Lords Sitting of 24 July 1873

MINUTES.
PUBLIC BILLS—First Reading—Extradition Act (1870) Amendment* (235). Second Reading—Salmon Fisheries (215) Turnpike Acts Continuance, &c.* (223).
Committee—Militia (Service, &c.)* (206–237).
Committee—Report—Steam Threshing Machines* (210–239); Medical Act Amendment (University of London)* (214); Exchequer Bonds (£1,600,000)* (222); Treasury Chest Fund* (217); Consolidated Fund, &c. (Permanent Charges Redemption)* (198); Military Manœuvres* (216).
Report— Conveyancing, (Scotland) (227–238): Petitions of Right (Ireland)* (233).
Third Reading—Elementary Education Provisional Order Confirmation (No. 1)* (167), and passed.

SALMON FISHERIES BILL.—(No. 215.)
(The Earl of Morley.)

SECOND READING.
Order of the Day for the Second Reading, read.
THE EARL OF MORLEY,in moving that the Bill which had come up from the Commons, be now read the second time, briefly explained its objects. The main purpose of the measure was to render the existing law more elastic. Power would be given to the Home Secretary to vary the limits of the fishing districts. The 40th clause, which was the backbone of the measure, would enable the conservators of rivers to draw up by-laws and to alter the close time within certain limits. The by-laws would not be valid until approved by the Secretary of State, who might, if he thought fit, order an investigation before granting his consent. As the details could be better discussed in Committee he did not feel it necessary to enter into them on this stage.
Moved, "That the Bill be now read 2a." —(The Earl of Morley.)
THE EARL OF MALMESBURYgave Notice that he would move Amendments in Committee.
Motion agreed to; Bill read 2a accordingly, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House on Monday next.

CONVEYANCING (SCOTLAND) BILL.
(The Lord Chancellor.)

(NO. 227.) REPORT OF AMENDMENTS.
Amendments reported (according to Order).
THE DUKE OF RICHMONDmoved to insert words providing that the Act should not come into operation till the 1st of January, 1874. The Bill would cause a great disturbance in the existing mode of land conveyance in Scotland, and therefore he thought that a proper amount of time should be given to persons who were in the habit of transacting land conveyancing business to prepare for the change about to be made.
THe LORD CHANCELLORsaid, he did not object to the postponement suggested by the noble Duke.
Amendment made accordingly.
Further Amendments made; Bill to be road 3a To-morrow, and to be printed as amended. (No. 238.)

THE ALBERT AND EUROPEAN ARBITRATIONS—EX-LORD CHANCELLORS.
Order of the Day for considering the Commons Amendments to the SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE BILL, read.
LORD CAIRNS: Before proceeding to the consideration of these Amendments I will ask permission of your Lordships to make an explanatory statement upon a matter personal to myself, and which, I think, had better be kept distinct from the merits or demerits of' any of the Amendments we are about to consider. I have said that the statement I wish to make is personal to myself; but if it were merely personal to myself I am not sure that at this period of the Session I should have ventured to delay your Lordships in proceeding to other business. But the charge or the statement to which I am about to refer, although personal to myself, conveys also in it that which appears to me to be a reflection upon the conduct of the legal business of your Lordships' House, and therefore I think it is my duty to mention it to your

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Lordships, and to make the statement for which I have asked permission. I have yet another reason for taking this course. The charge, while referring to me, refers also to one whose voice can no longer be heard among us to defend himself—I mean my late lamented Friend Lord Westbury—and knowing as I do the facts of the case, it is my duty on behalf of his memory, as well as on my own behalf, to call your Lordships' attention to the subject which I am about to mention. One of the Amendments which has been made in the Judicature Bill—and on the merits or demerits of the Amendment I am not now about to say a word—has dealt with the question of the relations between those who may hereafter be appointed to the office of Lord Chancellor and the Appellate Court created by the Bill; and a provision has been introduced into this Bill with regard to the terms upon which future Lord Chancellors shall be expected to take and to hold office. The argument by which that Amendment was pressed by the Prime Minister and the Attorney General had reference to circumstances connected with myself and the late Lord Westbury. The right hon. and the hon. and learned Gentleman to whom I have just alluded referred to some cases in which, under the authority of Acts of Parliament, Lord Westbury and myself have acted for some time in the discharge of a high judicial function created by the Acts. As far as I am personally concerned, the Acts of Parliament were, one connected with the London, Chatham, and Dover Railway, and another connected with certain Insurance Companies, of which the Albert was the head; and the statement made was, that my late Friend and myself had assumed in our positions as ex-Chancellors the transaction of that which was private as distinguished from public business; and the suggestion was, that that which was termed private business had interfered with the performance of what were described as our public duties, and that therefore legislation upon the subject for the future had become necessary. The Prime Minister and the Attorney General were good enough to say that they did not deny the perfect right of either my noble Friend or myself to act as we had done; but they stated that the House of Commons had a right to prevent a repetition of
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that which had been done—or, at all events, that they had a right so to guard the relations of ex-Chancellors towards the public as that the consequences which had been suggested should not again occur. Of those statements and arguments made and urged in the other House of Parliament I had no notice—if I had such notice, I could possibly, through the kindness of some Friends of my own who are Members of the House of Commons, have laid before the audience addressed the facts which I am now about to state to your Lordships. My late Friend, Lord Westbury, could not have had such notice, for at the time the statements were made he was in a condition in which notice could not have been given to him; and the same circumstances spared him what I cannot but think would have been to him the inexpressible pain of being made aware of the observations which had been made by his Friends upon his course of action. I will now state to your Lordships the facts which ought to be mentioned with reference to this subject. The charge divides itself into two portions. In the first place. there is the suggestion that judicial occupations of a private nature were undertaken by Lord Westbury and myself; and, in the second place, there is the statement that such occupations interfered and must interfere with the duties to be performed by us in this House. Let me, therefore, lay before your Lordships the short facts connected with the first Act of Parliament to which I have referred. A few years ago, the London, Chatham, and Dover Railway was on the point of collapse—or I suppose I might say had been reduced to a state of insolvency. The interests involved in that Company were between £17,000,000 and £18,000,000 sterling. There were, at the time the Act was passed, no less than 46 Chancery suits and 78 actions at Common Law pending with reference to the affairs of the Company; and, in addition, there were filed for the consideration of the Arbitrators appointed under the Act of Parliament 79 cases. At the time the Act was passed, the large revenues of the Company were entirely locked up, and whole families were reduced to destitution, because the income which they ought to have derived from the securities of the Company could not be paid. In addition to the Chancery

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suits which I have mentioned, some branches of the Courts, and particularly the Chambers, were absolutely blocked up and impeded by the magnitude and the cumbrousness of the litigation which had arisen. Tinder these circumstances, a measure was introduced into Parliament, and it was proposed that a special tribunal should be created in order to deliver the Company from its embarrassments. I have no word to say in favour of the policy of special tribunals. I have always entertained a very strong opinion against their policy, for I look upon the creation of special tribunals of this kind as a species of reproach upon our whole system of judicature. That, however, is not the question now under consideration. An application was made to my noble Friend not now present (the Marquess of Salisbury) and myself to act as Arbitrators. The answer I made was, that if Parliament conceived that I could be performing with advantage a public duty by undertaking the office proposed to be created by the Act, and if powers were conferred which appeared to me to be adequate to rescue the Company and those concerned in it from the difficulties they were in, I should feel myself bound to perform the duty which Parliament would thus impose upon me. I do not know what answer my noble Friend (the Marquess of Salisbury) returned, but I presume it would be something to the same effect. The Act of Parliament was passed and powers of the most ample and unusual kind were conferred upon us. The term "Arbitrator" was applied to us by that Act; but, in point of fact, the office we were asked to undertake was not that of Arbitrators at all. I understand an arbitrator to be a person who by the agreement of other persons decides disputes between them. But there was no agreement in this case—there was an absolute, unqualified, and unappealable power conferred by the Act upon the Arbitrators in reference to the whole affairs of the Company. They were clothed with a power higher than that possessed by any Court of Law or Equity in the country, and, as I have said, their decisions were unappealable and irreversible. I repeat that I do not argue with the policy of the Act; but the result of its working was that the whole of the litigation which had arisen and had occupied the Courts to the extent I have
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mentioned was finally concluded in 18 months from the time of the passing of the Act. I am not unwilling to admit that I look with satisfaction upon this result, although I question the policy of the Act of Parliament under which it was attained. I attribute the result mainly to the unexampled assistance which I received from my co-Arbitrator in the work. What I now want to ask your Lordships is, whether it is proper to describe the discharge of duties such as these as the assumption of private business to the detriment of public duties? I do not wish to argue the question; but I will state to your Lordships the views which I take of it. I believe the duties which under the Act of Parliament were imposed upon me, and which I performed, were duties which for their authority and their sanction, and as regards their responsibility, were as high in their nature and as public, and were as much clothed with the whole power and force of the Parliament of the country, as are the functions performed either by the Prime Minister or the Attorney General. Now, I pass to the other Act of Parliament to which I have referred. About five years ago, a huge Assurance Company—the Albert—collapsed and failed. In that Company were rolled up some 20 or more of other Assurance Companies. Your Lordships will be surprised to hear that the number of persons interested in the failure as policyholders was upwards of 23,000, everyone of whom either had or might have a separate case which he might raise and require to have determined. The number of shareholders having different interests was upwards of 2,000. The business of endeavouring to settle the affairs of the Company had gone on in the Court of Chancery for something like two years. It had been found absolutely impossible to arrive at the solution of any one of the various questions which were involved in the failure. Nothing had been got in and nothing had been paid at the time I speak of, and at the end of two years after the failure the only result of the proceedings was the incurring of an amount of costs, the magnitude of which would startle your Lordships were I to mention the figures. In this state of things, how came it to be suggested that Parliament should create a special and exceptional tribunal for dealing with the case? Lord Justice James made the

