Lords Sitting of 13 May 1872

MINUTES.
PUBLIC BILLS—First Reading—Statute Law Revision* (107); Prisons (Ireland* (108); Juries Act Amendment (Ireland)* (109).
Committee—Report—Epping Forest* (82–112).
Report—Metropolis (Kilburn and Harrow) Roads* (94).
Third Reading—Party Processions (Ireland) Act Repeal* (87); Pacific Islanders Protection* (100); Reformatory and Industrial Schools (No. 2)* (98), and passed.
Royal Assent—Consolidated Fund (£6,000,000) [35 Vict. c. 11]; Public Parks (Ireland) [35 Vict. c. 6]; County Buildings (Loans) [35 Vict. c. 7]; Deans and Canons Resignation [35 Vict. c. 8]; West Indies (Incumbered Estates) [35 Vict. c. 9]; Marriages (Society of Friends) [35 Vict. c. 10]; Pensions [35 Vict. c. 12].

TREATY OF WASHINGTON. TRIBUNAL OF ARBITRATION (GENEVA). THE INDIRECT CLAIMS.

  MINISTERIAL STATEMENT.
  EARL GRANVILLE: My Lords, it will be in the recollection of your Lordships that this day week I made an appeal to my noble Friend the noble Earl

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  (Earl Russell) to postpone the Motion which then stood in his name on the Minutes of the House. I did not make that appeal for the third time, as has been generally supposed; I made it for the first time. I think it necessary to say that in justice to my noble Friend, whose previous postponements had been made at no request of mine. At the same time, I gave an assurance to the House that either to-day or before this day I should be prepared to lay Papers on your Lordships' Table, or that, at all events, I would make a statement to your Lordships on the present state and prospects of the negotiations. My Lords, in that statement I wish particularly to avoid all irrelevant matter. I do not mean to touch on the general question of the Washington Treaty, though I may, perhaps, be allowed, after the disparaging language which has been held by some persons with respect to an omission in it, to say that, though I deeply regret and always have regretted that omission, I think it was inevitable. I think the Treaty is a great work, healing with regard to the past, good for the present, and highly advantageous to the interests of both countries in the future. I shall confine myself to a statement of what has passed since the presentation of the Oases in December last; but there is a subject into which I should have been ashamed to go in detail, unless some of my noble Friends had told me it was one of the great causes of that apparent want of confidence in the steadfast course of the Government. That has been manifested to a certain degree in this House. Our Case was presented, and so was the Case of the American Government, in the middle of December. If there was any person guilty of delay in dealing with the American Case it was necessarily myself as connected with the Foreign Office; next, it was the gentlemen charged with drawing up our Case and the duty of answering that of America; and, finally, it was the Cabinet itself. My Lords, I was very ill at the time, and should not have felt it necessary to apologize to your Lordships if, considering that I did not know that this Case was otherwise than a business-like dry document bike that presented by ourselves, considering that we had four months to deal with it, and considering I was not aware it was intended by the American Government
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  to publish it—I say that, under all these circumstances, I should not have apologized for not having read the Case until it had been inquired into and reported upon by the very competent persons to whom I have alluded; which in due course would have had to be done before it was necessary for me to take the responsibility of any decision on the matter. As it happened, my Lords, as soon as I was able I read the Case, and I will not describe the feelings with which I read it. I will only say that they were not a specific for the gout. At the introduction of the Indirect Claims I was greatly surprised. I was also greatly annoyed at the chapter relating to the Motives. It appeared to me to be incongruous and out of harmony with those statesmanlike and conciliatory feelings which I believed actuated, and which now at this moment I firmly believe, actuate the Government and the Commissioners of America in the negotiations and the conclusion of the Treaty. My Lords, I had some private correspondence on the subject, and I cannot help expressing my sense of the obligation to a noble and learned Friend behind me for the letters he has written on the subject. About the same time—on the 9th of January—I thought it right, before troubling the Prime Minister with crude opinions in dealing with this case, to possess myself of the views of the eminent man who had consented to act as our own counsel in the case, and I think it will be more interesting if your Lordships will allow me to read the note which he wrote to me in answer to a query I had addressed to him. His note was in these terms—
  "30, Portland Place, W., May 5, 1872.
  "Dear Lord Granville—The facts as to time (so far as I have to do with them) are as follows:—
  "I saw and read the United States 'Case' at the very earliest moment at which it was possible for me to do so, and my impression from the first was that it very materially transgressed the limits of the Reference, both by introducing the Indirect Claims and in other respects, and that, in preparing the Counter Case (which was the duty to which my own mind was naturally, in the first instance, directed), it would be necessary for us to separate what was within the province of the Arbitrators from what was beyond their authority.
  "The preparation of the British Case had, as you may suppose, been a work of considerable labour and anxiety, especially to Mr. Bernard, on whom (both in this work and in the preparation of the Counter Case afterwards) the principal

