Lords Sitting of 18 June 1872

MINUTES.
PUBLIC BILLS—First Reading— Queen's Bench (Ireland) Procedure* (159); Court of Chancery Funds* (161); Customs and Inland Revenue* (162); Chain Cables and Anchors Act (1871) Suspension* (163).
Second Reading— Appointment of Commissioners for taking Affidavits* (133); Pier and Harbour Orders Confirmation (No. 2)* (134); Trusts of Benefices and Churches (151); Local Government Supplemental (No. 2) and Act (No. 2, 1864) Amendment* (130); Board of Trade Inquiries* (155).
Committee— Baptismal Fees* (128–160).
Report— Pier and Harbour Orders Confirmation* (116).
Third Reading— Gas and Water Orders Confirmation (No. 2)* (122).

TRUSTS OF BENEFICES AND CHURCHES BILL.
(The Lord Bishop of Carlisle.)
TRUSTS OF BENEFICES AND CHURCHES BILL.

  (No. 151.) SECOND READING.
  Order of the Day for the Second Reading, read.
  THE BISHOP OF CARLISLEin moving that the Bill be now read the second time, said, its object was to remove doubts which had been entertained as to the validity of certain trusts for the exercise of ecclesiastical patronage. The single clause of which the Bill consisted provided that the powers and provisions of the Acts of Parliament which authorize the assignment or limitation of the patronage of churches or ecclesiastical benefices with cure of souls should be held to authorize assignments or limitations of such patronage with such consents and under such circumstances as are declared by the said enactments, so as to vest the same patronage in any number of corporations sole not exceeding five, or in one or more of such corporations. It was provided that the Bill should have a retrospective operation as to patronage heretofore assigned.
  Motion agreed to.
  Bill read 2a accordingly, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House on Friday next.

ARMY—THE PURCHASE AND THE SCIENTIFIC CORPS.

  ADDRESS FOR A COMMISSION.
  LORD ABINGER, in moving the Address, of which he had given Notice, for the appointment of a Royal Commission to inquire into alleged injustice towards certain officers of the late Purchase Corps by their supersession by officers of the Scientific Corps, said, it was, perhaps, hardly to be expected that a Member of the Opposition should receive a satisfactory answer when objecting to something that was being done by Her Majesty's Government; but he thought the noble Marquess the Under Secretary for War might have given him a more sufficient answer than he did when he brought this subject forward on a former occasion

  1907
  —because it was one which had in no respect a political bearing, but which the whole Army watched with the greatest interest. The Question he asked on a former occasion was as to what steps Her Majesty's Government proposed to take to remedy the injustice done to the officers of the late Purchase Corps through their supersession by the officers of the Scientific Corps. On that occasion the noble Marquess denied the alleged injustice; that the supersession would only apply to a small number; and, lastly, he argued that the effects of the system would be only temporary. Temporary it would be in one sense, for this reason—that life was short. And after the Purchase officers—againsts whom the supersession applied—had all died out, the injustice would survive only in the memory of their families. On the former occasion he (Lord Abinger) stated that the number of officers of other branches of the service who would suffer by the supersession of 300 officers of the Artillery and the Engineers was 815. He must modify those figures to some extent—that was to say, that the cases of great injustice were not so numerous as this—but there could be no doubt that the number of captains who would suffer in this way was very considerable. He held in his hand a tabular statement on the subject, which had been examined by a hon. and gallant Member of the other House of Parliament, who, though on a bed of sickness, was still as ready as ever to give all the assistance in his power to his brother officers. He alluded to Colonel Anson, the Member for Bewdley. As the tabular statement was a mass of figures, he would not trouble their Lordships by reading it in detail, but it shows that 560 captains of 17 years' service in the late Purchase Corps would be superseded by 50 captains of Artillery and Engineers, of whom 49 had only the same length of service, while one was junior to the 560. While 50 officers of Artillery and Engineers, having 18 years' service, superseded 279 officers in the regular Army having the same length of service. When he came to captains in the late Purchase Corps of from 25 up to 30 years' service, he found that no less than 44 of them were superseded by not less than 300 officers of the Artillery and the Engineers, while one captain of 30 years' service was superseded by 344 officers
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  of the Artillery and Engineers who were junior. It was impossible, therefore, to say that this supersession was unimportant. He had received a letter from an officer of 21 years' service in a Cavalry regiment. He had bought all his steps, had served nine years in India, and had waited a long time for his promotion—he was still a captain; and he complained that the Government prevented him from purchasing his majority, while a large number of officers of Artillery and Engineers would pass over his head by this supersession, and would have over him all the advantages of military seniority. The tabular statement showed that of officers of 21 years' service there were 68 who were superseded by 188 officers of Artillery and the Engineers. He thought he need not go further to convince their Lordships that the officers whose case he had ventured to bring under the consideration of the House had a very strong one. The Secretary of State had stated in another place that £20,600 would be the expense of the scheme. The promotion in substantive rank would involve an increase of pay of from 4s. 2d. to 6s. 6d. a-day; but to give the officers of the late Purchase Corps brevet rank would involve an increased pay of only 2s. a-day, which would amount to about £10,000 a-year. Now, though officers valued rank very much more than pecuniary reward, he thought that what he had suggested would only be just, and he was sure the country would not refuse to find the money for it. The officers of the Artillery and the Engineers were about to receive a permanent advantage; but this became a serious question when it was proposed to give them that advantage at the expense of so many officers in the other branches of the service. Let their Lordships take the case of a battalion of 1,000 men. It would have three Field Officers; or take 1,333 men, the proportionate number of Field Officers with them would be four. To a garrison battery there were 158 men; so that to 1,264 men in the Artillery there would be six Field Officers. The proportion of Field Officers would therefore be one-third more in the Artillery. The new system was a sop given to certain officers in order to enable the Government to get over the retirement difficulty. If it were fully carried out, the result would be that the number of Field Officers in the battalions of the

