Lords Sitting of 11 June 1872

MINUTES.
PUBLIC BILLS—First Reading—Drainage and Improvement of Lands (Ireland) Supplemental* (142).
Second Reading—Gas and Water Orders Confirmation (No. 2)* (122).
Select Committee—Report—Union of Benefices Act Amendment (No. 139.)
Committee—Report—Metropolitan Commons Supplemental* (115); Public Health (Scotland) Supplemental* (121); Cattle Disease (Ireland) Acts Amendment* (125); Charitable Loan Societies (Ireland)* (124).
Report—Union of Benefices Act Amendment* (12–140); Statute Law Revision* (107).
Third Reading—Local Government Supplemental * (103), and passed.

TREATY OF WASHINGTON.
  TRIBUNAL OF ARBITRATION (GENEVA) THE INDIRECT CLAIMS.

    THE SUPPLEMENTAL ARTICLE.
    ENLARGEMENT OF TIME. STATEMENT.
    EARL GRANVILLE: My Lords, it was at so late an hour last night and so few of your Lordships were present, that I am not sure that all your Lord

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    ships are aware that the noble Lord on the cross-benches (Lord Oranmore and Browne) put to me, after midnight, the Questions of which he had given Notice with regard to the position of the negotiations in reference to the Washington Treaty. I thought that at that hour of the night, and as so few of your Lordships were present, and as the circumstances referred to in those Questions were not quite applicable to the existing state of things, it would be more advisable for me to confine myself on that occasion to a promise of a statement this evening with reference to the position of affairs. My Lords, I have to state that on Saturday last it became perfectly clear that we must fail to ratify in time the Supplemental Article which would have the effect of cancelling the Indirect Claims, on condition of an agreement for the future as to the obligations under which both countries should be bound. It appeared that, on the one hand, the Government of the United States were of opinion that we were hypercritical as to the wording of the agreement; while, on the other hand, we were of opinion that we ought not to agree to words which would not clearly convey what the real meaning of both parties to the agreement was. That being the state of things, and finding it was no longer possible to have the Article ratified in time to send before the Arbitrators at their next meeting, we resolved—acting on a suggestion previously made by the United States—to propose an adjournment, in order to give time for the removal of the remaining difficulties between the two countries. I must now, my Lords, express my surprise and regret that the communication which I made to the American Minister should have been made public in New York almost immediately after its transmission. I spoke to General Schenck on the subject; and, in reply, General Schenck has explained to me that he could not account for the publication, as certainly the proposal had not been communicated to the public by anyone in the American Legation here. The Secretary of the Legation, however, suggested an explanation that might, perhaps, account for it—namely, that my communication had been sent to the United States not in cipher, but en clair; and that in consequence of its having been so sent, it had got into the Press from circumstances over which his Go-
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    vernment had no control. The substance of the proposal is this—that there should be an adjournment of the Arbitration for eight months, under certain reserves and certain conditions in which we should both join. Since the transmission of the proposal we have received a communication from the United States Government respecting the mode in which we proposed the adjournment should be made; and in answer to that we have made a further communication to the United States. I have only to add that to-morrow the Lord Chief Justice, as the Arbitrator for this country; Sir Roundell Palmer, our Counsel; and Lord Tenterden, our Agent, proceed to Geneva. But no inference is to be drawn from this fact:—whatever might occur, we thought it would be more dignified on our part and more courteous, not only to the American, but to the other Arbitrators, that our Counsel and Agent should appear; but they have precise instructions as to the course they are to pursue, and they have full powers for providing, on our part, that there shall be no act whatever which would be a departure from the declarations which Her Majesty's Government have made on the subject of the Indirect Claims.
    LORD CAIRNS: My Lords, your Lordships are so much accustomed in this important matter to surprises—to the expression at one time of the most sanguine hope, and at another to the confession of the most bitter disappointment on the part of Her Majesty's Government—that communications of the kind of that we have just heard have lost the claim of novelty. Before this occasion we have seen that communications which are usually regarded as most secret and sacred, have been issued to newspapers until the disclosures have ceased to surprise. I am inclined to think, however, that but for the disclosures which from time to time have been made in this way we might have been in a still worse position. They have, at all events, however they may have come out, put us in possession of facts with the knowledge of which, as they have occurred, we ought not to grumble; but, my Lords, the information of to-day certainly transcends any which has hitherto come to light during the conduct of these negotiations. It now appears from these "channels of information" that we have

