HL Deb 14 July 1873 vol 217 cc290-301
THE EARL OF CARNARVON

in calling attention to the concession recently made by the Persian Government to Baron de Reuter, and to move for Correspondence between Her Majesty's Government and Baron de Reuter on the subject, said, their Lordships must have been startled by the intelligence on the subject which appeared in the newspapers a short time ago. The concession appeared to him one of the most remarkable things that had occurred in the history of the world. He had not seen the text, but he found a summary of the document in The Times newspaper, which he took for granted was substantially correct. It appeared—he should refer only to the main points of the concession —that the Persian Government had authorized Baron de Reuter to establish a company for the purpose of giving effect to certain privileges which it proposed to confer upon him. It gave him further power to construct a railway between the Caspian Sea and the Persian Gulf, and in all other parts of Persia. It proceeded to guarantee to the new company any lands or buildings which might be necessary to carry out the object for which it was to be established. It exempted from all duties, tolls, customs, or excise, the materials employed in the work. It granted—with these exceptions, mines of gold, silver, and precious stones—the right of working any mines situated not only on lands belonging to the Government, but on those of private individuals. It made over all the forests to Baron de Reuter, as well as the control over canals, wells, and all natural and artificial water-courses throughout the country. It, moreover, empowered him to raise a capital of not less than £6,000,000, and it guaranteed interest at the rate of 5 per cent on all the moneys raised by the company. It further handed over to Baron de Reuter the whole management of the Customs for a period not less than 25 years; and gave him preferential rights for the supply of gas, the making of roads, telegraphs, mills, forges, and so forth. The concession lastly provided that the rights thus conferred might not only be enjoyed by him, but that they might be transferred by him to others. The House would see, therefore, that in the whole history of dealings between States and individuals there had never been so extraordinary a series of privileges conferred on any person. The whole thing reminded one rather of passages in The Arabian Nights than of anything that had ever occurred in real life. It might be said that all these privileges might be found worthless, as it was in the power of an arbitrary Government like that of Persia to put a stop to them at any moment. But as a matter of fact, concessions granted by Oriental Powers to Europeans were generally carried out. In the present case, the concessions might turn out to be the source not only of great wealth but of Sovereignty and Empire. But the concession having been granted, the next question which arose was how it could be worked. He did not believe it to be possible for any single individual unsupported by some powerful Government sanction to give it practical effect. Now, there were in the East but two Governments who could give such support. The one was our own, the other was that of Russia. He had reason to believe that concession had been placed before Her Majesty's Government, and that an offer—so far as he might use the expression—had been made to them to impose whatever conditions they pleased on the practical working of the concession. He believed those proposals had come before Her Majesty's Government in more ways than one, and perhaps he should say through more than one channel. He would ask his noble Friend to explain to the House what the answer of the Government had been on the subject. Had that offer been accepted, or was it still pending, or had it been declined? Had the Government refused to have any connection with the scheme, because they felt that by doing so they would be placing themselves and this country under engagements of an embarrassing nature and under heavy pecuniary liability? If so, although he should like to hear what the grounds and reasons for their decisions were, yet he should be the last person to find severe fault with them. But, on the other hand, if Her Majesty's Government had declined because they were opposed to the fair exercise of our commercial influence on that country, if they were going out of their way to "find lions in the path" and throw obstacles in the way of a scheme which, after all, was mainly of a commercial character, then he thought they had done wrong. A statement had gone the round of the papers that our Foreign Secretary had written a despatch or note expressing the intention of the Government absolutely to take no concern whatever in anything which might arise out of that concession. He hoped that was not true. If it were, he should say it certainly was gratuitous, and more than a great mistake on the part of the Government to have volunteered, as it were, that abnegation of their national duties and obligations. He now only desired that the House should know the exact state of the case, that they should not on that most grave and important question awake, as they had done on some former occasions, to the consciousness and the regret that things might have been otherwise if they had been only known and discussed by Parliament in time. Supposing the Government had declined all connection and concern with that matter, he said nothing of the obvious and most striking contrast between such a line of conduct and the reception which a few days ago it had been thought worth while publicly and privately to give to the Shah. What he would rather point out was that the state of Persia materially and socially was at this moment very bad indeed. For many years past that country had been falling deeper and deeper into distress