position of the most favoured nation. If the Treaty of 1819 had been in force, this Treaty of 1857 would have been a direct breach of faith towards Great Britain; but we never made such an objection, knowing that the Sultan was perfectly justified in considering himself freed from his obligations. If, however, he is relieved, England is also relieved. The only engagement now in existence between the two countries is that which has, in practice, been always observed by Achin, that British vessels and subjects should be hospitably received in her ports. He really thought that the Government of this country had made a very good bargain in carrying out their now policy. The Treaty of 1824 had proved to be wholly impracticable, and he considered that his noble Friend had made out no case showing that British interests would be injured by the course which the Government had pursued.

Motion agreed to.