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    made a proposal to adjourn the Arbitration at Geneva for eight months. My Lords, consider for a moment how far that is possible. I want to ask your Lordships, in the first place, what precise object is to be attained, what is supposed to be the utility of an adjournment of this kind? Is the object to decently put an end to that part of the Convention which relates to an Arbitration at Geneva? If so, would it not be better to do so openly and fairly than in this indirect and covert manner? What will be the consequence of adjournment for eight months? What will be the consequence on this side of the Atlantic? Great anxiety; great misgivings from day to day; great uneasiness in respect of the negotiations; great perplexity of telegrams and despatches, and from time to time explanations or partial explanations, such as have hitherto been made to Parliament. All this time the commerce of the country and the financial interests of the country will be disturbed and confused. Those who are most interested in the existence of friendly relations between the two nations will naturally feel anxious and perplexed throughout the whole of this period of adjournment. That will be the result on this side of the Atlantic. And if that will be the consequence in this country, what will be the state of things on the other side of the Atlantic? What the adjournment means is that a "platform" on one side and on the other will be made during the Presidential election of the relations between this country and the United States. Is not that the inevitable consequence? Your Lordships will have observed the tone and temper in which these negotiations have been commented on in the United States. Do not you think that as the Presidential election comes on, it will be the object on one side or on the other to depreciate the policy of the Cabinet of Washington, and that during the election the negotiations will be represented in the various lights in which the contending parties may feel it their interest to place them? Is that a state of things which can be regarded as beneficial to the interests of this country or to our relations with the United States? Is it desirable that relations which ought to be most friendly and intimate should be made a bone of contention during the election of President? and what is the prospect of the result of this
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    proposal? The noble Earl the Foreign Secretary has referred to a communication which appeared this morning, and which, we are told, has not been impeached by the Prime Minister in the other House of Parliament. That communication is prefaced with the statement that Mr. Fish has declared it is useless to discuss Amendments—that the Government of the United States has no suggestions to offer or entertain. Is that a prospect which ought to induce us to adjourn the Arbitration? It may be the case, as has been stated "elsewhere," that nothing but the want of a little good sense can prevent an agreement being arrived at on the points now in dispute. But, if so, I want to know whether a period of eight months is necessary for the development of a little good sense? I want to know whether a space of eight weeks is not sufficient, if an agreement can really be come to at all? Let me ask you now as to the possibility of an adjournment. We are informed that in answer to the noble Earl, Mr. Fish replied that the time for the Arbitration could be extended only by a new Treaty; but if the Arbitrators themselves wish to adjourn, the United States will not object. Let me remind your Lordships of the dates. The Counter Case was delivered on the 15th of April. Now, according to the terms of the Treaty, within two months from the delivery of the Counter Case the Arbitrators are to meet to receive the written or printed arguments on the points to be insisted upon by each side respectively. Having been so possessed of those points, the final Case on both sides, the Arbitrators are to be proceed with the reference and the decision of the Tribunal is, if possible, to be made within three months after the close of the arguments on both sides. Now, I am far from suggesting a doubt bat if the two Governments had agreed upon it, there might not be an adjournment of the Arbitration, even beyond bat time and for any period that might be required for the mere purpose of arguing the points of the case. But we have before us the views of Mr. Fish, who says the adjournment cannot be made except through the medium of a new Treaty. Whether these are correct or not, they are, at all events, the views of the United States Government—an adjournment can only take place with the concurrence of Mr. Fish. Her Ma-