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  share of labour devolved, according to the arrangements made by the Government."
  My Lords, I take the liberty to interrupt the reading of the note to bear my testimony also to Mr. Bernard, that, though other Members of the High Commission possessed legal attainments, he was eminently fitted to be one of the legal Commissioners whom we appointed. I cannot avoid reminding your Lordships how short a time ago it was since the Government were exposed to certain severe criticisms as to the presentation of a Counter Case, even sub modo. I believe that most of your Lordships are now of opinion that we did well to present the Counter Case in that conditional manner; and I believe that when you read the Counter Case all your Lordships will be of opinion that it is a document not unworthy of the country from which it proceeds. I cannot help saying that while that Counter Case was prepared by the legal Commissioners at Washington, its preparation was aided by the Secretary to the Commissioners, Lord Tenterden, whom I remember the noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Derby) recommended to me as one of the three best international lawyers in the country. It was minutely revised by Sir Roundell Palmer and corrected by the Cabinet, comprising most of the persons who have been described as inexperienced, ignorant, and inapt in the drafting of the original Treaty. My Lords, I now resume the reading of Sir Roundell Palmer's letter—
  "All concerned, however, had taken their share, and, with four months before us for the next step, and the Christmas holidays approaching, we wanted (and we thought ourselves entitled to take) a little breathing-time. We first met to consider the American 'Case' on the 5th or 6th of January (Mr. Bernard had then just lost a very near relative—in fact, his mother), and it was agreed at that meeting that he should prepare the draft Counter Case, and should distinguish, in doing so, between those matters which were within the Reference and those which were not.
  "Down to that time I had not communicated with you on the subject, my original impression being that, although it was clear that the American 'Case' contained important deviations from what I understood as the limits of the Treaty, yet it might possibly be sufficient for us to define our own position when we presented the 'Counter Case.'
  "A little further consideration made me very doubtful on this point, and very desirous that the Government should be advised by their Law Officers as to the two questions (1), whether the American 'Case' did (as I considered it to do)
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  exceed the limits of the Reference agreed upon; and (2), if so, what would be the proper course for; he Government to take in order to keep the Reference within its proper limits. It was, I think, natural that you, having intrusted us with the conduct of what I may call the 'defence,' should have looked for some assistance or suggestions from us upon any question of importance arising in the 'Case' upon which Her Majesty's Government might have to form a practical judgment; and you did, in fact, do me the honour, on the 9th or 10th of January, to ask for my opinion on this very subject, to which your own attention had been then already directed; and I, on the 10th of January (at the same time that I requested you to use your influence in favour of such arrangements being made as to the time of my attending at Geneva for the oral arguments as might be most consistent with my other duties), entered into a pretty full explanation in writing of my views of the whole matter; and I have reason to know that you afterwards lost no time in obtaining the opinion of the Law Officers of the Crown upon it in the ordinary way.
  "I may add that I felt the matter to be one of extreme gravity and importance, and requiring great and careful deliberation as to the proper course of proceeding; but that my own judgment (from the time that it been me fully matured on the point) was altogether in favour of the course which the Government actually took.—Believe me ever, my dear Lord Granville, yours faithfully,
  "ROUNDELL PALMER."
  My Lords, I may state that when I was in possession of these views, and not until then, I wrote to my noble and learned Friend on the Woolsack and to Mr. Gladstone on the subject. A very few days after—namely, on the 18th of January—at the first meeting of the Cabinet, I brought the subject before them for their deliberation. At that meeting we were of opinion that it was impossible for this country to submit those Indirect Claims to arbitration. We have never swerved from that opinion. We have never done or said anything which could weaken our position with regard to that matter. I am really ashamed to go into this matter; but it was settled at that Cabinet meeting that the Lord Chancellor should be requested to again communicate with the Law Officers. On the 25th my noble and learned Friend, my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister, and myself met Sir Roundell Palmer to consider the best way of preventing illegitimate matter from being brought before the Tribunal at Geneva. On the 30th the matter was virtually settled; and on the 2nd of February a decision was taken, and the terms of the Note which I was to address to General Schenck were settled and approved. My Lords, I can only repeat what I said on the