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following remarks upon the case, and those remarks were quoted in Parliament as a justification of the Bill:—
"I considered that as a Vice Chancellor could only give a portion of his time to things of that kind, it was desirable that Parliament should find some means of appointing some special tribunal which could give the time that was necessary and not give merely portions of days or portions of weeks. I did not see how it was to be worked out under half-a-century, if it could be done in that time. That was really the ground on which I proceeded."
Again, I have nothing to say as to the policy upon which Parliament proceeded in passing a Bill in conformity with the recommendation of this learned Judge. I was asked to undertake the office which was to be created under the Act. I stated that I was not much encouraged by my former experience; but in this case too, knowing the extent to which the Court of Chancery was blocked up hr the litigation—knowing, also, the extent of the interests which were involved, and the amount of misery which was being suffered by persons interested—I stated that if Parliament thought fit to confer upon me the duty of acting upon this tribunal, I should feel myself bound to accept the duty and perform it to the best of my power. Acting on this tribunal—which the Prime Minister and the Attorney General pleasantly describe as a piece of private business—powers were vested in me which I certainly believe were undesirable, for the Act of Parliament not only armed me with the whole of the powers of the Court of Chancery without appeal, but gave me in every part of Her Majesty's dominions, in every colony, in India, and in all Her Majesty's possessions, all the powers of all the Courts in these colonies and possessions. I look with some surprise upon the magnitude of those powers, and I trust I have exercised them with care; but I do not think the exercise of such powers can be called private business. The result is this—I am happy to say that at the end of the first year after the passing of the Act of Parliament, the first award, which settled almost all the cases in dispute, has been made; the second award is on the point of being made; every case has been heard and disposed of; and the only circumstance which prevents the whole proceeding being wound up and closed is that some assets remain to be got in, and that persons to whom money has been
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awarded will not come and take it away. Let me add one fact. These Acts of Parliament contained clauses contemplating the refusal of the persons named, and if I had refused the office, Parliament has thought fit to declare by these clauses that the only persons who could be appointed in my place were just the persons to whom the objections of the Prime Minister and the Attorney General would apply as much as to myself—namely, ex-Lord Chancellors. Judges of one of the Superior Courts, or Members of the Judicial Committee. Let me now say a word as to the case in which Lord Westbury acted. Subsequently to the failure of the Albert, another huge Assurance Company, the European, collapsed, and a similar Bill was introduced for dealing with its affairs. While it was pending Lord Westbury came to me and said he had been asked to discharge the duties which were created by the Bill, and he was good enough to add that he had declined to do so unless he found that I was unwilling to undertake these duties. I said it was quite impossible for me to undertake them, and I begged him earnestly, if he found his health and strength equal to the task, not to fail to give to the public—because it was given to the public—the benefit of the assistance which he, perhaps, beyond all other men could give in such a case. I believe it was owing to my strong representation that Lord Westbury very reluctantly undertook to give effect to the Act of Parliament. I come now to the other question—whether the discharge of those duties has interfered with my duties in this House. As regards those persons who have held the office which I have had the honour to hold, I apprehend there is little doubt as to their duties to the public. I hold that, altogether irrespective of the office which I have had the honour to holding. I, as a Member of your Lordships' House, and as what is called a Legal Member of the House, am bound by my obligations to your Lordships to undertake, to the best of my poor ability, along with my noble and learned Friends, the duties of the Appellate Jurisdiction of this House; and I hold, again, that, irrespective of any office which I have had the honour of holding, as a Member of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, when summoned by Her Ma-

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jesty to attend the Judicial Committee, I am bound to attend and offer my services there. But let me now consider the charge which was made that the functions I have described interfered with my duties in the House. The proceedings in the case of the London, Chatham, and Dover Railway Company occurred in 1859. On looking back I find that 18 sittings were held by my noble Friend and myself in that case, and not one of those 18 sittings was held upon a day devoted to appellate business in your Lordships House. So much for that charge. I have also turned to the case of the Albert Company. I find that 38 sittings were held under the Albert Act. Out of these 38 sittings, only four were held upon days when judicial business was taken in this House; and upon one of those days I find that, owing to the meetings being at different hours, I was able to sit in this House as well as in the Arbitration. Thus, out of 56 sittings which occurred during five years, three only were held upon days when judicial business was proceeding here. Your Lordships will now be able to judge what degree of foundation there was for the statement either that the duties undertaken by me were private duties, or that they interfered with my duties in this House. I have already stated that I had no notice of the statement or the charge—whichever it must be called—made against me in the other House of Parliament. I must go further. This is a Bill which began in your Lordships' House. It was considered here upon the second reading, and also before a Select Committee, upon which there were several Members of Her Majesty's Government. The scheme of the Bill then was, that future Chancellors should have their choice of a certain pension if they were willing to serve upon the Appellate Court, and of a certain other pension if they were unwilling to do so. That clause was not accepted in the Select Committee, and I rather think that the Members of the Government concurred in its omission. What I have to call your Lordships' attention to, however, though not by way of complaint against my noble and learned Friend on the Woolsack, is this—if the Government were of opinion that any functions undertaken by Lord Westbury and myself should be made the foundation of changes in the Bill,
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why was not that opinion expressed here? Why were not the proposals of the Government made here? Why was this statement made in "another place?" Why were these proposals reserved till the last stage of the Bill in "another place?" What led to a change in the Bill in the other House I do not stay to inquire. I have laid the facts before your Lordships, and I leave it to your Lordships as men of honour to judge whether the course adopted in this case by the Prime Minister and by the Attorney General has been marked by courtesy or by justice.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, one thing I cannot help saying, and that is, that whatever reason there may be for regretting that anything should have been said elsewhere which could have touched or moved the feelings of my noble and learned Friend, or of the other noble and learned Lord to whom he has referred, on one point I think your Lordships have no reason to feel regret—and that is that my noble and learned Friend should have had an opportunity of giving so fully before your Lordships and before the country the facts of this case, and of so entirely justifying himself from any personal imputation. But I cannot for a moment think that any personal imputation was by anyone intended. I can assure my noble and learned Friend that there was no premeditated idea on the part of the Government, or. I will undertake to say, on the part of any Members of the other House, of casting any imputation upon my noble and learned Friend or upon Lord Westbury, and I am convinced that a desire of making such reflections as my noble and learned Friend imagines was not the groundwork of the change in the Bill made in the other House. For reasons right or wrong, that change was made in the Bill—a particular alteration affecting the position of future Lord Chancellors was proposed to be made; and it is undoubtedly true that those who addressed the House, and to whom reference has been made, did refer to the parts taken by my noble and learned Friend and Lord-Westbury in the Arbitrations in question, as in their opinion furnishing some reason why for the future those arrangements should be made. I feel persuaded that if the whole case, as it has been put by my noble and

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learned Friend, had been before the minds of those who, I am convinced, then spoke without any premeditation, and certainly without any intention of casting imputation, no such observations would have been made. For my part, I do not deem that a sufficient reason for what the other House has done with regard to that clause; but I am sure that nothing that was said was intended to cast personal reflections upon those who undertook the duties undertaken by my noble and learned Friend and Lord Westbury under Acts of Parliament. I am bound to add that it appears to me that when Parliament thought fit to create new special Courts with such enormous and unprecedented powers, it was totally impossible that any persons should be entrusted with those powers except learned men who had the greatest judicial experience, and who, from the public opinion of their capacity, as well as of their virtue, might obtain the confidence of the country in the exercise of such extraordinary powers. If those Acts were to pass at all, it was an indispensable condition that some such men as my noble and learned Friend and Lord Westbury, if they could be prevailed upon to undertake those duties, should discharge them. They did undertake those duties under the direct cognizance of both branches of the Legislature—if I do not mistake they were named in the Bills. I am quite sure, therefore, your Lordships did not need the assurance of my noble and learned Friend that it was from a sense of public duty and nothing else that he and Lord Westbury undertook those duties. I should not satisfy my own conscience in this matter, or do full justice to my noble and learned Friend, if I did not also tell your Lordships that when one of those Bills—I am not quite sure which—was in the House of Commons, a Member of that House communicated with me upon the subject of the propriety of such duties being undertaken by a person who had filled the office of Lord Chancellor; and what I said to him and to other persons was, that I did not feel it consistent with my duty to deprive the promoters of those Bills of the services of men competent to discharge those duties; and that in my opinion only men of the highest judgment in the country, if they were free from other engagements, could dis-
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charge those duties. I declined, therefore, to take any part in opposing that Bill, and I may have been, in some degree, responsible for the decision of some other Members of the Legislature not to oppose it.

SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE BILL.