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    jesty's Government are not at liberty to arrange beforehand that there shall be an adjournment of the Arbitration. But this statement goes on to say that if the British Government proposes an adjournment, and if the Arbitrators consent to it—if the British Government and Arbitrators are for an adjournment—the American Government will not oppose it. But that is not an agreement that the American Government will approve it. What it amounts to is throwing the responsibility on the British Government and Arbitrators, and taking the proceeding out of the ambit of an agreement between the parties. I say, my Lords, it is very much more than doubtful whether the Arbitrators have the power to go outside what is necessary for the purpose of convenience in respect of the carrying out of the reference, and of adjourning the Arbitration in this manner for a period of eight months. The words in the Treaty give a power to the Arbitrators in respect of what is to be done in the case of the death or the absence of any one of the Arbitrators appointed to hear the reference; but I hold that under the reference to Arbitration, it is the duty of the referees to go on with the Arbitration in the regular course at the time appointed. Of course, if both sides agree, the Arbitration may, for convenience sake, proceed notwithstanding such an event; but it is more than doubtful whether, without an agreement between the parties, the Arbitrators have the power to adjourn for eight months for a purpose that is merely collateral to the object of the reference. If they have the power under such circumstances to adjourn for eight months, why not for a year or for eight years? There is no reason why their power should be limited as to time. But we have it stated that the American Government will not enter into an agreement—that Mr. Fish is of opinion that this is not to be done by an agreement, but by a new Treaty. If, however, the Arbitrators order an adjournment, the United States Government will not object. I wish to know what is to be our position after an adjournment under such circumstances? But, my Lords, the matter does not stop there. What is the position of this country in submitting this proposition to Mr. Fish? The noble Earl who brought forward the Motion the other night (Earl Russell) stated on that occasion what is
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    quite true. He stated that in this matter we are not suppliants, going to America and putting forward claims and asking for satisfaction—we are a people against whom America is making certain demands, which under certain conditions we are willing to submit to a proper tribunal. Is it, then, consistent with the dignity of the Sovereign, or with the high position this country should assume, that we should go to America in the form of suppliants—we who want nothing, and have nothing to ask for? I say, then, that we should be degraded if we went to the American Government and asked them for an adjournment of the Arbitration for eight months. And for what reason? For any definite reason? No. For the chance of something turning up. At the end of five months the Government have failed; and what you have failed in accomplishing in that time you think you may accomplish in eight additional months. Now, with reference to this despatch, I wish further to ask the noble Earl what it is he proposes? According to the published despatch, this proposal has been made by the noble Earl—
    "With this view I have the honour to propose that, on the meeting of the Geneva Arbitrators on that day, joint application shall be made for an adjournment for eight months. If the Government of the United States concur in making an application for adjournment, it is the intention of Her Majesty's Government to deliver to the Arbitrators on the 15th inst. the summary of the argument under the 5th Article of the Treaty, accompanied by a Declaration, of which I have the honour to enclose you a copy for the information of your Government.—[No. ix, 64.]
    Well, my Lords, I will observe that the first step that is to be taken before the Arbitrators is to lodge the printed statements on both sides, with the points relied upon. Therefore the first step must have been taken before you can approach the Arbitrators to make your application to them. But the noble Earl says—"If you concur in applying for an adjournment, we will lodge our Case, with this condition that there is an assumption that the adjournment will take place." But the United States say—"We will not agree; it must not be a matter of agreement, because we will not concur." Now, I want to know whether in that case Her Majesty's Government mean to arm the Arbitrators with the points and with the arguments which are your last pleadings? When

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    you hand in those points the whole process is complete:—and then what position are you in? Even if Her Majesty's Government in the form of suppliants ask the Arbitrators to direct an adjournment for eight months, how do you know they will agree to that? Suppose they said—"We will not accede; our duty is to hear the case as soon as the pleadings are complete. We have no right on the application of either side to adjourn the Arbitration. We have no authority to do so, and therefore must decline, without the consent of both sides, to order an adjournment." Where are you if the Arbitrators should arrive at that decision? If they go on, how are you to stop them? Your pleadings having been completed, and the Arbitrators being armed with them, where is your power to arrest the progress of the Arbitration? I have only one other statement to comment upon. In the published account of the Declaration there is this statement—
    "The Undersigned is instructed by the Government which he represents to state that this printed Argument is only delivered to the Tribunal conditionally on the adjournment requested in the Note which he had the honour to address to the Tribunal this day, jointly with the Agent of the United States, being carried into effect, and subject to the notice which the Undersigned has the honour herewith to give that it is the intention of Her Majesty's Government to cancel the appointment of the British Arbitrator and to withdraw from the Arbitration at the close of the term fixed for the adjournment, unless the difference which has arisen between the two Governments as to the claims for indirect losses referred to in the Note which the Undersigned had the honour to address to Count Schlopis on the 15th of April, shall have been removed."
    Perhaps it may be said that it is the intention of the Government to cancel the appointment of the British Arbitrator. But, my Lords, that term "cancel" in this case is quite new to me. I want to know by what authority the Government will "cancel" the appointment of their Arbitrator. I do not see any such authority in the Treaty. If an Arbitrator dies or is incapable of acting, that is a case provided for by the Treaty; but I cannot find any words in the Treaty giving power to cancel the appointment of the Arbitrator; and I think that the power to do so is, to say the least, doubtful. My Lords, in a case so novel, so unusual, and so unprecedented, I hope—to repeat the phrase made use of by a noble Lord on a former occasion—the Government will not, in their endeavours
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    to escape from a bog, end by only getting deeper into it. I hope they will give your Lordships some assurance that, without any prospect of light or explanation, we are not to be drawn into eight more months of fruitless negotiation and bitter disappointment.
    THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, my noble and learned Friend commenced his observations upon the statement which has just been made by my noble Friend the Secretary for Foreign Affairs saying that the Government were again placed in a position in which, according to him, we have been so often placed—that position being that at one time the most sanguine hopes are expressed, and at another the most bitter disappointments are confessed by Her Majesty's Government. Now, sitting here as I do every night during the whole of the discussions in your Lordships' House, I take upon myself to say that—my own recollection fortified by that of my noble Friend—I can assert that the noble Earl never on any occasion expressed the most sanguine hopes, and never on any occasion confessed the most bitter disappointment, with reference to these negotiations. So much as to the accuracy of the noble and learned Lord's recollection. He then proceeded to comment on the statement that appeared in a morning paper—which, he says, is not controverted in any way in "another place," though brought under the attention of my right hon. Friend at the head of the Government—in which the United States Government is represented as saying, through Mr. Fish, there can be no agreement for an adjournment, except through the medium of a new Treaty. Now, I do not blame my noble and learned Friend for quoting that statement, because it appears in the published statement; but I am glad to be able to say that it is wholly inaccurate. Mr. Fish never said that an agreement for an adjournment could no the effected except through a new Treaty, and I should have been very much surprised if he had. I do not mean to follow my noble and learned Friend through his comments on Treaties. I believe his comments on the Treaty of Washington, which have excited so much painful attention for a long time, were not very accurate, and that their inaccuracy has been productive of much evil. It is very singular that my noble