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  first day of the Session—although you may think it presumptuous in me to do so—namely, that if the thing was to be done over again, notwithstanding all the adverse criticism which has been passed upon it, I should deeply regret if we had taken action in the Case earlier than we did. I believe that, both in substance and appearance, nothing was so much to be deprecated as appearing to act under the impulse of temper or pique, instead of after full and very careful deliberation. My Lords, the letter I wrote to General Schenck was very short. It was courteous in terms—courteous towards the American Government—and it also expressed a strong desire to maintain the Treaty. In short, I think it deserved the description which has been somewhat commented on, but from which I do not shrink—that of a "friendly communication." In it we went back and used almost exactly the same words which we advised Her Majesty to use in Her Speech from the Throne, with regard to our understanding of the scope of the Treaty with reference to these Indirect Claims. As far as I remember, the only difference between them was, that instead of the word "understanding" we used the word "hold." That Note was courteously acknowledged by General Schenck, and in due course he communicated to me a despatch from Mr. Fish in reply. That despatch objected to the position held by us, and, adhering to the position which the Government of the United States had taken up, it maintained that the Indirect Claims were matter to go before the Arbitrators. In short, the Government of the United States adhered to the position it had at first taken, and gave reasons at no inordinate length for the views they had put forward. My Lords, to that letter Her Majesty's Government thought it necessary to make a full and comprehensive reply—we thought it only fair that the Government of the United States should be put in possession of the reasons which had induced us to come to the determination at which we had arrived. Accordingly, my despatch was a long one—an excessively long one. I hope it will not tax your Lordships' patience to read it; but it would be impossible in the compass of a statement like this for me to give you an accurate and detailed account of the arguments we brought for-
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  ward. I think it will be sufficient for me to say that in that despatch your Lordships will find a fulfilment of the assurance given to Parliament on the first night of the Session. None of your Lordships can doubt that it had always been our intention that the Indirect Claims should be excluded by the terms of the Treaty. We stated in the despatch that not only had such been our intention, but we had some grounds for supposing that the same had been the intention of the United States; and we stated further—that which has been very much doubted—our opinion that when the case came to be argued it would be found that the Treaty absolutely excludes these Claims. My Lords, I think the next step in the proceedings was the presentation of the Counter Case, without prejudice, in the manner to which I have alluded. That Case is included in the Papers already laid before the House. Next came the despatch of Mr. Fish to General Schenck. I have already apprised the House of its character. In it the Government of the United States still adhered to the position they had taken. It gave an answer to a portion—but a portion only—of the arguments we had advanced, but it left the Case exactly where it was. I am not sorry for this correspondence, because, when you read the case on both sides your Lordships will be the better able to come to an accurate conclusion; but it left the Case exactly where it was, and showed an irreconcilable difference of opinion between the two sides, and did not in any degree further the negotiations. My Lords, I will go a little back. I am sure your Lordships do not think it likely that during these two or three anxious months General Schenck and I held aloof from each other, and were not in frequent communication. We were in constant communication, endeavouring to find a solution honourable and satisfactory to both countries. And here I feel bound to bear testimony to the American Minister that, although he always strenuously supported the views of his Government, as he was bound to do, he has throughout these negotiations evinced an earnest and sincere desire to maintain the Treaty, and prevent any disturbance of the most friendly relations between the two countries. My Lords, as regards these communications, they came to