  1909
  Line, the colonial corps, the battalions of the Guards, and the regiments of Cavalry, exclusive of extra Field Officers to regiments it India, would be 564, while the number in the Scientific Corps would be 760. He trusted he had shown reasons why their Lordships should adopt the Motion which he now begged to move.
  Moved that an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, praying that a Commission may be issued to inquire into the alleged injustice towards the captains of the late Purchase Corps occasioned by their proposed supersession by the first captains of the Scientific Corps; and further to inquire whether the intended advancement of the first captains of the Royal Artillery and Engineers to the rank of field officers would have the effect of removing the slowness of promotion in those corps, and as to the best means of remedying the same; and that in the meantime and until the report of the Commission the publication of the Royal Warrant on this subject be delayed.—(The Lord Abinger.)
  THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNEsaid, that although no one regretted more than he did that the noble Lord (Lord Abinger) should have thought it necessary to put this Motion on the Papers of their Lordships' House, he was not sorry that he should have this opportunity of supplementing by a few words the explanation which he had given in answer to the noble Lord a few nights ago. In the discussion on the occasion to which he referred, statements were made by noble Lords who spoke with great authority, to which he was not on the moment able to reply; and he was now anxious to show that Her Majesty's Government, in electing to pursue this course with regard to the Scientific Corps, had not either lost sight of or ignored many of the arguments then put forward. Her Majesty's Government felt it to be their bounden duty to face this difficulty and deal with it in some way or other; the course which the predecessors of the present Government had pursued in reference to the question pointed in this direction; and had the difficulty been avoided by the present Government they would have justly incurred the reproach of their Lordships' House, the public, and the service. The present Government came into office with the inheritance of some materials of great importance as bearing upon the subject under discussion. First, they had the Report of the Committee of the House of Commons on Army Retirement
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  of 1867; and, next, they had the result of the investigations subsequently made by the War Department when Sir John Pakington was at its head, and which were extremely valuable. Now with regard to the Report of the Committee of 1867, he specially wished to refer to it because its recommendations were difficult to carry out. One of the principal recommendations of the Committee involved a retirement—in one case compulsory and in another optional—after 22 years' service. The Government did not desire to adopt the scheme for two reasons—one of great, the other of paramount importance. The first reason was, that the scheme would have been inordinately costly. It would have raised the retirement in the Royal Artillery in time of peace from £42,400 to £81,146 as a minimum, and £119,989 as a maximum, and that of the Engineers from £18,285 to £54,678 as a minimum, and £77,477 as a maximum. That was one good reason for not adopting the scheme; but there was another which weighed still more with the Government, founded on the interests of the service. It could easily be understood that in the interests of the taxpayer there could be no greater error than that of offering exceptional inducements to officers in the prime of their intellectual and physical vigour, and who were both possessed of ability, and whose military experience had reached its most ripe stage of usefulness, to abandon the service to which they were of such value and transfer their abilities to civil employments. He believed one officer of the Ordnance Corps had been taken without any money as a partner in a firm, solely on account of his proficiency in the particular branch in which that firm required his assistance. After much consideration of all the circumstances, and reluctant to adopt the scheme of the Committee of 1867, the Secretary for War determined to improve the position of the officers of the Scientific Corps, not by any scheme of retirement, but by endeavouring to proportion their rank to their responsibilities and the importance of their duties. In order to arrive at a fair opinion of these positions and responsibilities his right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War looked, in the first instance, to the practice of foreign countries; in the second place to the precedents and indications con-

  1911
  tained in the history of our own service; and lastly, and most important of all, to the position of the commanding officer of a battery. In Russia, a battery consisting of eight guns was commanded by a lieutenant colonel: in Prussia, a battery consisting of six guns was commanded by a captain—but a Prussian captain in the Infantry was a mounted officer, and commanded 250 men. In France a battery of six guns was commanded by a captain, but there was a very large proportion of young officers both in the Artillery and Engineers. Looking to the precedents in our own service the Secretary for War found that in the Peninsular and the Crimean Wars the commanding officers of batteries, though captains, had been ranked for reward and brevet with the officers commanding regiments. After the battle of the Alma, Lord Raglan required a return of the captains commanding batteries; they were mentioned with the officers commanding regiments; they got the Bath, and were all promoted. Then, looking to the responsibilities devolving on the officer commanding a battery at the present day, his right hon. Friend considered that the command of a battery of field artillery was more akin to the command of a wing of a regiment than to the command of a company. Having regard to all the considerations, and having considered various proposals, the Secretary for War came to the conclusion that the first captain of Artillery should have the rank of major. He did not wish to detain their Lordships, or to weary them with figures; but he might say that the total additional expense which this scheme involved would be £27,000 less than that of the scheme recommended by the Committee of 1867. He had looked as carefully as he could into the objections enumerated by the noble Lord opposite (Lord Abinger) to the course which the Government had proposed, and they seemed to resolve themselves into two main groups. The first set of objections amounted to this—that a grievous injustice was done to the officers of the Line, because by what it was proposed to do a very large number of them would be superseded by those first captains of Artillery being made majors. The second objection, if he understood it rightly, was that there would be very great military inconvenience
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  —if he might use that expression—on account of the large predominence of field officers of Artillery as compared with the field officers of the Line which would result from their scheme whenever any body of the troops were brought together. When the noble Lord said their scheme involved supersession, he, for one, admitted at once that it did; but the question their Lordships had to decide was not whether there was some supersession, but whether its amount was inordinate or unfair. He was prepared to show that the supersession involved in their scheme was slight in its degree and temporary in its character; and further, that if the periods of promotion which were laid down by Sir John Pakington, which were universally accepted, and all pointed in this direction, were to be carried into effect—if they were so to arrange things that a captain of Artillery, after spending 18 years in the service, was to be no longer a captain—they could not attain that end by any means, unless they sacrificed the interests of the service by removing from it officers in the prime of their career, without having at least as much supersession as was involved in the present scheme. Their Lordships had been told on two former occasions what, in the opinion of noble Lords opposite, that supersession would amount to. On the last occasion the figures given by the noble Lord who moved the present Address were, if he remembered rightly, that 331 Ordnance officers would be put over the heads of 823 officers of the Line. [Lord ABINGER said he had qualified that statement.] He was glad to hear that, because those figures needed very considerable qualification. The figures formerly given by the noble Lord—and he was not sure that his present figures were not open to the same criticism—appeared to involve this fallacy—namely, that the whole of those officers of the Ordnance Corps to be promoted to the rank of major were juniors to the whole of those officers of the Line whom, according to the noble Lord, they were about to supersede. Now, he objected to those figures, and still more to the particular case which had been quoted as an illustration of the mischief they were doing. The officer selected on a recent occasion as a typical instance of that alleged injustice was an officer of the Indian Engineers. It was, he thought,