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    and learned Friend should be the person who raised the first doubt I ever heard of being expressed either in this or any other country as to whether the Treaty of Washington excluded the Indirect Claims. I have been searching ever since he gave expression to that doubt to find who were those who supported him in that doubt, and, as far as I can discover, no one supported him in it. My noble and learned Friend (Lord Westbury) said the other night he had no doubt the construction of that Treaty did exclude the Indirect Claims. The noble Earl who proposed the Resolution for an Address to the Crown (Earl Russell) said the same thing; the noble Earl who followed him (Earl Granville) concurred in that opinion; and the noble Earl the late Secretary for Foreign Affairs (the Earl of Derby) said that though the language of the Treaty might be ambiguous, he thought that it excluded those Claims. For my own opinion I shall not say much; but it is the same as that held by the Attorney General and the Solicitor General; and the American jurists have said they have no doubt on the matter, because they cannot find in the Treaty language which would give such a construction to it as would include the Indirect Claims. My Lords, that being so—being unable to discover anybody who gives his sanction distinctly to the doubt entertained by my noble and learned Friend—I hesitate to accept the construction which he has put on the Treaty. It is doubtless much to be regretted that in the earlier stages of debate—after my noble Friend the Foreign Secretary stated the terms of the Treaty, and that by them the Indirect Claims were excluded—this statement should have been allowed to go without contradiction from July to December, and that then the statement of my noble and learned Friend (Lord Cairns) should have been fastened on and introduced into the American Case as one bearing the authority which justly attaches to any opinion expressed by him; but I repeat, my Lords, that when I find that, besides such legal authorities as we have in this country, the American jurists are against the view taken by my noble and learned Friend, I must arrive at the conclusion that he is not a very safe expounder of Treaties. My noble and learned Friend on the present occasion undertakes to expound
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    the sense of the Treaty with reference to adjournments of the Arbitration; and, further, with regard to expressions he finds communicated through the channels we have heard of, and reflected back to us from America in the singular manner in which intelligence is now reflected back from that country, he says that he finds no words in the Treaty authorizing the Government to cancel the appointment of the British Arbitrator. Nobody supposed there was—it was never assumed that the question of cancelling the Treaty would ever arise. But surely the appointment of the Arbitrator could be cancelled if the case arose which I hope never will arise—namely, that through the two parties to the Treaty being unable to come to an agreement as to the intention of the Treaty it never became full and complete, because it was not taken in the same sense by the two parties. I hope that that will never arise; and why? Because an Article has been proposed by which the Indirect Claims, whether set up or not, will be put aside by an agreement which, I believe, will be a good one if it can be effected, and which will operate, by reason of a consideration on both sides, to hinder the bringing forward of the question whether the Indirect Claims are to be admitted. If that be so, is there not good reason for asking for an adjournment when the question at issue is so near an arrangement? Our hope of bringing the settlement of that Article to a conclusion was frustrated by The accidental circumstance of the Senate of the United States being in that position that its adjournment was fixed to take place within a period which expired yesterday. But my noble and learned Friend says, why should we apply for an adjournment at all? He says we have nothing to ask for—nothing to gain. I am proud to say we have nothing to gain; but we have a great deal to ask for, and so has the United States. Each nation has to ask the other to join in an act which will cement their friendship, put an end to their temporary heartburnings and disquietudes, and prevent any arising in the future. Each has to ask that the other should join her in uniting in bonds of brotherhood the English race throughout the world. I ask, is not this sufficient to negotiate for—is it not sufficient to induce us to prolong the negotiations as

