(NO. 266.) COMMITTEE. (Hansard, 1 August 1873)

§ LORD CAIRNS
said, he desired to call attention to the peculiar character of this Bill. It was, as the noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Kimberley) stated in moving the second reading, introduced in consequence of the conviction and sentence of certain gas-stokers, who had, as their Lordships would remember, "struck" against their employers some time ago. The sentences passed upon these persons were, undoubtedly, severe; but there was no reason for saying that they were not in accordance with the existing law. These sentences, however, had been made the subject of much comment, and of some discontent. The gas-stokers wore indicted under two counts: the first charging them with an unlawful combination under the Criminal Law Amendment Act, which subjected 1420 the accused, on conviction, to three months' imprisonment; and the second count, under the Master and Servant Act, charging them with a conspiracy to break their contract, for which that statute provided the punishment of 12 months' imprisonment. The accused were convicted on the second count—for the conspiracy—and the Judge, Mr. Justice Brett, passed the full sentence. Now, if these persons had been convicted not for the conspiracy to commit the offence, but for the offence itself, under the 30 & 31 Vict. c. 141 (the Master and Servant Act, 1867), the punishment which could have been inflicted would have been much less severe. It seemed very anomalous that the conspiracy to commit an offence should be dealt with with greater severity than the commission of the offence, and this Bill was in consequence introduced into the other House by a private Member, the hon. and learned Member for Oxford City (Mr. Vernon Harcourt). The measure, when so introduced, was limited to a provision that persons indicted for conspiracy under the Master and Servant Act, should not be liable to a heavier punishment than that allotted to the offence when committed by an individual. While the Bill was in the Commons it was, as stated by the noble Earl (the Earl of Kimberley), enlarged and extended, so as to embrace not only the individual case, but tore-model the whole Law of Conspiracy. Such being the real character of the Bill, he (Lord Cairns) hold that a measure of so important a nature should have been introduced on the authority of the Government, and not by a private Member, than whom the Government had better opportunities of taking the opinions of the Judges, who might be termed the guardians of the criminal law of this country, and who were really the only authorities on whom the Government could confidently rely. Nor had their Lordships' House any opportunity at this period of the Session, and the absence of the Judges on circuit, of requiring, as they had a right to require, their assistance in considering so considerable a change in the law. The Bill drew a distinction between offences indictable by statute and offences indictable at Common Law. Offences against the statute law were left untouched; but of those now indictable at Common Law it selected seven, which were set forth 1421 in a Schedule. The legal consequence was that the Law of Conspiracy was repealed and done away, except as regarded these seven specified offences. The gravity of the delicta majora thus selected could be judged by their Lordships by reading the list; but he thought it would be highly dangerous to exclude all other Common Law offences from the operation of the Law of Conspiracy. For instance, one of the Law Officers of the Crown had been asked, whether sending forged telegrams was an indictable offence? He (Lord Cairns) did not know how this might be now—a conspiracy to do such an act for the purpose of influencing the funds was an indictable offence. This was clear—that if this Bill passed persons who attempted this very serious offence would no longer be indictable for conspiracy. By Common Law, conspiracy was not restricted to combination to effect an illegal thing—it included also a combination to effect a lawful purpose by illegal means. It was doubtful whether, under this Bill, that would continue to be so. He demurred to the general proposition laid down by the Bill, that a person convicted of conspiracy should not be liable to any punishment greater than that provided by statute for an act done by a single person; because in many cases where a number of persons combined to do a particular illegal thing, the offence was much greater on the part of every one of those persons than if only one person attempted to do the same thing. But the Bill, after laying down that unsafe general rule, itself departed from it. An offence indictable by Common Law for conspiracy was not to be punished by more than six months' imprisonment without hard labour; where as an individual might be imprisoned for one, and even for two years. Breach of contract was not punishable criminally, except under the Master and Servant Act—an exception, he presumed, adopted after full consideration. He had a strong feeling against such legislation being carried further. He thought the punishment provided by the Act for an offence committed by an individual was sufficient; and the punishment for conspiracy to commit the same act ought not to be heavier than that on the individual who actually committed it. If the Government were willing to limit the Bill to such a provision he should have no 1422 objection to it; but if the whole Law of Conspiracy were to be dealt with, it had better stand over till next Session.

THE EARL OF KIMBERLEY
explained that the object of the Government in enlarging Mr. Vernon Harcourt's Bill was to place the Law of Conspiracy on an intelligible footing, by providing that, except as to seven serious offences, the punishment for conspiracy should not be heavier than that for individual offences. At present the Judges had an indefinite power of awarding a much heavies punishment; and when a man, cognizant of the punishment for an individual act, found himself liable to a much severer sentence for conspiring to commit the act, much discontent was aroused. He gladly accepted the noble and learned Lord's admission that the exceptional punishment criminally of breach of contract under the Master and Servant Act ought not to be greater in cases of combination than that assigned to individual acts. He thought the Bill dealt with a large subject in a satisfactory manner; but the noble and learned Lord's opposition had reduced him to the one question, whether he would confine the Bill to that single point rather than lose the measure altogether; and he thought it more advisable to accept the former alternative, considering that, as far as it went, it was a decided amendment of the law.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR
said, the Bill had been extended by the Government after careful consideration, and the limitation suggested by his noble and learned Friend (Lord Cairns) would not meet the dictum of Mr. Justice Brett in the gas-stokers case—that any combination to force the will of another by unjustifiable means was punishable for conspiracy by Common Law. Differences of opinion had been expressed as to this; but their Lordships would not assume that so eminent a Judge had taken a mistaken view. The doubt and uncertainty attending the Law of Conspiracy tended to an arbitrary administration of it, and the Government, especially its Law Advisers, had desired to remove that uncertainty. The Bill as it stood would not affect conspiracy to effect lawful ends by unlawful means, but in cases where neither means nor ends were punishable by law it was desirable that the limits of the Law of Conspiracy should be more clearly laid 1423 down. The conspiracies left untouched were those to cheat or defraud, to extort money, to accuse of crime falsely, to impede the course of justice, and conspiracies contrary to public morals and decency or against the Government. The Home Office and the Law Officers of the Crown, with some assistance from Mr. Wright, the author of a recent work of considerable merit on the Law of Conspiracy, had gone carefully into the matter, in order to satisfy themselves that no kind of conspiracy had been overlooked. If it were consistent with their Lordships' convenience at this time of the Session to go into all the details he should have been prepared to defend them; but, looking to all the circumstances of the case, he considered it might be better to accept the suggestions of his noble and learned Friend than to leave matters in their present state.