  COMMONS' AMENDMENTS.
  (Commons' Amendments, 234.—The page and line of these Amendments refer to Bill No. [154.] as first printed by the Commons.)
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I now pass from this subject to address to your Lordships a few words in moving that your Lordships do take into consideration the Commons' Amendments to this Bill. So far as I am concerned, it is my intention to propose some consequential or corrective changes in those Amendments, but not to propose anything of importance which would interfere with what the House of Commons has done. Upon those matters it is not necessary now to trouble your Lordships in detail; but on one important point I have undertaken to propose to your Lordships an addition to the Amendments of the House of Commons, which I hope and believe will tend to produce a general agreement among your Lordships on a matter of great importance, which otherwise might be a subject of no slight division of opinion. It will be in your Lordships' recollection that when the Bill was introduced, the 18th clause, which authorizes Her Majesty if she think fit to constitute a new Court of Appeal, to hear those Appeals which now go to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, did not extend to appeals from the Ecclesiastical Courts. I stated to your Lordships at the time, on more than one occasion, the reason which had led me to make that exception. The subject was one of great and increasing importance, and had received a good deal of public consideration; and I was apprehensive that if I proposed by the Bill to deal with these ecclesiastical appeals the Bill would be over weighted and its success might be endangered. I stated at the same time to your Lordships that my own individual opinion was not opposed to a transfer of such appeals to the new Court of Appeal, but that I thought it

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  better on that subject to defer as much as possible to the general opinion of the clergy and laity of the Church, and more particularly to the right rev. Prelates who sit on that bench. No change in that respect was made in the Bill before it left your Lordships' House; but afterwards there appeared to be a greater degree of concurrence of opinion than had been expected in favour of a transfer of these appeals to the new Court of Appeal. Some Members of the right rev. Bench were known to be in favour of it. And here I cannot but refer to the loss your Lordships have so lately sustained by the death of that great and illustrious ornament of the right rev. Bench, the Bishop of Winchester, who in so lamentable a manner has been taken from us, and the authority of whose name I believe will grow in lustre and strength during the lapse of years. That right rev. Prelate was one of those who were favourable to this change. It is not for me to say to what extent his opinion is shared by other Members of the right rev. Bench. I know, however, that some did not concur in that opinion when the Bill left your Lordships' House, but "elsewhere" there appeared to be so general a concurrence of opinion in favour of the transfer of ecclesiastical appeals to the new Court of Appeal that the House of Commons has thought fit to send up the Bill with an Amendment excluding the exception which was in the Bill when it left your Lordships' House, and adding certain words directing in what manner a sentence of suspension or deprivation on any clerk shall be pronounced. An increased degree of public attention has since been directed to this matter; and I think it is tolerably clear that a considerable portion of the members of the Established Church, as well as some of the most distinguished Members on the right rev. Bench, are dissatisfied with the clause in the shape in which it has come back to your Lordships' House. I have been anxious to arrive at a course which may avoid the future agitation of this subject, and so prevent its being brought forward at a future time when circumstances might not be so advantageous for finally settling the question as they are at present. Under these circumstances I entered into communication with the most rev. Prelate whose sentiments I knew to be opposed to the Amendment introduced
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  into the clause in the other House, in order to see whether some safeguards could not be introduced into the Bill which, in the judgment of your Lordships, might be necessary to prevent the measure from operating in such a manner as to forfeit the confidence of the clergy of the Established Church in the new Court of Appeal. I have succeeded in arriving at something like an agreement with the most rev. Prelate, and—as I understood from him—with a considerable number of his right rev. Colleagues on the subject; and at the proper time I shall move the following Amendment:—
  "The Court of Appeal, when hearing any Appeals in Ecclesiastical Causes which may be referred to it in manner aforesaid, shall be constituted of such and so many of the Judges thereof, and shall be assisted by such assessors, being Archbishops or Bishops of the Church of England. as Her Majesty, by any general rules made with the advice of the Judges of the said Court, or any five of them (of whom the Lord Chancellor shall be one) and of the Archbishops and Bishops who are members of Her Majesty's Privy Council, or any two of them (and which general rules shall be made by Order in Council) may think fit to direct."
  I think that that Amendment will accomplish the two main objects which your Lordships are likely to have in view—namely, first to prevent any accidental weakness in the constitution of the Court for each particular cause, and, secondly, to prevent what would be still worse—the suspicion that the Court might be constituted in such a way as to give it a bias one way or the other. The possibility of the impartiality of the Court being suspected would be almost as bad as the reality. The rules which under this Amendment Her Majesty in Council will have power to make will provide that the Court shall be constituted of a considerable number of Judges, and at the same time that they shall be taken in such order as to prevent any degree of distrust or suspicion arising with regard to the selection of the Judges for the hearing of any particular appeal. It is also proposed by the Amendment to retain the advantage of the assistance of some Archbishop or Bishops of the Church of England, to be selected in. such manner as the Order in Council shall direct, and who, not sitting as Judges, but as Assessors merely, shall give such assistance and advice as may be necessary to the Judges, for whose judgments, how-

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  ever, they they are in no way to be responsible. Under this arrangement, the Judges will be saved from the risk of falling into error on technical matters which, if not avoided, might possibly lead to consequences unintended and unforeseen. In order that the two great interests of the laity and clergy may have due influence in the consideration of these rules, and in advising Her Majesty as to how they should be framed, the Amendment proposes that a certain number of the Judges of the Court and also not less than two of the Episcopal Members of the Privy Council shall concur in advising Her Majesty what those rules shall be. I hope that this proposal will meet with your Lordships' approval, and that it will lead to a satisfactory settlement of this part of the question. I now beg to move that your Lordships proceed to the consideration of the Commons' Amendments to the Supreme Court of Judicature Bill.
  Moved, "That the said Amendments be now considered."—(The Lord Chancellor.)
  LORD REDESDALE,who had given Notice to move that the consideration of the Amendments made by the House of Commons be deferred for three months, said, he desired, in the first place, to remind their Lordships of the course he had taken with respect to this measure since its introduction by the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack. Without for a moment pretending to look at this matter from its strictly legal aspect, he should confine his remarks to the effect the surrender of their Appellate Jurisdiction would have upon the character of their Lordships' House. In his opinion the House had no right to surrender a jurisdiction which was one of vital importance, not only to themselves, but to the interests of the people at large. The opinion he was now putting forward was not a new one—it had been long entertained by competent judges of what concerned the character of that House. In speaking on the subject at the time of the contest that arose between the two Houses with respect to the Appellate Jurisdiction of that House, the great Lord Shaftesbury had said "Your judicature is the life and soul of the dignity of the Peerage of England." In his (Lord Redesdale's) opinion that dignity could not be given up without
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  impairing in an important degree the position of their House; for if the House admitted that it was unfit to discharge the judicial duties it had so long performed efficiently, it might be held to have declared itself unequal to discharge its other duties, and it must fall in the estimation of the public. The Appellate Jurisdiction of the two sister Kingdoms had been delegated to the House by the Acts of Union, and he believed that very serious results might flow from any successful attempt to transfer that jurisdiction to a new Court. He had not brought forward this matter with a party object; nor had he had any communication with any Leader either on the one side or the other—in fact, he anticipated as much opposition from the noble Lords who sat behind him as he did from those who sat on the opposite benches. The Amendment he proposed commenced by stating that—
  "It was now admitted by the promoters of the Bill that there should be only one Court of Ultimate Appeal for the United Kingdom;"
  but when he had proposed a Resolution to that effect on the 2nd of May, it was opposed by the Government, and was rejected in that House by a majority of 38 to 13. Their Lordships knew what had occurred afterwards in the other House. Her Majesty's Government, on Notice being given of the intention of a Member of the House of Commons to move to amend the Bill by introducing into it words to transfer the Scotch and Irish Appellate Jurisdiction from their Lordships' House to the new Court of Appeal, had, even without waiting until the question had been discussed, acceded at once to the proposition. His Resolution went on to declare that—
  "As it was uncertain whether any such Court could be newly constituted in England which would give the same satisfaction to Scotland and Ireland which it was admitted that that House had afforded, it was inexpedient, without allowing time for farther Inquiry, to pass a Bill which established a separate Court of Ultimate Appeal for England, and must therefore render a repeal of the settlement under the Acts of Union necessary, if the appeals from those countries were to be transferred to that Court., the formation of which would justify Scotland and Ireland in desiring to have separate Courts of Ultimate Appeal in their own capitals, if they were no longer allowed to come to that House."
  It was universally admitted that the Appellate Jurisdiction of that House was satisfactory to the people of Scotland