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    long as there is any hope of their being brought to a successful issue? And, finally, I say my noble and learned Friend must not assume because he reads published a correspondence which was never intended to see the light till the negotiations were finished—when, of course, it must have been produced on both sides of the water—he must not assume that the expressions in that correspondence are to be held as expressing the final determination of the negotiators. The course of these discussions has, undoubtedly, been greatly favoured by the forbearance of your Lordships' House, and at this moment it is so by the forbearance of the House of Commons. Your Lordships thought fit to break through that reserve—through that reticence—which is usually observed by the Legislature during the course of negotiations until a Treaty has been concluded; but, notwithstanding that somewhat untoward intervention, while I will not express a sanguine hope—because my noble and learned Friend trembles at the very idea—this I must say, that the Government at least hope that the object they have in view of bringing these negotiations to a satisfactory conclusion will yet be realized with the approval of the Parliament and the people of this country.
    THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, I think your Lordships will be inclined to agree with me that a more grave position for the country and a more difficult position for the action of this House could scarcely be conceived. Consider what is your position. My Lords, six months have been spent in negotiations, and how far these negotiations are likely to tend to cement that brotherhood of which the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack has spoken in such enthusiastic terms, you can easily judge by a perusal of the American newspapers. But those six months have passed away, and have practically and precisely left us in the same position as when the American Case first met the eyes of the noble Earl opposite—when the Indirect Claims were put forward, and when he said the Government would insist on a withdrawal of these Claims. But they are not withdrawn. The Americans are now asserting them as strongly and as determinedly as ever they did before. The only difference is that whereas there were then six months before the Arbi-
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    tration, the Arbitration is now at our door. The Indirect Claims are put forward as strongly as ever, and no advance seems to have been made by Her Majesty's Government in making good their declaration that they would never suffer those Claims to be gone into before the Arbitrators. We have some ground of complaint in this. It is not a case of embarrassment come on the noble Earl for want of warning. Over and over again he was warned by my noble Friends of the fatal approach of dates—of the fatal approach of the time when some definite course must be taken; but no action has been taken, and here we are within three days of the Arbitration and the Indirect Claims are still upon the Table. The noble Earl told us that in all questions relating to the Indirect Claims and to the time appointed for the meeting of the Arbitrators full care would be taken; but we find now that the English Arbitrator is going to Geneva and that the English Counsel is going over to conduct our case with a protest which will make the proceedings to be gone through at Geneva valueless. I should like to know what Sir Roundell Palmer is going to do, and what the English Arbitrator is to be sent out for? If the United States agree that the Arbitration should be adjourned for eight months, Sir Roundell Palmer will have his journey to Geneva for nothing. If the United States do not agree to the adjournment which Her Majesty's Government are asking from them, are we to understand that Sir Roundell Palmer is going to conclude our Case—to deliver that Case out of the hands of England—so that there will be nothing to stand between us and the arbitrament of the Indirect Claims? We ought to have clearer accounts of these negotiations than we get through scraps of information derived through the corrupt indiscretion of American officials? The noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack spoke of the great forbearance of Parliament during those negotiations—certainly it has been carried further than it was ever before carried during negotiations as important as these—but we are entitled to ask Her Majesty's Government whether it is intended for the next eight months to leave us to subsist on the indiscretion of American officials; or does the noble Earl intend now to lay the Papers on the Table? Does he in-

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    tend to give us any further information, or to leave us to chance for the next eight months? My Lords, obviously there is in the Cabinet some influence which counteracts the strong and generally expressed feelings of the people of England that those Indirect Claims should be at once put an end to; and we are justified in feeling apprehension. I hope the House will urge on the Government to give us clear information; but if the Government still refuse—still shelter themselves behind official privilege, I hope your Lordships will again step forward and say on what terms—and what terms alone—Great Britain would consent to proceed with the Arbitration.
    THE EARL OF KIMBERLEY: My Lords, I am not surprised at the manner in which the noble Marquess treats this question. He feels complete distrust of Her Majesty's Government, and is justified in expressing it. But what I wish to put to your Lordships is this—that when a Ministry is charged with the government of this country they cannot discharge that duty under the principle of distrust. If we, who are Ministers of the Crown, are as such intrusted with these negotiations, and Parliament does not take any means to displace us, it is our bounden and absolute duty to the country and to Parliament not to be driven by any taunts or attacks or mistrust to depart from the system we think necessary to conduct these negotiations to a prosperous issue. My Lords, I must express my opinion—speaking in reference not only to the present, but to all other diplomatic negotiations—that no negotiation can be brought to a successful result if it is to be conducted in the face of day, and information is to be given to Parliament day by day, and, as noble Lords opposite have wished, almost hour by hour, of every step which is taken. For my own part, I should infinitely prefer to cease to be one of the responsible Advisers of Her Majesty, and would never desire to be in such a position again, if we are to be made responsible for negotiations carried on under such circumstances. The noble Marquess asks if it is our intention to keep Parliament for eight months without information. If it were so we should, indeed, be carrying reticence to a point where there would be no excuse for it. But so far from that being the case, it
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    is the intention of my noble Friend, before the close of this week, to lay before Parliament the whole of the Papers connected with these negotiations. From them it will be seen precisely what has and what has not been done, and Parliament will be able to judge whether the negotiations have been conducted in a manner consistent with the declarations we have given and with the honour of the country. As to the observations of the noble and learned Lord opposite (Lord Cairns), there was one point to which my noble and learned Friend on the Woolsack did not advert. It was the extraordinary argument that supposing the adjournment were to be consented to it would cause angry discussions in the United States. But can anyone conceive anything more likely to cause anger than the failure of the Treaty? If anybody tells me that the adjournment of this Arbitration—which can obviously only be agreed to because the two countries conceive there is, at all events, the possibility of coming to an agreement—is more likely to bring about dissension between the two countries than if the Treaty were entirely broken because of complete disagreement between the two Governments—I say deliberately that such language can only proceed from a person who, from the first, has been determined, whatever might be the consequences to the interest of his own country, to destroy this Treaty. The person who takes that view is the noble and learned Lord opposite, who has been a consistent advocate of the United States Government from the first. Therefore, I do not propose to tell the noble and learned Lord what instructions will be given to our Agent upon the occasion of the meeting at Geneva. If I did so I know that the noble and learned Lord would rise in his place, and with that power of ingenuity which I always admire would at once demonstrate that it was the one thing which was necessary to prove that the United States Government had been entirely in the right, and that this country had been entirely in the wrong. My Lords, I decline to give any such information; but while I do so I do not intend anything I have said to bear a personal character as regards the noble and learned Lord. The character of the noble and learned Lord stands far above any attack, and I do not propose to make one. But I