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  scarcely right to take Captain Ducat as a fair instance of that supersession. Captain Ducat, who was an Engineer officer, was four years junior to the youngest of the Artillery officers to whom the statement related; and again, he was a member not of a non-purchase, but of a Purchase Corps. He was informed that the Bombay Engineers were, strictly speaking, a Purchase Corps; and it was owing to the fact that they were a Purchase Corps that Captain Ducat had attained the position to which some noble Lords had adverted. Another peculiarity about that officer's case was that he was a member of one of the smallest corps in the whole of the Engineers; so that in that corps the steps were much more rapid than if they took an instance out of any other corps of Indian Engineers. With regard to the actual extent of the supersession which their scheme would involve, that point had been very carefully inquired into by the War Office actuaries, and the result of their inquiries showed that there would be 34 officers only who would have a less period of service than the average service of the Line on attaining the rank of major. That average was a little under 18 years. [Lord ABINGER said he did not proceed upon averages.] The noble Lord objected to averages, but in a large comparison of that kind he (the Marquess of Lansdowne) thought averages were the only thing they could possibly look to; and he told the noble Lord candidly that he would rest the main part of his defence on averages. The actuaries went on to tell them that during the next two years it would take an Ordnance Corps officer 17 years to reach his majority, whereas in the Line about 18 years was the period; so that for those two years there would be a slight supersession. After those two years they were told that the services would stand in a somewhat similar footing for two years longer, and soon afterwards the Ordnance Corps would attain their normal period of promotion, which would be 2⅛ years. The Government were, however, pledged to maintain promotion in the Infantry of the Line, at an average of about 18 years; and, therefore, after a very limited period it would be the Artillery and Engineers who would have the disadvantage, and the Line would have the advantage in respect to promotion. The
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  noble Lord (Lord Abinger) complained of the great injustice done to senior captains of the Line by that supersession; but it was those very officers who would be the greatest gainers by the change recently made. The reason why those senior captains had been stagnant as to rank was because they had been purchased over: the Government had made arrangements which would enable them to rise at a proper period, and they would be gainers by what had been done. There was only one other comparison which he wished to make—namely, that between the injustice, as the noble Lord called it, of the limited and temporary supersession under the Government scheme, and the wholesale injustice which the noble Lord and others had acquiesced in. He was surprised to hear it said that those senior captains felt that supersession to be a slur upon them. He asked what must have been the feelings of the whole Ordnance Corps when, under the purchase system, they were superseded time after time and year after year by the Line? If there was a slur now, it must have been ten-fold greater under the old system. He now came to an argument which a noble and gallant Lord on that side of the House had brought forward some nights ago, and which had embarrassed him (the Marquess of Lansdowne) when the noble Lord used it. He stated that the flow of promotion was inconsistent with the fact that in a brigade of Artillery there would be 32 captains and subalterns and 14 Field Officers, while in the Line there would be 30 captains and subalterns and only three Field Officers. That argument, he must admit, seemed to him one that was very difficult to answer, but he believed the explanation of the difficulty was this—there were several facts which required those figures to be very much modified. In the first place, the Line had, and the Artillery and Engineers had not, an unattached list—and that circumstance must be borne in mind as affecting that calculation. In the second place, experience told them that the Artillery and Engineers would always be the arm which men desiring to devote their whole life to the service in what might be called a professional sense would select in preference to the Line. ["No!"] He thought that experience had unquestion-

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  ably taught that. Under the purchase system, out of 1,000 officers who entered the Army 627 retired before they reached the rank of Field Officer. Of course, that difference would not continue to exist in the same degree when purchase was abolished; but they were justified in anticipating that there would always be some difference of that kind between the two branches of the service. A third fact bearing on the difficulty to which he referred was that the Government had pledged itself distinctly—in the event of other means failing—to maintain the promotion to the rank of major in the Line at or about the standard period of 18 years. So that, if everything else failed, they might reasonably expect that whatever Government was in office something would be done to keep promotion in the Line in a proper condition. With regard to the contention that under the change the number of field officers in the Engineers and Artillery would be wholly disproportionate as compared with those in the Line—he maintained that this was only apparent. There were, it was true, 14 field officers to the 1,600 men forming the brigade of Artillery, and only three to the 1,000 men forming the brigade of Infantry. But the proportion of Infantry to Artillery was 16,000 Infantry to the brigade of Artillery; so that the Infantry field officers would number 48 to 14 of the Artillery, or in the proportion of nearly four to one. Another argument was that by giving majorities to the captains of Artillery a distinct inducement was offered to them to remain in the service instead of going out to increase promotion, so that things in the future would be worse than they were in the past. But at present officers in the Artillery were not in the habit of retiring, except from ill-health; so that even on the assumption that promotion to the rank of major would be an inducement to these officers to stay on, what the Government had done had not made matters worse. He had been obliged to go into details in order to explain the grounds upon which the changes had been made. The conclusion at which the Government had arrived, and which he had endeavoured to state to their Lordships was this—it was incumbent on the Government to provide some remedy for the stagnation of promotion in the Scientific Corps, and the remedy proposed
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  would, in their belief, cause less disturbance than any other that had been suggested. Some disturbance was inevitable. The noble Lord had spoken of injustice, and, truly, injustice had been done—but it was not of the present day, and it was this very injustice that the Government sought to remedy. He trusted their Lordships would assist in carrying out a scheme which public opinion demanded, and to which the Government had very good reason to adhere.
  THE DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE: My Lords, I must express my great satisfaction at the very calm and moderate manner in which this subject has been introduced, and I believe the House will agree with me that my noble Friend who has just spoken (the Marquess of Lansdowne) has replied to the arguments advanced against the proposals of the Government in a manner highly to his credit. For my own part, as the representative of the whole Army, I cannot but feel very strongly on this question; but speaking on behalf of the Army as a whole, I wish to divest myself in dealing with this question of all preference to any particular branch of the service, and I should desire that the same feeling should pervade those composing the different branches when considering any change that is proposed, because it is necessary for the good of the service that the most cordial good feeling should exist between all branches whenever and wherever they may be brought together. No doubt differences of opinion will arise among a large body of men on questions of justice and injustice, and the subject may be argued with strong feelings on both sides. I am glad that upon this occasion nothing approaching the acrimonious has been imported into the discussion, and I feel sure the service as a whole will not be injured by discussions conducted in the spirit in which this has been taken. Otherwise I should deprecate any discussion whatever, because it cannot but be injurious that a large portion of the service should be encouraged in the feeling that they are being treated unfairly. There is no doubt that, when the members of any profession get accustomed to a state of things which is acknowledged in a general way to be defective and fruitful of injustice and hardship, they accept the injustice and