and dis-organization. The only chance that seemed to present itself to the more intelligent minds of Persia was the enlistment of English capital and enterprise in that country. To that he thought they might attribute this concession to Baron de Reuter. It had been the fashion to speak of it as a most senseless and. irrational act; but if he was right in the light he had now ventured to throw upon it, their Lordships would see that a wise statesman in Persia, anxious for his country's welfare, might feel that in the enlistment of English capital and enterprise lay the greatest and perhaps the sole chance of her regeneration. To that fact, in a great measure, was due the recent visit of the Shah to England; and he was afraid that those Persians who had come here had left us mortified to a certain extent by the feeling that that concession, which might have been worked by English companies and English capital, would in consequence of the course taken by the Government not be so worked. If that were so, and if the concession was not worked by English companies, the only alternative was, he feared, that they probably would be worked by companies of that nation who had the next greatest interest in that part of the world—namely, Russia; and moreover, while the companies working it would be Russian, the capital would, no doubt, be found in the English market. He doubted whether that would be altogether a satisfactory state of things. Any man would be perfectly blind to the known history of the case, and almost senseless, if he did not see that it had been not only the irresistible tendency but the set policy and purpose for years and years past on the part of Russia to enlarge the area of her dominions in that part of the globe. Let them consider the marvellous system of railways gradually being laid out over the whole of the Russian Empire on the highest strategical principle, connecting St. Petersburg with the extreme East and South—let them remember the lines of military forts which connected one position with another, and how completely, in a great measure, the Black Sea, the Caspian, and the Sea of Aral were now connected for military purposes. Who, then, he asked, did not perceive the vast advantage which the Russian Government would obtain if that concession—which included a railway front the Caspian to the Persian Gulf—were carried out under Russian auspices? From that moment there would be a direct line of railway and navigation exclusively in the hands of Russia from St. Petersburg to the Persian Gulf. Every Power must be the judge of its own responsibilities and its own strength. He was quite aware how great was the strength of our Indian Empire. He knew well the view which had obtained among many of the most able and competent authorities, that the defence of India against whatever enemy was to be found rather by concentrating our strength within ourselves than by travelling beyond our frontiers to meet danger. He knew that within the last few years that great Empire had grown, so to speak, far more compact and concentrated in itself, and that by our own system of railways our position on our frontiers had assumed a very different character from what it wore some 20 years ago. On the other hand, nothing that could affect the condition of neighbouring States could ever be indifferent to us; and of all the neighbouring States around our Indian possessions, none could be held to be of greater importance to us than the kingdom of Persia. Her people were, probably, the most intelligent of Easterns, and she had a cohesion which was wanting in every other country in those regions. Her resources, however reduced, were still considerable. Moreover, Persia and the Porte were the only two Powers in the East which filled the Native mind, as it were, with the idea of Sovereignty. Persia lay as a wedge between Turkey and India, and the master of Persia would necessarily be in a great degree the arbiter of those two countries. Afghanistan had often been spoken of as vitally important to us, and Persia was no less so. We were bound in every act and word—words, perhaps, being as important as acts—not to hinder the extension of the commercial influence and enterprise of a country—still less so that of a country with vast resources, which, if brought to some degree of civilization, would be a blessing to its neighbours. A cautious and waiting policy had great recommendations; but had England always been excessively cautious her history would have been very different. It was desirable not to endanger good relations with our great neighbour in the East, and it was to the interests of both that the frontiers of the two Powers should not be conterminous. He preferred, however, to rest the case on the possible development of Persian resources were such concessions taken up by an English company and fairly worked for the good of the country, and on the commercial influence which Eng- land might naturally claim, as it had done under similar circumstances. These were critical times in the East, deserving the attention of this country. The cancelling of the Treaty of Paris as regarded the Black Sea, the rumoured change in the relations between the Porte and Egypt, and the fall of Khiva, were events of more importance to the East than any that had happened within a century. We could not be indifferent spectators; and while he readily admitted that the wider range of our present Empire imposed more caution and prudential reserve than our forefathers knew or practised, nothing could free us from the responsibilities and traditions of our Eastern Empire. Moved that an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty for, Copy of correspondence between Her Majesty's Government and Baron de neuter on the subject of the concession recently made by the Persian Government to him.— (The Earl of Carnarvon.)