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    have made these remarks, because words spoken by a noble Lord of such high character have an effect upon the interests of the country which we must all deprecate. It is for these reasons that I think the Government right in refusing to give the noble and learned Lord the information for which he has asked.
    THE EARL OF DERBY: My Lords, I have no intention of carrying further the rather personal discussion initiated by the noble Earl who has just sat down. I am not, however, surprised that the noble Earl should have preferred to look at the matter from that point of view, because I can easily understand that to the noble Earl and his Colleagues the discussion of any topic would be more agreeable than that of the facts now under our consideration. Nor do I feel it necessary to vindicate the character of my noble and learned Friend, who is charged by the noble Earl with having done all in his power to destroy the Treaty. My Lords, nothing has been said or done by my noble and learned Friend in the course of these discussions for which we who sit near him do not take an equal responsibility. And when he is charged with having given his support to the American Case, I must say that he simply pointed out what appeared to him to be weak points in the Treaty so far as regarded the interests of this country—objections which afterwards proved to be well founded:—but when he did so the Government had still an opportunity to prevent the Treaty from being ratified before those doubts he had suggested were fully cleared up. I do not want to go further into that. For my own part, I do not wish to indulge in any of those taunts or sarcasms which the noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Kimberley) deprecates. I think such a course would be particularly inadvisable, when all the facts of these negotiations are so imperfectly known, and when circumstances are so critical:—but I must say that notwithstanding the speech of the noble Earl the Secretary for Foreign Affairs—who, I have no doubt, has laid before us all that he thinks it consistent with his duty to make known—notwithstanding that the unexpected disclosures from the other side of the water have thrown some light on the matter—the position in which the matter stands is by no means satisfactory. It is quite clear that the Arbi-
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    tration could not go on at the time originally appointed—that is admitted on all hands; but there are two points on which we have heard no explanation. First, why this delay specially asked for is applied for by us? and, secondly, why the delay asked is for the particular period of eight months? Unquestionably, any delay that may arise must be for reasons of mutual convenience. The American Government have quite as much to lose as we have—I will not say they have more, but certainly they have quite as much to lose as we have—by the breaking off of the Treaty, if that unfortunately happens. Then, why is so long a term as eight months asked for? If no difference has arisen except one as to the conditions of Arbitration, the question might be settled in a very much shorter time than eight months—if, indeed, it admits of being settled by negotiation. I do not say that we may not be able to get over the difficulty—I hope we may—but it is clear that by an adjournment for a few weeks, or a few days, you would be quite as likely to get over it as you would by an adjournment for a longer period. I do not suppose the date of adjournment is fixed with reference to the Presidential election in the United States; but, of course, that is an idea which occurs to every one's mind. I, however, reject that, because to suppose it would be to suppose this country placed in a position which it is not too much to say would be ridiculous, and even degrading. You must, however, consider the risk to which you expose the pending negotiations in hanging them up in a way that they shall be made use of by two political parties in fighting out their battles. At the same time, I admit the difficulty of the situation, and I am very reluctant to press for information which may be withheld for public reasons; but I cannot think there would be any breach of diplomatic reticence on the part of the noble Earl in his telling us why a delay for such a period is necessary; why the delay is to be so protracted as would amount to almost an indefinite postponement? I need not point out the evils that will result from the injury which it will occasion to commerce and the anxiety to which it will give rise. These must occur to the minds of the Government. What I now want to know is what is the reason which induced them to take