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  hardship because they found it to exist, and they bear it without question; but immediately that something new is set afoot the feeling of injustice revives, and in any reform that is proposed the smallest injustice and hardship is magnified, and by being constantly dwelt upon the proposed change is liable to the severest criticism. This is essentially so in this case. I was myself the person who originally brought this sub-subject forward as regards stagnation of promotion, and I cannot but recollect that both sides of the House admitted it to be a question difficult to settle—as all questions must be that involve organic changes. It was felt that injustice existed in the Ordnance Corps; promotion was slow, and the present scheme has been designed to put the Artillery and the Line on the same footing in regard to promotion. There is no injustice in this as a matter of principle. It is obviously advisable that promotion should go on pari passu in every branch of the service. I make these remarks to show that, although it was I who originally brought forward the question which led to these changes, I at the same time strongly feel the objections to organic changes, and am distinctly of opinion that they should not be entered upon without a clear gain. Promotion in the Artillery was so bad in consequence of the large augmentations which took place in 1854 and in 1857—especially among subalterns—as to take away all spirit and hope for the future. That was a state of things which it was impossible to overlook; and I have been repeatedly during past years requested by successive Secretaries of State to suggest some means of improvement. The matter was referred to a Committee of the House of Commons, which made a Report; but the scheme suggested by that Committee was pronounced too expensive to secure the concurrence of Parliament. Another scheme was suggested by which the difficulty was sought to be overcome by creating the rank of major in the Ordnance Corps; and the Government decided that it would be better to adopt this proposal than to give such large retiring allowances as would make it worth while to go out. The Secretary for War under the late Government (Sir John Pakington) laid down standard periods, on the basis of which the right hon. Gentleman wished to calculate
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  actuarially what ought to be the periods for promotion in the Ordnance Corps, and for a captain the periods named were 12 years, for a major 18, and for a lieutenant colonel 25 years. That proposal was based on the opinion that it would secure a better flow of promotion essential to the public service than any scheme of retirement which could be reasonably put forward. I agree that the essential point is to secure such rapidity of promotion as would give elasticity to the service; and if there be any argument needed in support of the change in addition to the ordinary requirements of the public service, it may be found in the fact that the Artillery, which in times past was a less important arm, has now come to be regarded as of the highest value. Your Lordships should bear in mind that the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War, when questioned on the subject last year, said he could not enter into the question of retirement: he said that the question was too large a one to be then considered, and that promotion would be kept very much at the point at which it then stood in the Line. I also understand that if this promotion be now granted, and that it should be found to be in excess of the Line hereafter, the Line would be brought up to it. The Line, therefore, has some security for the future. There is, no doubt, a considerable difference of opinion as to whether promotion is better obtained by this scheme or by a system of retirement. For my own part, I am not adverse to a system of retirement, and though, no doubt, it would lead now and then to our losing a good officer, I do not so much mind that, because I think we can always replace him. At the same time, it must not be carried to too great an extent, because in that case the service would suffer. I think if we could adopt some medium course by which we could have a reasonable system of retirement, at the same time not exceeding the expenditure which Parliament could be reasonably called upon to grant for the purpose, we should arrive at what would really be the proper and normal point for promotion in the Army. I do not think it much matters whether promotion in the Ordnance Corps and in the Line is exactly on a level. With an increased flow of promotion in the Ordnance Corps there will be no lack