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  nothing. I made some suggestions to the American Minister; but he seemed to think they were too much of one character, and were not likely to be acceptable to the American Government. He made me a large number of suggestions as to the mode of settling the difficulty. Some of these were obviously of a character perfectly unacceptable to Her Majesty's Government. There were others which, at all events, deserved the careful consideration of the Government: although all on examination failed to meet the exigencies of the case. I am bound to say as to General Schenck, with regard to some of those which were most obviously unacceptable, they generally followed some suggestions which had been made in this country as to the mode of settling these difficulties. For instance, no sooner had it been suggested that we might settle the matter by a trifling payment of £5,000,000 or £6,000,000, or something of that kind, than the very next day General Schenck came to sound me as to whether some arrangement for a small sum might not solve the difficulty. I will now come to the time when, without giving an assurance, I informed your Lordships that Her Majesty's Government had ground for hopes as to a satisfactory settlement of the misunderstanding. The statement to your Lordships arose from a communication made to me I think on the 28th of April—in the first place confidentially, and afterwards officially—by the American Minister. It was a proposal which in several points could not have been accepted by the Government; but it was a proposal which did appear to afford a basis of some satisfactory settlement. The United States proposed that the arrangement could be carried out by an interchange of Notes. Acting on that, we prepared a Note stating our views as to the possible limits within which a settlement could be carried out. That was revised and altered, we wishing nothing but to keep our meaning perfectly clear, while at the same time desiring to propose nothing which the United States might find it difficult to adopt. When we had finally settled that Note—I think it was on the 8th of May—I got a communication from General Schenck in which he informed me that he had received a telegram from Mr. Fish stating that, although the President thought it possibly within his
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  constitutional powers to agree to the Note we had sketched out, yet he thought our Note went beyond what, in his individual capacity, he could accept: he thought it preferable to frame an additional Article to the Treaty, which might effect the object we had in view, and which he might submit to the Senate for their sanction. We found some difficulty in acceding to the proposition to frame a Note on the suggestion of others; but we thought that any question of punctilio would have been perfectly ridiculous, and that if we were able to accomplish our object we ought to do so. The difficulty was great, and it took considerable time. We thought it better that we should clearly and at once show that to which we were willing to consent, and the limits of that consent. That draft Article was sent by me to General Schenck, and was by him transmitted to Mr. Fish, with the declaration that if the United States Government were prepared to adopt such an Article, we on our parts were ready to accept it. I was informed yesterday by General Schenck that he had received a telegram from Mr. Fish, stating that he had submitted that Article to the President, and that it was the intention of the President to submit it to the Senate. I understand that at this moment the Senate are in secret executive Session to consider that Article. My Lords, your Lordships will perceive that it is impossible for me to give your Lordships any assurance of the settlement of this affair, because it is impossible for me to speak of what the action of the Senate may be; but what I understand is that, according to all the rules and practices of the American Constitution, the fact of the President having submitted this proposal to the Senate indicates that he is willing, if the Senate will agree, to carry out the Article. Your Lordships will feel that it would be improper for me to give your Lordships further details at a time when this Article is under the consideration—not of a legislative body like the House of Lords or the House of Commons—but of the Senate, which in its peculiar position becomes a part of the Executive Government for this purpose. My Lords, I cannot but think that our hopes are greatly increased of arriving at a settlement which, I believe in my heart, will be satisfactory to your Lord-