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    a course so singular and so unexpected, and which the country will hear of with so much surprise and regret.
    EARL GRANVILLE: Before I answer the questions the noble Earl (the Earl of Derby) has put to me, I must say a single word as to the arguments of the noble Marquess (the Marquess of Salisbury)—who is so singularly qualified to speak of the best means of promoting conciliation and avoiding irritation either between two individuals or two countries—that I do not believe the language he has used to-night is calculated to produce that soothing effect upon the United States which he is so alarmed lest the action of Her Majesty's Government should disturb. I deny that at this moment there is the greatest irritation between the two countries, and that a really unfriendly feeling has been shown in the United States towards this country. I think the very reverse is the case. Even as regards the Press of the United States—which is of course carried away by party politics, and very likely takes the same course as regards the Government of that country that some noble Lords do in respect of the Government of this country—shows a better feeling than it formerly displayed in reference to these negotiations. I may observe that not only in newspaper articles, but in speeches of Senators the Government of the United States are charged with having allowed themselves to be out-generalled and humiliated by this country. I saw the other day that General Butler denounced General Schenck for dancing attendance in my antechamber, and writing by dictation from me. The Governments on each side of the Atlantic must put up with such things; but I believe that in the result any Government that seeks honestly to discharge its duty in endeavouring to keep good feeling and peace between the two countries will reap its just reward. With regard to the question put to me by the noble Earl (the Earl of Derby), I have to say that we proposed the period of eight months as that of the adjournment because we thought it combined these two advantages—the meetings of the Congress are fixed by the Constitution for certain dates—the next meeting will be on the 1st of December. On the other hand, Parliament generally meets in the beginning of February, and our arrangements would not be concluded
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    till Parliament met next year. It is quite true that the President, if he bikes to exercise his privilege, can call the Senate together in extraordinary Session; but I believe—though I am not authorized to say the fact is so—that there are objections to that course, and these objections would probably be increased at the time of the excitement consequent on the Presidential election, which event happens every four years. There is a minority of the Senate bitterly opposed to the re-election of President Grant. We have some knowledge of what minorities can do in this country; but I believe that in the United States speeches are not made as here by hours, but by consecutive days. Here it is only necessary for us to have a mere majority; but there a majority of two-thirds is necessary. I believe that to press the American Government to call an extraordinary Session of the Senate would not be a wise proceeding under existing circumstances; and therefore we believe that the objects we have in view will be best promoted by an adjournment of the Arbitration to the time we have proposed to the American Government.
    EARL GREY: My Lords, I have heard with alarm and regret the statement of my noble Friend the Foreign Secretary. I think that this Arbitration should not be allowed to go on in any manner without a clear and distinct understanding that those Indirect Claims are not to be pressed before the Arbitrators. We have now had the question before us for five or six months—noble Lords on the Opposition benches have pressed again and again for the assurance that the Indirect Claims shall not be admitted—I have very humbly joined in the same request; but we see step after step some concession made, and now we hear that Sir Roundell Palmer goes to Geneva to-morrow with instructions of which we do not know the purport, but which I fear can only have the effect of prejudicing this country. I have to remind your Lordships that when the letter of General Schenck was read the other night it was believed that if the Arbitration went on, with the Supplemental Article and that Letter before the Arbitrators, no doubt could exist that the Indirect Claims had disappeared. I ask your Lordships whether anyone in this House acquiesced in the proposal to refrain from expressing any opinion

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    upon the subject, except upon the understanding and in the belief that if the Supplemental Treaty should fall to the ground, then, without any new regotiations or any new scheme for patching up the failure, we were at once to withdraw from the Arbitration. I am convinced of nothing more clearly than that this was the understanding my noble Friend (Earl Russell) came to, and that it was on that understanding only he asked the House to refrain from addressing Her Majesty on the subject. On any other supposition it would have been very wrong for us to have taken that course. We all understood that if the Supplemental Treaty failed then we were to withdraw from the Arbitration at once, without any further attempt at negotiations, when so many had been made and had failed. We now find ourselves placed in the most embarrassing position, and I hardly know what duty requires of us. Can we, after what we have lately done, allow these proceedings to go on without taking some steps to obtain from the Government an assurance that nothing shall be done inconsistent with the honour of this country? The circumstances almost warrant our adopting the unusual course of sitting on Wednesday, and reviewing to-morrow the proposals of the Government. I make no proposal of that kind; but I must repeat that we are placed in a most embarrassing position by the disclosures of to-day, after having assented to the withdrawal of the Motion made last week.
    THE DUKE OF MARLBOROUGH: My Lords, I do not wish to prolong the discussion upon this subject, but to advert to a statement made by the noble Earl the Colonial Secretary, to the effect that the noble Earl the Foreign Secretary would lay on the Table the Correspondence on the subject of this new Convention before the close of the present week. What I wish to ask is, whether that Correspondence which the noble Earl proposes to lay on the Table will embrace the alterations which have been made, or are supposed to have been made, in the Supplemental Treaty by the Senate of the United States—so that the House may have an opportunity of knowing what those alterations are, and what view the Government has taken of those alterations?
    EARL GRANVILLE: It is not usual previous to the presentation of Papers to describe their contents; but, at the same time, I have no objection to state, in reply to the noble Duke's Question, that the information he desires will be contained in the Papers I shall lay on the Table. In reply to the noble Earl on the cross-benches (Earl Grey), I would say that Her Majesty's Government have taken all the measures they thought necessary in order to carry out all the assurances they have made to the House.
    LORD ORANMORE AND BROWNEsaid, he had merely placed the Notice which appeared in his name on the Paper to allow any noble Lord who might wish to raise the question to do so consistently with the Orders of the House.