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  of candidates. I do not deny that there is a great deal to be said in favour of the principles of promotion either by advancement in rank or retirement. I am anxious that the House should see I do not wish, as far as I am concerned, to disguise the difficulties of this question. It is one of the most delicate subjects it is possible to conceive; but, at the same time, I believe that everything that has been done has been done with the best desire to promote the interests of these corps and of the service generally; and whatever may be the feelings and sentiments of individuals on the subject, I am convinced in my own mind that the proposition submitted by the Government was one which the Secretary of State for War honestly desires to put forward in the best interests of the Army in general, and without any undue advantage to specific corps.
  LORD SANDHURST: My Lords, it is with regret that on this occasion I find myself compelled to adopt a course in opposition to the Government. But the question which is involved is one of so much importance to the Army at large, and is one which so much affects not only the present but the future administration of the Army in most weighty particulars, that I should be wanting in my duty if I were restrained by party allegiance from recording the convictions which I hold in relation to it. My Lords, the question comprehends the consideration of equity in the largest sense on the part of the Government towards a great body of officers in the service of Her Majesty. I entirely agree with what has been said by the illustrious Duke on the cross-benches with regard to the extraordinary difficulties attending the question of the promotion of the officers of the Artillery and Engineers, and the insurance of a due flow of promotion in those corps. I also entirely agree in the necessity of preventing angry feeling between the different corps of Her Majesty's service, and of avoiding causes of heart-burning, disappointment, and irritation. The illustrious Duke has very accurately described what are the feelings of officers with reference to the point of supersession. It has been very truly said that there is no point on which officers feel so acutely—are so sensitive, so touchy. Well, my Lords, if this be so—and there can be no doubt of the truth of it—what is so likely to produce
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  feelings of acerbity and disappointment, and to promote that heart-burning and jealousy between different portions of the service, as a leap-frog exceptional promotion in favour of one portion and to the disadvantage of all the others—a leap-frog process which is entirely at variance with the conditions hitherto understood by officers at large since they entered the Army? It was my lot, when serving in another quarter of the globe, to assist at deliberations with regard to operations of promotion in the Indian Armies of a character somewhat analogous to that under consideration. My voice was, unfortunately, not listened to. I was of opinion that promotion of an exceptional character, with new institutions, should not be adopted—at all events, to affect the existing generation. The warnings which I ventured to utter were unavailing, and the consequence was that a feeling arose in the Armies of India—a feeling which was not confined to the officers in that country only, but which was developed and extended even in England. Thus, we had Committees sitting in London, formed of officers of those Armies, for the purpose of influencing the Legislature and of exercising a direct control over the Executive. Surely I am not wrong in saying that nothing can be more dangerous, nothing more mischievous, nothing more contrary to our constitutional principles, than such a state of things. This state of things was caused by the exceptional system of promotion then adopted. First one set of officers was touched, then another. It was impossible to meet all the claims of different kinds that arose, and it ended at last in concessions being made which very severely taxed the revenues of India. I do not apprehend now any serious consequences of this character; but, still, I say that the forbearance of our officers cannot be a reason for us, if we contemplate what I believe to be an injustice. Let us view this consideration from another point. The rank of major was merged in that of lieutenant colonel in the Royal Artillery, as I understand, a few years after the Peninsular War, in order to give them the advantage of two steps at once, for the purpose of accelerating their promotion. About 15 years ago Government followed suit in this lery, the rank of major being merged in matter in the Indian regiments of Artil-that of lieutenant colonel. This was felt

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  most keenly in the seniority services of India, as it entailed very serious disadvantages on the officers of the other arms. It actually occurred, when I had the honour of being Commander-in-Chief in the Presidency of Bombay, that the Adjutant General of that Army considered it incumbent on himself to memorialize Government regarding the injury thus done to him. Thus, my Lords, we had the spectacle of an adjutant-general, the representative of discipline, memorializing the Government against what he conceived to be a personal injustice to himself!
  Let us now reflect on what is the case under consideration. A great organic reform was carried last year in the face of a strong opposition. That organic reform caused a large body of officers in the Army to lose the advantages which they believed had been secured to them by a great expenditure of money on their part. If you consider the fact that the system then abolished was an old and established one—one which had come to be a part of the habits of this country—one which, though nominally against the law, had the acquiescence of the Legislature and of the highest Executive—if you think of the advantages taken away from the officers who had spent their money, with a view to those advantages, I believe you must admit that there is a large consideration due to them; that a great point of equity is involved before we add to the disadvantages they have already incurred. I, as you know, was an ardent advocate for the abolition of purchase; but I felt that the opponents of that measure had a very strong argument when they said that officers below the rank of lieutenant-colonel had bought the right to purchase onwards, and so, if they could, obtain more rapid promotion. This consideration particularly affects the rank about to be prejudiced by the favour shown to the first captains of Artillery and Engineers; for it was with a view to the ultimate promotion to the rank of lieutenant-colonel that officers in the Cavalry gave from £5,000 to £6,000 for a troop, and officers in the Infantry from £2,000 to £3,000 for a company. Thus, these officers expended large sums of money, not merely for the purpose of exercising subordinate commands, but in order to obtain the right of purchasing onwards to the higher regimental ranks,
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  and no compensation was afforded them when they lost that great privilege. And now it is proposed to add to the very considerable sacrifice they were then called upon to make. When we are told of the grievances of the Artillery, our informants invariably forget that officers in the Artillery and Engineers receive for their services a fair professional income, which, although their promotion is rather slow, is a great make-weight in their favour, as compared with the position of the officers in the Cavalry and Infantry; for the latter, in reaching the higher regimental rank, have positively hitherto given their services to the country for nothing. Last year the Secretary of State for War declared that the officers of corps, which had been Purchase Corps, but in which purchase was about to be abolished, would in no wise suffer in their future relative position to the rest of the Army. If the measure now proposed be carried into execution, it cannot be said that that pledge will have been redeemed. I say this, because I cannot accept the assertion of the noble Marquess that the amount of supersession involved in the new scheme will be very slight. I have examined the tabular statements referred to by the noble and gallant Lord who brought forward the Motion now under consideration; and, according to those statements, I am able to say that it is shown that a large amount of supersession will be inflicted on the Cavalry and Infantry, not only with regard to the last step of rank, but actually with reference to the number of years which officers have served in the Army. I am not, of course, in a position at present to verify the accuracy of those statements; but I believe them to be correct. At all events, the very difference of opinion which exists between the noble and gallant Lord (Lord Abinger) and the noble Marquess (the Marquess of Lansdowne), in reference to the nature and amount of supersession, forms in itself a very fair and a very sufficient ground for inquiry. The whole question raised by the Motion before the House naturally divides itself into three branches—firstly, there is the consideration of the supersession of officers; secondly, the real interests of the Royal Artillery officers; and, thirdly, the interests of Her Majesty's service, and, therefore, of the State at large. With regard to the