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  and Ireland; and when that was the case, why, he should ask, should it be altered? He had heard no argument why their Lordships should give up a jurisdiction which had been so satisfactorily exercised. It was admitted that the House had exercised its jurisdiction efficiently, and it might be still further improved by the introduction of certain high legal officers in this country into the House, and it might be, also, in certain instances, of high legal officers from Ireland and Scotland, so that as good an appellate tribunal as could be bad might be secured in that way. He regretted that an Amendment which he had proposed, that where a further hearing should, in accordance with the suggestion of his noble Friend behind him (Lord Cairns) be considered necessary it should be referred to this House, had been rejected. A third hearing might in some instances be highly desirable, as in those cases in which the decision of the first Court had been reversed, and there was nearly a balance of opinion among the Judges of the Appellate Court, and why should not such hearings be before their Lordships' House? If that Amendment had been adopted the ultimate appeal in England would have been reserved to the House of Lords without any interference with the general provisions of the Bill. He hoped that, in any future arrangement which might be made with respect to the constitution of a final Court of Appeal for all the three Kingdoms, that House would still be allowed to exercise a jurisdiction which it had shown itself perfectly competent to discharge. As to the proposal immediately before the House, asking their Lordships' assent to the Amendments made in the Bill by the House of Commons, he would observe that it was not right at the end of July that the House should be asked to consider a long list of Amendments in a Bill which had been sent back to it two days ago. That was not a satisfactory mode of proceeding in dealing with a measure constituting a High Court of Judicature as well as a Court of Ultimate Appeal, and lie, for one, could not see what would be lost by postponing the settlement of the question for another year. Indeed, great advantage would, in his opinion, result from postponement, for the proposals contained in the Bill would undergo examination during the Recess,
  872
  and a more complete and satisfactory measure would in all probability be the result. If their Lordships were to dissent from the Commons' Amendments in any important respect, that House might, when the Bill went back, insist on their Amendments; and how, he should like to know, could the question be fairly discussed when the Bill was returned to their Lordships, perhaps at the close of another week?
  Moved, To leave out from ("That") to the end of the Motion for the purpose of inserting the following words: ("As it is now admitted by the promoters of the Bill that there should be only one Court of Ultimate Appeal for the United Kingdom, and as it is uncertain whether any such Court can be newly constituted in England which will give the same satisfaction to Scotland and Ireland which it is admitted that this House has afforded, it is inexpedient, without allowing time for further inquiry, to pass a Bill which establishes a separate Court of Ultimate Appeal for England, and must therefore render a repeal of the settlement under the Acts of Union necessary, if the appeals from those countries are to be transferred to that Court, the formation of which will justify Scotland and Ireland desiring to have separate Courts of Ultimate Appeal in their own capitals if no longer allowed to come to this House and it is therefore expedient that the consideration of the Amendments made by the House of Commons be deferred for three months.")—(The Chairman of Committees.)
  THE ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURYsaid, he desired to say a few words on the particular point to which the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack had made special reference in connection with the Amendments which had been introduced into the Bill in the House of Commons. The Bill came back to their Lordships in a very different state from that in which it had left them. His noble and learned Friend had been Committee enough to place him on the Select Committee to which the Bill had been referred simply because one of the clauses had reference to ecclesiastical matters: and after the fullest consideration it was resolved both in that Committee and in the House itself that ecclesiastical matters had better not be mixed up with a general measure of this kind. He could not help thinking that his noble and learned Friend had exercised a wise discretion when he avoided the somewhat extended range of ecclesiastical law and the thorny paths into which those who discussed that law would be likely to lead the House. It had turned out, however, that others had rushed in

  873
  where a Lord Chancellor feared to tread, and he was very much afraid that those who had so rushed in did so without that full consideration and understanding of the subject which its importance demanded. His noble and learned Friend was entitled to his personal thanks for his courtesy in consulting him on the subject of the Amendment which he intended to move; but he felt himself in some difficulty with regard to it, because he and those who held similar views on the question had been driven, as it were, into a corner. He had never been more surprised than when he learnt that before dinner on a day in July, when men's minds were naturally occupied with other thoughts besides those of the constitution of the Church of England, a sudden change had been made in the Bill, which was of such importance that a very eminent lawyer had declared in print that the introduction of that change altogether destroyed the Royal Supremacy in the Church in this land, and destroyed at the same the character of the Court of Appeal as belonging to a tribunal which was henceforward to have the highest cognizance in ecclesiastical matters. When he heard that, he confessed he felt more surprise than he could well express. He felt that in that matter they were almost in the condition of persons who were run off with in an express train, and did not know what in the world was to happen next. A right hon. Friend of his in the Lower House had communicated to him what had occurred there while he was at dinner. Immediately after he returned home, he received a letter from the Prime Minister. "Of course," he said to himself, "it must be a letter desiring to be made acquainted with my opinion and that of the Episcopal Bench in a matter which at all events very materially alters the constitution of the Church of these realms." Well, when he opened it, the language was, as it always was, courteous, but it informed him, in plain English, that the thing was done. And not only that the thing was done, but—what surprised him still more—that the right hon. Gentleman had consulted his Colleagues in the Cabinet on the propriety of doing it the day before, although no communication whatever had passed between the Heads of the Church and those who were engaged in quietly considering in the Cabinet whe-
  874
  ther the whole constitution of the Church should be altered or not. He did not know what was meant by "consulting one's Colleagues in the Cabinet;" but it was often said that when any Prime Minister had a specialty the Members of his Cabinet were more or less in the position of the Kopha prosopa with which they were all familiar in the Greek drama. He was therefore much obliged to the noble and learned Lord for having so far listened to the Episcopal Bench as, at all events, to have altered what appeared to be a total exclusion of the ecclesiastical element from the highest Court of Appeal in ecclesiastical causes. He was not unwilling to accept the modified proposal now made, because it enabled them probably to get out of a great difficulty. He thought, however, the mode in which the change was made after the Bill had left their Lordships' House was the strongest proof that it ought not to have been made, because he felt convinced that if a thing of that kind was done in such hot haste on so important a matter, it could not possibly be well done. He understood it was said that the unanimous feeling of the country was in its favour. Well, he had presented a number of Petitions that day, all of which were distinctly condemnatory of the course suggested—namely, that of excluding the ecclesiastical element from the Final Court of Appeal; and even, in these days of accelerated communication, it was almost impossible to make people aware of what was done in Parliament with sufficient speed to enable them to be awake to what was transacted so hurriedly. He was told that a large number of Petitions would be placed in his hands to-morrow morning to the same effect as those he had already presented; but by to-morrow morning the whole thing must necessarily be over. While, therefore, he was thankful for the modification of the proposal that was to be made, because it gave them something where they feared they would get nothing, yet he wished the country had had a more deliberate opportunity of expressing its opinion on that subject. Every clause of the Bill, as far as it referred to the Court of Appeal, might be viewed in a somewhat now aspect; because they must consider not only whether it was a good new Court of Appeal for the cases which would come before it from the

  875
  ordinary civil Courts, but whether it was a good Court of Appeal for the ecclesiastical matters which were to be imported into it. He did not know whether that new Court of Appeal was to be divided into a great number of, as it were, Committees, and whether they might not be so unfortunate, in that press of business which had been so graphically described as arising in the ordinary Courts, as to have their ecclesiastical affairs referred, perhaps, to not the most important members of that appellate tribunal. The writer of the pamphlet to which he had alluded stated that it was very important that persons acquainted with theology should be present, and should take a considerable part in the drawing up of its judgments—which might relate to such matters as the Real Presence in the bread and wine, the adoration of the consecrated elements, &c. If those most abstruse questions were to be brought before the highest Court of Appeal, it certainly did seem necessary that they should have the assurance that they would have the ablest Members of the Court present to hear those cases. It was not right that those matters should be decided by a simply civil tribunal; but it was not proposed even now to decide them by a purely civil tribunal. The Court of Delegates, to which the present Judicial Committee of the Privy Council succeeded, was not a civil tribunal any more than the Judicial Committee, when sitting upon ecclesiastical matters and having the whole powers of the Court of Delegates transferred to it, became in those cases a civil tribunal. The fact that a Court consisted entirely of laymen was not rendered thereby a civil tribunal. The Court of Arches, which sat in the name of the Archbishop of Canterbury, was presided over solely by laymen. The Consistory Court of London, which exercised its ecclesiastical powers in the name of the Bishop of London, was a distinctly Ecclesiastical Court, and was presided over by a layman. Their highest Court of Appeal would be an Ecclesiastical Court still, for it would represent the Queen in her ecclesiastical capacity as exercising the Supremacy of the Crown; and in that capacity it would be an ecclesiastical tribunal. Whether it consisted entirely of laymen, or of laymen advised by theologians, it would be an ecclesiastical tribunal. He wished that to be
  876
  distinctly understood; because he found another Amendment in the Bill which he did not understand, and although he had read the discussions in the other House they had not helped him to do so. That tribunal was to have all the powers of the Judicial Committee of Privy Council in matters ecclesiastical—those powers, descending from the Reformation throughout the whole course of the administration by the Court of Delegates, were now to be transferred to this Court of Appeal; and yet the most important part of the functions of that Ecclesiastical Court of Appeal were to be taken from it and transferred to the Court of Arches. That was, no longer was the sentence for degradation or suspension to be pronounced, as it had heretofore been, by this Ecclesiastical Court of Appeal; but they were to refer to the Court of Arches in order to give some sort of authority to the Court which was above. That, he thought, was a matter which required very serious consideration. It was proposed to transfer all the powers of the Judicial Committee to the new Court of Appeal, and yet, for some reasons which he should like to see explained, they proposed to deprive it of anything which gave it the semblance of being an Ecclesiastical Court. Various opinions had been expressed by Churchmen as to the proposed change, but for the greater part against handing over to a purely civil Court the decision of matters purely ecclesiastical. Indeed, one gentleman went so far as to declare his determination to treat with contempt the decision of a civil Court in such cases. For his own part, he was opposed to that proposal to deprive the last Court of Appeal in matters affecting the Church of that ancient ecclesiastical character which in one sentence the Bill seemed to preserve to it and in another to take from it. The subject was a very important one. It stirred the feelings of a great number of people. It had to do with the social and religious life of the country, and therefore it would be disrespectful to the Church and the people of England if their Lordships' House were to appear to hurry through a matter of such importance with the same speed with which it passed a Railway Bill.
  THE MARQEESS OF SALISBURYsaid, that one observation made by the most rev. Prelate who had just spoken com-