LORD STANLEY OF ALDERLEY

said, their Lordships and the country had reason to be satisfied with the skill the noble Earl the Secretary for Foreign Affairs had shown in conducting the negotiations as to Central Asia, and believed the country would look to him more than to any other Member of the Government for a wise policy in all these matters. It would be wrong to neglect this opportunity of promoting the prosperity of Persia by means of railroads, and it would be a great national inconsistency whilst British merchants and the British Press in China were complaining of the Chinese Government and wishing for pressure to be put upon it, because it would not allow them to construct railways in China, for the British Government to refuse to assist the Persian Government to construct railways. It was true that railways would pay better in China because it was more populous, whilst Persia had just been devastated by famine; but Persia was a country which had had more ups and downs than any other, and a country in which periods of abasement had been rapidly succeeded by others of grandeur and prosperity. He understood Baron de Reuter to solicit the moral support of this country, and he would want men to carry out his plans. Now, this was a good opportunity of utilizing the services of the numerous officers, some of them Engineers, whom the amal- gamation of the East India Company's with the Queen's Army had discontented by placing them in a position of pay without work. Not only the Mussulmans, but the Hindus would rejoice to see us helping Persia in this way, for the leading Hindu papers had recently complained of the supineness of the Government in not counteracting the Russian advance in the East. Of late years the Foreign Office had neglected Persia, and this might be the last opportunity of doing what ought to have been done many years ago. He trusted that the Government, if they had not already done so, would come to a decision in the interests of England, and that should anything in the form of guarantee have been rejected, some alternative measure which might answer Baron de Reuter's purpose as well would be adopted.

EARL GRANVILLE

thanked the noble Lord (Lord Stanley of Alderley) for the compliment he had paid to himself, and, without offering an opinion on the practical character of his suggestion, felt bound to say that he had been more definite in his advice than the noble Earl who introduced the subject. The latter always gave a good deal of excellent advice as to "a spirited policy worthy of a great country"; but in this case he had failed to perceive the exact line which the noble Earl thought the Government should adopt. He had been surprised to hear the noble Earl express astonishment at the concession, for he believed it was the topic of all the papers during last autumn. He himself had more right to feel astounded when first informed by Baron de Router last September that he had received a concession giving large powers as to railways, irrigation, and other public works, and that it had not only been signed, but ratified by the Shah. Baron de Reuter asked him to recognize the validity of the concession and for a promise to protect his rights as a British subject in the performance of it. After due consideration of the subject and consultation with his Colleagues, the answer he gave the Baron was that it would give Her Majesty's Government great satisfaction to see the resources of Persia developed by means of railways and roads, but that it was altogether out of our usual course to protect officially a commercial undertaking of that sort. The noble Earl alluded to some information he had received in reference to this matter, and which very much resembled the contents of a letter which had been handed to him (Earl Granville) since he entered the House. Then the noble Earl stated that His Majesty the Shah, who had been so well received in this country, had gone away entertaining a feeling of great disatisfaction towards Her Majesty's Government. All he could say was that he was not aware that His Majesty entertained any such feelings, and he should be very sorry to believe anything so contrary to the professions which up to the last moment had been made on his Majesty's behalf. Not only had he received the most cordial assurances to the opposite effect from the principal Ministers of the Shah, but, he might also say, from his Majesty himself, and he might add that he had very recently received similar assurances from Paris. On the subject of the concession, he held the same language—entirely in conformity with the views of his Colleagues—to all who had spoken to him in reference to it. To the Persian Envoy and to Baron de Reuter, what he said was this—that Her Majesty's Government entertained the strongest wish for the prosperity of Persia, and believed that that prosperity would be developed by material improvement in the means of communication; that an arrangement might, perhaps, be arrived at such as was contemplated, which would be mutually beneficial to Persia on the one hand and to the capitalists concerned on the other; but that it was impossible that Her Majesty's Government could give to either the one party or the other any advice with reference to the terms of such a commercial agreement. They could not give it material support; and with regard to moral support, of which he had heard so much, he confessed he had never been able to find out what was meant by those who used the term. It would, of course, be enormous moral support to the capitalists if Her Majesty's Government were to tell them they would hold the Shah bound by every word of the concession. On the other hand, it would be great moral support to the Shah if they assured His Majesty that the capitalists would execute the works in question in the best and cheapest manner. But when he asked what was meant by the term, "moral support," he could never get a definition of what that support was to be. With respect to the Motion, he had no objection to produce the Correspondence which had taken place between Baron de Reuter and Her Majesty's Government. In conclusion, he had only to say that he was not aware of having ever given the slightest opposition to the scheme referred to; nor had he observed the "lions in the path" which the noble Earl said it was his custom to see. Some caution was, however, he thought, due to the Persian Government and to capitalists at home, and therefore it was that he had made the communication in reference to the views of Her Majesty's Government which he had stated to their Lordships.