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  first point, I need add nothing more; but there is one consideration to which I am bound to invite the attention of your Lordships. Thus, a comparison has been frequently drawn out-of-doors—and it has been repeated in this House to-night—which is eminently in favour of Artillery officers, and in depreciation of officers of Cavalry and Infantry. Now, as I entirely disagree to the propositions thus confidently stated, I propose to join issue upon them, and to subject them to a slight test of argument. It is said that the responsibilities of Artillery officers are greater than those of officers of Cavalry and Infantry of similar rank; that the Artillery officers have charge of horses, and so on, and these are among the reasons adduced for the proposed measure. Now, it often happens in time of war that either but one field officer is left with the regiment or battalion, or none at all. In either case, superior duties of an important character devolve on the senior captains, who thus find themselves in command of either the regiment or of wings of Cavalry or Infantry—that is, of considerable bodies of Her Majesty's troops in the face of an enemy. In the case of a siege, it is a matter of daily occurrence that a captain is in command of trenches with four or five companies under him, with all the heavy responsibilities attendant on such a position. Now, I would ask, are not the duties and responsibilities of a captain, who is thus employed in the trenches—the men who are under him being in close grips with the enemy—of a more important character than the responsibility of a captain of Artillery, who is 1,200 yards in the rear, covering the attack with his fire? Surely, we know something of the qualities requisite in the officer who leads his men in attack "through the imminent deadly breach." He must be a man of great character and power in every sense of the word. We know something of the value of personal influence in such circumstances, and of what is due to the character, bearing, and conduct of the man to whom the general in command looks on such an occasion. But, again, if we leave the scene of war, and refer to what is called the state of peace, the duties of the two classes of officers again show differences of a similar kind. Does it ever happen that the Artillery or the Engineers are called out in aid of the
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  civil Power? This duty, which is of the most difficult and delicate kind, devolves on the officers of the Infantry and Cavalry. When the civil Power and the populace are in conflict, everything depends on the prudence and conduct of the officer in command of the troops whose services have been required. That duty is very generally performed by officers of the rank of captain; and, as I have said, it is difficult to exaggerate its importance, the delicacy of its character, and the personal risk and responsibility which it involves—this being frequently and more especially seen in Ireland. Surely, it is a fair question to ask if duties of this character are to be subordinated to the charge of stores? The noble Marquess referred to the personal responsibility of battery commanders, and to certain orders lately issued for the purpose of giving greater utility to the Artillery arm. But, whilst it is understood that a larger margin is to be allowed to commanders of Artillery, we must not be led to believe that in actions of importance, where Artillery is massed, the duty of placing guns in position will be left to captains of Artillery. The duty of choosing such a position is far too serious to be relegated to an inferior officer. It must be carefully looked to by the lieutenant-colonels of Artillery themselves; and, what is more, no general officer who cares for the safety of the troops under his command and his own reputation would be content to rest the placing of his artillery, without correction, under his own eye. I am not stating any novelties; I am merely describing conduct which must be suggested by the commonest prudence and all experience. In such matters the commander of the corps d'armée looks to himself only, and, if possible, will not trust to the eyes or reports of others.
  Great stress was laid by the noble Marquess upon certain actuarial calculations. But it is surely difficult to attribute much value to them if they be subjected to even a slight examination. They all refer to facts connected with the Army when it was under the purchase system; but they do not touch upon what the condition of the Army will be when the purchase system having been abolished for some years, promotion comes to rest entirely on the new regulations. I am aware of the pledge given last year by the right hon. Gentleman the Secre-

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  tary of State for War with reference to the promotion of Line officers, and I was happy to hear that pledge repeated again to-night by the noble Marquess. But it must be understood we are dealing with promises only, and my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State has not in any manner shown how he intends to redeem that pledge. With regard to the question immediately before the House, and the value of the actuarial calculations to the parties concerned, let us take the case of the garrison of Malta, where there are some seven or eight garrison batteries which are commanded at Malta pretty much as a single battalion of Infantry is commanded in the same garrison. Each of these batteries will then come to have a major, who in the ordinary course and friction of garrison duty will supersede all the captains of the Line who were but yesterday the seniors of the new majors. This is surely not likely to conduce very much to harmony and content, and it does seem that the brigade of Artillery at Malta will have a superfluity of field officers. When we say that each brigade, in its existing form, has six field officers, we really very much understate the case; for, as your Lordships are aware, there are a great many situations both in England and in India of an administrative and executive and a manufacturing character. Now, I believe I am right in stating that whenever an officer of whatever rank is removed to one of these situations from the military branch proper he is seconded, and promotion throughout the regiment follows in consequence. Therefore, the Artillery regiment has already many more field officers than are represented by the proportion allotted to the batteries. But let us see how the proportion stands. In the horse brigades of England there are 6 field officers and 8 batteries to a brigade; in the field battery brigades the establishment stands at 6 field officers and 10 batteries. But in India the field officers are more numerous in proportion to the batteries. An Indian horse brigade has 5 batteries and 5 field officers; or, practically, 1 field officer to each battery.
  I have alluded to what was done after the Peninsular War with regard to the promotion to lieutenant-colonel. I have had the curiosity to look into The Army List of this month, and there I find that the junior lieutenant-colonel of Artillery
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  is an officer of 24 years' standing. By his late promotion he has not only superseded 60 or 70 captains, but 300 or 400 majors, or whatever their number may be, who lately stood above him, and a vast number of whom must have been far longer in the service than he has been. Now, my Lords, this is an example of a point alluded to by the illustrious Duke (the Duke of Cambridge). This supersession is one to which the Army has been accustomed for a long time, and takes it as a matter of course: it is not resented because it has become a habit; whereas a novelty, involving similar consequences, cannot but cause great discontent, and is resisted accordingly. With reference to the real interests of the Artillery regiment itself, I cannot bring myself to believe that the proposed measure will produce the results aimed at by the Committees of 1867 and 1869. It seems to me that to confer a boon upon a small class of officers does in truth produce the very reverse of what was the object of those Committees—namely, to ensure a certain flow of promotion throughout the regiment. It is a principle of human nature that if you make the position of individuals more important and more comfortable you render them more desirous to stop where they are, which, then, of course, must act as a bar to the promotion of their juniors. I venture to say, then, with all respect to the noble Marquess, that the granting of this boon of promotion to a certain number of officers, or, to use the phrase of the Duke, creating majors out of the present materials, will not answer the object of the Committees. That point has not been made out. If I could bring myself to believe that, under all the circumstances, the object of those Committees would be in any, even in the slightest, degree attained, I should almost be inclined to waive my opinions on the subject, strong as they are. We have, however, no security that such a result would follow. On the contrary, I believe the result will be that the second captains, and the many hundreds of subaltern officers in the Artillery regiment, will be worse off than they were before. I think a strong case may be made out on the part of those Artillery officers, that they are about to be prejudiced in favour of a small class in their own regiment.
  We have now to consider whether the