  877
  pelled him to say a few words in defence of a right hon. Friend of his in the other House. The most rev. Prelate had applied to his right hon. Friend the epithet which had become classical. ["What?"] Well, he never used the word himself; but a noble Duke opposite (the Duke of St. Albans) had, and it appeared to have received the high sanction of the most rev. Prelate.
  THE ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURY: I said "some persons."
  THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: The most rev. Prelate said that his right hon. Friend (Mr. Hardy) had taken the House of Commons by surprise in proposing his Amendment; but that allegation was entirely negatived by the fact that not only had due Notice been given of it, but the subject had been debated in their Lordships' House, and the opinions in reference to it of the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack, of other noble Lords, and of at least one Member of the Episcopal Bench had been expressed. Eventually it was only put aside lest the passing of the Bill in the House of Commons should be imperilled. Having been proposed in the House of Commons, there was an obvious reason why the Government should accept it without notice to the most rev. Prelate—they had only "Hob-son's choice" in the matter—if they had not accepted it they would simply have been beaten, for the unanimous opinion of the House of Commons—Conservative, Liberal, and Radical—was in favour of the change. And, perhaps, one reason why the Amendment was so speedily accepted was to be found in the phenomenon that during the discussion in either House no speaker rose to defend the composition of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council with the exception of the two most rev. Prelates. They sat absolutely alone. Except the two most rev. Prelates, the tribunal seemed to have no adherents. But the most rev. Prelate said that the clergy were in favour of it, and that he had presented numerous Petitions. Did he forget the petition which had been presented against it to the Lower House of Convocation.
  THE ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURY: That petition expressed the opinion of individual clergymen—not that of the Lower House of Convocation as a body.
  THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: It expressed the opinions of 38 representative members of the Province of Canterbury, and no counter opinion whatever was expressed. He did not propose to follow the most rev. Prelate into a technical legal discussion in reference to this change. In his opinion, it was not the case that the Court of Delegates was composed of spiritual persons. It was composed of persons, lay or clerical, at the will of the Sovereign—and, as a matter of fact, he believed the Court of Delegates had sat only four times from the Reformation down to the present day in order to decide cases relating to Church discipline. He trusted that the provision suggested by the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack would tend to the attainment of the end he had in view—namely, the furnishing of the best information to the Court of Appeal on ecclesiastical subjects. Whether it would do so or not, would depend in a great measure on the mode in which the new rules were framed. For his part, he could have wished that the power of summoning Assessors had been extended beyond the Episcopal Bench to all divines, because it was obvious that the gift of ecclesiastical learning did not, any more than that of reading or writing, come by nature. Still less did it come by virtue of official position. There had been, and there were Prelates distinguished by learning of all kinds—there had been, and there were Prelates distinguished for that abstruse branch of knowledge, canon and ecclesiastical law. But it did not follow that because a man was a Bishop, therefore he was a man of such attainments. Bishops were chosen for a variety of reasons—exalted piety, personal influence, successful administration of a parish; but they might not have the least capacity for giving information to Judges as to questions of ecclesiastical law. He hoped, therefore, that under the rules to he framed, it would be secured that the Assessors to be chosen should not only have high rank in the Church but also capacity to give sound advice to the appellate tribunal. To assume that a Bishop, because he was a Bishop, must therefore be versed in ecclesiastical law, was equivalent to assuming that an Admiral, because he was an Admiral, was therefore learned in the law of the Court of Admiralty. It was, doubtless, inconve-

  879
  nient to interpolate one debate into the middle of another, but he was not the first offender; and he could not, without some observation, hear the classical term by which they now designated each other in that House extended to so inoffensive a person as Mr. Hardy. The great object to be attained was that henceforth no suspicion, just or unjust, of partiality should rest on those who occupied the position of Judges of Appeal in ecclesiastical causes. He had no doubt whatever that the most rev. Prelates who heretofore sat in judgment on these cases had honestly endeavoured to dismiss all bias from their minds; but by their office and by the nature of their duties, it tended very much to controversy in the Church, that a clergyman brought before the tribunal of which they formed part should see before him men whom lie might possibly regard as his leading adversaries. No doubt they were very unjust in imputing partiality, but the possibility of such a thing being said was almost as bad as if it were really true. For the future, however, such a thing would be impossible, and the country-would have the satisfaction of knowing that the clergy, like other people, would be judged in the last resort by persons of learning, who were sure to be well advised. He deprecated the proposal of the Attorney General that when sentence was pronounced by the secular Court it should be handed over for execution to the spiritual Court below. He could understand a spiritual Court delegating the execution of its sentences to a secular Court; but the course which had been followed in this case was a curious reversal of the power. He hoped the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack would not consider it inconsistent with his proposal to modify that Amendment, which he was sure would not find favour with the House.
  LORD CAIRNSsaid, that nothing could be worse for the country than over-rapid legislation—namely, legislation without giving people adequate notice of what was about to be done. Such legislation could not be justified on the ground that everybody must approve what was done, for the first object should be to make the country perfectly aware of the course it was intended to take. Now, with regard to ecclesiastical appeals, he regretted that means were not taken to put deliberately before the
  880
  country the course intended to be taken by the Government. He could understand how they had been led into it; but he could not help regretting the absence of Notice, and he could not agree with his noble Friend (the Marquess of Salisbury) that because certain members of Convocation and speakers "elsewhere" had all approved a change in a particular direction, this was to be taken as the general opinion. People who wanted a change were the people to speak out promptly; while it was not till the proposal was fully placed before them that others, who perhaps did not want a change, applied their minds to it, and expressed an opinion upon it. He himself wished for a change as regarded the hearing of ecclesiastical appeals. One reason was that at present, in any case exciting immense interest and stirring to the depths the different schools of thought in the Church, the body hearing it was necessarily formed for that particular purpose. He knew as a matter of fact that this had always been done in the best possible way and with the best possible objects; but it was always open to people out-of-doors to say that particular men had been chosen to hear a particular case. That could not be satisfactory; and he believed the dissatisfaction rose to a height in the present year, when a Gentleman for whom he had great respect was appointed under the Sign Manual a Member of the Judicial Committee on the eve of an important ecclesiastical ease. He had had no judicial, and he believed no forensic experience, but he sat on that case; was supposed, rightly or wrongly, to have advocated the views of one particular side in the question to be argued; and as far as he knew had never sat upon any other case. Another reason for dissatisfaction was, that if it was desirable to have a fair representation of ecclesiastics as Judges, the actual representation—never more than two, and often only one—was altogether insufficient. On the other hand, those who objected to any ecclesiastical element were also dissatisfied. The proposal of his noble and learned Friend—though he was sorry there had not been more time to let the public know what was to be done—had so much to recommend it that he was not prepared to advise their Lordships to reject it. As he understood it, Her Majesty, as supreme over all

  881
  causes ecclesiastical and temporal, would fix by an Order in Council the number of Members of the Supreme Appellate Court to hear ecclesiastical cases, and would prescribe who were to hear them, so that the Court would not be composed for every particular case. The proposal also secured an ecclesiastical element in the most desirable form. The advice and instruction of highly-cultivated minds were required on matters of phraseology and more important points, and such persons would give by private communications to the lay Members that assistance of which, they always stood in need. He did not agree with his noble Friend that there should be an indiscriminate power of summoning divines, for that would lead again to the error of a Court ad hoc. An Order in Council could not prescribe what divines were permanently to act as Assessors, whereas it was easy to prescribe the number of Bishops who were to act. As to the proposal of the noble Lord (Lord Redesdale), he was disappointed with some of the changes made by the House of Commons in the position of the Court to which their Lordships were willing to surrender their Appellate Jurisdiction, but he was not without hopes that some of these matters might yet be adjusted, and entertaining such hopes he could not at this stage support a Motion which would preclude the opportunity for such Amendments.
  THE EARL OF CARNARVONsaid, he regretted the declaration just made by his noble and learned Friend (Lord Cairns), for the Bill had come back from the other House at such a late period, and the Amendments that had been made were so important, that he thought further time ought to be allowed for their consideration. The House had wandered into a discussion as to ecclesiastical appeals, but the present question was whether the Commons' Amendments should be considered. He had had great difficulty in making up his mind on this point, one reason being that it was a great legal question, and that a layman must hesitate to express an opinion on points which might be of a technical nature. The matter, however, concerned the honour, dignity, and interests of the House, and therefore concerned the country which had committed these to their charge. Great, moreover, as might be the force of legal authority
  882
  arrayed in favour of the Bill, both in its first and last stages in this House, he believed that in the searching criticism it had undergone in "another place," not a single lawyer except the legal Members of the Government could fairly be said to have supported it. The measure, too, had come back largely altered, and owing to the pressure of time had not been printed in the usual form; for instead of red ink showing what had been altered and expunged, their Lordships had nothing but the original Bill and the Bill as it left the Commons, with pages of close print, containing the alterations; and it was difficult for all but the most acute minds to ascertain the exact position of the matter. Some of the changes were very extensive, and the noble Lord's argument that they wanted a little more time fully to consider the question was a reasonable one. There was one objection which he entertained to the Bill as altered he desired to express to the House—it was, that that which was, no doubt, a very high-class Court of Appeal had been converted into a Court of an inferior nature to that proposed by this House. Was it for such a Court that their Lordships gave up so large a portion of their jurisdiction? The next point on which he wished to touch was the question of the salaries to be paid to the Judges. The salaries represented the value which the State set upon the services rendered. Their Lordships would remember that the salaries originally contemplated were £7,000; but when the Bill left their Lordships' House the salaries were fixed at £6,000 per annum; the House of Commons, however, had made a still further reduction, and it had come back with the amount reduced to £5,000. But this was not the whole question. When a Committee sat to inquire into and consider this very question, the decision arrived at was that £6,000 per annum would be a very fair minimum salary to fix for the Judges appointed in the new Courts to be constituted; but this recommendation had been disregarded in "another place," when Mr. Vernon Harcourt, a strong supporter of the Government, expressed his opinion that if the House of Commons, with unwise parsimony, reduced the salaries of the Members of the Court of Appeal to £5,000 per annum, the House of Lords