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  ships and the country, and which, moreover, I am of opinion will be honourable to the Government of the United States. If we do succeed, Her Majesty's Government will take no credit for the fact of that success. We have been considerably helped by circumstances in the course of these negotiations. I may mention in the first instance the forbearance of this House and also the forbearance of the other House of Parliament. I may further mention that while public opinion has been singularly firm and united, there has been great moderation both in speeches and in the Press with respect to this case; whereas, had another course been pursued great irritation might have been infused into our relations with the United States. I believe that, with some exceptions, the tone has been admirable in this respect. We owe also much to the manner in which the matter has been discussed in the United States. There was, perhaps, not the same temptation to discuss it in open Session of the two Houses there; but they also have shown great forbearance; and it is impossible to have read the newspapers, to have read the declarations, to have read the remarkable letters which we have all read and know of, without feeling that the United States, if they make concessions on this subject, do it from a feeling of fairness and justice, and are actuated by a strong desire to maintain the most cordial and friendly relations, such as ought to exist between two great kindred nations. If I take no credit to the Government or myself, I must, nevertheless, say that this is the first fruits of the Treaty of Washington. I believe from the time of the close of the Rebellion up to the beginning of these negotiations, if any difference had arisen between the two countries, of which one thought there was a question of great injustice to itself, and the other thought it was a question, even if only as a matter of form, of making any concession—I believe the irritation in this country and more especially in America was such that it would have been impossible to make the progress we have now done towards a settlement, which I think will be satisfactory to this country, honourable to the United States, and of great advantage to the best interests of both countries. I have now only to offer my personal thanks to your Lordships on
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  both sides of the House for the indulgence you have extended to me, and I am sure you will allow me to make an appeal to you—that so critical a moment as the present is not the one when we should go into a discussion of this case.
  No noble Lord rising to address the House—
  EARL GRANVILLEagain rose and said: I am sure the House would like to know the course my noble Friend (Earl Russell) proposes to adopt if my noble Friend would be kind enough to state it.
  THE DUKE OF RICHMOND: Before the noble Earl (Earl Russell) rises, perhaps my noble Friend the Foreign Secretary will state how long it is likely to be before he can lay on the Table or state the exact contents of the Supplemental Article which is now the subject of negotiation?
  EARL GRANVILLE: I hope the House will not think there is any relucance on my part to afford information when I say it is impossible for me to answer the Question of my noble Friend. I have put the House in possession of all the facts; but it is impossible for me to state when an answer to our terms will be received from the United States. The Senate will very likely take two or three days to consider the Supplemental Article, but I am unable to give anything like certain information on the point.
  EARL RUSSELL: My Lords, my noble Friend the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has sat down without giving the House any information as to the course which he will pursue if those Indirect Claims are not withdrawn, and it is under these circumstances that he has appealed to your Lordships against any discussion of this question. Now, in the first place, let me state that I have no doubt whatever my noble Friend has been perfectly sincere in all his endeavours to make a Treaty with the United States which would be honourable to both countries, and that he never intended that such Claims as those that have been put forward by the American Government should have been included in the Treaty signed at Washington. Now, my Lords, I shall not refer to dates anterior to the Treaty of Washington; but I must refer for a few moments to circumstances which occurred in this House on the 12th of June last year,

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  and to what was then stated by a noble and learned Lord opposite (Lord Cairns), who, whether as an advocate or a Judge, has had perhaps as much experience, or greater experience, than any other Member of this House, and who, likewise, is second to none in his capacity for judging of the value of the terms of a treaty. The noble and learned Lord, referring to the allegation that these preposterous Claims could have been made under the Treaty negotiated by the noble Earl (the Earl of Derby) who succeeded me in the Foreign Office, went on to say he had examined the Protocols and had examined the new Treaty, and he perceived that those same Claims might be set up under the Treaty of Washington. That was an important statement coming from such an authority, and I should have thought that it would have produced a great impression. Treaties have been signed by Plenipotentiaries which have often afterwards been rejected by the Governments in whose name they have been made, and I should have supposed that in the case of such a Treaty as this, taking warning from the statement of the noble and learned Lord, my noble Friend (Earl Granville) would have taken further advice after the debate in this House had concluded, and when he still had it in his power to advise Her Majesty to ratify this Treaty or to refuse to ratify it. He might have asked the United States Minister whether he was right in understanding that the Indirect Claims had disappeared, and would not be brought forward under the Treaty? My noble Friend might have waited to have a distinct declaration on that point; and then possibly he might have been told by the Government of the United States—"You are mistaken in your comprehension of the Treaty; these Indirect Claims are by no means surrendered, and we think we are at liberty to set them up whenever, in pursuance of the Treaty, our Case is presented." My noble Friend did not ask any such question, or express any such doubt. On the other hand, the American Government did not set us at ease by declaring either that the Indirect Claims had disappeared or that they had not. Her Majesty's Government did not enter into negotiations for any Supplemental Articles to be inserted in the Treaty. Nothing of that kind was done on either side; and months elapsed before we heard any-
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  thing more on the subject. The American Minister having left the House before the speech of my noble Friend was spoken on the 12th of June last, may not have thought it necessary to make any statement in reply to it; but that speech having appeared in print with the correctness which usually characterizes the report of the debates in this House, it is wonderful that the statement of my noble Friend should have received no rectification from the American Government, and that the ratification of the Treaty should have taken place, the whole of the people of England being allowed to continue in the belief that the Indirect Claims had altogether disappeared. It may, indeed, be said with truth, that these Indirect Claims are of a most fantastic character. One of the demands made under this head is that we should be made answerable, and should pay damages to the United States, for the prolongation of the war. There have been many instances of the payment of damages for injury to the commercial marine of a country. General Washington was in correspondence with Lord Grenville under somewhat similar circumstances. General Washington had a notion that a Treaty of Commerce between France and the United States justified the fitting out by those countries of ships to act against the commerce of either belligerents; but Lord Grenville remonstrated, and General Washington, with that fairness and sense of justice for which he was so distinguished, saw he was wrong. Finding that he had misunderstood the meaning of the Treaty of Commerce, and that privateers and armed ships had been fitted out in New York and Boston to act against English commerce, he gave compensation for the injury done. But if it had been said by the Representative of England to the United States—"Under this Treaty you are answerable for the capture of British ships, for the prolongation of the war, and all the expenses of the war from that time must be paid by you"—what would have been the reply? Yet that is the extravagance of the nature of the Claims now put forward by the United States. Another case was that of the injury inflicted on Spanish and Portuguese commerce during another war. In that case it was said—just as I said afterwards—"Produce your evidence, and we will give