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  matter as proposed to be arranged is for the general public advantage. We have been told that the country desires the proposed measure. I entirely disagree from the view that this particular Artiltery question has been considered by the country at all—indeed, it appears to me to be just one of those subjects of which what is called the country is absolutely ignorant; but I do believe that the public are alive to the necessity of insuring a proper flow of promotion in those regiments, and that the interests of the Army, and therefore of the State, are involved in the same. But I must again ask the question, if this is insured by conferring a particular boon on a small class, as now proposed? But, in truth, after the organic change of last year, what is wanted is a full experience of the facts of the Army after sufficient time shall have elapsed. I think it is a matter to be deplored, when looking at the whole from this point of view, that we should commence tinkering one part of the service before a complete scheme is proposed. As yet, it is impossible for the Secretary of State to judge of the results of his measures, or for your Lordships to be able to give an opinion upon them. For my own part, I should much prefer to see all these matters remain in statu quo for three or four years to come. We have had many inquiries into military matters of late years—perhaps it may be thought too many; but, with regard to the particular question before the House, I am certain it is impossible to do justice to it without a most searching investigation of the facts, stated so ably by my noble and gallant Friend opposite, and as to whether the scheme was likely to further the object which the Committees of 1867 and 1869 had in view. For these reasons, I would express my earnest hope that the Government will see fit to accede to the Motion of the noble and gallant Lord opposite.
  THE MARQUESS OF RIPON: My Lords, I am afraid it is not possible for me to give my noble and gallant Friend the satisfaction he desires by promising that the Government will advise Her Majesty to issue the Commission. My noble and gallant Friend in some of the last remarks he addressed to your Lordships seemed to be inconsistent with himself and somewhat harsh towards my right hon. Friend the Secretary of
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  State for War. My noble and gallant Friend said he would leave all these questions alone, and would not touch the question of retirement at all for three or four years to come, at all events. He complained, also, of my right hon. Friend because he said he had given a pledge which he had taken no measures to enforce. My Lords, the Government has not taken measures to maintain the standard rate of promotion because the time has not arrived to take them. Neither according to the pledge given, nor according to the views of the noble and gallant Lord himself, has the time for taking those measures arrived. The noble and gallant Lord is rather fond of speaking of the pledges which he says have been given. I am well aware of one pledge to which allusion has been made by the noble Marquess behind me (the Marquess of Lansdowne), and which has been renewed to-night on behalf of the Government—namely, that, when the time comes, it would, in the opinion of the Government, be right to take measures for maintaining the standard of promotion. My noble and gallant Friend also alluded vaguely to another pledge given by Mr. Cardwell as to officers in the late Purchase Corps retaining their relative positions in the Army;—now it would have been well if my noble and gallant Friend had given us a quotation from a speech in which such a pledge was embodied—that would only have been right and fair when he charged Mr. Cardwell with having given a pledge which he had not kept. I am a little inclined to think that the noble and gallant Lord has unintentionally confused the supposed pledge to which he has now alluded with that renewed by the Under Secretary to-night—namely, that when it is necessary measures shall be taken to maintain the standard rate of promotion. I do not propose to go into the question raised as to the comparative importance of the position of a captain in the Artillery and one in the Line. It is very undesirable that comparisons of that description, which must necessarily be in their nature somewhat invidious, should be made in this House. I am bound to say I failed to catch the bearing of the main argument by which the noble and gallant Lord (Lord Sandhurst) endeavoured to prove the greater importance, as he appeared to think it, of the position

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  of a captain in the Infantry or Cavalry over that of a captain in the Artillery or Engineers. Doubtless it is true a man may go into action a captain and come out in command of a battalion; it is possible he may be a lieutenant-colonel when he comes out, or entitled to be promoted to that rank—and so may a captain of Artillery. The noble and gallant Lord said that a captain of Infantry in face of the enemy was in a position of greater importance than a captain of Artillery 1,200 miles in the rear—of course the noble and gallant Lord did not mean that distance, but he said it. I admit that a captain of Infantry before the enemy is in a position of much greater importance and responsibility than a captain of Artillery in the rear; and it may be as truly said that a captain in face of the enemy is in a position of much greater importance and responsibility than a general officer commanding troops at home. There is one thing to be borne in mind, about which there will be no contest whatever, and it is that the present position of the Ordnance Corps in regard to promotion is admitted on all hands to be an unsatisfactory position, and one which ought not to be continued. But this is not a new question. The acknowledged existence of the evil led to the appointment of a Committee in 1867, and its Report was considered by two successive Governments, each of whom, notwithstanding the authority of the Committee, said it was impossible for any Government to adopt the plan it proposed. It was therefore laid aside, and the Government had to consider how they could otherwise provide for promotion in the Ordnance Corps. Whether it is done by the method proposed now by the Secretary of State, or by a measure expediting retirement in the higher ranks, in either case, there must inevitably be a certain amount of supersession. The proposal to stimulate retirement in the lower ranks has been completely disposed of by the noble Lord, who has shown the mischief it would produce to the best interests of the service. The illustrious Duke touched the main point in the question when he told us there was no question upon which officers in the Army were so susceptible as the question of supersession; and, although he said most truly that civilians could not fully appreciate their feelings, I can do so to
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  some extent, from the connection I have had with the War Office and with the India Office; and I desire to speak of that susceptibility with every consideration and respect. As the illustrious Duke told us, the supersession now complained of results from the new arrangements for the Artillery and the Engineers. The jump from captain to lieutenant-colonel must produce supersession not only of the senior captains of the Line, but also of the majors; and you cannot expedite promotion by retirement without encountering a supersession of that kind. That being so, it is for your Lordships seriously to consider whether you think it desirable to prescribe a mode in which arrangements of this description shall be carried out. That is the practical effect of the vote which your Lordships are about to give on a Motion which distinctly aims at condemning the conclusion at which military authorities have arrived after the fullest consideration. The pledge of the Government is to maintain the standard of promotion laid down by Sir John Pakington; and I cannot admit that in matters of this kind you are to look to individual cases and not to general averages—for such a principle, carried out to any extent, would prevent your making any change whatever in your Army, however much it might be required. This is a question which must be settled one way or another, and I contend that it cannot be settled without some supersession. I cannot conclude these remarks without congratulating the noble and gallant Lord opposite (Lord Abinger) upon the fair manner in which he brought this question forward, and the able and temperate manner in which he discussed it.
  EARL DE LA WARRsaid, that in the correct estimate which had been formed of the amount of direct and immediate supersession which would result from the contemplated measure of the Government, in reference to promotion in the Artillery and Engineers, it had been forgotten that purchase officers—colonels, lieutenant-colonels, and majors—were retiring from the Army at the rate of 64 a-month, that this occasioned a flow of promotion which would last for many years, and that there was no such outlet for promotion in the case of the Artillery and Engineers. There was no occasion to rely on rough conjectural calculations, because quotations had been made that