  883
  would be well entitled to refuse to pass a Bill containing such a proposal. ["Order!"] He would not refer further to the debate in "another place," but would be content with quoting Mr. Harcourt's opinion. He was aware that it might be urged that the salaries of the paid Members of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council were £5,000 a-year; but he would remind their Lordships of the fact that it was not very easy to obtain such Members at such a rate of payment. They were not to take individual cases in dealing with such a question as this. It might be possible now to induce lawyers of eminence to accept the positions with that rate of remuneration attached to them; but he very much doubted whether such a state of things would long continue. The truth was that in this, as in other respects, Her Majesty's Government were actuated by a spirit of parsimony in small things and of extravagance in matters of greater moment. It must not be forgotten that parsimony in the matter of salaries paid to Judges meant a lowering of the whole judicial standard; because it was not to be expected that men of the highest character and legal ability would accept laborious duties with a niggardly scale of payment attached thereto. There was another and more serious objection to this branch of the measure as it had come back to their Lordships' House. Clause 13 had for its marginal note the words "Pension of Lord Chancellor," but, instead of these words, the note should have read, "The future status of the retiring Lord Chancellor," for the clause provided that no pension should be granted in future unless the retiring Lord. Chancellor signified in writing his willingness to serve as an additional Judge of the Court of Appeal, or unless he should have served 10 years as Chancellor or 15 years first as Chancellor and then as Judge. Let them consider the position in which this would place the Lord Chancellor. An ex-Chancellor had been the highest officer in the State, the head of the law, the Keeper of the Sovereign's conscience, and the embodiment, may be, of some of the finest passages in English history yet it was proposed henceforward to put him under the lowered and degraded conditions contemplated by the clause to which he was referring. If he left his argument at this point he believed he
  884
  would have made out a sufficient case in support of his contention; but he had a further and still stronger objection to urge. This Bill came back to their Lordships' House as an avowed instalment of some future measure, and he most earnestly objected to any such course. It was true that the House of Commons had given up the position they took in reference to the Irish and Scotch appeals; but what security was there that if the Bill passed this Session in its present form, an attempt would not be made next Session to resume the position from which they had temporarily retired? The effect of taking up again the question of Irish and Scotch appeals, and dealing with them in the manner suggested in "another place," would, in his opinion, be to lower, what ought to be an Imperial tribunal to the level of a provincial Court. An hon. Member of the House of Commons who was supposed to represent the Home Rule party in Ireland, had stated very significantly that the Irish people would not be satisfied with the measure in its present form, and he therefore strongly deprecated the taking of a course which could possibly stir up a fresh source of contention and bitterness on the other side of the Channel. Their Lordships had already made great concessions to Ireland, and had obtained small thanks for it—the fate as a rule of those who made surrenders to a majority—and he urged that no further similar concessions should be made at the present time. One of the most remarkable men who ever sat in that House made a speech nearly 200 years ago, in which he put with great force the point he was now urging. Lord Shaftesbury said—
  "This matter is no less than your whole judicature and your judicature is the life and soul of the dignity of the Peerage in England; you will quickly grow burdensome if you grow useless. You have now the greatest and most useful end of Parliaments principally in you, which is not to make new laws, but to redress grievances and to maintain the old landmarks."— [Parl. Hist. iv. 793.]
  Their Lordships should beware, at all events, of acting hastily in this matter. He did not ask them to insist upon Privilege. The question of Privilege had been disposed of, and Privilege, like Prerogative was a dangerous weapon. He did not ask their Lordships to retract what they had once done, because the question which had arisen was a new

  885
  one. He did not ask them to reject the Bill—he merely asked them to give it a little further consideration. If, in consequence of the Government running their Lordships into this corner, the indirect result of the Motion was the failure of the Bill, the fault was theirs. Like the most rev. Prelate, he deprecated hot and un statesman like haste in this matter. Their Lordships were fully entitled to take time and consider this large question as a whole; not piecemeal, for it was a question which involved the rights and powers of the House, and that which was of even greater importance—the trusts and duties for which it was responsible to the people of this country.
  LORD HATHERLEYsaid, there were two points on which he wished to address a very few words to their Lordships. One was the change made in the Bill as to ecclesiastical appeals; the other was the recommendation that their Lordships should postpone the measure for another year—a course which would, in his opinion, be attended with inconceivable mischief to the country. Upon the first point he shared the opinion of the most rev. Prelate (the Archbishop of Canterbury) that it was desirable that the construction and powers of the new Court should not be open to misconception or misunderstanding, and that it should be made perfectly clear that though presided over by lawyers it was still an Ecclesiastical Court of Appeal for ecclesiastical causes. He should therefore prefer to omit the provision that where suspension or deprivation might ensue as a consequence of their judgment, the Court should hand over that part of the case to the Court of Arches. Such a provision would lead to the inference that the new Court of Appeal was not an Ecclesiastical Court—which it undoubtedly would be. The character of a Court did not depend upon the profession of the Judges. Down to the reign of James I. the Court of Chancery was, more frequently than not, presided over by an ecclesiastic, but that did not make the Court of Chancery an Ecclesiastical Court. Again, the fact that Lord Stowell, Dr. Lushington, and. other laymen presided in the Court of Arches did not make that a lay or civil Court. The question in all such cases was not "Who are the Judges?" but "Under what authority do they sit?" Ever since the Reformation the Crown, being supreme in all
  886
  causes, ecclesiastical as well as civil, united in itself both functions, and conferred these two functions upon the various Courts by which it was represented. As it had been pointed out in an able publication by Mr. Fremantle, cases had occurred in which not a single ecclesiastic had sat in the Court of Delegates upon appeals coming to them from the Court of Arches. But that fact did not make the Court of Delegates the less an Ecclesiastical Court; and there was no doubt that the new Court of Appeal, when sitting upon appeals from the Court of Arches, would be to all intents and purposes an Ecclesiastical Court, possessing powers of suspension and deprivation, and all other powers incidental to an Ecclesiastical Court. Within his own experience the Judicial Committee had exercised the painful duty of suspending a clergyman for disobeying the order of the Court and as a process for compelling obedience. They looked into the authorities in that case, and found that the Judicial Committee sat under the authority of a statute which gave them all the powers of the Court of Delegates—a Court which constantly exercised the power of suspending and depriving clergymen; and that power would clearly be transferred to the new tribunal. As to the postponement of the Bill, he would remind their Lordships that the question had been under discussion for years past; that their Lordships themselves had resigned their Appellate Jurisdiction as regarded England; and that the whole community were looking forward anxiously to the establishment of a new appellate tribunal. Why were their Lordships to delay the establishment of such a tribunal for England, because it was possible that hereafter Scotland and Ireland might also desire to resort to it? The Bill as it stood would not take effect till November in next year, and if it were delayed till next Session the new Appellate Court would not be formed till November two years. Their Lordships had been told that the object of the new Court was to get rid of double appeals; but a still more cogent reason was, that the House of Lords were not a Court sitting continuously, like other Courts of Judicature, and that their Lordships depended for the hearing of appeals upon very precarious assistance. The decisions in appeal cases were really the decisions,

  887
  not of the House of Lords, but of what might be termed a small Committee of the House, subject to the risks of illness and death; and one instance of the precariousness of this assistance had just occurred in the removal by death of a noble and learned Lord who had appeared till recently to be stronger and more vigorous than he (Lord Hatherley) was, and whose valuable services had been lost to the House by a singularly rapid and unexpected illness. At such a time, and after this illustration of the risks which were run in the present constitution of the Appellate Court, he appealed to their Lordships no longer to disappoint the expectations of the country, which had been looking forward to this Bill with a rare unanimity.
  THE EARL OF HARROWBYsaid, it was most unfair to their Lordships that they should be called upon in the last days of the Session to consider new points that had been raised in the other House, on which the public mind had not yet been formed, and as to which it was impossible to say what direction opinion would take. This was not now an entire measure. Their Lordships had discussed an English Court of Appeal; the other House had been discussing an Imperial Court of Appeal. It did not follow that what was good for the one was good for the other. Their object should be to establish such a Court as should carry the greatest weight in the feelings and opinions of men. The superstructure their Lordships were now asked to sanction would have too narrow a basis. It might seem presumptuous in a layman to discuss the question—but was it not one of the essential elements of the highest Court of Appeal, that as much as possible it should consist of the same persons—and of a small number of persons, whose opinions should not vary from time to time, and who should be of higher attainments and higher authority than both those who appeared before them and, if possible, those from whose judgments appeal was brought? On all these points the Bill would lower the position of our highest Court of Appeal. If it was one of the heaviest charges against the existing system, that possibly the decisions of the House of Lords and of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council might not always harmonize; what must it not be when there would be practically five Courts,
  888
  each supreme, and with such very varying elements—Irish, Scotch, Colonial, Indian? Further, it would lower the position of the Chancellor. As a Member of the House of Lords he could not be indifferent to that lowering of the dignity of the Great Seal of England—that Seal, to which such a romantic and mysterious interest was attached in English history. The noble and learned Lord who had just spoken (Lord Hatherley) had not shown that there was any pressing necessity for passing the Bill this Session. One of the grounds assigned for depriving the House of Lords of its Appellate Jurisdiction was that its sittings were not continuous. But were the sittings of the Courts continuous? Their Lordships had a vacation of six months, and the Courts had a vacation of four months. Was the difference between those vacations sufficient to justify what was now proposed? As to the insufficient judicial strength of the House of Lords, why were not the suggestions of the noble Lord the Chairman of Committees adopted by which the heads of all the Courts would have been made Peers for life? He thought no case of urgency had been made out for passing the Bill at such a period of the Session and should vote for the Amendment of the noble Lord the Chairman of Committees.
  THE LORD CHANCELLORsaid, the noble Earl who had just sat down had spoken as if he imagined that the Bill as returned to their Lordships would transfer Irish and Scotch appeals from their Lordships' House to a new Imperial Court for the hearing of English, Irish, and Scotch Appeals. The noble Earl was completely mistaken.
  THE EARL OF HARROWBYsaid, he knew that was not intended by this Bill, but it laid the foundations for taking such a course next year.
  THE LORD CHANCELLORsaid, the arguments of the noble Earl were adapted to a case which was not before their Lordships. If their Lordships should be opposed to a transfer of the Scotch and Irish appeals, they would have ample opportunity when that transfer was proposed to consider and reject it; but he could imagine no course more likely to have the ultimate effect of forcing such a change on their Lordships, whether they approved it or not, than to say that all English appeals should be kept as at present, so long as