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  you compensation for the injury done." Never, I believe, in the history of nations has there been so preposterous a claim, put forward, as was put forward by the American Government in their Case presented at the end of December or the beginning of January. Let it now be added—for I do not think it ought to be disguised any longer—that the first demands of the American Government were couched in the most offensive terms personally towards the Ministry of this country. Lord Palmerston was at the head of that Government; I was its Foreign Secretary; and I say that no swindler or pickpocket ever had worse terms applied to him than those which were applied to us by the American Government. Could anything be more offensive than the conduct of the American Government in making such charges as they did with respect to a matter in which such men as Lord Palmerston, Sir Roundell Palmer, and Sir Thomas Fremantle were concerned? Now, it appears to me that immediately the Government of the United States put forward these Indirect Claims, my noble Friend ought to have made a direct representation to that Government. I think he should have said plainly and directly that the British Government could not go into arbitration on these Claims, and that it would not send any person to appear before the Arbitrators till the Indirect Claims were withdrawn. It appears to me that position ought to have been taken at the time. After the Government had received the American Case, and had perused it and made up their minds on it—after they found that it was in direct contradiction of all my noble Friend the Secretary for Foreign Affairs had said in this House, and in direct contradiction of all that had been declared in Her Majesty's Speech to the two Houses of Parliament, they should have said at once—"Unless these Indirect Claims are withdrawn we cannot go into arbitration." But, my Lords, are we sure that such language has been held, even up to this day? We do not know. Up to this day the Government have never condescended to inform Parliament as to what has been going on. This business has all been conducted by what is known as "secret diplomacy." My own opinion is that if the ordinary mode of diplomacy had been adopted in this case,
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  it would not have failed. I believe that if Sir Edward Thornton, who is a most able man, and one who understands perfectly the art of arranging difficulties—I believe that if he had been united with my noble Friend (the Marquess of Ripon), we should have had a Treaty under which these Indirect Claims could not have been made. There is a vast mass of obscure language in this Treaty, and in the Protocols which preceded it. It is said of the Alabama that she "escaped;" and no doubt she did "escape," from Liverpool, but she did not receive her armament until after she had escaped. Afterwards there is a reference to another ship which is said to have "escaped" from the Thames. Now, she was a regular merchant ship, and left the Thames with a regular clearance to go to Bombay, and therefore it cannot be properly said that she "escaped." With respect to this vessel, an extraordinary document has been put forth by the American Government, which has much the character of a work of fiction. I find it stated in the American documents that she ought to have been seized and not having been seized, the British Government is responsible, because her owner, Mr. Wright, was father-in-law to a leading partner in a firm engaged in trade with the Southern Confederacy. What is called the "escape" of this ship is alleged as a charge against the Government of this country. Now, ought we to instruct Sir Roundell Palmer to go before a court of justice and institute proceedings for the seizure of a vessel on such a ground as that? We should have to pay damages if we had adopted such a course. That is a specimen of the alleged misconduct of the English Government in allowing these vessels to "escape." I do not, however, wish to go more fully into this question on the present occasion; but I hope my noble Friend will not allow any unreasonable time to elapse before he informs the House whether this Additional Convention or this Additional Article will be added to the Treaty of Washington. And this I can say, my Lords, that unless those Indirect Claims are positively withdrawn—unless they are withdrawn by a formal act and not by a hint or an evasion, in which the American Government seems to delight—unless by a formal act these Claims are entirely set aside, and "disappear