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  night from unimpeachable actuarial tables, and these showed that supersessions could endure only for a short time. If those superseded officers were dissatisfied with their lot, let them come to the Purchase Commission Office and they would get their money in a very few days. It was because he believed no injustice would be done that he should support Her Majesty's Government in resisting this Motion; because he saw in their scheme an earnest, for the future, of a just consideration for the privileges, professional interests, and position of the scientific branches of the Army. He hoped their Lordships would not agree to the Motion of the noble Lord, for it had been distinctly proved by the noble Marquess (the Marquess of Lansdowne) that there was no need for inquiry, because in future there would be no just cause of complaint.
  THE DUKE OF RICHMONDsaid, he must confess that if he had not been aware of the distinguished military position of the noble and gallant Earl who had last spoken (Earl De La Warr)—a position to which his gallantry quite entitled him—he should not have gathered that he belonged to the military profession from the speech he had just heard. The noble and gallant Earl had failed to answer a single point advanced by his noble Friend who brought forward this subject. The remarks of the noble and gallant Earl appeared to him to resolve themselves into this—these superseded officers might have injustice to complain of at present, but, inasmuch as they had a pledge from the Government, they had no right to complain, because everything would be set right in a very short time. In the very few remarks he had to make on this important subject, he should endeavour to follow the example set by the illustrious Duke, who had upon this occasion spoken in a manner so well-befitting the position he held at the head of the Army, and the line of conduct he had laid down for himself, and which he always expected the illustrious Duke would pursue. The illustrious Duke appeared carefully to avoid giving an opinion on either side of the question; he rather took on himself the office of a judge who laid before the jury both sides of the case; and if, on the one hand, he admitted that there was some force in the remarks of the noble Mar-
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  quess (the Marquess of Lansdowne), he also, he thought, admitted that there was equal force in the statement of his noble Friend (Lord Abinger) behind him. He did not think the illustrious Duke committed himself of an opinion of any sort or kind; and, considering the position the illustrious Duke occupied, he was very glad he had not pronounced an opinion on the matter. For himself, what he (the Duke of Richmond) objected to was that the plan of the Government was, according to the statement of the noble Marquess himself, neither one thing nor the other. The noble Marquess treated it as a system of retirement. If it was so, it was a sham system of retirement, because it dealt piecemeal with what ought to be dealt with as a whole. No doubt, in the Scientific Corps promotion had been slow, but the constitution of the Royal Artillery and the rest of the Army was totally different. He did not mean to draw any distinction as to their respective merits, and he was extremely sorry to think that the noble Marquess (the Marquess of Lansdowne) had given the idea of drawing invidious distinctions between the merits of the two branches of the service. In point of fact, the officers of the Army who voluntarily underwent the severe examinations for the Staff College showed that they possessed very high qualifications, while those of the Royal Artillery did not pass any examination after the first. He (the Duke of Richmond) had said that as a scheme of retirement there was nothing in the plan of the Government—and as a means of advancing promotion that was the very thing it would not do; for if the first captains in the Royal Artillery were made majors, the promotion in the junior ranks would not be so rapid. Within six months of the revolution which had occurred in the Army they were beginning at the wrong end—beginning with a small scheme when it ought to be a large and comprehensive one, a scheme which would cause a great deal of heart-burning and unpleasant feeling in other branches of the service; and he did not think it for the benefit of the service that such a scheme should be adopted. He thought the proposal of his noble and gallant Friend behind him (Lord Abinger) was a very fair one. He only asked for inquiry—he did not condemn the system except

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  so far as to make out a case for inquiry. He (the Duke of Richmond) thought inquiry was necessary; and it should be conducted by a Royal Commission, because the appointment of its Members would rest with the Advisers of Her Majesty, and they might then hope those appointed would come to a conclusion that would give general satisfaction.
  THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNEwished to say one word in explanation. He hoped he had said nothing that could be interpreted into an attempt to draw any such invidious distinction between the two branches of the service as had been suggested by the noble Duke who had just sat down. He had expressed no opinion with regard to the military bearings of this question As to the Staff College, officers went to that college for purposes of their own, and that had nothing to do with the question under discussion.
  On Question? Their Lordships divided: Contents, 42; Not-Contents, 39; Majority, 3.
  Motion agreed to.
  Ordered, That the said Address be presented to Her Majesty by the Lords with white staves.
  House adjourned at a quarter past Eight o'clock, to Thursday next, half past Ten o'clock.