  889
  Scotch and Irish appeals were separated from English appeals. So far as concerned the addition of ecclesiastical appeals, he hoped—and he thought he had every reason to hope, from what had been said on both sides of the House—that the manner in which it was proposed to modify that alteration would be generally acceptable. So far as related to the general scheme and arrangements of the and all the important machinery provided for the union of Law and Equity and the consolidation of the judicial powers, hardly any substantial alteration had been made by the House of Commons in the Bill. In the constitution of the High Court of Justice, only one alteration had been made, and that was not by any means of vital importance; he referred to the alteration which confined the judicial functions of the Lord Chancellor to the Court of Appeal. The fact that the salaries of the Judges of the Court of Appeal had been fixed in the other House at £5,000, instead of £6,000 per annum—though in strictness their Lordships had not inserted any amount in the Bill; being the privilege of the house of Commons to fix salaries—was not a matter which should lead their Lordships to reject the measure, although they might be of opinion that the larger sum should have been determined upon. Upon this point he must further remark that the Appellate Judges would, in all probability, be most often selected from experienced Judges in the Courts of the First Instance, in which their salaries were also £5,000 a-year, subject to considerable expenses; and he ventured to say that those eminent men would not be disinclined to accept the still higher and less laborious dignity of Judge of the Court of Appeal, notwithstanding that they would not, beyond the saving, in some cases, of circuit expenses, derive pecuniary benefit from the change of position. The cases where gentlemen obtaining large emoluments at the Bar would refuse to accept the dignity in consequence of the reduction in the amount of the salary were very rare, and might be left out of consideration. The only other change of importance which had been made in the Bill by the other House was that which left it to the discretion of the Crown to appoint any three persons besides those expressly mentioned, to sit as Judges in
  890
  the Court of Appeal: whereas in the Bill as it passed their Lordships' House, those three additional Judges were to be selected from the existing Judges. This change, however, was merely intended to facilitate by greater liberty of choice, the working of the Bill. In conclusion, he ventured to remind their Lordships that this Bill was the result of very careful deliberation, extending over many years, that it had been very carefully considered in its passage through both Houses, and that it was now, with but few exceptions, in the same form in which it had met with their Lordships' approval. If the measure were to be rejected now, the whole legal business of the country would be thrown into confusion until future legislation could be had on the subject, and no measure which on a future occasion their Lordships were likely to pass could be expected to be returned to them from the House of Commons as little altered as the present Bill had been, neither was it probable that it would come back to their Lordships at au earlier period of the Session.
  VISCOUNT MIDLETONdesired to draw attention to the evidence given before the Select Committee, as to the great value attached in the Colonies, and especially in India, to the fact that, presumptively, appeals to the Privy Council were heard by Her Majesty herself, and that the Judicial Committee was composed of the ablest of Her Majesty's legal servants. He had been so much struck with this statement that he had asked many Indian officials about it, and they all confirmed it. He feared that there would not be equal satisfaction with the new Court of Judicature. Since, however, their Lordships had accepted the Bill on the second reading he felt that he could not at that last stage offer any opposition to the measure. He regretted that it had not been considered and debated at greater length when it was before their Lordships on the previous occasion.
  After a few words from Lord DENMAN, which were inaudible,
  On Question, That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Motion? their Lordships divided:—Contents, 61; Not-Contents, 34: Majority 27.

  CONTENTS.

  Canterbury, Archp.

  Brodrick, L. (V. Midleton.)

  Selborne, L. (L. Chancellor)

  Cairns, L.

  Calthorpe, L.

  Camoys, L.

  Richmond, D.

  Chelmsford, L.

  Saint Albans, D.

  Cloncurry, L.

  Wellington, D.

  Congleton, L.

  Crofton, L.

  Ailesbury, M.

  Dunning, L. (L. Rollo.)

  Lansdowne, M.

  Dunsany, L.

  Ripon, M.

  Ettrick, L. (L. Napier.)

  Foley, L.

  Camperdown, E.

  Hamner, L.

  Derby, E.

  Hatherloy, L.

  Devon, E.

  Heytesbury, L.

  Fortescue, E.

  Keane, L.

  Granville, E.

  Kenmore, L. (E. Kenmare.)

  Ilchester, E.

  Kimberley, E.

  Ker, L. (M. Lothian.)

  Morley, E.

  Kildare, L.(M. Kildare.)

  Nelson, E.

  Lyttelton, L.

  Methuen L.

  Canterbury, V.

  Monson, L.

  Halifax, V.

  Poltimore, L. [Teller.]

  Hawarden, V.

  Ponsonby, L. (E. Bess-borough.)

  Leinster, V. (D. Leinster)

  Rosebery, L. (E. Rosebery

  Torrington, V.

  Sheffield, L. (E. Sheffield.)

  Chichester, Bp.

  Exeter, Bp.

  Skelmersdale, L.

  London, Bp.

  Somerton, L. (E. Normanton.)

  Oxford. Bp.

  Rochester, Bp.

  Sudeley, L.

  Sundridge, L. (D. Argyll.)

  Boyle, L. (E. Cork and orrery.) [Teller]

  Waveney, L.

  Brancepeth, L. (V. Boyne.)

  Wrottcsley, L.

  NOT-CONTENTS.

  Buckingham and Chan-dos, D. [Teller.]

  Clancarty, V. (E. Clancarty.)

  Rutland, D.

  Boston, L.

  Bristol, M.

  Clinton, L.

  Bute, M.

  Denman, L.

  Ellenborough, L.

  Amherst, E.

  Fitzwalter, L.

  Bantry, E.

  Gormanston, L. (V. Gormanston.)

  Bothltrst, E.

  Beauchamp, E.

  Howard de Walden, L.

  Carnarvon, E.

  Oranmore and Browne, L.

  Doncaster, E. (D. Buecleuch and Queensberry.)

  Redesdale, L. [Teller.]

  Saltoun, L.

  Feversham, E.

  Silchester, L. (E. Longford.)

  Gainsborough, E.

  Harrowby, E.

  Sinclair, L.

  Leven and Melville, E.

  Thurlow, L.

  Mansfield, E.

  Wigan, L. (E. Crawford and Balcarres.)

  Powis, E.

  Selkirk, E.

  Wynford, L.

  Strange, E. (D. Athol.)