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  altogether"—to use the phrase employed by my noble Friend last year—unless we are assured that no Representative of Her Majesty shall appear in a room on the table of which those mendacious Claims are lying—I shall certainly renew again and again before the 15th of June the Motion which stands on the Minutes in my name. I believe if my noble Friend had said—"Unless this arrangement is come to, and these Claims are withdrawn, we shall not allow a representative of Her Majesty to appear before the Arbitrators," these Claims would have been withdrawn. The case appears to me to be one between the honour of the Crown of this country and the election of General Grant as President of the United States. For my part, I prefer the honour of Her Majesty—I prefer the honour and reputation of this country—to any prospects of the re-election of General Grant.
  THE EARL OF DERBY: My Lords, I do not rise for the purpose of protracting this debate, partly because I understand there is no Motion before the House, and partly because this does not appear a convenient time to discuss either the merits of the Treaty of Washington or the conduct of the negotiations which preceded that Treaty, and which have followed the misunderstanding that has arisen with reference to its provisions. What I gather, and what I think the House has gathered, from the statement of the noble Earl (Earl Granville) to-night is, that the Cabinet have made a proposal which has the concurrence of the American Executive for a modification of the Treaty, and that that proposal is now under the consideration of the Senate. We are, therefore, in this position—we do not know what reception will be given to the proposition. I apprehend that is a matter on which we are altogether unable to speculate. Interference by either House of Parliament pending negotiations is a very delicate and extreme measure to adopt; but even if we desired to interfere we should be too late for any practical purpose that could be answered by taking such a course. Moreover, we have received from the noble Earl—speaking on behalf of the Government—the strongest possible assurance that the New or Indirect or Consequential Claims, from which all these difficulties have arisen, will not in any form be submitted
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  to Arbitration. We have also the assurance from Her Majesty's Government that they have never swerved from their opinion on this point. Indeed, the statement of the noble Earl is as clear and explicit as could be fairly asked for. In the absence—the necessary absence—of the Papers on which a judgment can be formed, and considering the very limited knowledge we possess of the nature and character of the proposition itself, I do not think it would serve any public purpose to carry this discussion further at present. Everybody in this country, and, I hope, in America also, wishes this matter to be brought to an amicable settlement; but we have a right to utter one word of warning, and to say—"Let us have no more 'understandings.'" We have a right to ask that this new engagement, which is about or likely to be entered into, and which, as I understand, is to supersede and control the former provisions of the Treaty, should be couched in perfectly clear, precise, and unmistakable terms; because if this is not done we shall be exposed to have over again all the trouble and misunderstanding which have caused us so much anxiety.

THE WHITSUNTIDE RECESS.

  ADJOURNMENT OF THE HOUSE.
  EARL GRANVILLEsaid, he had communicated with the noble Earl near him (Earl Russell) and with the noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Derby) in reference to the Adjournment of the House, and they agreed with him that it was not desirable to vary the Notice he had already given; and therefore, in accordance with that Notice, he moved the Adjournment of the House to Friday, the 31st instant.
  EARL RUSSELLexpressed his concurrence in the statement made by the noble Earl, and said, that in giving Notice of his Amendment for the Adjournment of the House to the 24th instant, he did not mean to press it if it should appear that there was no necessity for doing so.

  STATUTE LAW REVISION BILL [H.L.]
  A Bill for further promoting the Revision of the Statute Law by repealing certain enactments which have ceased to be in force or have become unnecessary—Was presented by The Lord CHANCELLOR; read 1a. (No. 107.)
  PRISON'S (IRELAND) BILL [H.L.]
  A Bill to make further and better provision for the custody of Prisoners, and to amend the law relating to Prisons in Ireland—Was presented by The Marquess of LANSDOWNE; read 1a. (No. 108.)

  JURIES ACT AMENDMENT (IRELAND) BILL [H.L.]
  A Bill to amend the Juries Act (Ireland), 1871—Was presented by The Lord O'HAGAN; read 1a. (No. 109.)
  House adjourned at half past Six o'clock, to Friday the 31st instant, at a quarter before Five o'clock.