LORD NAPIER AND ETTRICK

said, he had not one word to say against the legitimate development of railways and other public works in Persia; but at the same time he believed that the selfish interests of England would be best served if the railways in question and the other public works the subject of the concession were not made. They ought not, however, to arrest the progress of material improvement on account of their supposed self-interest—to do so would be wholly unworthy of this great country, and he believed that the magnanimity and generosity of this country would never allow such a course to be taken. His opinion, however, was that when the railways in question were constructed the stream of British commerce would probably be diverted from the Black Sea and from Turkish territory, where no transit dues were paid, to Russian territory, where dues, the amount of which they could not now foresee, would be charged. He could not see that, in a. political point of view, or, in the first instance, in a commercial point of view, England would be at all benefited by the establishment of those railways and other public works; but he could not help thinking that it would be an unworthy policy on the part of this country to oppose them. He desired it to be understood that in any observation he made he was not actuated by any feeling of jealousy towards Russia. From her history, her interests, and her geographical position, it was impossible but that Russia should exercise a considerable influence in Persia, and he was far from saying that that influence had up to the present been exercised in an unworthy manner. On the contrary, he was free to admit that the operations of the Russian troops in the Khanate, which had resulted in the fall of Khiva, had conferred a great benefit upon Persia by protecting her borders from invasion by barbarous hordes. It was not, therefore, jealousy of Russia which made him say it was for the interest of England that Persia should be strong, independent, and self-governed. That was a well-recognized fact. How did the concession in question consist with the interests of Persia in that point of view? The circumstance should not be lost sight of that the great concession in question contained no reservation whatsoever as to transfer. Baron de Reuter could at any moment transfer the concession and all the rights derived under it to any Company or to any Government he pleased. He had the honour of knowing the Baron, and entertained a sincere esteem for his character. As a great financier and speculator, he had, of course, his own interests to serve, but, he believed Baron de Reuter was not exclusively nor even chiefly, influenced by pecuniary considerations. There was something of an aspiring character in the man; and he believed that in obtaining those concessions he was prompted by a desire to do something useful—something which would reflect glory upon himself and would do good to others. But what security had they that the concessions would be administered by him? He might die; the concessions might—as he said—be transferred to a foreign association or to a foreign Government. What position, he asked, would this country be in if the immense power were placed in the hands of Russia? Again, there was no condition laid down as to the gauge of the railways or their direction—both very important considerations in a military point of view. It was important for the commercial interests of Persia that her rulers should be able to exercise some option upon these and other matters; and it would be unsatisfactory to Great Britain if the railways in the south of Persia, which were of importance to us as regarded India, should be indefinitely postponed, while the railways in the north of Persia, which were of importance to Russia, should be immediately executed. He did not say there was any danger of such an occurrence while Baron de Reuter retained the concession; but such a danger might arise if these powers fell into other hands. A word or two now as to the economical aspect of this question. Persia had granted to Baron de Reuter all the forests. Now, if there was a country in the world in which we should expect the Government to prescribe care and economy in the management of the forests it was Persia. In the north of Persia there were forests of great extent and value, and these were useful in developing the resources of the country, besides being of value in their influence upon climate. But under the concession those forests might be entirely destroyed. Again, in no country in the world was irrigation more important than in Persia, and you would naturally expect the Government to retain some control over the management of works of irrigation. Not only, however, was absolute authority given to Baron de Reuter in reference to irrigation, but the irrigated soil was to pass into the possession of the concessionaires, who might there establish colonies of any nationality. The establishment of agricultural colonies composed of foreigners upon the soil of an Eastern country was likely to create serious complication and to bring the colony into collision with the Government. He only mentioned these facts to show that concessions of a very large and, indeed, unprecedented nature had been made, which hereafter might prove embarrassing or even dangerous, and that the Persian Government in its anxiety to promote the material welfare of the country had not surrounded these concessions with the guarantees and the precautions which a Government was bound to provide for its own dignity and for the welfare of the people. It was very strange that in this matter the Persian Government should not have consulted the Governments of England and Russia. Both these Governments were seriously interested in all that concerned Persia, and if the Government of Teheran had submitted the proposed concessions to the judgment of their allies, precautions would probably have been suggested which might have been safely adopted without the loss of any—at all events without the loss of many—of the material benefits which were expected. But by what might be called a generous imprudence, without regard to poli- tical consideration, or the advice of their natural allies, the Government of Persia had put themselves, this country, and Baron de Reuter in a very difficult and embarrassing position. He hoped that at some later period, when these concessions were transferred to some company, they might be so modified as to render them more consistent with the independence of Persia and with the good relations which ought to exist between that country and the Governments of Russia and England.

Motion agreed to.