  Original Motion agreed to; Commons Amendments considered accordingly; several Amendments agreed to.
  Clause 5, line 12, leave out ("The Lord Chancellor").
  LORD CAIRNSobjected to the Amendment, pointing out that the effect of it would be to deprive the Lord Chancellor of that proper status as the head of the Chancery Division of the new Court to which his position entitled him, and that position would be taken by the Master of the Rolls. The Amendment in fact altered materially for the worse the position of the Lord Chancellor, and would place him in the position in which no Lord Chancellor had ever been placed before—that of being a stranger in a Court which had hitherto been called his own, causing him to sit as a mere unit in the Court of Appeal. He therefore asked their Lordships to disagree to the Commons' Amendment, so as to maintain the Lord Chancellor in the Primary Court, and keep up the necessary and useful connection between the Lord Chancellor and Chancery.
  Moved, to disagree to the Amendment made by the Commons in Clause 5, page 2, line 12, viz., to leave out ("The Lord Chancellor.")—(The Lord Cairns.)
  THE LORD CHANCELLORsaid, he could not assent to the rejection of the Amendment made by the other House. It made, in his opinion, the Bill more symmetrical, and more in conformity with what would be the actual practice.
  On Question? Their Lordships divided: —Contents, 48; Not-Contents, 36: Majority 12.
  Resolved in the Affirmative; and Commons' Amendment disagreed to; several Amendments agreed to.
  Clause 8 (Qualifications of Judges. Not required to be Serjeants-at-Law), after ("person") in line 11, leave out to ("Chancery") in line 13, and insert—
  ("Being or having been a barrister in England or Ireland, or an advocate in Scotland respectively of not less than fifteen years standing, or a Judge of the High Court of Justice of not less than one year's standing.")
  LORD CAIRNSmoved to omit the words inserted by the Commons making membership of the Bar in Scotland and Ireland a qualification for sitting in the Supreme Court of Appeal. The insertion of those words was premature, and he proposed that they should be struck out.
  Amendment disagreed to; clause struck out.
  Clause 10 (Precedence of Judges).
  In line 28, leave out from ("The") to ("thereof") in line 36, and insert—
  "The ex officio Judges of the Court of Appeal shall rank in the Supreme Court in the order of their present respective official precedence; and after them the rest of the Judges of the Court of Appeal, whether additional or ordinary, shall rank according to the priority of their respective appointments to he Judges thereof: Provided always, that it shall be lawful for Her Majesty to give such precedence in the Supreme Court 'to any additional Judge who shall have been Lord Chancellor as she may think fit."
  After a few words from the LORD CHANCELLOR,
  Amendments made, and Commons Amendments, as amended, agreed to.
  New Clause A. (Pension of Lord Chancellor.) Moved, to agree to the Amendment inserting the said Clause.
  LORD CHELMSFORDsaid, he considered that the clause was a most degrading one. The Judges of the Court of Appeal were to have £5,000 a-year; but the clause enacted that if the ex-Lord Chancellor did not attend the Appellate Court he should lose £5,000 a-year—that was to say, be deprived of his pension. That provision would place future Lord Chancellors in a degraded position. It was said that an ex-Lord Chancellor was bound to give his services to their Lordships' House, and he agreed that there was a moral obligation on them to do so—not as ex-Lord Chancellors, but as Peers. That moral obligation had been amply recognized not only by past and present ex-Lord Chancellors, but by his noble and learned Friend who formerly held the office of Lord Justice General in Scotland. He hoped their Lordships would not agree to the clause.
  THE LORD CHANCELLORproposed to correct a clerical error in the clause, pointed out by the Clerk. The clause recited that the Judges were to receive retiring pensions "as provided by the Act of his late Majesty William I." He confessed he did not know what retiring pensions were provided for his retiring Judges by William the Conqueror. He proposed to amend the error by altering it to William IV.
  LORD CHELMSFORDremarked that this would be the alteration of a money clause.
  THE LORD CHANCELLORsaid, that in this case he thought their Lordships
  894
  might make the alteration without fear of the Commons taking objection on the score of Privilege. As to the clause itself, he should be as ready to render such service as an ex-Chancellor, without any such provision, as if lie were placed under the extremest legal compulsion, and he believed this would be the opinion of others; but lie should be sorry if their Lordships, on a point of so little practical operation, ran the risk of a collision with the other House.
  THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURYsaid, he could understand the objection to their Lordships altering a money clause, but thought it must be in their power to strike it out.
  LORD CAIRNSwas of the same opinion; the Act of the last reign regulating the salary of the Lord Chancellor could not be repealed without the consent of both Houses.
  THE LORD CHANCELLORhad not said that an objection by the House of Commons in this case would be a sound view of Privilege, but he feared these were days of exaggerated views of Privilege.
  On Question? Resolved in the Negative.
  Amendment disagreed to.
  New Clause B. (Salaries of future Judges.)
  Moved, to agree to the Amendment inserting the said Clause.
  LORD CAIRNSexpressed a doubt whether the new clause gave any salary to the ordinary Judges of the Court of Appeal, for after assigning the Lord Chancellor and Chief Justices, the Master of the Rolls, and the Chief Baron, "the same annual sums which the holders of those offices now respectively receive," it proceeded—" To each of the ordinary Judges of the Court of Appeal "—nothing —the following line giving to each of the other Judges of the High Court of Justice the sum of £5,000 a-year.
  THE LORD CHANCELLORsaid, he was happy to state that after consulting a high authority connected with "another place," lie had found that the correction of a clerical error even in a money clause was not an alarming breach of Privilege. He should, consequently, propose to insert "and" after the words quoted by his noble and learned Friend, thus giving those Judges £5,000.
  LORD CAIRNSremarked that last year the Government proposed £6,000 as the salary of the Appellate Judges, and that though this year they proposed £5,000, the Select Committee substituted £6,000, which sum went down in red ink to the Commons, as an intimation of their Lordships' expectations of the character of the Court to which they transferred their Appellate Jurisdiction. High appointments were declined a short time ago by those to whom they were first offered, because the salary was only£5,000; and £1,000 a-year to a middle-aged man might make all the difference whether he was able to provide for his family or not. The Chief Justices, the Chief Baron, and the Master of the Rolls, nominally Members of the Appellate Court, but practically Judges of the Primary Courts, were to have £8,000, £7,000, and £6,000; and if, as was argued by the Government elsewhere, these were the prizes of the profession, the best men would stand out and wait for them—so that the Primary Courts would have the men with the great prizes, and the Appellate Court, which ought to be the strongest, would have no prizes. A man would actually be benefited by being taken out of the Appellate Court and made a Chief Baron or Master of the Rolls. They were going to make a change even more important than the one he had alluded to—namely, to determine that in future there should be only one appeal from the decision of the Primary Courts. If the salaries were fixed as proposed in the Bill, and, as a result, the ablest men sought and obtained positions in the Primary Courts, their decisions, even though unanimous, might be irreversibly overturned by a majority in a Court composed of less able men. The question had been decided in the other House contrary to the opinion of men on both sides of the House who were most competent to give an opinion upon it; and, as it would not be necessary for the purposes of the Act to fix the salaries until next Session, he would suggest that the clause be omitted from the Bill in order to give the other House time to afford to the question the full consideration in all its bearings which it had not as yet received.
  THE LORD CHANCELLORhoped their Lordships would not accede to the suggestion of his noble and learned Friend. The effect of such a decision
  896
  could not possibly be mistaken by the other House of Parliament, and if passed would render nugatory everything else that had been done. He did not believe that the adoption of £6,000 as the salary, instead of £5,000, would make the slightest difference in the ability of the persons who would be induced to accept positions on the Judicial Bench, because £6,000 would still be £2,000 less in some cases, and £1,000 less in others than the salaries paid to the highest class of Judges in the Primary Courts.
  LORD HATHERLEYalso hoped the proposal of his noble and learned Friend would not be acceded to. If the clause was struck out, the House of Commons could not avoid the conclusion that their Lordships' House, instead of simply desiring that the proposal contained in the clause should receive further consideration, wished to fix the amount of salary to be paid. The omission would therefore be fatal to the Bill, for the Commons would certainly not allow their Lordships to exercise their privilege of fixing the amount of the salaries of the Judges. The clause was a money clause, and it was the Privilege of the Commons solely to deal with it.
  LORD CAIRNSsaid, that to omit the clause would be no interference with the Privileges of the Commons; the effect of the omission would simply be to leave the matter open to the Commons to consider. However, he would not persist in asking the omission of the clause, but would content himself with protesting strongly against the proposal of the Bill.
  The word. "and" inserted.
  Moved, to agree to Clause B. (inserted by the Commons), as amended.—(The Lord Chancellor.)
  On Question? their Lordships divided: —Contents 46; Not-Contents 24: Majority 22.
  Clause, as amended, agreed to.
  New Clauses (C.) (Retiring pensions of future Judges of High Court of Justice, and ordinary Judges of Court of Appeal); and (D.) (Salaries and Pensions how to be paid)) agreed to.
  Clause 18 (Power to transfer jurisdiction of Judicial Committee by Order in Council).
  Moved, to disagree to the Amendment made by the Commons, and to insert in lieu thereof—

  897
  ("The Court of Appeal, when hearing any Appeals in Ecclesiastical Causes which may be referred to it in manner aforesaid, shall be constituted of such and so many of the Judges thereof, and shall be assisted by such assessors, being Archbishops or Bishops of the Church of England, as Her Majesty by any general rules made with the advice of the Judges of the said Court, or any five of them (of whom the Lord Chancellor shall be one) and of the Archbishops and Bishops who are Members of Her Majesty's Privy Council, or any two of them (and which general orders shall be made by Order in Council) may think fit to direct: Provided, That such rules shall be laid before each house of Parliament within forty days of making the same, if Parliament be then sitting; or, if not, then within forty days of the commencement of the then next ensuing Session, and if either House of Parliament shall within two months object to any of the said rules, it shall be void and of no effect."—(The Lord Chancellor.)
  THE BISHOP OF LONDONsaid, the most rev. Prelate (the Archbishop of Canterbury) had been taken severely to task for his remarks on this subject; but the surprise he had expressed was not at the transfer of ecclesiastical causes to the new Court of Appeal, but that the transfer should be effected without precautions against the effects of a change which would cause an entire revolution in this respect. There never had been a period at which ecclesiastical persons had not formed part of every Court for the hearing of ecclesiastical appeals.
  On Question? Resolved in the Affirmative.
  Several Amendments disagreed to; some agreed to; some agreed to, with Amendments.
  A Committee appointed to draw up Reasons to be offered to the Commons for disagreeing to several of their Amendments; Committee to meet Tomorrow, at a quarter before Five o'clock.

  PROTEST.
  "DISSENTIENT:
  "1. Because the Bill was returned to this House late on Tuesday night, and the ten pages of important Amendments made by the Commons were only delivered to the Peers in the course of this morning, and the manner in which it might be proposed to deal with any of them either by rejection or alteration was unknown to the House generally until after the Motion was made that the Commons Amendments be now considered.
  "2. Because by assenting to this Bill this House abandons its ancient prerogative of being the Supreme Court of Appeal in England when the expediency of having only one such Court for the United Kingdom, which was denied by the promoters of the Bill while it was passing
  898
  through this House, is now admitted by those who then voted against it, and as it must be uncertain whether the Court constituted under this Bill will give the same satisfaction to Scotland and Ireland which it is admitted that this House has afforded, it is important that time should be allowed for further consideration before this House agrees to establish a separate Court of Ultimate Appeal for England, which will justify a demand from Scotland and Ireland for similar Courts in their own capitals if no longer allowed to appeal to this House."
  "REDESDALE, BEAUCHAMP, RUTLAND, SELKIRK, HERTFORD, HOUGHTON, DENBIGH, CLANCARTY, ELLENBOROUGH, BATHURST, THURLOW, DONCASTER, ABERGAVENNY FEVERSHAM, GAINSBOROUGH, SALTOUN, WYNFORD.
  "For the whole protest down to the second England' in the second paragraph.
  "DENMAN." House adjourned at a quarter past Eleven o'clock, till To-morrow, Eleven o'clock.