  TREATY OF WASHINGTON—COMMUNICATIONS OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONERS—PROFESSOR BERNARD'S LECTURE.—QUESTION.
  LORD BUCKHURSTrose to ask the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Whether there was any objection to laying on the Table of the House a copy of the Correspondence between Her Majesty's Government and the British High Commissioners during the negotiation on the Alabama Claims and since the presentation of the American Case referred to in Earl Granville's letter to Sir Edward Thornton, dated the 13th of May, 1872? The noble Lord said, he introduced the subject in the form of a Question in consequence of a letter from the noble Earl to Sir Edward Thornton, recently laid on the table, in which the noble Earl said the British Commissioners, in the information they had furnished during the negotiations and since the presentation of the American Case, had uniformly maintained that the claims for Indirect Losses were not included, nor intended by them to be included, in the terms of the Case to be submitted to Arbitration. And in the course of the recent debate the noble Earl had stated that on a particular day a statement was received by the Government from the British Commissioners to the effect that the Indirect Claims had been waived by the American Government. The document containing this statement should be on the Table of the House. That a

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  Correspondence such as he referred to did exist was clearly proved by the speech of Sir Stafford Northcote at Exeter, and the lecture delivered by Mr. Bernard at Oxford. In the latter, Mr. Bernard stated that throughout the whole of the proceedings the British Commissioners were constantly in communication with their Government. He would ask, therefore, whether it was consistent with the dignity of their Lordships' House that information of such importance as that which the speeches of these gentlemen contained should first he communicated in the forms of lectures and speeches. Again, in a letter to Sir Edward Thornton, the noble Earl opposite said that the nature of the claims made by America was closely defined and limited. He should be glad to learn where that definition and limitation occurred—for they were not to be found in the instructions given to the Commissioners, nor, as far as he could see, either in the Treaty or the Protocol. They must, therefore, occur in the correspondence for which he was now asking. He would at the same time ask the noble Earl the second Question of which he had given Notice—whether the sum—namely, £5,000,000 or £6,000,000 sterling—claimed by the American Government, as stated by Mr. Bernard, in his lecture at Oxford, is the total amount of the "Direct Claims" now presented to the Arbitrators at Geneva.
  EARL GRANVILLEsaid, he must decline to enter into any statements made by Mr. Bernard, and would further beg to point out that the noble Lord would, find the amount of the American claims by consulting the proper records. As to the Correspondence between Her Majesty's Government and the British High Commissioners, there had been no correspondence between them since the presentation of the American Case. With regard to the clear definition of the Claims referred to arbitration, that clear definition would be found in the Treaty itself. All the Correspondence, except that which was confidential, had been laid upon the Table; and as to the confidential portion of it, he saw no advantage in presenting it to the House.

  TREATY OF WASHINGTON—TRIBUNAL OF ARBITRATION (GENEVA).

    MOTION FOR AN ADDRESS.
    LORD ORANMORE AND BROWNE, believing it to be desirable that such a Resolution should be placed upon the records of the House, said he would now move the Address of which he had given Notice.
    Moved that an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, praying that Her Majesty will be graciously pleased to give instructions that all proceedings on behalf of Her Majesty before the arbitrators appointed to meet at Geneva pursuant to the Treaty of Washington be suspended until an agreement in writing be come to between Her Majesty's Government and the Government of the United States, and such agreement be laid before the arbitrators at Geneva by the joint action of these two Governments, removing and putting an end to all demands on the part of the Government of the United States with regard to the claims included in the case submitted on behalf of the United States and understood on the part of Her Majesty not to be within the province of the arbitrators.—(The Lord Oranmore and Browne.)
    Resolved in the Negative.
    House adjourned at a quarter before Seven o'clock, to Thursday next, half-past Ten o'clock.